Swami Satchidananda's major work represents the first large scale critical history of Advaita Vedanta ever attempted. It seeks to establish a clear view of the traditional Advaita Vedanta based on the upanishads, Brahma Sutras and Bhagavadgita as systematised by Śaṅkara & his close associates, unencumbered by the mass of conflicting theories developed by later writers of the school. Stripping back these layers of later interpretation, Swami Satchidanandendra calls the reader back to Śaṅkara, who never forgot that the ultimate purpose of all study and reflection is the attainment of immediate experience of one's own true nature as the Self of All.

The Author

The author was born in Karnataka in 1880, & assumed the name of Y. SubbaRao. He taught English in Bangalore as a house holder till retirement in 1935. Initiated for the study of Śaṅkara by the Jagadguru of Shriingeri at about the age of 20, he devoted his life as layman and monk to the study and propagation of Śaṅkaras interpretation of the upanishads, in its theoretical & practical aspects.

continued in cover 3
Adhyatma Granthavali

S'UDDHA-S'ĀŃKARA-PRAKRIYĀ-BHĀSKARA
(Light on the Vedantic method according to S'āṅkara)

BY
SRI SRI SATCHIDANANDENDRA SARASWATI SWAMIJI

Serial No. 217

PUBLISHERS:
ADHYĀTMA PRAKĀSHA KĀRYĀLAYA
HOLENARSIPŪR - 573211
(Karnataka, India.)
2001
Tel No : 08175 - 73820
PUBLISHERS' NOTE TO THE SECOND
(COMPREHENSIVE) EDITION

All the booklets of the series printed during the First Edition were sold out and as there is a great & incessant demand from jīgāṇāsūs of English knowing people not only in India but also in foreign countries, the second (comprehensive) edition now is brought out. All the three booklets, which contain continuous matter of the title, have been now combined & published as one book. We hope that this will facilitate all the readers to obtain a clear thought of the subject in full.

Sri Subhana Saxena, an Indian settled in London, has held senior positions in a number of multinational companies. He has studied many books of Swamiji through the grace of his Gurus from Mattur village, in Shimoga, Karnataka. We hope through his mission Swamiji's message & works will find a place throughout foreign countries.

The Kārayālaya owes a deep debt of gratitude to Shri Subhana Saxena, who has financed the entire cost of bringing out this comprehensive edition.

May we hope that the readers will give wide publicity to this new comprehensive edition dealing with pure pristine S'āṅkara's Vedānta.

Holenarasipur
Date: 18-7-2001

Publishers
Gentle Reader,

Kindly go through the prefatory remarks attached by us to the first instalment of the series of Sanskrit booklets of this name. This free translation of it, is to help those that want to understand the Sanskrit original better. It is a companion to the original work and is intended for those who know English better, but would still like to assimilate Vedantic thoughts through that sacred language if only they could secure some assistance.

At our request, Swamiji has effected a few additions and alterations in this English version which, it is hoped, will enhance the usefulness of the original contribution. A generous donor, who prefers to do this piece of service incognito, has laid us under a deep debt of inexpressible gratitude, by financing the publication.

May we hope that you will give wide publicity to this new translation-series of Vedantic booklets?

Holenarsipur
20-9-1965

Sd. Y Narasappa
Chairman,
A.P. Karyālaya.
Preface (First Booklet - First edition)

This booklet is a free translation of "The S'uddha-S'öñkara-Prakriyä-Bhäskara" written by me in Sanskrit. The aim of the series of booklets of which this is the first instalment may be learnt from the publishers' prefatory remarks to the Sanskrit original. It is intended for readers who wish to have an outline of the thoughts contained in my "Vedänta Prakriyä-Pratyabijñä", a Sanskrit work which contains a comparative study of all the important Vedantic systems available from the most ancient times up to the time of Sarvajñätma, just to illustrate how all the Post-S'änkara Vedantins up to that epoch, no less than the ancient monists, have failed to recognize the only method which holds the key to the right understanding of the Upanishadric teaching.

The present series is complete in itself and can be studied independently by those who wish to be acquainted with this Unique Method of the Upanishads without taxing their brains at the very outset with all the details of the argument.

As it was felt that an English Translation of the Series might facilitate its study for those whose knowledge of Sanskrit is limited, this first instalment of the Translation-Series has been placed before the public, to see how far it serves the purpose. Whether the second instalment should be undertaken at all, depends on how my readers receive this one.

Any suggestions calculated to improve the translation series so as to make it more useful to those for whom it is intended, will be thankfully received.

All rights of printing & publishing this brochure has been unconditionally made over to the Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarasipur, as in the case of all my previous writings.

20-9-1965 AUTHOR
Gentle Reader,

Kindly go through the prefatory remarks attached by us to the first instalment of the series of Sanskrit booklets of this title. This free translation of the second instalment is to help those that wish to understand the Sanskrit original better. It is a companion to the original work and is intended for those who know English better, but would still desire to assimilate Vedantic thoughts through Sanskrit if only they could secure some assistance. Of course, it can be used even by English-knowing students of Vedanta who know no Sanskrit.

At our request, Swamiji has effected a few additions and alterations in this English version, which, it is hoped, will enhance the usefulness of the original.

May we hope that you will give wide publicity to this new translation-series of Vedantic booklets dealing with the essential matter and method of Sankara's Vedanta?

Holenarsipur 26-4-1967

Sd. Y. Narasappa
Chairman,
A.P. Karyalaya.
Preface (Second Booklet - First edition)

This booklet is a free translation of the second instalment of "The S'uddha-S'āṅkara-Prakriyā-Bhāskara" written by me in Sanskrit. The aim of the series of booklets of which this is the second one, may be learnt from the Publishers' Prefatory Remarks to the Sanskrit original. It is intended for readers who wish to have an outline of the thoughts contained in my "Vedānta Prakriyā-Pratyabhijñā", a Sanskrit work which contains a comparative study of all the important Vedantic Systems available from the most ancient times up to the time of Sarvajñātma, just to illustrate how all the Post-S'āṅkara Vedantins up to that epoch, no less than the ancient monists, have failed to recognize the only method which holds the key to the right understanding of the Upanishadic teaching.

The present series, however, is complete in itself and can be studied independently by those who wish to be acquainted with this Unique Method of the Upanishads without taxing their brains at the very outset with all the details of the argument.

As it was felt that an English Translation of the Series might facilitate its study for those whose knowledge of Sanskrit is limited, the publishers have asked me to begin this series of English rendering. The first instalment of the series was published in 1965, and the second one is now brought out to meet an incessant demand.

Any suggestions calculated to improve the translation series so as to make it more useful to those for whom it is intended will be thankfully received.

All rights of printing & publishing this brochure has been unconditionally made over to the Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Holenarasipur, as in the case of all my previous writings.

26-4-1967 AUTHOR
Gentle Reader,

Kindly go through the prefatory remarks attached by us to the first instalment of the series of Sanskrit booklets of this title. This free translation of the third instalment is to help those that wish to understand the Sanskrit original better. It is a companion to the original work and is intended for those who know English better, but would still desire to assimilate Vedantic thoughts through Sanskrit if only they could secure some assistance. Of course, it can be used even by English-knowing students of Vedanta who know no Sanskrit.

At our request, Swamiji has effected a few additions and alterations in this English version, which, it is hoped, will enhance the usefulness of the original.

May we hope that you will give wide publicity to this new translation-series of Vedantic booklets dealing with the essential matter and method of S'āṅkara's Vedanta?

Holenarsipur 29-5-1968

Sd. Y. Narasappa
Chairman,
A.P. Karyālaya.
Preface
(Third Booklet - First edition)

This booklet is a free translation of the third instalment of "The S'uddha-S'ānkara-Prakriyā-Bhāskara" written by me in Sanskrit. The aim of the series of booklets of which this is the third one, may be learnt from the Publishers' Prefatory Remarks to the Sanskrit original as well as my preface to the second instalment of this series.

The second instalment of the series was brought out last year; the third is now placed before the public in view of the incessant demand for it. That the series really supplies a felt-want is evidenced by frequent orders and enquiries about future instalments. I therefore intend to continue to produce one or two more instalments to make the attempt complete.

All rights of printing & publishing this booklet has been unconditionally made over to the Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryalaya, Holenarasipur, as in the case of all my previous writings.

29-5-1968

AUTHOR
CONTENTS

1. THE SYSTEM OF VEDANTA

1. Non-Advaitic Vedantins never referred to by S'āṅkara. 1
2. Vedantins at the time of S'āṅkara were all Advaitins. 3
3. No Vedantin recognizing the distinction of the Individual and the Supreme Self during Bādarāyana's time. 4
4. Various Doctrines of other Advaitic Schools referred to by S'āṅkara. 6
5. Conclusion. 13

2. THE TRADITION OF S'ĀṅKARA'S SCHOOL

6. S'āṅkara, the Resuscitator of an old Tradition. 14
7. Gauḍapāda himself refers to more ancient teachers. 16
8. S'āṅkara's earnestness with regard to Tradition. 18
9. Dravidācārya. 19
10. Teacher Brahmanandin. 24
11. Upavarshācārya. 27
12. Dvaita-Vedanta conspicuous by its absence during S'āṅkara's time. 29
13. Conclusion. 31

3. LANDMARKS IN S'ĀṅKARA-VEDANTA

14. Self-evident nature of Brahman as one's own Self. 32
15. The individual self is, by his very nature, no doer of action, for he is identical with Brahman as Pure Being. 34
16. The individual soul is essentially Brahman, not a cognizer. 37
17. Pramāṇās are such only till knowledge accrues. 41
18. How S'āstra is the final Pramāṇa. 45
19. Conclusion. 49
## 4. THE METHOD OF S'ÂNKA-RVEDANTA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>The Method in a nut-shell.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Assumption of specific features is only a device employed for the purpose of teaching.</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>The deliberate superimposition employed in Vedanta never affects its validity.</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Why the Method of Superimposition and Rescission alone is employed exclusively in Vedanta.</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>That Brahman is known only through the negation of the superimposed is a teaching common to all the three Prasthānas.</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Teaching by means of superimposition, is only for negating what it is not.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Extracts from the Bhāshyas.</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 5. VARIETIES OF THE VEDANTIC METHOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Relation of the sequel to the preceding section.</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>The Method of distinguishing Vidyā and Avidyā.</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>The Method of S'āstra-Prāmāṇya.</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>The Method of Creation.</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>The Method of Cause and Effect.</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Brahman's entry into creation as a Jiva.</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>The Method of Religious Works and Meditation.</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>The Method of the Five Kōs'as.</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>The Method of Self-effulgence.</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Exit, Going away and Returning, are all from the stand-point of Imputation.</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>The Method of the Universal and the Particular.</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>The Method of Three States also a device.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>The convention of Bondage and Release &amp; c.</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. ŚAṆKARA'S SCHOOL OF VEDANTA AS CONTRASTED WITH OTHER SCHOOLS

40. Relation of the sequel to the preceding section. 98
41. Common characteristics of Ancient Schools. 98

Defects in the Ancient Schools

42. The Dogma that the Upanishads are injunctive in their Aim. 102
43. The inconsistency of the S'ārīraka being composed afresh. 104
44. No need for approaching an Ācārya. 105
45. The misconception that Final Release is an effect. 106
46. The doctrine of Release as the destruction of Avidyā. 106
47. Vedic Authority cannot exculpate the Schools. 110
48. Bringing forward a controverted argument. 110

Special features of S'āṅkara's Tradition

49. S'ruti and Reason conformable to Intuition. 111
50. The Upanishads purport to teach Reality as without Specific Features. 113
51. Release from Actual Bondage not assumed. 116
52. All charges rebutted by assuming two different Stand-points. 118

7. VEDANTA CONTRASTED WITH BUDDHISM

53. Objection. 122
54. Suspicion of the admixture of Buddhistic Doctrine in this system. 124
55. Reasons for trusting the Kārikā-tradition. 129
56. The disparity of the two teachings with regard to Reality. 130
57. Divergence of the two systems with regard to Non-origination. 134
58. Disparity in the Methods of establishing Reality. 140
59. Conclusion of the Comparison with the S'ūnya-doctrine. 146
60. Vedantic Vijnāna contrasted with Buddhistic Vijnāna. 150
61. Dissimilarity in the method of rejection of the external object in the two systems. 154
62. Mere employment of the word 'Citta' does not entail similarity. 158
63. Not even the employment of the term 'Lōkottara' can engender the similarity of the systems. 160
64. Dependence on Yōga and the absence of it sharply distinguish the two systems. 162
65. Conclusion of the Contrast. 165
66. Conclusion of the repudiation of Buddhistic Influence. 169
67. Conclusion of the Section. 170
ABBREVIATIONS

N.B: Page numbers of the Sūtra-Bhāṣya are those of the Nirmaya Sāgara Press (Text only), and those of the Gītā and Upanishads are of the Vanivilasa Edition, Banaras. Bh. means Bhāṣya on the work.

A.A.Ā., अ.स.आ Abhisamaya - Āloka of Haribhadra (Baroda)
Ai. Aitareya Upanishad.
Ai.Bh. Aitareya Bhāṣya.
AP. Ālambanā-Parīkṣā of Dignāga (Madras)
Bg. Bh., GBh. Bhagavadgītā-Bhāṣya.
Bh. SB., BBh. Bhāskara's Sūtra-Bhāṣya.
BL., BCA. Bodicāryavatāra by Śāntideva (Bib. Ind.)
Br. Brahadāraṇyaka Upanishad.
Br. V. Brahadāraṇyaka Vārtika.
Ch. Chāndogya Upanishad.
Ch. Bh. Chāndogya Bhāṣya.
G. Bhagavadgītā.
GBh Bhagavadgītā Bhāṣya.
GK., गौद.का. Gaudapāda's Kārikās on the Māṇḍukya.
GK. Bh. Saṅkara's Bhāṣya on Gaudapāda's Kārikās.
GS. Gūdhārtha Sangraha, Commentary on the Śri-Bhāṣya by His Holiness Ranganātha Brahmāntantra Parakāla Swāmiji of Mysore.
HIP.  
History of Indian Philosophy of Dasgupta.

K., Ka.  
Kāṭhaka Upanishad.

Ka. Bh.  
Kāṭhakopanishad-Bhāṣyā.

Kau.  
Kaushitaki Upanishad.

Ke.  
Keṇōpanishad.

Ke.Bh.  
Keṇōpanishad-Bhāṣyā.

Ma.  
Māṇḍūkya Upanishad.

MBh.  
Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣyā.

MK., MaKa.  
Mādhyaṃkika Kārikās of Nāgārjuna.

MKV., MV  
Mādhyaṃkika Kārikā Vṛtti (Prasanna Pāda)

Mahāvīra  
By Chandrakīrti.

Mo.Dh.  
Mōkṣha Dharma in Shānti Parva of Mahābhārata

Mu.  
Munḍaka Upanishad.

Mu.Bh.  
Munḍakopanishad-Bhāṣyā.

MVB.  
Madhyantā-Vibhangā of Maitreya Nātha.

MVB.  
Madhyantā-Vibhangā Sūtra-Bhāṣyā Tīkā by Sthiramati.

Nai.  
The Naishkarmya-Siddhi by Sures'varācārya.

Pr.  
Prasnoṭpanishad.

Pr.V  
Pramāṇa Vārtikām by Dharma Kirti.

SR.  
Samādhi Raja.

SB., SBh.  
Sūtra Bhāṣyā.

S'ri Bh.  
S'ri Bhāṣyā of Rāmānuja.

S've.  
S'vetās'vatara Upanishad.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td><em>Sankshēpa-Shārīraka</em> by Sarvajñatma Muni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STr.</td>
<td><em>Siddhi-Traya</em> of Yāmunācārya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai.</td>
<td><em>Taittirīya Upanishad</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai. A.</td>
<td><em>Taittirīya Āranyaka</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai. Bh.</td>
<td><em>Taittrīyōpanishad - Bhāshya</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trim.</td>
<td><em>Trimśika</em> of Vasubandhu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBh.</td>
<td><em>Vācaspati Mis'ra's Bhāmati</em>, a commentary on Sāṅkara's Sūtra-Bhāshya, Nirmaya Sagara Press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD.</td>
<td><em>Vedānta-Dīpa</em> by Rāmānuja (Madras).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vim.</td>
<td><em>Vimśhika</em> of Vasubandhu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VS.</td>
<td><em>Vedānta Sūtrās</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSBh.</td>
<td><em>Vedāntara Sūtra-Bhāshya</em> by Madhvācārya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VV.</td>
<td><em>Vigrah-Vyāvartini</em> of Nāgārjuna (Edited by Jayaswal and Sāṅkṛtyāyana).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. THE SYSTEM OF VEDANTA

NON-ADVAITIC VEDĀNTINS NEVER REFERRED TO BY S'AṆKARA

1. It is admitted on all hands that S'āṅkara recognizes Advaita alone as the system of thought taught in the Upanishads. While the followers of Vis'ishtādvaita, Dvaita and other schools of Vedanta that are prevalent today lay equal claim to the possession of the Vedantic tradition, an examination of S'āṅkara's Bhāshyās forces us to conclude that these schools of thought have come into vogue only very recently. For we find absolutely no trace of any reference by S'āṅkara to Vedantic schools other than Advaitic even when he undertakes to refute systems opposed to his own. The dualistic schools that he regards as his adversaries are all evidently non-Vedantic. Not a word is to be found in all S'āṅkara’s writings with reference to schools akin to Madhvacārya’s Dvaita, Rāmānujācārya’s Vis'istādvaita, Vāllabha’s S'uddhadvaita or any other non-Advaitic Vedantic school whether in considering the objections of other schools against his own system or in refuting dualistic doctrines. This reticence on the part of that great thinker, would be altogether
The only dualists that Śaṅkara ever recognizes in his writings, are the followers of other Dārsanās or systems, such as those of the Śāṅkhyaśas, the Vaiśeṣikaśas, the Buddhists, the Jains and the Pāṣuṇaṇas.

It is noteworthy that it is especially the Śāṅkhyaśas that take a prominent part in the discussion of most of the important points in the exegesis of many a text considered in the Sūtra-Bhāṣya. Śaṅkara is there seen to be considerably exercised throughout his exposition of Vedic passages, either over defending his own position as against the Śāṅkhya or else confuting the latter’s interpretation in favour of his own school. It would surely be passing strange that he never alluded to a Dvaitic Vedantin in all his works, if indeed a non-Advaita Vedantic school were in existence at the time. For no contemporary Vedantin of another school would concede that Śaṅkara’s position had been conclusively proved by the mere refutation of one or more non-Vedantic systems, while opponents from the Vedantic schools were quietly ignored.

An indirect confirmation of this fact may be found in the evidence furnished by the non-Vedantic systems such as the Śāṅkhya contemporaneous with Vedanta. Whenever any of these systems refer to Vedanta, they presume that Advaita alone is the Vedantic doctrine. Never once does any of them make the least reference overt or covert to non-Advaitic Vedanta. In fact, non-Vedantic systems of India whether at the time of Śaṅkara or before him, never disclose the least suspicion of the existence of any shade of Vedanta which is not Advaitic.
VEDANTINS AT THE TIME OF S'ANKARA WERE ALL ADVAITINS

It is evident from the above that S'ankara never believed in the prevalence of non-Advaitic schools of Vedanta at the time of the composition of the Vedanta-Sūtras, since he does not allude to any such in all his Bhashya on the Sūtras.

VEDANTINS AT THE TIME OF S'ANKARA WERE ALL ADVAITINS

2. Non-existence of Dvaita Vedanta in ancient times is not to be merely inferred from the argument of silence advanced above. There are direct statements in S'ankara’s Bhashyas themselves which corroborate this supposition:

1. ‘There is no dissension among the followers of the Upanishads as to the uniformity of Upanishadic teaching concerning the identity of the individual and the Supreme Self.’

Br. Bh. 2-1-20.p.738.

2. All teachers of Māksha (release) hold that correct knowledge alone leads to the final release.


It goes without saying that if there were schools insisting upon the absolute difference of the individual soul and Brahman, S'ankara could not have proclaimed with such assurance that there was universal agreement among Vedantins regarding the identity of the two. Nor could he have made the sweeping statement that knowledge was considered as the one means to final release, if he had met with schools contending that Divine Grace, Bhakti, or any similar means other than Jnana was the direct and immediate conduit leading to it.
No Vedantin recognizing the distinction of the individual and the Supreme Self during Bādarāyaṇā's time

3. Again Bādarāyaṇā, the author of the S'ārīraka-Mīmāṃsā, has three Sūtras alluding to three Rshis who are divided in their opinion regarding the relation between the individual self and the Supreme Self. The aphorisms are supposed to express three different views in connection with the discussion of the Brhadāranyaka passage "Atman alone, my dear, is to be heard, reflected upon, and contemplated" (Br. 2-4-5). It has to be decided there how the text at the commencement could describe the individual self as the most lovable, if really the Supreme Self were intended to be taught. Āshmarathya and other teachers have argued and explained the passage each in consonance with their respective views as follows:-

1. 'The teacher Āshmarathya thinks that this is a reference to the aspect of identity of the conscious self and the Supreme Self merely to justify the opening proposition 'Atman being known, all this becomes known.'

SB. 1-4-20, p.170.

2. 'The teacher Audulomi is of opinion that the individual knowing self, which is impure on account of its association with the conditioning factors, viz., the aggregate made up of the body, the senses, the manas (thought) and buddhi (understanding) becomes clear through knowledge, meditation and other acts of discipline, and can become unified on departure from the coil of the body etc. It is in anticipation of this future union that the opening text begins with the assumption of identity.'

SB. 1-4-21, p.171.
3. 'The teacher Kāś'akṛtsna opines that the statement of identification at the commencement, is because of this very Supreme Self being manifest in the form of this knowing self also.'

SB. 1-4-22, p.171.

Each of the three different views presumes the identity of the individual self and the Supreme Self as is evident from S'āṅkara's further comment on these standpoints:

(a) While Āshmarathya accepts the identity of the individual soul with the Higher Ātman, it is evident from his saving clause 'pratijñasiddheh' (to justify the opening proposition) that some kind of cause-and-effect relation (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) is intended. p.171.

(b) In the case of Audulōmi on the other hand both distinction and identity are expressly referred to two different states. p.171.

[Hence simultaneous identity and difference accepted by Audulomi has been obviously rejected here.]

(c) Kāś'akṛtsna opines that the Supreme Lord himself without undergoing any modification whatsoever, is the individual self, and not another self. p.174.

So then, on the whole, according to S'āṅkara, Bādarāyaṇa regards all the three teachers, in spite of divergency of opinion with regard to the present state of the individual soul, are unanimous as to the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Self in the state of final release. Hence we may safely conclude that according to S'āṅkara, schools according with Rāmānuja's in insisting that 'the Supreme Self is absolutely distinct from and dissimilar to the individual self bound or free' (VD. p. 114) were not in existence during or before the time of the author of the
The System of Vedanta

Vedanta Sūtras. Much less was there any talk, among Vedantins, of individual souls being servants of God, servants of eternally higher and lower ranks.

Various Doctrines of other Advaitic Schools referred to by Śaṅkara.

4. Moreover, there are various other doctrines of Non-Śaṅkarite Advaitins interspersed among Śaṅkara’s comments on the Prasthanatrayī (the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Vedanta Sūtras). Some of these may be cited here:-

(1) “It is true that the Śāstra is the only pramāṇa (source of valid knowledge) for Brahman, but Brahman is presented therein only as subservient to the injunction of meditation. (To explain) : There are many Vedic injunctions like these : ‘Ātman alone is to be seen’, ‘The Ātman free from all sin..... is to be sought out and to be realized’, ‘He is to be meditated upon as Ātman (the all-pervading Self)’, ‘One should meditate upon the Ātma-lōka alone’, and ‘Knowing Brahman one becomes Brahman itself’. The question arises here ‘Who is that Ātman?’, ‘Which is that Brahman?’. And all the Upanishads are meant to point out the nature of that Ātman or Brahman, such texts for instance as the following : ‘He is ever-pure, omniscient, all-pervading, self-contented for ever’, ‘Of the nature of being ever pure, ever conscious, and free for ever’, ‘Brahman is Consciousness and Bliss’ and so on. And from its meditation accrues the eschatological Moksha, known only through the Śāstra.”

SB. 1-1-4, pp. 12, 13.

Here is the doctrine of the Advaitic school which, while admitting that Brahman is to be known only through the S'ruti, insists that meditation and not mere knowledge is the means to
final release. We learn from the Brhadāranyaka that a section of the school contended that meditation could even dispel nescience (avidyā).

(2) "Not this, not that’, ‘Not gross’, ‘One without a second’, ‘Beyond hunger etc.’ - these and other such texts are for setting forth the nature of the Ātman to be meditated upon. And the fruit of this Upāsanā is either release or the removal of avidyā.”

Br. Bh. 1-4-7, p. 661.

It is noteworthy that while agreeing with the later Rāmānuja school in insisting that the knowledge recommended in the S'rutis for the removal of avidyā is the practice of Upāsanā and not mere knowledge of the nature of Brahman, this school unlike Rāmānuja’s, openly declares that texts like neti neti which negate all specific characteristics describe the true nature of Brahman.

(3) “Can it not be that Brahman is pluralistic? It possesses many potentialities just as a tree has many branches. Hence unity and plurality are both real. Just as a tree is one in itself, but many as the branches; a sea is one as a whole, while it is many in its aspect as foam, the waves and the like; clay, one in itself, may be many also in so far as it is pots and cover-lids. (So also Brahman is both one and many). In this case, knowledge of Brahman in its aspect as one would lead to release, while in its aspect as many it may serve practical purposes in so far as it is useful for human procedure, mundane and Vedic, as inculcated in the Karma-kānda (portion of the Vedas devoted to works).”

SB. 2-1-14, p.197 .

This doctrine seems to belong to Bhartṛprapāṇca, a sustained refutation of whose views is prominent throughout the Brāhadāranyaka Bhāṣhya

(See Br. 5-1, p. 951).
(4) "If it be said that repetition of s'raṇa-pondering over the sacred text - is recommended just because a single act of s'raṇa cannot lead to the knowledge of the individual self with Brahmā, we deny it; for even a repetition cannot effect it. (To explain :) If a single listening to the text 'That thou art' cannot generate the knowledge of the identity of Brahmā with the Ātman, then where lies the hope that a repetition of the same could do it? It might be perhaps argued that a mere text cannot give the direct realization of anything; hence the text aided by reasoning may be expected to bring about the experience of the identity. Even so, repetition would be needless; for a single application of even that reason can very well produce the experience needed. Perhaps your idea is that the text conjoined with reason can give only a general notion but not the experience of the particular thing itself. (To illustrate :) On hearing the sentence ‘there is acute pain in my heart’ and observing the tremor of the body and other physiological gestures of the person speaking, one can only infer the existence of the pain but cannot directly experience the pain as the suffering person himself does. It is, however, only the realization that can remove ignorance. So repetition is needed for it. We say, ‘No, for it is not possible for even the repetition of the two conjoined several times to lead to the direct realization. Direct realization not attained through a simple application of the S'āstra conjoined with reasoning cannot be attained even if the two means be employed a hundred times.”

SB. 4-1-2, p.. 461.

The above passage refers to three Advaitic schools holding divergent views regarding the need of repeated practice of s'raṇa (hearing or study) of the Vedantic texts like 'Tat-tvam-asi' (That thou art): Viz., (a) The school which demands repetition of s'raṇa for the attainment of the knowledge of the identity of the
individual and the Supreme Self; (b) the school which insists that the repetition of s'ramaṇa combined with manana or reasoning for the same purpose; and (c) the school which contends that in addition to the knowledge of the meaning of the Vedantic text, the direct realization of the truth is possible only through the repetition of the two means.

The first and the third theories have been restated and refuted in *The Naishkarmya Siddhi* of Sures'varacārya. According to the first view, knowledge arising from s'ramaṇa is held to be unable to dispel ignorance, while intensification of the same thought (bhāvanāopacaya) by constant meditation can and does erase all ignorance, as testified to by the S'ruti ‘Having become a deva, he is merged in the devas’ (Nai. 1-67, p. 40). According to the third view, however, knowledge arising from the text being relational (saṁsargātmaka), can never fathom the truth about the entity, the Ātman, but the self-same knowledge meditated upon continuously like unto the Ganga stream, produces another ineffable knowledge (avākyātmakam vijñānam) which disperses all the darkness of ignorance completely (Nai. 1-67, Intro. p. 40).

The second alternative referred to, in the Bhāshya (also called the *Prasankhyāna Vāda*), viz., that the repetition of verbal knowledge conjoined with reasoning produces direct realization, is stated at some length and refuted separately in the third chapter, of the *Siddhi*.

(5) Another Advaitic school which maintains (परविषयाः सत्यगतिभुतः प्रतिद्वापत्तिः paravishayā eva Gatishrutih pratishthāpayanti) that Upāsanā alone takes the aspirant after death to the Highest Brahman through the *Devayāna* (path of the Gods) is alluded to in the Bhāshya on 4-3-14.
That school rejects the doctrine of Brahman being void of all specific features.

SB. pp. 497-498.

(6) “As for the statement that even S'rutis which speak of Brahman with form ultimately teach formless Brahman through the dissolution of all differences (prapañca-pravilaya-mukhena प्रपञ्चप्रवीलयमुखेन); even that does not seem to be right.”

SB. 3-2-21, p. 360.

(7) “Here the Bhāgavatās are of the following opinion: Bhagavān Vāsudeva is the one really real stainless entity. He stands divided into four forms, the Vāsudeva Vyūha, the Saṅkarshaṇa Vyūha, the Pradyumna Vyūha and the Aniruddha Vyūha. By the appellation ‘Vāsudeva’ is meant the Supreme Self, by ‘Saṅkarshaṇa’ the individual self, by ‘Pradyumna’ is meant the mind and by ‘Aniruddha’ the ego. Of these, Vāsudeva is the ultimate cause, the others- Saṅkarashaṇa and the rest-are its effects. Now by worshipping this Supreme Lord the Bhagavān for all the hundred years of one’s life by means of reverential approach, collecting the means of worship, sacrifice, study of the S'āstrās and Yoga, one becomes free from all mundane troubles and attains Bhagavān Himself.”

SB. 2-2-42, pp. 259, 260.

The Bhāgavathās alluded to here believed in the absolute union of the individual self with Brahman in the state of final release. The individual self, they supposed, is born from Bhagavān and finally becomes merged in Him by means of continued meditation. This view of the school is held in derision and totally rejected as silly in S'ākara’s Gītā-Bhāshya (13-2, p.195). This school is referred to in the Brhadārānyaka Bhāshya also (Br.Bh. 2-1-20, p. 735). It is significant that in both these references the Bhāgavatās are represented as teaching that the individual self is transformed into Brahman in the state of release:
(a) “Cessation of Samsāra has to be accomplished by me by means of the knowledge of Kshetra and Kshetrajña and through the realization of Kshetrajña the Lord by means of meditation and then taking on His form (तत्स्वरुपवस्थानेन tattvarupāvasthānena).”

Bg. Bh. 13-2, p. 195.

(b) “And through worship he realizes and becomes Brahman, the Lord of all (Sarvesitṛ Brahma bhavati सर्वेषितृ ब्रह्म भवति)”

Br. Bh. 2-1-20, pp. 735, 736.

It is crystal-clear that these Bhāgavatas referred to in Śaṅkara's Bhāshyas have nothing to do with either the Vis'ishtadvaita of Rāmānuja or the Dvaita of Madhva both of whom claim to be Bhāgavatas following the Pāñcarātra Agama, since neither of these latter schools would subscribe to the doctrine that the Jiva becomes Brahman (ब्रह्म भवति Br. Bh.) nor to that which insists that Vāsudeva is 'the sole Reality of the nature of Pure Consciousness ैसिन्नज्ञानस्वरूपः परमार्थत्त्वम्' SB. p. 239, nor yet to the teaching that all the four Lord's manifestations are equally without any distinctive features whatever (वासुदेव एव हि सर्व यूहा निविवेभि इप्यन्ते SB. p. 261). Hence a critical student of the history of Vedantic thought has no-option but to conclude that the Pāñcarātra System has undergone certain modifications and split itself into the Vis'istadvaita and Absolute Dvaita branches after the time of Śaṅkara. That Śaṅkara's version of the Pāñcarātra doctrine is the more ancient one is confirmed by Bhāskara a recent opponent of Śaṅkara, who quotes the following sūkta (repeated by Vācaspati Mishra still later) in his Sūtra Bhāshya,

पाण्ड्रात्रा अप्यादु :-
आयुज्ञेयेन एव स्याजीवस्य च परस्पर च।
"The Pāñcarātras also declare that there is distinction and difference between Jiva and the Supreme Self till the state of release. For the released soul, however, there is no distinction whatever for the cause of distinction is absent."

Again among the Gaudapāda's Kārikās we have the following:

उपासनाश्रितो धर्मो जाते व्रहणी वर्तते ।
प्रागुत्ततेराज सर्व तेनासी कृपण: स्मृत: ॥

In this S'loka, Gaudapāda as explained by S'āńkara says that the aspirant who thinks that he is born from the Unborn Brahman and will again attain that Brahman by dint of Upāsanā, knows only the limited Brahman and is hence considered to be suffering from an inferiority complex by knowers of Brahman eternally unborn (तेनासी कारणेन कृपण:, दीन:, अत्यक:, स्मृतो नित्याजन्मादर्शिभि: - स्त्रयभिभ्राय: ॥) GK. Bh. p. 208.

This derisive allusion is evidently to the doctrine of the same Bhāgavatas who believed in the origin of the Jīva from Vāsudeva and who are criticized in S'āńkara's Sūtra Bhāṣya (वासुदेवसंज्ञकात् परमात्मन: सहस्रसंज्ञकस्य जीवस्तु उत्पत्ति: संभवति SB. 2-2-42, p.260). The present day Vis'ishtādvaitins and Dvaitins, however, think that the Bhāgavatas do not preach this doctrine of Jīva's origination thus disclosing that their views of the Pāñcarātra system varies from that of the original Bhāgavatas in this respect also.
5. For all the above reasons, the conclusion is forced upon us that during the time of S'āṅkara and even before that, all the varieties of Vedantic schools were Advaitic in the sense that they taught the absolute oneness of Jiva and Brahman in the state of Mukti or final release. S'āṅkara's school, which had been existing side by side with other monistic schools, was to be distinguished from others only in the peculiar method of presentation of Vedantic Advaita which it had adopted from the beginning.
2. THE TRADITION OF S'ANKARA'S SCHOOL

S'ANKARA, THE RESUSCITATOR OF AN OLD TRADITION.

6. S'ankara was by no means the originator of his school, for the tradition prevailed even before him as we can gather from his express statements in his Bhāshyas on the PrasthānaTrayi. Here are two quotations from the Sūtra Bhāṣya (1-4-14, p. 163, and 2-1-9, p. 191) wherein Gauḍapāda has been specifically styled as a knower of this tradition :-

(१) तथा च सांप्रदायविदो बदन्ति-
मृत्योहिष्पुनिज्ञाते: सृष्टियां चोदितान्ययः ।
उपायः सोववताराय नास्ति भेदः कथं चन ॥
GK. 3-15

[This is a quotation from Kārikā 3-15, where Gauḍapāda remarks that illustrations like those of clay, gold and sparks are only meant for facilitating the grasping of Advaita, and so there is no implication of duality.]

(२) अन्वोत्तं वेदान्तार्थसांप्रदायविद्विराज्यायः -
अनादिमायया सुसो यदा जीव: प्रजुपयते ।
अजातनिद्रामस्वमेवदे सुपुयते तदा ॥
GK. 1-16

[Here Gaudapāda declares that it is only an illusory appearance of Ātman which exhibits him as subject to the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. The ego realizes itself as the Absolute One without a second as soon as it awakes from the beginningless Mayic dream.]
It is well-known that all orthodox Advaitins ascribe these verses found in the printed *Māṇḍūkya Kārikās* to Gauḍapāda, who is invariably regarded by them as the grand-preceptor of S'āṅkara. It is true that S'āṅkara himself does not mention Gauḍapāda by name here or elsewhere. But the former's immediate disciple Sures'varācārya has given out the name of the author of the Kārikās as Gauḍācārya or Gauḍapāda in his famous Brhadāranyaka Vārtika :-

(a) निषेष्यदिश्यान्तविविद्येणिर्प्रभाषितम् ||
गौडाचार्यं वस्तु यथास्माभि: प्रपश्चितम् ||
मृदोहविस्मुलिङ्गाय: सृष्टिया चोदितान्यथा ||
उपाय: सोडवताराय नास्ति भेद: कथानन्द || Br. V. 2-1-386, 387.

