The Essential Gauḍapāda

Written in Kannada by
Swāmi Satchidānandendra Saraswati

Translated By
D.B. Gangolli

Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya
Holenarsipur, Hassan - 573 211
Karnataka, INDIA.
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About The Author

His Holiness Paramahamsa Sri Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swam ji, the founder of Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya and author of over 200 reputed works on Advaita in Kannada, Sanskrit and English, blessed the earth with his presence for 96 useful and rich years (1880-1975).

His works are characterised by vast and deep scholarship, clear and precise perception and an attractive and lively style. His authentic interpretation of Śaṅkara has been greatly recognized by both the East and the West. He was not just a rare and accomplished individual but a mighty and magnificent institution.

About The Book

Shri Gauḍapāda has established by taking as his central authoritative source the Māndūkya Upanishad, which though smallest in size (only 12 Mantras or verses) among all the Upanishads yet the most famous one, the following profound Siddhānta by means of logic fully in consonance with Anubhava (universal Intuitive Experience): "On the support of Anubhava of A vasthātṛya or three states of consciousness, Atman of all of us is verily Ajādvaya Brahman alone which is Nityaniravastha or eternally devoid of any state; That alone is the Paramārtha satya"

Further, he has not only clarified as to what exactly is the wide difference between the predominantly perverted logic - orinted Vijnānāvādis and Shūnyavāda, on the one hand, and Vedānta on the other, but also has convinced all true seekers about the facts that: (a) Vain logic can never stand its ground all through; (b) all the devices adopted by the logically- oriented Darshhanas or schools of philosophy are all meant for the worship (Ārādhana) of Paramātman.
Adhyatma Granthavali

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PUBLISHERS’ NOTE

This treatise, which is the second of ‘The Essential.....’ series, the first being ‘The Essential Ādi Śaṅkara”, is a faithful translation of Śri Satchidananandendra Saraswati Swāmījī’s Kannada gem of “Śri Gaṇḍapāda Hridaya” into English for the benefit of those true seekers who do not have the facility of understanding this regional language. This is yet another prestigious book published by our Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Holenarsipur, Hassan District, Karnataka - 573211 with a view to propagating the pristine pure Śaṅkara Vedānta, cleansed of the alien doctrines interpolated into the renowned Vedāntic literature of the original Śaṅkara Bhāshyas. Śri Gaṇḍapada, who was the grand-preceptor of Śri Śaṅkara, had written a solitary treatise called - ‘Māṇḍūkya Kārikās” which are based on the shortest Upanishad, Māṇḍūkya, comprising a mere 12 mantras. This terse Upanishad is utilizing one of the most important and the subtlest methodologies based on the axiom of Superimposition and Rescission, and the very fact that Śri Gaṇḍapāda chose this brief Upanishad to write his elaborates commentary vouches for the importance and prominence that is given by all spiritual preceptors. It would not, for that reason, be an exaggeration if it is stated that whosoever masters this principal methodology adopted subtly by these illustrious Āchāryas and as explained and elucidated by our Śri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swāmījī of revered memory, can never miss the real purport behind the gemine teachings of this ancient school of non-dualism, Advaita Vedānta.

We are confident that this treatise translated by Śri D. B. Gangolli, an ardent follower of Śri Swāmījī, will benefit all those who patiently study this book and adopt a way of life in consonance with these profound tenets.

Chairman

1st November 1997
Holenarasipur.
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**Errata**: Through inadvertence several errors have crept in. The errata is given at the end. The inconvenience is deeply regretted.
FOREWORD

Upanishads are an unparalleled treasure of supreme spiritual wisdom. Of all the Upanishads the Vedas include, the Māṇḍūkya has a distinct place of excellence and charm. Philosophy intends to probe into existence and knowledge and unearth the ultimate source of both. In other Upanishads the external objective existence is the subject of enquiry, whereas Māṇḍūkya presents a distinct difference, which makes it brief but compulsive.

