SALIENT FEATURES
OF
ŚANKARA’S VEDANTA

BY
SWAMI SATCHIDANANANDENDRA SARASWATI

INTRODUCTION BY
PROF. S.K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

ADHYATMA PRAKASHA KARYALAYA
THYAGARAJANAGAR, BANGALORE 560 028
"SALIENT FEATURES OF ŚAṆKARA'S VEDĀNTA"
by Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati
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This is a free rendering of Sri Swamiji’s ‘Śaṅkara Vedānta Prakriye’ (Kannada) which was first written during his Cāturmāsya Samkalpa at Davangere in the year Manmatha. The Second Edition was published by us in 1959. It has been translated into Telugu and Tamil since, but English-knowing readers who could not understand any of the three Dravidian Languages have continued to press for an English rendering of this popular book. His Holiness has himself undertaken the task at our request.

We hope that the valuable contents of this production will now appeal to a wider circle of readers.

Holenarasipur
22-1-1967

Y. Narasappa
Chairman of the Executive Committee
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PREFACE

First Edition

There have been a number of books on Śaṅkara Vedanta produced and published in this country and elsewhere. While they are very popular probably because their authorship has been ascribed to the great Śaṅkara, they contain tenets in conflict with one another. Relying upon these as well as the systems contained in the subcommentaries on Śaṅkara’s classical works, even learned men professing to follow Śaṅkara have been broadcasting ideas opposed to one another in the name of that great thinker. And adverse critics belonging to other schools of Vedanta have been mis-representing Śaṅkara’s system are greatly puzzled and perplexed as to what exactly is the matter or method adopted in the school belonging to his tradition.

It is not easy for beginners to consolidate and discriminate for themselves the various doctrines contained in the three groups of works collectively called the Prasthāna Trayī indisputably ascribed to Śaṅkara. I have therefore tried to do this to the best of my ability.

Two Appendices—one containing the cardinal Tenets of Śaṅkara’s Vedanta, and the second a list of the Sanskrit quotations adduced in the body of the work—have been given at the end of the work. The first is a free rendering and adaptation of an article by my student, Pandit H.S. Lakshminarasimha Murthy. I hope that these will be helpful to beginners to remember the principal points of the system. I have every hope that one who has mastered the leading ideas of Śaṅkara’s
Vedanta contained in this little book, may very well take to the study of more advanced books such as my 'How to Recognize the Method of Vedanta', with assurance.

I have—as usual—made over the copyright of this book to the Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya. May Bhagavan Narayana shower His blessings on their laudable enterprise.

Holenarasipur Satchidanandendra Saraswati
22-1-1967
ADHYATMA PRAKASHA KARYALAYA

(PRIVATE TRUST)

An Institution to help the interpretation of Indian Culture by stimulating the study and practice of the Adhyatma Vidya in its universal aspect.

HOLENARSIPUR – 573 211; Hassan Dist.

Date 1-7-1990

To

The Secretary
Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya
Bangalore Branch
No 68, 2nd Block
Thyagarajanagar
Bangalore - 560028

Subject : PERMISSION LETTER

Permission is hereby granted to Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Bangalore branch to reprint and publish all English and Sanskrit works of Parama Pujya Sri Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswathi Swamiji, published earlier by Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, (H. O.), Holenarsipur, unconditionally.

We pray that God bestow His choicest blessings on the branch Karyalaya and give them enough strength to print and publish all the works of Sri Sri Swamiji.

We heartily wish success in their project.

Holenarsipur
1-7-1990

H.S. Lakshminarasimha Murthy
Secretary
Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya
PUBLISHERS' NOTE
Second Edition

His Holiness Sri Sri Satchidānandendra Saraswathi Swamiji (1880–1975) has written a number of books on Vedanta in Kannada, Sanskrit and English. While the books in Sanskrit are useful primarily for pundits all over the country, the Swamiji was hopeful that books in English would prove useful to a large number of persons not only in this country but all over the world, who are interested in the study of Vedanta in general and Śaṅkara Siddhānta in particular.

Pujya Swamiji established a branch of the Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya at Bangalore mainly because, this being an international city would serve as a centre for spreading Śaṅkara Siddhānta all over the world.

As most of these books in Sanskrit and English are now out of print and the demand for such books remained unfulfilled, it was felt that a reprint of these books would fill in the breach in this respect.

Therefore a reprint project of Pujya Swamiji’s English and Sanskrit works has been launched by Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Bangalore Branch. This project is now inaugurated by the publication of this reprint of the English book — “Salient Features of Śaṅkara’s Vedanta”.

We are thankful to Smt. and Sri C.S. Seetharama Rao, Tax-consultant, Jayanagar, Bangalore, who have made it possible for us to reprint and publish this
valuable work of Parama Puja Swamiji, by their generous financial assistance. This donation has been made in the sweet memory of Late C.V. Suryanarayana Rao and Narasamma, the revered parents of Sri C. S. Seetharama Rao.

We profusely thank Prof. S.K. Ramachandra Rao who has on our request kindly written the scholarly introduction. It has enriched the value of this book. It not only throws light upon the contents of the book, but also gives an idea about Puja Swamiji’s life and mission.

We are grateful to the authorities of the Adhyatma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Holenarsipur for having permitted us to reprint and publish this book.

Our heartfelt thanks are also due to all those who have carefully read through the proofs and to many others, but for whose efforts this work could not have seen the light of day.

We are also highly thankful to Sri Nithyananda Printers, for their elegant execution of the printing and binding work.

We pray that the revered Swamiji bless us with the required strength in executing this project of reprinting all his English and Sanskrit works.

Our pranams at the holy lotus feet of Swamiji.

K.G. Subraya Sharma
Secretary
Adhyatma Prakash Karyalaya
Bangalore 560 028
**ABBREVIATIONS**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABh. SBh.</td>
<td>Adhyāsa Bhāshya of Sūtra Bhāshya</td>
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<td>Ai.</td>
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<td>Br.</td>
<td>Brāhadāraṇyaka Upanishad</td>
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<td>Br. Bh.</td>
<td>Brāhadāraṇyaka Bhāshya</td>
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<td>Br. Mā.</td>
<td>Brāhadāraṇyaka, Mādhyandina Recension</td>
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<td>Ch.</td>
<td>Chāndogya Upanishad</td>
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<td>G.</td>
<td>Bhagavadgītā</td>
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<td>GK.</td>
<td>Gauḍapāda’s Kārikās</td>
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<td>GK. Bh.</td>
<td>Gauḍapāda Kārikā Bhāshya</td>
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<td>Jai. S.</td>
<td>Jaimini’s Sūtras on Dharma</td>
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<td>Kā.</td>
<td>Kāthaka Upanishad</td>
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<td>Mā., Mān.</td>
<td>Māṇḍūkya Upanishad</td>
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<td>Mā. Bh.</td>
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<td>Mu., Mun.</td>
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<td>Pr. Bh.</td>
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<td>Tai.</td>
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<td>V. S.</td>
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* * *
INTRODUCTION

The author of this work, the revered Svāmī, Śrī Sacchidanandendra Sarasvatī (1880-1975), is justly acclaimed to be the second appearance of the great Śaṅkara. The task before Śaṅkara when he appeared a thousand and odd years ago was to recover the true Vedāntic tradition from among the mass of wrong interpretations of the Upanishadic texts. When the author of this work appeared over a hundred years ago, the mission before him was to recover the true techniques of Śaṅkara from among the maze of perverted viewpoints of the various sub-commentaries.

The task to which the revered Svāmī addressed his entire life, dedicating every waking moment to it, was to set the house of Śaṅkara in order. He realized quite early in his life that the views of the great master were being unfortunately and grossly misrepresented by his followers as well as opponents, that considerable pernicious accretions had occurred in the general standpoint of Advaita, thanks to the later sub-commentators, and that the philosophy now claimed widely to be Śaṅkara’s is not really his. The Svāmī undertook to vindicate the traditional method and matter as envisaged by Śaṅkara not only by translating the original and genuine works of Śaṅkara in Kannada, but by writing independent works in English, Kannada and Sanskrit on the subject. His literary output was truly phenomenal, and his writings, prolific as they are, are characterized by precision, lucidity and erudition. But it was not before years of scrupulous and intensive study not only of the works of Śaṅkara, but of all the
sub-commentaries and glosses available, and also of the definitive texts belonging to the schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva, that he applied himself to the publication of his discovery that Śaṅkara has been misrepresented.

He was branded as a rebel by the conventionalists because he dared to question the prevailing approach to Śaṅkara, which is moulded principally by the sub-commentaries (Bhāmatī and Pañchapādikā). But the Svāmi has convincingly demonstrated, by elaborate and painstaking scrutiny, that the sub-commentaries have subscribed to, and introduced, many a concept that is altogether alien to Śaṅkara’s commentarial corpus, and that not infrequently these concepts militate against the tradition that Śaṅkara attempts to uphold.

This has been the achievement of the Svāmi’s long life and single-minded devotion. And reasons are not far to seek why this discovery of the unadulterated philosophical position of Śaṅkara (Śuddha-Śaṅkara-Prakriyā) has not received the recognition, celebrity and acceptance that it merits; the strength of convention has set up strong barriers in the minds of people, and there is resistance both unconscious and deliberate, to welcome any attacks on the conventional views, however well-founded and cogently presented.

It is a curious irony of our religious attitudes that the dogmatists are prepared to sacrifice Śaṅkara’s commentaries for the sake of the sub-commentaries on them, namely, Bhāmatī and Pañchapādikā. It appears all too important for the dogmatist to defend Vāchaspati- miśra and Padmapāda even when they misrepresent Śaṅkara. It, therefore, required of the Svāmi, courage of conviction and steadfast determination to speak the truth at all costs. Instances are numerous as to how attempts were made to discredit
the Svāmi and prevent his viewpoints from being recognized. Undaunted, however, the Svāmi persevered and went on publishing his books in Kannada for popular edification in Karnataka, in Sanskrit for carrying conviction to the conventional scholars, everywhere in India, and in English for the enlightenment of the interested students and scholars of modern persuasion all over the country and abroad. He also moved about from place to place, giving lectures and discourses on the same theme.

A simple, and unostentatious man with a retiring disposition and an ascetic temperament, he was also extraordinarily peaceable and quiet. He did not appear either in his talk or in his approach in the least like a rebel. He altogether avoided heat in his arguments, and did not delight in debates or controversies. He was entirely academic and intellectually honest in his attempt to eradicate the misconceptions concerning Śaṅkara. While his devotion to Śaṅkara was unflinching and complete, he boldly debunked the myths and legends which the conventional Śaṅkara-vijayas are replete with. His approach to the problem of Śaṅkara and his accomplishments was historical and rational.

He therefore rejected most, if not all, of the stotras and prakaraṇas, popularly ascribed to Śaṅkara, as spurious, and placed his entire reliance on the commentaries on the three prasthanas (Upanishads, Gītā and Vedānta-Sūtra) and a few other works like Upadeśa-sāhasri and Aparokshanubhūti. Among these commentaries (Bhāshyās) he regarded the one on Vedānta-Sūtra as the most authentic and comprehensive statement of Śaṅkara’s own ideas. He accepted Suresvara as faithful to Śaṅkara, and attached great
importance to his Naishkarmya-Siddhi and Vārtikās.

The need to discover the real Śaṅkara was felt by him when he was only thirty-five (in the year 1915). He had already studied the basic works of Śaṅkara under the guidance of K.A. Krishnaswamy Iyer (the author of Vedānta or the Science of Reality), and had undergone the traditional discipline of Vedānta-learning under the renowned scholar Mahāmahōpādhyāya, Vidyānīdhi Hānagal Virūpāksha Śāstri. He had also by then got initiated by the then pontiff of Śrīneri, Śrī Śivābhina-Nṛṣimha-Bhāratī Svāmi, at Kālayi (1910), and he had come under the influence of saintly scholars like Brahma-chaitanya Mahārāj of Gōndāvali and Kurtukōti Mahābhāgavata. With this rich philosophical and spiritual background, the desire that he felt to discover the real Śaṅkara for himself expressed itself in the monograph, Mūlavidya-nirāsa in Sanskrit, in 1929, also called Śrī-Śaṅkara-hṛdayam. He applied himself diligently to repeated study of Śaṅkara’s works (Bhāṣyās on the three Prasthānās) for several years to convince himself that the sub-commentaries (of Vāchaspāti miśra and Padmapāda) had not done justice to the great master.

It was in the year 1920, a year after his wife passed away, that he felt called upon to take this as a mission in his life. He resolved to dedicate the rest of his life to correct the popular but fallacious understanding of Śaṅkara’s philosophy, and to present Śaṅkara to the interested folk, altogether independent of the sub-commentaries.

He was working as a school-master at that time in Bangalore, and he established a centre for the study of Śaṅkara’s original works, and also for the publications
he would periodically bring out to present Śaṅkara’s thought in its pure form. This centre was called Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya. This centre was shifted to Hoḷenarasīipur in the year 1938, two years after he retired from Government service as a school-master in Bangalore.

He continued his study and he went on publishing books and monographs, all purporting to present Śaṅkara’s philosophy unadulterated by the sub-commentaries, through the Kāryālaya at Hoḷenarasīipur. Ten years later, he felt the urge to renounce his worldly life and enter the monastic order. He was 68 years of age in 1947 when he became a sanyāsin under the monastic name of Śrī Sacchidānandendra Sarasvatī (his previous name being Yellaṁbaḷase Subbarāya). He lived for twenty-seven years after taking Sanyāsa, continuing the work he had been doing for the past twenty seven years. He brought out two books in Sanskrit calling upon the conventional scholars to reconsider and recognize the differences between Śaṅkara’s commentaries (Bhāshyās) and sub-commentaries (Vyākhyanās). The Vijñāpti (1961) and Vidvadgosti (1962) are polemical in character and list the inconsistencies and textual problems. He prepared guides in Sanskrit for understanding aright the Sūtra-bhāshya of Śaṅkara (Sugamā, 1955 and Sūtra-bhāshyārtha-tattva-vivechanī, 1964) and a series of seven handbooks in Sanskrit to crystallize genuine viewpoints of Śaṅkara (Śuddha-Śaṅkara-Prakriyā- Bhāskara, 1964).

During the latter years of his monastic life, he was prevailed upon to establish a branch of Adhyātma
Prakāśa Kāryālaya in Bangalore in the year 1970. In Bangalore it was that the institution first took its birth about fifty years earlier and had continued here till it was shifted to Hoṇenarasīpur eighteen years later. His health had now begun to fail, mainly because of extreme old age, but he continued with will and zeal to write books and address interested folk almost till he attained Mahā-Samādhi on August 5, 1975 when he was 96. His long and dedicated life was an excellent translation into action of the ageold counsel that one must spend all one’s time till sleep overtakes waking hours and death overtakes life, in quiet contemplation of the Upanishadic truth:

आ सुपरेण मूते: कालं नयेहेदांतचित्तया

An early influence in his life was his association with another saintly soul, Hosakere Chidāmba-rayya, who was a fellow-teacher in the schools where he worked, and who was like himself devoted to a deep study of Vedānta, not as an intellectual exercise but with an eye for practical application. Both of them had set their eyes on the monastic order quite early in their lives, especially after their wives died young. Chidāmbarayya wrote some works in Kannāḍa, but did little more; he was given to a contemplative mode of life.

Another early influence on the Svāmi was Subrahmanya Iyer, who was his teacher in the High School at Hāssan, and who also taught him the first lessons in Vedānta, besides providing free lodge and boarding to him (the poor boy that he was) at his own home. If the Svāmi developed an excellent command over the English language although he never entered the portals of a college, it was because of this teacher who taught him English in the school and at home.
It was this teacher again who introduced him to K.A. Krishnashwami Iyer in Bangalore, who was not only an erudite scholar in Vedanta but an author of philosophical works of considerable renown. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan was an admirer of this Iyer, and had profited by talking, with him on Vedantic issues. He wrote a foreword to Iyer's *Vedanta or the Science of Reality*. Continued and intimate association with Krishnashwami Iyer provided the future Svāmi with valuable insight into the method of Vedanta, especially the one dealing with the three states of being: wakefulness, dream and deep sleep. Iyer was also known for his independent thinking, his sole reliance on the three commentaries of Śaṅkara (the Prasthāna-traya-Bhāshyas) and his disregard for the sub-commentaries. The Svāmi derived great moral support from Iyer for his own urge to discover the real Śaṅkara.

After the death of Krishnashwami Iyer, the future Svāmi had to plough a lonely furrow. He had no one to sympathize with his search for the real Śaṅkara, or to support him in this cause. His adversaries were naturally numerous, for he threw stones at the shibboleth of convention. The hold of the conventional pūṇḍits on the masses was so strong that very few patrons came forward to help his Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya grow. Even his own erstwhile teacher, Hānagal Virūpāksha-Śāstri, who had taught him Sūtra-Bhāshya, had now turned against him, and treated him like a heretic and outcast. He prevented the then Mahārāja of Mysore from helping the cause of Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya.

But the future Svāmi was made of sterner stuff, and
he faced the challenges all alone and unyielding. He continued his search for the real Śaṅkara as if in a fury, in the teeth of severe opposition, and published book after book defending his call to ignore the sub-commentaries and go back to Śaṅkara. At last he found an ally in Viṭṭhala-Śāstri, who was a great Vedāntin and scholar attached to the court of the Mahārāja of Mysore. Viṭṭhala-Śāstri was so convinced that he not only supported the position of the future Svāmi against all adversaries, but claimed him as his own guru. Indeed, in later years he received initiation into monastic order under the name of Svāmi Jñānānandendra-Sarasvati, and continued the work of his teacher. Another scholar who supported the call for going back to Śaṅkara was Parakkaje Subrahmanya Bhatta.

With the exception of these two scholars, there was hardly any positive help that was forthcoming to the cause of Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya, which was established solely for popularizing the genuine and original teachings of Śaṅkara. The Svāmi has brought out from his own pen more than two hundred books from the Kāryālaya, all of them purporting to explain the tradition of Vedānta as recognized by Śaṅkara.

While most of the books written by him are in Kannāḍa, some are in Sanskrit, and some in English. And while most of the books are either translations or explanations of Śaṅkara’s own original commentarial works, there are also translations of other works like Pañchapādikā (an incomplete sub-commentary on Śaṅkara’s Sūtra-Bhāshya, (1966), not however faithful to Śaṅkara), and Rāmānuja’s commentaries on Brahma-Sūtra (which are severely critical of Śaṅkara’s
views). The most significant contribution made by the Svāmi to philosophical literature in Kannada is the translation into easy and readable Kannada for the first time all the commentaries of Śaṅkara (on Vedānta-Sūtra, on the ten Upanishads and on Bhagavad-Gītā), with ample annotations and critical introductions.

His early work in Kannada tracing the history of Vedāntic ideas before and after Śaṅkara, (Vedānta-Vichārada Itihāsa) is a monumental work, although only the first part of it was brought out. Dealing with the same theme but in a more elaborate and well-documented manner is his work in Sanskrit, Vedānta-Prakriyā-Pratyabhijñā (1964), which can be said without exaggeration to be the most important contribution ever made by any one to the Vedāntic literature in the country. It is easily his magnum opus. It contains an elaborate introduction in English dealing with how to recognize the Vedāntic method. It is an analytical and comparative study of all the Vedāntic thinkers and authors who lived prior to the days of Śaṅkara, and those who lived after Śaṅkara’s days; it is an honest and dispassionate appraisal of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta as a tradition, and is encyclopaedic in its scope in this particular field.

His writings in Kannada and Sanskrit on Gauḍapāda’s Māndūkya-Kārikā (Māṇḍūkya Rahasya-vivṛti, 1958), and Śaṅkara’s commentary on it provide remarkable insight into the discussion of the three states of Being (avasthātrya, the three avasthas); he establishes with elaborate arguments that Gauḍapāda was a Vedāntin and not a Buddhist. While I have my own reservations on this issue, his arguments
are undoubtedly serious and worthy of attention by all Indologists interested in this area. Likewise, his works on Sureśvara's Naishkarmya-Siddhi in Kannada and Sanskrit (Kleśāpahārini), are profound and deal extensively with an important subject in Vedānta, the role of wisdom (jñāna) apropos ritualistic action (karma).

He merits the gratitude of scholars in Vedānta for having brought into focus the original essay of Śaṅkara, Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya, which is designed to be prefatory in character to his commentary on Vedānta-sūtras. He has written on this, essays in Sanskrit, Kannada and English, and has suggested that 'adhyāsa' is the corner-stone of the philosophical position of Śaṅkara, and that it is all too important in the conceptual framework of Advaita Vedānta. The Svāmi's perceptions are indeed correct, for Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya is without doubt the most original and definitive of Śaṅkara’s writings; it seeks to reconcile the lay and universal conviction of mundane existence (lōka-dṛṣṭi) with the enlightened view of reality as expounded in tradition (Śāstra-dṛṣṭi). The import of this prefatory essay is far-reaching; and it is a master-piece of early Sanskrit prose writing.

It was usual for his books in English to be only translations or adaptations from lectures delivered originally in Kannada for several days in various places on occasions like Chāturmāsa or Śaṅkara-saptāha. The book-form which these talks assume involves rearrangement of topics, enlargement of scope and revision of the matter, so that each book will be self-complete and meaningful.

Among the English works written by him, the Intuition of Reality answers very convincingly the usual
charge against Advaita-Vedānta that it is merely academic and intellectual, and that it has no use for a personal god. How to Recognize the Method of Vedānta illustrates the value of the concept of “adhyāropā” (superimposition) and “apavāda” (removal of this superimposition after ascertaining the nature of the object on which the superimposition had been made), and The Vision of Atman explains the importance of śravaṇa (study of scriptures), manana (intense cogitation over what has been received from the study) and nīdīhyāsana (total absorption in the object of pursuit) in realizing the Vedāntic reality. Śaṅkara’s Clarification of Certain Vedāntic Concepts is a valuable work inasmuch as it clears many a cobweb that has grown in course of time around the most seminal concepts like the Ātman, Vidyā and Avidyā, Īśvara, Māyā, Sanyāsa and Yoga in the field of Advaita Vedānta. The Upanishadic Approach to Reality establishes that the various Upanishads uniformly adopt a single method of approach leading to the ultimate intuition of Reality.

It is rather remarkable that although he has written a large number of works, he does not repeat himself. Each of his books presents a specific argument or aspect of Vedānta, not covered by any of his other books. And it is usual for him to cite chapter and verse for every statement that he makes, and his books are thus a veritable mine of relevant and significant quotations from the original works of Śaṅkara. His intellectual honesty and sincerity of purpose are apparent in every one of his books.

It is heartening to note that the Bangalore branch of the Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya has undertaken to
reprint all his English books for the edification of the English-knowing folk all over the country and abroad. Some of his major books in Kannada are being brought out in new editions by the main office of the Kāryālaya at Hoḷenarasipur; and this has gone a long way in catering to the needs of the seekers of Vedāntic wisdom in Karṇāṭaka. There is now an enlarged circle of those who are hungry for authoritative works on Vedānta, not only in Karnataka but outside also, who would prefer books in English for various reasons.

There is real dearth of small, readable but accurate and dependable books in English on the subject of Vedānta in general and Śaṅkara in particular. Most of the books on Advaita Vedānta that are now available follow closely the sub-commentaries (Pañchapāḍikā and Bhāmati) or later works, dependent upon these sub-commentaries (like Vivaraṇa Kalpataru, Pañchadasī, and Saṁkshepa-Śārīraka), and therefore present only a distorted picture of Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the Vedāntic tradition.

The need for making the English works of the Svāmi available to the people is, therefore, great and urgent. They will help to correct the wrong impressions that are now widely held, and clarify issues on which sufficient light has not till now been shed. And they will serve as authoritative handbooks for understanding the true spirit of Vedānta and for organizing one’s life in accordance with the tenets of the Vedāntic tradition.

The book that the Bangalore branch of the Kāryālaya has selected to inaugurate this reprint-series is Salient Features of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. This book was first published in 1967 from Hoḷenarasipur as a free rendering in English of a Kannada work (entitled
Sāṅkara-Vedānta-Prakriye) which had been written by the Svāmī during his Chāturnāsya residence in Dāvanagare during the Hindu Year Manmatha (corresponding to 1956) and published in 1959 (second edition). This Kannada work was so well received by the seekers of Vedāntic wisdom that it was published subsequently in its Telugu and Tamil versions. The English translation was done by the Svāmī himself, and this version too became popular.

This book takes into account the baffling perplexity which the students of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta would normally experience when they hear or read irreconcilably conflicting views ascribed to the same Śaṅkara, and adverse criticisms voiced by the opponents against all these views. That the ideas ascribed to Śaṅkara differ among themselves is to be expected and would be warranted if all the various works that at present go by his name are really his. Evaluation and understanding of Śaṅkara’s viewpoint would be impossible unless we rely only on the works that are genuinely his. The Svāmī rightly relies on the three groups of works of Śaṅkara which are collectively known as Prasthānatraya-Bhāshya, and on nothing else. And among these (the commentaries on the Upanishads, on the Gītā and on the Vedānta-sūtras), the magnum opus and most indubitably authentic is the commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras. Śaṅkara’s views as expressed here can safely be regarded as truly his own. Whatever view runs against the views expressed in this work cannot reasonably be Śaṅkara’s, and can be dismissed as outside the framework of tradition.

This book presents Śaṅkara’s views in a brief but lucid manner. All the doctrinal issues that are germane to the traditional viewpoint (theory and practice) of Vedānta are dealt with here: the pure or
“Witness”-nature (Sākshi) of Brahman, the scope and validity of scripture (Śāstra) which is the only means of our knowing this nature, the relative importance of reason and intuition, the states of consciousness apropos the real Self (Ātman) and the practical involvements in Self-realization.

The chapter on “Spiritual concentration” (Ch.5) is particularly interesting, for it discusses the role of upāsanā, Yoga and nīḍāhyāsana in Vedāntic discipline as no one has done earlier. It clarifies the aspect of Śādhanā apropos the liberating wisdom (jñāna), which alone is held in Vedānta as the immediate, necessary and sufficient precondition for liberation, moksha. The author shows how the “yōga” of Vedānta is distinct from the “yōga” of Patañjali, and argues that “nīḍāhyāsana” according to Śaṅkara is a direct means to the intuitive vision of the Self (or self-realization). For greater elucidation of this issue, the reader is referred to the Svāmī’s Sanskrit work Gītā-Śastrartha-Viveka (1965), where Śaṅkara’s position alongside the Sāṅkhya and Yoga ideologies is discussed.

In the brief compass of this book, the author has packed extremely valuable information for those who are given to intellectual inquiry as well as for those who are spiritual seekers. The author has also provided at the end a comprehensive list of Sanskrit quotations from the source-texts (particularly from Śaṅkara’s Sūtra-Bhashya), which have been used while preparing this book. The relevant original passages in Sanskrit have been reproduced in full, and this adds value to the book. The discerning reader who is also acquainted with Sanskrit may at once check if the translations of the passages are correct and the ideas as explained here are faithful to the original texts. This
method of providing complete relevant material in its original form whenever a point is made speaks volumes for the author’s honesty and integrity, and for the authenticity of the book.