That the name 'Gauḍācārya' is a variant for Gauḍapādacārya is evident from the following :-

(b) शोकांश्व गौडपाददिर्पयोक्तार्थस्य सांक्षिण: ||
अपीयतेऽस्य यत्नेन सप्रदायविविद: स्वयम् ||
तत्त्वमाव्याात्तिमिं हष्ट्रा तत्त्वं हष्ट्रा तु वाह्यन: ||
तत्त्वेभूतस्तदारामस्तत्त्वारुपायव्ययो भवेत् || Br. V. 4-4-886, 887

[Here Gauḍapāda is represented as having been quoted by mystic Advaitins as favouring their own school.]

It is clear, in the first place, that S'āṅkara's Sūtra-Bhāshya claims to represent Gauḍapāda's tradition.
GAUḍAPĀDA HIMSELF REFERS TO MORE ANCIENT TEACHERS

7. The above considerations will be enough to convince the reader that there was at least one other teacher before S'āńkara whose way of interpreting the Upanishads had features distinguishing it from that of other Advaitins. S'āńkara therefore has to be taken as only a volunteer of the school who infused vitality and vigour into the system and rendered the traditional method more vivid by extending its application to all the three Prāṣṭhāṇas of Vedanta besides exposing the frailties of the methods chosen by kindred schools. And Gauḍapāda himself refers to previous teachers of his school thus:

(1) "The wise ones (सत्त्वनादि:) say that the states of dream and waking are identical." GK. 2-5.

(2) "As dream and products of Māyā (magic) are seen to be mere appearances and as is the Gandharva-nagara (a seeming city in the cloud-land), so is this world regarded by those who are intelligent in understanding the Vedantas (वेदान्तेऽपि विज्ञापणं:) ." GK. 2-31.

The S'ruti says "All the three, waking, dream and sound sleep, are only dreams" (Ai. 1-3-12), "One should know that the Prakṛti is Māyā." (Shve. 4-10) and in the wake of this Vedic teaching Gauḍapāda says:

(3) "This Ātman is declared to be free from all thought-con structs, and free from all differentiation by sages who have crossed to the other shore of the Vedas, and are free from all attachment, fear, and wrath." GK. 2-35.

(4) "Those that have settled views (निस्थितिः:) see neither sleep nor dream in the 'Turya'." GK. 1-14.
Rāmānujaçārya has included the second citation in para 6 (अनादिमायया सुसृत) among S'rutis¹ (Shri Bhāṣhya, 1-1-4, p.88) and Madhvacārya considers *the whole of the Āgama-Prakaraṇa* of Gaudapāda as *mantras* revealed to Brahmā and that they have been quoted by Varuṇa here in support of what he has stated. His sole authority for this strange belief is the *Garuḍa Purāṇa*, which is said to contain the following verses:

प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणं च बलवद्र विचारे युने।

[Verse starts here]

उत्तर भोक्ता भवनैतिति चकारैव पृथक पृथक।

The earlier Advaitic tradition, however, regards that the chapter is from the pen of Gauḍapāda. It will be seen that all the four chapters of Gauḍapāda present a teaching in perfect harmony with the tradition we are considering here. The negative phrase 'अजमनिन्दस्वप्नं' (unborn, unsleeping and undreaming) which occurs as an epithet of the one Ātman without a second (Advaitam) in this particular verse and which is always used by Gauḍapāda (GK. 3-36 and 4-81) to denote the Highest Reality, cannot quite fit in with any other line of interpretation - either Rāmānuja's or Madhva's - demanding that Brahmā invariably possesses numerous auspicious qualities.

¹ S'ri Rāmānujaçārya is not seen to quote from the Māṇḍūkyya anywhere else in all his writings. His quoting the Kārika along with S'veta'svatara is the only evidence for those who think that he regards the Kārika as a S'runi. He is, however, not always exact in his quotations. See, for instance, his Bhāṣhya and the Vedānta Dīpa on Sūtra 1-1-31 where he fuses two different quotations into one "तद्वैतत्त्व प्रयत्नः

[Verse continues here]

ः भूतात्मानः सूर्यायांहि केशवानुपितेरित्स्मि चित्र। " (This is to be found partly in the Brhadāranyaka and partly in the Rigveda).
8. S'āṅkara's Bhāshyas now and then reveal that he sets great store by the tradition he follows. A few of such references may be cited here:

(1) "Even one who is versed in the S'āstras should not try to seek out the knowledge of Brahman by himself. This is the purport of the emphasis laid on the expression (one should approach) 'the Guru alone.'"


(2) Some who are wise in their conceit aver that the intellect cannot grasp the entity Ātman, since the latter is devoid of all form. True, this is just so for such as have not had the benefit of the traditional teaching of a Guru, and have not listened to the teaching of the Vedantas, for those whose mind is attached to external objects of sense, and who have not taken the trouble to make use of the right means of knowledge; but for those who are the reverse of this it is extremely difficult to entertain the idea of Reality with regard to Dvaita of the nature of subject and object since they see nothing else than Self-Consciousness.

GBh. 18-50, p. 281.

(3) True it is so ; one cannot teach another the essential nature of Ātman by means of Pramāṇas like perception, but it is quite possible to convey the knowledge through Āgama.

Ke. 1-4, p. 20.

[By Āgama is meant the traditional way of teaching handed down through a succession of teachers and disciples, for that alone is efficient to convey the purport of the S'ruti's so as to make it intuited straight away. It is called Āgama (or that which has come down) not only because it has come down to ourselves through tradition, but also because it alone is able to make seeker directly to intuit it (आगमपिन्त्रल्वाच).]
(4) [a] Thus alone Ātman is quite easily realized when he is taught by an Ācārya in possession of the traditional teaching that Ātman is identical with one's own self. Ka. Bh.1-2-8. p.72.

[b] "This knowledge born out of Āgama, can be acquired easily only when it is taught by one who is acquainted with the Āgama, one who is altogether different from a mere ratiocinator."

Ka.Bh. 1-2-9, p.72

(5) Therefore, one who is unacquainted with the tradition should be ignored like a fool, albeit he may happen to be versed in all the S'astras."

GBh. 13-2, p.195.

[Here we are told to reject as untraditional even the doctrine of Advaitins who insist that final release is to be attained only after realization through meditation and merging oneself in the Supreme Self at the time of death.]

DRAVIDĀCĀRYA

9. There were other teachers also belonging to this tradition, whose works, however, have not come down to us like the Kārikās of Gauḍapādācārya. This may be gathered from the benedictory verse at the commencement of S'aṅkara's Taittiriya Bhāṣhya, which alludes to 'ancient gurus by whom had been explained all the Upanishads': -

(1) चैरिमेगुरुमिष्य पूर्वः पद्वक्ष्यप्रमाणातः ।
व्याख्याताः सर्वविदान्तास्तातिपुन्य प्रणतोस्मयाहम्॥

Here is a passage referring to a Dravidācārya belonging to this tradition:

(2) Here those that know the tradition narrate a story (अन्त्र च सम्प्रदायविद्य आर्थिकां सम्प्रचारने),
A certain prince who happened to be separated from his parents at the very time of his birth, was brought up in a hunter's cottage. Not knowing his parentage, and believing that he belonged to the hunter's caste, he took to habits natural to a born-hunter. But, when some highly compassionate person conscious of the prince's aptitude for the attainment of a kingdom drew his attention to his lineage and disillusioned him about his false notion by telling him how he happened to enter the hunter's cottage and was brought up there while being the son of such and such a king, he at once gave up his belief that he was born a hunter and abandoning the habits and actions fit for a born-hunter adapted himself to his own hereditary status being now firm in the belief that he was really a kshatriya. In like manner this individual self, the Jiva, is separated from the Supreme Self but is kindred in nature just like a spark which has darted from fire. Having entered into the deep forest of this aggregate of the body and the senses, he takes on the characteristics of the body and the senses befitting a transmigratory soul, and unaware of his being really the Supreme Self fancies himself to be the aggregate of the body and the senses either lean or fat, happy or miserable. When awakened by the Ācārya and taught that he is not of this nature but really the Highest Brahman itself transcending all life's misery, he abandons running after the three desires and is confirmed in the knowledge of his being Brahman itself.

Bṛ. Bh. 2-1-20, Ānandās'rama Edn., p. 298.

The glossator Ānandagiri here observes:

"S'aṅkara here appeals to the approval of Dravidācārya to support his view that the texts like 'that thou art' really purport to teach the identity, while teaching about creation etc. is merely subordinate to it."

Some confound Dravidācārya with the Dramiḍācārya referred to in Rāmānuja's Bhāshya and raise the objection that the story narrated above does not really fit in with the doctrine of Ātman free from all specific characteristics. For, they say,
"Dramiḍācārya has brought in the illustration of the prince just to show that it is inconsistent with the teaching of Brahman without attributes because in the sequel to the illustration of the sparks there is the sentence 'His Upanishad is the Real of the real' etc. (Br. 2-1-20). So also, they think, the text 'neti neti' (not this, not that) is not compatible with the Nirvis'esa doctrine, because of the subsequent statement 'And now its name is the Real of the real'. Nobody would insist, evidently, on the identity of the king and his son. Nor could the young prince, yet in his state of incapacity, aspire to ascend the throne while his father was alive. Even if this were possible, it would only illustrate the likeness of the individual self to the Supreme Self and not complete non-difference."

GS., p. 243.

This criticism is altogether out of place, for the good offices of the compassionate friend in the story is meant only to disabuse the prince's mind of the wrong notion that he was a hunter's son and draw his attention to the fact that he being the son of so and so, was really the royal heir-apparent (राजपुत्रस्य राजश्रीप्रीतियोग्यतां जानन् अमुःपुत्रतानं वोधयति). Nor is there any allusion to the king's being alive or not alive at the time.

This Draviḍa who evidently brought in the story to show how the doctrine of the identity of the attributeless Brahman and Jiva is traditionally speaking the only purport of texts teaching creation, should of course be quite different from the Dramidācārya alluded to by Rāmānuja, for the latter insists that Brahman does have a real form and not an illusory one assumed for the time being:

(3)  न वा मायामात्रमृ अअसेव विब्ध्रूजो रूपम्। ततु न च च्छृता ग्राह्मम्, मनसा त्वकलुषण साधनान्तरवता गृह्वते 'न च्छृता गृह्वते नापि बाचा मनसा तु विशुद्धेन (?)' इति श्रुते। न हरस्वाया देवताया रूपमुपविद्यथे; यथाभूतवादि हिषास्त्रम्। 'यथा माहारजतम वासे', 'वेदामेतं पुरुषं महान्तम्। आदिद्वयर्चस्यं' इति प्रकरणान्तरिनिर्देशात्।

VSā. p. 206.
In the above passage Rāmānuja's Dramidā most probably exhibits his reaction to S'āṅkara's dictum that 'even the Supreme Lord, may assume, by force of his free will, an illusory form just as an act of grace to meditators' (स्वातृ परमेश्वरस्यापि इच्छावशात् मायामयं रूपं साधकानुगहार्यम्) and enters a strong protest by his insistence that 'the form of the All-Creator cannot be merely Mayic, for the S'astra, as the revealer of actually existent facts cannot possibly teach that the really formless Divine Being has a form.' Now such a protest is possible only for a recent writer who could not put up with what appeared to him to be an un-Vedic doctrine of S'āṅkara's. No other previous writer besides S'āṅkara is known to have taught that the Lord's form is illusory, and in S'āṅkara's writings we do not find any allusion to or refutation of the doctrine of an opponent school that the real form of God is perceived exclusively by the mind. All these considerations force us to conclude that this Dramidacārya is later than S'āṅkara.

Besides, we have a more direct reference to the ancient Dravidacārya in S'āṅkara's Kārikā-Bhāshya which serves as a clincher here, Shankara writes:

(4) Therefore, it is conclusively established that features like 'being happy' are only constructs of imagination in the Ātman who is altogether free from all specific features. As for the S'āstra which describes the Self as 'not happy' etc., that is only to negate happiness and other attributes. Hence the aphorism of the knowers of the right tradition: 'Its validity is substantiated by its negation of wrong ascriptions'.

GK. Bh. 2-32, p.205.

Ānandagiri's gloss on this sentence 'सिद्धं तु निवर्तकं कालं इत्यागमविदं सूतम्' says that this is an appeal to the approval of Dravidacārya (उष्णेऽथ प्रविद्याशयं संमतिमाहि - 'सिद्धं तु' इति). Surely Rāmānuja's Dramida could never make such a palpably Advaitic statement. And it is
perfectly in accordance with this that Rāmānuja has offered quite another version of the story of the prince brought up in the hunter's cottage: When the prince learns from some reliable person that his father, the emperor, is in the city, anxiously awaiting the return of his lost son, he is overjoyed to know that he is the son of a living father. And the king also is glad to learn that his son lives hale and strong and well-educated, and at once begins to institute a diligent search, and then both meet each other. ('अहं ताब्रु जीवतः पुत्रः, मल्लिता च सर्वसंपत्तं मुखः' इति निरतिस्यपर्समानितो भवति, राजा च सत्यपर्यं जीवत्सरोगमातिमोहरदर्शिं विदितसंकल्पेयं श्रुत्यावभाससमस्तपुरुष्यां भवति। पञ्चात्तदुपादने च ग्राहवते। पञ्चात्तदुपायी सज्ज्येते च - इति॥ Shri.B. 1-1-4, p. 157) It is evident that according to this version the Jīva learns from his Guru all about God, and then, begins to meditate upon him: and the Lord on his part blesses him with His grace.

Another thought-arresting narrative ascribed to a traditional teacher is found in the Aitareya Bhāṣṭya. It is worth quoting here, for it is most probably from the self-same Dravida whose aphorism (सिद्धं तु निवर्तक्यात्) is quoted by S'āṅkara, and elucidates the spirit of that aphorism :-

Question :- How then is He to be known as my Ātman ? Please tell me in what way I can recognize him as 'my Ātman'.

Answer :- (Teachers of Vedanta) have a short story to narrate in this connection. An ignoramus was up-braided on an occasion of some instance of mis-behaviour in these words "Fie upon thee ! Thou art no man !" Being dull by nature, he approached some one to be assured of his being a man and said "Please tell me what I am". Convinced of his stupidity, the other man replied, "I shall enlighten you step by step". After denying that he was either an animate or an inanimate creature, he finally concluded by saying "You are not a no-man" and then kept quiet. Now the dull-witted person began to ply him with the question "How now ! You began to teach me who I am, but now keep silent. How is it that you do not enlighten me as you promised to do ?" Now, your
question is just like that. How could one who was incapable of understanding that he was a man even after being told that he was not a no-man, know himself to be such even if he were told that he was a man?

Ānandgiri throws no light upon the name of the teacher here alluded to; he simply says: "(The Siddhāntin) replies with a sneer". We shall have occasion to refer to this story once more in the next part of this work.

**TEACHER BRAHMANANDIN**

10. Ānandagiri says that Dravidācārya wrote an extensive Bhāṣya on the *Chāndogya* in the very order of the text itself, while S'ankara's was comparatively briefer (अथपाठकममाधित्यापि द्राक्षिण्ड भाष्यं प्रणीतम्; तत् किमीनेन? इत्यादिद्वाद् - 'अल्पग्रन्थमिमाम्' इति) Sarvājñātma Muni, the author of the *Saṅkshepa Sārīraka*, however, alludes to one Brahmanandin the Vākyakāra also as one belonging to S'ankara's tradition. This Brahmanandin is said to have regarded all effect as such merely for practical purposes only (आत्रेयवाक्यमृण संज्ञवहारामां कार्य समस्तमिति न: कथयांवसूव *S Sh*. 3-217), and, after having considered the common-sense view of cause and effect, he is said to have given it up in favour of the theory of illusory causation as more proximate to Advaita:

1) आत्रेयवाक्यमृण संज्ञवहारामां

   कार्य समस्तमिति न: कथयांवसूव ।

   सत्कार्यवादविपये न हि दोपराशि-

   मर्यामये भवितमुत्सहते विरोधातूः ॥ ।

   *S Sh*. 3-217.

[Here Brahmanandin is said to be a descendent of Atri.]
In his commentary on the first of these s'ātokas (3-217) Madusūdana has an excerpt from Brahmanandin, which leaves us in no doubt about the school to which he belongs:

3) नासत उपत्तिः, अनिष्काल्यात्। नापि सतः, प्र्यृत्यान्तर्व्यतः, सत्वाविशेषतः।
अभियत्तवर्यथ्यमिति चेत्। न, तस्या अपि सत्वात्। प्र्यृत्चिनित्तित्वाच सदा
अभियत्तिप्रसङ्खः। न। संवत्त्वाहारामात्त्वात्।

S S'. 276

[This passage is to be found in the Kalpataru (BS. 1-4-27, p. 429) also, but the phraseology there is slightly different. Hence we have to suppose a mere paraphrase of Brahmanandin's statement has been given in one or the other of the two works.]

There is some discrepancy in the account given of Draviḍa Bhāshya by Madhusūdana and Ānandagiri. While the latter seems to say that Draviḍāchārya wrote an extensive commentary on the Chāndogya itself, Madhusūdana interprets Sarvajñātma as saying that the Bhāshya was on Brahmanandin's work in the form of aphorisms (वाक्यानां सूत्रस्तुपाणाम्):

“श्रवानन्त्वितिरितिबाव्यायां सूत्रस्तुपाणां भाष्यकर्तार्य त्रिविद्धाचायोऽधिक
अद्यब्रह्मणः प्रत्यगत्माभेदौ बाव्यकाराभिवृत्तः इति कथयति सम। ततो व्यवसीयोते
श्रवानन्त्विन्दोऽविकारवादे अभिभामते इत्याह।”

In either case, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Vākyakāra and the Bhāshyakāra cannot be identified with their
namesakes Vākyakāra Taṅka and Bhāshyakāra Drāmīḍa to whom Rāmānuja appeals. For the name 'Taṅka' was quite unknown to Vedantins before Yāmunācārya, the grand-preceptor of Rāmānuja, and the word Drāmīḍa never occurs as a variant of Drāvida either in Advaitic or Vis'ishtādvaitic works. Besides, we have the following reference to these later teachers in Rāmānuja's Vedārtha Sangraha :

4) Yathokte bākṣyakāryaṇe - 'Puruṣo tattvamāpya kṣopāsanam' ēsti. Vyākṣyātāṃ ch drāvīḍaśāyena 

Vākyabikṣam bhadatā 'yadvapī sāchitīn na nirūpāyedanta gūṇaṃ manasādūyaṅeṣu, tathāpi 

anuttaragūnāmaḥ devatāṃ bhujat ity traṇapi saṃgūṇeṇ devatā praṇāyaṃ.

VSan. p. 143.

Now let us compare this with Sarvajñātma's reference to his Drāvida Bhāshyakāra :

anuttaragūna bhavantī pardeবhavate 

pratyagūṇeṇaḥ bhavānplyaḥ bhāṣyakāraṃ. ।

āhaḥ śma yatdīdh niṃgūṇavastūvaṁ 

sādhyaḥ na tu pūṇaṃ saṃgūnaṇāvaṃ ।

S S'. 3-221.

It will be noticed that Drāvīḍācārya, according to Sarvajñātma (S S'. 3-221), uses the epithet pratyagūṇa (of the nature of the inmost Self) for the Highest Deity (pardeবhava) in contrast with saṃgūṇa (with attributes only) of Drāmīḍa quoted above. And Brahmanandin has been never known to have alluded to 'tattvamāpya kṣopāsanam' in connection with Sadvidyā as Rāmānuja's Taṅka insists in the above quotation. We are thus forced to suspend our judgment with regard to the identification of Taṅka with Brahmanandin as well as that of Drāmīḍa with Drāvida until we find any voucher in Vedantic works for such identification. These
two pairs had best be kept apart as different authorities supporting the doctrines of two distinct and mutually exclusive schools of Vedanta.

**Upavarshācārya**

11. Upavarsha is another ancient teacher of S'āṅkara's school as may be inferred from the reverential reference to him in the latter's Sūtra-Bhāṣya.

अत एव भवात्त उपवर्षेण प्रथमे तत्वे आत्मास्तित्वाभिधानप्रसंजो 'शारीरिकः
वश्याम्' इत्युद्वारः कृतः ॥

SB. 3-3-53, p. 424.

S'āṅkara here says that since no Sūtra of Jaimini’s is forthcoming in proof of the existence of the self as distinct from the body, the teacher S'abaraswāmin has borrowed the doctrine from the second Mīmāṃsā in the section on Pramaṇas in his Bhāṣya on Jaimini’s Sūtras (इत्यत चाकृत्य आत्मार्याणा वामुमानाप्रमाणलक्षणेवर्णितम्). And he then makes the above-mentioned observation with regard to Upavarsha who says that the subject 'will be discussed in the S'ārīraka'. Hence it follows that according to S'āṅkara Upavarsha wrote a Vṛtti on the s'ārīraka Mīmāṃsā as well as on the previous Mīmāṃsā. Of course this Upavarsha must have been a very ancient teacher earlier than even S'abaraswāmin who also like S'āṅkara uses the honorific 'Bhagavan' with his name (अष्टगीतिवन्तके शब्दः ? गकाराकारविज्ञानीय इति भगवानुपवर्षः' (Bhāṣya on Jaimini, 1-1-5, p.4).

Vedāntades‘ika of the Vis’ishtādvaita school, however, surmises that Upavarsha is perhaps an alternative name of Bodhāyana, the Vṛttikāra on whose authority Rāmānuja relies in his S'ri Bhāṣya. But this cannot rank higher than an unsupported
guess at the best. For Upavarsha is no where to be seen as having been identified with Bodhayana by S'abaraswamin or any other ancient writer and neither S'anka nor any one of his followers- and no Indian philosopher ancient or modern writer up to Ramanuja for that matter - has ever referred to Bodhayana as a Vedantin. Indeed, it is highly doubtful whether Ramanuja himself had seen Bodhayana - Vṛtti as a complete work, for the use of the pluperfect (सचिनिलिपि:) in the opening sentence of S'riBhashya (भगवद्धोपवनकृता विस्तीणां श्रेयसुत्तवृत्तिः पूववार्यायः: सचिनिलिपि:, तन्मतानुसारेण सूत्राक्षरण्य न्यास्यावयने) would seem to imply that he was only following the teachings of ancient teachers who had abridged the big Vṛtti. It is significant that even from the abridgment, he has been able to adduce very few citations. And this is in consonance with the traditional report that he had to travel all the way to Kashmir where he got permission from the library authorities to have just a look at the only copy of the Vṛtti available there. He is said to have been able to cite extracts - sentences from the Vṛtti - with the assistance of a disciple of his, endowed with extra-ordinary memory. Add to this the circumstance that Mahācārya, a Vis'ishtādvaitin himself, considered Upavarsha and Bodhayana as two different writers (GS., p, 8 kh.) and the whole theory of the supposed identity of Bodhayana and Upavarsha completely falls to the ground.

In the face of the above, certain Vis'ishtādvaitins find fault with Advaitic writers that the procedure of these is altogether improper when they criticize the Vṛttikara, but accept the Vākyakāra and others as the supporters of their Absolutism. Obviously, this is to presume that S'āṅkara's criticism of previous Vedantic views relates to those of Bodhyāna, a supposition as untrue to fact as the conjecture that S'āṅkara and Gauḍapāda were promulgating Advaitic doctrines which had no traditional support
whatever. The fact seems to be just the other way about, for Advaita alone has a hoary tradition while not one of the authorities cited by the Vis'is'tādvaitic school has any chance of being identifiable with any universally acknowledged ancient Vedantin of repute.

**Dvaita-Vedanta conspicuous by its absence**

Dvaita-Vedanta conspicuous by its absence during S'aṅkara's time.

12. It goes without saying that we miss even a casual mention of the tradition of Ānanda-Tīrtha (Madhva) for he is a Vedantin who stands for the doctrine that God is merely the efficient cause of the world, a doctrine altogether condemned by S'aṅkara as outside the pale of Vedic teaching. Witness S'aṅkara's Bhāshya (on Sūtra 2-2-37):

\[
(1) \text{तस्मात्, अप्रकृतिर्पियता केवलनिमित्तकारणम् ईश्वरः-}
\text{इत्येक दक्षो वेदान्तविभिन्त्रहृदेकत्वप्रतिपश्चत्वात् यद्रेनात्र प्रतितिध्यते।}
\text{सा चैयं वेदवाहीनश्चरक्त्यना अनेकप्रकारा।}
\]

SB. p. 256.

[The reader is invited to notice the phrases that S'aṅkara uses: 'opposed to the Vedantic doctrine of the unity of Brahman' (वेदान्तविभिन्त्रहृदेकत्वप्रतिपश्चत्वात्) and 'the theory of God which is outside the pale of the Vedas." (वेदवाहीनश्चरक्त्यना)]

It is clear that S'aṅkara could only regard such teaching as owned by followers of unvedic scriptures called Āgamas. It is obvious that such strong language could not be possible at a time when Dvaitic Vedanta was prevalent.

As for Rāmānuja he was a *Pariṇāmavādin* (one who held that the world is the effect of Brahman which is its material cause)
since all animate and inanimate things which evolve from the subtler state to the grosser state are his body; for he says-

(२) तदेव नामस्वपरिभागानहसृष्टदायकच्यूडृकृतपुष्यावारीश्रव धार्श कारणावस्थमः;
जगत्स्तदापतितेष प्रलयः। नामस्वपरिभागाविभक्तस्यूलचिदचिद्रस्नुतारीश्रव कार्यावस्थमः। धार्शणस्तत्त्राध्यायत्सूलभावाय एव जगतः शृष्टिरित्युच्यते॥ वे. सं. १५७

(३) प्रकृतिप्रकारसंस्थिते परमात्मनि प्रकारभूतप्रकृतियंशो विकारः। प्रकारीशो चाविकारः। एवमेव जीत्यप्रकारसंस्थिते परमात्मनि प्रकारभूतजीवांशो सर्वेचापुरुषाः।
प्रकार्यशो नियत्ता निरर्थः: सर्वकल्याणाणांकरः: सत्यस्सल्य सत्य एव॥ वे. सं. १५६।

"Brahman having for its body Prakṛti and Purusha in the subtle state where their name and form are undifferentiated, is in the causal state; the dissolution of the universe means its reduction into it. Brahman having for its body the gross sentient and the non-sentient whose name and form are differentiated, is in the state of effect; creation means the evolution of Brahman into that gross nature (V. San. 117). Thus the sentient and the non-sentient being Ishvara's modes as his body, change in the Supreme Self in His nature with the modes Prakṛti and Purusha, relates to Prakṛti his mode, but there is no change in the substance. It is only in the mode Jiva that all defects inhere whereas the inner controller Brahman as substance of which Jiva is the mode is eternally pure, repository of all auspicious qualities, with his will unfailingly fulfilled (V. San. 116)."

But this is evidently quite different from the Parināmavāda accepted by S'āṅkara from the empirical stand-point. For the latter says :-

(४) अवियाकलितेन च नामस्वपल्पश्चाश्रव धार्श परिणामात्माविविधविवाहस्स्यद्विप्रतिपयते॥

"Brahman is spoken of as subject to evolution in its special aspect endowed with name and form conjured up by Avidyā, the aspect which is indescribable as either identical with or distinct from its real nature."

SB. 2-1-27.
And we have shown in these pages that among the adherents of the Pariñāma-vādins during S'āṅkara's time, there were no Vedantins who held "that the Supreme Self is quite different in nature from the individual soul whether bound or free" as Rāmānuja declares. In any case, it remains indisputable from S'āṅkara's statement quoted already that those who propounded the doctrine of God's being only the efficient cause of the world, were regarded in those days to be altogether outside the orthodox Vedic circle.

**CONCLUSION**

13. The upshot of all the discussion conducted up till now in the two sections is this: It was universally accepted, in S'āṅkara's time and even before then, that Advaita is the only system of thought represented in all the Upanishads; and there is no trace of Dvaita, Vis'ishtādvaita or any other school being expressly alluded to in all the philosophic literature down to the period when Bhāskarācārya's or even Yāmunācārya's works put in their appearance. Among the Advaitins themselves, however, there were schools that supposed that the Jīva-nature of Brahman is also real, and that the soul's union with Brahman has to be attained only after death by means of certain practices enjoined in the S'rutis. They likewise differed among themselves in their attitude with regard to the relation of the world and Brahman, and with regard to final release and its means.

S'āṅkara's school itself, while agreeing with others in being Advaitic, differed from them all in adopting a particular method of its own in presenting Vedantic truth. S'āṅkara, however, was by no means the originator of this method, for it had been handed down by a line of teachers belonging to a hoary tradition.
3. LANDMARKS IN S'ÄNKARA-VEDANTA

SELF - EVIDENT NATURE OF BRAHMAN AS ONE'S OWN SELF.

14. We have already shown that the various Vedantic traditions that were in vogue even before S'ankara, uniformly agreed that Advaita is the only system taught in the Upanishads, and there were no varieties of schools among Vedantins such as the Dvaita or the Vis'istädvaita of the present day. We have also made it clear, on the strength of certain citations from ancient teachers that S'ankara's school itself differed from those other schools only in adopting a particular method of presentation of truth handed down by a succession of teachers belonging to a hoary tradition. We are now going to quote from teachers belonging to this same tradition certain passages that reveal the distinguishing features of this system which mark it off from the systems approved by the other schools.

The quotation that deserves our foremost consideration in this connection is the one from Draviḍācārya already quoted in the previous chapter:

(१) सिद्धं तु निर्वार्तकत्वात्

(Its validity is substantiated through negation)

The following is the substance of the above aphoristic teaching: Brahman is invariably referred to and described as the 'Åtman' in all the Upanishads, and as the word Åtman primarily means the innermost self, it is clear that Brahman is intended to be presented as the very self of us all. And our self must be admitted by every one to be self-established, inasmuch as every
one takes himself to be existent and no one can conceive his own non-existence. How then, it will be asked, can the s'āstra be considered to be the only means of knowledge with regard to self-existent Brahman when there is nothing for it to reveal? Here Dravidācārya replies "True, Brahman is self-revealed inasmuch as it is known to be the very self of us all; nevertheless the validity of the S'āstra as the means of right knowledge concerning Ātman, follows from its pointing to the actual nature of the self as an entity by cancelling features foreign to it but wrongly supposed to belong to it."

The following S'rutilis teach the self-established nature of Brahman as being directly intuited as the Ātman:

(a) "(Please tell me what is) the Brahman itself directly known, He who is the inmost Self." Br. 3-4-1.

(b) "All this is indeed Brahman, this Ātman is Brahman." Ma. 2.

The Author of the Bhāshyas takes his stand on this traditional doctrine that the Ātman as an entity self-revealed is knowable only through the Upanishads, when he repeatedly affirms thus:

1. Ātman is a stranger to no one, for he is self-demonstrated. SB. 2-3-7, p. 268.

2. (Objecttion) :- Is not Ātman determined by the Āgama (Vedic Revelation) and even by perception and other means of knowledge before that (revelation)?

(Reply) :- No, for Ātman is self-demonstrated. GBh. 2-18, p. 16.

3. (Super-imposition is possible for another reason, for) the inner self is directly known as being the Ātman within. SB. Introduction, p.2.
4. Now this non-transmigratory Purusha, this Brahman, no one can assert that He is non-existent or not known, for the S'rti uses the word 'Ātman' (the Self) when it declares "This is the Ātman already described as Neti Neti (not this, not that), and it is impossible to disavow Ātman".

SB. 1-1-4, p.20.

THE INDIVIDUAL SELF, IS BY HIS VERY NATURE NO DOER OF ACTION, FOR HE IS IDENTICAL WITH BRAHMAN AS PURE BEING.

15. At the close of his commentary on the fourth Śūtra Śaṅkara adduces three S'lokas of an ancient teacher which contain the quintessence of the system of Advaita as he sees it. Here is the first s'loka:

(२) गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽस्त्रे पुनादहददिवाद्वनात् ।
सद्यात्माहित्येवं बोधेप कार्य कर्यं भयेत् ॥ १ ॥

"How can there be anything to be performed after the realization of one's own Self or Brahman, the Pure Being, for then there is neither the figurative nor the false Ātman consequent on the sublation of the idea of the son, as well as of the body and other associates of the Self?"

Here is clarified the distinctive view of Advaita Vedanta that the self-existent Ātman is by his very nature non-active. The meaning of the verse is that a man who is quite uncultured superimposes on himself the properties of his son and others, and feels as though he is himself possessed of a sound body and perfect limbs when his son or any other close relative of his possesses a sound body and perfect limbs, and feels himself to be mutilated when they are mutilated. Now the son or other relatives in this case are only his figurative selves since they are evidently distinct from his actual self. He knows of course that he himself is his
self in the primary sense; only, being too much attached to them as his own, he mentally transfers their features to himself. On the other hand, the body and other adjuncts—that is, his body, senses and the mind—cannot be separated from himself in like manner. It is clearly because he cannot discriminate and distinguish the body and the self and say to himself 'that is the body, and this is my own Self distinct from it' that he mistakenly transfers its properties to the Self, and deliberately identifies the one with the other. Hence the body is a false self, and so are the senses and other adjuncts. The body and other adjuncts of the Self are called the false selves, since one deliberately associates the me-notion with them and says 'I am stout', 'I see', 'I hear', 'I know', 'I am pained', 'I possess the body and the limbs'. This being the case, a false notion such as 'I am Mr. so and so' or 'This Vis'numitra is my son' is wiped out as soon as one reaches the realization 'I am the One Brahman, the Pure Being without a second' consequent on the teaching 'That thou art' received from the S'astrā and an expert teacher. And then, there being no me-idea associated with the aggregate of the body and the senses, or its correlates since they have all been known to be non-existent, there cannot arise any volition such as 'Let me do this and achieve such and such a result for myself or for my kith and kin'. For then there is no superimposition of the acts of the body and other associates on the Ätman. So then, there can be no residue of duty when Brahman the Pure Being has been realized as one's own Self.

Here it should be noted that by the denial of any remainder of duty after realization, the writer evidently implies that men are active agents merely because of the absence of realization, while as a matter of fact, each one of us is essentially this Pure Self beyond all action.

The following are the S'rutis which declare that all talk of action, means of action, and result (of action) is in the region of
Avidyā only, while no action is possible when the secondless Ātman has been realized:

(a) "When all the desires residing in one's heart have been got rid of, then the mortal being becomes immortal, and attains Brahman here, in this life. Just as the cast-off slough of a snake would lie lifeless in an ant-hill, so also does the body of the enlightened person lie there; and he is now (really) bodiless, the Prāṇa, Brahman alone, the Light of Pure Consciousness alone.

[Here is taught the effacement of the idea of one's identity with body due to the realization of one's identity with Brahman; for the possession of a body was only through ignorance, while the intrinsic nature of bodilessness is revealed as soon as enlightenment dawns.]

(b) "I am verily this One". Should a person recognize Ātman and know him directly in this manner, desiring what, and for the fulfilment of whose desire, would he then trouble himself with the feverish activity of his body?"

[Here is denied the continuance of desire for an enlightened person. Desire is the only motive for all action, and that being absent for a person who has realized the secondless Ātman, there can be no more toiling for himself or for the sake of his all kith and kin; for with the dawn of knowledge distinction of me and mine will have been wiped out.]

S'āṅkara relies on this traditional teaching of his school when he declares.

"For all these reasons, all injunctions (and all means of knowledge) can function as such only till one reaches the intuition 'I am Brahman'."

SB. 1-1-4, p.23.

2. "For the absolute destruction of all karmas is well known to result from the knowledge of Brahman, in S'rūtis like the following
'And his karmas are destroyed when that Brahman which is both the Higher and the Lower (both the cause and the effect) is realized as one's own self' (Mu. 2-2-8)" SB. 1-1-28, p.57.

3. "Inasmuch as the knower of Brahman is free from allnescience, Karma-yoga, based as it is on mis-apprehension, could have no place in his case."