The text of Māṇḍūkya Upanishad consists of twelve mantras in which the seventh stands paramount. It describes the Ultimate Reality, Brahma, to be the supra-consciousness, distinct from all the other levels of consciousness normally accessible to us. This supra-consciousness is described as “Santam Śivam and Advaitam. This is the Ātma and this indeed is to be known” spells out the mantra.

To illustrate and explain the process of Śādhana the Upanishad presents the monosyllable Ōm, relating its three component syllables A, U and M to the three states of man’s awareness, wakefulness (Jāgrat), dream (Svapna) and deep sleep (Sushupti).

The Upanishad’s revelations have their own exclusive sanctity and are to be honoured and accepted outright. But whatever the Upanishads present are not without reason and verification. In fact, the entire gamut of Upanishads aim at inculcating in the seeker his own personal testimony for which a full ‘Śādhana’ is laid down. But scriptural pronouncements, supported by one’s own direct experience cannot be without the stamp of reason or ‘Yukti’. Only when all the three - ‘Śruti’, ‘Yukti’ and ‘Anukhava’ (scriptures, reason and direct experience) blend well the findings become final and unassailable.

Assigning reason or ‘Yukti’ its supreme place in the field of religion and spiritual life, Sri Gauḍapāda presents three sections of Kārikā - Vaitathya, Advaita and Alātaśānti. By these he first proves, on the basis of relentless reason, the unauthentic, illusive character of the objectivity of our experience. He then
established the nondual nature of existence as well as consciousness and finally disposes of all possible arguments against these findings.

The PrakaranaS of Sri Gauḍapāda are held with as much esteem and sanctity as the Upanishadic mantras themselves. Unlike in other parts of the world, in this blessed country the philosophers are always ascetics and sages, proving thereby that their philosophical effort is not at all an intellectual pursuit but a full-fledged religio-spiritual mission with the sole aim of realizing the Supreme Reality and thereby fulfilling the main purpose of human life on this earth.

Is the objective existence around us true and absolute in nature and purpose? Or is it merely a subject of perception alone? This is the basic question the Kārikās pose and discuss. Perception is the outcome of the ‘perceiving process’. And ‘perceiving’ is a process which proceeds from the ‘perceiver’. There cannot be an ‘action’ except when the ‘actor’ is first there. An ‘action’ is a phase of expression of the ‘actor’. An ‘actor’ becomes so only when the ‘action’ proceeds. Before the action proceeded, one cannot think of any actor at all. The twins of ‘actor and action’ emerge at one stroke. Dissociated from ‘action’, the ‘actor’ becomes inconceivable. Something distinct from ‘actorhood’ and ‘action’ has thus to be thought of, as the Eternal Presence.

The objective world, or objectivity, around us, however huge and imposing it may be, is not a full-fledged or absolute perception, the Kārikā sets forth. For the duration and condition in which the external objects are perceived, consitute only a part of our life and consciousness. We are conscious of the world, but only during our wakeful state. Wakeful state by itself does not complete or exhaust our consciousness, either its potential or expression. Besides wakefulness (Jāgrat), we have two more distinct states. One is the dream (Svapna) and the other the deep sleep (Sushupti).

Sushupti or deep sleep is an undisturbed, unbroken long enough state, which does extend to several hours of the day - nearly or more than one third of the day. It can extend even
beyond. The same ‘I’ which remains wakeful and thereby per­ceives through the senses the objective world, withdraws itself into ‘Sushupti’, to drop all wakeful perceptions altogether. How can a perception be held true, if it is subsequently nullified like this? The ‘I’ brings in sleep all by itself, independently, uncomprehending anything else, even the body, mind and intel­ligence. Besides this deep sleep, we have also the solely inward dream state, which, whenever it transpires, succeeds sleep. The dream state brings in altogether a new world, new objects, new values and new responses. Thus the dream state fully contradicts and invalidates wakefulness.