It is to be hoped that the Bangalore branch of the Kāryālaya will persevere in this laudable venture, and bring out all the English works of the revered Svāmi in reprint-editions. It will facilitate proper appreciation of the rich contribution made by Śrī Śaṅkara to the cause of spiritual and intellectual renaissance in the country more than a thousand years ago. It will also help the cause of the mission to fulfil which Śrī Sacchidānandendra- Sarasvatī Svāmi took his birth over a hundred years ago.

I congratulate the earnest, energetic and enterprising Secretary of the Bangalore branch of the Kāryālaya, Puṇḍit Śrī K.G. Subrāya Šarmā, who is devoted to the task of keeping alive the sacred memory of the revered Svāmi, and has resolved to launch this reprint-project as another venture in that direction.

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CHAPTER ONE

BRAHMAN AS THE UNIVERSAL WITNESSING SELF

1. If one were asked to state in a single proposition the metaphysical Reality taught in all the Upanishads, or Vedantas as they are known to Śaṅkara, the following text from the Chāṇḍogya might be appropriately quoted: “Now this subtle principle, all this phenomenal universe has that for its essence; that is the only Reality, that is the only Self. That thou art, O Śvetaketu!” (Ch. 6-8-7). This Upanishadic doctrine summed up in these three words ‘That thou art’, can be realized here and now by anyone who has duly qualified himself to enter on the course of Vedantic study.

2. This ultimate Reality can neither be expressed by any word nor grasped by any concept. “From it all words fall back failing to reach it, along with the intellect” (Tai. 2-9), for it possesses none of the distinctive features such as genus, substance, quality, action or relation, and these are the only conditions affording scope for words. Nor is It a knowable - that is to say, something objectifiable - by concepts. So say the Śrutis and the Smṛtis alike: “This is inapprehensible and eternal” (Br. 4-4-20); “He is indestructible and incomprehensible” (G. 2-18). It is the very self of even speech and mind, for it is this which reveals them as such. “It is the mind of mind, speech of speech” (Ke. 1-2); “That which is not utterable by speech, but by which speech itself is uttered” (Ke. 1-5); “That which one is unable to conceive by mind, but by which mind
itself is said to be conceived” (Ke. 1-6) - Śrutis such as these say so. That is why Śrutis try to describe It by denying all possible properties of knowable objects. “Now the teaching ‘Not such, not such’, for there is none beyond this ‘not such’ ” (Br. 2-3-6). This Śruti expressly says that there is no other possible way of presenting the nature of transcendental reality except in the negative form ‘neti neti’.

3. Even while ultimate Reality is thus unobjec-
tifiable by words or concepts, the Śruti tries to indicate its real nature by employing certain epithets such as ‘Brahman’ (the Absolute), ‘Bhooma’ (Plenitude), ‘Sat’ (Pure Being). Students of Vedanta should remember that reality is not the express meaning of such terms. “It is only by means of name, form and action super - imposed on it that Brahman is positively described in Śrutis by expressions like ‘Brahman is knowledge and bliss’ (Br. 3-9-8); ‘Solid consciousness only’ (Br. 2-4-2); Brahman’, and ‘Ātman’ (Br. Bh. 2-3-6).

4. The existence of Brahman does not allow of any doubt, for Brahman is our very Self. “Brahman must be taken to exist inasmuch as it is the self of everyone” (SBh1-1-1). “One would himself become non-existent, if one were to think of Brahman as non-existent; if, on the other hand, one were to take Brahman as existent, then he is himself regarded as existent” (Tai. 2-6). That is why the Śruti says “This is Ātman (the Self) described as ‘not such, not such’” (Br. 3-9-26). That is why “The word ‘Ātman’ is used in all Śrutis with reference to Brahman” (Br. Bh. 2-1-20).

5. Although Brahman is our very Self, there is conflict of opinions among philosophers regarding its specific nature. The mere body, the senses, the mind,
the momentary stream of consciousness, the indeterminate Śūnyā - all these have been severally held to be the Self. Some maintain that there is, distinct from all these, a doer and enjoyer of the fruits of action, while yet others hold that he is only the enjoyer but not the doer. Others believe in the existence of a Ruler other than the individual soul, an omniscient and omnipotent Being. The Vedantins are of the opinion that this Ruler is in truth the Self of the enjoyer, and that this is the Brahman of the Upanishads. Sri Śaṅkaraḥārya teaches that the Highest Goal of human life is reached by the realization of this Brahman.

6. The Mīmāṃsakas aver that the individual self (Jivātman) as distinguished from the body and the senses, is both the locus and object of the ego-(the ‘me’-) notion. Such too is the popular idea of all that believe in the existence of an individual soul. But as a matter of fact the only real Self is the Witness (sākshi) who is the seer of even that Jivātman, the object of the ‘me’ notion. This Witnessing Ātman is not many, not one for each body. He is the Self common to all beings. He is to be known only through the teaching of the Upanishads. That is why in the Śruti ‘I ask thee about the Purusha of the Upanishads’ (Br. 3-9-26), the significant epithet ‘Apanishada Purusha’ has been used. So says the great Śaṅkarāchārya (SBh.1-1-4).

7. No one can deny the existence of this Self of the nature of the witness, for ‘He is the Self of even the person that denies it’ (SBh. 1-1-4). The venerable Śaṅkara brings home to everyone the existence of this Ātman basing his observation on a fact of universal intuition. He remarks ‘Whoever it be that denies this Self, It is even his own inalienable essence’ (SBh. 1-1-4; 2-3-7).
8. That this Witnessing Principle is of the nature of consciousness and the Universal Self of all beings, is a unique teaching of Vedanta. The following Śruti declares this in the most unmistakable terms: “One and the same Shining One (Deva), is hid in all beings, the omnipresent, the inmost Self of all beings, the Overlord of all acts, presiding over all beings, the Witnessing Consciousness, One, and without attributes” (Śve. 6-11). Anyone who can take his stand in this Witness can be convinced of the appropriateness of the various characteristic epithets used in this Vedic text.

9. It is impossible that there should be two selves for one and the same body (SBh. 1-2-20), for ‘Ātman’ means one’s own nature’ (SBh. 1-1-6). While the term ‘Ātman’ is well-known to denote one’s own self, there are some who hold that there is a Supreme Self (Paramātman) distinct from our individual self, and that we are each distinct from that Supreme Self. Evidently they are doing violence to the common signification of the term ‘Ātman’ and foisting an unusual meaning on it. They are also thereby treating the Supreme Self as the non-self and an object, thus imputing to that Self the characteristics of external objects and rendering it an impermanent thing. It is not possible even to conceive of anything other than our individual self as our own self. Śruti says “He is the un-seen seer, un-heard hearer, un-thought thinker, un-understood understander. There is no seer other than he, there is no hearer other than he, there is no thinker other than he, there is no understander other than he. This is your Self, the Inner Controller (Antaryāmin), the Immortal One. Anything other than this is ephemeral” (Br. 3-7-23). Those that torture this Vedic text whose meaning is quite in consonance with universal intuition by giving it
any other interpretation, would be courting an obstacle to their own spiritual progress.

10. It is inconceivable that there can be more than one Witnessing Ātman. We all know that ether (Ākāśa) is all-pervading. Anything conceived to exist must be in ethereal space. Now even the mind which cognizes all this space as its object is itself an object of the Witnessing Consciousness. Can we now say that this all-pervading Witnessing Ātman is limited by space and divided into many? The Upanishads speak of Ātman as an all-pervading principle: "As extensive is this physical space, so extensive is this Ākāśa (Ātman) within the heart" (Ch. 8-1-3); "By whom is pervaded the ether, the heaven and the earth." (Tai. Nā. 1)

11. The Witnessing Principle is other than the self cognized by the notion of the ego, that is to say, it is of the nature of changeless Consciousness. So it is neither the agent nor the object of any act. "Neither something to be acquired, nor to be rejected, for the very reason that It is our own Self" (SBh. 1-1-4); "All perishable effects can perish only upto and exclusive of the Purusha (the Witness). But the Purusha is imperishable, for there is nothing else extraneous to Him to cause His destruction. There being nothing else to affect Him, He is unchangeably eternal, and hence of a nature eternally pure, conscious and free" (SBh. 1-1-4).

12. This is the sum and substance of the truth taught by Vedanta: "This Atman is indeed the great, unborn, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless Brahman. It is well-known that Brahman is fearless. Whoever realizes it thus becomes indeed the fearless Brahman itself" (Br. 4-4-25).

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CHAPTER TWO

NO REAL DISTINCTION OF THE KNOWER, MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE AND OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE IN BRAHMAN

13. The all-witnessing Brahman being inapprehensible, cannot be known through any means of knowledge. Only an apprehensible object can be seen through the senses. A sensible object has one or more of the characteristic properties of sound, touch, colour or form, taste and smell. But Brahman is devoid of all these properties. "Soundless, touchless, formless, undecaying and tasteless; likewise, eternally odourless, beginningless, and endless, beyond the Mahat (universal principle of consciousness) and constant, realizing that, one is freed from the jaws of death (that is, ignorance, desire and action)" (Kaṭ.1-3-15) so says a Śruti text. It is here stated that this Ātman is beginningless and endless, that is to say, being the witness of both time and space as well as objective things, He does not begin or end in time, and that He is changelessly eternal and beyond all intellect.

14. This principle called Ātman is no object either of sensuous perception or inference and other valid means of knowledge. "Now this principle is obviously not an object of perception since it is devoid of form and other sensible qualities; nor is it an object of inference and other means since it is free from any inferential sign or other perceptible aids of knowledge" (SBh.2-1-6). Therefore, observes Śaṅkara, this has to be known only by the help of Āgama (revelation) just as the supersen-
suous *Dharma* (religious duty and merit) (SBh.2-1-6).

15. The application of the means of knowledge (*Pramāṇāni*) necessarily implies the triple distinction of the knower (*Pramātra*), the senses and other means (*Pramāṇa*) and the object of knowledge (*Prameya*). But the Śruti says, “This inapprehensible constant principle is to be realized as a uniform entity” (Br. 4-4-20), ‘as a solid mass of consciousness, homogeneous, continuous without any break whatsoever like the all-pervading ether’ as Ācārya Śaṅkara explains it (Br.Bh. 4-4-20).

16. Well, it may be asked, even if the external senses will not do, would not at least the intellect be necessary to know it? How else could we know it if not through the mind? Quite true. “Through the mind alone, one has to see it” says the Śruti, “There is no diversity whatsoever in it. Whosoever sees as though there were any diversity in it goes from death to death” (Br. 4-4-19). Ordinarily the mind habitually sees only diversity; but in the opinion of Śaṅkara, (GBh. 2-21) it becomes a competent means of seeing the Ātman free from all distinctions when it is purified by means of initiation from revelation and teacher (*Śāstra* and *Ācārya*), as well as by disciplinary aids like the control of the mind and the senses (*Śama* and *dama*).\(^1\)

17. It might be doubted whether the mind can ever transcend its nature of perceiving duality, whatever be the degree of purification it might undergo. Is it ever possible for one to know the Self without being aware at the same time of the distinctions inextricably involved in the process of knowing? He must necessarily be conscious of being the knower, of the mind as the

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\(^1\) Even then it cannot objectify Ātman. It can know Him only by intuition, when it is merged in Him. See the next para.
means of knowledge and of the Self as the object of knowledge. The distinctions will be there at least, even if he be not aware of them at the time. Of course, this objection is quite valid from the empirical standpoint. But when we have actually realized the possibility of knowing the non-dual Self, there can be no reasonable ground for any such doubt. Then we shall have been convinced of the sole reality of the Self as well as of the misconception on which the distinction of the knower and the known rests. This fact has been thus disclosed by Gaudapādācārya, the grand-preceptor (Parama-guru) of Śaṅkarācārya. "When the mind becomes aware of the sole reality of Ātman, then it reaches the state of no-mind, for it cannot grasp anything when there is nothing to grasp for it" (GK. 3-32). Ācārya Śaṅkara observes, that just as fire ceases to burn when there is no fuel to burn, so also when following up the teaching of the Śāstra and Ācārya, the truth dawns that Ātman is the only Reality and everything else is only a false appearance conveyed through mere words. Then the mind ceases to conceive there being nothing to conceive, and thus becomes no mind. So realization of the unreality of the distinction of knowledge and its object notwithstanding its appearance, is what is really meant by transcending all distinctions.

18. 'Is it right to regard the distinction of the knower, the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge as unreal, while it is a fact of universal experience?' it may be asked. But an appearance within the experience of all need not be necessarily real. It is natural for all men, sometimes to mistake the mother of pearl for silver, or for those suffering from cataract or some other kindred clouded eye-sight to see two moons where there is only one. But nobody would insist on that
account that there is actual silver or the additional moon in these instances. So while it is true that the distinction of the means and object of knowledge is a fact of experience common to all, it is only a case of natural super-imposition (adhyāsa), a misconception of something for another like the perception of apparent silver in the mother of pearl or of the second moon, in the instances cited above. The mutual super-imposition of the self and the not-Self on each other, is called Avidyā. “Basing themselves on the presupposition of this mutual super-imposition of the Self and the not-Self, named Avidyā” says Śaṅkara “proceed all activities of ordinary life as well as those prescribed by the Vedas” (ABh. SBh.).

19. The illusion of silver in the mother of pearl, or of the second moon, is not universal, whereas the distinction of knowledge and its object is a fact of universal experience. Would it not be a total abolishment of human life and activity altogether if we should dismiss as unreal distinctions universally recognized as real in common life? This misgiving need not deter us from knowing the truth. For if the idea of the distinction of knowledge and its object is really unfounded, its rejection cannot be regarded as a bold venture. That the distinction appears to be real to all cannot make it necessarily real as a matter of fact. There are many universal illusions and hallucinations such as the sun’s apparent movement, the blueness of the sky and so on. Nor need we fear that all human transactions would come to an end if philosophers should decide, on a careful analysis, that the distinction is unreal. “All ideas and activities can continue to be regarded as valid and real until one realizes one’s identity with Brahman, just as the ideas and activities of a dream are regarded valid
and real before waking. (To explain):- As long as the knowledge of the unity of the One Real Ātman has not dawned, it never strikes anyone that the effects of the nature of means of knowledge, object of knowledge as well as the resultant knowledge, are all unreal. Far rather, every individual regards only effects (such as one's body, children & c.) in the relation of me and mine through ignorance totally oblivious of his inherent identity with Brahman. Therefore all proceedings whether of ordinary life or based on scripture, can very well go on undisturbed so long as one does not wake to one's identity with Brahman. The case is quite analogous to that of a common man dreaming, while seeing a variety of things, feels up to the time of waking, quite certain that he actually perceives those things never suspecting for the moment that it is only an illusory perception" (SBh. 2-1-14).

20. An objection may naturally arise here. Even though perception and other means of knowledge do appear really to function in the dream state, they are all falsified as soon as we awake. Can we conclude, on such a self-betraying evidence, that the never-sublated waking perception and other means of knowledge within the experience of all, are the result of a misconceived phantasy? And, after all, what is gained by such a bold-faced dismissal of all the means of knowledge? The reply is that while a dream is falsified only in the waking state, we need not wait for any other succeeding state, to realize that the idea of the means of knowledge etc. is indeed real only for the ignorant. An analysis of the functioning of perception and other pramāṇas will quite do to bring it home to us. Ācārya Śaṅkara has concisely expressed all that is involved in the process in a single sentence: "No one can possibly be a knower
unless he entertains the notion that the body, the senses and so on, are either identical with or belong to him, and the means of knowledge can never function without a knower” (ABh. SBh.). It follows that perception and other means are valid only for the ignorant.

The body is an object of the Witnessing Consciousness. Evidently one cannot be identical with the body, the object of his own consciousness, nor can the senses ever dependent on the body be regarded as belonging to one-self. In other words, unless one wrongly takes the body to be one’s self and the senses as one’s own, one cannot regard oneself as the knower, the employer of the means of knowledge, who desires to know an object. Now the intuition of this fact entitles us to conclude that all distinction of knowledge and its object is only a false appearance proceeding from ignorance. And when this realization is reached, the knowledge of the sole reality of the all-witnessing Ātman immediately emerges. “Thus this innate superimposition of the nature of misconception is beginningless and endless and primarily responsible for the notion of agent and enjoyer as is well-known to all people. All Vedantas have been revealed in order to destroy this cause of all evil by the attainment of the knowledge of the sole reality of Ātman” (ABh. SBh.). By means of the knowledge attained through this teaching, this evil effect of ignorance is absolutely removed and we take our stand in our real Ātman, which is the highest goal of human life.

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CHAPTER THREE

ŚĀSTRA THE ONE MEANS OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

21. It might be objected that if all distinction of means of knowledge and its object be unreal, we shall have no means by which to know the Self, and since the existence of a thing has to be ascertained by some means of knowledge, it follows that we cannot be assured even of the existence of our own self. Nihilism would thus be triumphant without any opposition. This objection is not valid because the Veda is the exclusive means of knowing the Ātman. As the Brāhmaṇa passage declares "No one who has not understood the Veda can know that Great One" (Tai. Brā. 3-12-2-7). And we have already adduced the text “It is about that Purusha of the Upanishads, that I ask thee” (Br. 3-9-26) to show that Ātman is revealed in the Upanishads alone.

22. The Vedas are also known as the ‘Śāstras’. How are we to take the Śāstra to be a right means of knowledge? This question has been variously answered. Some are of the opinion that the Śāstra has to be believed to be an authority, just as we put faith in the testimony of experts (āptavākya). That would imply the dependence of the Śāstra on some other source of right knowledge for its veracity. If some one were to assure us that there are five fruits on the other bank of a river, the truth of that statement would have to be verified by actual perception or some other means of right knowledge. Similarly if we followed this school of thought, Vedic statements would require ratification by
some other accepted means of right knowledge. Others declare that the Vedas must be taken to be reliable inasmuch as they are a message from the omniscient God. In that case the Vedas cannot be taken to be the word of God before the existence of God is itself established. If it is insisted that God is to be known only by the Vedas, that would be arguing in a vicious circle, God being the guaranty for the authority of the Vedas while the Vedas in their turn are our testimony for the existence of God. The Mīmāṃsakās aver that the Vedas are a means of right knowledge since they are not of human origin. Their idea is that while a statement carries its own validity, it is possible that it is tainted by the faults of the person who makes that statement. In the case of the Vedas, however, nobody knows their author. Śrutis and Smṛtis declare that the Vedas are beginningless and endless. So the Mīmāṃsakās conclude that the Vedas not being of human origin are a valid means of knowledge. While the orthodox section of our countrymen admit this, the Buddhists and the Jains do not. The followers of the Vedas do admit that these revelations have come to us through certain Rṣhis, notwithstanding the fact that their authorship is not ascertained. If followers of any other faith should happen to claim likewise that their accepted revelation is not of human origin either, then, in case of a conflict of statements, disagreement may naturally arise as to which of the two revealed texts is the one indisputably valid. Even if others may not claim super-human origin to the revelation of their own faith, questions may arise as to whether or not a statement must be accepted as valid simply because it is not of human origin; whether it is binding on us to believe in the existence of a text not human in origin, or whether, being but a statement
just like any other, it should not be inferred to be of human authorship likewise. There is room for many such differences of opinion on such points, if we are asked to accept the position of this school.

Now in regard to this matter, Śaṅkara is found to accept the individual view-point of the school with whom he happens to discuss for the time being, and generally speaking, he is seen to adopt the view of the Mīmāṁsākās in particular when he has to deal with Vedic teaching from the empirical standpoint. But in considering the validity of the Vedas with regard to Ātman, he has put forward a unique principle of interpretation which deserves to be specially kept in view. “Express statement and other textual aids (such as indicatory expression, syntactical relation and so on) are not the only means of valid knowledge in the case of the enquiry into the nature of Brahman (Brahma- jñāsā) as they indeed are in the case of the enquiry into religious duty (Dharma- jñāsā). But intuition (anubhava) ¹ and such others (as reasoning) should also, where possible, be taken to be the means in this case. For the knowledge of Brahman is to culminate in a final intuition and relates to an already existing entity” (SBh. 1-1-2). Again “In the case of religious duty, direct statement by the text and the like would be the only means of knowledge, because no experience is needed in support and because a duty to be accomplished depends entirely on the will of the person doing it” (SBh. 1-1-2). The Self, however, is something already existent and not

1. The original Sanskrit term (anubhava) covers the whole range of sensuous experience, psychic experience as well as supramental intuition by means of which we directly intuit the three states of waking, dream and sound sleep.
something to be accomplished. Hence the knowledge of the Self has to culminate in experience. Although the Vedas declare that heaven &c. are attained through the performance of certain religious works, these resultants, heaven &c. are not within the range of experience. A doubt may possibly be entertained regarding the fruit of a religious rite as to whether or not it would accrue, since the result is not expected to be within the doer’s direct experience. But the fruit of knowledge of Ātman is quite within one’s immediate intuition, inasmuch as the Śruti says “Brahman is that which is immediate and not indirect” (Br.3-3-32). Hence Śaṅkara’s dictum that “the Veda is absolutely valid with regard to its subject-matter just as the sun is the one direct means of throwing light on the form of an object, whereas human statements are in need of another means of corroboration and are also intercepted by the memory of the person making the particular statement and hence they are further removed from what they express” (SBh. 2-1-1). Obviously this applies with greater force to the question of knowledge of the Self than that of religious duty.

23. Perception and other means of knowledge are self-valid. No one would think of proving the validity of perception by a course of reasoning. Perception and other pramāṇas are deemed valid for the very reason that they yield us certain and unfalsified knowledge in their respective spheres. Similarly the Vedāntic text supplies us with perfectly certain knowledge of Ātman never to be sublated subsequently. Hence the Śāstra is to be considered a valid means of knowledge just because it is efficient to give us the realization of Ātman. Its validity requires no support from reason. “Since the knowledge of Ātman produces its own fruit instantaneously, its validity can never be impugned; nor is the
validity of the Śāstra dependent upon inference” (SBh.1-1-4).

24. Is it not self-contradictory to assert that Ātman is no object of any means of knowledge and to claim at the same time that the Śāstra is the one means of knowing Ātman? No, because the Śāstra reveals Ātman as self-effulgent and hence not an object of any knowledge. It does not claim that it is the only means of objectifying Ātman. “It is well known that Ātman is no adventitious thing for any one of us, for He is Self-evident: One’s own self is not to be ascertained for one-self by some means of knowledge, for it is for his ascertainment of unknown external objects that means of knowledge are to be employed” (SBh. 2-3-7). External objects can never be known except through instruments of knowledge, but Ātman is a self-established entity prior to the very idea of objects and means of knowing them.

25. If the Śāstra does not specifically reveal Ātman as its object, how can we regard it as a valid means of knowledge concerning Ātman? This objection is not well-founded, for “The Śāstra aims at the removal of distinctions conceived by ignorance. (To explain:) The Śāstra does not attempt to define Brahman as such and such an object. Aiming as it does to reveal Brahman as never objectifiable because of its being the inmost subjective Self, the Śāstra only removes all the idea of distinctions conceived by ignorance, such distinctions for instance, as of the knowable, knower and knowledge. The Śāstra is to be considered a valid means of knowledge only in so far as it does this”. (SBh. 1-1-4)

26. Since the Śāstra is itself of the nature of speech, how can it be affirmed that Ātman is beyond all speech? It is evident that this objection cannot rear its
head after what has already been said above, for the Śāstra does not function as a form of descriptive speech with regard to Ātman. “Even revelation makes Ātman known to us only by negating the function of a knower or of any means of knowledge in his case. ‘Seen by whom, and by what means? Know whom and by what means?’ it asks, ‘Where everything is Ātman alone?’ It does not assume the usual descriptive function of speech which rests on the presumption of the relation of words and things denoted by them”(Br.Bh.4-4-20).

27. Diving deeper into the matter, we find that each and every means of right knowledge can only end by removing the ignorance of its particular object, for it can never directly shed light on anything by objectifying it. “Those, however, who think that the means of knowledge operates on a jar by producing a resultant knowledge besides removing ignorance concerning it, are really claiming that an act of cutting a log of wood into pieces, operates upon either piece besides undoing the cohesiveness of the parts of the log to be cut” (Ma. Bh.7). Therefore every means of knowledge has the only function of removing the mis-conception about its object. The Śāstra too can very well be a pramāṇa in this legitimate sense.

28. One outstanding difference between the Śāstra and the other means of knowledge, is that while the latter dispel the ignorance enveloping their respective objects in particular, they never assure the knower of the destruction of all ignorance for good; whereas the Śāstra pulls up all ignorance by the roots, “The ultimate means of knowledge (to wit; the Śāstra) removes the knowing nature itself super-imposed on Ātman, and simultaneously with that removal, it ceases to be a
means of knowing just as the means of dream-knowledge ceases to be such on waking” (GBh.2-69).

From the standpoint of common sense, “The Self as knower is necessarily taken for granted before seeking for the means of knowledge. Nobody indeed ever thinks of proving himself to be such and such before proceeding to determine the nature of an object” (GBh. 2-18). Similarly Pramāṇās are necessarily presumed to be really means of right knowledge by every investigator who seeks for them to determine the nature of objects. Hence the concept of one’s being the knower lies at the root of all human conduct based on primeval ignorance. But the Śāstra reveals that the very fact of Ātman being a knower rests on Avidyā. So, when the self is no longer a knower, the Pramāṇās are no Pramāṇās and without Pramāṇās there can be no object to be determined. Hence when the Śāstra enlightens us on the non-dual nature of Ātman “all has been reduced to the one Self who is to see, what object and by what means? Who is to know what and by what means?” (Br.4-5-15). The very notion of these discrete elements of knowledge is effaced at the dawn of this unifying knowledge of Ātman just as our dream-notion of the distinction of the knower, the knowable and knowledge is sublated as soon as we awake. Inasmuch as the Śāstra thus abolishes the very nature of all means of knowledge as such, it has been called ‘antya- pramāṇa’, the final means of knowledge. And the Śāstra being itself a means of knowledge just like any other Pramāṇa ceases to be such as soon as the knowledge of the One Ātman makes its appearance, in the same way as dream-means of knowledge fade away on waking. Hence the Śruti says ‘The Vedās become no Vedās’ (Br.4-3-22) when one takes one’s stand in Ātman.
29. Perception and other sources of knowledge do throw light on their respective objects and continue to be valid so long as our notion of perceptive and discursive knowledge obtains. The Šrutī likewise reveals the true nature of Ātman, as that is its legitimate sphere of functioning. Only in this case, all notion of recognizing things by particular means is altogether abolished. It is clear that there is really no conflict between the Śāstra and the other means of knowledge such as perception, for as Ācārya Śaṅkara says “The several means hold sway only in their respective spheres” (Br. Bh. 2-1-20).

30. It might be objected that since the Upanishadic teaching implies at least the unavoidable distinction of the teaching, the teacher and the taught, the non-dual Absolute transcending all distinctions can never possibly be established. But this objection does not hold water. For as Gaudapāda remarks “This distinction is only admitted as a device at the first step for the convenience of instruction. When the truth is known, however, it will be found that no distinction of the kind is real as such” (GK. 1-18). The validity of the Śāstra as a means of the knowledge of non-duality thus remains quite intact.