GBh. 5-1, p.84.

4. "For as opposed to the previously entertained idea of being an agent and experiencer of the fruit of action, the knower of Brahman will have come to this conclusion; 'I am Brahman devoid of all agentship and experiencing fruits of actions for all the three periods of time. I was never an agent or experiencer even before this, nor am I such now, nor shall I be such in future' ."

SB. 4-1-13, p.473.

**The Individual Soul is Essentially Brahman, Not a Cognizer**

16. Just as the notion of being an agent is the result of ignorance, just as we are all free from the taint of action by our very nature, so also it is the outcome of ignorance to think that one is a cognizer, and has first to get rid of this ignorance through the knowledge of Brahman and thereby attain identity with Brahman. The firm conviction of those that have realized their identity with Brahman, is that they are verily Brahman itself, eternally pure, self-known and free by nature, devoid of all distinction of knower, knowledge and the object thereof. This is taught in the second of the three verses quoted by S'ankara at the end of his commentary on the fourth Sūtra :

(3) अन्येष्वात्मचिज्ञानानातं प्राकृत ग्राहतृत्वमात्मन: ।
अन्निष्टं स्यातं प्रशमतेऽप पापदशायतिर्जित: ॥

"The individual self is a cognizer only till the intuition dawns on the Ātman to be sought after, but when He is sought out, the very cognizer
himself will have become that Ātman free from the evils of sin and the like."

Just as the statement 'I am Brahman the Pure Being (सद्व्यत्ततअ)'
in the first quotation, is a reference to 'सदेव सोम्मेदम्य आसीदेस्वमाम्यततित्तम्' (This was in the beginning Being alone, my dear boy, One without a second. (Ch.6-2-1), 'the Ātman to be sought after (अन्वेष्यत्तमविज्ञानानात्) here, is a reference to Chandogya (Ch. 8-7-1) which in full runs as follows :

(a) 'That Ātman, eternally free from sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, and free from thirst, possessed of unfailing desires and unfailing resolves, He is to be sought after, He is to be realized. Whoever knows Him and realizes Him, he shall attain all the worlds, and all the objects of desire.' So said Prajāpati."

(b) "Both the Devas and the Asuras came to know of this. They said, 'Let us then, seek after that Ātman, seeking out whom one attains all the worlds, and all the objects of desire. Indra himself among the Devas and Virūcana among the Asuras, these two, neither of them letting his intention to be known to the other, approached Prajāpati, with respectful presents in hand (samitpāni)."

Here Prajāpati's statement that 'He, the Ātman, is to be sought after' and the proposal of the devas and the asuras to seek after him, seems to imply that the Supreme Self to be sought after is other than the seeker, while Prajāpati's teaching that the Self is to be known and realized (anuvidyā vijānātī) really implicates that the very self of the knower is the subject of this teaching. So we have here to investigate and decide which of these two alternatives is more reasonable. A consideration of the whole context shows that the 'search and realization' are here intended to result in an intuition in this very life. For, Prajāpati has been here referring to
one and the same Self of Indra when he says 'Now this Purusha who is seen in the eye' (Ch. 8-7-4), 'See your own self in the plate, and tell me what you do not understand about your Ātman' (Ch. 8-8-1), 'He who moves about reverenced in the dream state, this is that Ātman' (Ch. 8-10-1), and 'Now where he sleeps withdrawing all his senses, and is pure, knowing no dream, this is that Ātman' (Ch. 8-11-1). And Indra on his part sees some defect or other in that Self and says 'I see no good in this' (Ch. 8-9-2......8-11-2).

And the same Supreme self (Paramātman) who has been taught by Prajāpati as being free from all the defects due to the three states in these words 'In the same manner, this samprasāda, (individual self) rising above (transcending) this body, merges in the Supreme Light and attains his own essential nature. This is Uttama Purusha' (Ch. 8-12-3), the self-same Ātman, has been sought after and has been realized by Indra as his own self. Reflection on the whole passage in its context, drives us to the conclusion that the same Self which had been taken to be the cognizer endowed with the body and the organs of sense, was now realized by Indra as the Supreme Self (Paramātman) with attributes such as freedom from sin, identical with his very self. Therefore the sum and substance of the meaning of the verse is that the cognizership of the self imagined before the Ātman was sought out, is the effect of ignorance, while freedom from sin and other defects recognized after He was sought out, pertains to his inherent nature itself.

Following up this tradition S'ankara writes in his commentary on the Sūtra भेदोद्वेदेन भास्कर ('And because they are spoken of as different' VS. 1-1-17):

1. Question : How are we then to interpret the S'ruti texts and Smṛti texts like the following 'Ātman is to be sought after', 'There is no
gain higher than that of the Self (Ap.)? For you say that the gainer cannot himself be the object to be gained.

Reply: Quite so. But yet, while Ātman never loses hold of his self-hood, people are seen to mistake the body and other not-selfs to be the real Ātman owing to non-apprehension of Reality. Hence even in connection with Ātman who has thus become the body it is consistent to use expressions implying difference such as the following: 'Ātman is not sought out, and has to be sought after, is not attained but has to be attained', 'has not been heard about, but has got to be heard about', 'has not been thought over, but has got to be thought over', 'has not been realized, but has got to be realized'. From the standpoint of Reality, on the other hand, any seer or hearer other than the Omniscient Supreme Lord is actually denied by such texts as 'There is no seer other than He'. (Br. 3-7-23). The Supreme Lord, however, is other than the embodied self, fancied by Avidyā, the doer and experiencer of fruits of action, known by the name of Vijñāna Ātman (the intellect-self), in the same way as there is, other than the seeming magician holding a sword and shield in his hand, and climbing up by a rope to the sky, the same Māyāvin (magician), actually standing on the ground, or again in the same way as the ether not limited by any conditioning environment is other than the jar-ether conditioned by an environment. Now it is on the basis of such a difference between the Vijñāna Ātman (the intellectual-self) and Paramātman (the Supreme Self), that the Sūtrakāra says, 'Not the other, for it is not consistent', 'And because they are spoken of as different.'

[This extract from the Sūtra-Bhashya actually pertains to the Vṛttikāra who maintains that Anandamaya - Ātman is the Supreme Self or Brahman. Yet it is evident that he also was a follower of the school advocating the doctrine of Brahman without any distinctive features, and as such belonged to the Vedantic tradition of S'āṅkara. S'āṅkara himself is seen elsewhere to expalin the relation between the individual self and the Supreme Self exactly in these terms.]
This is why S'añkara writes that *pramāṭṛīva* (being a knower) is itself the figment of avidyā since it is sublated by S'āstra the 'final pramāṇa'.

2. The final pramāṇa indeed removes the very knowership of Ātman. GBh. 2-69, p.39

[How the S'āstra is the final means of knowledge will be explained later on in para 18.]

**Pramāṇās are such only till knowledge accrues**

17. To say that Ātman ceases to be a knower simultaneously with the dawn of self-knowledge is to say that the means of valid knowledge also lose their nature at the same time. This is made clear by the third s'loka quoted by S'añkara at the close of his commentary on the fourth, or the *Samanvaya Sūtra*:

(3) देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्भूत प्रमाणात्वेन कल्पित: ।

लौकिकं तद्विद्वेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥

"Just as the notion of the body itself being the self is held to be true (till the dawn of S'āstraic knowledge of the distinct Self), so are the empirical means of knowledge considered to be valid up to the time of determination of the real Self."

The meaning of the s'loka is as follows: The common run of mankind take the notion of identity of the body with the Self to be correct till they come to know that the Ātman is really distinct from the body. It is only through the teaching in the S'āstras that those that have faith in them happen to believe in the existence of the Self apart from the body, merit and demerit of religious acts, rebirth as a result, and the experience of pleasant or unpleasant
fruits of religious acts. And it is only by the knowledge born of S'āstraic teaching that this notion of the identity of the body and the Self is invalidated. In a similar manner, those that are not in possession of the knowledge of Reality firmly believe in the validity of the knowledge of their Self being a cognizer on account of the superimposition of the properties of their body, senses and the mind, and in the validity of perception and other means of knowledge depending on that cognizer. When, however, the conviction dawns through the teaching of the S'āstra and the preceptor that their Ātman is really the secondless Self, then, simultaneously with the birth of that conviction, is abolished the nature of being cognizer, and consequently the validity of the means of knowledge depending on that cognizer.

There is a S'ruti text also to this effect:

"Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another, there one smells another, there one tastes another, there one speaks to another, there one hears another, there one thinks another, there one touches another, there one knows another; but where, for this knower, all this has become the one Ātman, then whom could one see and with what, then whom could one smell and with what, then whom could one taste and with what, then whom could one speak to and with what, then whom could one hear and with what, then whom could one think and with what, then whom could one touch and with what, then whom could one know and with what?" Br. 4-5-15.

That is to say, where in the state of avidyā there appears to be duality, there one is a seer, and sees through the organ of sight, an object of sight distinct from himself. Similarly smells another, tastes, speaks to, hears, thinks of, touches or knows some one or something other than oneself. Thus it is to be expected then that a cognizer knows something distinct and definite with the assistance of some distinct means of knowledge. But in the state
PRAMĀNAS ARE SUCH ONLY TILL KNOWLEDGE ACCRUES

wherein everything becomes merged in one's own Ātman in virtue of Brahman (intuition of Brahman as one's own Self), then which is the cognizer, and with what means is he to see or know an object distinct from his own Self? The S'ruti thus grants that the Pramānas can function only in the state of Avidyā while it negates all means of knowledge such as the means of perception which can operate only in the sphere of duality.

It is to this axiomatic principle of Vedanta that S'āṅkara adheres when he declares:

1. Now this superimposition of the above described nature, the learned take to be Avidyā (ignorance), and the ascertainment through discrimination of things as they are they call Vidyā (wisdom). Such being the case, no substrate on which something else is superimposed is affected in the least by the merit or demerit of that which is superimposed."

2. All usage of the means and object of knowledge, whether ordinary or Vedic proceeds on the pre-supposition of this mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self known by the name of Avidyā.

[By saying that even Vedic usage presupposes avidyā, it is implied that even injunctions like 'That Self is to be sought for' proceed on the
presupposition of avidyā adopted for purposes of instruction, Ātman being really self-established and never in need of seeking or finding.]

3. And how are the means of valid knowledge and the S'āstras to be supposed to relate only to an ignorant person? We reply, 'Because pramāṇas cannot function as such in the case of one who does not regard the body, senses etc., as oneself or one's own since he can never be a cognizer without such presupposition. SB.p.2.

[Being a cognizer and being an agent of action both rest on the presumption that one is identical with or possesses the body, senses and the mind. So also in the case of metaphorical selves such as one's wife and sons, for one engages in anything to be done for them only because one presumes that they are one's own. And it follows that means of valid knowledge deriving their very life-breath from the cognizer can never function without a cognizer. This becomes still more evident from a consideration of the next quotation.]

4. Therefore all injunctions, and all the other means of valid knowledge can function as such up to the moment of the realization, 'I am Brahman', for after the realization of the non-dual Ātman neither to be shunned nor to be acquired, there can be no means of knowledge whatever, since there would be no object or cognizer for them.

SB. 1-1-4, p. 23.

[Here is a summary of all the contents of the three verses quoted. Ātman being one's own Self can never be an object, and for the same reason can neither be something to be shunned or acquired. As the S'ruti 'When all this becomes Ātman alone' declares, there can be no distinction of knower, means of knowledge and object of knowledge when the oneness of Ātman is realized, in the same way as there can be no construction of imagination like a snake or streak of water 'when the actuality of the rope is realized, and hence on the realization of nonduality neither the cognizer nor any object of cognition is left over. Hence without a cognizer for their locus and without an object to be cognized, the pramāṇas can never continue as such.]
5. *(Objection:*) If Absolute Monism be taken for granted there would be no room for diversity, and perception and other empirical means of knowledge would be nullified since they would have then no object in the same way as the ideas of a man etc. relating to a stump etc. And the S'āstra of injunction and prohibition would likewise be invalid in the absence of all difference on which alone its validity rests. And even the S'āstra teaching release would be self-contradictory in the absence of the distinctions of the teacher and the taught etc. on which alone its validity depends ..... *(Reply:*) To this we reply: No such blame can be attached to our position. For all forms of usage can very well be real previous to the realization of one's identity with Brahman, like the procedure during dream before waking. So long as the real oneness of Ātman is not intuited, no one would think that the modifications, means of knowledge, objects of knowledge and the resultant knowledge are false appearances. On the other hand every creature could take the modifications themselves to be his own self or as belonging to him through ignorance discarding his natural oneness with Brahman. Hence every way of life ordinary or Vedic before realization is quite intelligible.

SB. 2-1-14, p. 198.

[The portion of the s'loka, 'Pramāṇa is valid up to the moment of realization of Ātman' and the illustration of the notion of body-self have been explained and clarified by comparing ordinary life with the apparent human procedure in dream. It has thus been shown that notwithstanding that Ātman is no agent of action and no cognizer, being secondless by his very nature, agency and other properties seem to be real for the time being like the illusory appearances in a dream for the simple reason that one is ignorant of his real nature.]

**HOW S'ĀSTRA IS THE FINAL PRAMĀNA**

18. We have seen that the idea of Pramāṇa etc. are realized to be unreal as soon as one becomes aware of the true nature of
Atman as a result of the teaching by the S'āstra and the preceptor. It may be asked at this stage, why should not the knowledge of Non-duality also be sublated, say by the knowledge of S'ūnya (essencelessness) of things, in the same way as the notion of duality is sublated by the knowledge of non-duality? How are we to be assured that the knowledge of the Non-dual Ātman is final? The notion of waking that accompanies a dream enclosed in another dream, is well known to be sublated by the conviction that the enveloping dream is waking, but subsequently that waking notion also is in its turn sublated by the consciousness of the real waking state. One's knowledge of Non-duality might well be imagined to be sublated in like manner. Here is the reply of the Gauḍapādācārya, an authority on the tradition of Advaita - Vedanta:-

विकल्पो विनिवृत्तं कल्पितं यदि केनचित्।
उपदेशाद्यं बादों ज्ञाते हैंतं न विघ्ते॥

GK. 1-18.

Vikalpa might be sublated if it were the construction of imagination pertaining to some particular person. This is only a device for the purpose of teaching, and so there can be no duality subsequent to the knowledge of truth.

This is the idea underlying the s'Tōka: Vikalpa is an empirical notion arising out of ignorance, as for instance the notion of the sun being only a span in length, or the notion of water with reference to a barren soil, or that of a snake attached to a rope etc. Such a Vikalpa would be sublated by correct knowledge of the substrate so falsely imagined to be something else, as for instance the notion of a span's length etc. disappearing in the case of those that know the true measurement of the sun etc. Similarly it is but reasonable that the notion of the body being the Self, the notion of the soul's being subject to ills of mundane life, or the soul's being related to duality, is sublated by the knowledge of Non-duality.
since these notions are the outcome of innate ignorance. But the \textit{vikalpa} of the distinction of teaching, teacher, taught etc. are no such imaginary notions conjured up by an ignorant brain. It is only a device adopted by the knowers of Brahman for the purpose of teaching. When the truth of \textit{Advaita} is realized, one comes to know that the duality of the distinction of teaching etc., does not actually exist any more than the duality fancied by people, ignorant of Vedantic truth. The suspicion that at this rate even what is called \textit{Advaita} may also be possibly only a construction of imagination has no foundation. For by the term \textit{Advaita} is used only to indicate what cannot be thought away after all duality is negated. Nor can there be the distinction of the knower, means of knowledge and the object of knowledge as a residue even when the truth of the essence of things is realized, so as to allow room for the doubt whether even \textit{Advaita} may not be sublatable. Nor can it be objected that even the Veda itself may cease to exist if all duality is obliterated. For that is a consummation we welcome. That is why Vedantins call the Veda the 'final \textit{Pramāṇa}', i.e. a \textit{Pramāṇa} that brings knowledge sublating all idea of \textit{Pramāṇas} including Vedic \textit{Pramāṇa} itself.

It is on the strength of this axiomatic Vedantic principle that S'ankara writes:

1. If it be argued that in the absence of perception etc., even the \textit{S'rutī} would cease to exist, we say that there is nothing unwelcome here, for we do admit that even the \textit{S'rutī} will cease to exist when one is awakened to truth. There is the \textit{S'rutī} text which endorses this. Beginning with the statement 'The father becomes no father here', it proclaims that the Vedas become no Vedas in the state of enlightenment. 

\textit{SB. 4-1-3, p. 465.}

[This is really a text relating to deep sleep. Nevertheless, S'āṅkara quotes it here in connection with enlightenment because there is unity of Ātman in both the cases.]
2. Moreover, this is the final means of knowledge (antyaṃ Pramāṇam) revealing the oneness of Ātman desiderating nothing else beyond it. Unlike the injunction 'One should sacrifice' in ordinary usage which rouses further enquiry as to 'what ?', 'with what ?' and 'how ?', the statement 'I am Brahman' rouses no further enquiry, for the knowledge arising out of it relates to the unity of the Self of all...... Nor can it be maintained that this knowledge is useless or delusive, for there is the definite result of doing away with Avidyā, and there is no subsequent knowledge sublating it. SB. 2-1-14, p.199.

[Consequent on the intuition of the Secondless Self, there would remain nothing else distinct from it, relating to which a further enquiry might be occasioned, and there could be no sublating knowledge then for the simple reason that the very distinction of knowers, and means of knowledge would have been wiped out by then.]

3. All Pramāṇas are such only up to the realization of Ātman for subsequent to that there can be no talk of the means and objects of knowledge. The final Pramāṇa (or the S'rutī) takes away the very nature of being a knower pertaining to Ātman, and simultaneously with taking it away, invalidates itself as a means just as a means of knowledge obtaining in a dream does on one's waking. GBh. 2-69, p. 39.

[Here is a reason adduced for holding the S'āstra as the final means of knowledge, to wit, that the S'āstra-knowledge does away with the knowing-nature of Ātman. That has been stated to be the reason too, why S'āstra itself ceases to be such after enlightenment.]

4. For the S'āstra does not propose to describe the nature of Brahman as such and such an object, but it only teaches that it is no object since it is the innermost Ātman, and in doing so it removes the distinction of the object of the knowledge, its knower and knowledge, etc. SB. 1-1-4, p.16.
CONCLUSION

5. The S'āstra, the final Pramāṇa happens to be a means of knowledge only on account of its pointing out and removing what is not the property of Ātman, but not because of its making known what was previously unknown.

[S'āstra is a means of knowledge only because it removes the nature of being a knower and other features that are not the properties of Ātman, and also because it deprives the pramāṇas of their continuing as such. This is an indirect allusion to the traditional saying 'siddham tu nivartakatvāt' quotation on page 32.]

CONCLUSION

19. We have so far set forth a few land-marks distinguishing the Vedanta-system approved by S'āṅkara by citing certain passages from ancient teachers of his tradition. It has been shown how according to this system the secondless Ātman is self-established and devoid of any determining features, that it is through Avidyā, that constructs of imagination such as the distinction of the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge, or thought-constructs referring to the distinction of action, means of action and the result of action, are imposed on him. It is on the presupposition of that self-same avidyā that S'āstras purport to set-forth injunction or prohibition or to reveal the nature of release (mōksha). The S'ruti does not throw light on the nature of Ātman directly by objectifying it, but is regarded, in a secondary sense, as a means of knowledge only because it removes all distinctions such as knower, object of knowledge and means of knowledge. It has been also made clear that even the distinction of S'āstra, teacher and the taught is assumed as a device for the purpose of teaching only before the dawn of Ātman knowledge, and that distinction disappears likewise when the truth is known.
We shall now before concluding this section, cite two passages revealing how the distinction of knowledge and ignorance is itself the figment of avidyā and does not actually exist from the standpoint of Reality: -

1. To the question 'To whom does this non-awakening belongs?' we reply 'To you, who are putting this question'. 'Well', you will perhaps object 'but the S'ruti tells me that I am the Lord Himself'. We answer 'If you are thus awakened, there is no non-awakening for anyone'. The objection that is brought forward by certain opponents that there can be no non-duality so long as there is ignorance is something second to Ātman, is also answered away by this reply. SB. 4-1-3, p. 465.

2. 'To whom is avidyā seen to pertain?' This question is useless. For if avidyā is seen, you see him also to whom it pertains. And it is improper to ask whom avidyā pertains to, while you actually perceive the person to whom it pertains. GBh. 13-2, p. 195.

[One who demands that the consistency of Advaita should be proved, is clearly labouring under the delusion that there is something to be proved by something else even with regard to Advaita. Hence from his own standpoint there is avidyā, for he himself is ignorant, and there is duality also imagined to exist through avidyā. When, however, he comes to be aware through the teaching of the S'āstra and the preceptor that he is himself really the secondless Brahman, ever pure, then it is clear that there is no room for any such question. For from the highest standpoint of Reality there is neither avidyā nor duality, both these being real only from the standpoint of the seeker of truth only.]

The principle doctrines of Vedanta belonging to the tradition of S'ākara's Vedanta that have been briefly explained in this section, will be explained at greater length in the next one, to be devoted to the Method of S'ākara's Vedanta.
4. THE METHOD OF S'ĀNKARA - VEDĀNTA

THE METHOD IN A NUT-SHELL

20. A few land-marks of S'ākara's - Vedanta have been enumerated in the last section on the basis of certain propositions enunciated by ancient teachers, just to acquaint the reader with the particular tradition followed by that revered teacher. We have now to ascertain the nature of the method approved by that tradition.

Duality of the nature of pramāṇtvā (being a knower) and other distinctions, has been super-imposed upon the eternally pure secondless Ātman by Avidyā or ignorance which misconceives the aggregate of the body and the senses etc. to be Ātman himself. Hence the Vedantas (or Upanishads) proceed to determine the true nature of things by negating the superimposition. We have said that these texts are figuratively said to be Pramāṇas (means of knowledge) with regard to the self-established Ātman simply because they help to retract what is not really the property of that Ātman. Now what is the method employed by them to remove the properties alien to Ātman? S'aṇkara's reply to this question is the following citation found in his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā:

1. And so say the knowers of Vedantic tradition अप्यारोपणवादाध्यायं निष्प्रथेप्रप्रज्ञाते 'That which is devoid of all differentiation is explained by the double method of deliberate superimposition and rescission.'

GBh. 13-13.

Here is the nature of the method in brief:

(a) In order to disclose the nature of the self as Brahman in
itself S'rutis like the following negate all specific features superimposed on it by the unenlightened common mind:

"It is this Akshara (the Imperishable), O Gārgī, so the knowers of Brahman say. It is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long, not red, not viscid, not shadowy, not dark, not the air, not the ether, not adhesive, tasteless, odourless, without the sense of sight, without the sense of hearing, without the vital principle, mouthless, without measure, neither interior nor exterior,. It eats nothing, nobody eats it."

Br. 3-8-8.

(b) Lest, by this strict denial of all properties it may be taken to be absolute nothing (s'ūnya), it is taught by means of illusory attributes seemingly pertaining to it owing to Upādhis (apparently conditioning factors).

(c) At the close of the teaching the rescission of even the imputed attributes used as a device for purposes of teaching, lest it should be regarded as actually belonging to it.

**Assumption of Specific Features is Only a Device Employed for the Purpose of Teaching**

21. Now Vedāntins refer to both the specific features imputed by the unwise on their real Self and also the devices employed by the S'rutis for purposes of teaching the truth without, however, insisting that either of these really belongs to the Self. It thus happens that they presume, as devices for the purpose of teaching, that students are really a distinct set of enquirers, that they are beset by ignorance, that this, their ignorance, is really destroyed by the knowledge arising through the teaching of both S'āstra (revelation) and the Ācārya (preceptor) and that when all differentiating characters are done away with, the Ātman alone
remains as devoid of distinctive features. All these are presumed by them to be actual existents, just as a means of teaching. Now Sri Gaudapāda himself an adept in this line of traditional teaching, has clearly stated this in the following lines:

अन्यथा गृह्ततः स्वप्नो निद्रा तत्च्यमजाताः ।
चिप्पाः से तयोः श्रीणे तूरियं पदमङ्कुसः ॥

"Dream is for one who misconceives, and dreamless sleep for one who knows not the truth. When both the wrong ascriptions are destroyed, one attains the position of this Turiya (the fourth).

अनादिमायया सुस्वते यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।
अजमनिद्रामन्यः प्रभृत्ते हुष्यते तदा ॥

"When the individual soul dreaming through a beginningless Maya awakes at long last, then he comes to know the Unborn, Sleepless, Dreamless, Non-dual Self.

प्रपंचो यदि विश्वेत निर्वचितं न संसारः ।
मायामायात्रन्त्रिं भैरत्मात्रेतं परमार्थित: ॥

"If the world really existed, it would, no doubt, really be removed. All this duality is but Maya, Advaita (non-duality) alone is really real."

विकल्पो विनिर्वचित कल्पितो यदि केननित् ।
उपदेशायं वाद्यो ज्ञाते भैरतेन न विचयते ॥

"Misconception would be sublated, if it were really a construct of imagination of any particular person. All this is only a device employed for the purpose of teaching; there will be no duality whatever when reality is known." Gk. 1-15 to 18.
Here (a) the meaning of the first verse is as follows: Dream and waking are granted to be real and have been dubbed 'a dream' by way of a deliberate superimposition, and the three states of consciousness, viz., waking, dream and sound sleep are assumed to be real and the name of 'sound sleep' has been ascribed to them by way of deliberate superimposition. And of these, misconception is said to be the error common to both waking and dream. While of course, sleep or the absence of correct knowledge persists even in these states, yet the imputation of 'sleep' (or ignorance) alone is peculiar to deep sleep only, and hence that alone is said to be characteristic of that state exclusively and therefore the three states are classified into two groups only. So, when the error of absence of knowledge and the error of misconception are sublated by the dawn of true knowledge, then one comes to be convinced that he is really the Turiya (the fourth) beyond all the illusory states.

(b) Ignorance of truth and misconception of truth are thus the two misconceptions hypothetically imputed to the Self for the sake of convenience in teaching, in the first verse. And now in the second verse they are both rescinded. The substance of this verse is this: Neither 'sleep' (ignorance of reality) nor 'dream' (misconception of it) actually inhere in Ātman. Both of these are thought-constructs only like a dream. These two, sleep and dream, have been superimposed only through beginningless Māyā. Just as an ordinary person would imagine certain features baselessly as belonging to his own self owing to the effect of a magic, so also this Jīva or individual soul imagines ignorance and misconception to be attached to his self only through the effect of beginningless māyic dream. When, however, he awakes from this magical dream on knowing his true nature by dint of teaching imparted by the S'āstra and preceptor, then he will be convinced thus: 'There never was, nor will there ever possibly be in future, either sleep of the nature of ignorance or dream of the nature of misconception in me; for I am the unborn, secondless Ātman ever
free from the three states of consciousness.' He thus realizes his real nature as the *Turiya* or the fourth with reference to the three illusory states.

Here we should not take the literal meaning of the verse and delude ourselves into the belief that 'When one awakes, then one comes to realize his unborn, sleepless and dreamless non-dual nature'; that is to say that the properties of not being born etc. belonging to the self are realized only subsequent to the awakening. For the statement purports only to teach that birth, sleep etc., are no attributes of Ātman but never implies that the illusory dream and other evils are at first real events to be subsequently sublated by a real waking. Indeed it will be declared later that

"The birth of individual souls is like that of Māyā, and that Māyā never exists."

Hence we have to understand that from the transcendental standpoint of view there is no Māyā, no mayic dream, no birth, no sleep or dream, and no awaking which sublates these. For the same reason, the epithets like *aja* (unborn) etc., are also to be taken to be meant for merely negating the birth etc. postulated by other schools. This also is going to be declared at a later stage:

"He is unborn only from the standpoint of a hypothetical point of view relative to a supposition. From the standpoint of reality, however, he is not 'unborn' either."

(c) The import of the third verse quoted from Gauḍapāda is as follows: It should not be supposed that the *Jiva* is really attached to a world of the many and that he is going to be denuded of this manifoldness only after enlightenment. Why not? Because the world in all its manifoldness is really Māyā (an illusion), and hence is eternally naught; the real nature of this Ātman is to be free from all manifoldness.
(d) And the fourth verse purports to say that we should not seriously take the disciple to be a distinct person to be awakened from the state of ignorance by the teaching of the S'ästra and preceptor actually distinct from him, and that he actually awakes to the state of freedom from the manifold. For all this teaching—of the distinction of the teaching (S'ästra), the teacher (S'ästa), the taught (Sishya), ignorance (ajñänam) and realization of the truth (pratibodha)—is merely a device employed for the purpose of teaching. When Reality as it is, is intuited, it will be clearly seen there is not even the thought-construct of distinction of the taught etc. as a matter of fact.

THE DELIBERATE SUPERIMPOSITION EMPLOYED IN VEDANTA NEVER AFFECTS ITS VALIDITY

22. It will be seen that superimposition so called of the not-self upon the Self, is of two different varieties - one due to innate avidyā of the common man, and the other a deliberate device employed by S'ästra (revelatory teaching). Of these two, the ordinary human procedure due to Avidyā is the source of all evil in life, while deliberate superimposition employed by the S'ästra for the purpose of teaching is purely a conventional device aiming at enlightening the intellect of the enquiring student. So says the teacher Sri Gauḍapāda:—

1. "Everything is born from the viewpoint of Saṁyūti and so there is nothing eternal. As a matter of fact, however, everything is unborn and so there is no destruction whatever." GK. 4-57.

Here Saṁyūti means concealing, the common sense-view of ordinary men under the influence of Avidyā. The meaning of the verse is this: From the empirical standpoint all this is certainly born; so in the region of Avidyā, there is nothing which can be
Validity of Vedanta not affected by Superimposition

considered to be eternal. But from the viewpoint of things as they are, i.e. viewed from the position of Reality, everything is the one entity, the unborn Self and there is nothing destructible.

2. "He who exists by Kalpita Samvriti, does not exist from the viewpoint of Reality. It is only from paratantrabhisamvriti, the thought-position of other schools, but not as a matter of fact."

GK. 4-73.

Here Kalpita-samvriti only means the procedure adopted by the S'āstra or the preceptor as a device for teaching the means of knowing the truth. As for instance, in texts like the following: 'He is unborn both within and without' (Mu.), the assumption of interior and exterior with reference to what which is really devoid of a within or a without. And paratantrabhisamvriti is the granting for argument's sake the procedure of the Sāṅkhya. Kaṇādas and others which postulates the distinction of pramāṇa (the means of knowledge), and prameya (the object of

1. Here it should be noted that even Mādhyamikas talk of two truths, Samvriti and Paramārtha "Reality is beyond the range of intellect, and intellect is called samvriti" (BCh.), "Paramārtha is not taught without reference to ordinary procedure; without knowing Paramārtha (reality) Nirvāṇa is never attained." (MK. 14, Can. p. 181). Some persist in holding that the very distinction of samvriti and paramārtha enunciated by the followers of Buddha, has been utilized by Gauḍapāda and so his followers are crypto-Buddhists. This misconception, however, is due to ignorance of the difference between the method adopted by the Buddhists and that employed by Vedantins. Why Gauḍapādācārya has adopted the terminology of the Buddhists and how the two methods differ may be learnt by a reference to the Māṇḍūkya-Rahasya-Vivṛti by the present writer. This topic is discussed in detail in chapter 7.
knowledge), *Sat-kārya-vāda* (the theory of pre-existent effect), *paramāṇuka Śrāṇavāda* (the theory of the Atom as the cause) etc. Both of these *saṃvṛtis* are to be taken only as concessionary devices adopted for the purpose of teaching the truth.

It will thus be seen that while empirical procedure and the Vedic one are both in the sphere of Avidyā only, the superimposition incorporated in the method of Vedanta known as *adhyātma-paṇa-apavāda* (superimposition and rescission) by no means invalidates the efficacy of Sāstra; for, it has to be remembered, this superimposition is only a concession as Gauḍapāda has clearly shown, and S'āṅkara is only following in the footsteps of that teacher.

**Why the Method of Superimposition and Rescission alone is employed exclusively in Vedanta**

23. The self-established Ātman not being objectifiable, is hard to be known directly. So the S'ruti employs a number of superimpositions, negates the device employed in the superimposition and thereby only suggests that Ātman is ungraspable. This secret underlying the method has been expressly disclosed by Gauḍapāda himself an authority on the tradition.

स एष नेतिनेतीति व्यास्यालं नित्यते यतः ।
श्रेम्यग्राह्मभवेन हेतुनार्ज प्रकाशते ॥

GK. 3-26.

The S'ruti negates again and again at every step, whatever it employs as a means of teaching (vide Br. 3-9-26, 4-2-4, 4-4-22, 4-5-15). It proclaims 'Now this Ātman is He who has been
BRAHMAN IS KNOWN ONLY THROUGH NEGATION OF SUPERIMPOSITION

Described as *neti neti* (not such, not such). The non-dual unborn essence of Átman, says the Káriká, then shines forth of itself.

**That Brahman is known only through the negation of the superimposed is a teaching common to all the three Prasthānas**

24. That Brahman being devoid of specific features and never objectifiable has to be made known only by the negation of the superimposed attributes foreign to it, has been expressly stated in the Sútras of Bādarāyaṇa; it has been taught in the Upanishads and announced in the Bhágavadgítā also. This harmony of the three Prasthānas has been pointed out by the commentator S’ánkara. The student should ponder over the texts cited in the Bháshya on the two aphorisms:

1. दृश्यति चाशो अपि स्मर्यते।
   "The S’ruti shows this and it is declared in the Sméritis also."
   VS. 3-2-17.

2. अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकाविवर्त।
   "Hence the simile of the reflexion of the sun etc."
   VS. 3-2-18.

The following are the texts to be gone into in particular:

"Now therefore, the teaching (of Brahman): 'not such, not such'" (Br. 2-3-6); "It is certainly other than the known, and is higher than the unknown" (Ke. 1-4); "That (bliss) from which words turn back along with the mind, failing to reach it" (Tai. 2-9); "This Átman is (perfect) silence" (?); "It is neither being nor non-being" (G. 13-12); "Do not think that I am invested with the qualities of all these elements (such as the earth etc.)" (Mó. Dh. 339-45); "He is made to appear to be of a
different form only through the associating adjunct" (?); "He is seen to be one and many like the reflection of the moon in the water." (?).

SBh. 3-2-17, 18, p. 358-359.

TEACHING BY MEANS OF SUPERIMPOSITION, IS ONLY FOR NEGATING WHAT IT IS NOT

25. The sub-varieties of the Adhyārūpa-apavāda method are innumerable. Only a few of them are known by particular names. Some of them, we are going to consider in the next section. In order to forewarn the student that they are to be regarded as samples only, we now set forth some more varieties of superimposition implying the negation of certain other features:–

Although Brahman is devoid of all specific features, and although it is ever attained because of its all-pervading nature and because of its being the very Self of every one, 'attainability' is imputed to it in certain S'rutis such as this one for instance: 'The knower of Brahman attains the Highest' (Tai. 2-1). This is only to negate that it is attainable by some means other than knowledge. It also implies that Brahman should not be regarded as something to be reached after travelling towards it, as is the case with regard to Lower Brahman (Hiranyakāśipu) whose attainability is taught in S'rutis like 'He attains Swārājyam (his own kingdom, as Hiranyakāśipu)' (Tai. 1-6). Sometimes 'knowability is attributed to Brahman by superimposition, as for instance in S'rutis like the following: 'This is to be known, for it is always in the form of one's own Ātman' (Sve. 1-12); 'Nārayana the great knowable' (Tai. Na. 13-29); '(That teaching) by which even that which is not heard becomes heard, that which is not thought over becomes thought over, and that which is not understood becomes understood'
(Ch. 6-1-3). And this superimposition is to reveal that ignorance is utterly destroyed by knowledge and that there remains nothing else to be known henceforth. And in certain cases knowership is superimposed to negate knowability, as for instance in the S'ruti: 'By what means, my dear, can the knower be known?' (Br.2-4-14). And by certain S'rutis again the nature of being a witness is imputed to Ātman to deny even knowership to Ātman as in the text 'He is the witness, conscious and devoid of all attributes' (Sve. 6-11). And by certain other texts the very essential nature of Ātman is pointed out as in the text '(He is) neti neti, not such, not such' (Br. 2-3-6) in order to negate all specific attributes including the nature of being a witness. Similarly knowability by Vedantic text only is superimposed sometimes to teach that Ātman is not knowable by perception and other empirical means, as may be seen from texts like 'Those who have quite correctly ascertained the truth by means of intuition arising from Vedantas...' (Mu. 3-2-6). Ascertainability by the mind is sometimes taught to indicate that it is not known through sensuous knowledge, as is done in texts like 'By mind alone is this (Brahman) to be seen, there is no plurality whatever here' (Br. 4-4-19). And in other instances it is taught that Brahman is beyond both the mind and speech in order to reveal that Ātman is known exclusively through intuition distinct from both (mind and speech). As for instance, in the case of texts like this: 'From which words fall back, along with the mind failing to reach it - one who has intuited that bliss of Brahman, is not afraid of anything' (Tai. 2-9). Discriminating students may similarly interpret for themselves other instances of deliberate superimposition.