Should not the rational man evaluate the objective world, taking his stand on all the three states together? Instantly, objectivity proves itself to be unauthentic and illusory. What is then the ground or substratum of this illusion? If the whole existence around us falls as illusory, its substratum has necessarily to be not anywhere outside, but solely inside. The very ‘I’, which undergoes all by itself the three of wakefulness, deep sleep and dream, and which endures alike in all of them, can alone be and is the substratum for all the states. Everything the ‘I’ produces and perceives is illusory but the ‘I’ itself is not.

That the Self of the Upanishads which the entire Vedas extol is the only source of creation and is the Ultimate Reality, is what the Karikās argue out and establish. The scriptural Upanishad thus derives a confirmation and enrichment in the hands of the Karikā.

Swāmi Sacchidananda Saraswati, a staunch and loyal Śaṅkarite, has written elaborately bringing forth the essential content and message of Sri Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā and the excellent reasoning set forth there. This work rendered in a regional language has now been made available to larger audience in an international medium by Śri D. B. Gangolli, who has authored a free translation of Swāmi Sacchidananda Saraswati’s original composition. By this a large scope is thrown open by the author which will make Swāmi Sacchidananda Saraswati’s thoughts available to the world over.

These days when the Upanishadic, Epic and philosophical
thoughts constituting Vedānta are sought more and more by thinkers and students in the world, Śri Gangolli’s effort at publishing this book is quite timely and beneficial. One can hope that his efforts will be properly rewarded and enough of reading and introspection will take place in the field of Upanishadic thought, especially the distinguished Māṇḍūkyoṇaṁ and Śri Gaṇḍapāda’s Kārikā on it.

Māṇḍūkyoṇaṁ Upanishad is incomplete without Gaṇḍapādakārikā and proper understanding of the Kārikā will no doubt make the seeker unshakeable in his spiritual pursuit and the realization of the Self.

Trissur
Nārāyaṇāshrama
Tapōvanam
18.06.97

Swāmi Bhoomānanada Tīrtha
PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Soon after ‘The Essential Ādi Śaṅkara’ was published in 1991 by the Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Thyāgarājanagar, Bangalore - 28, the idea of publishing the second of this ‘Essential’ series, viz. ‘The Essential Gaunḍapāda’ was mooted. Although the translation of this magnum opus in Kannada by the erudite pen of Śrī Śatchidānandendra Saraswati Swāmīji, of revered memory, was completed by me early in 1993, the publication was put off owing to several causes beyond my control. However, by God’s benign grace, I have succeeded to overcome all hurdles and hindrances - most of them could not even be anticipated - and now this gem of Vedāntic science is in the hands of the readers. It is hoped that this will also be well-received by the connoisseurs and seekers alike just as its predecessor, ‘The Essential Ādi Śaṅkara’. It will also be in the fitness of things to complete this endeavour of propagating the pristine pure Advita Vedānta as expounded by a line illustrious preceptors like Veda Vyāsa (Bādarāyaṇa), Gaunḍapāda, Śaṅkara and Sureshwara who belonged to a time-honored traditional school of Advaita philosophy. And hence now I have mooted to publish in the near future two more texts of this series to bring it up-to-date, viz, ‘The Essential Sureshwara’ and ‘The Essential Śatchidānanda’.

It is quite well-known in Vedāntic circles all over our country that Śrī Gaunḍapādāchārya was the grand-preceptor of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, and barring the former’s ‘Kārikas’, (commentaries) on the Māṇḍūkyopanishad there are no other authentic works which are extant in his name. Although Ādi Śaṅkara’s Prasthāna Traya Bhāshyas have become world-famous and are exhaustive in their exposition of almost all the rudiments as well as the subleties of the unique traditional (Sampradayic) methodologies handed down over the ages from the teacher to the taught, Śrī Gaunḍapāda’s Kārikas, numbering a mere 215 divided into four chapters (Prakaranas), project the same traditional teachings in a terse and trite verse form. And unless the ardent student takes recourse to the expert guidance of Ādi Śaṅkara’s edifying
and enlightening Bhāshyas, he finds it almost impossible to discern the hidden import of the Kārikas. The traditional methodology of teaching was by word of mouth from the preceptor to the pupil in a discursive manner and only the initiated pupils with a pure heart and incisive intelligence could divine and intuit the subtle truths.