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CHAPTER FOUR

REASON SUBSERVIENT TO SELF-REALIZATION

31. It is stated in the Brhadārānyaka Upanishad that Yājñavalkya instructed his wife Maitreyī in the knowledge of Ātman in these words “Ātman, verily, my dear, is to be seen by listening to teaching about Him, by thinking over His nature and by contemplation” (Br. 2-4-5). And in the Chāndogya, it is taught that just as the intelligent reflective man in the story reached his country Gandhāra after enquiries made on the strength of the instruction received from a wayfarer, so also, one who has had due instruction from a teacher can realize Ātman (Ch. 6-14-2). It follows from this that an aspirant should make use of reasoning as well as revelation from the Śruti for the purpose of realization.

32. Those who are able to arrive at the truth by the teaching of the Śruti alone, do not of course stand in need of any reasoning, since they have reached the goal. For such as have fully grasped the meaning of the two words ‘That’ and ‘thou’ used in the sentence “That thou art”-require nothing more to understand what the sentence means. “But in the case of those who are hindered by ignorance, doubt or misconception from having a correct appraisal of the signification of these words, the sentence ‘That thou art’ cannot possibly convey its true import. For understanding the meaning of a proposition pre-supposes the understanding of the meaning of the terms involved in it. Such aspirants, therefore, would require repeated study of the Śāstra as well as application of reasoning ancillary to it” (SBh. 4-1-2). Accord-
ingly the Śruti says "This Ātman is not accessible to many even for hearing about, and many there be who know Him not, even after a study of the Śāstra" (Ka. 1-2-7).

33. "It is beyond speculation, for it is subtler than the subtlest" (Ka. 1-2-8). "This knowledge is not to be had through speculation" (Ka. 1-2-9) nor can it be refuted by speculation. So says the Śruti. At first sight, it would appear from this pronouncement, that knowledge of Ātman has nothing to do with reason. But the Śruti only means that Ātman is not within the reach of dry reasoning which is not based upon the instruction of a teacher initiated in the traditional method of imparting the knowledge. Accordingly it has been declared "There cannot be any failure to understand it, when it is communicated by one who has become identical with Ātman" (Ka. 1-2-8). Again "It can be well understood when taught only by an Ācārya other than the ordinary ratiocinist" (Ka. 1-2-9). Āgama is the peculiar traditional method of efficacious teaching by virtue of which the aspirant is enabled to see his identity with Ātman. The Śruti (Ch. 6-14-2) relating to the intelligent and reflective man of Gandhāra (referred to in para 31) demands the aid of reasoning ancillary to such teaching. Hence that text is not in conflict with the one which rules out speculation unsupported by this means of right knowledge.

34. The Sanskrit term 'tarka' has been used in different senses by different schools of thought. Some give that appellation to syllogistic inference. There ought to be fire on the yonder hill, for we see smoke there. Since we actually guess the existence of fire in this inference, the name 'tarka' may well be applied to it. An
additional reasoning may also be advanced in support of this inference. 'No smoke would be visible if there were no fire there.' This reasoning substantiating the original inference has been also termed 'Tarka' by the Naiyāyikas. But neither of these two kinds of reasoning is meant in the text 'It is to be thought over and contemplated' (Br. 2-4-5). “For the truth relating to this Reality which is conducive to final release is too deep even for a conjecture without revelation” (SBh. 2-1-11). Enquiry into Brahman demands primarily the consideration of Vedantic text and, as subservient to it, reasoning not in discord with it.

35. The difference between the reasoning proposed by the Śruti and mere speculation is this: The reasoning recommended by the Śruti being meant to be conducive to intuitive experience is never in conflict with experience. Independent reasoning, however, is merely the outcome of the conjecture of one's own mind. “Speculation is unbridled.... It is impossible to expect finality from speculations, for men's minds are diversely inclined” (SBh. 2-1-11).

36. Is it not itself a reason to argue that no reasoning is final since certain speculations have not arrived at finality? And reason approved by Śruti is in any case reason to be sure. For otherwise the injunction ‘It must be reflected upon’ (Br. 2-4-5), would be meaningless. Such being the case, what is there anything peculiar to it which makes it superior to other reasonings? Logicians too base their reasoning on something found true to experience ‘From the known to the unknown’—is that not a principle to be acquiesced in by all?

Our reply to all this is as follows: Non-Vedic reasoning proceeds on some basic principle assumed in each individual case. But all do not subscribe to the
basic assumption of a particular school. Even in cases where the fundamentals may appear unassailable for the present, there is no guarantee that they will continue to be so for all future. For instance, the doctrine of the pradhāna (primordial matter) of the Śāṅkhyās, and the doctrine of the paramāṇus (atoms) of the Vaiṣeshikās, have been assumptions based upon mere speculation. These fundamental postulates not being universally accepted, conclusions drawn from arguments based upon them have likewise failed to command universal acceptance. Similarly the fundamentals postulated by the Buddhists, the Jains and the various schools of Western thought, have all been questioned. Śāstraic reasoning on the other hand, is based on universal intuition which can never be challenged. For instance, the teaching that the inmost Witnessing Principle in us is our own Self can never be gainsaid by anyone, for It is the Self of even the would-be denier. “Besides, Ātman cannot possibly be denied, for the simple reason that It is one’s own Self” (SBh. 2-3-7). That is why the reason proposed by the Śruti, claims superiority over any other ordinary speculative reason. It is based upon universal experience while the other speculations are barren since they have no such support. Therefore no dry reasoning can be admitted here under the pretext that there is a text recommending reason” (SBh. 2-1-6).

37. It is true that other schools of thought likewise claim to base their arguments on experience; but that so-called experience does not cover the whole ground of life. Reason based upon that partial experience cannot stand the onslaught of a higher reasoning based upon a wider experience. “For we see that there is conflict of opinion among system-founders of even recognized fame for mental eminence like Kapila and Kanāda” (SBh. 2-1-11). So we cannot take that all of
them have given us correct ideas of truth and reality, for such mutually contradictory doctrines cannot all be absolute truth. “Right knowledge ought to be uniform throughout, since it must conform to an existent fact. That is to be considered real which consistently maintains its self-identity, and knowledge of that reality, is commonly called right knowledge, as for instance, the knowledge that fire is hot” (SBh. 2-1-11).

There have been a number of schools of speculative thought, both in our own country and in the west, which have each built different systems of their own, and there is scope for many more such schools to appear in the future. “But it would not be possible to assemble all the speculators of the past, present and future times at one place or time so that we might decide by their consensus of opinion that a particular conclusion is the ultimate truth in respect of any one fact to be regarded as real” (SBh. 2-1-11), whence it follows that no speculative thinker can be taken to have said the last word on the matter. “The Veda, on the other hand, being eternal and always capable of yielding the same knowledge, may be justly relied upon to let us know Reality as it is, and that universal knowledge which arises from it cannot be assailed by any of the speculators of the past, present or future” (SBh. 2-1-11). This is because the Vedic reasoning takes into account the entire range of the knowable and examines all the three states of experience, to wit, waking, dream and deep sleep. “These three states have been called ‘the knowable’, because there cannot be any thing knowable which falls outside the three, since the postulates of the advocates of any other school must necessarily be included in one or the other of these states” (GK. Bh. 4-88). Hence the Vedic dialectic which arrives at the
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final conclusion after an examination of all the three states is based upon the most comprehensive experience. This experience being in entire harmony with that of persons of all places and times, Vedic reasoning based upon it is the only one that can be accepted as infallible.

38. Even the Vedic reasoning employed to ascertain the nature of Ātman does involve duality of course. This is so because “Even the unreal forms of Ātman due to upādhis (concomitant conditions) are provisionally assumed as though they were a property of Ātman to be known; this, however, is only a device just to make us aware of the existence of Ātman” (GBh. 13-13). This dual characteristic is, however, invariably shown subsequently not to belong to Ātman as a matter of fact. Ācārya Śaṅkara quotes in this context the maxim of the experts in the traditional method of right teaching. “That which is really devoid of all plurality has to be explained by the method of superimposition and subsequent rescission” (GBh. 13-13). It is this method of provisional attribution and subsequent abrogation that is followed by the Śruti while it approves reasoning referring to the triad of states, causality and the like. This makes it clear how the employment of logic involving duality, does not adversely affect Advaita.

39. Two examples have been cited in the Śūtra-Bhāṣṭya to illustrate the kind of Vedantic reasoning based on universal intuition. (1) “Since waking and dream exclude each other, the Self is unaccompanied by them, and since in the state of deep sleep He leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with Pure Being, He is really of the nature of Pure Being altogether free from the world of plurality. (2) As the world comes forth from Brahman it cannot be different from Brahman in accordance with the principle of the
effect being not different from the cause” (SBh. 2-1-6). Śaṅkara’s reference to ‘reasoning of this type’ in this connection may be taken to cover the method of the sāmānya-viśeṣa (the universal and the particular) as well as the reasoning based on the pañca-kōshas (the five sheaths). As one example of the former may be cited the argument that “as everything is unfailingly accompanied by Pure Consciousness it must essentially be Pure Consciousness itself. By the perception of sound in general produced by the beating of the drum, the particular notes coming under the class are also perceived, for as particulars they have no independent existence of their own. So also no particular thing either in waking or dream can be perceived as distinct from Consciousness” (Br.Bh. 2-4-7). As for ‘the five sheaths’ made up of food, vital air, mind, intellect and blissful feeling, since they are each penetrated by the succeeding inner sheath, and Ātman is the most all-pervading innermost principle, none of the sheaths has any being of its own apart from Him. Here in the first of the four examples mentioned above, the three states are provisionally assumed to belong to the Self. In the second, Brahman is taken to be the cause of the world, and in the third, it is regarded as a genus, while in the fourth pervasiveness and the nature of being the inmost of all are temporarily ascribed to the Self for the sake of facilitating instruction. Of course, all these attributions are subsequently rescinded when Pure Reality comes to be pointed out.

40. It is sometimes argued that acceptance of

1. In the English Introduction to the Sanskrit work ‘Vedānta–Prakriyā–Pratyabijñā’ it has been explained at great length how this method, called the Adhyātma-Āpavāda Nyāya, illustrates the central theme of the Upanishads and convincingly reconciles all apparently conflicting doctrines in these Sacred Books.
Advaita as the ultimate reality would run counter to perception, inference, and the portion of the Vedas enjoining rituals. Moreover, there would be no teacher of Advaita; neither the teaching nor anyone to be taught according to the system which assumes Absolute Non-dualism. If all this be allowed, would not the Advaitic Śruti prove suicidal to its own validity besides abolishing the universally accepted canons of evidence?

Now all this is only bad logic. For we have already shown that Ātman is no object of perception or inference. True, the Karma-kānda (Portion of the Veda prescribing religious works) pre-supposes the distinction of action, its means and results. But “a man naturally takes for granted the distinction of action, its means and results projected by avidyā, just as it obtains in ordinary life. Taking his stand on that distinction, he is engaged in adopting whatever is, in general, the means to accomplish something good and to avoid anything which is bad. But he has no idea of what particular means tend to what particular ends, desirable or undesirable. The Śruti only informs him of that means. But it says nothing about either the reality or unreality of the distinction of actions, means and results well-known in common life, nor does it try to prevent him from proceeding in that line” (Br. Bh. 2-1-20). So no means of knowledge is invalidated if Advaita is taken to be the ultimate Reality. For as already remarked (in para 29), “The means of right knowledge are dominant in their respective individual spheres (and not elsewhere)” (Br.Bh. 2-1-20). “When unconditioned Brahman is taken to be the sole reality, there is certainly no teaching, no teacher, and no end to be achieved by understanding the teaching” (Br.Bh.2-1-20). And hence no charge of contradiction can be laid at the door of
Advaita. Nor can it be objected that the teaching of the Śāstra would be fruitless in the case of one who has realized Advaita, for one who has known the truth, has nothing else to know. “Even in ordinary life, no means of proof is seen to urge one to seek knowledge again about anything when once it has been known” (Gītā 2-69).

41. Even the mutual opposition and attempted refutation of the speculative systems, indirectly prove the truth of Advaita. For the schools presume duality to be real and put forward the claims of their respective theories and try to confute those of the other schools. Not one of them has been so far able to defend itself against all attacks and to convince all others of the truths of its own position. It follows that duality as such is the one fertile source of all conflict, and fallacies are inevitable if it is taken to be real. On the other hand, there is none to dispute the reality of the Ātman of Advaita, for He is the very Self of every one as Intuitive Consciousness. It is from this viewpoint that Śaṅkara quotes a traditional śloka which purports to say that “The knower of Vedic teaching, leaves the cause of disagreement exclusively to the disputants themselves, and rests in perfect peace, because of the consciousness of reality safe-guarded by them all” (Pra. Bh. 6-3).

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CHAPTER FIVE
SPIRITUAL CONCENTRATION

43. "Ātman verily, my dear Maitreyī, is to be seen by listening to teaching about Him, by thinking over and by contemplation. By seeing Ātman verily, through listening, thinking over and assimilation, my dear, all this becomes known" (Br. 2-4-5). So has Yājñavalkya enumerated the means of self-realization to his wife Maitreyī. Ācārya Śaṅkara explains this passage as follows: “First one has to listen to teaching about Him by the teacher as well as the Śāstra. Then one has to think over the teaching by reasoning. Then one has to contemplate upon the Reality. For thus it is that He is seen when these disciplines of listening, reasoning and contemplation are all accomplished. When these are all harmonized, then and then only, the true vision of the One Brahman is achieved and not otherwise, by mere listening” (Br. Bh. 2-4-5).

By ‘mere listening’ in the above Bhāshya, is meant listening which is not in harmony with thinking and contemplation. Any and every kind of interpretation does not constitute real listening. One must listen to the instruction of a teacher familiar with Āgama (the traditional method of efficacious teaching). And then one must reflect upon what has been listened to, and harmonize the teaching with reasoning, so as to clear all doubts and difficulties about it. Much more valuable than either of these is nididhyāsana (contemplation), for it is the final means of corroborating the teaching by one’s own experience. It is also known as vijñāna (special knowledge, assimilation). It is note-worthy that in
the above quotation, *vijñāna* is given as a synonym for *nididhyāsana*. And in the Chāndogya, it has been taught “He is to be sought out, He is to be known”. ‘Seeking’ there is but listening and thinking over here referred to; for there can be no other way of actually seeking out one’s own self. And “‘vijñāsitavyah’ there means that one should know Ātman in a special way, that is to know Him through one’s own intuition” (Ch.Bh.8-7-1).

44. Listening, thinking over and contemplation, all the three are the means to attain immediate knowledge of Ātman; when we talk of *Brahmajñāna* or *Ātmajñāna*, the word *jñāna*, does not signify either the act or the means of knowing. Knowledge involved in the word *jijñāsā* (wish to know or enquiry) is the resultant knowledge or final intuition, *Jñāpantī*. “The object of desire denoted by the desiderative suffix (the ending in the word jijñāsā) is the knowledge resulting in *avagati* (final intuitive consciousness), for desire aims at a result. It is Brahman that is desired to be intuited by jñāna the means of final knowledge. And it is the intuitive knowledge of Brahman which is the highest goal of man, because it destroys, once for all, *Avidyā* and other evils which are the seed of *samsāra*” (SBh. 1-1-1). “Reflection and contemplation are both meant for the intuitive knowledge”(SBh. 1-1-4). Now this intuitive knowledge is exactly what is meant by seeing Ātman. And so there remains nothing to be done after seeing Ātman. Everything becomes known when the Ātman is thus seen, for there is nothing else independent of Ātman. All action, means of action, and ends are due to *Avidyā* (misconception), just as the snake in the rope is the result of a misconception of the rope. Hence the Śruti says “Everything becomes known (when Ātman is seen)” (Br. Bh.2-4-5).
45. Listening (study of the teaching), thinking over and contemplation are the means for the intuitive vision of Ātman. "Since listening and the other means are to culminate in the vision, they must bear fruit in this very life in the same way as enjoined acts such as pounding paddy are to end in the appearance of rice-grains" (SBh. 4-1-1). Hence it follows that listening and other courses of discipline are to be pursued till the vision of Ātman ensues. "But in the case of those who are endowed with an adroit mind unhindered by ignorance, doubt, or misconception, the futility of repetition of these disciplines must certainly be admitted, since they would be able to intuit the meaning of the text 'That thou art' even when it is taught to them but once" (SBh. 4-1-2). Such aspirants are qualified in the highest sense for the teaching of Vedānta.

46. Upāsanā (meditation) and Nididhyāsana (contemplation) are both terms denoting preparatory species of discipline. "Upāsanā and nididhyāsana are means of mental acts involving a repeated process" (SBh. 4-1-1). Only, nididhyāsana is a particular species of upāsanā having a result to be experienced in this very life. "As for the upāsanās which are meant for perfect knowledge, the limit of their application is of course quite determined since they are to end in a visible effect just as acts like pounding of the paddy. For it cannot be insisted that some additional effort is necessary even after the effect, to wit, right vision of Ātman, is achieved" (SBh. 4-1-12); not so in the case of the other upāsanās, for their practice has to be continued for life, since the effect is to be experienced only after departure from the body, and depends on the last thought at the moment of dying.
The terms *upāsanā* and *Vedana*, may mean either meditation or knowledge according to context. For instance in the passage “He who devotes himself (*upāste*) individually to them he does not know (*veda*); for (the Self) will be incomplete when taken singly out of the whole. Therefore one should take to it (*upāsīta*) as Ātman, for all these become one here” (Br. 1-4-7). In this text both the terms *upāsanā* and *vedana* are knowledge of Ātman, whereas the self-same words are used in the sense of meditation (*upāsanā*) in this Śruti: “One should meditate (*upāsīta*) upon mind as Brahman, whoever knows (*veda*) it thus he shines and warms up with name and fame, and spiritual splendour” (Ch. 3-18-1, 3). Now meditation is an act, while knowledge is not that. “An action is that which is enjoined without any regard to the nature of an existent thing, and which depends upon the exercise of a person’s will....Although meditation or flow of thought is a modification of the mind, yet it is possible for a person either to do or not to do, or even to do it in a wrong way, since it quite depends on the will of the person meditating. Knowledge, on the other hand, is to be effected by some *pramāṇa*, and a *pramāṇa* has to conform to the nature of its object as it is. Knowledge therefore is not something which can be done, left undone or done in the wrong way at will, for it exclusively depends on an existent thing and not any Vedic injunction nor on a person’s will” (SBh. 1-1-4). The knowledge of Brahman as one’s own Self, is in fact that consciousness (*jñāpti*) which has been already referred to (in para 44) as ‘avagati’ (intuition). “Consciousness (*jñāpti*) is identical with Ātman and not some thing different therefrom. Hence it is eternal. The modifications of the mind as an *Upādhi*, which passing through the organs of hearing,
sight &c. assume the forms of objects like sound, arise at their very inception only as objects of and pervaded by the consciousness which is Ātman. It is for this reason that they are semblances of Ātman-Consciousness commonly called by the name of knowledge, are imagined by people lacking in discrimination to be properties modifying Ātman Himself” (Tai. Bh. 2-1). It is from this common-sense viewpoint that we can talk of knowledge as ‘arising’ in conformity with the nature of its object. The knowledge of Brahman arising from Vedanta teaching means necessarily a mental modification and as such it cannot objectify Ātman. Yet it is called Ātma-jñāna because it reflects the Ātman, who is of the nature of consciousness and it is also in this sense that it is contrasted with meditation as dependent on its object and not on any injunction or a person’s will.

_Nididhyāsana_ no doubt is mental too, and it is also a kind of steady flow of thought enjoined by the Śruti just as any other upāsana is. But the former is a mental process of focussing one’s closest attention in order to realize the nature of its object. “Come, sit down, I shall explain it to you. You had better try to assimilate it by close attention (nididhyāsasva)” (Br. 2-4-4). In this passage Yājñavalkya in using the word _nididhyāsasva_ evidently exhorts Maitreyi to concentrate her mind upon what he says so that she might understand the thing without any doubt or difficulty.

48. In the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya the term ‘Yōga’ is sometimes seen to be used as a variant for both _upāsana_ and _nididhyāsana_. “The white (sukla) and other paths to liberation which the Yōgins (devotees) speak of, are not paths to real freedom, for they relate to worldly life only. They merely lead to the worlds of
Brahma and other gods, since reference is made in that context to departing through particular parts of the body in such terms as 'The Ātman departs either through the eye or through the head, or through any other opening in the body' (Br. 4-4-2)" (Br. Bh. 4-4-9). In this context, evidently, the yōgins referred to are upāsakās. "Now will be taught the resultant fruit of yōga, the realization of the identity of one's Self with Brahman, leading to the complete cessation of all mundane suffering" (GBh. 6-29). The yōga mentioned here is nididhyāsana or concentrated contemplation. In his commentary on a particular verse in the Gītā, Śaṅkara remarks that 'dhyāna is thinking on the nature of the Self and yōga is exclusive concentration on the Self' (GBh. 18-52). There also the yōga referred to is 'nididhyāsana'. And in the Śūtra-Bhāṣya, "Now, as for this samādhi which is taught in the Vedantas, which aims at the realization of the Ātman of the Upanishads..." (SBh. 2-3-39), the samādhi to which reference is made is nididhyāsana likewise. Samādhi literally means concentration upon the Self. "Moreover, yōgins visualize this Ātman, the unmanifest, devoid of all plurality, during the time of Samrādhana, and Samrādhana means the practice of devotion, flow of thought and focussed attention" (SBh. 3-2-24). In this passage too, taken from the Śūtra-Bhāṣya, by yōgins are meant those who conduct nididhyāsana; and samrādhana is the process of practising this kind of contemplation. Again in the Śruti "The wise one having realized this Deva (Ātman) through the Adhyātma-yōga overcomes both elation and grief" (Ka. 1-2-12). Śaṅkara explains 'Adhyātma- yōga' to be "the concentration of the mind which has been withdrawn from the sense-objects" referring again to this nididhyāsana. And the mano-nigraha (control of the
mind) which Gaudapāda refers to (GK. 3-40) as resulting in fearlessness and realization of Ātman, is nothing but *nīḍīḍhyāsana*. If we take note of the fact that in all such cases *nīḍīḍhyāsana* is invariably taken to be the means of realization of Ātman, it will be evident that it is not the ‘yōga’ practice as taught by *Patañjali* that is meant. This should be sufficient to dispel the false notion that *nīḍīḍhyāsana* should result in ‘Nīrvikalpa Samādhi’ (trance bereft of all thought constructions) before knowledge of Ātman dawns. When the realization of Ātman is achieved through *nīḍīḍhyāsana* the mind is transformed into no-mind (*amanībḥāva*) or Ātman” (GK. 3-31, 32). It does not result in mere ‘suppression of the modifications of the mind (*cit-tavṛttinirōdha*)’ as taught by *Patañjali*.

49. The word ‘samādhi’ has been variously interpreted by Śaṅkara to suit the particular contexts in which it occurs. “To those who are attached to enjoyment and power, and whose mind is enticed by the flower of speech relating to particular rites, the thought of resolve is never formed in their samādhi” (G. 2-44). Here the Ācārya explains samādhi as the mind in which everything is deposited for the enjoyment of the person concerned. In the verse (G.2-53) ‘When thy mind now perplexed by various Śrutis stays steadily on the samādhi, then wilt thou attain yōga’, he takes samādhi to mean the Ātman, since the mind becomes stable when staying on the ‘Ātman’. And in the śloka “What is the description, O Keśava, of the steady-minded one who has taken his stand in samādhi?” (G.2-54), the Ācārya interprets ‘samādhhisthasya’ as of one who has got discrimination acquired through a balanced mind, or in other words, of one who has realized Ātman as distinguished from all not-self. Again in commenting on the sentence “Now
listen to wisdom concerning the *yoga*” (G. 2-39), the \Acarya says “wisdom regarding the Karma-yoga or performance of works, and in the \yoga of samādhi” meaning *nīdīhyāsana* otherwise called *Dhyāna-yoga* by the term *samādhi*. He has nowhere stated that *samādhi*, *Savikalpa* or *Nirvikalpa*, (trance with or without thought-constructions), is the result of *nīdīhyāsana*. As for the \Śruti, it expressly declares that *nīdīhyāsana* is a direct means to intuitive vision of \Ātman.

* * *
CHAPTER SIX

THE PURPORT OF THE VEDANTIC TEXTS IS TO TEACH THE NATURE OF ÂTMAN

50. Do the Vedanta texts aim at teaching the nature of the Self as identical with Brahman or do they aim at enjoining some action? It is essential for the orthodox students of Vedanta to find out an answer to this important question. For the purposes of this chapter, we shall suppose that the orthodox are those who believe that the knowledge arising out of the Vedantic teaching is the only means to final liberation. By ‘Vedantas’ we mean the well known Upanishads. Inasmuch as they are also part and parcel of the Veda, they may be expected to aim at enjoining something. “Nowhere do we find, nor is it reasonable to hold, that the Vedic texts serve any purpose unless they have something to do with an injunction” (SBh. 1-1-4). Such is the prima facie view. “This innate super-imposition of the nature of wrong notion, beginningless and endless as being the occasion for living beings to conceive themselves as agents and experiencers of the fruits of their actions, is a matter of common experience. With a view to the destruction of this cause of all evils, all the Vedantas are begun, in order to enable one to attain the knowledge of the unity of Atman” (ABh. SB.). This is Ācārya Śaṅkara’s position.

51. Brahman is known only through the Vedanta Śāstra, and the Śāstra has the single aim of teaching Brahman. For “Statements in all Vedantas are uniformly found purporting to teach this” (SBh. 1-1-4). This uniform aim is visible in a three-fold context. The first
indication of the purport is that all the Vedantas whether belonging to Rk, Yajus, Sāma and Atharva Veda, uniformly teach Brahman. The second indication is that statements in any particular Upanishad all teach Brahman in a sustained way. And the third one is that the words in the principal statements have a syntactical connection only as referring to Brahman. The Saṁskrit word samanvaya literally means, going in perfect harmony with something, agreement. The aforesaid harmonious agreement of the various Vedantas, the agreement of the sentences in each individual Upanishad and the syntactical agreement of the words in the principal propositions—this threefold agreement endorses the view that the Vedanta-Śāstra purports to teach Brahman only. This has been conclusively shown in the commentary on the aphorism ‘Tat tu samanvayat’ (That is because of the agreement). (V.S.1-1-4)

52. Since action is the purport of the Veda (‘whatever texts do not relate to it serve no purpose’) (Jai. S. 1-2-1). ‘It is well known that it aims at teaching rituals’ (Śa. Bh. 1-2-1)- these statements of Jaimini and Śabaraszwami relate to the enquiry into Karma (religious work) and justify the validity of the Karma-kāṇḍa of the Veda. But in such texts as “This Ātman is Brahman, the experiencer of everything” (Br. 2-5-19), teach Brahman alone. “And it is not proper to interpret this as teaching something else, while the syntactic agreement of the words is seen unfailingly to point to the nature of Brahman” (SBh. 1-1-4).

53. Although such words as satya (reality) that constitute texts like “Brahman is Reality, Consciousness and the Infinite...” (Tai. 2-1) syntactically refer to
Brahman, it is not directly signified by those words. "Nor is Brahman denoted by the word consciousness. Nevertheless, it is indicated by the word consciousness which is really the name of its semblance, a property of the mind. So with regard to the term 'Reality'. Since Brahman is altogether devoid of specific characteristics such as genus, substance etc., It is merely indicated by the word 'Reality' which ordinarily denotes the objective genus reality, while it is not directly expressed by that word. Thus 'Reality' and the other words mutually restrict one another on account of their concatenation, distinguish Brahman from the objects directly signified by them, and at the same time serve to point to Brahman by indirect indication. Thus it is established that Brahman is neither denoted by any word nor directly taught by means of an ordinary sentence of the form, for instance, of 'The lotus is a blue, large, sweet-smelling flower'. This is in accordance with the Śrutis 'From which all words return along with the mind having failed to reach It' (Tai. 2-9), 'Undefined and having no other basis' (Tai. 2-7)" (Tai. Bh. 2-1).