Nor is it a rule that each superimposition aims at removing only one particular thought-construction. To illustrate by an
example: Superimposition of knowability of Ātman not merely wards off the supposition that some other thing deserves to be known, but also suggests that one becomes omniscient by the knowledge of Brahman and that all his ignorance is removed once and for all. It is also implied that ignorance of Ātman alone is responsible for the appearance of all duality, and that subsequent to the dawn of Self-knowledge there would no longer continue the distinction of knower, means of knowledge, and the object of knowledge. And so on. It will thus be seen that the one superimposition of knowability on Brahman implies the dispersal of all constructs of imagination such as (1) the supposition of the actual existence of something other than Ātman, (2) the presumption that assumption of duality is the only imagination-construct to be removed by its knowledge, (3) the imagination that ignorance might recur at some future time, even after the knowledge of Brahman, (4) the supposition that actual existence of duality is responsible for its appearance, (5) the unfounded lease of continuance for knowership even after the knowledge of Ātman has dawned, and so on.

We have here adduced only a few instances to indicate that some particular superimpositions are intended to negate some other particular thought-constructs. The intelligent reader can now proceed for himself and infer the implied negations in similar cases. It should be never forgotten that wherever reality free from all attributes is presented as endowed with any particular attribute, it is only intended to negate some other property commonly imputed to it by the human mind, but never implies that the particular attribute employed for the purpose of teaching, really characterizes Reality as it is. For it will be seen that even this attribute is in its turn expressly negated elsewhere.
26. We shall now cite certain passages from the Bhāshyās to illustrate how Śaṅkara lays particular emphasis on the importance of the Adhyātma-apavāda method on the score that Reality being devoid of all specific features, can never be positively described:

1. In the same way that an animal is described positively by exclaiming 'There goes the ox, the white one, with horns', Brahman is described by means of superimposed name, form or action by means of words and expressions like 'Brahman is consciousness and bliss', 'It is a solid mass of consciousness', 'Brahman' and 'Ātman'. When, however, it is intended to indicate its essential nature itself, free from all particulars conditioning adjuncts, then it is impossible to define it in any particular manner. And so, for that purpose the only means to employ is to point out it by negation, i.e. by calling it 'neti neti' (not such, not such), thus denying all properties attributable.

Br. 2-3-6, p. 755, 756.

2. Every word used to reveal a particular thing, or heard by listeners when so used, makes the particular thing known only by showing how it symbolises it, by referring to its genus, action, quality or relation and by no other means. For no other means is known to us. For example it can point to its genus by calling it 'a cow' or 'a horse' etc; or it can indicate its action and say 'he cooks' or 'he reads' etc.; or it may indicate it by pointing to its quality and say 'it is white or black' etc.; or else it may refer to its relation to something else and say 'wealthy', 'possessed of cattle'. But Brahman is without genus and so cannot be expressed by words like 'being'; nor has it any quality in which case it could be expressed by an adjective of quality; it is by its very nature
free from all qualities. Nor can it be expressed by means of its action. for it is actionless. For the Sruti says "It is devoid of parts, free from activity, and free from all distinction" (Sve. 1-19). Nor is it related to something else, for it is one, secondless Being, not objective, and the very self of everything, it is only proper to say that it can be expressed by no word whatever. And because there are such Srutis as the following: 'From which all words fall back' (Tai. 2-9).

3. Nor is the self in its essential nature object of any other means of knowledge, for there is no associate conditioning it as an ox etc. Nor has it any genus, for being secondless it has no distinction of genus and species. Nor has it any predicatable action like a cook, for it is changeless. Nor is it characterized by a quality like blue, for it is devoid of all qualities. Hence it cannot be expressed by any name.

Ma. Bh. 7, p. 186.

4. It is because of the interception of specific features like happiness that Atman does not abide in his own essential nature and final beatitude (S'reyas) is only abiding in one's own nature. Therefore the S'astras brings about the notion of not being happy etc. and thereby annuls the notion of being happy etc. by means of texts like 'neti neti'.

GK. Bh. 2-32, p. 205.

5. Hence that Brahman cannot be denoted by the epithet 'Jñānam' (knowledge) either. Nevertheless, it is indicated (lakshyate) though not expressed, by the word 'Jñānam' denoting the semblance of consciousness which is really a modification of the mind. It is not directly denoted by that term because Brahman is devoid of genus and other specific features which alone are the occasion for the application of words to a thing. So is it with regard to the term 'Satyam'. For Brahman is by its very nature devoid of all specific features. The term
Satyam really refers to the genus 'being' inhering in external objects, and when Brahman is described as 'Satyam' (Real), it is only indicated by that term. But Brahman is not actually expressed by the term 'Satyam'.

Tai. Bh. 2-1, p. 285.

[It is not intended even to stress that it is 'indicated' by any term. For words cannot objectify Brahman by means of any function (vṛtti) whatever, because Brahman is no object, and because it is the very self of even words. It has been clarified by Bhāshyakāra elsewhere (Tai. Bh.2-1 p. 283) that by applying the epithet Satyam to Brahman the S'ruti wants to tell us that Brahman is no effect. Similarly we have to understand that the expression 'Jñānam-Brahma' (Brahman is consciousness) aims at revealing that Brahman is unlike in nature to such things as a pot. For the Bhāshya says 'since it is declared that Brahman is the cause, it is liable to be taken to be an efficient factor like any ordinary thing, and an insentient thing like clay. Hence to ward off this supposition, it is said 'Brahman is consciousness.']

6. Objection: "Is not even Ātman denoted by the word 'Ātman'?"

Reply: No. for there are S'rutis like 'From which words fall back', 'That in which one sees nothing else'.

Question: How then do texts like 'Ātman alone is below....' and 'It is Ātman' reveal Ātman?

Reply: This is no fault. For, the word (Ātman), primarily used in the world of differences to denote individual soul as distinct from the body it possesses, is extended to indicate the entity which remains after the rejection of body and other not-selves as not deserving that appellation, and is used to reveal what is really inexpressible by words".

Ch. Bh. 7-1-3, p. 542.
[This observation is made in the context of revealing that Brahman which is the Self of everyone is ineffable, for it is of a distinct nature and quite unlike all the nameables and names inasmuch as the latter are only modifications of Brahman and every modification belongs to the category of not-self. Hence the import of the passage is that the employment of the word 'Ātman' even with reference to the real inmost Self too great for words, is only to remove the notion which is current among common people that the body etc. are themselves the Self.]

We have thus set forth the nature of the method employed in S'āṅkara-Vedanta. We shall now enumerate in the next section some varieties of this method in order to show how they are all subsumed under this main method.
5. VARIETIES OF THE VEDANTIC METHOD

RELATION OF THE SEQUEL TO THE PRECEDING SECTION

27. It has been shown how according to S'ankara the one method of Adhyārōpa-apavāda is uniformly employed in all the Upanishads for the purpose of revealing the non-dual Reality. The nature of the method in its general aspect has been also exhibited in the course of citing certain passages from ancient teachers in order to demonstrate that the cardinal principles assumed by S'ankara belong to a hoary tradition. We shall now briefly indicate how particular varieties of this method have been pointed out in the Bhāshyas on the Prasthāna-trayi, i.e., on the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Vedānta-Sūtras.

THE METHOD OF DISTINGUISHING Vidyā AND AVidyā

28. Texts like the following declare that by the knowledge of Brahman alone one can attain the highest goal of human life, viz., Brahmanhood. 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tai.2-1), 'Whoever comes to know that Supreme Brahman, becomes that very Brahman' (Mu. 3-2-9), 'Indeed this one is the all-pervading, unborn Ātman, undecaying, deathless, immortal, fearless Brahman. Brahman as is well known is fearless. Whosoever knows thus, becomes indeed that very fearless Brahman' (Br. 4-4-25). Hence we conclude that Mukti (release) is intercepted by Avidyā (ignorance) alone. Hence the method of distinguishing Vidya and Avidya (Right knowledge and error) has got to be considered first and foremost.

The following extracts from the Bhāshyas may well be pondered over in this connection:
1. In the same way as in the case of a piece of nacre appearing like silver, not grasping it consists only in the interception of wrong knowledge, so also grasping it means right knowledge only; for knowledge aims at removing the interception of wrong knowledge only. So also, in the present case, not attaining Ātman means only the interception of Avidyā. So attainment means only its removal, and never can there be any other way of attaining it. Br. Bh. 1-4-7, p. 666.

2. For Brahman alone is the state of freedom.

SBh. 3-4-52, p. 458.

[Here we are told that identity with Brahman, while it is ever attained appears to be unattained owing to Avidyā and that it appears to be attained through Vidyā.]

3. It is evident that the subject and the object which are of quite opposite nature as being objects of the I-concept and the thou-concept respectively can never be possibly mutually convertible in essence; and still less probable it is that their properties are convertible into the nature of one another. Therefore it is but proper to suppose that there can be no superimposition of the object which is in the sphere of the concept 'thou' and its properties upon the subject which is in the sphere of the concept 'I', and which is the subject of the nature of consciousness. Neither conversely can there be the superimposition of the subject and its properties on the object. Nevertheless it is a natural procedure of mankind to mix up the real and the unreal owing to wrong knowledge due to non-discrimination of the two absolutely distinct properties and possessors of properties, to superimpose the mutual identity and mutual transference of their properties and to think 'I am this', and 'This is mine'.

3(a). Now this superimposition, thus defined, the wise consider to be Avidyā (ignorance), and the ascertainment of the essential nature
of the two after discrimination they call \textit{Vidyā} (wisdom).


[Here is disclosed the nature of \textit{Avidyā} which screens our Brahmic Nature. Mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self and the mistaken transference of their properties due to non-discrimination is \textit{Avidyā}. It is also declared here that the ascertainment of the true nature of Reality by discrimination is \textit{Vidyā}]

Thus by means of deliberate superimposition of \textit{Vidyā and Avidyā}, the reality of bondage and the adventitiousness of release have been denied. Here are excerpts from the Bhashyas divulging that wisdom no less than ignorance is a deliberate superimposition and not the inherent nature of \textit{Ātman}:

4. In the same way as \textit{Ātman} is presumed to be 'the knower' of objects like sound etc., which are conveyed by intellect etc., because of \textit{Avidyā} or modification of the mind of the nature of non-discriminating knowledge, \textit{Ātman} himself who is really changeless is called 'the wise one' because of the modification of the mind, which is unreal likewise, viz., knowledge discriminating the self and the non-self.

GBh. 2-21. p. 19.

[That is to say, the nomenclature of \textit{Vidwān} (the wise one) and \textit{Avidvān} (ignorant) is itself due to conditioning adjuncts of the nature of modifications of the mind.]

5. Both \textit{Viveka} (discrimination) and \textit{Aviveka} (non-discrimination) are directly intuited to inhere in the \textit{Ancakaraçūm} (inner organ, the mind). It is common knowledge that colour which is perceived is no property of the perceiver. And \textit{Avidyā} is objectified by one's own intuition as when one thinks 'I am ignorant', 'My knowledge is not distinct'. The discrimination due to \textit{Vidyā} is likewise intuited. Wise ones impart their knowledge to others and these others grasp it. \textit{Vidyā}
and Avidyā, therefore, have to be classed with name and form alone; and name and form are admittedly no properties of Ātman.

Tai. Bh. 2-8, p.310.

6. If it is argued that being the locus or not being the locus of Avidyā, is certainly a specific feature of Ātman just as blindness due to cataract or freedom from that blindness is a specific feature of a person, we say "No; for being ignorant by himself has been expressly denied in the case of Ātman by the S'ruti 'He thinks as it were, He moves as it were'." Br.Bh 4-4-6, p. 919.

(It is stated here that Vidyā and Avidyā both belong to the not-self since they can be objectified, and that the fact of Ātman appearing to possess them as properties is only a false appearance.)

It will thus be seen that the method of Vidyā and Avidyā is employed only by superimposition of knowership on Ātman in accordance with others' views, but in reality Ātman is not even a knower. This is in consonance with the traditional dictum.

योंडस्ति कृत्यितसंबृत्या परमार्थेन नास्त्यसौ ।
परतन्त्रभिसंबृत्या स्याचास्ति परमार्थतः ॥

"He who exists by kalpita-sarīrvati, does not exist from the view-point of Reality. He is only from the paratantrāḥbhīsartvāt, the thought-position of other schools but not as a matter of fact."

GK. 4-73.

THE METHOD OF S'AŚTRA - PRĀMĀṆYA

29. Similarly when it is maintained that Ātman is known only through the Upanishads, on the strength of texts like "I ask thee of the person known in the Upanishads" (Br. 3-9-26), "That
position of which all the Vedas sing (Ka. 1-2-15) it is only for the purpose of intimating that He is not knowable by perception and other empirical means of knowledge and not to convey the idea that He is actually known through the word. So says the author of the Sūtra-Bhāshya:

1. The intuition of Brahman is indeed achieved through the ascertainment of the import of Vedic text and not by other empirical means of knowledge like inference. SBh. 1-1-2, p.7.

2. For this entity is no object of perception because it has no colour and other properties. Nor is it the object of inference and other means for it has no indicatory mark etc. (necessary for those means to function). This entity can be known through Āgama (revelation) alone like Dharma. SB. 2-1-6, p.188.

It is for the purpose of teaching that Brahman is known only through Āgama that the revered Bādarāyaṇa has written the aphorism शाह्योनित्वात् (for it has S'āstra for its means). And the author of the Bhāshya has explained it thus "The meaning is that Brahman, the cause of the origin etc. of the Universe, is knowable through the S'āstra-pramāṇa alone." But because of this, one should not delude oneself into the belief that the distinction of pramāṇa and prameya (means and object of knowledge) sanctioned by common usage is really real, and that S'āstra is also a means of knowledge just like perception etc. enabling one to know Brahman which is not known through other means. For the s'ruti says "That which is not expressible by speech, but by which speech itself is expressed (known) - that alone is Brahman." (Ke. 1-5). And there is a further reason for this warning, for all Pramāṇas and S'āstras function under the presupposition of Avidyā for their basis. This is stated by the author of the Bhāshya:-.
72

As for S'āstra, it is the Final Pramāṇa; it derives its validity only by pointing out and removing what is not the property of Ātman, but not by directly making known what is not known through other means.

GBh. 2-18, p. 16.

[In the Sanskrit original the word 'mātra' (only) has to be read after 'nivartakatva' to yield the intended meaning.]

2. The Final Pramāṇa removes the knowership itself and while so removing it loses its own validity, just as the means of knowledge in a dream, is invalidated on waking. GBh. 2-69, p. 39.

[The idea is that the S'ruti also is spoken of as a means of knowledge only in a secondary sense, from the stand-point of Avidyā, since all talk of Pramāṇas or means of knowledge depends on the presupposition of a knower, who is himself really a product of Avidyā.]

3. All usage of the means and object of knowledge, whether ordinary or Vedic, proceeds on the presupposition of the mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self known by the name of Avidyā; so also do the S'āstras purporting to lay down injunctions or to prohibit certain acts or to teach release.

SBh.p.2.

[The word 'all' being a general term, the talk of one who desires to be released and one who is released is also to be understood as the outcome of Avidyā. Since the S'āstras include those that purport to teach 'release' also (Moksha-parāni) even the S'āstra relating to Ātman is to be taken to be within the ambit of the usage of Pramāṇas based on Avidyā.]

Thus it is evident that for the Vedantins the convention of the means and objects of knowledge as also that of S'āstra etc. is only a device subsumed under the comprehensive method of Adhyāropa-apavāda contrived for the purpose of teaching.
30. Just as the enquiry into Brahman is recommended in the Upanishads granting for the nonce that the individual soul is a knower and Brahman is to be known, so also Brahman as the cause of the origin etc. of the universe, the entry of Brahman into the created world as a soul, and also the merging of the soul again into Brahman - all this is taught on the presumption of the distinction of the individual soul and Brahman. So also are taught the different states of consciousness, departing of the soul from and return back to this world, the constant transmigratory life of birth and death, and the states of knowledge and release as well. All this comes only under the device for the purpose of teaching the Reality, the Supreme Self, using the one method of Superimposition and Rescission, and it is never taken seriously that Brahman is really the cause of the origin etc. of the Universe, that it actually enters into the created Universe as a Jiva and that the Jivas do really undergo bondage and attain release afterwards. This has been summed up in a verse by Sri Gauḍapāda ācārya:–

न निरोधः न चोत्तचिर्वद्धः न च साधकः।
न मुमुक्षुर्नै भूत इत्येशा परमार्थता॥

"There is neither creation nor dissolution, no one bound nor one who undergoes spiritual discipline; no one who intensely desires to be released nor one who is released. This is the whole truth." GK. 2-32.

We shall first of all take up the method of creation for consideration, because enquiry into the nature of individual souls, mundane bondage in the shape of states of consciousness, and departing and returning from the other world on the part of Jivas, their release from the bondage and the means of release - all these presuppose creation.
The texts relating to creation, in the first place, aim at revealing the knowledge of the oneness of Ātman, but they are not very particular about the reality of creation. This we can conclude for instance from the Taittiriyaka Upanishad which begins with relating the good resulting from the knowledge of Brahman, and after narrating creation etc. by statements like 'From Ātman was born ether' (Tai. 2-1) goes on to say 'When this seeker attains stability which knows no fear in this invisible, bodiless, undefined entity in need of no other substrate - then he will have got freedom from all fear' (Tai. 2-7) thus denying the existence of all created (elements) with and without form in that very Brahman (its material cause). So also in the Mūḍḍaka which solemnly declares that the Imperishable Reality (Akṣharam) is free from all specific features by describing it as 'That which is invisible, ungraspable, causeless, attributeless, having neither eyes nor ears, and having neither hands nor feet' (Mu. 1-1-6) and then relates the creation of the universe from that very Imperishable entity thus 'Brahman becomes fat in the Tapas of brooding and from it is born food (or the manifesting Avyākṛta)' etc., and concludes 'All this is verily this Purusha (Supreme Person)' (Mu. 2-1-10), and 'That which is before us is verily immortal Brahman' (Mu. 2-2-11). This is evident too, from the enunciation of the good issuing forth from the knowledge of Brahman in these words:

"He who knows this to be hidden in the cave, of the heart, my dear friend, he verily unties the knot of Avidyā'.

Mu. 2-1-10.

In like manner, we can discern that the method of creation, is presented in all the Upanishads as a variety of the Adhyārōpa-apavāda method.

This method of superimposing the Universe on Brahman for the purpose of teaching the unity of Ātman and subsequent
revoking it, is common to all the three Prasthānas. Thus in the Bhagavadgītā:

(१) मल्ला मनि सर्वभूतानि न चाहच्छ तैलवस्थितः॥

All these beings rest in me, but I do not rest in them.

(२) प्रकृति स्वामवष्टय बिसूद्धामि पुनः पुनः॥

Controlling my Prakṛti, I create them again and again.

[This is superimposition.]

(३) न च मल्ला मनि भूतानि पश्य मे योगमेश्वरम्॥

Nor are the beings really in me. Just look at the Yoga (Glory) belonging to me, the Lord!

(४) न च मां तानि कर्माणि निविद्धत्वि धन्तः॥

And yet these acts do not bind me, O Dhanañjaya!

[This is rescission.]

So also in the S'ārīraka or Vedanta Mīmāṁsā:

(५) कारणत्वेन च यथाव्यवहितोऽति॥

For Brahman is spoken of as the cause of ether etc. in all the Upanishads, uniformly in the same way of description.

And in the Bhāshya we read:

(a) Of what description the Omniscient Lord of all, the Self of every one, One without a second is spoken of as the cause in any one Vedantic text, of that very same description is he spoken of (as the cause) in the other texts too. ..... (For example) by the statement "May I become plenteous, may I be born" which expresses the will to become
plenteous on the part of Ātman the S'ruti has enunciated the non-difference of the created effects from the creator. And by the statement "He created all this, everything without exception" the S'ruti points to the creation of all the universe by Him, and thereby says that before creation, the creator was one without a second. Now of whatever description it is that Brahman is known from this text to be the cause (of the universe), of the Self same description is it known (to be the cause) elsewhere also.

SBh. 1-4-14, pp. 162-163.

(b) It may even be that texts with regard to the effect are disharmonious, for it (the effect) is not purposed to be taught. (To explain:) It is not indeed the purpose of the S'ruti to teach all this detail of creation & c., for there is no good of human life perceived or declared in the S'ruti in that connection. Nor can it be presumed (on the strength of the context); for from the commencement and conclusion in the various contexts (the texts treating of creation) are seen to be construable as going along with texts about Brahman to aid the unity of thought. .....Moreover, it can be concluded that all these details of creation etc. is intended to teach the non-difference of the effect from the cause by means of the illustrations of clay etc. Accordingly those that are well-acquainted with the tradition of Vedanta, say :-

मृदोहविस्फुटिन्त्वायैः सृष्टियां चोदितान्यथा।
उपायः सोडङ्गवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथान।।

"The creation which is taught in various ways by means of illustrations like that of clay, metal, and sparks, is only a device for the purpose of leading the mind to the truth; there is no diversity on any account (GK. 3-15)". SBh. 1-4-14, p. 163.

**THE METHOD OF CAUSE AND EFFECT**

31. This explains the method of cause and effect also. For
the S'rutis teach that Jivas are born from Brahman and are dissolved again in Brahman. As for instance, "Just as similar sparks dart forth in thousands from a fire aflame, so also, my dear friend, various beings are born from the Imperishable (Aksharam), and are dissolved in that very same (Aksharam)" (Mu. 2-1-1). And it also announces that all things of the world subjective and objective are born from Brahman alone thus "From this alone are born the vital force, the mind and all the senses; the ether, air, fire, water, and the earth supporting all" (Mu. 2-1-3). So also another S'rutis beginning with "It thought - 'Let me become plenteous, let me be born'. It created fire" (Ch. 6-2-3) says that Brahman itself was born in the form of fire and other elements. From all this, it would appear that a cause-and-effect relation is intended to be taught between Brahman and the Universe. From the rescission of this very relation of cause and effect, however, we have to conclude that this method of cause and effect has been devised only for the purpose of revealing the non-difference of the effect from the cause. For there are S'rutis like the following: "He is born in diverse ways, while he is really never born" (Tai. A. 3-13-39), "Prakṛti should be taken to be Māyā (an illusion) and the Great Lord to be the Māyāvin (the magician) and by parts of his, all this universe is pervaded." (Sve. 4-10).

This has been indicated by the author of the Sūtra also thus:

"Their non-difference is concluded on the basis of the word Ārambhāṇa and other texts." VS. 2-1-14.

And the author of the Bhāshya has thus explained the drift of the Sūtra:-

1. The 'effect' is the universe comprising the panorama of ether etc., and the cause is the Highest Brahman. And we can conclude
that the effect is non-different from the cause. How? On account of the word अरम्भन and other texts. We shall first take up the word 'अरम्भन'. After laying down the proposition asserting the possibility of knowing all things by knowing one particular entity, it is said, by way of supplying an illustration which is demanded by that proposition: "Just as, my dear boy, all that is made up of clay is known through the knowledge of a lump of clay, since the effect is only a name conjured up by speech and the only reality is what is known as clay". The meaning is this: When one lump of clay is ascertained to be really clay, all that is made of clay, such as a pot, a lid or a pail also becomes known, since they are likewise essentially clay. For an effect is वाचारम्भणम् Nāmadheyam i.e. the effect is conjured up as existing only by speech which calls it 'a pot', 'a lid', or 'a pail'. But as a matter of fact there is nothing which may be called an effect; for it is only a name, unreal; what is known as clay is the only real thing. This is the illustration cited in the S'ruti for Brahman. By the word वाचारम्भणा used therein, we have to infer that even in the case of that of which it is an illustration that no effects exist apart from Brahman. Again, after stating that fire, water and food (earth), are the effects of Brahman, the S'ruti says that the effects of fire, water and food, do not exist apart from fire, water and food, in these words: "The fireness of fire has gone away, for the effect is only a name conjured up by speech, the only reality being the three colours (Ch. 6-4-1)" etc. 

SBh. 2-1-14, p. 196.

2. By the word 'अधि' (etc.) in the expression 'अरम्भनस्त्र म्भद्वाधियाय' in the original, we have to understand and cite such texts as 'All this has this (Sat) for its essence, that alone is real, that alone is the Ātman, that thou art'; 'All this is verily what we know as this Ātman' which (texts) teach the unity of Ātman.

SBh. 2-1-14, p. 197.

Here by the assertion that the effect is non-different from the cause, what is intended to emphasize is that all effect is spoken
of as being born only illusorily, just to impart the knowledge of the oneness of Ātman. As a matter of fact, however, there is no effect as such, it is only superimposed upon the cause by Avidyā.

so says the author of the Bhāshya :

3. Therefore in the same way that the ether spaces limited by a large pot or a little one (for drinking water) or by any other vessel, are non-different from the cosmic ether, and in the same way that mirage water etc. are non-different from the barren soil etc., just appearing and vanishing away as they do, and being of a nature undefinable, so also we have to understand that this universe of manifoldness in the form of experiencer and experienced etc. is non-existent apart from Brahman.

SBh. 2-1-14, p.197.

We shall now cite three Kārikās just to ratify that the above quoted extracts from the Bhāshya are quite in harmony with the Vedantic tradition :

सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न ्तु तत्त्वत्: ।
तत्त्वतो जायते यस्य जातं तस्य हि जायते ॥

"Of a real being an illusory birth alone can reasonably happen; for him whose opinion it is really born, it would be tantamount to say that what is born alone can be born." GK. 3-27.

न कथितजायते जीवः सम्भवोऽस्य न विचारते ।
एतत्तद्वन्धसत्यं यत्र किष्मिच जायते ॥

"No Jiva is born, and there is no cause for him (from which he is to be born). This is the highest Reality wherein nothing is born." GK. 3-48.
Birth is taught as a doctrine by the wise ones to those who hold to the doctrine that things exist because of their appearance and practical efficiency and who are always afraid of that which is unborn."

GK. 4-42.

**Brahman's entry into creation as a Jiva**

32. In the same manner that real creation is not the purport of S'rutis when they teach creation, Brahman's entry into the created world too, is taught not to stress the reality of entrance as a factual event but only to introduce the enquirer's mind to the idea of the unity of Ātman by teaching that Brahman itself unchanged, illusorily appears to be in the form of Jīva. That this is so, has to be concluded from the circumstance that the Jīva is taught to be identical with the Brahman so entering the creation. Therefore texts like the following are from the stand-point of *Adhyārāopa* (deliberate superimposition):

(a) Having created it, He entered into that very creation.

Tai. 2-6.

(b) Splitting this very same seam of the hair, he entered through this opening.

Ai. 1-3-12.

(c) Let me enter in the shape of this Jīva my own self and differentiate name and form

Ch. 6-3-2.

And these and other S'rutis are employed for *Apavāda* (rescission):-
(a) Now this One in the body of man and that One in the Sun, is one and the same. 
Tai. 2-8.

(b) He saw this very Purusha, the all-pervading Brahman and ejaculated "Now I have seen this Brahman!". 
Ai. 1-3-13.

(c) All this has this (Being) for its essence, that is real. that thou art. O Svetaketu. 
Ch. 6-8-7.

So says the author of the Bhāshya also :-

1. Now this very same cause of ether etc. has created the effect (Universe) and is intuited in the particular forms of a seer, hearer, thinker and understander, as though it had entered into it. This really is (what is meant by) entering the creation. Tai. Bh. 2-6, p.301.

2. Having created the effect beginning with ether up to and including the Annamaya (the physical body), it is intuited as possessing particular forms, as though it had entered into the created object. Therefore one should know it to be of a nature quite distinct from that of all effects, and Bliss distinguished by characteristics like invisibility, as one's own Self. For teaching about entry into creation is meant to inculcate this. Tai. Bh. 3-1, p.313.

3. For statements relating to creation, entry into creation, sustenance and dissolution of the Universe, are all meant to aid the realization of the unity of that Ātman. Br. Bh. 1-4-7, p. 658.

4. Texts relating to creation etc. may be reasonably understood to be meant as aids to the realization of the unity of Ātman, for this additional reason that perception of duality is derided. So we have to understand that being known in the effect in the special form (of Jīva) is figuratively spoken of as entry into the created world. 
Br. Bh. 1-4-7, pp. 658-659.
33. It is evident that the nature of being an agent of action and experiencer of the results thereof (Kartrtvam Bhōkttvam ca) is, just like the nature of being a knower (Pramāṭṛtva); a property belonging only to Ātman who has become Jiva after entering into the aggregate of the body and the senses; for the superimposition of the properties of the body, senses and the mind is common to both these capacities. Now, the S'āstra enjoining religious works pre-supposing agency of action as inhering in Jivas, does not insist on the reality of agency and other factors of action, but on the other hand, expressly denies that Ātman is actually tainted with right and wrong religious works as seen in such texts as 'He is devoid of Dharma, and devoid of Adharma....' (Ka. 1-2-14). And in like manner, the S'ruti which enjoins Upāsanās (meditation) should not be supposed to emphasize the reality of the agency of meditation as pertaining to Ātman, for it denies the reality of that agency likewise by saying 'He is meditating as it were, he is moving as it were' (Br. 4-3-7).

Accordingly, the author of the Bhāshyas says :-

1. Assuming the existence of the factors of action as recognized in empirical life, the S'āstra which enjoins religious works for the benefit of those who desire to be released and for the benefit of those that desire the fruits of religious works, cannot be supposed to be engaged in asserting the reality of the factors of action.

Tai. Bh. Conclusion of S'ikshavalli 278.

2. This Upāsanā as well as Karmas is recommended for the benefit of those in Ās'ramas which are meant for sādhakas entertaining the lowest and the mediocre stand-points of view, but not for those who
entertain the highest point of view which sees the one Atman without a second. GK. Bh. 3-16, p. 215.

3. This being the case, the person who thinks that the Kevala Atman (the Pure Atman) is the agent of the action done by these (the five factors of action) which he has identified with his own self, and imagines that he is himself the doer, that unwise person does not see things aright. Why? Because he has no prepared mind, no mind purified by the teaching of the Upanishads and a preceptor or by good reasoning. He is an ill-minded person possessed of a low, perverted, impure mind occasioning constant births and deaths. This wrong-minded person sees not even while seeing, like one suffering from cataract, who sees many moons; or like one who sees the moon as moving very fast where actually it is the clouds that pass quickly, or again like one who sitting in a vehicle imagines oneself as moving fast while it is some others that so move.

GBh. 18-16, p. 263.

[The five factors of action referred to here are the body etc. enumerated in the fourteenth verse.]

**THE METHOD OF THE FIVE Kōś'as**

34. It is evident that the method of the five sheaths (Paṇc'a-Kōs'a-Prakriya) too, is a variety of the Adhyāropa-apaśāda method. For there the S'ruti enumerates the five 'selves' invented by Avidyā beginning with the body thus: 'Different from this self made up of food, there is another self, the Prāṇamaya', 'another self made up of the mind', 'another self made up of bliss', and in each case it enjoins the meditation of the body etc. taken in its cosmic aspect (Samashti). And at the end it teaches the innermost Brahman itself as the tail
of Ānandamaya and declares "He who thinks that Brahman is Asat (non-existent), he himself becomes non-existent" (Tai. 2-6) and thus, passing beyond all the selves superimposed by Avidyā, it concludes by emphasizing Brahman alone as the one substrate of all thought-constructs, wherein all specific features have vanished altogether. It then asserts that this Ātman is one and uniform (Sa ekah) in all, and says that the wise one who realizes it as the true self of even that Ānandamaya (एत्मानन्दराजस्वाभिषेकमुपसंक्रामति Tai. 2-8), as his own Self is entitled to attain the *sumnum bonum* of life.

And this has been expressly said by the author of the Bhāshyas thus :-

Therefore, *Sarıkramaṇam* is not attaining; nor is it the act of any one of (the five selves) beginning with the *Annamayātman*. And so, as the only alternative left over, we have to take it that *sarıkramaṇa* is the act of that which is other than the five kōsās beginning with *Annamaya* and ending with Ānandamaya and it is only knowledge that is meant by the term *sarıkramaṇam*. Tai. Bh. 2-8, p.210.

[By the statement that *sarıkramaṇa* is an act of the self other than those ending with Ānandamaya it is intended to say that one who realizes the One Self unconditioned by any associate is verily Brahman itself.]

Knowers of the tradition, such as Gauḍapāda, have also said:-

रसादयो हि मेकोशा व्यास्त्वात्स्तैत्तिरीयः ।
तेषामात्मा परो जीवः संयथा संप्रकाशितः ॥

"Of the Kōs'as (sheaths) beginning with *Anna-rasamaya* which have been explicated in the Taittiriya Upanishad, Ātman is the life, and
He is the Supreme Self which we have reasoned out by the illustration of ether."

[GK. 3-11.]

[The same Ātman that is revealed in the Taittiriya Upanishad we have presented through the help of reason based upon intuition. So this is no mere speculation.]

**THE METHOD OF SELF-EFFULGENCE**

35. In the same way too the Shruti has framed Janaka's question "What light has this Purusha (the aggregate of body etc.)?" and has offered an answer through Yājñavalkya by the method of Adhyārōpa-apavāda. It is common knowledge that the aggregate of the body and the senses has several functions to perform such as resting in a place, going to some other spot, doing some work and returning therefrom. King Janaka asks this question, "Which is the guiding light?" for all these functions? He wants to know whether this aggregate is its own light that guides it while performing such functions, or whether it performs its functions guided by some light other than itself. Yājñavalkya in his reply first presumes the external sun, moon, fire and sound to be the light in question, but since the aggregate is found to function even in their absence, Janaka asks which might be the factual light in question and Yājñavalkya gives his final answer and says Ātman alone is the light of this aggregate (Br. 4-3-6).

Here it is seen that the sun etc. have been hypothetically proposed as the light, not with the express intention of asserting that they are actually such, but only to insure the probability that there must be some external light other than the aggregate. In the same way that Prāṇamaya and other sheaths are proposed by turns
just as a device for the purpose of determining the real inmost Ātman, here also in the S'ruti "Who is that Ātman? This one made up of Vijñāna among the Prānas (the senses) the Light within the heart" (Br. 4-3-7), the imputation of being the light required to be the sun etc., is only a conventional device used for the purpose of making known the self-effulgence of the Ātman who illuminates all the body and the senses without depending on the external lights. For we have the emphatic assertion "Here this Purusha is self-effulgent" (Br. 4-3-9, 4-3-14). So says the revered S'āṅkara also while commenting on the Sūtra - Bhāshya: -

"Dream has been taken up for discussion just for the purpose of distinguishing the self-luminosity of Ātman, since in waking it is difficult to distinguish it owing to the contact of the objects and the senses, and since there are the lights of the sun etc. also inter-blending."

SB. 3-2-4, p. 346.