The fact that Śhri Śaṅkara in a verse acknowledged Śhri Gauḍapāda as a Knowledgeable teacher of Advaita Vedāṇta belonging to his line of traditional (Samprādāyic) preceptors as well as the fact that Śhri Śaṅkara has written an exhaustive and extensive Bhāshya on these extant and most ancient (for, no other authentic or authoritative work on Advaita Vedāṇta by way of an explanatory Prakaraṇa Grantha is available, barring the Śrūtis, the Smṛitis and the Brahma Sūtras - going together by the popular name of Prasthana Trayī) work.

It being so, it is unfortunate that some Vedāntins belonging to an alien group and modern scholars with a pronounced sense of an academical study but not trained or prepared to accept even the word of Śhri Śaṅkara have raised all kinds of doubts with regard to Śhri Gauḍapāda’s identity or whereabouts and have opined that Māṇḍūkya is a recent work passing muster as an ancient Upanishad, the author being Śhri Gauḍapāda. Further, some of these academicians have, quite audaciously too gone to the extent of nick-naming not only Śhri Gauḍapāda but also his faithful glossator Śhri Śaṅkara as ‘Pracchanna Bauddhas’, meaning psuedo-Buddhists marauding as Advaita Vedāntins. This they have done on the mere but flimsy reason that the former has literally, sometimes even bodily, borrowed Buddhistic terms and verses and have adapted them to suit their own whimsical theories or tenets. Suffice it to say that all these are wild, unsustainable charges and can easily be dismissed as idiosyncrasies of academicians for each and every such allegation can be disproved (and have been repeated by Śhri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swami, of Adhyātma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarasipur - of revered memory) quite convincingly. For more details in this regard the students or seekers are requested to read ‘Māṇḍūkya Rahasya Vivṛutihi’ in Sanskrit, (with an exhaustive English Introduction by the Swāmiji) published by the Kāṛyālaya.
But here is this context some relevant and important details regarding Shri Gauḍapāda, his works and contributions to Vedānta will be mentioned so as to remove any misconceptions that one might have had because of such false propaganda by the academicians as well as proponents of philosophy opposed to Vedānta.

1. MAṆḌŪKYOPANISHAD

Among the Upanishads that belong to the Atharva Veda, Shri Śaṅkarāchārya has written his Bhāshyas only on three of them, viz. Muṇḍaka, Prashna and Māṇḍūkya. Among the three - nay, among all those Upanishads which Shri Śaṅkara has chosen to write his commentaries on - Māṇḍūkya is the smallest. Even so, Shri Śaṅkara has described it as "सर्वव्याधित्वांतरंसासः" (the quintessence of the tenets of all Upanishads). Since Shri Gauḍapādāchārya’s commentary in the form of ‘Kārikās’ is also written on this Upanishad, we can say - from the standpoint of history of Vedāntic lore - that this diminutive Upanishad has a unique importance of its own. With regard to the question - ‘To which part of Atharva Veda does this Upanishad belong?’ - it is not possible to determine, as there is no clinching evidence available. In this regard, Shri Śaṅkara has not stated anything whatsoever in his Bhāshya. Since the lone methodology of Avasthāthraya (the three states of Consciousness) is to be found in this Upanishad through which the Ultimate Reality is determined and expounded, there is a high probability of surmising it to belong to the Āraṇyaka of that Veda.