54. It cannot be maintained that Vedantic texts teach Ātman as an agent of action. "For the Śruti 'There, whom could one see and with what instrument?' (Br. 4-4-15) totally rejects all action, instrument of action as well as the result of action in the case of Ātman" (SBh. 1-1-4).

55. It is not right to think that since Brahman is an already-existing entity and not an action to be accomplished, it ought to be accessible to some means of knowledge other than Śruti. "Though Brahman is an existing entity, it cannot be the object of perception or other means of knowledge; for the identity of Brahman
40 Salient Features of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta

and the Self, cannot be ascertained through any means other than the Śāstra” (SBh. 1-1-4).

56. It is wrong to maintain that the Vedanta ought not to be regarded as teaching an existent entity, simply because the texts of the Karma-kāṇḍa do not teach things not connected with any injunction. “Although Vedic texts have not been elsewhere seen to have validity without any connection with an injunction, yet it is not possible to deny the validity of the Śāstra teaching Ātman, for the knowledge arising out of that teaching culminates in an actual result experienced here. Nor is the validity of the Śāstra in need of any proof by inference, in which case only we should have to seek for an example in support of the inference” (SBh. 1-1-4). Hence the analogy of the Karma-kāṇḍa texts serves no useful purpose here. “The fact that a particular text teaches a thing or an action is no criterion for its validity or invalidity, the only criterion being whether or not it gives rise to knowledge having a sure effect. Whichever text satisfies that condition, is valid and whichever does not, is invalid (Br. Bh. 1-4-7).

57. Some schools, while admitting that the Śāstra is the one source of the knowledge of Brahman, maintain that it teaches Brahman only as an accessory to the injunction of some meditation. In the same way as the Yūpa (sacrificial post), the Āhavaniya (a sacrificial fire) and other existent things unknown to common life, are taught as accessory to religious works, Brahman though an existent entity may well be taught, in their opinion, as an accessory to upāsana enjoined in the Śāstra without anything derogatory to the latter’s validity. Their position is that the Śāstra can serve some purpose only in so far as it is either incentive or dissuasive. Such
injunctions as ‘Ātman verily, my dear, is to be seen’ (Br.2-4-5), ‘He is to be sought out, He is to be known’ (Ch. 8-7-1), are to be found in the context of Ātmajñāna also. These teachers believe that Ātman is presented there as an object of meditation enjoined there. “‘Not such, not such’ (Br.2-3-6), ‘Not gross....’ (Br.3-8-8), ‘One alone without a second’ (Ch.6-2-1), ‘Transcending hunger and other defilements’ (Br.3-5-1)-these and other statements serve the purpose of presenting the particular form of the Brahman to be meditated upon. And the fruit of the meditation is either liberation or cessation of Avidyā.” (Br. Bh.1-4-7)

Now this view that Brahman is only an accessory to meditation ordained by the Śruti, is not correct. For in the first place, if liberation be deemed to be the effect of meditation, it “would then have to be regarded as only a species of the effects of Karma, one of the various grades already described. But liberation is universally acknowledged to be eternal by all those who recognize it. Hence it is improper to think that Brahman is taught as an accessory to something to be done” (SBh. 1-1-4). Secondly, there cannot possibly be any scope for meditation after the enlightenment of the sole reality of Ātman has appeared. “For the idea of duality which has been effaced by the realization of the unity of Ātman, cannot rear its head any more” (SBh.1-1-4) and therefore Brahman as that non-dual Ātman cannot be made subservient to any meditation. And thirdly, it is not justifiable to hold that statements describing Ātman are only meant to present the nature of the object of meditation desiderated by the injunction “Ātman verily is to be seen”. “For statements presenting the nature of Ātman such as ‘That thou art’ themselves lead directly to the realization of Ātman at the very moment one
understands their meaning by listening to them and there remains nothing else to be done in deference to the injunction about seeing Ātman” (Br.Bh. 1-4-7).

58. Some think that the continuous remembrance of the knowledge of Ātman arising out of the Vedantic teaching, has to be carried on to attain liberation, and that has got to be enjoined by the Śruti. That is not admissible either. For when the idea of the not-self has been rejected as false, its impressions cannot rise up again and hence “the impressions due to the knowledge of the unity of Ātman continue as a matter of course, and hence there is no need for the Śruti to enjoin them” (Br.Bh. 1-4-7).

59. “Brahman is seen to be taught by the Upanishads in two different aspects, one as qualified by different Upādhis or limiting factors which are the different modifications of name and form, and the other as the opposite of this, that is, as altogether free from all limiting conditions. Now it is only in the state of ignorance, that we talk of the distinctions of Brahman as the object of meditation, the meditator, and the like” (SBh. 1-1-12). It is to Brahman as the object of meditation—and not to Brahman to be realized—that forms, attributes and the like are ascribed. Of the two sets of texts, such Śrutis as the following lay stress on the Self as Brahman free from all distinctions ‘Not gross, not subtle, neither short nor long’(Br. 3-8-8), ‘Soundless, contactless, formless, undecaying’(Kā. 1-3-15), ‘Ākāśa, indeed, is that which differentiates (the undifferentiated) into names and forms, and that is Brahman which is beyond them’(Ch. 8-14-1), ‘Effulgent, formless is the Purusha, changeless both within and without’ (Mu.2-1-2). Now this is Brahman having neither an antecedent
nor a consequent, neither within nor without, this self is Brahman, the all-experiencer' (Br. 2-5-19). That texts like these do not lay emphasis on anything else has been conclusively shown in the commentary on the Śūtra 'But that is because of the concord' (SBh. 1-1-4). But the texts which teach Brahman with form are not mainly concerned with the nature of Brahman, for they are primarily meant to enjoin the meditation of Brahman' (SBh. 3-2-14). Hence it is not right to say that Brahman free from all distinctions or thought-constructions which Śrutis directly aim at presenting is to be treated as subservient to any injunction of meditation (upāsana).

60. Nor would it be right to consider that the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and the Self is in itself a kind of Upāsana. For in that case, such an injunction would have to be conceived as (1) either an injunction of meditation of some ascribed attribute, as for instance in the meditation of the mind as the Viśvedeva gods on the score of its possessing innumerable modifications (Br. 3-1-9), or as (2) an injunction of a mental super-imposition, such as that of meditating the mind as Brahman or again as (3) an injunction of a specific activity, as in the meditation of Vāyu (the cosmic Life-principle) as the final merger (Ch. 4-3-1), or finally as (4) the injunction of a meditation for a ceremonial purification of Ātman, as for instance in the case of ghee to be purified by a look on the part of the sacrificer’s wife. "If the unity of Brahman and the self be taken as falling under any one of the above-mentioned forms of meditation, the syntactical agreement of the words tending to make the texts, like ‘That thou art’, ‘I am Brahman’, and ‘This Self is Brahman’—statements of the unity of Brahman and the Self, would be
disturbed" (SBh.1-1-4) and texts like “The knots of the heart are cut asunder, and all doubts are resolved” teaching the cessation of *Avidyā*, as the result of this knowledge would also be disregarded. And in none of the aforesaid conceptions of meditation could we be able to construe faithfully texts which teach the self as attaining the very nature of Brahman, such texts for instance as ‘the knower of Brahman verily becomes Brahman itself’ (SBh. 1-1-4).

61. “Nor can it be held that the knowledge of the Self as Brahman is itself enjoined. For the knowledge of the Self as Brahman relates to an existent fact, and as such it is not dependent on any injunction. Hence there being neither a person to be urged nor an action to be done, the imperative ending (*lin*) and other suffixes denoting an injunction when applied to it become altogether ineffective very much like the sharp edge of a razor or other instrument which becomes blunt when applied to a stone or any other hard thing, for they are then dealing with something which can be neither acquired nor avoided” (SBh. 1-1-4). “It is well-known that an injunction can function only with regard to things that can be acquired or shunned.” (SBh. 1-1-4)

62. Of what use then are the texts which look like injunctions at any rate? Why do these make their appearance in the context of Self-knowledge if the latter cannot be enjoined at all? Such texts, for instance as ‘Ātman indeed, is to be seen; He is to be heard about....’ (Br.2-4-5). Our reply to this query is as follows: “When an extrovert person endeavours to acquire what is pleasant or to avoid what is unpleasant to him, but finds therein no hope of attaining the highest goal of human life while he is actually anxious to reach such a
goal, such texts as the one cited above make him set his face against the natural activity of the aggregate of the body and the senses, and continually direct the stream of his thought towards his inner Self. And when he has thus set himself to seeking Ātman, the real nature of the Self which is neither to be acquired nor to be avoided is taught by Śrutis like ‘All this is verily this Ātman’ (Br. 2-4-6)....” (SBh. 1-1-4). And he becomes free by virtue of that knowledge. “Even in ordinary life, when we say ‘Look at this!’ or ‘Listen to this!’ or make other similar statements, we only mean to direct one to concentrate one’s attention on the fact, but do not ask him actually to set about knowing it. For even when one has turned his attention towards the thing to be known; actual knowledge may or may not ensue according to circumstances. Therefore one who wishes to teach something existent, has only to point out the object to be known and knowledge will arise just in accordance with the nature of the object and means of knowledge” (SBh. 3-2-21).

63. There were some ancient Vedantins who thought that Śrutis urge the seeker to endeavour to dissolve the world of duality. But Śaṅkara says, “since the world is the product of Avidyā or super-imposition “Only Brahman has to be pointed out after negating the world of duality super-imposed by Avidyā” (SBh. 3-2-21) and by no other means can we hope to dissolve the world. Hence it is futile to command one to do that.

64. There are some who believe in the need for an injunction on the ground that a mere statement about Ātman could be of no avail. But “We do find that even a mere statement is effective, as for instance, a statement like ‘This is only a rope, not a snake’” (SBh. 1-1-4).
An objection is sometimes started that unlike the rope-statement a mere statement about Brahman as the Self is not found to result in the realization of the identity, for we know that actually in too many cases the suffering soul continues to be such even after listening to Śāstaic teaching. But this objection has been already answered (in para 32). In the text ‘That thou art’, the word ‘That’ is intended to convey the Reality free from birth and other modifications, free from all the attributes of a substance, the Reality of the nature of Pure Consciousness knowable through immediate intuition. And the word ‘thou’ in the statement, is intended to indicate the consciousness other than the body, vital principle, mentation, intellect and the ego, all of which are likely to be imagined to be denoted by the term. “Now in the case of those for whom these significations of the two terms are intercepted by ignorance, doubt or misconception, the statement ‘That thou art’ cannot possibly give rise to the understanding of what it teaches” (SBh. 4-1-2). But the understanding does arise in the case of one who has grasped the meaning of those terms. “It is impossible to show that one who has realized his identity with Brahman remains a suffering soul just as before. For that suffering is incompatible with the knowledge of one’s identity with Brahman, which is the outcome of Vedic teaching” (SBh. 1-1-4).

65. One more objection can be started against the view that Vedantic teaching can give rise to real knowledge of Brahman. The starting postulate was that ‘Brahman is our very Self and hence it is no object of concept or speech. No means of knowledge can possibly point it out since it is not a knowable entity, and no words can describe it as it has no specific attributes’. It is now being claimed that a Vedantic passage purports
to teach Brahman, that the words in the Vedantic sen-
tence can have syntactical agreement which tends to
point out Brahman, and that the knowledge arising out
of Vedantic teaching can do away with samsāra. How are
we to reconcile these two mutually opposed views?

This objection has been virtually disposed of
already. From the stand-point of Avidyā or the mutual
super-imposition of the Self and the not-Self, we are all
enquirers living the mundane life and in search of true
knowledge, and at this stage the Śāstra is the means for
us to the attainment of the knowledge of the Real. The
Śāstra teaches us that our Self is Brahman itself free
from all duality, by abolishing the very distinction of
knowledge and its object, before we realize our identity
with Brahman. And from that paramārtha (metaphysi-
cal) point of view, where the unity of Ātman is realized,
there is no distinction whatsoever of knower and know-
able. Nor is Ātman then the object of any knowledge.
“Hence all injunctions and all other means of
knowledge remain as such only up to the moment of
their culmination in the transcendental awareness of
the form of ‘I am Brahman’. For when the non-dual
Ātman has been realized, the pramāṇas or means of
knowledge cannot continue to function as such, since
they are deprived of both the knower and the objects of
knowledge” (SBh. 1-1-4).

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CHAPTER SEVEN
ĀTMAN AS ABOVE ALL STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

66. The empirical view that one is a knower is the view of ignorance, Āvidyā. It is from this point of view that all secular and Vedic activities proceed. For the idea that one is a knower, is the result of a mental superimposition of the real Witnessing inner Ātman and the unreal object witnessed, to wit, the body, the senses and the mind. “This secular and Vedic activity being the effect of Āvidyā, ceases on the cessation of Āvidyā in the case of one who is possessed of the steady knowledge due to the dawn of the discrimination of the Self; and Āvidyā ceases because it is opposed to Vidyā (enlightenment) just as darkness is dispersed as soon as the sun rises” (GBh. 2-69). This point may be made still more convincing on an examination of the three states of consciousness. (Avasthātraya Parīkṣā).

67. The three states i.e. waking, dream and deep sleep are to be subjected to an orderly scrutiny. “That by which ‘the worldly (waking), the pure worldly (dream) and the ultra-worldly (sound sleep)’ states become known is ‘the knowledge’; these very states are ‘the knowable’ inasmuch as there is nothing to be known beyond them and all the basic principles postulated by the different schools of philosophy are included within their limits. And the Vijneya, the specially knowable, is the highest reality known as the Fourth (Turiya), the essential nature of the non-dual, unborn Ātman (GK. Bh. 4-88). When the knowledge of the worldly (waking)
and other states is attained and when the threefold knowable is realized by a gradual process, that is to say, the process which consists in understanding the worldly (waking) first of all, then realizing the pure-worldly (dream) by noticing the disappearance of the waking in it, then being aware of the ultra-worldly (sound sleep) by noticing the disappearance of the previous dream-state in it—and when by such a process noticing the disappearance of all the three states in it, the really real, the Turīya (the Fourth), the non-dual, unborn, fearless (entity) is intuited, the aspirant has taken his stand in his own Self, his true nature” (GK. Bh.4-89). Here knowing the waking and the other states, means nothing else than to intuit the Reality underlying them all and thus to reduce them into that Reality which is known as ‘the Fourth’.

68. Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, Prajña and the Turīya have been called the pādās (literally feet), aspects of Ātman. Ātman conditioned by the waking state is ‘Vaiśvānara’. The entire waking world divided into the Ādhyātmika (internal), Ādhibhautika (external) and the Ādhideivaivika (of the presiding deities) -forms the conditioning factor for Ātman here. This is the first of the four aspects of the real Ātman. Similarly Taijasa conditioned by dream is the second and Prajña conditioned by sleep is the third aspect. “The knowledge of the fourth is attained by merging each of the preceeding, the Viśva and the other aspects in the succeeding one. So the word pāda applied to them is to be understood in the sense of the instrumental case” as that by means of which Turīya is attained (padyate anena iti). But in the case of Turīya, it is to be understood in the sense of the objective, that is, as that which is attained (padyatē iti)”. So says Śaṅkara (Mān.Bh. 2).
Such being the case, the text ‘Now this Ātman is four-footed’ should not be understood as teaching actually four feet to Ātman additively. What is really meant here is that one and the same Ātman can be seen in four different ways, only the fourth being the reality about Him.

69. ‘Viśva’, ‘Virāt-purusha’ and ‘Vaiśvānara’ — all these three are names of the witnessing Ātman conditioned by the waking state. ‘Taijasa’ and ‘Hiranyagarbha’ are both the names of the Ātman conditioned by the dream state. ‘Prājña’, ‘Avyākrita’ and ‘Prāṇa’ — these three are the names of the Ātman conditioned by deep sleep. “All the world inclusive of the region of the gods together with this Self, is proposed to be presented as forming the four several aspects of Ātman. Only thus is Advaita established after the abolition of all duality, and only thus is the one Ātman visioned in all beings as also all beings in that Ātman.... . Otherwise only the inner-self delimited by one’s own body would have to be taken to be the Ātman, as for instance it is taken by the Sāmkhyas and others. And if it be so taken, Advaita, the unique teaching of the Śrūtis, would be missed” (Mān. Bh.3).

70. People commonly believe that the waking state represents the real while the dream state represents the unreal. But this opinion is not grounded in fact. “The wise consider both the states waking and dreaming as of the same value, for the well-known reason that the different phenomena in each are of the same nature presented as they are in the relation of perceiver and perceived” (GK.Bh.2-5). The things in each state equally possess causal efficiency in their respective sphere. For instance fire burns, food satisfies hunger, and so on. That the efficiency of things felt in one state is stultified
in the other, applies to both. External things perceived are considered real, and mere imaginary ideas in the mind are thought to be unreal in both the states. Again, in both the states, ideas in the mind last for a time living a lonely life, while each of the external phenomena enjoys a life coeval with another. That mental impressions are unmanifest while external things are manifest, is equally true in the two states. All these are common characteristics of both the states. Time, space and causality peculiar to the particular state, are experienced in both. Hence these two states are quite independent, and equally unreal, since each is totally abolished while the other state lasts. This has been explained at length in the Bhāshya on the second chapter of Gauḍapāda’s work (GK.Bh.2–6 to 15).

71. Chitta (the mind) manifests itself in the form of duality as much in the waking state as in dream. We see many souls in the waking state just as in dream. The phenomena noticed in dream are not independent of the mind there; nor is that mind independent of the dream- observer. The same is true of the waking state. The phenomena there do not enjoy an existence of their own apart from the mind noticing them; nor has the mind any existence of its own independent of the waking observer. Apart from the Witnessing Self neither the mind nor the phenomena enjoy any absolute existence, for they are relative to each other. The souls which one comes in contact with during one’s waking, are all imaginary, just like dream- souls, souls created by magic or souls conjured up by virtue of spells, yogic power and the like. Every thing there is really the mind, and the mind really Ātman. This is set forth at length in Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Alātaśānti Prakaraṇa (GK. Bh. 4-61 to 72).
72. Both in dream and waking is to be found time in its dual aspect, subjective and objective. In both are experienced time, space and causality appropriate to each. Hence it follows that these two states are not related to each other in point of any particular time, space and causal relation common to both. One might take illusory appearances for reality in a dream just as much as he does in the waking state. So we conclude that one confronts phenomena in dreams “then and there and not those arising out of waking experience” (GK.Bh. 4-41). It is quite wrong to suppose that there is a real cause-and-effect relation between the two states.

73. We thus arrive at the conclusion that waking and dream do each present a world peculiar to each, “Knowing that the infinite and all-pervading Ātman by means of whose light one is enabled to see both the dream-state and the waking state, the wise one grieves no more” (Kā. 2-1-4).

74. Waking and dream are each the result of mind-vibration peculiar to the respective states. “The waking consciousness, provided as it is with various gate-ways of knowledge, appears as though it had external things for its objects. But being really no more than mind-vibration it deposits corresponding impressions in the mind. And the mind thus impressed, behaves like a canvas on which a picture has been printed. Urged by ignorance, feelings and the effects of previous actions it presents itself as a replica of waking in spite of the fact that it is not equipped with external aids” (Mā.Bh. 4). This description of waking is from the empirical standpoint. But really speaking, there is no relation whatsoever between the two states. It is generally believed that waking is a public experience common to all, whereas dream is an experience private to each in-
dividual. The truth, however, is this: “Just as a dream appears to be an experience common to all, though in fact it is an individual experience of the dreamer, so also waking which we suppose to be its cause, ought to be only apparently common to all and not really a state of public experience, any more than a dream” (GK.Bh. 4-37). We have already seen that both waking and dream are unreal and there is nothing exclusively distinctive about either state. Nor is it right to imagine a causal relation between the two since they have neither temporal nor special connection. The misconception of taking the non-dual Ātman for a knowing Self related to means and objects of knowledge is a feature common to both the states.

75. This conclusion that either of the states waking or dream is no more than a dream, a misconception of reality, has the sanction of the Śruti also. Here is a statement in support of this view: “Now this same Ātman enjoys himself and roams about in the waking state merely seeing good and evil (deeds), and again comes back in the inverse order to his former condition to the dream state direct” (Br. 4-3-17). If the Śruti did not consider waking also to be a dream, it would have said ‘does good and evil deeds’ in contrast to merely ‘seeing’ them in a dream. Similarly while defining sound sleep, the Śruti designates it as “that state wherein one never desires any pleasures, and sees no dream whatever” (Br.4-3-19). Ācārya Śaṅkara remarks in this connection “The Śruti considers even the experience of waking a dream, and hence it says ‘where one sees no dream whatever’ ” (Br.Bh. 4-3-19).

76. In sound sleep we do not see things distinct from one another as in waking or dream state; nor are
the ideas of things or the pleasures and pains derived from them distinctly experienced as in the two other states. “Prājñā whose limiting condition is sound sleep, who is unified, one mass of homogeneous consciousness, full of bliss and enjoying bliss only and the door to distinct awareness, is the third pāda” (Mān.5). “The Ātman here is called ‘Prājñā’ because Pure Consciousness (prājñā) is his special feature since the Ātman in the other two states have individualized consciousness also” (Mān. Bh. 5). It should be noted that the Ātman in sleep is not only Pure Consciousness, but also Pure Being and Pure Bliss likewise.

77. In sound sleep the soul (jīva) the knower divests himself of the nature of a knowing self. “When that mind suffused by which and stationed in which the soul is capable of thinking, seeing, hearing and performing other similar functions, when that is dissolved, the soul assumes its own divine nature” (Ch. Bh. 6-8-1). The Śruti says “When a man is spoken of as sleeping (svapitī), then, my dear boy, he is in union with Pure Being, he is dissolved (apītō bhavati) into his own (svam) nature” (Ch. 6-8-1). Śaṅkara remarks that Uddālaka proposes to show his son, his own divine nature, divested of his soul-nature, in sleep alone.

78. The Śruti describes in a variety of ways the Self in sound sleep in order to bring its divine nature home to the listener. “Pure like clear water, One, the Seer without a second. This is the Brahma-world, O Supreme Ruler” - so said Yājñavalkya. “This is its supreme good, this is its highest attainment, this is its highest heaven, and this is its supreme bliss. Other beings live on a particle of this self-same Bliss” (Br. 4-3-32). “Here a father becomes no father, a mother no mother, the worlds no worlds, the gods no gods, the Vedas no Vedas.
Here a thief becomes no thief, the killer of an embryo no such killer, a caṇḍāla no-caṇḍāla, a paulkasa no-paulkasa, a monk no-monk, a hermit no-hermit. This nature is untainted by good, untainted by bad; for he is then verily beyond all woes of the heart” (Br. 4-3-22). The experience of sound sleep is quite in consonance with this teaching. For there is universal experience supporting the view that Ātman is of the nature of supreme bliss, above all distinctions of the knower and the known; and of doer, deed and means and results of deeds.

79. Distinction of names and forms experienced in waking or dream, is entirely absent in deep sleep. No time, space or causality is experienced there. Hence the Ātman in deep sleep has been characterized in the Śrutis as the undifferentiated Self. “He is the Lord of all, He the All-knowing one; He is the Inner-Controller, He is the Source of all, the Generator and Dissolver of beings” (Mān. 6). This description quite fits in with the experience of the Self in sound sleep. Another Upanishadic text tells us how all this world comes out of the Ātman in sleep: “As a spider stretches itself out in the form of a thread, and as from a fire dart out tiny sparks, so also from this Ātman come out all organs (of sense and activity), all the worlds, all the gods and all creatures” (Br. 2-1-20). In deep sleep we do not find the world distinguished by deeds, instruments of action and results thereof. The witnessing Self there continues to show itself in both waking and dream. But a special feature of these latter states is that there are a number of distinct souls and details of deeds, instruments and results. When we ponder over these two facts we have no grounds to suppose that there is either any material or efficient cause for this world except Ātman. We have therefore to admit that the witnessing Ātman is Himself
the origin as well as the resort of the dissolution for this world, that the world is held up by Ātman, and shines in the light of His consciousness, and that Ātman alone is the Self of all beings. Here again we have the support of universal experience for the statement made by the Śrutī that the Self in sleep is really the omniscient Lord of all and the Inner-Controller.

80. Looked at from this stand-point, Ātman would appear to present himself in two different forms, one with and the other exempt from multiplicity. But inasmuch as the multiformity is experienced only in waking and dreaming, and as that is only a false appearance as we have seen before, we have to conclude that the manifold aspect is only the figment of ignorance. Compared to Ātman, all phenomena are unreal and have only Ātman for their essence. All selves to be distinguished as Viśva, Taijasa or Prājña actually exist as identical with the causal Ātman before they make their appearance in their illusory forms of names and forms shaped by ignorance. Just as the snake is existent as the rope before its appearance so also all beings do exist as identical with the causal Ātman as their seed, prior to their creation” (GK. Bh.1-6).

81. It is stated in the Śrutis that Brahman first wished to become many and be born as the many, and then manifested Itself as the world. This becoming many is nothing but the differentiation of the ignorance-fabricated names and forms which were one with Ātman before their appearance. “When the unmanifested names and forms previously existent in and as Ātman are differentiated, then those names and forms are differentiated in all circumstances without renouncing their nature as Ātman, never distinct in time, space from Brahman. This differentiation of names and forms is the ‘becoming many’ spoken of here, for there can be no
other possible way of becoming many for Brahman which has no parts” (Tai. Bh. 2-6). Since Brahman is without parts, It cannot actually assume the form of the manifold like a seed which breaks up into parts and exhausts itself in a tree branching off in many forms; nor can it shrink itself in size, rolling up its multiple forms into one. An illusory snake never abandons its nature of being a rope even while it appears to be a snake. Similarly the world of innumerable beings and things will not have shaken off its real nature as the witnessing Ātman non-different from the non-dual Brahman, even while manifesting itself in its manifold form during waking or dream.

82. On this view, it is clear that Ātman remains the same for ever. “The evolution of sound sleep, dream and waking, is like a rope thrown up by a magician. Prājñā, Taijasa and Viśva are like the illusory magicians created by him for climbing up the rope, and the reality called the Fourth is like the self-same real magician altogether distinct and different from both the created rope and the illusory juggler who, all the while remained standing on the ground though screened by magic from the sight of the on-lookers” (GK. 1-7). Neither the three states nor the Ātmans in those states have any existence apart from the real Ātman.

83. And why does Ātman create the world of names and forms, while remaining intact? This is not a legitimate question, for metaphysically speaking, Ātman has never transformed Himself into the world. “No reason can be assigned for substances like the rope illusorily appearing like a snake and so on; one can only say that it is their nature to appear so through the perceiver’s ignorance” (GK. Bh. 1-9). Similarly Ātman naturally appears to have assumed the form of the manifold from the stand-point of ignorance. We cannot
attribute this appearance to anything else but natural ignorance.