EXIT, GOING AWAY AND RETURNING ARE ALL FROM THE STAND-POINT OF IMPUTATION

36. Exit, going to other worlds and returning etc. are likewise from the stand-point of deliberate imputation only. As for instance, exit from the body is implied in S'rutis like "When this Purusha becomes afflicted and is about to die, becomes insensible after extreme weakness, they say 'He has departed for he hears not, sees not, neither does he talk with the organ of speech nor has he thinking power.' Then he becomes merged in the Prānas, then speech is dissolved in him with all the names, the organ of sight is dissolved with all colours, the organ of the ear is dissolved with all sounds, the mind is dissolved with all mental faculties. When he departs from this body, he goes out indeed with all these" (Kau. 5-
3)\(^1\), and "Prāṇa goes out with him as he departs" (Br. 4-4-2). The departure of the soul from the body is described in S'rutis like "Whoever go away from this world, they all go to the moon" (Kau. 3-2), "He takes to this Devayāna path and reaches the world of Agni" (Kau. 3-3) etc., going to other worlds is taught. In texts like "From that world, he returns to this world to perform karmas" (Br. 4-4-6), returning is taught. All this is from the stand-point of imputation. Abrogation of this exit etc. is found in the text "He thought over like this : 'Whose departure is it, due to which I also depart, or whose stay is it due to, that I shall also have stayed ?' He then created Prāṇa" (Pr. 6-3, 4) which purports to say that departure of the soul from the body is due to departure of Prāṇa, and does not intrinsically pertain to the soul. We have to conclude so from the fact that the S'ruti describes the self as 'Aprāṇa' (free from Prāṇa). For, as it is well known, knowers of the tradition like Gaudapāda have declared :-

मरणं संभवे चैव गत्यागमनयोरपि ।
स्थितं स्वर्यशरीरं चाकाशोनाविलक्षण: ॥

"In death and birth, in going away and coming back, and in staying in all these bodies - he is not dissimilar to the ether." GKBh 3-9.

The Bhāshya on this verse runs thus :-

1. Just as the birth and death, going and coming back as well as staying in a place seemingly pertain to the jar-space, so also the birth and death etc. seemingly pertain to Ātman. GKBh 3-9, p. 212.

1. This text is an extract from the Ānandāshrama Edition of S'ankhayana Āranyaka. There it is counted as the first chapter. In the Upanishad of the Kaus'itaki as found in the Nīnayasagara Press Edition, the Upanishad text is slightly different from the above.
Therefore, exit etc. of the soul are evidently from the standpoint of imputation only just to create dispassionateness.

2. Here in the first pada, to begin with, the various ways of going to other worlds is set forth taking the Pancāgni Vidyā for the authority. This is just to induce dispassionateness, for we have the S'rti 'Therefore one should become dispassionate' at the close of this section.
   SBh. 3-1-1, p. 324.

THE METHOD OF THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR

37. So also we have to understand that the treatment of Ātman as a universal is really from the thought-position of deliberate imputation. Thus there is the S'rti illustrating this :- "The illustration is this : While the kettle-drum is being beaten, one would not be able to grasp the external sounds by themselves, but the sound is grasped only through conceiving it as that of the drum, as the sound arising from the beating of the drum."
   (Br. 2-4-7).

We find that the author of the Bhāshya explains this in the following two extracts :-

1. By grasping them as of the drum, i.e. by taking them to be specific sounds of the drum, these particular sounds will have been grasped, for they are not apart from the genus, sound of the drum. By grasping the genus sound as produced by the beat of the drum, the species underlying it are also grasped, but they cannot be grasped as distinct from that genus. For as species they have no independent existence. In like manner no particular thing can be perceived as an entity in dream or waking apart from Prajñāna (Pure Consciousness). Hence it is right to conclude that they do not exist apart from Pure Consciousness.
   Br. Bh. 2-4-7, p. 762.
2. More than one illustration have been cited, to call attention to the fact that there are numerous genera. It is well-known that there are numerous sub-species animate and inanimate which are distinct from one another. They have all to be somehow brought under the one highest genus the Pure Consciousness. Just as the subaltern genera of sound like that of the kettle-drum, the conch or the lute, are included in the genus sound, so it can be concluded that, during the time of sustentation of the universe to begin with, that things being non-different from the subaltern genera are all one with Brahman.

Br. Bh. 2-4-9, p. 762.

Here it is clear that the nature of Brahman as the highest genus is not seriously emphasized, for everything as not-self is unreal and therefore cannot be regarded as a species of any one genus, whence it follows that Ātman is no genus to which they might be regarded as subordinated species. Indeed it has been declared in the Gita-Bhāṣya:-

3. It is common knowledge that there are two notions corresponding to everything, in apposition to each other, like the two notions corresponding to a blue lotus. Thus we have these two notions in concatenation when we conceive 'an existent pot', 'an existent cloth', 'an existent elephant' and so on in each case. Of these two notions, the notion of 'pot' etc. is variable, as we have shown already, but not the notion of existence. Thus final conclusion as to the essential nature of both being and not-being, the self and the not-self, has been arrived at by the knowers of truth; they have concluded that the existent always is, and the non-existent (or unreal) never is. GBh. 2-16, pp. 14, 15.

And as there can be no genus without species, it is to be concluded that Ātman is a genus only by the view-point of deliberate imputation employed as a device for the purpose of teaching.
38. So also should we consider the imputation of the states of consciousness to Ātman in the S'rutis. 'He who is in the waking state of outward consciousness is Vaishvānara, experient of the gross' (Ma. 3), 'He who is in the dream state, of inward consciousness ...... is the Taijasa, experient of the subtle' (Ma. 4), 'He who is in the state of sound sleep, reduced to a single entity only, one mass of consciousness, Ānandamaya (preponderating in bliss), is Prājñā, experient of bliss, with a door tending to awareness' (Ma. 5). For this imputation is for the purpose of presenting the Ādhidaivic aspects of Ātman in order to negate his limited nature. And we have the subsequent text 'Not of inward consciousness, not of outward consciousness, not of consciousness in either direction, not a mass of consciousness, neither conscious nor unconscious' which negates all contact of states of consciousness and declares that Ātman is free from all specific features. Accordingly the Bhāṣya while commenting on the twelfth Mantra points to Ātman as being essentially the Pure Aṁkāra devoid of the distinction of the name and the named, and concludes thus :-

"This Aṁkāra has become the Non-dual Reality free from all distinctive details, and auspicious. Aṁkāra as uttered by one who has acquired the aforesaid intuition of the three measures and of three aspects, is verily Ātman himself. Whoever knows this, enters his real Ātman as Ātman in his own true nature. Having the vision of Reality, this knower of Brahman has entered the Ātman after burning of the third seednature, and therefore is born no more. For the Turiya (the fourth) is no causative seed. The snake which has entered into the rope after the discrimination of the nature of the rope and the snake, cannot,
THE CONVENTION OF BONDAGE AND RELEASE & c.

39. Nay more, whatever varieties have been noticed in this section, and whatever other varieties there be which are referred to in the Upanishads but have not been noticed here, all of them have been employed only as devices for the purpose of teaching the Reality devoid of all specific features; eternally pure, intelligent and free in itself and no properties whatsoever imputed to Reality in virtue of this method can in any way effect the least alteration in the nature of Reality itself. This is the one dictum of Vedanta. All the Upanishads employ various means as devices and aim at conducing to the enlightenment that this Vijñānamaya, seemingly a transmigratory soul from the stand-point of the unwise, is verily Brahman itself freed from eternity from all distinctive factors.

Accordingly the S'ruti proclaims :-

1. Now the Brahman is without an antecedent, without a consequent, without an interior and without an exterior. This Ātman is verily Brahman, experiencer of everything. Br. 2-5-19.

2. This indeed is the great, unborn, Ātman, free from old age, free from death, immortal, fearless, Brahman itself. Brahman is well-known to be fearless. He indeed becomes verily this fearless Brahman, whoever knows this. Br. 4-4-25.

3. All this has this Pure Being for its essence. That is real, that is Ātman, that thou art. Ch.6-8-7.
And the author of the Bhāshaṇya has said in the course of explaining the Brāhadāranyaka:-

(a) In all the four chapters, one and the same Ātman has been uniformly determined to be the Highest Brahman. The means employed for knowing it, however, is different in each case. The end, on the other hand, is that very Ātman who has been pointed out in the fourth chapter in these words: "Now, the teaching concerning (the Ātman), 'not such, not such'.

Br. Bh. 4-5-15, p. 944.

It cannot be suspected that it is tantamount to nullity since it is devoid of specific features and not objectifiable and there can be no knowledge of such a thing; for it is of the nature of Consciousness self-established, and being the Self of everyone is in no need of another knowledge to throw light on it. Nor can it be objected that since it is self-established, all teachings about Brahmanvidyā become futile and invalid, and that since the knower is himself Brahman, the desire to enlightenment as to the nature of Brahman would become pointless inasmuch as Ātman cannot be both subject and object of knowledge simultaneously. For wisdom (Vidyā) is a term signifying nothing more than the intuition of Brahman as self-established, as the self of the knower himself. The teaching of the S'astras and the preceptor is indeed aimed at inducing the unfolding of that very kind of intuition by treating in detail what is devoid of all details by the method of superimposition and rescission.

This has been clearly stated by the author of Brāhadāranyaka Bhāshaṇya:-

(b) This (soul) which is found in the body now, was Brahman itself in the beginning, that is to say, even before enlightenment. Only, without enlightenment, it superimposed upon itself the following
notions: 'I am not Brahman, nor am I the whole' and consequently it presumed 'I am an active agent, and experiencer of the fruits of action; I am happy, miserable, a transmigratory soul'. But in reality it was Brahman itself quite different in nature from what it presumed itself to be, and it was the all too (sarvam ca). Now it was somehow awakened by the compassionate Ācārya who said 'Thou art not a transmigratory soul' and then knew itself in its own intrinsic nature. The meaning of the word 'eva' is Brahman itself in its own nature freed from the specific features superimposed upon it. Br. Bh. 1-4-10, p. 673.

(c) [Objection:] Is it not self-contradictory to say that the knower knows himself? For there is the S'ruti 'You cannot know the knower of knowledge itself.'

[Reply:] No. It is no contradiction to say that he is known this way. He can be known and is known in this manner, to wit, that he is the seer of the sight, for He is known as the seer of sight, and this is so because he is in no need of another knowledge. Br. Bh. 1-4-10, p. 673.

It cannot be objected that the intuition of Brahman itself would be impossible on this supposition, since there would be no need to seek for the means of the same. For by the expression 'intuition of Brahman' we only mean to say that Ātman is of the nature of the stuff of intuition or Pure Consciousness itself. Resting in Ātman alone after the impediments to its knowledge are removed, and the birth of a concept, a modification of the mind illumined by the semblance of Ātman-consciousness, is all that is meant by the term 'intuition'. We have the support of the Bhāshya itself on this point:-

This Ātman of the nature of intuition (anubhavātmaka) named Brahman, devoid of all properties pertaining to worldly life, is
the entity denoted by the term 'That' (tatpadārthah) well-known to experts in Vedanta. SBh. 4-1-2, p. 462.

5. Such being the case, the proposition 'that thou art' cannot give rise to right knowledge about its meaning in the case of those for whom the entities denoted by these two terms ('that' and 'thou') are impeded by ignorance, doubt and misconception. SBh. 4-1-2, p. 462.

6. Therefore this is the intuition of Ātman which gives rise to the conviction 'I am of the nature of consciousness free from all evil.' SBh. 4-1-2, p. 463.

7. The witnessing Self itself would be intuited by itself of the nature of intuition. The birth of the (corresponding) intellectual concept with its semblance is called its intuition. Up. Sā. 18-205.

[It has the semblance of the witness, because it is pervaded by the consciousness (Cit) of the nature of intuition itself. 'Its intuition' in the verse means intuition of Ātman.]

So also the following S'rutis:-

8. 'The Ātman alone, my dear, is to be seen, is to be heard, thought over and understood.' Br. 2-4-5.

9. One should not enquire into pleasure and pain; one should know the knower (experiencer) of pleasure and pain. One should not enquire into the nature of the mind; one should know the thinker.

Kau. 5-8.

In texts such as the above, means like Shravana (hearing) intended for the attainment of knowledge or intuition of Ātman are taught subject to the presumption of the distinction of the Vijñānatman and Paramātman. This presumption is a device
employed for the purpose of inducing introversion on the part of the seeker of the truth.

The convention of bondage and release etc. is likewise a presumption granted as a device for the sake of teaching the truth. This also has been affirmed by the author of the *Sūtra-Bhāshya*:

10. There may be an extrovert person who longs exclusively for what is pleasant, and is anxious that nothing unpleasant may happen to him, but who is not able to attain the absolute good by that way of life. Now texts like 'Ātman alone, my dear, is to be seen', turn back this person who longs for the absolute good. They turn him away from the object of the natural outward tendency and action of the aggregate of the body and the senses, and direct him to go along the stream of thought inclined towards the inner Ātman. SBh. 1-1-4, p.19.

11. The Jīva even while he is the very Brahman (to be known), is called an agent of actions and the experiencer of the fruits thereof in view of his special aspect due to the conditioning adjuncts like the mind. In order to reveal his own real nature as Brahman by excluding the special aspect due to the conditioning adjuncts, it is taught that "One should not enquire into the nature of speech, but should know the speaker himself" etc. This is for the purpose of directing the seeker to turn towards the inner Self. Hence there is no contradiction here.

S Bh. 1-1-31, p.61.

12. For *Manana* (thinking over the nature of the self), and *Nididhyāsana* are also for the purpose of intution like *Sravaṇa*.

S Bh. 1-1-4, p. 23.

13. The Supreme Ātman himself as conditioned by the associates (*Upādhis*) to wit, the body, the senses, the mind and the intellect is spoken of by the ignorant as the *S'arīra* (the embodied self). This is just like the ether which is really unlimited appearing to be
limited owing to conditioning associates like pots, jars and the like. And relative to that limitation the convention of taking it as being subject to differentiating relations like that of the subject and the object previous to the grasping unity of Ātman inculcated in the S'ruti 'that thou art' is no self-contradiction. When, however, the unity of Ātman is grasped, all talk of bondage and release etc. would come to an end for good.

SBh. 1-2-6, p. 67.

Thus all instances of human procedure being the outcome of Avidyā, the Upanishads teach creation and dissolution etc. from the stand-point of deliberate superimposition and from the stand-point of rescission they negate all that was taken for granted before that. This is the convention sanctioned by those who are an authority on Vedanta. Now this has been formulated by Gauḍapādācārya himself, well-acquainted with the Vedantic tradition:

न मिरोधो न चोत्पतिनि बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्ने वै मुक्तः इत्येष परमार्थता ॥

"There is no dissolution, no creation either; no one in bondage and no one who makes an effort to get free; no one longing for release, and none that has become free. This is the sole truth. Gk. 2-32.

[Bhāshya :- When all duality is unreal and the Ātman alone is real - then it will have been concluded that all this human procedure - both mundane and scriptural - is wholly in the region of Avidyā. ..... There being neither creation nor dissolution, the one truth is that there are no persons bound by sāṁsāra etc.]

We have explained the Method of Vedanta briefly in its general form and its varieties as well, as approved by the revered S'āṅkara. In the chapters forthcoming we shall illustrate how
schools ignorant of the method have speculated in various ways about the Vedantic System like the blind men of the fable who made different guesses about the real nature of the elephant. Our object in doing this will be solely to wean the students of Vedanta from straying away from the right path so that they may be all led back to the only path to the highest goal of human life.
6. S'ANKARA'S SCHOOL OF VEDANTA
as contrasted with OTHER SCHOOLS

RELATION OF THE SEQUEL TO THE PRECEDING SECTION

40. It is impossible to describe the unborn secondless Reality, the Brahman-Self, by making it an object of speech and thought, for the simple reason that it is devoid of all specific features. Nor is there any need for this self-established and self-luminous Self of everyone being made known through any means of knowledge as is the case for instance with a clay-jar or a piece of cloth or any other insentient knowable. The Vedantas (or Upanishads) are called the means of knowing it only by courtesy, because they reveal its true nature by sublating Avidyā or ignorance which alone intercepts and falsifies the nature of Reality. This method of presenting Vedantic truth, peculiar to S'ankara's tradition, has been set forth at some length in the previous section.

Followers of other schools of Vedanta, however, who were contemporaneous with S'ankara, described the Upanishads as the valid means of knowing Brahman in different ways in accordance with their own traditions. In order to assure the student of Vedanta that this is the only method adopted in the Upanishads, it is necessary to set forth the reasons for rejecting their modes of interpretation even while they are all Advaitins. The sequel will be devoted to this purpose.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF ANCIENT SCHOOLS

41. Even the followers of the ancient schools take Brahman to be the cause of the Universe, and agree that Jivas
become one with Brahman in the state of final release. These thinkers are very particular, however, about the special means of release as taught in their respective traditions: (1) Some of them believed that Moksha, or release should be assumed to be the effect of the both Karma (religious works) and Jnana (meditation) practised in combination. Karmakanda (portion of the Vedas teaching religious works) being Veda, should, in their opinion, be treated as equally authoritative with the Jnanakanda (portion teaching knowledge).

(2) Others thought that the Jnana taught in the Upanishads, is really Upasan (meditation), since bare knowledge of things as they are, would be of no avail in regard to the ultimate goal. For we find injunctions in the Upanishads like the following: "Atman alone, my dear, is to be seen" (Br. 2-4-5), "He is to be sought after" (Ch. 8-7-1). As for assertive sentences which speak of existent entities, they must be taken to present the nature of what has got to be meditated upon. A few belonging to this school believed that even the removal of ignorance could be achieved by this meditation.

(3) Others were of opinion that as Moksha (final release) is attaining identity with Brahman free from multiformity, the aspirant is enjoined in all the Vedas to dissolve all distinctions and differences. So Moksha has to be attained only after gradually dissolving every feature of difference.

(4) Some others again, taught that the aspirant for release, cannot reach the goal even after listening and understanding the nature of Brahman. Hence Brahman-hood is to be attained only after constant practice of meditation on Brahman known through the text for a long time and only the accumulation of the impressions of this creative imagination would do away with
nescience without any residue and result in the identification with Brahman.

(5) There were others who thought that the repeated practice of the Jñāna arising out of the teaching of the Vedantic text 'That thou art', or the repeated practice of that Jñāna aided by reflection, Manana, would alone give the realization necessary to destroy all ignorance.

(6) According to others the knowledge obtained through the text being a whole composed of related parts, a non-relational species of knowledge has to be evolved out of constant practice of meditation on the primary knowledge before ignorance is wiped out.

(7) Yet others averred that the ultimate good could be attained only by suppression of the impression of the three states of consciousness-waking, dream and sound sleep- in accordance with Vedantic teaching. The knowledge acquired through other means would not be Vedantic, and therefore, they thought, the Vedantic teachings were not meant for the mere acquisition of the knowledge of Ātman. One should discriminate and recognize the Ātman as distinct from the three states by applying the modes of reasoning known as Anvaya and Vyatireka (tracing the constant and the variables), and one who has achieved this is alone enjoined by the Upanishads to practise the suppression of the impression of the three states.

(8) Another school taught that a duly qualified person is enjoined by the Upanishads to practise the suppression of the modifications of the mind, and that when all the modifications have been suppressed, Ātman who is self-effulgent, could reveal himself to the seeker.
(9) There were yet others again, who imagined that even a person who has realized Brahman would be merged in Brahman only after he had shuffled off this mortal coil, and only that would be final release to be sure, for till then, they contended, the attainment of Brahman would not be absolute.

Thus the ancient schools of Vedanta were divided in their views regarding the nature and means of release. All the same, these schools had certain doctrines in common. Thus they all declared that:

(1) The S'rutī, being of non-human origin, is to be regarded as a means of right knowledge only in so far as it reveals the relation of spiritual ends and means not known through any other source of knowledge.

(2) The Ācārya or teacher is a guide only in so far as he teaches the meaning of the S'rutī.

(3) As for the particular means of final release, enjoined by the S'rutī, it has got to be known through the traditional teaching of a particular school.

(4) Bondage in the shape of being an individual soul, is factual, and has to be got rid of by the particular means taught by the tradition.

(5) Ajñāna or avidyā (nescience) is to be known only through the S'astra, or Veda, just as the effects of sin and virtuous conduct are to be known only through that source.

(6) The interpretation of the Vedic texts should observe the principles of Mīmāṁsā (enquiry into Dharma), as approved by the tradition.
(7) Even in confuting the opponent's views, the maxims of the Mīmāṃsā have to be observed, and the disputants should conform to the principles of reasoning sanctioned by the logicians (the Naiyayikās).

DEFECTS IN THE ANCIENT SCHOOLS

1. THE DOGMA THAT THE UPAISHADS ARE INJUNCTIVE IN THEIR AIM

42. We are now going to expose the defects common to all these schools, just to disclose that their methods are un-Vedantic in character. In the first place, a common defect is that they all took the Upanishads as purporting to lay down certain injunctions. For in the texts teaching the nature of Ātman as free from specific characteristics we do not smell any injunctions of acts or urging the aspirants to perform something in order to attain the final goal. The texts and the terms of which they are composed, are uniformly seen to culminate in teaching an existing entity alone. Hence the first charge against these schools is that they try to twist texts teaching an entity in interpreting them as yielding some other meaning.

This has been declared in so many words by S'āṅkara:

(1) Nor is it right to attach some other meaning to these texts, while the words constituting them are syntactically pointing unmistakably to the true nature of Brahman; for then one would be rejecting what the S'ruti teaches and assuming something other than what is taught therein. SBh, 1-1-4. p.11.

Again,

(2) In the commentary on the sūtra तत्तु समन्वयात् 'Tat tu
samanvayāt' (that Brahman is known only through the Vedanta S'āstra, the only means of knowledge, because of coherance) it has been established that Vedantic texts such as the following mainly aim at teaching the principle free from multiformity, and have no other purport:

"Now this Brahman is without a before, or an after, without an interior and without an exterior. This Ātman is Brahman intuiting all"

(3) It has been established in the commentary on the sūtra नेतृ समन्वयातू (But because of coherance) that statements regarding Brahman only purport to teach a factual entity and not injunctions urging one to do something.

Reason also supports this. For no person who has been enlightened by texts like 'That thou art', and has arrived at the realization of his identity with 'The one without a second', 'The Brahman without a cause or an effect; without an interior and without an exterior' would think of himself as an agent proposing to achieve an end by means of some religious work enjoined in the Vedas, or that he is urged by Vedic texts to perform certain religious works. For such an idea would be in conflict with the conviction of one's being no agent, which has dawned through the teaching of Vedantic texts.

And this fact has been re-inforced in the following Bhāshyas:

(4) Since simultaneously with the realization (of the absence of inward consciousness etc.), the result aimed at viz., the disappearance of all undesirable diversity, has been achieved, there is no need for seeking for some other means of right knowledge or for something else to be practised to attain the goal.
(5) And, one who is so urged, is sure to entertain the idea - contrary to the notion of his identity with Brahman - that he is an agent who has got to perform the particular practice and that it is his duty to perform it.

SBh. 4-1-2, p. 463.

2. **THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE S'ĀRĪRĀKA BEING COMPOSED AFRESH**

43. The inconsistency on the part of Badarāyana that he proposes to attempt an additional S'āstra investigating the purport of the Vedantas or Upanishads, stares all these thinkers in the face. For, all these schools accept that the Jñānakānda also purports to treat of injunctions, and so according to their own showing there should have been absolutely no need for Bādarāyana to attempt a new work beginning with the aphorism अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा.

Then, therefore, the enquiry into the nature of Brahman, inasmuch as Jaimini had already composed a treatise beginning with the aphorism अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ("Then, therefore, the enquiry about religious duty") dealing with all Vedic injunctions. But we see that a new S'āstra has been written on Brahman. Hence, we have to conclude that the teacher Bādarāyana does not approve of the view that the enquiry about the nature of Brahman, is subservient to any injunction.

Accordingly the author of the Sūtra-Bhāṣṭya says:

"If Brahman were meant to be merely ancillary to an injunction of meditation, a distinct S'ātra would not have been attempted at all since there has been already a S'ātra beginning with the sūtra अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा (Then, therefore the enquiry about religious duty.) If at all, this S'ātra would have commenced with some such aphorism as 'अथात: परिमिश्यधर्मजिज्ञासा' (Now, therefore, the
enquiry about supplementary religious duty), in the same strain as there has been a Sūtra 'अधात्र: ऋत्वर्षेपुरुष्याय्योमोजिज्ञासा' (Now, therefore, the enquiry with things ancillary to sacrifice and the performer of the sacrifice).

SBh. I-1-4, p.23.

3. **No need for approaching an Ācārya**

44. If even in Vedanta some injunctions were meant as is the case in the portion of karmas (religious works), then there would be no occasion for recommending that one should approach a teacher as though it were never known before, or for emphasizing the need of approaching a preceptor in such terms as the following: 'In order to realize it one should approach a guiding teacher alone' (Mu. 1-2-12). Hence we have to conclude that texts teaching the unity of the Supreme Self (Brahmatman), do not desiderate any injunction of meditation.

This has been pointed out in the Bhāshya on the Chandogya Upanishad:

"If it were or ly meant to enjoin that one should think of oneself as the Being, and there is no actual identity of the disciple denoted by the word 'thou' with the Pure Being, then there would be no occasion for recommending the means of knowledge by the statement 'One who has the right Ācārya (teacher) alone can realize this'. For this (the need for a teacher) would be a necessary implication as in the case of injunctions like 'One should offer the Agnihōtra libation' etc."

Ch. Bh. 6-16, conclusion. p. 240.

[This charge applies with equal force to all systems which hold that as a rule some injunction or other is necessitated by the Jñānakānda (knowledge portion) of the Vedas.]
4. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT FINAL RELEASE IS AN EFFECT

45. Another defect common to all these systems is that they all pre-suppose that Final Release is a real effect of some action. For if Release be presumed to be the disappearance or destruction of the actually existing Jiva-nature, and that nature is of being an agent of action and reaping the fruit thereof, then it would be against all reason to say that that nature is removable by the performance of some act of religious discipline. Moreover Release, being the absence of bondage, would be of the nature of nothing in essence very much like the breaking of fetters that bind one's feet. If on the other hand, Release be one with the unity of Self, as is held by S'āṅkara's tradition, it would be eternal, unlike Release dependant upon something to be done and perforce transitory.

So has it been stated in the Bhāshya:

(1) Nor is it possible, in case the identity of the individual Self with Brahman is not admitted to be realized through knowledge, it is impossible to hope for Final Release to the individual soul who is by nature an agent of action and experiencer of the fruits thereof. For the nature of a thing like the beat of fire can never be got rid of.

SBh. 4-3-14, p.500.

(2) Nor is the idea of Release as mere removal of bondage, mere non-existence like the breaking of one's fetters, possible: for Release is taken to be identical with the unity of the Supreme Self, on the strength of the S'ruti text 'One only without a second'.

Br.Bh. 4-4-6, p.918.

5. THE DOCTRINE OF RELEASE AS THE DESTRUCTION OF AVIDYĀ

46. While some of these schools do not admit that Release
is the removal of actually existent bondage, they hold nevertheless
that it is the destruction of Avidyā or nescience. Notwithstanding,
this new way of looking at matters, they cannot exonerate
themselves from the abovementioned charge. And a section of
Vedantins belonging to this school, insist on the injunction of
knowledge itself, and hold that Release is the effect of the practice
of knowledge. Both of these positions are of course untenable.

So has the author of the Sūtra-Bhāshya declared:

(1) Vidya (knowledge) is not of a nature to be enjoined, and
the result of Vidya is not the effect of anything done.
SBh. 3-4-33, p. 449.

Nor can it be supposed that by the mere removal of the
obstacle, freedom which already exists can well manifest itself
and so there would be no room for any such blame, since in this
case release is not something effected by the employment of
means. For, the obstacle surmised here can be either something
permanently existent or only transient. It is of course impossible
to do away with a permanent existent. In the case of something
transient, it may be possible to get rid of it, but where is the
necessity of seeking to remove it by some means, since it is liable
to make itself scarce of its own accord at some time or other?
Besides, existing plants or grasses are seen to crop up again and
again even after they have disappeared for a while, and so it is
quite possible to conjecture that Avidyā and the like might very
well recur. It might be urged that since Avidyā is beginningless,
the above objection does not hold good in its case. We reply,
even this position is not unassailable, for the disappearance of
something beginningless, and the permanent continuance of
something which has a beginning are both inconceivable. Release
being a positive goal, we can never expect it to begin one day,
and stay permanently without break. Nor is it conceivable that bondage being supposed to be co-existent with Avidyā or primeval ignorance which has no beginning whatever, is likely to be destroyed once for all by knowledge, however effective the latter might be in its own sphere of revealing things as they are. For if it is conceded that Ātman can pass from one state to another, it would be an admission of his transience. And the idea of bondage and freedom as two distinct states is itself against all canons of right reasoning. This has been shown in the Gītā-Bhāshya thus:

(2) Ātman cannot be in different states. If it is said that bondage and freedom are different states pertaining to Ātman, they must be supposed to be simultaneous or successive. In the first place they cannot be conceived to be simultaneous, since they are mutually opposed, in the same person in the same way as simultaneous staying and moving cannot be attributed to one and the same thing. If they be successive, they can be conceived as occurring with or without a cause. If they have no cause, then there can be no freedom at all. And if there be an extraneous cause, then they do not exist in and for themselves, and as such they would be unreal, which of course would nullify the very postulate that the bondage and freedom are both real. Moreover, when determining which of these two, bondage and freedom, is antecedent and which subsequent, bondage would have to be accorded precedence and taken to be beginningless and yet having an end. And that would be opposed to right reasoning. In like manner the state of release would have to be accepted to have a beginning but no end, and that would also be in contradiction of all canons of right reasoning. Nor is it possible to maintain that one who is in a particular state now and is going to have another state in future, is permanent.

GBh. 13-2, p.193.
Besides, this doctrine of future manifestation of something now obscured, has been refuted in the Bhāshya on the Brāhadāraṇyaka after examining all possible alternatives. It may be profitable to reflect upon that refutation here as well:

(3) Again those who aver that some other consciousness and some other bliss manifest themselves in the state of release, have to tell us what the term 'manifestation' signifis. In the first place, if the meaning of the word be no more than the common sense of becoming the object of cognition, then we should like to know whether it is an actual existent thing that manifests itself or something which does not exist now. If it does exist now, it is the very Self of that person to whom it shows itself and being ever-manifest cannot be intercepted from his cognition, and so there is no meaning in saying that it reveals itself particularly to the released person. If on the other hand it manifests itself only at some particular point of time, then it is intercepted from cognition and is not his self, and in that case it would have to be revealed by something foreign and consequently would stand in need of some means of manifesting it. But if it be co-existent with cognition, there would be no occasion to suppose any intercepting factor, it would be always manifest or unmanifest; and there can be no warrant for supposing something midway between these two alternatives. Nor is it possible that properties co-existing in the same substrate, and are identical with one and the same entity, can bear the relation of being subject and object to each other. One who is a transmigratory soul before the manifestation of consciousness and bliss, and free after their manifestation, must be different from the Supreme Self whose consciousness is ever manifest, being of quite an unlike nature as cold is unlike heat. And if the plurality of the Supreme Self be granted, the established doctrine of the Veda itself would be abandoned once for all.

Br. Bh. 4-4-6, pp. 918, 919.
6. Vedic Authority cannot exculpate the Schools

47. "There is no defect whatever in our system since we take our stand on the authority of the S'ruti." - this is a common fortress of defence put up by all those who take refuge in the holy cave of Revelation. But it has to be decided in the first place which system of Vedanta, the S'ruti itself favours. It goes without saying that mere display of dexterity in the interpretation of texts can never be the court of final appeal in the matter of settling the ultimate truth in Vedanta, for an alternative interpretation would be always available to the opponent also. Nor can a self-contradictory statement or one that is decidedly against another valid means of knowledge, be ever taken to be intended by the S'ruti.

So has it been declared by the author of the Gita-Bhāshya:

"Even a hundred S'ruti texts cannot be considered to be valid if they pronounce fire to be cold or non-luminous. If on any occasion they should say so, even then, some other meaning must be supposed to be conveyed by them, but not something contradicting other valid means of knowledge or self-contradictory, since otherwise the S'ruti itself would cease to be valid."

GBh. 18-66, p. 295.

7. Another defect: bringing forward a controverted argument

48. In addition to the weaknesses already mentioned, there is a feature common to all these schools which prompts them to put forward some specious reason generally considered valid within the exclusive ambit of one's own school. For it cannot be expected that another school cannot adduce some reason peculiar
to itself and claim it to be the clincher with regard to Vedanta, or mercilessly criticize the argument put forward by the opponent. Nor can we hope that any argument particularly belonging to a school would be considered to be universal and the best of all. This too, has been stated in so many words by the author of the Sūtra-Bhāshya:

"As we all know, that which has been particularly claimed to be an infallible thought by some speculator has been exposed to be an error by another thinker, and he in his turn has been thrown overboard by another." SBh. 2-1-11, p. 19.

Nor can it be argued that it is an odious comparison to put the illustrious followers of traditional Vedanta who can ascertain the Vedantic truth with the aid of texts and reasoning on the strength of exegetical principles of Mīmāṃsā, on a par with those who are satisfied with unstable ratiocination. For we are now discussing as to the very criterion that would settle the question which is the best knower of Brahman, and which the best of reasoners, among the Vedantins themselves who have taken to different paths but nevertheless veneratingly aver that theirs alone is the ultimate traditional truth based upon Mīmāṃsā principles and other paraphernalia considered to be indispensable to an infallible system. And that question has not been so far settled.

Special features of S'āṅkara's Tradition

1. S'ruti and Reason conformable to Intuition.

49. Granting that all other systems have the weak points enumerated above, what are the distinguishing features of S'āṅkara's tradition that assure us that it is really the one acceptable system?
In reply, we invite the reader to recall the landmarks and the method peculiar to this Vedantic System, as detailed in the previous parts of this work. Advaita is not accepted here merely as a dogmatic belief. Neither is a S'ruti text claimed to be valid just because it is Vedic. Nor do we seek to establish our ultimate truth by means of any display of skill in interpretation solely by the adoption of Mīmāṃsik maxims. Nor do we aim at establishing our doctrine by logical refutation of other schools and by speculative defence of our own. The one thing peculiar to this tradition is that the Vedic truth is established on the basis of Universal intuition, without foregoing the right to be aided by Mīmāṃsik exegeties.

This is expressly stated in the Bhāshya also:

1) The Veda being eternal, and the invariable source of intuition, can reveal Reality as it is, and therefore the validity of the knowledge arising out of its teaching cannot be questioned by any of the speculators in the past, present or future. Therefore it is established that this knowledge imparted by the Upanishads, is the only right knowledge. Any knowledge other than this cannot possibly be valid, and therefore following it would never lead to freedom from transmigratory life. SBh. 2-1-11, p. 194.

[Here 'eternity' of the Vedas is not adduced as a reason for their validity, but is only intended to convey the idea of absence of discord, and diversity unlike in the views of speculators. That the S'ārīraka (collection of Vedanta - Sūtras) never attempts to establish the eternality of the Vedas by means of proofs, but only confirms their empirical eternity already claimed by the Previous Mīmāṃsā (or enquiry concerning religious duty), is evident from the Bhāshya on the Sūtra अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ('Hence the eternality of the Vedas' VS. 1-3-29). बिज्ञानहेतुत्त्वे ('being the
source of intuition') implies the validity of the Veda as leading to universal intuition.]

(2) In the Brahma -Jijñāsā (enquiry about the nature of Brahman), S'ruti etc., are not the exclusive means, as is the case with the Dharmajijñāsā (enquiry about the nature of religious duty), but in addition to S'ruti etc., other means such as intuition etc., are also the means of arriving at valid knowledge here, in accordance with the requirement of the context. For, the knowledge of Brahman has to culminate in intuition, and relates to an existent entity. SBh. 1-1-2, p.8.

[The Sanskrit word 'Srutyādayah' may mean either an expressly denoting term, implication, a proposition, context, position, and designation - the six criteria of determining the meaning of any text; or else S'ruti (original Vedic passage), Smṛtis (sacred writings of authoritative persons), Purāṇas (mythical stories) etc. We prefer the latter interpretation because the first set is not so comprehensive as the second.

The Bhāshya passage quoted here means to say that scriptural authority alone cannot decide the nature of Brahman. It depends not merely on verbal authority but also on whether or not the knowledge arising out of the Vedic teaching leads to the direct intuition of Brahman. Even in the Upanishads, passages dealing with meditation, are to be understood on verbal authority alone. Hence the qualifying phrase 'in accordance with the requirement of the context.]