84. What is the upshot of the examination of the three states? "Manifestations like inward consciousness or outward consciousness are unreal because they annul one another just like the snake, a streak of water or any other fancy construction on a rope. And the nature of Consciousness itself is real because it is never annulled in any state" (Mān. Bh. 7). Outward consciousness appears only in waking and inward consciousness appears only in dreams, while unconsciousness characterizes sleep only. Hence none of these phases which manifest themselves in the states peculiar to them, can be regarded as pertaining to the essential nature of Ātman. Waking, dream and sound sleep do not for a like reason really belong to the essence of Ātman. So we arrive at the conclusion that neither the manifold world nor its absence enters into the nature of Ātman. Pure Consciousness alone is his real nature.

85. But, it will be objected, even consciousness forsakes Ātman during deep sleep. For do we not remember on waking that we knew nothing during our sleep? "No, consciousness does not desert him in sleep, for one is conscious of sleep" (Mān. Bh.7). That consciousness which intuits sleep, is the consciousness of Ātman.

86. It is reasonable to ask why we are unconscious of everything, if, as it is alleged, consciousness persists even then. The reply is this : That is because everything becomes one with Prājña in that state. "This purusha firmly embraced as he is by Prājña is quite unaware of anything either external or internal" (Br. Bh. 4-3-21). So "Oneness is the cause of unconsciousness" (Br. Bh. 4-3-21). The Śruti says "True, he does not know anything there, but it is only while being a knower that he knows
not; for the knowing power of the knower never disappears, only there is nothing second to and distinct from Him there, which he could possibly know” (Br. 4-3-30).

87. Ātman is Pure Consciousness in waking and dream states too, just as much as He is such in deep sleep. Only there is, in these two states, the appearance of a world which looks as though it were a second to Him. “Dream is to him who sees the truth otherwise, and sleep to him who does not know it; when the misconception about these two ceases, one has attained the state of the Fourth” (GK. Bh. 1-15). Since dream is seeing truth otherwise, both waking and dream may be metaphysically considered to be dreams. Unconsciousness of the truth is deep sleep; so sleep or ignorance of the true nature of Ātman may be said to continue in all the three states. Of these three, deep sleep is characterized by ignorance alone, whereas misconception preponderates in waking and dream. But on closer scrutiny along the lines we have indicated so far, no ignorance whatever is seen to be actually lurking in deep sleep, for Ātman of the nature of Pure Consciousness alone remains there, while people mistake and look upon him as enveloped in ignorance from the waking point of view. And as there can be no misconception without ignorance underlying it, the same Ātman should be considered to maintain Himself free from dream or waking. We are thus justified in concluding that the notion of the existence of the three states is itself a grand misconception. Accordingly the Śruti proclaims ‘These three are his dreams’ (Ai. 1-12). The final conclusion, then, is that Ātman is eternally free from all the three states.

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Ātman as Above All States of Consciousness
88. Gaudapāda has thus revealed the real nature of Ātman in one of his verses: "When the Jīva awakes from his beginningless illusory dream, then he realizes the unborn, sleepless, dreamless, non-dual (Ātman)" (GK. 1-16). That the Ātman is beyond sleep and dream, that he is free from the so-called three states of consciousness, we have already seen after an examination of the states. It follows from this, of course, that Ātman is free from birth and other modifications and that He is non-dual also. For there being no time, space, or causality apart from Ātman who is in Himself without parts and without qualities, He must be above all change such as birth. For the same reason the conclusion forces itself upon us that He is One without a second, that is, that His nature precludes the existence of selves and things other than Himself, and also that He is devoid of distinctions within His own nature. The present chapter is begun only to make His birthless and secondless nature still more clear.

89. The general belief of the common run of Vedantins is as follows: ‘I am one among the innumerable souls inhabiting this world. I have to attain, through practice of devotion, union with the Supreme Self after shuffling off this mortal coil. In the Śrutis also it is stated that this world is born of God and that individual souls also emanate from Him. For instance, look at these texts: ‘He wished ‘May I become many, may I be born’. He brooded over it and after He had
brooded over, He created all this, whatever we find here” (Tai. 2-6), “Just as tiny sparks dart forth from a fire, so also from this Self emanate all the organs … all these souls” (Br. Mān. 2-1-23), “So, my dear boy, all these different beings are born of that Imperishable One, and are dissolved there too” (Mu. 2-1-1).

Now this belief of devotees is not founded on fact. For in the first place, it is impossible to conceive the Self as an effect. “Ātman is no effect for the very reason that he is of a nature whose existence cannot be thought away” (SBh. 2-3-7). To say that the Self is born is to concede that he can cease to exist, but the latter fact is quite inconceivable. A conceiver is required to conceive the non-existence of Ātman and if there is one, he would himself be that Ātman. “All perishable effects can perish only up to and exclusive of the Purusha (the Witness) but the Purusha is imperishable for there will be nothing else to cause His destruction. He is unchangeably eternal and hence of a nature eternally pure, conscious, free” (SBh. 1-1-4). Śrutis also declare that Ātman is beyond birth and allied modifications: This Śruti for instance “Now this Ātman is great, unborn, free from old age and birth; He is immortal, fearless, Brahman itself” (Br. 4-4-25). It is not quite correct therefore to say that the individual soul is born or that it has to attain liberation by means of devotion. Śrutis like the following aver that the Ātman is “Completely free from the manifold phenomenal world, perfectly unperturbed, the highest good, one without a second” (Mān. 7). And this has been conclusively shown to be true by an examination of the three states. So it is not right to hold that this world consisting of animate and inanimate entities is come from the Supreme Self.
90. The following considerations may perhaps deter some people from accepting the truth of the above statement. The existence of the world is vouched for by perception and other evidences. It is common knowledge that there are in it several individual souls engaged in activities and reaping fruits thereof. And many Śrutis say that all the multiplex world consisting of ether and other phenomena has arisen from the Supreme Ātman, and will go back into Him in the end. Would it be right to disregard all these sources of knowledge?

But perception and other means of knowledge transcended as they are by the highest intuitive knowledge and opposed to the teaching of Śruti texts declaring that Ātman is unborn and secondless, as well as to those like ‘That thou art’, teaching the identity of the soul with Brahman, cannot be of any account with regard to the Highest Reality, though there is nothing wrong in utilizing these evidences for purposes of practical life. Besides, it has been demonstrated that all idea of distinction of knowledge and its object, is based upon avidya. Hence we have to understand that texts teaching the creation of the world or of individual souls do not seriously insist upon actual creation.

91. But, it will be asked, why do Śruti texts describe the creation of the souls as well as of other objects at such length and with such a wealth of illustrations, if as it is urged, there be no intention of emphasizing actual origination? We reply: "True, creation has been described in several ways and has been elaborated and richly illustrated by examples like that of clay, iron and sparks. All that description is only a means to prepare the mind for understanding the unity of the
individual and the Supreme Self" (GK. Bh. 3-15). Just as all that is made of clay is known through the knowledge of clay, all the world becomes known through the knowledge of Ātman. For the effect does not exist independently of the material cause. "The effect is only a matter of words, a mere name; that which is called the clay is the only reality" (Ch. 6-1-4). Like unto the vessels great and small made of clay, the world being an effect, cannot be independent of its cause, Ātman. Thus the Śruti only teaches the unreality of the world. "But the Śruti says that souls emanate from Ātman like sparks, and the Smṛti also teaches 'My own part is the individual soul' (G. 15-7). No, for that is only meant to confirm and strengthen the idea of the unity of the soul and Ātman. It is well-known that a spark darting forth from a fire is but fire and so in common life we treat it as one with fire. Similarly the soul which is a part of Ātman should also be considered to be one with the whole, the Supreme Self" (Br. Bh. 2-1-20). That is what is intended by the Śrutis and Smṛtis cited by the objector; they do not teach actual creation of souls.

92. But what about the seeming plurality of souls in actual life? "That distinction is only apparent owing to different associating conditions (upādhis) such as the mind, just as in the case of one undivided ether which appears to be cut up into several distinct portions owing to a jar and other conditions" (SBh. 2-3-17). "Ātman is born as so many jīvas in the same way as ether is seen to be born in the shape of several jar-spaces; and he is born as so many aggregates of bodies and senses in the same way as ether is born as jars and the like. Such is the illustration for origination" (GK. 3-3). The Śruti teaches creation merely to explain that the souls and the aggregates are not other than Ātman in consonance with
the principle of non-difference of the effect from the cause. That a seeming birth or a seeming plurality does not necessarily point to real birth or plurality, may be verified by a reference to dream-experiences. "Just as a dream soul is born and dies, so all these souls come into being, so do they disappear" (GK. 4-68). "All the aggregates of bodies and senses are thrown out by the Māyā of Ātman, like those of dreams" (GK. 3-10). We have convincingly shown the metaphysical identity of both waking and dream in the previous chapter.

93. The Śruti says that Ātman in dreamless sleep is the cause of both the origin and dissolution of the world. Herein lies a principle that deserves to be borne in mind. Since we have already shown that both waking and dream are equally unreal, the world manifesting itself there stands in no need of a cause either for its origin or dissolution. For those that are convinced of this truth, Ātman is ever free from the world. "If the world really existed we could talk of its dissolution, no doubt. All this duality is but an illusion, Non-duality alone is real" (GK. 1-17). The statement in the Śruti therefore that the world is born of Prājña is only to remind us that Ātman is the one substrate for all the unreal manifestations just as the rope is the substrate for the illusory snake and other appearances that might be imagined there.

94. While the Unborn, Secondless Principle is the sole Reality, the creation of the world and the souls is taught in the Śrutis for seekers who belong to the average class. "For those who affirm that things do exist, because they are experienced and produce practical results, the wise ones have taught the origination of the world, for these people are afraid of the truth of non-
birth” (GK.4-42). “Let them take it as a tentative teaching, for as they advance in the study of the Vedántas, they will of course rise to the realisation of Ātman unborn and secondless, such is the view of the wise, for they are never serious about the reality of origination” (GK.Bh. 4-42); “Even meditation is out of a lenient consideration for seekers of a middling capacity” (GK. 3-16). The distinction of the devotee and object of devotion as well as the path of light (arcirādi mārga) &c. taught for devotees who have realized the truth through meditation, is all from the stand-point of avidyā. “The soul in its several states is not dissimilar to the jar-space of the analogy, when it seemingly dies or is born, when it goes to the other world or comes back from there, or even while it exists in all the various bodies” (GK. 3-9).

95. Ātman is changeless and the world has no existence. Hence the highest truth is that nothing is really born. But yet “that which exists can be born illusorily though not in fact” (GK. 3-27), “From an existent entity as the cause, the world may very well be born like effects such as an elephant conjured up by magic, but not from a non-existent cause. Or again an existent entity like a rope, may be very well born illusorily as a snake &c. though not in fact. So also the unborn Ātman, even though unperceivable, may be illusorily born as the world”(GK.Bh. 3-27). This is the sat-kārya-vāda, the doctrine of the effect already existent in the cause, which is taught in Vedanta.

96. ‘There is no diversity whatever here’ (Kā.2-1-11), ‘Indra, the Supreme Lord, appears as many through the māyās’(Br. 2-5-19), ‘Unborn, He is born in many forms’ (Tai.Ā.3-13), ‘Brahman, though changeless becomes the object of all conception and language
involving transformation and the like in its aspect of name and form, differentiated and undifferentiated, called into being by ignorance, and undefinable either as identical with or distinct from it' (SBh. 2-1-27).

'Name and form constructed by ignorance as though identical with the Omniscient Lord, undefinable either as identical with or as distinct from Him, are the seed of phenomena of mundane existence, called by Śruti and Smṛti variously as māyā (illusion), sakti (potentiality), prakṛti (primordial material cause)' (SBh. 2-1-14).

When we speak of the world as having come from Brahman, we are speaking at the level of this māyā. This is a conception too, from the stand-point of avidya. "But when from the stand-point of the Highest Reality these names and forms are further scrutinized in the light of the Śruti, they are found to have really no independent being of their own apart from Reality just as foam is not independent of water or as a jar is not independent of clay, or as any other effect has no independent being of its own apart from its cause. It is from that view-point, at the level of the highest vision, that Brahman becomes the object of conceptions such as 'One without a second', 'There is no diversity whatever here' etc.'" (Br. Bh.3-5-1).

97. The final conclusion is this: "No individual soul is born, there is no cause which can give rise to it. This is the highest truth and reality, wherein nothing is born, never a whit"(GK. 3-48).
CHAPTER NINE
PRACTICE AND FINAL GOAL

98. While Ātman is actually One without a second, a two-fold distinction is foisted upon Him by avidyā, to wit, that of being the pramātr or the seeker of Reality on the one hand, and that of Paramātman, the Supreme Self free from all sāṁsāric defilements, to be sought out by that aspirant on the other. There is a traditional saying to this effect: “Before the realization of Ātman to be sought out, Ātman is a pramātr. When He is sought out, the pramātr himself would become the One Supreme Self free from all evils of good and bad and the like” (quoted by Śaṅkara at the end of SBh. 1-1-4). It is from the stand-point of Pramātr that spiritual discipline is enjoined in the Śrutis and Smṛtis for the attainment of jñāna, the knowledge of Ātman.

Religious works, devotional meditation, listening to the Śrutis &c.- all of these are means to knowledge. “Agnihotra or any other obligatory ritual whether with or without the aid of Upāsanā performed in this or in a previous birth with a view to obtaining freedom, becomes in proportion to its intensity, a means to the knowledge of Brahman through the destruction of accumulated sins that form a hindrance to the realisation of Brahman. Through the proximate means such as listening to Śrutis, reflection, faith and perseverance, it

1. This and the other two ślokas quoted along with it are usually attributed to Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya on the strength of a statement by the commentator on Sūtasamhitā, but this ascription is open to question.
ultimately achieves along with *Brahma-Vidyā* (knowledge of Brahman) the same result that is aimed at by the latter” (SBh. 4-1-18).

99. In the Śruti ‘It is this Ātman whom *Brahmaṇas* seek to know through daily recitation of the Vedas, sacrifice, charity and asceticism of moderation in food’ (Br. 4-4-22), it is evident that these sacrifices and other practices are a means to the birth of knowledge, since the wording is ‘seek to know’ (SBh. 3-4-26). The Gita also says “Man attains perfection through worshipping Him by means of duty proper to him” (G. 18-46). *Karma-yoga* therefore “which consists in the worship of *Īśwara* through performing duties without attachment after doing away with the pairs of opposites” (GBh. 2-39), is also a good discipline.

100. *Karma-yoga* removes desires and other defilements of the mind. “Yogins do their duty, abandoning all attachment, for self-purification” (G.5-11). But this *Karma* need not be necessarily an obligatory ritual like the *Agnihôtra* enjoined by the Veda; for even those that were not qualified for performing the *āśrama* rites, have been known to be enlightened souls. “Raikva, Vāchaknavi and others, who belonged to no *āśrama* are found to have been recognized by the Śruti as knowers of Brahman” (SBh. 3-4-36). “And in the *Itihāsa* or *Mahābhārata, Samvarta* and others are reported to have been great yogins although they had nothing to do with rituals prescribed for the several *āśramas*, as is evident from the fact that they went naked and conducted themselves in other ways (not allowed for those who accept one of the prescribed stations of life)” (SBh.3-4-37). It is quite possible that disciplinary spiritual acts like *japa* (repetition of mantras), *upavāsa* (holy fasts), and *devatārādhana* (worship of the gods) enjoined on all
human beings, are conducive to knowledge of Reality” (SBh. 3-4-38). It may even be that religious works performed in a former existence, give rise to knowledge in the present life. “So says the Smṛti, ‘Perfected in the course of many births, he then reaches the Supreme goal’ (G.6-45) thus showing that particular mental impressions accumulated in other existences also may lead to knowledge” (SBh. 3-4-38). “In the case of Vīdura, Dharma-vyādha and others who reached illumination on account of effects produced by past deeds, no one can deny their attainment of the goal on the score that they were ineligible to perform Vedic rites, since knowledge of Ātman must invariably yield its fruit” (SBh. 1-3-38). “And all the four castes are entitled according to the Smṛtis to know the truth through the Īthiḥāsas and Purāṇas as the Mahābhārata specifically enjoins that it should be explained to all the four castes” (SBh. 1-3-38).

101. Disciplinary acts conducive to knowledge are of various kinds. “By the term ‘karma’, we should understand not merely rituals like the Agniḥōtra. Brahmacharya (religious celibacy), tapas (asceticism), Satyavadana (truthfulness), śama (self- control), dama (control of the senses), ahiṁsā (harmlessness) and others of the kind are also karmas well-known among the followers of the stages of life other than that of a house-holder, to be of greater efficacy in contributing to enlightenment and unmixed with defilements, and there are also karmas of the nature of meditation and concentration” (Tai. Bh. 1-11). And there is the express injunction of śama and other practices as leading to knowledge. “Therefore one who knows thus, shall become self- controlled, self-subdued, quietistic, patient and concentrative and thereby see the Ātman in himself” (Br. 4-4-23).
102. It is declared in Śrūtis like the following: that freedom ensues so soon as knowledge dawns. "Only thus much, my dear, is the means to immortality" (Br. 4-5-15). Hence "Kindling the sacrificial fire or other āśrama-Karmas are not desiderated by knowledge to yield its effect" (SBh. 3-4-25).

103. It is wrong to maintain that knowledge is only subsidiary to religious works. If it were so, it would mean that knowledge is for house-holders only, and that religious celibates, hermits and sannyāsin (those that have renounced all karma), are not eligible for knowledge. "But knowledge is declared in the Śruti to accrue to followers of the other stages of life wherein aspirants remain absolutely chaste. And knowledge cannot possibly be conceived to be ancillary to karma there, since they have no karma to perform" (SBh. 3-4-17). And renunciation of all karma is expressly enjoined as a means to reach Ātman. Witness the Śruti "It is this world of Ātman, wishing to reach which, the monks go away from their homes" (Br. 4-4-22). Hence it is clear that knowledge can give freedom independently of all karma.

104. In the Chāndogya, a text says "One who has taken his firm stand in Brahman attains immortality" (Ch. 2-23-1). That Śruti has declared in so many words that the followers of the other three āśramas go to the worlds of the virtuous (to enjoy the fruits of their good deeds), but only the sannyāsin who has taken his firm stand in Brahman attains immortality. "The word Brahma-saṅstha (one who has taken his firm stand in Brahman) denotes steadfast devotion to Brahman and implies whole-hearted staying of the mind on Brahman to the exclusion of every other activity. And this can never relate to the other three stages of life, for the Śruti threatens them with sin if they should cease to do the
duties enjoined upon them as members of their respective āśramas. To the Parivrājakā (mendicant), however, no sin would accrue in default of performance of such works, inasmuch as he has renounced all karmas. Śama, dama, and similar internal acts of discipline constitute his duty which strengthens his establishment in Brahman but is never antagonistic to it. Devotion to Brahman supported by self-control, self-subduedness and the like, is verily the duty proper to his āśrama, just as sacrifice and other practices are proper to the other stages and only when he transgresses that, would sin accrue to him" (SBh3-4-20). "Hence no one can impute futility to the knowledge of Brahman alleging that we claim immortality to whomever that happens merely to occupy the fourth āśrama" (SBh. 3-4-20) for a real parivrājaka according to us, is one who is established in Brahman, and by dint of it has the natural endowments of self-control and other kindred virtues. It follows therefore that knowledge of Brahman is quite independent of karma, since Brahma-nishthattva (devotion to Brahman only) is possible only to one who has renounced all duties pertaining to the other three stages of life.

105. Paramahamsa-pārivrājya (the highest order of religious mendicancy), becomes a necessity for those who want to devote themselves exclusively to śravaṇa (listening to scriptures) and the like, since that order of life ‘conduces to the ripening of knowledge’ (SBh. 3-4-20). Renunciation of all karma is seen to be recommended in the Gītā (G. 6-3) under the name of ‘śama’, as a means to Dhyāna Yōga (the yōga of contemplation), the immediate means to knowledge of Brahman. "In the case of one who has acquired the knowledge of Brahman, this Pārivrājya (absolute renunciation) comes as a matter of course even without any sanctioning text as an
inevitable result of his unshakable conviction alone that he is one with Brahman devoid of all factors of karma such as the deity in view and qualificatory attributes such as a particular caste" (Br.Bh. 4-5-15). It is possible that a knower of Brahman stays away in the householder's station of life. "If for any reason, he is not in a position to renounce all religious works, he may continue to perform karmas, just to set an example to the world, though not being attached to the action or its result, he has no ends to serve thereby for himself. Such a person does not really perform any work at all; his action having been burnt up by the fire of knowledge, his action becomes no action" (GBh. 4-20). Even from this viewpoint, it is clear that knowledge stands in no need of the co-operation of karma in order to produce Moksha (liberation) its immediate result.

106. One who has renounced all works has to attain firm stand in knowledge (jñāna-nishtha) exclusively through the practice of the means prescribed. So says the Śruti "Therefore a Brāhmaṇa should stand upon the strength of knowledge (or according to another interpretation should attain the humility of a child) after exhausting all knowledge; having exhausted strength and knowledge, he becomes contemplative; and having exhausted both contemplation and non-contemplation, he becomes a real Brāhmaṇa"(Br. 3-5-1). The meaning of the Śruti is this: First one should know all that is worth knowing about Ātman and by virtue of that knowledge overcome the consciousness of the reality of sensory objects and learn to behave in all humility just like a child, without making a display of his knowledge, scholarship, moral excellence and the like attainments. And over-passing even that stage, he should devote himself to the contemplation of the real nature of
Âtman. When he has succeeded in all these three stages of practice, he becomes a Brâhmana, or knower of Brahman in the real sense of the word. So barring the practice of such nivrtti dharma (renunciatory acts of discipline) a paramahamsa has no other prescribed duties whatever to perform.

107. Spiritual discipline has fructified when it is found to culminate in knowledge of Brahman, and knowledge has fructified when absolute freedom is realized. "Since the fruit of knowledge is an immediate spiritual experience here and now, every one desirous of knowledge may be deemed to be qualified for it, unless there is any express prohibitive text. Hence even widowers and others who belong to no specific stage of life, may be held to be entitled, without fear of contradiction to śravāṇa and other means of knowledge and thereby to knowledge itself." (SBh.3-4-38).

108. It cannot be insisted that śravāṇa and other practices should necessarily lead to knowledge in this very life. "If the discipline undergone is not hindered by any obstacle resulting from any past deed fructifying at present, knowledge is born here only; but in case of such an obstacle hindering it, one may have to wait till a future birth for its dawning"(SBh. 3-4-51). Hence it is that the Śruti says "Vāmadeva proclaimed its spiritual truth even while in the womb of his mother"(Ai.2-5) implying thereby that knowledge may have to be attained in a birth subsequent to the one in which the means are practised. If those who reach Brahmālōka by virtue of Upāsanā (constant staying one's mind on Saguna Brahman), do get knowledge in that region, they become immediately free as is evidenced by Śrutis like "And he does not return"(Ch. 8-15-1). But we gather
that it is quite possible that even in such highly evolved worlds, knowledge may not be accessible as a rule, from texts like the following: "They do not return to this human world" (Ch. 4-15-5). "For them there is no return hitherward" (Br. Mā.6-1-18). "Therefore in order to justify qualifications like 'this' and 'here', we have to conclude that they will return in another kalpa (cosmic period)" (Ch. Bh. 5-10-2).

109. In the case of mukti (spiritual freedom) which is the fruit of knowledge, however, it is not open to us to set any time-limit and say it shall be attained in this life or another. "Means of knowledge may possibly effect different degrees of perfection in its own result, viz. knowledge, but never in freedom which is the result of knowledge. We have repeatedly urged that freedom is nothing to be newly acquired, but, being an ever-attained essential nature of the self, is only realized by knowledge. Nor is there any possibility of degrees, higher and lower, even in that knowledge, for lower knowledge is no knowledge, the highest alone being entitled to be called such. Therefore gradation in knowledge is possible, if at all, only in its appearing earlier or later. But there can be no gradations whatever in freedom" (SBh. 3-4-52). For in fact freedom is no other than Brahman itself (SBh. 3-4-52) and not something to be attained through some means. Freedom therefore has only to be realized through knowledge. Rightly viewed, even knowledge does not admit of any degrees or grades, for the highest knowledge which is incapable of being stultified is the only true knowledge in the strict sense of the term. Knowledge may arise earlier or later according to the difference in degree of the intensity of the effort employed to achieve it. So freedom is bound to accrue simultaneously with
knowledge. "The sentence 'That thou art' can by no means be made to mean 'Thou wilt become That after death'. ‘Ṛṣi Vāmadeva, while seeing this, realized 'I have been Manu, and Sūrya also' (Br. 1-4-10). This text tells us that becoming all this, or realizing one’s identity with everything, is the simultaneous result of true knowledge. Hence the immediate attainment of freedom has no exception in the case of one who has got knowledge" (SBh.3-3-32).

110. We have adduced the identity of freedom with the nature of ever-existing Brahman, as the reason why the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman cannot be conceived to be something to be reaped at a distant future. But some imagine that there might be a special freedom of disembodiedness besides the Brahman-hood immediately from right knowledge. They rest their belief on the Śruti 'Being Brahman itself, he becomes merged in Brahman' (Br. 4-4-6). But the Śruti is quite innocent of this interpretation. 'It only means this: There being no desires to serve as limiting conditions to make him non-Brahman, he is verily Brahman here only and becomes merged in Brahman, not after he has shuffled off his mortal coil. A wise man cannot be conceived to be of one nature while alive and of quite another after death. It is only because he no more assumes another body that he is said to be finally merged in Brahman'(Br.Bh. 4-4-6).

111. It is wrong to think that a knower of Brahman has a body while alive and enters into freedom of disembodiedness only after death. The Śruti says "Just as the slough of a snake worn out and cast off, lies in an anthill, so does this body lie here, and as for himself, he is verily bodiless, immortal, Life, Brahman indeed,
Light itself" (Br.4-4-7). That is to say, "Now this other, the knowing one who is compared in the Śruti to the snake, has become free, identical with all. Like the snake in the illustration, he is verily bodiless. Although he continues to be there, he is no more an embodied being as before..... he was embodied and mortal before this because of his pre-conceived identity with the body owing to desire and action. Now that he is free from either, he is bodiless, and hence immortal” (Br.Bh.4-4-7).

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CHAPTER TEN

REVIEW OF OTHER SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

112. Vedanta is not particular in criticizing other systems of thought. “This system primarily aims at determining the purport of the Vedantas or Upanishadic texts and unlike other rational systems, not meant for establishing or refuting any particular system by means of pure ratiocination” (SBh.2-2-1).

113. Vedantins do not deny in toto all intrinsic value to systems like the Sāṁkhya. They only confute certain views in them which are opposed to reason and experience. They argue on the principle “What is not expressly condemned, may be assumed as approved” (SBh. 2-4-12), and have absorbed whatever is commendable in the teaching of the Sāṁkhya, Yōga and other systems.

114. In the Vedanta system of Bādarāyaṇa, the Sāṁkhya and the Yōga come in for criticism in greater detail than other systems. “This is because the Sāṁkhya and the Yōga are popularly supposed to supply means to the Highest Beatitude. They have been accepted by authoritative Vaidikas and are seemingly supported by certain Śruti texts by implication. In particular there is this Śruti which says “Knowing that Cause, the Lord reached through Sāṁkhya and Yōga, one is liberated from all the snares of life” (Sve. 6-13). “The point of refutation is that the Highest Goal is never reached either by the way of the Sāṁkhya or that of the Yōga independent of the Vedic teaching.... As for the text quoted with reference to the cause reached through
Sāṁkhya and Yōga, it is only the knowledge and contemplation taught in the Vedas which are respectively to be understood by the terms ‘Sāṁkhya’ and ‘Yōga’, for the text in question is in the context of Vedic teaching. But in so far as these systems, the Sāṁkhya and the Yōga, are not in conflict with the Vedic teaching, they certainly have their place even in the Vedantic system (SBh.2-1-3).

115. The self-same principle holds good in the case of the logical systems also. “If they are of any help here through contributing their speculation and reasoning, by all means have them. As for the knowledge of truth, however, that must come from the Vedantic texts alone” (SBh.2-1-3).

116. Similar is the treatment to be accorded to Buddhistic and other non-Vedic systems of thought. The policy of Vedanta is to accept every reasoning unopposed to the Vedas. For instance, “The non-dual Reality devoid of the distinctions of knowledge, knowable and the knower has not been referred to by the Buddha. Nevertheless, the repudiation of external objects and the postulate of consciousness as the sole reality taught by him are doctrines very proximate to the doctrine of the non-dual entity. Highest Reality, however, has to be ascertained from the Vedantic texts only” (GK.Bh.4-99).

117. Sri Gaudapāda pays his homage to non-dual Reality and closes his treatise with a benedictory verse: “Difficult of comprehension and immensely deep, unborn, even throughout, and pure; realizing this state of non-distinctions, we bow to it in the measure of our ability.” (GK.Bh. 4-100).

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APPENDIX

CARDINAL TENETS OF ŠAÑKARA’S VEDANTA

Here is a brief summary of the salient features of Šañkara’s Vedanta as described in the previous pages of this booklet. Failure to appreciate the cardinal principles of this system has resulted in many glaring misconceptions, some of which are noted below. Those that seek to know more about this subject, should apply themselves to a serious study of Šañkara’s Bhāshyas on the three branches of study, *Prasthānas* as they are collectively called - the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgīta and the Brahma-Sūtras with the aid of a competent teacher.

1. **Brahman** is the reality of the universe, which can be known only through the Upanishads. It is the Self-luminous Witness (*sākshin*), the very Self of us all. There is no *pramāṇa* or means of right knowledge, which can reveal it; nor is any *pramāṇa* needed to prove its existence either.

   Persons unable to understand this truth have conceived the theory of *Ātma-Sākshātkāra* (Self-realization) for which they imagine that practices like the repetition of the *Mahāvākyas* (texts like *Tat-twam-asī*—That thou art), *laya-chintana* (merging the objective world in Brahman by means of meditation) or the practice of *Pātañjala yōga*, are necessary.

2. **The Vedanta-Śāstra** is not a *pramāṇa* directly revealing the nature of Brahman. It is called ‘*Pramāṇa*’ simply because it dispels avidyā (ignorance) of Brahman. It is called the ‘FINAL MEANS’ (antya pramāṇa) because it shows how the distinction of *pramāṇa* and
prameya (means and object of knowledge) accepted in common parlance, is really due to avidyā. That is to say, there cannot be any trace of pramāṇa and prameya after the knowledge of Vedanta has dawned.

Some who have not understood this principle believe that the Non-duality taught in the Vedanta texts is a matter of faith, others resort to the strange course of interpreting Vedantic texts according to their own preconceived theory and asserting that their theory is correct because it is based upon those texts. A few more teach that there are both positive and negative texts revealing the nature of Atman, while there are others who hold that the positive (affirmative) texts are more authoritative than the negative ones.

3. Avidyā is an innate, beginningless misconception due to a mental superimposition of the real and the un-real, the Self and the non-self as well as their properties on each other. This avidyā is known through intuition. This superimposition is the *primus* of all notions of the distinctions of pramāṭr, pramāṇa and prameya (knower, means of knowledge and the object of knowledge). Vidyā or true knowledge consists in discriminating and determining the true nature of the self and the not-self with the aid of the Śāstra.

It is evident that those who proceed to prove avidyā by means of reason or pramāṇas (valid sources of knowledge) or the authority of the Śāstra are resorting to an obviously erroneous procedure, since the very notion of ‘knower’ is due to avidyā. Avidyā common life ignorance, doubt or misconception of objects and vidyā (true knowledge) that dispels it, are both in the sphere of avidyā par excellence. Strictly speaking, even the distinction of avidyā and vidyā relative to Atman is a hypothetical notion allowed by Vedantins as a concession to the popular mind, just as a device for explaining the highest truth. The final position is that the Reality or Atman transcends both vidyā and avidyā.

Failure to realize this truth, has given rise to the imper-
missible demand for the cause of avidyā. The topsyturvy process of offering perception, inference, presumption or the Śruti as pramāṇas in evidence of avidyā, has been in vogue just because of this failure. Curious problems have cropped up regarding the locus of avidyā as well as the number of avidyās. ‘Does it reside in the individual soul or Brahman? Is there a single avidyā or are there as many avidyās as there are individual souls? Would universal liberation ensue when the avidyā of a single jīva is destroyed? ’ And so on!

For a detailed discussion of this subject, readers are referred to my ‘Vedānta-Prakriyā-Pratyabhijñā’ a Sanskrit work, where the only comprehensive method of Vedanta has been explained at length. The English Introduction to this book has been separately published by the Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya under the title ‘How to Recognize the Method of Vedanta’.

4. Vedantic texts purport to teach Atman alone as an entity; that is to say, they negate what are not really His properties, and culminate in revealing the self-established Ātman. There would remain nothing more to be done after realizing the import of the texts.

Various strange beliefs prevail among those that are not aware of this open secret. Some imagine that the Vedantic text only yields an indirect knowledge of Ātman, and that hence the repeated practice of the knowledge of the Mahāvākyā, or the merging of the world of multiplicity in Ātman by means of meditation or the meditation on the qualityless Brahman or the practice of Pātanjala Yōga, or else continued mental repetition of Pranava (the syllable Aum) etc. is required.

5. Atman is an ineffable entity. He cannot be expressed by words or sentences; for no genus, quality, action or any other specific feature pertains to Him. He is devoid of all distinctions and can never be objectified.
Some who cannot understand this, think that negative propositions are incapable of giving rise to the knowledge of the form 'I am Brahman' just because they end in merely negating the superimposed attributes. One cannot completely get rid of the ignorance of the rope merely by the knowledge that it is not a snake. Hence, they argue, negative texts can never remove avidyā without a residuum. Some are even of the opinion that negative texts can only repeat what positive texts directly disclose and are hence no pramāṇas at all!

6. Śravaṇa (study of sacred revelation), Manana (reflective thinking) and Nididhyāsana (concentrated contemplation), are all means for realizing Ātman. Highly developed souls, however, who can immediately grasp the true meaning of the Vedic teaching, do not stand in need of any additional effort.

Not taking this principle into account is responsible for the divergence of opinion among commentators of Śaṅkara-Bhāshya about the relation of Śravaṇa and Nididhyāsana. Of these, some aver that Śravaṇa is the principal means and the other two are only ancillary to it; while others insist that nididhyāsana is the one means to direct realization and without it mere Śravaṇa would be of no avail.

7. Śravaṇa and the other means are enjoined only in so far as they turn the seeker inwards and direct him to stay his mind on Ātman, but the resultant knowledge is no object of any injunction.

Those who cannot distinguish between the effort required for Śravaṇa &c. and the resultant knowledge in each case, have made it a matter for controversy whether or not 'śrōtavyah' and similar texts constitute true injunctions. Some of them maintain that these are all injunctions while others insist that they are seemingly injunctions in form but are really statements of fact. Some even think that they are merely eulogistic statements.

8. Manana refers to the type of reasoning suggested
by the Śruti itself conducive to experience. Hence the term 'experience' here should be understood to mean the supersensuous intuition which results from our enquiry which takes in one sweep the whole field possible of whatever is knowable.

From this the reader has to understand that use might be made of ordinary reasoning also in so far as it is conformable to the reasoning suggested by the Śruti. Advaitins do try to disclose the hollowness of other systems according to the course of reasoning accepted by themselves. But Advaita itself cannot be established by means of pure logical ratiocination. People who are not aware of this fact, often try to apply speculation or inferences based upon partial experiences to Vedanta also. Others condemn all reasoning and affirm that reasoning is of no use in matters taught by the Śruti. So they interpret Śruti according to their own predilection and place their own convictions before seekers as the final Vedantic truth.

9. **Nididhyāsana** is that kind of spiritual discipline by means of which one concentrates one’s mind on the subtle principle, Ātman. At the end of this discipline, one becomes conscious of the fact that the mind itself is a superimposition on Ātman. Then the mind becomes no mind, that is to say, it is realized essentially as Ātman himself.

Many confound Nididhyāsana with ‘Upāsanā’ and believe it to be a sort of spiritual imagination. It is this confusion that prompts some to believe that Nididhyāsana must end in ‘trances’, Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa (with and without consciousness of distinctions).

10. **Examination of the three avasthas**, is a special kind of reasoning suggested in the Śruti itself. It is the nature of Ātman only that has to be taken into account in this method. The whole of the world has to be regarded as the conditioning associate (upādhi) of
Ātman. Each state is to be evaluated from its own standpoint. This mode of reasoning comprehends the whole of human experience, inasmuch as there is no knowable not included in the three states.

People who cannot rise to this way of thinking, mistakenly suppose that the method of states (avasthās) is an examination of the states rather than that of Ātman to whom the states attach themselves. They argue that there is a fourth state called the Turiya which is often identified with the trance of Nirvikalpa Samādhi. They largely use the memory of dream and sound sleep for determining the nature of these two states.

11. **Each of the three states** is a full manifestation of Reality. Those who are capable of conceiving this fact, can attain the knowledge of Ātman even through the determination of the true nature of the Self in any one individual state.

Sensuous perception, mental awareness and receding to the undifferentiated nature of the Self erasing any of these modes of consciousness, may respectively be equated to the three modes conditioning Viśwa, Taijasa and Prājña. This method has been pointed out in the first chapter of Gauḍāpāda’s Kārikās. Thus looked at, the Witnessing Principle itself becomes the Turiya Self. Aspirants after truth sufficiently developed in reflection, can convince themselves that all objective not-self is really a super-imposition on the Witness of the waking state. The entire objective not-Self in the state is pervaded by the Witnessing Consciousness and is ultimately identical with it. Similarly with the two other states.

12. **Following in the wake of the method of avasthās**, it is quite possible to look upon each of the five sheaths (the Panca-kōśas of the Taittirīya) as comprehending the entire objective not-Self and merge the kōśas successively each in the next interior pervading sheath until at last we come to the conclusion that all else is superimposed on the Witnessing Principle which
is called Ānanda (infinite bliss), the real ground of all the phenomenal world.

Failure to understand that the avasthās are independent expressions of the same Reality, has led some thinkers to imagine that there is a residue of positive ignorance in sleep, which serves as the seed of the waking world. Ignorance of this fact, has also induced some to assume that the Ānandamaya kośa, the principle of enjoyment of fruits of actions which really can exist in waking only, continues to persist potentially in sleep.

13. Atman is eternally unborn and without a second. Śrutis teach that the world has proceeded from Ātman. It is only as a device for gradually leading seekers of intermediate and lowest grades of intellect to the realisation of this truth. The statement that the world is born of Ātman simply means that it is a superimposition on Ātman.

Those that cannot get mental hold of this secret, variously posit that Ātman and positive avidyā (or māyā) are both the cause of the world or that Ātman is the efficient cause while avidyā (or māyā) is the material cause of it.

14. While the duties devolving upon Varnas and Āshramas (castes and stations of life) do lead to knowledge, they are not universally indispensable. Śama, dama (Self-control and control of senses) and the like, however, are absolutely necessary as being intimate disciplinary acts enabling one to become introvert. Since knowledge has to end in a result to be experienced here and now, all those who are not expressly prohibited in the Śrutis, may be assumed to be entitled to a study of the Vedantas. Śūdras and others may enter upon the study of Vedanta through the Itiḥāsa and Purāṇas.

Some ignorant people insist that women and Śūdras are strictly outside the pale of Vedantic knowledge; and there are some
who hold that knowledge is impossible for anyone in this age of *kali* since all *karmas* enjoined in the *Śāstras* have slackened off in practice!

15. **Karmas performed in a previous birth may also serve as means to knowledge** in the present life. The only duty for Sannyāsins is unremitting devotion to knowledge. *Paramahamsa Sannyāsa* only means the renouncing of *eshaṇātraya* (the three kinds of desires pertaining to the three worlds).

Those who are not in touch with this truth, argue that householders can never hope to get knowledge of Ātman, since they are not entitled to *Śravaṇa*. Others again insist that even *paramahamsas* have duties incumbent on their stage of life, over and above *Śravaṇa* and the like *sādhanas* obligatory for them.

16. **Śravana and other means may not give true knowledge invariably in this life.** Knowledge may come in a subsequent life, if there be any obstacle for its immediate birth. Spiritual freedom, however, is the immediate consequence of the knowledge of Ātman.

The mistaken notion that all who have studied Vedanta are Ātma-Jñānins and the self-stultifying postulate of *residual avidyā even in a Jñānin*, are both due to imperfect understanding of the above-mentioned doctrines. Whether one has or has not attained spiritual enlightenment, is a matter of personal intuition and not a subject to be settled by disputation.

17. **The enlightened man becomes free simultaneously with his enlightenment.** There is no further state called *Videha- mukti* (disembodied freedom). An enlightened man has been ever free, eternally bodiless, from his own metaphysical standpoint.

Some who cannot rise to this level of thought consider that *Jivanmukti* (liberation while alive) is only figurative or secondary while liberation after death, is the only liberation properly so called. Others believe that as soon as ignorance (*avidyā*) is
destroyed without any residue, the body of the enlightened one must drop down dead! Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣṭya, has declared in unmistakable terms that when the Šrutī says that a Jñānin is merged in Brahman (Brahmāpyeti), it is only to intimate that he no more takes up a new body like the common run of mankind.

18. A Jñānin has completely broken the shackles of karma. That he is reaping the result of fructifying karma (prārābdha karma) is only a statement from the empirical standpoint.

Knowledge of Ātman is the knowledge that one has ever been the Supreme Self devoid of body and action. That an enlightened person is spoken of as experiencing the effects of fructifying karma, is based on the apparent continuance of the semblance of the (badhītunuvṛtti body) even after it has been sublated by knowledge of the truth, and it is only an accommodation to the empirical view. This may be compared to the expression ‘The sky is blue’ used even by persons who know that the sky has actually no colour whatever. An enlightened man would never look upon the possession of a body as a real fact. Some who are not aware of the meaning of what they are speaking, seriously insist that the fructifying karmas of an enlightened soul are of three kinds—voluntary, accidental, and due to the others wish— all of which have got to be exhausted by enjoyment before final liberation is reached!

19. There are no gradations in Self-knowledge. He who has realized that he is the secondless Brahman beyond all action, means of action and results thereof, is the only real Jñānin. Such an enlightened one has nothing more to accomplish.

Conceptions of gradations among Jñānins labelling them as Brahavadis, Brahavadivaras and Brahavadivaristhas (as having reached the high, higher and the highest stages of knowledge) and also of imagining certain disciplining acts as incumbent on the Jñānin for the so-called direct realization are due to lack of grasping the truth enunciated above.

There is one thing which is most important to
remember for the students of Śaṅkara Vedanta, and that has been the basis on which all that has been presented in this booklet has been erected. It is common to all schools of philosophy other than that of Śaṅkara to give prominence to sensuous perception or mental cognition in their schemes of thought. Hence it is that most of these thinkers take Ātman to be the object as well as the subject of the notion of ‘I’. Śaṅkara has repeatedly urged that the final aim of Vedanta is to point out that all talk of Jīva as the ego endowed with a body in which the senses and the mind inhere, presupposes a primary ignorance (avidyā), and to draw our attention to the Witnessing Consciousness which is the real Self of us all. That, over and above the sensuous perception and mental activity, there is a source of universal experience to be recognized as the innermost intuition, is a fact which it is absolutely necessary to bear in mind before one can ever hope to resolve the knots of Śaṅkara’s dialectics. It is our hearty prayer to Srīman Nārāyana that by His grace the attention of all our readers who are real seekers of spiritual freedom, may be drawn to this central fact of the system.

Om Tat Sat
APPENDIX-II
LIST OF QUOTATIONS ADDUCED IN THIS BOOK

N.B.: Upanishad and Gita quotations are in Roman Type, while Bhashya quotations are set in Antique.

Page 1-1 ‘स य एपोडिमैतदाल्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्वमिसि क्ये तके’
(छ. ६-८-७, ६-१४, ६-१०-३, ६-१४-३)
2 ‘यतो वाचो निवर्तते अभास्य मनसा सह’
(तै. २-९)
3 ‘एतदमयं धूमम्’
(बृ. ४-४-२०)
4 ‘अनाशिनोउपमेयस्य’
(गी. २-१८)
5 ‘मनसो मनो यद्याचो ह वाचम्’
(केक. १-२)
6 ‘यद्याचावन्ध्युदितं येन वाचम्पुदिते’
(केक. १-५)

Page 2-1 ‘यमनसा न मनुते येनाहर्मने मतम्’
(केक. १-६)
2 ‘अश्वत्त्दशो नेति नेति न हेतुस्मादिदति नेत्यन्यत्यपरमित’
(बृ. २-३-६)

3 ‘अध्यात्मप्रतापनुसपमस्यम्वद्वरेण बह्य निर्दिश्यते ‘विज्ञानमानन्द बह्स्य’
(बृ. ३-९-२८-७), ‘विज्ञानचन एव’ (बृ. २-४-१२), ‘बह्स्य’,
‘आत्मा’-इत्येक्ष्यादिदिशाध्येण”
(बृ. भाषा. २-३-६)
4 ‘सर्वश्रायात्मत्वाच बह्साचाष्ट्यत्वप्रसिद्ध:’
(सू. भाषा. १-१-१)
5 ‘अस्त्रवेच स भवति। अस्त्रवेच्योति बेदेचेत। अस्त्रवेच्योति चेदेचेत।
सन्नमें ततो चिदु:’
(तै. २-६)
6 ‘स एव नेतिनेत्यतात्मा’
(बृ. ३-९-२६)
7 ‘सर्वश्रायुत्वुच बह्सायत्वायत्ब्योगात्म’
(बृ. भाषा. २-१-२०)

Page 3-1 ‘तं त्यापितिकं पुरुषं पृच्छिष्ठात’
(बृ. ३-९-२६)
2 ‘य एव निराकारं तत्त्वयात्मकं’
(सू. भाषा. १-६-४)
3 ‘य एव हि निराकारं तदेव तत्त्व स्वरूपम्’
(सू. भाषा. २-३-७)
Page 4-1  ‘एको देव: सर्वभूतेषु गृहः सर्वन्यायी सर्वभूतानाति'।
कर्मिवधानः सर्वभूतातिवासः साशी चेता केवलो निरुपेक्ष।’
(श्री. 6-१९)

Page 4-2  ‘एको हि प्रत्यगात्मा भवति, न दौ प्रत्यगात्मानी सम्भवतः’
(सू. भा. १-२-२०)
3 ‘आत्मा हि नाम स्वरूपम्’
(सू. भा. १-९-६)
4 ‘ अदृश्येऽनांशुहृतः श्रोतांसमो मन्तवाविजातो विजाता नान्योऽस्तोऽस्ति
इश्वर नान्योऽस्तोऽस्तिः श्रोता नान्योऽस्तोऽस्ति मन्तव नान्योऽस्तोऽस्तिः विजातैः
त आत्मानात्यथायमः मूलोऽस्तोऽस्तिः’
(ब्र. ३-७-३३)

Page 5-1  ‘यावाना अयामकास्रास्तान्येषोऽन्तरहीदय आकाशः’ (छान. ८-२-३)
2 ‘येनार्ज्जुवं चं च दिवं महोऽ च’
(तै. ना. १)
3 ‘आत्मानादेव च सर्वेऽं न हेयो नातुभुधेः’
(सू. भा. १-९-४)
4 ‘सर्व हि विनाशयद्विभ्रमणं पुरुषार्थं विनयितः। पुरुषो विनाशयात
हेतुभावाविनाशी विनयितंविनयावच्यः कृष्ठविनयात्मकः। अत एव
नित्यशुद्धवृद्धिमुक्तस्वभावः।’
(सू. भा. १-९-४)
5 ‘स वा एस महानः आत्माजागरणोऽस्तोऽस्ति भयं भ्रामण मृत्यूः कृत्यं भ्रामण मृत्यूः
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त्रात्मातस्तरस्य नित्यगमन्यवच्य यत्।' ।
अनादर्म्यं महतः परं पूर्वं निवचायं तं मृत्युमुखात्म समुच्छये’
(कार. १-३-१५)
2. ‘रूपाभावाक्षरः नायनाम्: प्रत्यक्षसः गोचरः। नित्याभावात्मकः
नानुपातातीतं मृत्युः।’
(सू. भा. २-१-६)
3 ‘अद्यामात्रासमाधयां एव त्यामयोऽध्येः धर्मेऽत्’
(सू. भा. २-१-६)

Page 6-1  ‘अशाब्दावस्रीमूलाभ्यं तथासर्स नित्यगमन्यवच्य यत्।' ।
अनादर्म्यं महतं परं पूर्वं निवचायं तं मृत्युमुखात्म समुच्छये’
(कार. १-३-१५)
2. ‘रूपाभावाक्षरः नायनाम्: प्रत्यक्षसः गोचरः। नित्याभावात्मकः
नानुपातातीतं मृत्युः।’
(सू. भा. २-१-६)
3 ‘अद्यामात्रासमाधयां एव त्यामयोऽध्येः धर्मेऽत्’
(सू. भा. २-१-६)

Page 7-1  ‘एकथ्यावानुश्रव्यमेद्यध्यायं धुतम्।’
(ब्र. ४-२-१०)
2 ‘विज्ञानपैकरमेश्वरारोगी अवधारणाविप्रतिवर्तनारोगी’
(ब्र. ४-२-१०)
3 ‘मनवावानुश्रव्यमेद्य नायनासत्स धियण।
मृत्युः: मृत्युममायी य इह नाएत पश्यति।’
(ब्र. ४-२-१९)
4 ‘शाखा चायाविपलेशाभास्मदपासस्कृतमं मन: आत्मदर्शिने करणाम्।’
(गी. भा. २-२१)
Page 8-1 'आत्मसतःत्यानुबोधनं न संकल्पयते यदा।
अपमनतः तदा याति प्राहाराये तदंप्रमुः॥' (गौ. का. ३-३२)

Page 9-1 'तन्त्रपर्वित्वात् यमात्मानात्मनोपरितेरताधारानि पुरस्कृतः सर्वं प्रमाणप्रयेवव्यवहारा लोकिका वैदिकक्ष प्रवृत्ता॥'
(सू. भा. अव. १-१-१)

Page 10-1 'सर्व्यवहाराणामेव प्राम्बहायत्वात्विन्द्रानात् सत्यवृत्तपते।
स्वनव्यवहारस्थि: प्राकृ प्रबोधात्। याविज्ञ न सत्यत्मैकत्वप्रतिपतिसति: व्रुद्धान्मेयमत्वस्यक्षेपि विकारे:ज्ञातचुरु:सूनु: कस्यचिदुत्थाते।
विकारानेव तु 'अहम्', 'मम' - इत्यविचारा आत्मापीये भावेन सर्वो जन्तु: प्रतिपद्ते स्वाभाविकी बहावता हिता।
तस्मात प्राम्बहायत्वात्प्रतिवेदाद्युपपत: सर्वतः लोकिको वैदिकक्ष व्यवहारः। यथा सृज्ञत्व्य प्राकृतत्व्य जनात्य स्मरे उच्चावाच्यान्
भावान् परंतो निष्ठितपत्र प्रत्यक्षाभिमानं विज्ञानं भवति प्राकृतप्रतिवेदाद्युपपत: न च प्राम्बक्षाभासाभाभायत्वत्तकारे भवति, तद्दुः॥' 
(सू. भा. २-१-१४)

Page 11-1 'देहेनद्र्द्विद्यांनमामाभिमानातहितस्य प्रामातूनापधकः प्रामाणप्रयुक्तानुपपत:,'
(सू. भा. अव. १-१-१)
2 'एवमायमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यात: मिठ्यास्तत्त: कर्त्त्वभोक्तत्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकस्यत्कः। अस्यावनपितो: प्रहाणायात्तैवक्तव्रियादपितपत: सर्वे वेदान्ता आर्थिये॥' 
(सू. भा. अव. १-१-१)

Page 12-1 'नाःवेदविमुतुः ते बूहनाम्'
(तै. शा. ३-१२-२-७)
2 'तं लोपिनियं पुरुषं पुर्चाछि'
(तै. ३-६-२६)

Page 14-1 'न धर्मन्वितासामायिन श्रुत्याद्य एव प्रमाणं बहुविज्ञासायाम। किं
तु श्रुत्यादोऽनुभावदाय यथासंभवपिह प्रमाणम्। अनुप्रवाससाधनादृ: भूतवसुविषयव्याच्य बहुविज्ञानस्य॥' 
(सू. भा. १-१-२)

Page 15-1 'कर्त्तेन तेन नाःवेदार्थस्यास्ततित्व श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रमाणं
स्यात्। पुरुषाधीनामाभिभावत्व कर्त्त्यस्य॥' (सू. भा. १-१-२)
2 'कर्म्फलेन हि यस्यादनुभावानदृ: स्यादास्थात्त्वे भवेद्रा न बा इति।
अनुप्रवाससाधनात्मकप्रत्येक्षत: 'श्रुतादात्मरोकाद' बहाः' (शु. ३-५-४)
इति शुने, 'तत्त्वसि' (छन्छा. ६-८-७) इति च सिद्धायुपदेशात्॥' 
(शु. भा. ३-३-३२)
Page 15-3 'बेदस्य हि निरपेक्ष स्वार्थ प्रामाण्य रवेतिर रूपविवेचे । पुरुषवर्षसं तु मानातपरेष्कं वकृत्स्मृतिवबहिं चेति विवर्णः।'  
(सू. भा. २-९-१)  
Page 16-1 'आत्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यंतवतात्र तद्विययस्य शाब्दिक्य प्रामाण्यं 
शक्यं प्रयायःकारं । न च आन्नामग्न्यं शाब्दिकारमाण्यं।'  
(सू. भा. १-९-४)  
Page 16-2 'न हात्माःस्वमातुकः कस्यचिच्छ । स्वार्थसिद्धवतिः।'  
(सू. भा. २-३-३)  
3. 'न हात्माःस्वमनः प्रामाण्यप्रस्तरितं सिद्धिः । तत्स्य हि प्रत्यक्षार्थःकमनि 
प्रामाण्यप्रस्तरितं प्रस्तरितं सिद्धिः उपादितवति।'  
(सू. भा. २-३-७)  
4. 'अधिनययस्य श्रावणं अधिनययस्य श्रावणं विवाहाद्य । न हि शाब्दिकारणं विवाहाद्य 
प्रत्यपमतात्र अधिनययस्य श्रावणं अधिनययस्य श्रावणं प्रत्यपमतात्र अधिनययस्य श्रावणं अधिनययस्य 
श्रावणं।'  
(सू. भा. २-३-७)  
Page 17-1 'सर्वस्यात्मातोल्यं केनं कण्ठपेदिजानीयवादित्वं प्रमातृप्रामाण्यद्वानुपादित्वं 
पाराप्रतिविक्षमानंवद्वाصولग्निख्यातिकरणं।'  
(ब्र. भा. ४-४-२०)  
2. 'येषां पुनरानन्यायविवेचितीकरणं घटाधिकमे प्रामाण्ये ब्याचित्वते येषां चेताये 
वायदेशन्वयविवेचित्विन्यान्यतरायवेब्धि चिदिस्मिशियति इत्युक्तं 
स्यात्।'  
(माः भा. माः)  
Page 18-1 'प्रमातृतः हात्मानो निवर्णायनं निवर्णायनं प्रमाणमः । निवर्णायनं 
चाहानमिनीभवति स्वप्नकालप्रमाणायनं प्रकृति।'  
(ग्री. भा. २६९)  
2. 'सिद्धं हात्मानि प्रमातृति प्रमित्वोः प्रमाणीवेशणं भवति। न हि 
पूर्वमित्वमहुमूह इत्यार्थानं प्रामाण्य प्रश्नात् प्रमेयपरिच्छेदाय 
प्रस्तति।'  
(ग्री. भा. २६९)  
3. 'यत्र तत्स्य सर्वभावस्वयमाध्यात्त्वं तत्केन कं पर्येतं तत्केन कं 
विज्ञानीयात्।'  
(ब्र. ४५-१६)  
Page 19-1 'अव वेदां अवेदाः।'  
(ब्र. ४५-२२)  
2. 'स्वविश्वस्यौराणिः हि प्रमाणानि।'  
(ब्र. भा. २-१-२०)  
3. 'उपदेशादयं वादः।'  
(ग्री. का. १-६८)
Page 19-4 ‘झाते हैं न विचारते’
(भृ. का. १-९८)