2. THE UPANISHADS PURPORT TO TEACH REALITY AS WITHOUT SPECIFIC FEATURE.

50. A special feature of this system is that it does not take all the Vedantic passages as invariably enjoining an act to be performed, but it insists that mainly the Upanishads aim at teaching
one featureless Brahman without a second. Hence passages teaching an entity and those that enjoin meditation are distinguished according to their purport, and therefore there is no occasion here for twisting the meaning of Vedantic passages as is done in the other systems.

Accordingly the author of the Bhāshya writes:

(1) There is nothing contradictory if a passage dealing with a God etc., is taken to be meant for enjoining meditation in that context. But Brahman cannot be regarded in the same way as subservient to an injunction of meditation, for being Absolutely One it is free from the nature of something to be courted or shunned and hence in that context all notion of duality involving actions, factors of action etc., are reasonably sublated. SBh. 1-1-4, p.11

[The sublation of the notion of duality of action etc., referred to here does not apply equally to all Vedantic passages, but only to texts dealing with the nature of Brahman.]

(2) In the commentary on the sutra Tat tu samanvayāt (that Brahman is known only through the Vedanta Śāstra, the only means of knowledge because of coherence), it has been established that Vedantic texts such as the following aim at teaching the principle free from all multiformity, and have no other purport :-

"Now this Brahman is without a before or an after, without an interior or an exterior. This Atman is Brahman intuiting all." (Br. 2-5-19). SBh. 3-2-14, p. 357.

(3) In the sutra, तत्तु समन्वयात् it has been shown at length that texts relating to the nature of Brahman, culminate in pointing to the entity alone, but do not urge one to do anything. SBh. 3-2-21, p.361.
(4) If there is any conflict (among texts about the nature of Brahman) passages having Brahman as their main purport should be preferred to those that have no such purport. SBh. 3-2-14, p.357.

[In deciding whether Brahman is essentially with or without specific features, we have first to see if there are passages particularly aiming at the description of Brahman. If there are such passages, they should be naturally preferred to those that have no such purport, even if they be referring to meditation on Brahman.]

The recognition of the featureless Brahman as the main purport of the Vedantic texts, not only wards off the undesirable twisting of texts so as to suit one's own dogma, but also precludes the possibility of two other weak points rearing their heads here, to wit, the inconsistency of undertaking the composition of the S'ārīraka Mīmāṁsā afresh even while there is already a work on Vedic exegetics and the incompatibility of emphasizing the need for an Ācārya, while that is well-known in connection with religious works. For both of these facts are quite understandable in so far as Brahman is Reality to be known only through the guidance of a Guru and there is need for another S'āstra to treat of this Paramātman (the Supreme Self), and the recommendation to the seeker to approach a teacher.

Accordingly we have Bhāshya passages insisting on this fact:

5) [a] That Brahman the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the origin, sustentation and the dissolution of the universe, is to be known only through the Vedanta S'āstra. How is this? Because of coherence. SBh. 1-1-4, p.11.

[Special emphasis is laid here upon the S'āstra as the exclusive source of the knowledge of Brahman and not upon Brahman's being a
cause. That this is so, can be gathered from the rest of the Bhashya on this very Sūtra.]

[b] It is thus established that Brahman independent of injunctions is known exclusively from the Vedanta S'āstra, for there is coherence of Texts. Only on this view is justifiable the commencement of a new S'āstra on the subject beginning with the aphorism 'Then therefore, enquiry about the nature of Brahman'.

SBh. 1-1-4, p.23.

(6) It is the Lord's opinion that only the instruction from those that have realized the truth and no other teaching is effective and on this supposition only the next Shloka also becomes intelligible.

GBh. 4-35 (intro)

[For in the next (G. 4-35) s'lōka, it is said 'On understanding which, you will suffer no more from this delusion'.]

(7) When fortunately one happens to approach some supremely compassionate knower of Brahman the Pure Being, one who is the best of knowers of Brahman, free from bondage, then having been shown the way to realize the evils of sensual objects in samsāra, he becomes dispassionate, and when the preceptor says 'Thou art not the transmigratory person, the son of so and so, but that Being alone thou art' he gets rid of the tying cloth of ignorance, and attains his own self, the Pure Being just like the person of Gāndhāra in the story and becomes happy and contented. This same truth is taught in this text 'One who has a competent teacher realizes it'.

Ch.Bh. 6-14-2, p.535.

3. Release from Actual Bondage Not Assumed.

51. Here is no assumption of an actually existing bondage or Avidyā to be actually removed by the practice of some act of discipline, for the principle doctrine here is that bondage etc.,
superimposed upon the self by Avidyā, are abolished by means of knowledge acquired through the teaching of the S'āstra and Ācārya. Hence the defects imputable to the other schools find no room here.

The following are the relevant quotations in this connection:-

(1) न निरोधो न चोत्यतिन्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुकुर्म वै मुक्त-हत्येपा परमार्थतः ॥

No dissolution, no creation, none bound, and none who has to practise any act of discipline; neither one longing for freedom, nor any one released from bondage. This is the whole Truth. GK. 2-32.

(Bhashya on the Kārikā):- Hence it is to be concluded that duality is merely a mental construction. There being no duality at all the only truth is that there are no dissolution etc., GK.Bh.2-32 p. 204.

[Here it is declared that no means need be employed to remove the phenomena of duality since the latter is only a construction of thought. Hence there is no necessity here to postulate either destruction of something actually existing or the origination of something that does not exist already.]

(2) If it be objected that the Ātman would be really affected by the removal or non-removal of ignorance inasmuch as he is ignorant now, we have already met this objection by observing that this is only a case of being the object of superimposition due to Avidyā just as in the instances of the rope, the barren soil, the mother of pearl and the sky mistaken for a snake, water, silver, and something stained respectively. If it be insisted that being ignorant or not ignorant would itself make a difference in the Ātman, we deny it; for the S'ruti "He imagines as it
were, and moves as it were" expressly rejects the idea of Ātman being intrinsically ignorant. Br.Bh. 4-4-6, p. 919.

[It will be noted that Ātman is considered to be the locus as well as the object of Avidyā only from the standpoint of ignorance. Hence the defects imputable to other schools on this score do not make their appearance here.]

(3) If it be urged that Ātman is really the locus of the Avidyā-delusion, as is confirmed by the conception 'I am ignorant and do not know anything', we reply 'no, for that is also distinctly experienced as something objective. One who distinctly objectifies something when he grasps it, cannot be accused of being deluded in respect of that very concept. Br.Bh. 4-4-6, p. 919.

[This is to ward off the charge that the doctrine is opposed to experience.]

4. All charges rebutted by assuming two different standpoints.

52. So then, in this system, the Universe is real only from the empirical standpoint based upon Ignorance. The recognition of Jivas as knowing agents and experiencers of their action, the distinction of the meditator and that which is meditated upon, the validity of what is said in the S'āstra or by an Ācārya, the performance of spiritual acts of discipline, the sublation of Avidyā by knowledge and the states of bondage and release all these are admitted from the empirical standpoint based upon Avidyā, while from the transcendental point of view, there is nothing whatever other than the featureless Brahman.

Inasmuch as this doctrine is proved to demonstration in
accordance with the S'ruti, reason and universal intuition, there is no Vedantic position which remains unestablished and no charge not rebutted. Hence in this system Vedantic texts are explained according to the exegetical principles of Mīmāṁsā appealing to the pertinent passages from the S'ruitis, Smṛtis, and the Purāṇas; earnest seekers of truth are taught on the basis of S'āstra and reasoning suited to the capacity of each individual by adopting the rules of fair discussion subservient to and in harmony with the S'ruti, reason and intuition; and in order to wean aspirants for final release from being misled by the propaganda of other schools of thought, needful attempt is made to show the futility of their reasoning by having recourse to logical disputation and refutation etc. as well. All this becomes intelligible in the light of the two view-points mentioned above. The other systems in contrast, have no such basis for their procedure, since they do not recognize this distinction of views. Hence there is very great disparateness of the Vedantic system and the other systems in this respect.

So say the experts of tradition:

(1) Now that duality has been shown to be unreal, and Ātman alone is really real, it can be safely concluded that all this human dealing secular or sacred, is within the range of Avidyā alone.

GK. Bh. 2-32, p. 204.

(2) स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निथितम् ।
परस्परं विद्यमाने तैरायं न विद्यमाने ॥

गौ. का. ३-१७

अद्वैतं परमात्मों ति द्वैतं तात्रेत उच्यते ।
तेषामुभयथा द्वैतं तेनायं न विद्यमाने ॥

गौ. का. ३-१८

"The dualists are firmly entrenched each of them in his own view."
They are opposed to one another, but this conclusion of ours is not opposed to their views."

"Non-dualism is the only Reality, and duality may be called a variant thereof. But for them duality is the same both ways. So this is not in contradiction of it."  

GK. 3-17, 18.

['a variant thereof', the effect of that cause, that is to say, superimposition on it.]

(3) अजातस्य भावस्य जातिमिच्छन्निति वादिनः।
अजातो हृदमृत्तो भावो मत्यत्तां कथमेघ्यति।  
न भवत्यमृत्तं मत्यं न मत्यमृत्तं तथा।
प्रकृतेन्द्रयाभावो न कथमिदू भविष्यति।  

"The controversialists, choose to predicate birth to that which is really unborn. How can the unborn immortal entity, become a mortal thing? The immortal One can never become mortal, and the mortal can never become immortal. Change in the nature of things, indeed, can never be on any account."

GK. 3-20, 21.

[Vedantins predicing actual origination, bondage and release etc. are criticized here.]

And so it is impossible to conceive of any similarity between the traditional system of S'ankara and any one of the systems propounded by schools who hold that actual bondage or Avidyā could be got rid of by the practice of some act of discipline laid down in the S'ruti, and who can never avoid conflict with one another since they are determined to pitch their tents in camps each opposed to the other. For nowhere do we find in this system the dogma that bondage or Avidyā is presented as something
positively existing and to be plucked out like a thorn which has run into one's foot. On the other hand we find everywhere that Reality self-existing for ever and free from all manifoldness, is alone intended to be unfolded by adopting the method of 'deliberate superimposition and subsequent rescission'. That is the reason why this system is satisfactory in every respect.
7. VEDANTA CONTRASTED WITH BUDDHISM

OBJECTION

53. Some will ask here the following question: Let it be granted that S'āṅkara's system belongs to a hoary tradition, and let it be granted also that all other systems examined in S'āṅkara's Bhāshyas are really faulty. Does it necessarily follow that the method postulated in this tradition is the only Vedantic method that has been universally accepted as such from the remotest times till now? Is it undoubtedly probable that there were no Vedantic systems other than those that have been noticed in S'āṅkara's works, which may not have been discovered as yet?

It will perhaps be argued as follows: S'āṅkara's method has been shown to apply to all Upanishadic discussions, and it has been also shown on the basis of universal intuition that this is the only method competent to demonstrate the purport of all Upanishads to be Advaita. And even after this unquestionable conclusion has been arrived at, how can this objection based on the suppositious possibility of some other system having prevailed and disappeared, be put forward just to suspect the authenticity of the only surviving system and its method?

Our answer is this: This might pass for an argument if it had been universally admitted that S'āṅkara's tradition is the only genuine one that has prevailed down the ages. On the contrary, there are authors of Bhāshya belonging to other schools, who warn us against believing that this way of interpretation started by Gauḍapāda is genuinely Vedantic, since it is only an unenviable imitation of the Buddhists. For instance, Bhaskarācārya in his Sūtra-Bhāshya writes:
(1) This much controverted and groundless Māyāvāda that has been proclaimed by the Māhāyānic Bauddhas, they adulate and confuse the brains of ordinary people. Bh. SBh. 1-4-25.

(2) [a] That the self-luminous consciousness which projects unreal mental-constructs of the knower and the known superimposed on it, is the only Real Being is the opinion of the followers of Sugata overt and covert. S.Tr., p.19.

[b] This theory of reflection (Pratibimbavāda) has been already gainsaid in the course of refutation of the views of the crypto-Buddhists. S.Tr. p. 40.

The above extracts are from Yāmunācārya’s Siddhitraya.

(3) It has been shown convincingly in the course of the confutation of the crypto-Buddhists in the guise of Vedic scholars that those that attempt to prove that pure consciousness alone is real would render themselves the but of ridicule at the hands of all men. Sīrī. Bh. 2-2-27, p. 107.

So says Rāmānujaśārya.

(4) वच्छून्यवादिनः शून्यं तदेव ब्रह्म मायिनः ।

न हि लक्षणेदोपस्ति निर्विशेषत्वत्स्तत्योः ॥ २४० ॥

That which is the void of the Nihilistic Buddhist is verily the Brahman of the Māyāvādin; for there is no differentiating characteristic for either of them, since they are both featureless. VS. Bh. 2-2-8-28.

This is the verdict of Ānandatīrtha (Madhva) pronounced in his commentary on the Sūnyādhikaraṇa.

Again modern research scholars of renown have also opined thus:
(a) In Gauḍapāda's work the state of mind known as the Vijñāpti-Mātratā of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins has been adopted under a different name. Āgama-S'āstra Intro., pp. cxxxii onwards.

says Vidhushekhara Bhattācārya.

(b) The distinction of Paramārtha and Vyavahāra views postulated by the Advaitins is very much similar to the distinction of Samvṛtisatya and Paramārthasatya of the Mādhyamikas. The S'unya taught by Nāgārjuna and the Nirguna Brahman are very much alike.

Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1. p. 608.

This is the opinion of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan.

(c) Gauḍapāda was possibly himself a Buddhist.

Dasgupta's HIP. Vol. 1, p. 423.

So according to these scholars also, S'ākara's is not the one purely Vedantic tradition that has been in existence from time immemorial.

Therefore, notwithstanding the proven universality of the method of S'ākara's system to the detriment of all other traditions, that would not serve as a clincher to convince us that it is not parading in borrowed plumes so long as it is not shown that it is altogether independent of Buddhistic systems whose influence over S'ākara's Vedanta has been suspected by so many adverse critics. This is the justification for the new querey 'How are we to believe that this is the only system or method that has been handed down by genuine Vedantic tradition ?'

SUSPICION OF THE ADMIXTURE OF BUDDHISTIC

DOCTRINE IN THIS SYSTEM

54. We shall now reproduce the opinion of the critics who
suspect that Gauḍapāda has adopted certain doctrines of the Buddhists.

We shall first give the Buddhistic teachings and then quote from Gaudapada's work where Gaudapada has been supposed to have taken the former bodily and presented them as Vedanta:

(1) अनिरोधमनुर्वस्यादमनुर्वस्यानायामात्रेः ।
अनेकार्यायानायामात्रेः नांगमनागमानिमोऽ ।।

य: प्रतीत्यप्रमुत्यां प्रपञ्चोऽपरम स शिबं ।
देशायामास सम्प्रदस्तं बन्दे बदत्ता वरम् ।।

"No annihilation, no origination, no total destruction, no permanance: no identity, no difference; no coming in, no going out. The enlightened one who taught the dependent origination, the dissolver of all variety, the auspicious truth, I bow to him the best of teachers.

MK.V.pp.3-4.

न बध्यन्ते न मुच्यन्ते उत्तांत्ववर्जिणः ।
संस्कारः पूर्ववेतः सत्त्वो बध्यते नैव मुच्यते ।।

The satānkāras of the nature of rising up and immediately disappearing are neither bound nor released. A being is as before, neither bound nor free.

MK. 16-5.

The above two s'lokas are from Nāgārjuna's Madhyamika Karikās. Gaudapada is seen to use even the very same phraseology when he writes:

न निरोधो न चोत्तित्तिनः बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुयुष्णः वै मुक्त इत्यया परमार्थता ।।

GK. 2-32.
This Kārikā has been once quoted under para 51 and translated on page 117.

Again

(2) यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गत्यवर्जनगरं यथा।
तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानं तथा भवं उदाहान:॥

Like unto a magical appearance, like unto a dream and like unto a phantom - city in the sky, such is origination, such is sustenance and such is dissolution.

MK. 7-34.

The above is the Mādhyamika's view. So also has Gauḍapāda equated the world with dream and magician's creation:

स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गत्यवर्जनगरं यथा।
तथा विद्विभिदं दृष्टे वेदान्तेषु विचारणे:॥

Just as a dream or a magical appearance is seen or just as a phantom-city, so is this universe regarded by the adepts in the Vedantas.

GK. 2-31.

And in rejecting the reality of causal relation Nāgārjuna says:

(3) न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वार्भ्यां नायपहेतुत:॥
उत्पत्ता जातु विचयते भावं कथन कथन॥

न सत्वासच सदसनू धर्मी निर्भरतां यथा।
कथं निर्भरतो हेतुरेव सति हियुज्यते॥

"Neither out of themselves, nor from something else, neither from both nor without a cause at all, is anything born anywhere."

MK. 1-7.
"Neither an existing nor a non-existing one, neither both existing and not-existing nor of neither nature is a dharma (thing) caused. How then can we regard it right to postulate a cause producing an effect?"
MK. 1-7.

And Gauḍapādācārya also says:

स्वतो वा परतो वापि न किष्ठिदु वस्तु जायते ।
सदसत् सदस्त्रापि न किष्ठिदु वस्तु जायते ॥

Neither from itself nor from something else is anything born. Neither an existent, nor a non-existent, nor yet something which is of both these natures, is born.

विज्ञानवादिन्स नैव सापि चायातं न तिथितं न गच्छति ।
नायात: को विशेषोपस्य यन्मूहै: सत्यत: कृतम् ॥

Vijñānavādins say:

(4) It has not come from something else, and having come it neither stays nor goes away. What peculiar characteristic is it that induces the ignorant to regard this as real?

And this teacher also writes:

न निर्गतातस्ते बिज्ञानातू द्रष्ठत्वाभावयोगत: ।
कार्यकारणताभावातू यतोस्चिन्त्यात: सदैव ते ॥

They do not issue out of Vijñāna since they are no real things, and there is no causal relation between the Vijñāna and these. For they are always of an inscrutable nature.

GK. 4-52.
The Vijñānavādin says:

(5) अभूतपरिक्लोक्षस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विचारते।
शून्यता विचारते तत्त्व तस्यापि स विचारते॥

Constructive ideation does exist, duality does not exist there. S'ūnyatā exists in it, and in that S'ūnyatā too that idealism exists. MVB. 1, p.9.

And our Ācārya also says:

(a) अभूताभिनिवेशोधस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विचारते।

There is a persistent belief (of its existence); but there is no duality there. GK. 4-75.

And elsewhere, in the clearest terms he insists that there is only citta :-

(b) चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदं ग्राहय्यमाहकवद द्वयम्॥

चित्तं निर्विपयं नित्यमस्मि तेन कीर्तितम॥

This duality existing of the knower and the knowable is only the vibration of the citta. Therefore citta is without an object and untainted by anything foreign. GK. 4-72

Thus it appears that Gaṇḍapāda is echoing the views of the Māhāyānikas only, sometimes in their very words, and at other times taking their thoughts. And so it seems that it is not an undeserved charge at the hands of other schools that he is considered to be a crypto-Buddhist. How can we then, in these circumstances, regard Śaṅkara's system which follows Gaṇḍapāda's tradition to be genuine and approved by the Upanishads? This is a possible query from students of Vedanta.
55. It has been already shown on the basis of scripture, reason and intuition that this is the only method employed in the S'rutis throughout. But still those that cannot ascertain the purport of the Upanishads by themselves independently of external authority may not rest assured of this so long as the influence of Buddhism on the system imputed by certain Bhāshyakāras and research-scholars is shown to be groundless. Hence it is necessary to make an attempt to make this acceptable to them also.

In this connection we have to observe that knowers of this tradition have been already cited to show that they all have uniformly employed this very method for ascertaining the purport of the Vedas. It is not proper for those who cannot judge for themselves to lean, for no particular reason, upon opinions based upon recent systems, while they have before them the statements of the ancient knowers of the tradition. Besides there is an additional evidence for believing that the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda represent the traditional Vedantic teaching, viz., that S'anti-Rakshita and other Buddhists cite Gauḍapāda's system as Upanishadic in their works like the Tattva-Saṅgraha, for the purpose of examining the tenets of the Upanishad-teaching. It is quite unlikely that Buddhists would treat a teacher who holds their own doctrines as belonging to an opposite camp. Moreover, we have shown in a different section of this work, that Rāmānujacārya and Ānanda-Tīrtha (Madhva) have mistakenly regarded the Āgama-Prakarāṇa, the first chapter of Gauḍapāda's work to be S'ruti itself. Hence it is impossible to suspect Buddhistic influence on that chapter at any rate. For if it were well-known during the time of Rāmānuja to be the production of a crypto-Buddhist, it certainly would not have been quoted by those Vedantic teachers in support
of their own teaching, much less as a S'rutī. Hence, even according to these Bhāshyakāras of recent systems, there can be no suspicion that Gauḍapāda, who has been expressly extolled by S'āṅkara in his Bhāshya as the knower of Vedanta tradition, belongs to a foreign school. Sri Gauḍapāda has divided the Māṇḍūkyya texts into sections and has introduced his Kārikās in between every two sections with a sentence 'अत्रैते श्रोकाभवन्ति' 'The following verses are in elucidation of this section'. Seeing that traditional Advaitins have been studying the Kārikās in the same order, the authors of Bhāshyas pertaining to other schools, perhaps mistook the kārikās too for portions of the Upanishad, and attempted to explain them also by dextrous display of interpretation so as to suit their own doctrine. And being unable perhaps to twist the other chapters on unreality etc., studied independently by the Advaitins and more expressly establishing Advaita unequivocally, or even to meet the arguments adduced by the Bhāshya thereon, they may have begun to pacify their followers by dubbing the Advaitins as crypto-Buddhists. This is the only hypothesis that could explain the phenomenon.

1. THE DISPARITY OF THE TWO TEACHINGS WITH REGARD TO REALITY.

56. Let us leave over this argument based upon probability. We can convince ourselves that the Māhāyānic systems Vijñānavāda and S'ūnyavāda on the one hand and the Vedanta on the other, are poles apart from each other, by a direct reference to Buddhistic works by Nāgārjuna and other authors themselves. In these circumstances where is any room for suspecting Buddhistic influence on S'āṅkara's Vedanta for those that are willing to take into consideration the fact of the inability of recent dualist Vedantins to ascertain the truth of the case as well as their prejudice
REASONS FOR TRUSTING THE KĀRIKĀ-TRADITION

against the method of Pure Vedanta? In order to disclose this truth, we shall first of all exhibit the divergence of procedure with regard to doctrine and dialectic employed by Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda:

Let us start with a comparison of the two Kārikās of these two thinkers with regard to Reality:

(1) य: प्रतीतिवसमुदार्यत्वा प्रपद्धोपपात्यं शिबमूः।

dेशपामासं संबुद्धस्थं बन्दे वदतां दरमूः।।

म. का. वृ. प. 4

It is evident here that Nāgārjuna treats Dependent Origination (Pratītyā samutpāda) itself as devoid of dissolution and origin, and consequently rejects the reality of Ātman in any sense; for his main tenet is that all Dharmas are devoid of distinctive features (Prapañcōpas’ama). This has been explained by Chandrakīrti in the same strain:

(1) The import of the word Pratītya ending in lyap (denoting a perfect participle) is relativity; and the import of the word samutpāda is birth, for the root pad with the prefix ‘samut’ denotes origin. Hence the meaning of the word ‘samutpāda’ is origination of things dependent on causes and conditions.

M.V. p.2

(2) This same apparent Pratītya-samutpāda, not being essentially born, there is no origination in it from the view-point of the Aryas, is being described by the eight attributes beginning with non-dissolution. How Pratītya-samutpāda has no dissolution etc. is going to be explained in the entire S’āstra. While an infinite number of characteristics might be ascribed to Pratītya-samutpāda, only eight are enumerated here, for it is these that are mainly disputable. When the Pratītya-samutpāda is realized as it is by the Aryas, manifoldness such as expressibility is

The translation of this verse has been given on p.125
utterly abolished, and therefore Pratitya-samutpada itself is described as *Prapañcōpas' amat* (free from all manifoldness). *Citta* and *Caitya* (mind and mental states) not obtaining there, all ideas of the distinction of knowledge and knowable would cease to exist and consequently it would be altogether free from the evils of birth, decay, death and the like; hence it is *S'iva* (auspicious). M.V.p.3.

It is thus clear that what is described as the auspicious free from all manifoldness is nothing else than *Pratitya-samutpāda* itself. And Nāgārjuna rejects the category of Ātman (the Self), and explains that *Pratitya-samutpāda* itself is what has been described as neither one nor many etc. :-

And in the chapter devoted to the examination of Ātman, Nāgārjuna says :-

(2) आत्मन्यसति चात्मीयं कुत एव भविष्यति ।

निर्ममो निःश्ववः शास्त्रदात्मात्मनीनयोः ॥ २ ॥

निर्ममो निःश्ववः यथ सोऽपि न विचयते ॥ ३ ॥

प्रतीत्य यथाद्वयति न हि ताबतू तद्वच तत् ।

न चात्म्यद्वपि तत्तथात्मात्रोऽचिच्छिवं न च शास्ततम् ॥ १० ॥

अनेकार्थेनानार्थेनुष्ठेदमशास्ततम् ।

एतत्त्वकाणायानां वुद्धानां शासनामृतम् ॥ ११ ॥

Whence can there be one's own, when there is not one's Self? One becomes free from the notions of me and mine when the Self and one's own cease to exist. And as to one who is free from the notions of me and mine, even he never exists. Whatever a thing be as conditioned
by something else, it cannot be even that in the first place; nor can it be something else. Hence there is nothing destroyed, nothing permanent. The nectar of the teaching of the Buddhas, the Lords of the world, is neither one nor manifold, neither destructible nor permanent."

On the other hand Gaudapadacarya says basing himself on the S'ruti:

'Free from manifoldness, and auspicious, the Omkār (the Fourth) free from all measures is thus Ātman himself. He who knows thus enters into his own Self, as Ātman.'

(Ma. 12)

(२) प्रणवं हीथरं वियात् सर्वस्य गृह्ये सत्यतम्।
सर्वाःपिनिमोझां मल्या धीरो न शोचति॥
अमात्रोसन्तमात्रथ्वैतस्योपशमः शिवः।
ओझारो बिदितो येन स मुनिनेतरो जनः॥

(a) Prāpava (Aum) should be recognized as the Lord residing in the heart of each and everyone. Knowing Omkāra, the all-pervading, the wise one does not lament. Free from measures, immeasurable, free from duality, the Auspicious One, he who has realized this Omkāra, he alone is Muni, (the thoughtful one), and no other person. GK.1-28, 29.

Thus the Ācārya regards the Universal Self himself as indicated by the syllable Aum as transcending the distinction of name and nameable, as the real S'iva (auspicious one), Prapañcōpas'ama (free from manifoldness). And he observes that 'the ignorant alone regard things of the nature of non-self inseparable from Ātman, as though they were distinct' in the following Kārikā:
134 VEDANTA CONTRASTED WITH BUDDHISM

(b) एतेऽर्गोपृयम्भावेऽऽपृणंगेव लक्ष्यति:।
एवं यो वेद तत्वं कल्येतु सोकशिष्ठिति।।

By these inseparable phenomenal appearances, really inseparable from Him, He seems to be differentiated. He who realizes Him as such, he alone can interpret the Vedas without fear of contradiction.

And he continues to remark as follows :-

(c) स्वप्रभावेऽ यथा हद्देण गत्यवृत्तधर्मं यथा।
तथा विश्वमिदं हद्दं वेदान्तेषु विचित्रणे।।

न निरोधोऽ न च चोल्यतितिनं बह्द्रोऽ च सापकः।
न मुमकुशुर्णं वै सुस्तं इत्येषा परमार्थं।।

GK. 2-31, 32

In the above verses (already translated on pages 126 and 117 respectively.) he declares that Ātman alone is really real, and in Him Prāṇa and other thought-constructs as well as dissolution, origin etc., of the world have been superimposed like dreams, Māyā (products of magic) etc. Hence the utter dissimilarity of the doctrine of oneness of Ātman to the doctrine of the essencelessness of things is crystal-clear.

2. DIVERGENCE OF THE TWO SYSTEMS WITH REGARD TO NON-ORIGINATION.

57. Moreover,

न स्मातो नापि परतो न द्राभ्यं नापपहेतुः।
उत्पन्ना जातु विचारते भावः कचन केचन।।
"Neither out of themselves, nor from other things, neither from both, nor without a cause, are any things ever born anywhere."

MK. 1-1.

[Chandrakirti's Comment : Here the word Jātu (ever) means at any time. Kvacana (anywhere) is synonimous with Kvacid and denotes place. So the verse has to be construed thus : Never, nowhere, are to be found any things born out of themselves. Similarly the other propositions are to be interpreted.]

न सत्रास्त्र सदस्त्र धर्मी निर्वतते यदा ।
कथेन निर्वतत्को हेतुरेवं सति हि युज्यते ॥

[The verse has been translated on page 126.]

After thus declaring that the origination of things is impossible in any way, Nāgārjuna says :

यथा माया यथा स्वप्नः गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।
तथोत्पत्तादस्तथा स्थानं तथा भजं उदाहरत ॥

MK. 7-34.

[The verse has been translated on page 126.]

[Chandrakirti : Just as Māyā and the like intrinsically never born, and called by the appellations of Avidyā, Māyā etc., and are the objects of the notions of Māyā etc., of the common man, so also these birth etc. only known to the common man but not actually existing have been enumerated by the Lord, just to accommodate to the intellect of the disciples of the same level.]

In the above verses origination, sustentation and dissolution have been emphatically negated, and even after having recourse to the illustrations, Māyā (magic), dream etc., even the magician, and the seer of dreams etc., have been likewise negated. Hence it
is clear that absolute non-birth alone is intended to be inculcated by Nāgārjuna.

Gaudapāda on the other hand is strictly a Vedantic teacher who accepts the doctrine of illusory causality - origin, sustentation and dissolution of the universe - to be attributed to the Real Being or Ātman; for he says:

(a) 

पुनः नानेति चाम्हामातिनैऽ मायाबिरित्ययि।
अजायमानो बहुधा मायया जायते तु सः।।
सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्चतः।।
तत्चतो जायते यस्य जातं तस्य हि जायते।।
असतो मायया जन्म तत्चतो नैव युज्यते।।
वन्यापुज्यो न तत्चेन मायया बापि जायते।।

"As the Vedas say 'there is' no diversity whatever here' (Br. 4-4-19), 'Indra (the Supreme Lord) through Māyā's (sensuous perceptions due to ignorance) is imagined to be of various forms' (Br. 2-5-19), He the unborn one, is born in diverse ways only illusorily." Gk. 3-24.

"Real being indeed, may reasonably have an illusory birth, but not factual. For according to one who believes in factual birth, it amounts to saying that only something already born alone can be born."

Gk. 3-27.

"For a non-being, there can be no birth either illusorily or factually; a barren woman's son is born neither really nor illusorily."

Gk. 3-28.

[Here it is emphatically declared that non-being can never have even an apparent birth, while real being may have many illusory births or appearances.]
"Teachers of creation imagine it to be creation; doctors of dissolution as dissolution, and teachers of sustentation as sustentation. All these (constructions of thought) are in this Reality always."

GK. 2-28.

Here in Gauḍapāda's view even creation etc. are regarded as only superimpositions of thought. Accordingly Śaṅkara writes in his Bhāṣya on this verse:

"Prāṇa is Prājñā, the Self as the seed; for the other appearances are the effect of that Prāṇa. And all such mundane differentiations imagined by all the Jivas, have been superimposed—like the serpent and other appearances in the rope—on Ātman the Self, free from them, by Avidyā, due to non-determination of the real nature of the Self. This is the sum and substance of the verses recited here." MBh. 2-28

Thus we see that the Vedantic teaching is that the Real Being, the Supreme Self, is the one substrate of all the thought-constructs such as dissolution (nirodha) and origin (upāda); whereas the Mādhyamika doctrine is that the imaginary appearances are void of any substrate.

It is true that some of the scholars trained in the modern western way of thinking have a different theory. For they believe that the Mādhyamikas do not teach appearances bereft of a substrate. 'Śūnya' is no non-being taught by them, but only a
reality beyond the ken of the intellect, named *Praññā-पारमिता*. The thinghood of things (*dharmāṇām-dharmatā*) is variously described by them as *Praññā-पारमिता, Bhutakoti* (the Real entity), *Tathata* (suchness) etc. In my Sanskrit work *Māṇḍūkya-Rahasya-Vivṛti* (the disclosure of the secrets of the Mandukya), I have shown at great length how this view is not supported by Nāgārjuna and others. Readers interested are recommended to consult that work for fuller information in the matter. It will be sufficient for our purpose here to invite the reader’s attention to the fact that Buddhists themselves have proclaimed in unmistakable terms that the *Praññā-पारमिता* itself is like unto Māya (illusory appearance). For instance,

(1) अन्तःज्ञानमेव केवलं भावतो भावृपि परिशिष्ट्यं निर्दिष्टिः, तद्विप्रतीत्यसमुत्पत्तचत्वात् मायाविज्ञानस्मां तत्त्वोपपगता कान्तभावार्धावाद्यापरामर्शरूपमूं इति भावनूि.....

Here it is expressly recommended that the practician of spiritual discipline should consider the *Praññā-पारमिता* (Perfection of Wisdom) of the nature of critical reflection should itself be regarded as the only positive entity, (भावतो भावृपि) and even that having dependent origination (प्रतीत्यसमुत्पत्तचत्वात्) is essenceless like Māya (मायाविज्ञानस्मां). AAA PPL 498-499

(2) यत्र हि नाम निर्वाणमपि प्रतिविशिष्ट्यं धर्मकार्यमू अन्तःज्ञानस्मां भावाविज्ञानस्मां बद्धमि, तत्र कि पुनर्वैः धर्म रूपकार्यं न बद्धमि ?..... यदि निर्वाणादिपि कथित्यो विशिष्टत्यो धर्मं संभवते, तदा तमपि मायाविस्मृत्यं बदेदयमूि

Here the author says that even Nirvāṇa (the Highest Goal), the Dharma-kāya, (the Essential Nature of the Buddha) and even something higher than Nirvāṇa if conceivable, he would proclaim to be like unto illusion and dream (मायाविस्मृत्यं). AAA p.144
Besides, it is the half-verse of Dignāga प्रज्ञापरमिता ज्ञानमद्वयं सा
tathāgatā: on which these critics depend for the view that the
Mādhyamikas teach Prajñā-Pāramitā as the prius of all things.
Their translation of this statement is that Prajñā-Pāramitā is non-
dual knowledge, and that is the Tathāgata'. Even granting this
interpretation to be correct, we have shown that Prajñā-Pāramitā
has itself been regarded as like unto Maya or magical appearance.
And Nāgārjuna himself has declared even Tathāgata to be
essenceless. How can we then believe that the Mādhyamikas
treat either as real being (परमार्थ) ? This is what Nāgārjuna says :-

(3) प्रभृत्यत्त्ति ये बुद्ध प्रभृत्तत्त्तमल्लभम्।
ते प्रभृत्त्तत्त्ति: सर्वेन प्रभृत्त्त्ति तथागतत्त्त्॥

तथागतो यत्स्वभावस्तत्स्वभावमिदं जगतू।
तथागतो निनित्वभावो निनित्वभावमिदं जगतू॥

Here those that regard the Buddha as transcendental undecaying
Reality, are all derided as deceived by the manifold universe, not-
knowing the Tathāgata as he is. For Tathāgata is really essenceless and
the universe is likewise essenceless. MK. 2-2-15, 16

From this it is but right to presume that Nāgārjuna does not
approve the doctrine of those who think that Parinirvāṇa or
absolute Nirvāṇa without any trace of body-constituents
(Nirupādhis'esa-nirvāṇa) can be attained through the suppression
of the Skandhas. For he says :

(4) यथसिद्धि शून्यमिदं सर्वभूमिद्यो नास्ति न व्ययः।
प्रज्ञाप्रमित्वा निरोधाभास्तु कस्य निर्वाणामिच्छते॥

Since everything is essenceless and there is neither origin nor
140 VEDANTA CONTRASTED WITH BUDDHISM

destruction, then what is it that has to be abandoned or destroyed to get Nirvāṇa?