Page 20-1 ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्ट्वऽ श्रोत्वऽ मन्तव्यऽ निदिध्यासितवऽ’
(बृ. २-४-५)
2 ‘पण्डितो मेधावी’
(छाँ. ६-१२-१)
3 ‘येषपायेतो पदार्थों अज्ञानः सत्यनिगर्ष्येव विद्वानः
वाक्येऽव श्रवणं नोत्यादियतुं शक्तिः।
पदार्थोऽपूर्वं कथावादः
वाक्यार्थऽज्ञानस्येऽति; तात्प्रेयंष्टवः
पदार्थावेक्षप्रयोजन: शास्त्रयु-
क्त्यायात्।’
(सू. भा. ४-९-२)

Page 21-1 ‘श्रुत्तात्पुरोपो बहुभिः न लघ्यः श्रुव्यत्तोऽपि वहनो यं न विचारः’
(का. १-२-६)
2 ‘अत्तर्क्यमणुप्रमाणाः’
(का. १-२-६)
3 ‘नैपा तत्क्षेत्र महिलापनेया’
(का. १-२-६)
4 ‘अन्यप्रेक्षे वदित्र नासि’
(का. १-२-६)
5 ‘प्राक्षणेष वै सुधानाय’
(का. १-२-६)
6 ‘पण्डितो मेधावी गन्धारांगेयोपसंपंशे तेनेवहार्दचार्य्यान् पुरुषो वेद’
(छाँ. ६-१२-१)

Page 22-1 ‘मन्तव्यऽ निदिध्यासितवऽ’
(बृ. २-४-५)
2 ‘न हीदमतांगस्यं भावात्यात्यं मुक्तिनिवन्धनमाणामपन्तोरेवोत्यर्तुपि
शाक्यप्’
(सू. भा. २-१२-९)
3 ‘तस्माद्वहुः जाजासोपन्तयाः वेदांत्यादियमांसा
तस्माद्वेदात्यात्यादियमांसा
विद्वतेऽधितकोपकरणः निः:श्रेयस्यप्रयोजना
प्रस्तुत्यते।’
(सू. भा. २-१२-९)
4 ‘श्रुत्तुनुग्रहीत एव हात्र तकोऽपुनवाच्चेवनाशस्त्रीयते’
(सू. भा. २-१२-६)
5 ‘उदेश्याय निर्दृशत्वाद् एव न प्रतिपितित्वं
तक्ष्यां श्रवणं श्रवणं श्रवणं श्रवणं
पुरुषार्थात्वदायात्’
(सू. भा. २-१२-९)
6 ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्ट्वऽ श्रोत्वऽ मन्तव्यऽ निदिध्यासितवऽ।’
(बृ. २-४-५)

Page 23-1 ‘आत्मां वाच्चास्स्तनो सिंहारणास्तुपरिः’
(सू. भा. २-३-७)
2 ‘नानेन मिथ्येन शुच्यत्कर्मस्यात्माः
संबन्धति।’
(सू. भा. २-१२-६)
Page 23-3 'प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यभिमतानावपि तीर्थकराणां कपिलकण्ठसुरप्रभुवतीनां परम्परविनियोजकोतिरीर्णात्'
(सू. भा. २-१-१९)

Page 24-1 'सम्यग्नामेकरूपम्। वस्तुकेतुवाल्। एकरूपणे हजारस्थियो योधर्ष: स परमार्थः। लोके तद्विषयं ज्ञान सम्यग्नानविषयेते यथार्थप्रत्यय इति॥'
(सू. भा. २-१-१९)

2 'न च शक्यन्ते-अतीतात्मानात्मानात्मातात्माताकी एकसमान देवे काले समाहृतम् ये स्मृतिरकुपौराणिकविषयम् सम्यक् स्मृतिरित स्वातः॥'
(सू. भा. २-१-१९)

3 'बेदस्य तु निवेद्ये विज्ञातित्वानुहृतुचे स सति व्यस्तितावर्थविषय-
त्वोपरयो: तत्सन्नितस्य समस्तस्य सत्यक्षमतात्मात्मात्माकरः: सर्वे-
र्तिर तार्किकैरपराक्षोतस्तशक्यम्॥'
(सू. भा. २-१-१९-१)

4 'जैयम् एतान्देव स्त्रीणि। एतद्वितिरेक्षण ज्ञेयानुपपति। सर्वज्ञाना-
दृककार्यत्वेऽपि सूक्ष्मज्ञेयानाग्रेत्तथावात्।' (ग्र. का. भा. ४-८८)

Page 25-1 'उपाधिकृतम प्राचार्यपरिवारिविवाहितमाय ज्ञेयम्बन्धु परि-
कल्योग्यः
(ग्र. भा. १३-१३)

2 'अध्यारोपववादायं निश्चयस्य प्रपन्धः
(ग्र. भा. १३-१३)

Page 26-1 'स्वात्मानं बुद्धान्यथभयोरिततेतरण्यिवारायादामगमो-वागत
त्वम् संप्रसादे च प्रक्रियमित्रवागोग सदात्मा संप्रतिनिश्चितसदात्म-
त्वम्। प्रक्रियमः ब्रह्मप्रभुववाल्त कार्यकारणण-यतः वागोग ब्रह्मात्मिरेकः: इयेएकार्यीयः॥'
(सू. भा. २-१-६)

2 'दुनुथायाधातिविशिष्ट्यश शद्यसमान-सन्तस्य प्राप्तेन समाता विशेषो गृही-
tा भवति। न तु तथा निरिष्टा गृही तु शक्यन्ते, विशेषसे-स्यादशाबात् तेषाम्। तथा ज्ञेयम्बितिरेक्षण स्वनज्ञानित्यों कहितूः
वस्तुविशेषो गृहाते॥'
(बृ. भा. २-४-७)

3 'चिन्ताजन्मुगमात् सर्वत्र चतुर्विताते तेर्पते
(बृ. भा. २-४-७)

Page 27-1 'यद्याप्रातस्यैव अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितस्य कियाकारकफल-
ल्यातः श्रवणेन इत्यम्बितिपरिहारोपत्यास्यकार्यस्य व्रतस्य तही-
शेषस्मात्: तदाच्छायेण श्रुति: कियाकारकफलभेदस्य
लोकार्पितस्य सत्यताम् असत्यात् या नाच्छेते न च वार्यति॥'
(बृ. भा. २-१-२०)
Page 27-2 ‘स्वविषयशून्याणि हि प्रमाणानि’
(भ्य. भा. २-१-२०)
3 ‘एकस्य ब्रह्माणि निन्यापाथिको नोपदेशः; नोपदेशः न च उपदेशयाहं
हणकल्पम्’
(भ्य. भा. २-१-२०)

Page 28-1 ‘लोके च वस्त्वविषयं प्रवृत्तितेऽतुचार्यावर्णनात् प्रमाणस्य’
(गी. भा. २-६-१)

Page 29-1 ‘आत्मा वा अर्थ द्रष्ट्वः श्रोतव्रो मन्तव्यो निद्ध्वसितव्यो मैत्रीयालोको
वा अर्थ दर्शनेन श्रवणेन तत्त्वावज्जात्वेदर्शत सर्व विदितम्’
(भ्य. २-४-५)

Page 30-1 ‘सोंसेन्द्रः स विज्ञानसिद्धः’
(छाँ. ८-७-१)
2 ‘विशेषण जातुपेय्यः, विज्ञानसिद्धः स्वसंवेद्यादानपादविद्यः’
(छाँ. भा. ८-७-१)
3. ‘अवगतिपरंत ज्ञानं सत्यविद्या इच्छाया: कर्मं फलविषयविद्याचिच्छाया: ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेन गजुरुमिर्यं ब्रह्म ब्रह्मानितिः पुरुषार्थः। निशेषसंसारवीजाज्ञानज्ञानभिन्नायात्’
(सू. भा. १-१-१)

Page 31-1 ‘दर्शनयथवस्मातानि हि श्रवणदीनावर्ध्यमानानि दृढ़त्वात् प्रवृत्तिः
वयावघातादीनि तण्डुलादिनिन्यास्यपरिवर्धसानानि तद्हृत्’
(सू. भा. ४-१-१)

Page 32-1 ‘येषां पुण्यतपस्यानां नाजनसंवेद्यविषयवलक्ष्यं: पदार्थविषयं: प्रतिक्षोपर्यस्ति; ते शक्तिः सकृतुमुखेभ्युत्त्वम्यवायवत्त्वम्
वितुमिति तानु प्रत्यावृत्यान्यक्यमित्यपेशे’
(सू. भा. ४-१-२)
Page 31-3  ‘उपासना निदिह्यासनं चतुर्वर्णिताृत्वमिुन्धिगुणौ दियाविभुधीयते’

(सू. भाष. ४-१-१)

4  ‘यानि तावृत् सम्यक्षर्द्वालोक्यत्वापासनानि तात्वयावतात्त्वानि कार्यक्षर्द्वालोक्यतो वसनानातिगत्वात्मेृणां। न हि सम्यक्षर्द्वानि कार्यक्षर्द्वानि निष्पत्ते यतानां दियाविभुधासिति शक्यमि।’

(सू. भाष. ४-१-१२)

5  ‘आरण्यकान्दे आर्यत्वेत् प्रत्ययम। अन्तःप्रत्ययवशाय अदुव्यात-प्राप्तेः’

(सू. भाष. ४-१-१२)

Page 32-1  ‘स योगं एकैकपासते न स वेदाकृत्तस्य होष्योगं एकैकन भवत्त्व्यामेवे-वोपासीताृत्व होते सर्व एकं भवति।’

(बृ. १-४-७)

2  ‘मनो ब्रह्मपुस्तिहि भावति च तपस्ति च कौिा यससा ब्रह्मावचक्षुः स एव बेद।’

(छ. ३-१८-१, ३)

3  ‘किया हि नाम सा यत्र बसुकर्णपरस्परेेव चोढ़ते पुरुषविवचारायामै च।’

(सू. भाष. १-६-४)

4  ‘ध्यानं चतुंत撞 यदापि मानसं तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुंकर्तुंभणूयशा या कर्तुं शक्यमि। पुरुषतनत्रवात्। ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणान्त्यम। प्रमाणं च यथापूर्वतस्तुविनशयम। अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुंकर्तुंभणूयशा या कर्तुं- पश्चायम्। केवलं वर्तुतत्रामे।’

(सू. भाष. १-६-४)

Page 33-1  ‘आल्मन: स्वरूपं ज्ञितं ततो व्यतिरिच्चते अतो नित्येव सथितं पुरुषात्मेऽपि विश्वविश्वायान्तत्वाति गुणाृत्वमि। परिणामनियमं ये शास्त्राद्यकारायाभासम्। सन्ध्याविभासम्। ते आत्मविभासम् विश्वविश्वाय उद्ययां राय। तस्मात् विज्ञानाविम्मानं तथा उपयुक्ते। तस्मादात्मविभासख्याय ते विज्ञानन्तत्वायाभासस्य एव धर्मं विनियोगविश्वनं ईश्विने-किमं दर्शक्तयते।’

(सू. भाष. २-१-१)

2  ‘एवंस्या व्याश्यायामि। ते व्याच्यायामि युम् ने निदिह्यासने।’

(बृ. २-१४-४)

Page 34-1  ‘एव आल्म निदिह्याति चक्षुंत्रो वा मूष्ठों बाष्ट्रे। बया शरीरं-शेषइय।’

(बृ. २-४-२)
Page 35-2 ‘यान् शुक्लदीनौ येमिनो मोक्षपथानाहूं ते मोक्षमार्गः। संसार-विषया एवं हि ते। चक्षूशो वा मूृषो बाजनेयो वा श्रीरदेशेऽभ्यः।-इति श्रीरदेशाशाक्षरसम्बन्धस्मर्दिविदलोकप्राप्तका हि ते॥’
(बु. भा. ४-४-९)

3 ‘इदानीं योगस्य यत्कलं ब्रह्मकृत्वदीर्घं सर्वसंसारोऽच्छेदकारणं तदु प्रदर्शये’
(ग्री. भा. ६-२४)

4 ‘ध्यानंगरो नित्यम्’
(ग्री. ८८-५२)

5 ‘ध्यामात्मस्वरूपपरिणतं योग आत्मविषय एवैकाृपृकरणम्’
(ग्री. भा. ८८-५२)

6 ‘योजयमौधिनश्वात्मप्रतिपप्पणम्: समाधिरूपदिहो बेदानेषु’
(सू. भा. २-३-३९)

7. ‘अधि चैनमात्यान् निरर्तसमस्तप्रशास्मव्यक्त संरायनकाले पक्षरति
योगिन:। संरायनं च भक्तिध्यानप्रणितानामनुपानम्॥’
(सू. भा. ३-२-२४)

8 ‘अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं मला घीरो हर्षोकै जहाहि’
(का. १-२-५२)

9 ‘विषयेभ्यः प्रतिसंहत्य चेतसः आत्मनि समाधानमध्यात्यपोषः’
(का. भा. १-२-५२)

10 ‘भनसो निग्रहायत्तम्’
(ग्री. का. ३-६०)

Page 35-1 ‘अपनतं तदा याति’
(ग्री. का. ३-३२)

2 ‘व्यवसायलिका बुद्धः समाधो न विंवेेंयो’
(ग्री. २-४४)

3 ‘समाधियेतेऽसस्मपूर्णसप्थोगाय सर्वमितिः समाधिरत्नकरणम्’
(ग्री. भा. २-४४)

4 ‘समाधावलत बुद्धः’
(ग्री. २-५३)

5 ‘समाधियेतेऽचित्तसमस्तीत्रिः समाधिरत्नाः’
(ग्री. भा. २-५३)

6 ‘लभ्यसमाधिप्रत्यः’
(ग्री. भा. २-५४)

Page 36-1 ‘येनें लिंमाम् शासन्’
(ग्री. २-३९)

2 ‘कर्मको गर्मको नुष्ठानसे समाधियोमे च’
(ग्री. भा. २-३९)

Page 37-1 ‘न च शिवद्विप जेबदावक्यायं विधिसंप्रभुमन्तरेणार्थुत्तमम् दूः, उपपन्ना या’
(सू. भा. १-६-४)
Page 37-2 अस्त्रान्धि: प्रहाणायायज्ञकै विद्याप्रतिपत्तिये सबं नेदान्ता आरोपेते' (सू. भा. अध्यासभाष्य)
3 'सबेंहु हि नेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तत्त्वगृहीतस्याध्यत्यात् प्रतिपादकः प्रतिपादकः सम्पन्नतानि।' (सू. भा. १-२-४)

Page 38-1 'ततु समन्चयात्' (ब. सू. १-२-४)
2 'आनायास क्रियायत्वात्' (जै. सू. १-२-१)
3 'दूषो हि तत्त्वाः कल्पवोधनम्' (शा. भा. १-३-१)
4 'अयमात्ता ब्रह्म सर्वारुणो' (ब. २-५-१२)
5 'न च तत्त्वानि पदानि ब्रह्मास्ववर्षविवेये नित्ये समन्चयेष्ववग्य-मानेयश्रीतरकत्त्वा युक्ता।' (सू. भा. १-३-४)
6 ‘सत्यं ज्ञानमनस्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २-१)

Page 39-1 "न ज्ञानश्ववायाचयनि ब्रह्म। तत्त्वां तदाभास्ववाचकेन बुद्धिर्म-विशेषेण ज्ञानश्ववेदन तत्त्वक्षयते, न तृत्यते। शब्दव्यूतिभूत-ज्ञातदर्शित्वात्। तथा सत्यश्ववेदनापि। सर्वविशेषायत्वसंततिप्रत्यवादेऽहणोऽहणो बहस्तततात्मायथिवि-थेण सत्यश्ववेदन तक्षये सत्यं ब्रह्मतिं। न तु सत्यश्ववायाचयेष्व-भार। एवं सत्यार्थेव इतरेतसुभिन्धानात् अन्योनियन्यन्यन्यन्य-मकात्। सत्यश्ववायाचयः तत्त्वत्त्वा क्रिया श्रद्धा लक्ष्यवादाभिषेक भवतीतत्त्वं। सिद्धां 'यतो बाचो निर्वाचने, अप्राप्य मनसा सह', (तै. २-२), 'आनिस्केतीनित्यि' (तै. २-७)। इति चाल्वत्त्वं नीर्लोकन्यवायाचयाहं संब्हान।"
(तै. भा. २-१)

2 "'तत्त्वां च पश्चाद् तत्त्वाः' (दै. ४-४-१५) इति क्रियाकारकक्षण्याब-श्रुते।' (सू. भा. १-१-४)
3 'न च परिनिष्ठतत्वस्वस्वरूपचेति प्रत्यक्षाद्विप्रायमणे ब्रह्माण्यः। तत्त्वमसि (छां. ६-८-७) इति बहातत्त्वाध्याय साधारणतर्वा अनुन्वणात्त्व।' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

Page 40-1 'सद्यच्यत्र नेदरास्त्वात् विद्यास्यस्यभाषास्य प्राप्तमाणे न दूः, तत्त्वां आत्मविज्ञात्स्य तत्त्वगतृतवात् तत्त्वश्ववस्य साधारणं प्राप्ता, प्रत्याविश्बाद्यं। न चानुगामगमयं शास्त्रार्थायं, चेन्न्यात्र दूः निदर्शनसपेश्यति।' (सू. भा. १-१-४)
Page 40-2 ‘न वाक्यस्य वस्तुन्वाव्यांक्रियाव्याः क्रियाव्यायांना वा प्रामाण्यायायांक्रियायांकारण्यः किं तत्त्व निष्क्रियाकलप्तवद्वििनात्तादक्तग्यः। तद्नादसित तत्त्वमां वाक्यम् यत्र नासित तद्प्रमाणम्॥’ (बृ. भा. १-४-१७)

3 ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्ट्वः’ (बृ. २-४-६)

4 ‘सोजनेवहन्यः स विज्ञासितवः’ (छ. ३-७-१)

Page 41-1 “‘नेति नेति’, ‘अस्यूलम्’, ‘एकमेवधितितम्’, ‘अपनायदातीतः’।
-इक्तेवादिकाव्यायानम्, उपास्याल्मस्यविशेषक्षपक्षेपनोपयोगः।
फलं च मोक्षं; अविद्यानिवृत्तिः॥’ (बृ. भा. १-४-१७)

2 ‘तत्त्वं सति यथोक्तकर्मफलेष्वेव तारतम्याविश्वस्यस्तपनिदेयु कष्टः
दत्तिशयो मोक्षं इति प्रस्तुतेऽ॥’ (सू. भा. १-१-४)

3 ‘नित्यम् मोक्षम्: सत्वमोक्षवादिभिज्ञुपुगम्। अतो न कर्त्त्व्येोशेषः
त्वेन बहोधेशो पुक्तः॥’ (सू. भा. १-१-४)

4 ‘न होक्ताविज्ञानेनामाधिक्षत्वः हृदत्वान्नान्यम् पुनः संभवोऽसितः’ (सू. भा. १-१-४)

5 ‘आत्मस्वुस्तरन्पस्मार्क्वेव ऊक्त्वेऴत्वमसोत्तथादिभः: अववाना
काल एव तद्देशात् कृत्यादृश्यविशेषनुपदानातरं कर्त्त्वेदम्’
(बृ. भा. १-४-७)

Page 42-1 ‘आत्मक्षत्वाविज्ञानस्यत्तमतर्थस्य एव भावावलु न विशेषव्यवः॥’
(बृ. भा. १-४-७)

2 ‘द्विपुं हि ब्रह्मावगम्ये। नामस्मृतविकारेनेदोपाधिविशिष्टं तद्विपरे
रितं च सत्त्वमोगिधिविशिष्टम्॥’ (सू. भा. १-१-१२)

3 ‘तत्राविधायाभ्यां ब्रह्मण उपास्योपायकादिलक्षणं सत्त्वं व्यवहारः’
(सू. भा. १-१-१२)

4 ‘अस्यूलमनवहस्तवघण्डीर्मी’ (बृ. ३-८-८)

5 ‘अवधान्मूर्मनमुपप्रमाण्यम्’ (का. १-३-१५)

6 ‘आकाशौ वै नाम नामस्मृत्योन्निविहिता ते यद्यतरा तद्विद्रहः’
(छ. ८-१४-१)

7 ‘दिव्यो हम्मुः: पुरस्त: सवाहाम्बनतरो व्रजः’ (मु. २-१-२)

8 ‘तदनि श्रव्यापूर्वमनेरसर्वणतमेला कामाशयायमि तवस्यानुभुः’
(बृ. २-५-१६)
Page 43-1  "संपदादिसृप्ये हि बह्तासैकतविज्ञानेर्जुमगव्यावटे 'तच्चमसिः' 'अहं बह्तासिः' 'अयमात्मा बहः' इङ्कमात्रावतीनाः वाक्यानाः बह्तासै-क्तवस्तुत्रिप्रतिपदानपरः पदसमनवयः पीड़येत्
(Sू. भा. १-१-२)

2 'इतरणि व्यक्तार्थक्तविज्ञानिः वाक्यनिः न तत्प्रथानानि। उपासनानविक्षिम्प्रतिपदानानि हि तानि
(Sू. भा. ३-२-१२)

3 'अनंतं वै मनः अनन्तं विष्येदेवा।
(बृ. ३-१-९)

4 'वारुणां संवर्गः'
(छात. २-३-१)

5 'बह्तासैकतवस्त्रौष भवति इति चैवमात्रिनि चतुर्वापितिवचनानि संपदादिप- परः न सामाज्येनोपपपपधेरन्॥'
(Sू. भा. १-१-४)

Page 44-1  " 'भिक्षु ददयमनिष्ठित्वांते सर्वसंसर्याः। इति चैवमात्रीनिविधानविभिन्न-तिफलार्थवाणानुपध्येयेन्%'
(Sू. भा. १-१-४)

2 'यथाभूतबह्तासैकतविष्यतः ज्ञानं न चोदनात्मसः। तदित्युपलिङ्गः शृद्धयमाणं आयतनायोजयविष्यतःकुणौ भवस्तुष्पुलादिदु प्रयुक्त-शृद्धसौक्ष्यविद्यात्॥'
(Sू. भा. १-१-४)

3 'अहेयानुपजायस्तुविश्वास्तवात्।
(Sू. भा. १-१-४)

4 'आत्मा वा अरे इत्यवः श्रीत्वयः
(बृ. २-४-५)

Page 45-1  'यो हि बह्तामुखः प्रवृत्तिं पुरुषः 'इत्यं मे भूतात् अर्निः मा भूतिति न च तत्वानितिकं पुरुषार्थं लभेन, तत्तत्त्वानितिकुपुरुषार्थवाच्छिन्न स्वामाहिकतार्थकार्णशाधाृत्वात्त्रसृतीवीर्यातात् विविभाजीकृत्त्व प्रत्ययात-स्वस्तोत्सवात वित्तवलित् हरमात् अरे हरवात् हृदादीनि'' हरस्मात्वमात्रणामनुपजायं चाल्मात्रतंमुखःद्वहितते। 'इतं सर्वं यद्यमात्रम् (बृ. २-२-६) इत्यादिचिदः।' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

2 'सोकेदापीद परशु, इवमात्रकाशय इति चैववज्ञातकेशु निर्देशीय विषयस्रोतः द्वात्माना त्रुकु इत्युत्त्वे, न साक्षात्तज्ञानेव कुबितिः। ज्ञायाभिमुखस्वापि ज्ञानं कदाचिन् जाते कदाचिन् न जाते। तत्स्मात् ते प्रति ज्ञानविद्यव सूक्ष्मदर्शित्ववो जायविद्युतिकांमेन। तस्मात् ते शरीरेन्द्र योगवेत्त्वव यथाविषयं यथाप्रमाणं च ज्ञानम् उपात्तेत्।
(Sू. भा. ३-२-२१)

3 'बह्तासैकतवस्त्रौष इति इवमात्रविष्यतः विष्यतानेवायेद्यित्तानोधित्वम्
(Sू. भा. ३-२-२१)
Page 45-4 'रज्ञुरिं नायं सर्फं: इति वसुवार्तकरसनेपि प्रयोगसत्व दृष्टत्वात्
(सू. भा. १-७-४)

Page 46-1 'तत्र ऋषामेतो पदार्थविज्ञानसंसारस्वाभिव्यप सत्तबिद्ध हैं तत्वमसी-
त्यत्तद्वारय स्वायं प्रमाणो नीत्यादिविंशृ शाक्तिति
(सू. भा. ४-१-२)

2 'नागात्मात्मानभावस्य दयापूर्व संसारित्वं शाक्त्यं दर्शिपिनुृ। वेद-
प्रमाणाणितत्मात्माभावादिरौधात्
(सू. भा. १-९-४)

Page 47-1 'तत्समानः अहं बहस्त्वीः येतस्वागमाना एव सवें विधवः सर्वावरि-
चेतराणि प्रमाणणि। न होह्यातुपदार्थस्वात्मावतानी निविश्वायणस्वात-
प्रमाणतुकाणि च प्रमाणणि भवितुमहानति
(सू. भा. १-९-४)

Page 48-1 'योधं लौकिको वैदिक्य व्यवहारः स उपाणविवेकज्ञानस्य
स्तिथताभवस्य अविद्याकार्यव्यावहारिनुृ निवर्तीति। अविद्याकार्य
विद्याविरोधाभाजनुृति
(मी. भा. २-६-०१)