[Here Chandrakirti the commentator writes: Teachers of S'ūnya do not admit Nirvāṇa to be of the nature of the removal of Kleshas or Skandhas. And again later on he writes in his commentary on the Kārikā सर्वोपलम्बोपशम: (Sarvopalambhopashamah) in clearer terms: 'Thus it is established that there is no Nirvāṇa either.']

3. DISPARITY IN THE METHODS OF ESTABLISHING REALITY.

58. While origin as such has been effectively disproved by Nāgārjuna by his famous dialectic of four alternatives, he cannot be supposed to have revealed the substrate on which thought-constructs like being have been superimposed. It goes without saying that mere rational refutation of all possible alternatives proves neither the actuality nor its opposite of Reality; nor is it possible to wipe off the reality of a thing by mere negation based upon reasoning. A thing perceived, does not cease to be a thing, even after it is rejected on the score that it has been negatived by proving that its existence is not conceivable. This has been declared by the author of the Sūtra-Bhāshya:-

The probability or otherwise of a fact is ascertained by the functioning or not-functioning of some means of right knowledge but the functioning or not-functioning of some means of knowledge is not to be ascertained by the probability or improbability of a fact.

SB. 2-2-28, p.249.

It cannot be argued that this accusation is unjust since Advaitins also reject the authority of Pramāṇas (valid sources of knowledge). For the Advaitins show by reason based upon intuition that the convention of Pramāṇas pre-supposes Avidyā,
and Avidyā as the mutual superimposition of the real and the unreal is a fact of universal experience. The Buddhists, on the other hand, do not prove the untenability of the doctrine of the logical canons by any reason based upon universal intuition. Hence there is no parity of reasoning.

But, it may be objected that the Buddhists also recognize the hollowness of the convention of Pramāṇas and therefore even this is a groundless charge. For this is what the Buddhists say:

(१) ते सत्ये समुपांशित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदिशना।
लोकसंबृतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थं:॥

"The Buddhas preach the Dharma by having recourse to two truths, truth as based on the ignorant convention of ordinary life (Lokasamvṛtisatya) and truth which is really truth." MK. 24-8.

[Chandrakirti the commentator says: Lokasamvṛti-Satyam is truth according to the ignorant convention of ordinary people. 'All this conventional distinction of the name and the nameable, knowledge and the knowable etc. is called 'Lokasamvṛti Sathya'; for it cannot be really real.]

But this is not right. For the Saugatas say:

(२) य: प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः शून्यतां तां प्रचक्ष्महे॥

What is dependent origination, we call that Sūnyata. MK.24-18

For the simple reason that things originate as dependent on conditions, they are regarded as being essenceless. And dependent origination is itself based on ordinary convention. When Nāgarjuna says:
Reality is not taught without reference to ordinary life, and without knowing Reality Nirvāṇa is unattainable.

He really states nothing inasmuch as that which is called Reality is nothing else than what is conventional.

And again their doctrine is:

The alternative called Nirvāṇa, and that called Sāṁśāra, there is not a jot or little of difference between the two.

That is to say, Sāṁśāra is itself the Nirvāṇa and Sāṁśāra is in its turn covered up by Sarvārtha of the nature of dependent origination. Hence they have nothing to say touching Reality. Nor can the followers of Nāgārjuna predicate anything concerning Reality, for whatever is predicated could be only Śūnya or void, for everything is born relatively. He himself says:

If there were any doctrine of my own, then alone could this blame be laid upon me. But I have no doctrine, and hence no fault can be imputed to me. If I ever perceived anything with perception and other
means of knowledge, then alone there would be some occasion for engaging in some action or abstaining from doing something. But there being no perception etc. whatever, I cannot be blamed for anything.'

V.V. 29,30.

Hence the so-called negation of the phenomenal, is really no negation at all. As the writer of the Bhāshya says:

This ordinary conventional notion in ordinary life, cannot be denied so long as we do not know something else as the real. For a general notion obtains so long as there is no sublation by some other specific knowledge.

SBh. 2-2-31, p.252.

We have already remarked that the belief of the modern scholars that the Buddhists make use of synonymous terms like 'Sūnyatā', 'tathatā', 'Bhutakāti' and 'Dharmadhātu' all which, according to them, imply a substrate of thought-constructs, is not justifiable.

Nor does Nāgārjuna's statement imply a real substrate of appearances, when he says:

(6) अप्रप्रत्ययः शास्त्रं प्रपञ्चेतत्रपन्धितम् ।
निरिरिक्तियमनानार्थमेततु तत्त्वस्य रूप्यम्॥

'This is the essence of Tattva : Not known through others, quiescent, not describable by descriptive details, non-discursive and not manifold.'

MK. 18-9.

This, in the light of the previous Kārikā, only purports to say that the essence of things is neither born nor destroyed, and hence it cannot be described in words, but has got to be only intuited by oneself. So does Chandrakirti explain it:
"Those suffering from cataract while seeing unreal particles, mosquitoes and flies cannot ascertain the exact nature of those particles etc., even after being instructed by those not suffering from the disease as the latter actually know but being informed by the not-suffering people come to know that they are merely false appearances. When, however, they have got rid of the eye-disease and come to know the truth, then they personally experience the fact. Even so, that which cannot be known through others is the true nature of things. And it is quiescent. That is to say, it is devoid of any essential nature of its own, in the same sense that those not suffering from cataract do not see any particle there. It is not described by Prapaticas. Prapatica here means speech, for it describes things. So 'not described by Prapaticas' means not describable by words. 'Non-discursive', for there is neither Citta (intellect) nor the attachments .......... There is no real diversification here; and for what reason? Just because no things are really born. Thus one must know that lack of diversification is the characteristic of reality; for they are all uniform being essentially void (Sûnya)."

It needs no special mention that here it is merely said that non-origination is the only truth of all things, just like the essence of particles, mosquitoes and other false appearances, but no direct intuition of reality is referred to.

Acârya Gauḍapâda on the other hand refers to the unborn, secondless Reality itself, the Turiya (the fourth) self-resplendent Reality beyond all the three states as described in the S'rutis :

अजमनिद्रामस्तप्रार्थuraण्यं भवति स्वयम्।
सकृद्दिक्षातो हृद्येष्य धर्मो धातुस्वभावतः॥

"Unborn, sleepless, dreamless, it is verily the self-luminous ever-shining One, this Dharma (Ātman) in his essential nature."  GK.4-81
And then he goes on to show that it is impossible to deny by any kind of reasoning that this Reality is beyond all the four logical alternatives inasmuch as it is realized to be such by universal intuition:

"The ignorant man invariably obscures it by regarding it as changeful or steady or both (changeful and steady), or yet again as devoid of both these natures, by imputing to it the notions of (1) 'is', (2) 'is not', (3) 'is, and is not', and (4) 'is neither'. He alone sees everything aright who has intuited that Bhagavan (the Glorious One) untouched by any of these alternative views by adhering to which He is always obscured."

GK. 4-83, 84

The purport of these S'rtokas is that the Supreme Atman is beyond all constructs of imagination such as 'is', 'is not' etc. This is endorsed by the Sruti 'This is the Atman described as Neti Neti (not this, not that); He is ungraspable for no one can grasp Him . . .' (Br. 3-9-26). The word Atman denotes one's own nature, and one's own nature cannot be affirmed that it 'is', or denied by declaring that it 'is not', or doubted whether it 'is or is not' or taking it as being subject to the alternative 'may be thus'; for the Atman is the very nature of him who affirms, denies, doubts or takes an alternative view. Nay, even its being denoted by the word 'Atman' or being the object of the notion Atman, might be denied, but not one's own featureless nature, never and in no wise. Therefore the Acarya's statement that one who has realized his own real nature
free from all alternative views sees the whole truth, is perfectly right.

**CONCLUSION OF THE COMPARISON WITH THE S'UNYA DOCTRINE**

59. The outcome of the present discussion may be summed up as follows:

1. The teacher Gaudapāda bases himself on the S'rutī "There are no carriages there .........." (Br. 4-3-10) and on reasoning in consonance with it and brings forward reason conducive to intuition to show that the phenomena in both waking and dream being equally restricted to their respective states and not obtaining anywhere else, are equally unreal.

(a) स्वप्प्रजागरिते स्थाने हेक्माहुर्मनीषिणि: ।

Dream and waking states are declared by the wise to be one and the same in nature.

(b) आदाकने च यत्नस्ति वर्तमानेनेवि ततथा ।

विद्ये: सद्या: सन्तोदनित्या हि लक्षिताः ॥

That which is neither in the beginning nor in the end, is equally such (i.e. non-existent) in the present also. Things being quite like unrealities appear as though they were real.

But the Madhyamika depends upon mere reasoning and asserts that things are essenceless since they have dependent origination: -

(1) प्रतीत्य यद्रु यद्ववति तत्तत्त्वान्ते स्वभावतः ॥
Conclusion of the Comparison

Whatever obtains only relatively is void of nature.

MK. 7-17.

(2) यः प्रतीत्यसमुपल्ल: शून्यः तां प्रचाः।

What is dependent origination, that we call $S^\text{\textquotesingle}\text{\texttilde}\text{\textacute{u}}\text{\textacute{n}yata}$.

MK. 24-18.

2. Our teacher raises the question who is it that imagines the things in dream and waking, and who is it that decides their true nature, if as is asserted, dream and waking are both unreal since they are mutually equal in all respects? In reply he bases himself on $S^\text{\textacute{r}ut^\text{\textacute{i}}}$ like 'All the three are dreams' (Ai. 1-3-12), 'He only sees (but does not commit) virtuous and vicious actions' (Br. 4-3-17) verifiable by intuition and says that $\text{\textacute{A}tman}$ alone is the illusory imaginer and he alone determines their true nature.

कल्पयत्वात्मनात्मानमात्मा देवः स्वायया।
स एव बुध्यते भेदानिति भेदान्तनिश्चयः॥

It is the conclusion of the Vedantas that $\text{\textacute{A}tman}$, the Deva himself misconceives himself through his $\text{\textacute{M}āyā}$, and that it is He alone that determines the true nature of the different phenomena.

GK. 2-12

The Mādhyamika on the other hand spurns intuition itself and equally denies the existence of both positive and negative things and basing himself on mere reasoning asserts the non-existence of even the observer of both positive and negative things. He says:

अविचयमाने भावे च कस्याभावो भविष्यति।
भावाभावविधिमां च भावाभावविधाति कः॥
'When there is nothing positive, of what will the absence be conceivable, and who is it that knows things positive and negative, he himself being unlike both the positive and the negative?' MK. 5-6.

3. Teacher Gauḍapāda declares all duality as such to be māyic (illusory) in their apparent aspect and Advaitic (non-dual) in their real aspect, on the basis of S'rutis like the following and of reason in consonance with the S'rutis:

The S'rutis he relies upon are 'All this is Brahman itself' (Mu. 2-2-11), 'Being unborn he is born in many ways' (Tai.A.- 3.13-39).

His reasoning is as follows:-

(a) अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि द्वैतं तत्सद्वेद उच्यते II

Non-duality is real and duality is a twisting of it. GK. 3-18.

(b) मायया भिक्यते होतञ्जान्यायां जयञ्चन II
tतत्त्वतो भिक्यमाने हि मत्यताममृतं ब्रजेत् II

This unborn One is differentiated only illusorily and not otherwise in any manner. For if it were to be differentiated actually, that which is immortal would become mortal

(c) प्रपुजो यदि विवेत निवर्तेत न संशय: II
मायामार्थमिदं द्वैतमध्येत्य परमार्थेत। II

"If the world actually existed, it could, no doubt, be thought of as disappearing at some time. This duality is in fact only Māyā, in reality there is non-duality alone."

GK. 1-17.

But the upholder of S'ūnya on the other hand says that his tradition was started by its founder only for refuting all views
such as dualism or non-dualism and that the special feature of his own philosophy is taking no sides with any of the schools, and ultimately that S'ūnya itself is S'ūnya (essenceless):

(1) सर्वद्विगुर्हणाय यः सद्धमेशेशाय।
अनुकर्मपुस्ताद्वाय तेन नमस्यामि गौतमम्॥

"I bow to that Gautama who took compassion on mankind and taught the good Dharma for the sake of doing away with all views."

MK. 27-30.

(2) सून्तया सर्वद्विसीनां प्रोक्ता निस्तरणं जिने।
थेपां तु सून्तया दशिलानसाध्यान् वमापिरे॥

The Jinas (Buddhas) have declared that the S'ūnya doctrine is for the removal of all views. But those for whom S'ūnyata is itself a view, the wise ones have declared incurable.

MK. 13-8

(3) यथासून्तयं भवेत् किविन्तं व्याच्यूष्यमिति किन्वतं।
न किविन्दस्त्यसून्तयं च कुतः सूत्यं भविष्यति॥

If there were something that was not S'ūnya, then there would be something called S'ūnya. But there is nothing which is not S'ūnya, and so how can there be S'ūnya at all?

MK. 15-7.

Such being the case there can be no comparison whatever between the Mādhyamika who asserts the essenceless of all things, and of the denier of the essence of those things and of the denial also, in short, of even S'ūnya itself as having any essence,

(4) निर्मितको निर्मितकं मध्यापुष्प: स्मायायत्ससृष्ट्र।
प्रतिपेधयेत यद्वत् प्रतिपेधयोदयं तथेव स्मायत॥
Just as a *Nirmitaka* (one created by supernatural powers) would deny a *Nirmitaka*, and a magician created by magic world deny what he has created by magic, this my denial would be of the same nature.

Vv. 23.

[The gloss hereon: 'so also my words which are S'ūnya may very well deny the essential nature of all things. ']

there can be no comparison whatever between such a Mādhyamika, we repeat, and one who teaches the non-dual principle of Brahman which is the Self of all and the substrate of thought constructions like the illusory knower, knowledge etc. as taught in the Upanishads. No one would attempt to institute such a comparison unless his intellect were warped by bias or misconception.

**VEDANTIC VIJÑĀNA CONTRASTED WITH BUDDHISTIC VIJÑĀNA**

60. This should suffice to reject the comparison of Vedanta with the doctrine of Vijñāna also of the Buddhists. In the first place, it should be remembered that the teacher Gauḍapāda begins his chapter on *Alātas'ānti* (extinction of the firebrand) with the sole purpose of showing how the unborn secondless principle of Ātman is revealed by the mutual disputation of philosophers each of whom is biased in favour of his own school. He therefore refers to the doctrine of the Non-dual Ātman in the very benedictory verse to that chapter. And in particular, at the close of the exposition of his own system he expressly contrasts the Advaita philosophy which he favours, with the Vijñānavāda taught by the Buddha.
Thus at the commencement in the S'loka

(1) ज्ञानेनाकाशक्लेन धर्मानू यो गगनोपमानू।
   ज्ञेयाभिचरन संबुद्धसं वन्दे द्विपदं वर्षू॥ गी.का.४-१

he distinguishes the Advaitavāda (doctrine of Non-dualism) from
the Vijñānavāda. (doctrine of Vijñāna-consciousness as Reality)
as well as from the S'ūnyavāda (or doctrine of essencelessness of
things).

Now the S'ūnyavādins say that Jñāna (or knowledge) is as
essenceless as ether; and the Vijñānavādins say that Vijñāna is
untainted just because it has no object, that the external objects
are really no more than consciousness itself, inasmuch as they are
only the momentary consciousness transformed and so they do
not exist independently by themselves. It is therefore to exclude
both of these views that it is asserted here that the only reality
underlying the knower, knowledge and the knowable is the ever-
changeless Pure Consciousness and the former have no
independent being of their own. The revered author of the Bhāshya
has stated this in so many words:

"Expression of obeisance to the teacher involves the subject-
matter of the present chapter, to wit the propagation of the principle of
Paramātman, the Supreme Self free from the distinction of knowledge,
the knowable and the knower, through the refutation of the counter-
positions."

GK. Bh. 4-1, p. 228.

And at the close of the chapter Gauḍapāda says:

(2) ऋमते न हि वृद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु ताबिनः।
    सर्वं धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैन्द्रु वुद्धेन भाषितम्॥
The knowledge of a Buddha (wise person), the Tāyin (the all-pervading one) does not pass over to objective things. So also all dharmas (selves), and knowledge as well. This has not been taught by the Buddha.

And this has been explained by the author of the Bhāṣya as follows :-

"For the knowledge of a Buddha, i.e. a knower of the truth, does not pass over to dharmas, i.e. external objects, in the same way as the light of the sun never leaves it. The epithet Tāyin has to be etimologically explained thus :- One who has taya is 'tayin'. Taya is continuity; so the attribute means one who pervades all without any break like the all-pervading ether. Or the epithet may mean the revered one, or one who possesses the highest wisdom. So also are all the dharmas or Ātmans; they being all-pervading like the ether no less than knowledge itself, never pass over to any of the objects external to them. What was stated at the commencement of the chapter in the proposition 'He who knows the ether-like dharmas, by means of ether-like knowledge' etc. is concluded here by saying that the knowledge of the enlightened one does not pass over to anything other than itself, and so are all the dharmas or selves. This principle of the Brahmātman is immovable like the ether, changeless, without parts, eternal, secondless, untainted, invisible, ungraspable, and beyond hunger and other evils, for the S'ruti says 'There is no disappearance for the sight of the seer' (Br. 4-3-23).

This secondless Reality without the distinction of knowledge, knowable and knower has not been taught by the Buddha, while it is true that he has rejected the external objects and enounced the theory of the sole reality of knowledge - a theory proximate to that of the secondless Reality. This Absolute, the secondless Reality, however, is to be known from the Upanishads alone."
[Hereby the statement that 'consciousness does not pass on to external objects' the independent existence of the knowable is rejected; by the epithet 'tāyinah' the essential nature of Consciousness without break has been brought home. The so-called individual Ātmans also here denoted by the word 'dharmanas' are said not to pass on to anything external, in order to disclose their identity with the Supreme Self. And consciousness has been declared to be not distinct from its locus, the Ātman, just as the light of the sun is not distinct from the latter.]

Recent Vijnānavādins explain the significance of the epithet 'tayin' by interpreting 'tāya' as 'the teaching of the way discovered by him' or 'the revelation of the four noble truths' (Pr. V. 2-146, 147); but here 'tāya' has been taken to denote continuous all-pervasiveness or having the nature of ether-like all-pervasive consciousness. This doctrine is peculiar to Vedanta, because even according to Vijnānavāda, Buddha has never spoken of the omnipresence of the knower, knowable, or of knowledge as pure secondless consciousness. This tenet is in accordance with the S'rutī 'He is omnipresent and eternal like the ether (?), and the Smṛti 'By which all this is pervaded' (G. 2-17). As for the statement in the Bhāshya that the Buddha has taught something 'proximate to the secondless Reality' it should be taken only to refer to reason which explains away the conventional distinction of consciousness and the object perceived on the strength of the sole reality of consciousness without assuming the independent reality of the external objects. For basing ourselves on the self-same line of reasoning we can show how, treating the momentary Vijnāna also as comprehended by the category of the objective, all convention of the means of knowledge and the knowable is likewise the creation of the ignorance of the Ātman whence the corollary might be deduced of the sole reality of the Secondless Entity, the highest good, free from manifoldness. It is this idea at bottom that prompts
S'ankara to make the abovementioned observation, and not the mere dialectical need or justification for the rejection of the external objects in the face of common experience. For this Vijñānavāda has been refuted at great length in the Sūtra-Bhāṣya.

**Dissimilarity in the Method of Rejection of the External Object in the Two Systems**

61. The Buddhists who support the Vijñānavāda say:

अन्यतो नापि चायांति न तिष्ठति न गच्छति।

माया० को विवेयोस्य यन्मू०००: सत्यतः कृत्तम्॥

"It never came from something foreign, neither stays nor goes away; how does that differ from Māyā (magical appearance), which has been taken by fools to be real?" BCA. 9-143.

With regard to this position, teacher Gauḍapāda makes the following remark: If it is meant to emphasize the sole reality of the mind, and the absence of anything external to it which is the occasion of its corresponding mental variations, then by parity of reasoning, it will have to be admitted that just as consciousness appears to be a pot or something else even in the absence of the latter, so also the pure Ātman appears through Avidyā to be the mind even when while there is no mind at all in truth:

(1) तत्स्मात् जायते चित्तं चित्तदृष्टं न जायते।

तत्स्य पद्यन्ति ये जाति ये वै पद्यन्ति ते पदम्॥

For the same reason, there is no mind born, just as there is no object born. Those who see its origin, can surely see the trail of birds in the sky.

GK. 4-28.
Dissimilarity in the rejection of External Objects

[Here the Bhāṣya says: 'Since according to the Vijnānavādin the Citta appears as though it were a pot etc. even while there is no pot or some other thing, we confirm that inasmuch as it is in accordance with fact. Therefore it stands to reason that even the birth of the mind must be an appearance only even while there is no actual birth of it.]

And even with regard to the argument that unreal things only appear as though they existed independently just as they do in dreams and magic shows, Gauḍapāda says:

(2) स्वप्नस्य प्रचरन्त वेदान्त वेदविद्या दशासु स्थितानि।
अपदजाना वेदजाना बापि जीवानां परम्यते यानं सदा॥
स्वप्नतत्त्वतः प्रयत्ने न विचन्ते ततः पृथक्॥
तथा तहृयमेवेद वेदतत्त्वत्तमिप्यते॥
ब्रह्माकारिते जाग्रत्वदिष्टु ब्रम्हासु स्थितानि।
अपदजाना वेदजाना बापि जीवानां परम्यते यानं सदा॥
जाग्रततत्त्वोपयास्ते न विचन्ते ततः पृथक्॥
तथा तहृयमेवेद जाग्रतात्त्वमिप्यते॥

The egg-born or the sweat-born creatures which a dreamer moving about sees in all the ten directions, are all of them objects seen by the Citta (mind) of the dreamer alone, and as such do not exist apart from it. In like manner this citta of the dreamer is considered to be object seen by that dreamer alone. And the egg-born or sweat-born creatures which are moving about always seen in all the ten directions, all of them being the object of the waking mind, do not exist apart from it. In like manner the mind of the waking person should be considered to be the object of that waking person only."

GK. 4-63 up to 66 inclusive.
Here it is stated that the mind in dream and that in waking are
different and distinct, and that the seer of the mind is distinct from it in
each case on the basis of intuition. And the identity of the witnessing
self for both the states is also postulated on the strength of the S'ruti
'That by which both the dream and the waking are witnessed' (K. 2-1-4)
which is likewise supported by universal intuition.

The Kārikās cited above accept the equal unreality of both
dream and waking in accordance with the S'ruti 'these are the three
dreams' (Ai.) and reveal the dissimilarity of the Vedantic system
from the doctrine of Vijñāna. In the Sūtra-Bhashya, however, it
has been held that the similarity of waking to a dream or magic
adduced by the Vijñānavādīn on the basis of mere reasoning is
itself open to question:-

(3) "For there is dissimilarity between a dream and waking. And
what is this dissimilarity? We reply 'sublation and non-sublation'. The
thing seen in a dream as we know, is sublated for the person who is
awakened thus 'I falsely seemed to meet a great crowd of people; there
was no actual meeting for me of the crowd of people; but my mind was
overpowered by sleep and hence there was this delusion'. There is
similar sublation in the cases of magic and other states, as appropriate
to each of them. On the other hand there is no sublation of the thing
seen in waking in any other state."

SBh. 2-2-29, p.250.

It cannot be objected that on this supposition, the unreality
of phenomena cannot be established even by the Vedantin. For
we do admit this at the level of empirical views. This implication
is just what we hold to be true, to wit, that there is the distinction
of the Real and the unreal in the waking state. For the S'ruti says
'The real became the real and the false (of practical experience)'
(Tai. 2-6). From the stand-point of Reality, however, not merely
the mind and its object, but all non-self subjective as well as
objective, is unreal in every respect. This has been demonstrated in the *Vaitathya* Chapter.

Thus, there being no example supporting the inference, the proposition that the external object is not different from Māyā, and that it does not come from somewhere else falls to the ground. Ācārya Gauḍapāda on the other hand, first shows how dream and waking are perfectly identical in nature, and then draws our attention to the fact that both of them disappear in sound sleep and after this appeal to universal intuition only he concludes:

एवं न जायते विज्ञानमेवं धर्मं अजा: स्मृता:।

एवमेव विज्ञानन्तो न पतन्ति विपयये॥

Thus the *citta* is never born, and thus are all *dharmas*, unborn. Only knowing thus people do not fall into error. GK. 4-46.

Whereby the non-origination of the mind, and the identity of all individual selves as the unborn secondles Reality become quite clear. And this thinker describes the unborn unchanging Consciousness by the epithet 'Vijñāna' and writes:-

विज्ञाने स्पन्दमाने वै नाभासा अन्यतोभुवः।

न ततोस्न्यत्र निस्पन्द्हात्र विज्ञानं विशालिति ते॥

न निर्गतास्ते विज्ञानादृष्ट्वत्वाभावयोगतः।

कार्यकारणताभावादृ यतोदिचित्त्याः सदैव ते॥

As Vijñāna vibrates indeed the apparent forms do not come from something else, nor do they go away elsewhere when it ceases to vibrate, nor do they merge in the Vijñāna itself. They have not come out of Vijñāna since they are not real entities and there is no relation of cause
and effect (between Vijñāna and the appearances). For they are inscrutable for all times.  

The meaning is that the illusory forms make their appearance in the waking and dream states when the Vijñāna vibrates owing to Avidyā, while Vijñāna itself remains in its own nature as absolutely changeless Consciousness.

Here we should not suspect similarity of reasoning in the two systems with regard to the rejection of external things just because of the word Vijñāna employed in both of them. For in the one case the object of Citta alone is rejected, while in the other both Citta and its object are declared to be inscrutable illusory forms essentially one with the unborn secondless Consciousness in conformity with reasoning based on intuition.

**MERE EMPLOYMENT OF THE WORD 'CITTA' DOES NOT ENTAIL SIMILARITY**

62. It is sometimes supposed that Gaudapāda confirms Buddhistic doctrines when he employs expressions like ‘अभूतपरिक्लोकोऽस्ति’ (There is predilection for the non-existent GK.4-75), and ‘विज्ञानशिल्पमेरेः’ (this is no more than vibration of Citta GK4-72).

This position too may be considered to have been rebutted from what has been already said on this subject. For the first half of the Kārikā of Maitreyanatha, the Vijñānavādin is

अभूतपरिक्लोकोऽस्ति द्यं तत्र न विचयते।

[For the Kārikā complete see p. 128]

And Sthiramati explains it as follows:

‘न स्तरः अभूतपरिक्लोकोऽस्ति न भवति, Constructive ideation indeed cannot
The word 'Citta' does not entail similarity

be said to be non-existent. It is to be understood in the same way as a rope which is free from the nature of a serpent - not being of that nature it is always devoid of it, but not of the nature of a rope. That which is devoid of something else is existent, that of which it is devoid is not there."MVBT., p. 12-13.

Here Citta itself is abhootaparikalpa (the substrate of the thought-construct) because it is that in which the distinction of the perceiver and the perceived are falsely imagined to exist. Gauḍapāda on the other hand, says that being relative to each other neither the Citta nor its objects (the individual souls etc.) independently exist, either in waking or in dream (GK. 4-67), and all the Jivas are merely the false constructs of citta like dream-selves or Māyic-selves, or selves created by means of Yogic power (GK. 68, 69, 70) and concludes with the same doctrine that has been propounded in the chapter on Advaita (GK. 3-48) in the following Kārikā:-

न कथितज्ञायते जीवः सम्भवोक्ष्य न वियते ।
एतत्तदनां सत्यं यत्र कित्विन्न जायते ॥

No Jiva is ever born, there is no cause of his birth. This is the highest Reality where nothing is born, not even a jot. GK. 4-71.

[Bhāshya :- Empirically speaking, it has been stated 'the birth, death etc. of souls are like those of souls in dream etc. The Highest Reality, however, is that wherein no Jiva is ever born.]

Immediately subsequent to this comes the Kārikā

चित्तस्यन्दित्सेवेदं ग्राह्यग्राहकवच्यम् ॥
चित्तं निर्विपयं नित्यमस्ते तेन कीर्तितम् ॥

This duality consisting of the knower and the knowable is only the vibration of the Citta. Therefore Citta is without an object and untouched by anything foreign. GK. 4-72.

Now this Kārikā taken along with the other in the chapter on Advaita,

यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ।
तथा जागरूक्त्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ॥

"Just as the mind vibrates illusorily in dream as though it were divided into two, so also the mind vibrates illusorily in waking as though it were divided into two."

GK. 3-29

can only culminate in the Ātman doctrine. Therefore it is clear that the half verse

अभूताभिनिबोधस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विचये ।

'There is persistent belief (of its existence), but there is no duality there'

GK. 4-75.

can only purport to say that duality is imagined to exist in the changeless Ātman by wishful predilection, but cannot actually exist there. We can therefore have no scent here of Vijñānam of the Buddhists which can thrive only in waking.

**NOT EVEN THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE TERM 'LOKOTTARA' CAN ENGENDER THE SIMILARITY OF THE SYSTEMS**

63. There is another plausible point of similarity surmised by some critics. The Yōgācāra Buddhists have made the following remark:
"Thus overpowered by the impression of the slumber of superimposing unreal appearances, man sees as in a dream a non-existing thing without realizing its non-existence while yet not awake. When, however, he is awakened by attaining the lōkottara non-discursive knowledge which counters that idea then being confronted with the s'uddha-laukika-jñānam subsequent to it, he realizes the true nature of objects just as they are. So this is just like waking from a dream and seeing things in their true light."

Vim. 17, p. 109.

Just the same technical terms, Loka, S'uddha-Laukika, and Lōkottara that have been used by Vasubandhu have been used by Gaudapadacārya also in the following:

सस्तु सोपलम्भं च द्वारं लौकिकमिमिष्टे।
अवस्तु सोपलम्भं च शुद्धं लौकिकमिमिष्टे॥
अवस्तुनुपलम्भं च लोकोट्तरमिति स्मृतम्॥

GK. 4-87, 88

Hence, it is alleged, that this is the same as the Yogacāra-Vijñānavāda. Such bold research scholars would not hesitate to proclaim that the thousand-rayed sun has borrowed his light from the fire-fly just because there is the epithet Khadyota (shining in the sky) common to both of them. For the word 'Lōkottara', according to the Yogacāras, denotes a particular samādhi, while for the teacher Gauḍapāda it signifies deep sleep devoid of the distinction of the perceiver and the perceptible. The Yogacāras recognize the distinction of degrees of knowledge, whereas no degrees of sleep are recognized by Gauḍapāda. Nor is it even possible to conceive any degrees in that state. Moreover, Vedantins hold that the absence of duality is common to both sleep and samādhi. The author of the Sutra-Bhashya, as is well-known, has written as follows:
Even after the normal abolition of distinctions is attained in sleep, samādhi etc., the distinction reappears as before on awaking because false knowledge has not been cancelled. SBh.2-1-9, p. 191.

Dependance on Yōga and the absence of it Sharply Distinguish the Two Systems

64. Another point of difference. While in the Vedantic tradition Yōga of the nature of *manōnigraha* is recommended to aspirants at the medicore stage, yet the resultant of that Yoga is of no particular degree but only the no-mind state of the mind due to intuition of its identity with Brahman. Even when the Vijñānavādin accepts the sole being of Vijñāna as is referred to in the following verse:

यदा त्वालम्बनं ज्ञानं नैवोपलभते तदा ।
स्थितं बिद्धानमात्रत्वे ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहातुं ॥

When, however, consciousness has no object at all, then it remains only as pure Vijñāna because it does not perceive there being no perceptible. Trim. 28.

Even then, it is impossible to conceive the absence of the object. According to Vedanta on the other hand Ātman is taken to be always unknowable in the light of the S'ruti 'By what, my dear, can the knower be known?' (Br. 2-4-14), *samādhi* is nothing else but Ātman's remaining in the nature of self-effulgent Consciousness beyond the range of both speech and mind. So says Gauḍapada in his Kārikā.

(1) सर्वभिलापविगतः सर्वचिन्तासमुपचितः ।
सुप्रसान्तः सक्रृज्योतिः समाधिरूपोभयः ॥
Beyond all speech, above all thinking, absolutely quiescent, eternal light and fearless unperturbed Samādhi. 

GK. 3-37.

Even the control of the mind is taught here as culminating in merging in its own nature as Ātman.

(2) यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विशिष्यते पुनः ।
अनिन्द्यननाभासं निष्पर्यं ब्रह्म तत्तदा ॥

When the mind does not become dormant, nor projects itself again, when it is neither shaky nor shows itself in some objective form, then it has become Brahman. 

GK. 3-46.

That is why Advaitic insight is eulogized as the Yōga free from all contact :-

(3) अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वमुखी हितः ।
अविवादोबिबिश्च पद्धितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥

I bow to the well-known Aspars'ā-Yōga (intuition free from any contact) which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial to all, free from controversy, and opposed to none. 

GK. 4-2.

The Advaitic knowledge being of the nature of secondless intuition is the essence of Brahman only and therefore is called the Aspars'ā-Yōga. This alone is 'Yōga' in its primary sense, as contrasted with Yoga recognized by the other school, for this latter is only a temporary trance. The particles 'Vai' (well-known) and 'Nama' (so called) are intended to bring home that this knowledge is well-known by that appellation to all knowers of Brahman. For the S'ruti says 'there what would one perceive and with what?' (Br. 4-5-15). 'It is the happiness of all', it is really that which all
beings unwittingly feel as happiness, as is vouched for by the S'ruti 'It is a particle of this Bliss that other beings live upon' (Br. 4-3-32). 'Beneficial' for the S'ruti and the Smruti say: 'You yourself kindly choose for me what is most beneficial to man' (Kau. 3-1), 'I am telling you in view of what is beneficial to you' (G. 10-1).

Moreover this Advaita-Jñāna is 'free from controversy and opposed to none'. In the same way as this Aspars'a-Yōga is free from the contact of duality, conduces to the happiness of all beings, as it is of the nature of bliss itself and really beneficial because only by attaining this one can get eternal contentment, so also only this knowledge is free from controversy just because there is no opposition to any one else in this state of realization. This is because this Ātman is the very self of every controversialist. We know that the Sāṅkhya, Vais'eshika and others on the one hand, and the Buddhists who are divided in their doctrines such as the existence of all external things, the sole reality of Vijnāna (consciousness) or the essencelessness of all things on the other, cannot be expected to free themselves of mutual opposition or controversy with one another at any time.

True, the Mādhyamikas too consider that their giving up of all views leads to the cessation of controversy, for they too cite such s'lokas as the following: "This is the cause of dispute, viz. to persist in the existence or the non-existence of Reality" - अस्त्त्वति नास्त्त्वति विचाद एः (SR. 9-28), "If existence by nature were true, then there would not be non-existence of it" - यथासत्त्वतः प्रकृत्या स्यात्म प्रायेदस्य नास्त्तित (MK. 15-8), but yet they cannot avoid controversy with the Vijnānavadins and others who affirm that things do have an essential nature, since they are all opposed to these other schools and since they can never get rid of the belief of the existence of an opposite disputant so long as they propose to criticize the views
of all others by means of a logical dialectic. No doubt the Vijñānavādins maintain that their intuition of the absence of all objects other than Vijñāna-consciousness is incontrovertibly arrived at by means of the Lōkoītara-Prajñā, but the samādhi which they recommend being an individual intuition, cannot escape the possibility of being sublated by some other intuition. Not so with regard to the Advaitic intuition, for even the suspicion of the possibility of a second sublating intuition is warded off here by reasoning based upon universal intuition. So says Ācārya Gauḍāpāda :-

अस्पर्श्योगो वै नाम दुर्देशः सर्वयोगिभि: ।
योगिनो विभ्यति हस्मादभेयेभयदर्शिनः ।

This Yoga called the Aspars'a - Yōga (Yōga of non-contact) is not accessible to all Yōgins. For Yōgins are afraid of this, seeing fear where there is none. GK. 3-39.

[There is no fear here, because it is secondless non-duality.]

That is why adepts in Vedanta say:

"The knower of Vedic truth safely rests in truth, for he has left all that occasion for opposition with the controversialists only, and they themselves safeguard this view of Pure Being."

CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRAST

65. The sum and substance of the present discussion is this:

I. The Vijñānavādin takes up for examination only consciousness limited by the waking state. He says:
Because of its being of the nature of Vijñāna and appearing only as its object, the knowable which is really inside appears as though it were outside.”

A.P. 6.

and holds that the seemingly external object is really within. Gauḍapāda, however, concedes the reality of both knowledge and the knowable in the conventional field in the waking state though both citta and the object thereof are each to be assumed to exist relatively to the other.

(a) उभे ह्यान्योन्यद्धे तेष तदस्तीति नोच्यते।

Both of them are mutually dependent for their being; which shall we say is really existent?  

GK. 4-67.

(b) सत्वस्तु सोपलम्भं च द्वयं लौकिकरूपण्यते।

The duality—with the objective thing and perception of it— is Laukika (the waking state which is the field of conventional procedure).  

GK. 4-87.

His own view of Reality, however, is that it is distinct both from empirical consciousness and its object, and the essential nature of each one of us is Consciousness without a second and unborn.

(c) अजेयज्ञानमस्कृत्रां धर्मेनु ज्ञानमिश्यते।

यतो न कर्मेन ज्ञानमस्तर्तेतन कृतितम।

The knowledge of the unborn selves is, we maintain, unborn,
and never passes on to any object. Inasmuch as this knowledge never goes out to something else, it is said to be untainted. GK. 4-96.

[The meaning is knowledge as Pure Consciousness is one with the knower and has no object.]

2. The Vijñānavādin maintains that perception in the waking state is an illusion no less than dream perception, since it has no external object:

\[\text{प्रत्यक्षुचित्तः स्वप्नादौ यदा सा च यदा तदा।}\\
\text{न सोऽद्यथैं हृदयते तस्य प्रत्यक्षः कथं मतम्॥}\\

In dream and other states also there is the experience of the notion of perception. And when we experience it, there is no object already seen there. Such being the case, how can we say there is perception of it?

Vim. 16.

And according to him just as there is no dream-object perceived on waking, so also the absence of objects in waking is known by the Lōkōttara (Samādhi) knowledge. Gaudapāda on the other hand says (reasoning on the lines indicated in the s'lokas 4-87 to 89) that while there is knowledge or the semblance of it appropriate to waking or dream, they are equally absent in the Lōkōttara (deep sleep) state. The Vijñāna (Pure Consciousness) by which both of them and their absence are intuited is alone the eternal omniscient consciousness, and it neither wakes nor dreams; nor does it depend on the experience of Samādhi or any other state. For one who has known its nature as it is, Reality as Ātman, no such aid is possible or needed.

(d) \[\text{अजमानित्रिमस्वप्नः प्रभातं भवति स्वयम्।}\\
\text{सकृत्तिभावो होवेष धर्मं धातस्वभावतः॥}\\
Unborn, sleepless, dreamless, it is verily the self-luminous ever-shining One, this Dharma (Atman) in his essential nature. GK. 4-81.

(e) अजमनिद्रामस्यप्रमाणामकमस्तपकम्।
सकृत्विभांति सर्वं नोपचारः कयथनः॥

Unborn, sleepless, dreamless, without name, and without form, shining once for all, and all-knowing. There is nothing else to be done any wise. GK.3-36.

3. According to the Viṣṇuavādin one is awakened from the waking-state, as one gives up a dream on awaking. According to Gaudapādācārya on the other hand one has got to be awakened from the illusory dream of the three states, and that waking is not due to attaining any particular samādhi but to the realization of the sole reality of Atman caused by the teaching of a teacher expert in the knowledge of Vedanta. Witness the following Karikā :

(f) अनादिमाया सुषो यदा जीव: प्रवुध्यते॥
अजमनिद्रामस्यप्रमाणैं वुध्यते तदा॥

When the Jīva awakes from the beginningless illusory dream-sleep, he realizes the secondless Reality unborn, beyond sleep and beyond dream.

GK. 1-16.

[That the word dream signifies both dream and waking is clarified in the Bhāṣya here.]

Here we are told that in the Consciousness which is changeless and uniform in nature, devoid of all specific features, there is neither the impurity of any appearance of objective things, nor any purification by way of washing off the impurity by the enlightenment got by samādhi, or some other means. There is neither the seed-sleep of ignorance nor the dreamful-sleep of
CONCLUSION OF THE REPUDIATION

66. It is thus quite clear that neither the Vijnānavāda which rejects the external objects of consciousness nor the S'ūnyavāda which is addicted to the employment of hyper-criticism to repudiate all views of Reality, both of them taking their stand on the seeming distinction of knowledge and the object of knowledge obtaining exclusively in the waking state, can ever bear any comparison with the Vedantin's position which reveals the unreality of duality in consonance with reasoning based upon universal intuition. Likewise it has been shown that neither the Vijnānavāda which hopes to have the sublation of waking experience by the individual Lokottara-samādhi consciousness very much in the manner as the dream experience is sublated by the waking consciousness, nor the S'ūnyavāda which hopes to arrive at the non-dual consciousness of the nature of Prajñā-pāramitā free from the four extreme views by merely proving the essencelessness of all things on the basis of the dependent origination, can ever even in a dream attain similarity with the Vedanta Philosophy which reveals the self-established principle of the Ātman ever free from all constricts of imagination in accordance with the S'ruti which adopts the unique method of deliberate superimposition and subsequent rescission. More can be gathered on this subject from the Introduction to the Māndukya-Rahasya-Vivṛti. Sri Gauḍapādācārya has indicated the dissimilarity of the traditional Advaita teaching to the Buddhistic teaching no less than to the other Advaitic systems, in the benedictory verse
which begins the Alātas'ānti-Prakaraṇa. This sūkta which has been already quoted in connection with the refutation of the Vijnānavāda, we wish to quote once more before we close this section:

अस्यर्योगो वै नाम सर्वसत्चसुखो हितः।
अविवादोद्विरुद्धम् देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम्।

I bow to the well-known Asparas'ā-Yoga (intuition free from any contact) which conduces to the happiness of all beings, and is beneficial to all, free from controversy, and opposed to none. GK.4-2.

[Here is put forward the proposition that the Yoga of Advaita Realization is essentially of the nature of self-established changeless bliss inasmuch as it is identical with the secondless Ātman of the nature of eternally existent undifferentiated intuition, and that it is beyond disputation and opposed to no other view inasmuch as it is altogether ever untouched by a second. It is clear that unlike the Buddhistic position it is no mere fault-finding in the opponents' view.]

CONCLUSION OF THE SECTION

67. Thus we have compared and contrasted the system of Vedanta, exclusively employing S'āṅkara's method with the ancient Advaitic systems and the systems propounded by the Non-Vedic Buddhistic thinkers, so that aspirants for final release may take to a devoted study of it.
Books authored by

(Sri Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swamiji)

Published through A.P. Karyalaya, Holenarasipura.

Note:

(i) The figure in the bracket near the Sl.No. indicates the title number (Kramānka) of the book published by Karyālaya.

(ii) The figure in the bracket after the name of the book indicates the year of publication, Edition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th>
<th>Name of the Book</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>(58) Avasthāthrāya or The Unique Method of Vedanta (1982, II edition)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>(63) Narada's Aphorisms on Bhakti (With text, translation and notes. (1997, II edition)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>(75) Minor works of S'aṅkara (1999, II edition)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first publication on the method of the three states of Consciousness, to wit, waking, dream & deep sleep which our Real self transcends. A valuable introduction to the study of Vedanta as the Science of Reality.

The book will serve as a valuable guide to those who wish to tread the path of Bhakti or God-Love. The book is traditionally ascribed to the Sage Narada. The book is written in a lucid style & expounds the birth, growth, development, unfoldment & expression of Bhakthi, within a short compass. The treatment is quite non-sectarian & followers of other religions also are likely to find much food for reflection.

Here are Sixteen of the most popular minor works
172

ascribed to S'ankara, with English translation and short notes elucidating all different points.

4. (124) How to Recognize the Method of Vedanta
   (1995, II edition) 128

   The first sustained attempt to reduce all the seemingly various Methods of the Upanishads to the only comprehensive Method of Adhyārōpa-apavāda (superimposition & Rescission). This treatise contains a brief account of the History of Vedantic thought up to the time of Sarvajñātma Muni.

   This is an independent edition of the Sanskrit book Introduction to the Vedanta Prakriyā Pratyabijnā.

5. (129) Vedanta or the Science of Reality

   With a Foreward by Dr. S. Radhākrishna. This is a work dealing with the immediate Realization of Brahman by pure reflection on the witness of three states. It sets out the basis of all religions & the meaning of all experience. Faith justified by Reason and Ethics is placed on firm ground. All systems of thought, Eastern & Western, are examined to prove the truths of Vedanta. Second Revised edition written by Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswathi Swamiji was printed in 1965 & third edition in 1991.


   Sheds Light on the Vedantic Method according to S'ankara.

   Three booklets in Part I, Part II and Part III printed
during 1965, 1967 and 1968 are now printed as a comprehensive edition.

**Part I (1, 2) (1965)** - p. 48 determining the genuine doctrine of the Upanishads & the hoary tradition of S'āṅkara's school as distinguished from other ancient **Advaitic Schools**.

**Part II (3,4,5) (1967)** - p. 98 Treating of the distinctive features and tenets of S'āṅkara Vedanta and the unique comprehensive Method of the system, and the Varieties of that Method.

**Part III (6 & 7) (1968)** - p. 98 Compares & contrasts S'āṅkara's tradition of Vedanta with the other Ancient Schools of Advaita that flourished side by side with it, but have been now supplanted by S'āṅkara's system. The distinctive Vedantic doctrine of **Ajāti** or non-origination has been clearly set forth at some length.

Also repudiates the charge usually levelled at S'āṅkara's System Viz, that Gauḍapāda & S'āṅkara have themselves borrowed their vital doctrines from **S'ūnyavādins** (Nihilists) and the **Vijñānavādins** (Buddhistic Idealists)

**Salient Features of S'āṅkara Vedanta**

(1990, II edition) 136

**Presents Matter & Method of genuine S'āṅkara Vedanta in a small compass. The reference to original texts & classification & consolidation of the most important Upanishad teachings would make this little book a useful Companion to the "S'uddha-S'āṅkara-Prakriyā-Bhāskara" of the same author.**
8. (146) **S'āṅkara's clarifications of certain Vedantic concepts.** (1996, II edition) 96

This book contains a systematic account of the clarification of certain Vedantic Concepts as presented in S'āṅkara's classical writings, especially in his Śūtra Bhāṣya.


The book contains the following subjects:

(1) The Ātman to be seen  
(2) Reflection & Reason  
(3) Nididhyāsana as the continued practice of Sravaṇa & Manana  
(4) Manana further explained  
(5) Nididhyāsana, Upāsana and Yōga.  
(6) Are Sravaṇa & other means enjoined  
(7) Relative importance of the three means.

10. (155) **Essays on Vedanta** (1971, I edition) 192

This unique treatise has been written with the sole purpose of offering an Introduction to the central doctrine of the Upanishads & the due Singular Method of Approach uniformly employed in all of them in leading the enquirer to the INTUITION of the Absolute Reality which is his very Self.

11. (158) **Is'āvasyōpanishad** (1972, I edition) 70

(with translation.)

With the commentary of S'āṅkaracārya. English Translation by Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswathi Swamiji with Introduction, notes, appendix and an Index.


Another Master piece from the pen of S.S.Swamiji. Very ably illustrates how Vedantic knowledge is not
mere subtle intellectualism but is an Intuition of the Reality, arising through Divine Grace. The writer has incidentally refuted the oft-repeated assertion that S'ankara's philosophy is an out-and-out Rationalistic system and that he has provided no place of Iswara in his Advaita Philosophy.

13. (162) Misconceptions about S'ankara

(1998, II edn) 126

All criticisms on Vedanta are convincingly solved using the genuine traditional methodology of S'ankara Vedanta.

14 (163) The Upanishadic approach to Reality

(1997, II edition) 80

The Unique Method of Teaching Vedanta adopted by Sri Gauḍapāda, S'ankara & Sureswara.


Deals with chapter VI of Chandogya Upanishad; presents in a nut-shell the true nature of the Science of Being.

16. (202) Introductions of Vedanta text books


(Compilation of Introductions of English & Sanskrit books of S.S. Swamiji)

Sri S.S. Swamiji did yeomen service to students & seekers of Vedantic philosophy by writing highly enlightening Introductions in English, to several books of Sanskrit (17 Nos) and English (8 Nos). All such important introductions are compiled here, keeping in mind those readers who cannot read the original Sanskrit works but still eager to know the unique Teachings in them.
Books (Authored / Translated)  
*by* Sri D.B. Gangolli

17. (186) The unique teachings of S'aṅkara (1983, I edn) 66

It is a very Valuable booklet in which Adhyāsa (Misconception born out of Avidya or ignorance) is dealt with clearly. Without a thorough understanding of this fundamental teaching of Adi S'aṅkara, a true seeker cannot acquire the necessary qualification to enter through the portals to the August Sanctum of the Spiritual Science of Vedanta.


(Translation of S'aṅkara Siddhānta in kannada by S.S. Swamiji)

This book - though small in size has profound, lofty, unalloyed teachings of Adi S'aṅkara. This was the product of relentless & long drawn research carried out over a period of 65 years by Sri Swamiji. As a result of process of decadence & degeneration in the calibre of the preceptors & their teachings in the post S'aṅkara - era, many an alien & doctorine tenet, totally opposed to the traditional methodology propounded by the most ancient line of teachers like Vedavyāsa, Gauḍapāda, S'aṅkara & Sureswara, have come into vogue even in the highest Vedantic circles.

Here is a sincere & sagacious attempt to cleanse all the accretions or dross that S' ankara Vedanta has gathered over a millenium now & present S'aṅkara Vedanta in its pristine pure form.
19. (203) The Basic tenets of S’āṅkara Vedanta
(1996, I edition) 200

(Translation of S’āṅkara Vedāntahada Mōlathatwagalu in Kannada by Sri Swamiji)

This is one of the important works written by Sri Swamiji in kannada exclusively meant for the new initiates into the highly-developed, esoteric spiritual science of Advaita Vedanta. If the true seeker carefully scrutinizes the 21 topics delineated by the revered Swamiji in his own inimitable lucid style, he will be able to equip & enlighten himself with the fundamental tenets of Vedanta which will kindle in his pure heart an abiding interest to cognize the eternal values of life & its real goal.

20. (204) Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswathi Swāmigal
( Life sketch) (1997, I edition) 56

Sri Swāmiji was verily an incarnation of Adi S'āṅkara, whom we are all blessed to see in flesh & blood in these days of ever increasing materialistic & atheistic tendencies & trends. At a time when eternal or human values are vanishing into thin air, by modernistic attitudes tempered by scientific analysis among the intellectuals, the spiritual science of Vedanta dawn to drive away the mental darkness in the form of misconception & ignorance. He gave solace & succour to those who took refuge in Adi S'āṅkara's immaculate & irrefutable Advita philosophy by writing more than 200 books many of which have become beacon lights for people groping in the gloom of Avidya (Samsāra).
Other books by Sri D.B. Gangolli

1. The scientific approach of Advaita Vedanta
   (1997, I edition) 120
   Uses the modern audio-visual method with 14 diagrams to depict the fundamentals of Advaita-Vedanta.

   Translation of Paramārtha Chintāmani. in Kannada by S.S. Swāmiji
   The Magnum opus explains the subtle & secret teachings of Mandukya Upanishad using Avasthāthrya Prakriya

   (Translation of S'āṅkara Vedānta-sāra, in Kannada by S.S. Swāmiji)
   The excellent reference book & a constant guide for a genuine student of Vedanta

   (Translation of Gaṇḍapāda Hridaya in kannada by Swāmiji)
   Explanation of Mandukya Upanishad & Kārikās.

   (Translation of Vedāntha Artha Sārasangraha in kannada by Swāmiji)
   Secrets of Adhyāsa, Adhyārōpa-āpavāda Nyāya revealed

   Commentary of five verses composed by Adi S'āṅkara on Advaita Vedānta

For full details please write to
"Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya"
Holenarasipur - 573 211 - Karnātaka, India.
अध्यात्मप्रकाशकार्यालय प्रकाशिता:
संस्कृतग्रन्थः
अध्यात्मप्रकाशकार्यालय प्रकाशिते यथा उपनिषदः प्रयोगः यतु (१) ‘चित्वानुसारे प्रविष्टस्याचार्यसृजनसृजनः’ (२) तत्तद्भागः प्रतिपादयित्वसूक्तकिरितेऽक्षणमिवेशः, (३) पादानां निर्देशः भाष्यांतर संवादादिविदमुखानुपूर्वकः हितमिनाधिपतिप्रणालितम्, (४) विचारप्राचोदितका पीठिका, (५) उपायनमूलमय स्थूलायाः: भाष्यमय भविष्यायाः: उपायपतानार्थ भाष्यमय सामान्य स्थूलायाः: इति दैवतं विशिष्टविवाचणमुँडाईरुक्तं इति। सुन्दरः: अर्थः: शुद्धवृत्तार्थमेव मुद्रापितानामपत्रम् पुस्तकानां ग्रामाकारावतुष्णे परिमितमूल्ये वितरणे प्रयत्नः कृतः। सर्वनिर्णय व्याख्यानादिकं च नूतनत्याः श्रीसचिदानन्देन्द्रसत्ततीसर्वसंयतंदितिरुक्तम्॥

१. ईशावासोपनिषतः (२००२):
6 + 61 = 61 पृ.
सम्बन्धितप्रणयुताः। उपनिषदे मायमिदित्याः: जिज्ञासुसोगिन्नानुस्मरणिका श्रद्धास्वादिष्टमेव विचारप्राचोदितकीविठाकुपुरुषः।

२. केनोपनिषतः (१९९९):
20 + 41 = 61 पृ.
ईशावासम्भायवेदं सर्वपरिरोपेतः। परिशिष्टेः सर्वभागं स्वयं सत्तायांद्रवमूलानुग्रहेण
दतः। अत: भाष्यस्तितिसाधारितक्षेत्रक्रियाप्रथमाः: समालोचितः। पद्धार्यभाष्योत्तर झंझुलायमं समावेशमात्र तत्वों की विशेषार्थसम्बन्धितात्मक सम्बन्धाणि पीठिकायामुपालित च।

३. काकोपनिषताम्बम् (१९६२):
185 + 95 = 186 पृ.
केनभाष्यवत् सर्वपरिरोपेतं।

४. मुण्डकोपनिषताम्बम् (१९६२):
185 + 132 = 662 पृ.
काठभाष्यवत् सर्वपरिरोपेतं। पीठिकायाः न केवल भाष्यप्रवर्तकम्येचनम्: किं तु भाष्यस्तिताकार्याः: मर्यादेशब्रह्मां च कृतमत्।

५. माण्डुक्यसिद्धांशबिवृत्तः (१९६१):
*** ३०५ + ५८ एस० + ४६० = 618 पृ.
श्रीसचिदानन्देन्द्रसत्ततीसर्वसंयतं धर्मसूत्रितम्। अन्वयभाषायांस्वयं श्रीमादमहाभाष्यां श्रीमादमहाभाष्यां: भगवान्वित माण्डुक्योपनिषदं गर्भीतकान्ने प्रस्तुतं रहस्यामां श्रीगौड़ेशं सत्तायांसद्धार्थकार्यानुसंधानम्: तथा विनुवाति यथा भोक्तमानाः: नित्यानुसाराम्। श्रीरचरणांसत्तायां श्रीमादमहाभाष्यां नरादेशं तथा विशुद्धाधिकारणं पूर्वकं तथा व्याख्यातो यथा श्रीमादमहाभाष्यानुसारात्मक गतिनिर्देशं भवेत। पाठकामां।
विनिष्प च अङ्गातालाकित्रियाः प्रतिज्ञानवत्तात्त्विकोशेत्याय यत्मकालायांसद्धार्थकार्यानुसारात्मक गतिनिर्देशं भवेत। पाठकामां। विनिष्प च अङ्गातालाकित्रियाः प्रतिज्ञानववत्तात्त्विकोशेत्याय यत्मकालायांसद्धार्थकार्यानुसारात्मक गतिनिर्देशं भवेत। पाठकामां।
6. तैतिरियोपनिषदेशांकीमाध्यम (१९६१): 
7. तैतिरियोपनिषदेशांकी मम (१९६२): 

समाप्ता - श्रीसचिदानंदेन्द्रसत्त्वी निमिति ‘भाषाधिकारिणी’ व्याख्यासित ता।

व्याख्याया भाषासारानुसार मूलचित्रोपयोग से कृत। माध्यम अवचित्रनात्मकता प्रकप्रेषण वैदान्ति-
भिमेत्यायांत्रिकाणी निरस्त अर्थक बिनुशासिकतञ्च विद्याध्यायामानेण विद्यार्थीसत्त्वी तथा अनुवादक अर्थक भाषासारानुसार ज्ञात।

पुत्रस्यांते अतुर्कृत, उपनिषत्वां अर्थत्तेश्वरोऽपि भाषाभ्रोध्यान्यापिं सूची, श्रीसचिदानंदेन्द्र स्विधकर्मणि विश्विवाच्यति। अंगार्जीविज्ञान भूमिकाया: भाषागत सुशीलकिंवड़ा: सपथ्य परिवेशित: - तत्वर्णाङ्गसुल्ले परिष्करणातिकम्।

8. सुगम (१९९६-१, १९९७ - II): 

आयामात्मम्यायांत्वा। श्रीसचिदानंदेन्द्रसत्त्वी संस्कृतिशासिकिनिमितिः। प्रति संबंधिता व्याख्यायांतः भाष्यमे संहितार्यक च। सर्बभाषायिनी लक्षणां सपथ्यर्थायां प्रयाणमभाृतिक्रुणामुः आदिरिपट्टी सार्वज्ञातन्वानुसारबैद्याल्प्रकत्रयायापाषाणी! इत्यद्विवणा।

9. सूक्ष्मभाषायापत्त्वविज्ञानी (१९६३): 

जस्थानिर्दिष्टार्थणां भाष्यम् सुनीवें व्याख्या। श्रीसचिदानंदेन्द्र सत्त्वी संस्कृति संस्कृतिशासिकिनिमितिः। वैद्यक च स्थायित्व संबंधान्यां मनसमाधियन प्रयाणायां भाषाभ्रोध्यान्यापिं सूची, श्रीसचिदानंदेन्द्र स्विधकर्मणि विश्विवाच्यति।

कल्यकाल स्विद्याबाद्विंसतिः केवल विधिः भगत्यादसंस्कर्तं वैद्याल्प्रकत्रयायानुसार स्वरूपात्मक विचारित।

10. सूक्ष्मभाषायापत्त्वविज्ञानी (१९६४): 

जनभाषात्मक भाषाभ्रोध्याश्री सचिदानंदेन्द्रसत्त्वी विचारितः। वैद्य जस्थानिर्दिष्टार्थणार्थव्याख्यायां श्राँहास्यसत्तततत्तिष्ठियां कृताम्, श्रीसचिदानंदेन्द्रसत्त्वी वैद्यवाद्विंसतिः केवल विधिः परिष्करणातिकम्।

कृतिः च विज्ञातार्थणार्थव्याख्यायां स्विधकर्मणि विश्विवाच्यति। संबंधितार्थणां श्रावपरमार्प्पसत्तततततिष्ठियां अवचित्रणां स्वरूपकृत्वाहितता निर्दिष्टार्थपुणाम् उपकाराय विचारितः।

11. सूक्ष्मभाषायापत्त्वविज्ञानी (तृतीयो भाग): (१९७०): 

शास्त्रीयनिर्दिष्टार्थणां - समज्वाथिकरणां भाष्यम्यायांत्व। पृथ्वीदेव श्रांहास्यसत्तततिष्ठियां प्रकाशितिः। विद्याधिकारी श्राँहास्यसत्तततिष्ठियां स्वरूपपृष्ठितात्मकी विधिः इत्यादि: विधिः संबंधिताः।

12. श्रांहास्यसत्तततिष्ठियां भागमात्र (१-२) (१९६४): 

वैद्याल्प्रकत्रयायांत्व: - इति विक्रिणस्यामक: एतेह मोऽ भागः।

13. श्रांहास्यसत्तततिष्ठियां भागमात्र (५-६) (१९६४): 

अस्तित्वे द्वितीये भागे श्रांहास्यसत्तततिष्ठियां, श्रांहास्यसत्तततिष्ठियांस्वरूपम्, अवचित्रणांस्विधकर्मणि विश्विवाच्यति। इत्यादि: विधिः प्रतिपादितः।
181

14. शुक्राशुश्रुषायामाकर्षण (६७०) (१९६६) : ६ + ६० = ६६ पु.
अस्तिन्तु तुनीयं भागे - गाड़क्यक्रमस्य प्रसंवानात्सर्स्यं बैलश्रन्यं स्तुतितम्,
शाङ्काश्रव्यं त्रीणिमत्सामायकृत्वा च परिहंता।

15. गीतागार्थार्थविवेक (१९६६) : १०३ + १० एस० + १०६ = २१६ पु.
श्रीसंवादनदे-दसरस्त्रतीमस्यसमिक्षिततुपग्रहे त्र्यम्। अत्यपराप्यायोग्य प्रकृत्ये
सुचिन्तीत में आशुक्यस्यात्मकाभावायास्ति एवं बेदादिभागः गीतार्थार्थविसुन्हृत्य इति, स एव
चारुमृतं प्रमुखपवत्थायी इति च जिन्दस्य निदिकांशं विज्ञानीयः। अत्र परिप्रमं साधृः-योग-
क्षण-ञान्यानां प्रस्तरसंबंधं निरुहितं। परिधाये च भागे आशुक्यपालदश्नां भागी
गीतायामयं साधृःयाले इत्यथा च विधायते येन स्पष्ट विधायते सर्ववदात्सदिन्तं एव परिषुः:
स्वीकृत्यांश शास्त्रं इति॥

16. ब्रह्मविद्यार्थविवेक (१९६६) : १४१ + १० एस० + २३२ = २६३ पु.
समुपनिर्गृहश्रव्यार्थविवेकेन जिन्दस्या निरादरस्यायः। ब्रह्मणि यथा लभेत तथा
श्रीरुणः। चाणायानं निरुपोदयमोदयायः। अत्र व्यासः।

17. नैषाशास्त्रिकिर्ति ('ज्ञानप्रवरणिणि' व्यासः सत्यतं) (१९६८) : 
***१३३ + ३१एस० + ६६४ = ५६५ पु.
तत्त्वानुग्रहस्तर्विन्हर्मितिनिष्ठेषुद्वित्य स्वतन्त्रो निबोधः। तत्त्वास्मिन प्रथमे सम्पुर्णे
साधृःत बेदान्यभु अश्वायानान्याहाभ्राय एकेष प्रक्रिया प्राप्तेये परिहःतात्विनिति
बेदान्यभुमुक्तायं तदर्षितम्। अस्या: प्रक्रियाय अनादरवेदं हेतु: सत्त्वर्द्धे बावद्वजः:
बेदानीपदिस्मानमेकाद्यमहंभ्वारूपमादित्युत: नाथायुक्तिथंदेवतं निदितिमू अतिप्राणी
कालादर्श्य सर्वमुक्तिसमाशयनहृत्न्वेदान्त विचारतिहाससिद्धोपपथायने॥

विन्दुपार्वतियामाकर्षणविभूतिया संस्कृताभानायाम्यूलकाया च समलक्षुः। प्रभाब्यप्रयाध
नुक्रमाधिकारं।

18. बेदानीपदिस्मान (१९६६) : ६ + ६४ = ६० पु.
अभावपारुपितत्वातः समास्यान्यात्सर्स्य व्यासकालाम्। भाष्यकारार्किैनात
सर्वेणुस्मृतिय बेदानीसदिन्तोऽस्मात जिन्दस्या हृदयांगमितिः।

19. बेदानीकालणिक्षण (१९६६) : १० + ३० = ४० पु.
सुप्रसिद्धिर्म नीर्षाराज्यं भावशालिम्यायाय व्यासः सतितमू। व्यासः एवं लक्ष्यः शिक्षित्वाण्व
ञान्यानां बेदानीसदिन्ता शिक्षां येन स्यहितं। युक्ताय समुपर्णितात्।

20. बेदानीसदिन्तं (१९६६) : ८८ + ८५ = १७३ पु.
अत्र जिन्दाजुज्ञानसिद्धान्तायाम्यानुसारं अतुस्म्बधानन्द्वया मनोदयाः
22. विज्ञवेदान्तपरिभाषा (१९६१) : 
83 + 85 = 166 पु.
ब्रह्म, जगत्, जीव इति पदार्थपर्यथ सत्त्वम्, जात्रार्थणोऽऽ संबन्ध्यतः सामादायिकपरिभाषाजातमचरम्यं अत्र निरूपितः।

23. शास्त्रकर्त्ते बेदालोमांसाभाष्यम् (१९७४) (स्वर्य व्यासातमम्) :
16 + 195 = 211 पु.

24. बेदान्तविद्वार्गी (१९६२) :
313 + 35 एम् + 8 = 354 पु.
शास्त्रकभाष्यतवायुनिःपरिभाषायॊऽलश्रुण्यथाविकृति एकादश विन्दुश्राकादानामभिप्रायः
अत्र दत्तः। विद्वदःप्रभाषसंग्रहिका अंगरूप्यिकाविभूषितः।

25. पश्चापदिकप्रसारावतम् (१९६६) :
133 + 21 एम् + 77 = 251 पु.
अत्र पश्चाप्पादिकप्रसारायं भागप्रस्तावनेन तुलितमस्ति : तेनात्तोक्तिस्तेन निरूपितेत यत्
सर्वपथाणि प्रयासानान्तस्रेणाबलम्बितः पालिकाकारायेंः, भाष्याभाषणि तत्र तत्तावथायांजनेन
स्वाभूपत्ति प्रमेययुपारिणी वाक्यानि नीतानि चेति।

26. श्रीशास्त्रकर्त्तव्यायम् (१९६९) :
*** 36 + 232 - 263 पु.
श्रीसदिकर्त्तेवेदसरस्वतःसर्वति: पूर्वाभिमेव विनिमित्त प्रकटार्थिर्म पूर्वयादानां वीरादकर
भगवत्पालनां वेदान्तप्रक्रियायथस्थर्येदानाणि भगवद् अर्थयात विबृतोति। सर्वे च चात्र प्रमाणायायान्यु-
दाहतानि परशातम् पौर्णायाकृतां तत्साहान्तेत्रविशालस्त्र श्रीसुरेत्रात्रायांण्या स्पृहायोऽादेशः माणुयः
कार्यकृत्तां श्रीगौण्डात्रायायां च। अनुशास्त्रकर्त्तितिभः संप्रदायसिद्धेन नूतनत्वा अपूर्वीः
स्तय औपनिपदग्रिहया मस्तिनिकरणमुडस्य मूलवियोजार्द्य समूहवातानुष्ठितयोऽत्र निबन्धः
सम्पदानस्तलालस्त्रार्द्यातितिगुणकमशीताराचारणे महामानजूर्यो विज्ञायेः।

27. चारमहाप्रेममांसाः (१९६३) :
84 + 85 = 169 पु.
संपदासाधमः कर्त्ते शाङ्केन विहितः:, संपदायस्य प्रकराः:, यतीतीतानि नित्यानि अनुपेयानि,
संपदायिना मुख्यो ध्येयः:, प्रणविन्दुनास्य प्रकराः: - इवादायो विपयः: - शास्त्रकर्मणि
प्रभावपुर्णो श्रुतिस्वैतृत्तिस्मृतंतितुर्विभिः समादिताः आसिन्नः प्रकरे:। पारमहास्तयः वैशिष्ट्यायं सम्पूर्ण
दर्शित्तमः।

28. भक्तिवद्विया - नारदभक्तिसृजनान्य व्यास्या (१९६५) :
8 + 224 = 221 पु.
नारदप्रीत्यान्य भक्तिसृजनान्य व्यासस्यपोऽयोऽयः ग्रन्थः। शास्त्रकर्मणुज्योतीमुकुटस्तथा
स्वमुक्तम्यं नूतनम् व्यास्या। भक्तिवदिवये संभावितानां संभाव्यमानानां स्वस्योऽयो नरनामुऽ
स्वस्यान्यायां अस्तित्वात् च परिहारोऽऽ दर्शितः। भावूऽः: रसिकः: अवययः अन्तर्वेद्योऽयोऽयः ग्रन्थः। कविद्वृत्तमस्य
रचयिताः:
- श्री स्वामिः:, संस्थातानुवर्तकः - विद्यान्यैौकेतोदामासः शास्त्री, मदुर।

*** ग्रन्थस्य मुद्रणं अश्वितः
ABOUT

Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya

Founded in the year 1920, the institution was nurtured and developed by the revered Swamiji single-handed and became recognized as the very "fountainhead" of pristine pure Advaita Vedanta as propounded by Adi S'ankara.

Being an Institution himself, the Swamiji made the prime objective of Karyalaya as spiritual dissemination through publication of books, conducting classes, seminars and discourses in genuine Vedanta of Adi S'ankara. The same is being successfully carried out by the present authorities of the Karyalaya which is registered as a Public Charitable Trust.

The Karyalaya is also publishing two spiritual magazines in Kannada- "Adhyatma Prakasha" and "S'ankara Bhaskara" having a wide circulation throughout Karnataka, India & abroad.

The Karyalaya is continuously publishing unpublished works of Swamiji which are available in manuscript forms. The works of Swamiji in Kannada and Sanskrit are being got translated into English and published, with a view to propagate the unique teachings & methodology of the Swamiji among the large English knowing people not only in India but abroad as well.

The public patronage is the chief source for all the activities of the Karyalaya.

Donations to the Karyalaya are exempted under Section 80 G of Income Tax act of India.

Hence we appeal to you to help us with a generous donation to take full advantage of the available facilities in our Institution in pursuing a true spiritual path.

Cheques / drafts to be drawn in favour of "Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya" and to be sent to

Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarsipur - 573 211.
India., Tel : 08175 - 73820

e.mail : apkaryalaya@culturalindia.com
He founded the Adhyāṭma Prakāsha Karyālaya for this purpose, & published altogether 183 works in Sanskrit, Kannada & English (Details given at the end of the book) besides innumerable articles. He always sought to penetrate behind the later commentators to Śaṅkara's doctrine in its pure form, much in harmony with modern western scholarship.

Ordained a monk under the name Satchidanandendra Saraswati in 1948, he poured forth work in old age with astonishing fertility. In 1964 he published at the age of 84 his greatest Sanskrit work, Vedānta Prakṛiyā Prathyabhijña, here presented in English form. He lived on to produce many other works before his death in 1975.

The Translator

Dr. J. Alston was inspired to take up the study of Sanskrit and Vedanta by the late Hari Prasad Shastri. He was fortunate to receive training from Radhakrishnan and T.R.V. Murti. After a life time's study, he considers The Method of the Vedāntā to be the finest work on Śaṅkara ever written.

For a complete Book list please write to:-

Adyāṭma Prakāsha Karyālaya
Holenarasipur - 573211
Karnataka - India
Phone : +91 - 08175 - 73820
e-mail : apkaryalaya@culturalindia.com
ABOUT SWAMIJI

Shri Satchidanandendra Saraswathi Swamiji (1880 - 1975 A.D.) the founder of Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarsipur, Hassan Dist., Karnataka - 573 211 - a public charitable trust, wrote and published more than 200 books in Kannada, English and Sanskrit with a view to propagate Pristine Pure Advaita Vedanta as expounded by Shri Gaudapada, Shri Sankara Bhagavatpada and Shri Sureshwara in their famous extant works based on the three canonical Vedantic texts viz., Ten Principal Upanishads, Bhagavadgita and Vedanta Sutras (Popularly known as Brahma Sutras). The revered Swamiji carried out research for over six decades with a profound sense of Dedication and missionary zeal so as to cleanse Advaita Vedanta of the dross and distortions that it has acquired in the post-Sankara era. Although the Swamiji has authored nearly 20 odd books in English and over 25 books in Sanskrit, many of his masterpieces were written in Kannada. In order to provide the benefit of these gems, the Karyalaya has brought out several books in English which are faithful translations of the original texts in Kannada, for the guidance and benefit of ardent students of Advaita Vedanta. He was not just a rare and accomplished individual but a mighty and magnificent Institution.

Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya
Holenarsipur - 573 211. India.