2 'लौकिकं शृद्धृलौकिकं लोककारं च क्रमेण येन ज्ञानेन जायते
क्रान्तम्। ज्ञेयम् एताणेव त्रीणिः। एतद्वितिवेकेन ज्ञेया नुपरेतिः।
सर्वप्रावातकार्यमण्यवस्तुनेत्रो ज्ञेयावनभावात्। विजेयं परमार्थसत्यं
तुष्यवण्यमयपात्यत्वम्
(गौ. का. भा. ४-८-०३)

Page 49-1 'ज्ञाने च लौकिकादिविषये, ज्ञेये च लौकिकादिभिन्यिष्ठवक्ष्य
लौकिकं स्थूलस्य, तदभावेन वाचछुंदा लौकिकम् तदभावेन
लोककारं इत्येवक्रमेण स्वानन्याभावेन परमार्थसत्ये
तुष्यवण्यमेकेय चिरविह स्यमेवालस्तम्यवण्यमेकेय
(गौ. का. भा. ४-८-०३)

2 'अथायमित्रविधानो पूर्वप्रविधायने भृतिपतिष्टिति करण-
साधनः पादश्च
(मा. भा. म. २)

3 'तुरिवस्त्रव तु पदत इति कर्मसाधनः पादश्च
(मा. भा. म. २)

4 'सोदयमाना चतुष्पाति
(मा. २)
Page 50-1  'सर्वस्य प्रपद्धता साध्वैद्विकस्यादनात्मना चतुर्विद्वेश्वर्य विविधो-तत्त्वात्। एवं च सति सर्वप्रज्ञात्मेऽपेक्षात् सर्वभूतस्य-श्रात्वा एको दृष्टः स्वात्। सर्वभूतानि चाल्यनि। ....... अन्यथा हि स्वदेहपरिवर्तेण एव प्रत्यागत्वा साध्सृष्टिभिरृध्वं दृष्टः स्वात्। तथा च सति अन्हेत्तत्त्वित्त श्रुतिकृतो विशेषो न स्वात्॥'

(मां. भा. म. ३)

2 'प्रसिद्धेनैव भेदानां भाग्याक्षेत्रे हेतुना समलोकायमनारिवेनरूपमानुषिकथितं।' (गौ. का. भा. २-५)

Page 52-1  'तद्रैव परस्यति न तु जागरितादुस्त्रभवमाननान्'  

(गौ. का. भा. ४-४१)

2 'स्वनात्तं जागरितात्तं योभूमेव येनानुपरस्यति।'  

'महान्तं विमुक्तामानं मत्या धीरो न सोचति॥' (का. २-१४)

3 'जागरत्वः अनेकसाधनाः बहुविषयेवायभासमाना मनःस्यदनमा शती तथापूर्त्तं संबंधायेत। तत्कालस्य संकृतं विचित्रत इव पदो बाह्यसाधनान्येव क्षमणकामकर्मेच्छित्वात् तद्रूपमाणं जाग्रत्व-भासते।' (मां. भा. म. ४)

Page 53-1  'तथा स्वन्त: स्वनद्वृत्त एव सनू साधारणविद्यामानवस्तुवदवभासते, तथा तत्कालात्वः साधारणविद्यामानवस्तुवदवभासमानम् न तु साधारणां विद्यामानवस्तु स्वनवेदव॥' (गौ. का. ४-३७)

2 'स वा एव एतस्मात् सुदानेन रत्ना चरिता दृष्टेऽवै पुरुषः पापां च पुरा: प्रतिनिध्याः प्रतियोग्याविद्यात् स्वप्नात्यहैव।' (बृ. ४-३-१७)

3 'यथा सुप्तो न क्षण काम कामयते न क्षणं स्वन्तं परस्यति।'  

(बृ. ४-३-१९)

4 'जागरितारूपी यहर्षां तददिपि स्वन्तं परस्यति। अत आह् 'न क्षणं स्वन्तं परस्यति।' (बृ. भा. ४-३-१९)

Page 54-1  'सुपुष्पस्यात् एतस्मात् जाग्रत्वं जाग्रत्वं एव ज्ञात्मेऽपेक्षात् ज्ञात्मेऽपेक्षात् पादः॥' (मां. ५)

2 'प्रज्ञात्मामरम्येवात्स्याध्यायं रूपमु इति प्रज्ञः। इतरविविधशिष्टां विज्ञानमारत्त॥' (मां. भा. म. ५)

3 'यथा विषय जीवो मनन्दर्शनश्रवणादिद्व्यहाराय तद्यथा च वर्तमानवत्तु चिन्तनमेव विज्ञानमारत्त॥' (छार्य. भा. ६-८-१)
Page 54-4 ‘यैतसप्रवृत्तं स्वपितं नाम सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवति तस्यादेन स्वपितीयात्मकते।’ (५.६-८-१)  
5 ‘सुपुष्प एव रथ देवतारूपं जीवतःविनिन्युक्तं दर्शियचायाभाय।’ (५.६-८-२)  
6 ‘सलिल एको द्रष्टांहृतो भवत्येष ब्रह्मलोकः समाप्तिः हैनमनुशासाय याजवल्क्यः।’ (५.६-८-३)  
Page 55-1 ‘अन्त पितामिता भवति मातामाता लोका अलोका देवा अदेवा वेदा अवेदा।’ (५.६-८-४)  
Page 56-1 ‘सतां विस्मयानं स्वनायद्वृक्ततानां भूमिक्ष्याचार्यः स्वर्गीय: सतां विस्मया विस्मयाचार्यः स्वर्गीय: सतां विस्मयाचार्यः स्वर्गीय:’ (५.६-८-५)  
Page 57-1 ‘यदा आत्मस्येक्षकमनयभवते नामपूर्वे व्याक揭्यते तदा नामपूर्वे आत्मस्य परिवर्त्यानेव भ्रमणारुपेविभक्तकेशकाले सर्वस्वासु व्याकित्यते।’ (५.६-८-६)  
2 ‘मात्याचिन: सूक्ष्मप्रसारणमः सुपुष्पस्वनाथिविनितः।’ (५.६-८-७)
Page 61-3 ‘न हि रज्जवादीनामविद्याविद्याविद्यातिरेक्षेन सर्पदाहास्वदे काराण
शक्यं वत्कुम्’
(गृं. का. भा. १-९)

Page 58-1 ‘शर्योविषिषेषपि इतरेतरविषिषेषपि इतरेतरविषिषेषपि
रज्जवादार्थ र्षिधार्थनिर्दिष्टविषिषेषपि काराणं’
(गृं. भा. मं ७)

2 ‘सुपूः व्यविधातिती चेतन, सुपूर्वस्यानुभूम्यान्यात्’
(गृं मं ७)

3 ‘अर्थ पूःः प्रज्ञेनालम्बनं संपरिश्रवत् न वाहा मिकन वेद नान्तेष्यः’
(वृ. ४-३-२१)

Page 59-1 ‘एकायोवाणान्तेसुः’
(वृ. भा. ४-३-२१)

2 ‘यदैः तत्र विजानाति, विजानानुवै तत्र विजानाति, न हि विज्ञातुतिषेषपि
परिश्रवायेरितथा विज्ञातुतिषेषपि चेतनं सत्वस्यान्यान्यान्यान्यान्यात्’
(वृ. ४-३-३०)

3 ‘अन्ययो गृहणण: स्वात्वन्य निर्या तत्वभाजनं’
(गृं का. १-१५)

4 ‘वर्णः स्वात्त्’
(ऐ. १-१२)

Page 60-1 ‘अनादिशाया सुपूः यदा जीवः प्रज्ञेत्
अज्ञानजीत्यज्ञेत् सुपूः यदा’
(गृं का. १-१६)

Page 61-1 ‘सोदकार्यत वहुः स्था प्रज्ञेयेति। स सम्प्रतिपति। स तत्स्कन्धः। इंद्र
सर्पम् प्रति। यदिदं किं च।’
(लै. २-६)

2 ‘यथाने: सुद्रा विस्मुलिङ्गा व्युक्तत्वेवम्बेयास्मादत्वम्: सवें भागः:....
सवेऽत् आलानो: व्युक्तत्वम्।’
(वृ. मं. २-१-२२)

3 ‘तथाकार्यविविधः सोम्य भावः: प्रज्ञेने तत्र चैवप्रवेशन्ति।’
(वृ. २-१-१)

4 ‘अप्रत्यायेज्ब्धावाक्षत्वं व्यायामे कार्यविविधाभावः।’
(सू. भा. २-३-७)

5 ‘सवेऽ: हि विनाश्वमृत्तिकार्यतः पूर्वस्यान्य विनाश्वमृत्तिकार्यतः। पुरुषो विनाश्वमृत्तिकार्यतः
सवेऽ: स्ववास्मादिनाशी, विनाश्वमृत्तिकार्यतः कृत्यविविधः। अत: एव
निनाश्वमृत्तिकार्यविविधाभावः।’
(सू. भा. १-१-४)

6 ‘स वा एव महानज्ञ आत्माज्ञेयमतौस्मूलोऽभयो ब्रह्म।’
(वृ. ४-४-२५)

7 ‘प्रपशोपां स्वात्नेष्य स्वविविधतेन्त।’
(मं मं. ७)
Page 62-1  ‘मूलायोगियांवतुमुलिःस्रवपुण्याशायो प्रभावितां त्रिपाठाध्यायेन ततः सर्वं सृष्टि प्रकाशातः जीवप्रमाण्येकल्पुभु-दुःखबद्धरावय उपायः।’  (गौ. का. भा. 3-१५)

Page 63-1  ‘वाकारमण्णं विकारो नामेश्वर्यं युक्तिकेत्तेव सत्यम्।’  (छा. ६-१-४)

2 “‘शुद्धिः विस्फुलिः।’ (बृ. २-६-२०), समपावः। (गौ. ६४-७) —
इति च श्रूतये स्पर्शये चेतु। न एकलप्रायबद्धाध्यात्मात्। अनेकों विस्फुलिंहोज्जन्ते इत्येकलप्रायसुवहं दृष्टो लोके। तथा
चार्खोमिना एकलप्रायाः।’”  (बृ. २-६-२०)

3 ‘बुद्धायुपपादिनिनित्तं त्वम् प्रियिभागप्रतिभानम् आकाशवेद
घटादस्यनयिनिनित्तम्।’  (सू. भा. २-३-१७)

4 ‘आयमा धाराकाठोम्बोध्यादिको अविद्यतिं अविद्यतिं।
घातादिकः संघातैवात्तित्रिनिनित्तेऽधिकाशियां।’  (गौ. ३-३)

Page 64-1  ‘यथा स्वतन्त्रस्मृति जीवाः जापते प्रियते च।
तथा जीवा अभिः सर्वम् भवति न भवति च।’  (गौ. ४-६८)

2 ‘संधातः स्वाध्वराः आत्मामालविविविजाति।’  (गौ. ३-००)

3 ‘प्रपदो यदि विहोट निवृत्त न संशयः।
मातामात्रितं इत्वमें इत्वमें इत्वमें।’  (गौ. ०-००)

4 ‘उपलभ्धति समाचारादिज्ञानस्तुत्ववादिनाम।
जातिस्तु देशितः बुद्धिरजातेवशयः सत्।’  (गौ. ४-२४)

Page 65-1  ‘तां गुरुगतुः तत्वाः। वेदानांभासिन्नं तु स्वाधेयव अजाध्यात्म-
विवेको विवेको भविष्यतीति। न तु परमार्थमुद्ध्रया।’  (गौ. ४-३४)

2 ‘उपासनेपदिहें० तद्परमचक्षुकया।’  (गौ. ३-२०)

3 ‘मरणो संख्येव चैव गत्याएव परमपेष्ट।
रिष्यों सर्वसारिष्याः चाकाराविरिक्षाः।’  (गौ. ३-१०)

4 ‘सतो हि मायाय जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वः।’  (गौ. ३-२७)

5 ‘सतो हि विद्यामनात् कारणादिकारसिनित्तं हस्त्याविकारस्येव
जन्मजन्म युज्यते। नासत: कारणात। . . . . . . . . अथवा सतो
विद्यामनात् वस्तुनि राज्याः: सर्वादिकारायणाय जन्म युज्यते। न तु
तत्त्वं यथा तथा अप्राणायांपि तत् एवाज्यसत्तमति जन्म।’  (गौ. ३-२७)
Page 65-6 'नेह नानासित किस्मन ।' (क्र. २-१-९९)

7 'इन्द्रो मायाभिषु पुरुषूः ईयेत ।' (ब्रू. २-५-९९)

8 'अवायमानो बहुधा विजायेत ।' (तै. आ. ३-१३)

9 'अविविद्याकृतिपतेन च नासस्तल्क्षणेन रूपमेवेदन्त्वाकुतांतामकने तत्वाविविद्यामयामनिवृचन्नियेन ब्रह्म परिणामादित सर्वव्याहारस्य रास्यदल्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।' (सू. भा. २-१-७७)

Page 66-1 'सर्वज्ञानेश्वरस्य आत्मसूते ह्वाविविद्याकृतिपतेन नामस्ये तत्वाविविद्यामयामनिवृचन्नियेन संसारप्रभावबीजभूते सर्वज्ञानेश्वरस्य माया, शक्ति, प्रकृति: इति च शृण्टिस्मृत्योरिष्टित्वे।' (सू. भा. २-१-१४)

2 'यदा तु परमार्थदृष्ट्य परमार्थवचात् श्रुतिसुरसारिणिभ्रमणेन निरुप्यमाणे नामस्ये मुदादिविकारवद्व वस्तवतन्ते तत्त्वते न स्वातिको लक्ष्यातिदिविकारवदेव, तदा तद्यक्षय 'एकमेवाधितीयम्' 'नेह नानासित किस्मन' ह्वाविद्यारस्य रास्यदल्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।' (ब्रू. भा. ३-५-१)

3 'न कस्त्रिण्यजायते जीवः संत्मोहस्य न विद्यते।
उत्तरनः यत्वं यत्र किस्मन्त जायते।' (गौ. क्र. ३-४६)

Page 67-1 'अन्वेष्ट्यविज्ञानात्म प्राक्ष्यामायुवामात:।
अनिवृष्ट: स्यातू प्रमातैव वामदोस्यदिविष्टित:।' (सू. भा. १-२-४)

Page 68-1 'विविद्यामुख्ये नित्यरिहोत्त्रादित विविद्याहिनीं च भौष्णयपू मुदाया पोष्प्रमृजोदेशेन इह जनमि जन्मान्तरं च प्राग्नास्मेरां: कृत्य यतु तदु यथासामायः ब्रह्मादिगमप्रतिभूप्रकारणोपातुत्वादिविविद्यारेण ब्रह्माधिगमप्रकारल्वं प्रतिपद्यमानं श्रवणात्मक pardhāntardhūka परोपकारणेपेक्षं ब्रह्मादिविया सहीकार्यं भवति ॥' (सू. भा. ४-१-८)

2 'तमेते वेदानुवचपनो ब्राह्मण: विविद्याधिनिः चिन्ते दनने तपसानाशकेन ।' (ब्रू. ४-२-२२)

3 'विविद्यासंयोगाच्योयम् उच्चतिसाधनभायोंसीयते।' (सू. भा. ३-४-२६)

4 'स्वकार्मणा तमपत्यय्य सिद्धि विन्दति मानवः।' (गौ. १८-४६)
Page 68-5 'निसंगतया हेद्धमहाणपूर्वकमिश्रशरादनाः कर्मयोगो'।
(गी. भा. २-३९)

6 'योगिनः कर्म कुर्विति साङ्गे त्यक्वाञ्जमशुद्धे'।
(गी. ५-११)

7 'ैक्यवाचक्तक्षीत्रेतानामेवेष्टूदतामष्ठिविविधुत्तुपलिते।'
(सू. भा. ३-५०-३७)

8 'संवत्तप्रभुतीनां नन्यच्यादियोगादनापेक्षात्रामकर्मविनामिनित्य स्मर्तम् इतिहासे।'
(सू. भा. ३-५०-३७)

Page 69-1 'पुरुषानसंवचिज्ञापितोपनदेवताधनादिभिधर्मविवेशघृतायुहो विवादया: संभवति।'
(सू. भा. ३-५०-३७)

2 'अनेकनमर्मसिद्ध: ततो यति परां गतिम्'
(गी. ६-६५)

3 'तथा च स्मृत्ति: 'अनेकजन्मसंसोर्द्वतेतो यति परां गतिम्' इति जन्मातरसंवचितानामिप संस्कारविशेषानुग्रहीतनुव विवादया दर्शयति॥'
(सू. भा. ३-५०-३७)

4 'देशा पुनः पूर्वकृतसंसरकव्याशाद: विदुर्यथयथाप्रभुतीनां ज्ञानयस्तिस्ततथां न शक्यते फलप्राप्ति: प्रतियुक्तम्। ज्ञानस्मृत्यकानितकाष्टवतारु॥'
(सू. भा. १-३-६८)

5 'श्रावणवेच्छुरो वर्णनः(भा. शा. ३२७-४९) इति चतुर्वधपुराणाधिकमेव चातुर्वधपुराणकाष्टवर्णमादि॥'
(भा. भा. १-३-६८)

6 'न हुमितसोजादीश्च कर्मविनि। ब्रह्मचर्य तप: सत्यबदनं शाश्वदेवमद्रास्तेवमाध्वायणे कर्माणीतऽप्रक्षेत्रस्तिथानि विवाहस्ते ध्यानदाराणादिलक्षणानि च ॥'
(तै. भा. १-१९)

7 'तस्मिदेवविच्छातन्तो दानं उपरतंततिष्ठु: समाहितो भूतवारणश्रेष्ठाय गोरख परस्परति'
(बु. २-२३)

Page 70-1 'पताकवरे खल्लमूर्ततम्'
(बु. २-५-१५)

2 'अग्रीणयनायाःश्रमकर्मविनि विवादया स्वार्थसिद्धान्तायाविपक्षत्वादिनि'
(सू. भा. ३-५-२५)

3 'ऊध्रितसुः चास्रेमेवु विद्या भ्रुते। न च तत्र कर्माद्वयं विवादया: संभवति। कर्माभवताः॥'
(सू. भा. ३-५-२९)

4 'पत्तमेव ब्राह्मणो लोकमित्वसु: प्रभुवर्जित ॥'
(बु. २-४-२२)

5 'ब्रह्मसंस्थेवगृहमूल्यमेति।'
(छाँ. २-२३-१)
Page 71-1 'ब्रह्मसंस्थ इति हि ब्रह्मणि परिसमाधिर्न्यापारतात्त्वं तत्रीयोऽ
त्वमभिधीतसे। तच्छ व्रयाणामाश्रयाणां न संभवति। स्वाश्रयविहि-
तकर्मानुसारात्म प्रत्यविश्रवावात। परिव्राजकस्य तु
सर्वकर्मसंस्यासात्म प्रायवायो न संभवति अनुछानात्मितः। श्रमा-
दिस्तु तद्यथा धमो ब्रह्मसंस्थताया उपोग्लको न विरोधी। ब्रह्मनि-
ष्ठलवेप हि तत्स्त शामदायुश्वर्भिं हि स्वाश्रयविहिं कर्म। यज्ञादिनि
चेतोपाम् तद्वरोलम् च तत्स्त प्रत्यवायः। (सू. भा. 3-४-२०)
2 'तस्मात्वरिब्राजस्याःश्रममात्रादमूत्वाप्राप्तेः नानात्मक्यद्वाः
इत्येऽस्मि दौष्टो नावतरति' (सू. भा. 3-४-२०)
3 'ब्रह्मानपरिपाकाद्वाच्य परिव्राजस्य' (सू. भा. 3-४-२०)
4 'योगारुकस्य तत्स्यैव श्रम्काराणमये' (गी. ६-३)

Page 72-1 'अतो विद्युषस्तवत् परिवात्य सिद्धं सत्रादानादिकर्मकारकजाता-
यधुन्यायिक्रिययह्रात्दुप्रतिपतिमयित्र चचन्तमात्रेणासि' (सू. भा. ४-५-१५)
2 'स कुर्तिक्षित्रिमतात् कर्मपरिवात्यसंयं वति कर्मणि तत्स्ते च
सहारहिततया स्वप्रायोजनापायत्वोत्संगहतं पूर्ववत् कर्मणि
प्रवतोसं नैव किञ्चि तत् करोति। ज्ञानिनिद्धकर्मविलोक्तियन कर्म-
कर्मं कर्मं संपदते॥' (गी. भा. ४-२०)
3 'तस्माद्राहणः पाणिद्विनिविध बालेवनतिष्ठसे तु। बालवं च पाणिद्वं
च निविद्यायु सुमिरतमो च भानें च निविद्यायु ब्राहणः॥' (सू. ३-५-१)

Page 73-1 'दृष्टार्थं च विज्ञप्रतिपेदेभावार्थस्यविधानमिधिकरोति अव्रणा-
दिपु। तस्माद्राहणदीनामधिकारो न विरूध्यते' (सू. भा. ३-४-३८)
2 'यद्यक्षान्तस्य विज्ञप्राप्तविनमश्च न क्रियत उपस्थिति
तिविषयं कर्मन्तरणं तदा इवाव विद्या उत्पन्नते। यदा तु खलु
तत्प्रतिवन्द्यि क्रियते तदात्मुपुं॥' (सू. भा. ३-४-५१)
3 'गर्भं एवत्चछविन वामदेव एवद्वाच' (ऐ. २-५)

Page 74-1 'न च पुनरावति' (छठ. ८-१५-१)
2 'इम्म मानवार्थो नावर्तनेत्' (छठ. ४-१५-५)
Page 74-3 ‘तेपामिह म पुनरावृत्तिः’ (बृ. मा. 6-1-18)
4 ‘अत इमएँ इहेति च विषेषणार्थक्ताय अन्तःआद्यूतिः कल्पनीयाः’ (छां. भा. 5-10-2)
5 ‘विद्यासांगणं स्तविकष्ठिष्णापि स्वभल्ल एव विद्या एक्का विद्यार्थाँ विद्याविभाग्यत इत्यस्मातवाद्याः। न विद्यावले मुक्तः। तद्धर्मसाधय नियमित्युत्सभायय मेवव विद्याविभाग्यत इत्यस्मातवाद्याः। न च तत्स्माति उत्कर्षाक्षरः स्वभल्लकोभिषेष्य उपयुक्ते। न तिर्थसारः विद्याविभाग्यत। उत्कर्षाक्षरः हि विद्या भवति। तत्स्माति तस्यां विनिर्विष्णरत्नविषणि भवनु भवेति। न तु मुक्तः कल्पनार्थक्ताय संकोचस्तिः’
(सू. भा. 3-4-52)
6 ‘ब्रह्मव हि मुक्तवर्तं’
Page 75-1 “न हि तत्स्माति इत्यस्म वाक्यस्त्थार्थसतं मूलो भविष्यात्यते। परित्युतं श्रवयः। ‘तद्धैत्तु परित्युतं परित्युतं। प्रति प्रति परित्युतं। मूलथे परित्युतं। सूयं’ (बृ. 1-4-10) इति च समयदृष्टिकोटकालय तत्स्माति सर्वात्मान्यं दर्शाति। तत्स्मातिकार्यति विजुः। केवल्यसिद्धं’
(सू. भा. 3-3-12)
2 ‘ब्रह्मव सनुः ब्रह्मवेदिः’
(बृ. 4-4-6)
3 ‘यस्माति न हि तत्स्माति ब्रह्मवेदिः। कामः। सति तस्माति इहैव ब्रह्मव सनुः ब्रह्मवेदिः। न श्राद्धस्तत्त्वेन्तकालय। न हि ब्रह्मवेदी मूलस्य भावानात्मकेशि। जीतोविनयो भावः। देहात्मानित्यस्मात्यानात्मानात्माने-पौष तु ब्रह्मात्मातैतुच्छते’
(बृ. भा. 4-6-5)
Page 76-1 ‘तद्धैत्तुपरिरूपायनो वल्मीके मूला प्रत्स्मात प्रशोधनय तत्वायमेवेदं वल्मीके। रोतेशायमंगणोत्पूतः। भानो ब्रह्मवेदी तेजैव एव्’
(बृ. 4-4-7)
2 ‘अभावनित्य: सर्वस्यानि युक्तः सर्वस्तत्त्व:। सर्वस्यानि तत्त्व:। सर्वस्यानि युक्तः। सर्वात्मानोप्यात्मारः। एव। न पूर्ववत पुनः। सर्वात्मारः भवति।’
(बृ. भा. 4-4-7)
3 ‘कामकर्मप्रत्यक्षार्थात्मानेन हि पूर्व सर्वात्मानेन मल्ल्याः। तिल्म्यो-गाद्येद्यानिमः। अशर्तीः। अत एव च अपूर्वः।’
(बृ. भा. 4-4-7)
Page 77-1 ‘इंद्र वेदान्तवाक्यानामें... शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तं न तर्कशास्त्रवत्
केवलारूढःप्रतिकथितं: कहेऽिु सिद्धान्त साधितं दूषितं वा
प्रवृत्तम्॥’ (सू. भाषा. २-२-१)

2 ‘परमपरमप्रतिप्रतिधपनमुपतं भवति’ (सू. भाषा. २-४-१२)

3 ‘साधृक्ष्ययोगोत् हि परम्पुरुषार्थविधा नोके प्रज्ञानौ, शिष्टक्ष्य
परिगृहीतु, लिङ्क्षेन च श्रीतीनोपबुधितौ॥’ (सू. भाषा. २-१-३)

4 ‘तत्कारणं साधृक्ष्ययोगार्थिपार्थं ज्ञातं देवं मुच्यते सर्वसारणोऽ’
(श्रे. ६-१३)

Page 78-1 ‘निराकरणं तु न साधृक्ष्यं ज्ञातं वेदान्तप्रेक्ष्यं योगमार्गेण वा निषेध-
यसंधिगतम् इति॥’ (सू. भाषा. २-१-३)

2 ‘यतु दर्शनमुनत् ‘तत्कारणं साधृक्ष्ययोगार्थिपास्य’ इति बैदिकमेव
तत्र ज्ञानं ध्यानं च साधृक्ष्ययोगार्थविधाभिविलयते प्रत्यासर्वित्यह-
गत्यम्। चेत त्वंसेन न विद्ये तेनेन्द्रीयेव साधृक्ष्ययोगार्थिपास्योऽऽ
सावकाशल्यम्॥’ (सू. भाषा. २-१-३)

3 ‘तत्त्वप्रतिपरिमात्यं तत्त्वज्ञानायोऽपकूर्वनीति बैद्यकुर्वनु नाम न
तत्वज्ञानं तु वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव भवति॥’ (सू. भाषा. २-१-३)

4 ‘ज्ञानेविज्ञातुभेदेदर्शितं पराक्ष्यतत्त्वप्रमुखयं चतुः बूझेन् भाषितम्।
यद्यपि बाह्यार्थिनिराकरणं ज्ञानमात्रकल्पना चाइयःकतुसामोहमु-
क्षम। इंद्र तु परामार्थतत्त्वम् अहैैः वेदान्तायेव विवेयम्॥’
(गौ. काण. ४-९९)

5 ‘दुर्दश्यक्षिणितं सामयं विशंकर्तम्।
बुद्ध्या पद्मनामात्वं नमस्कर्तौ यथाबलम्॥’
(गौ. काण. ४-१००)

ॐ ततृ सतु