2. VARIOUS OPINIONS ABOUT THE AUTHOR OF THESE MAṆḌŪKYA KĀRIKĀS

Although Shri Śaṅkarāchārya has written a Bhāshya on the Upanishad as well as explanations for the Kārikās, he has not expressed that he has written his Bhāshya predominantly by himself on the Upanishad ; on the other hand, he has given all the predominance to the Kārikās which undertake the task of explaining the Upanishad. As at present, the Kārikās are divided into four Prakaranas (Chapters) called - Āgama, Vaitathya, Advaita and Alātashānti. More than the previous Prakaraṇa, the next one contains a higher number of Kārikās in that order. In the first among them, viz. Āgama Prakaraṇa, as at
present, 29 Karikās are to be found in groups divided and interspersed between the Upanishadic Mantras. But the remaining three Prakaranas are independent in their forms. The last and the biggest, viz. Alātashānti Prakaraṇa, comprising 100 verses or Karikās, contains invocatory verses both at the beginning and at the end. It being so, there are all kinds of opinions among the scholars with regard to the authorship both in the matter of the Upanishad and the Prakaraṇas.

First and foremost, many Advaitins opine that all these four Prakaraṇas are written by Shri Gauḍapāda, who was the grand preceptor of Śrī Śaṅkara. Secondly, Śrī Madhvačārya (the founder of the Dvaita school of Vedānta) has acknowledged that - (i) Āgama Prakaraṇa is not at all 'Puruṣheya' (of human origin); (ii) the Mantras, which are seen (heard by sages, who are Brahmacārya, when they are in commune with the Ultimate Reality) are exemplified in the Upanishad for the purposes of determining Self-Knowledge; (iii) both the Mañḍūkyopanishad and the Karikās are together the Śruti alone. The German scholar, Deussen, opines that together with these four Prakaraṇas the Mañḍūkyya Upanishad is one whole work written by Shri Gauḍapāda. Prof. S.N. Dasgupta, M.A. Ph.D, and many other modern scholars have declared that - (a) Among Shri Gauḍapāda’s Prakaraṇas - especially the fourth one - many Prakriyas (methodologies) found in Buddhist texts are to be seen; (b) since Shri Gauḍapāda came into the picture only after the famous Buddhist teachers like Ashwaghośa, Nagārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu etc., we have to perforce surmise that he too, in all probability, was a Buddhist, or else, he was a preceptor who had a great respect towards Buddha’s teachings. Among these four different opinions of various groups of scholars, the last three seem to be mere speculations, for each one of them cannot stand the test of reasonable deliberation.

IT IS NOT PROPER TO SAY THAT ĀGAMA PRAKARAṆA IS ŚRUTI

Let us first deliberate upon the reason or evidence forwarded by Shri Madhvačārya to conclude that the Karikās belonging to the Āgama Prakaraṇa are part and parcel of the Upanishad only. The authoritative sources that Shri Madhvačārya has adduced in support of his assertion are: (i) A text
called ‘Brahmatarka’; (ii) Garuḍa Purāṇa - of which the first treatise is not available now. No other Āchārya has referred to or mentioned about these works. Since there is every possibility of any number of new verses being added or interpolated, every now and then, in mythological treatises (Purāṇas), before we accept to consider Garuḍa Purāṇa to be an authoritative evidence for the present topic we have to perforce examine whether any other Āchārya has acknowledged these Kārikās to be the Upanishad or not. But no one worth the name before Madhwačhārya has assumed in that manner, and there is nothing to prove this conjecture! On the other hand, Shri Śaṅkarāchārya has clearly expressed that he is undertaking to write commentaries on the four Prakaraṇas (1–3); his direct disciple, Shri Sureshwarāchārya, has exemplified two Kārikās from the Āgama Prakaraṇa in his own treatise on Vedantic tenets called ‘Naishkarmya Siddhi’ and has mentioned that they are written by Shri Gauc;iapada. Even among the post-Madhwačhārya Advaita Vedāntins, some have opined that Āgama Prakaraṇa is Śruti (scripture); but they have not substantiated their statements by adducing any authoritative source or evidence. It is not possible to surmise as to what is Shri Rāmānujačhārya’s opinion in this matter; one Kurārāyana, who is a well-known follower of that Āchārya, has endorsed the viewpoint of Madhwačhārya alone. It being so, it has to be perforce concluded that to affirm that - “Āgama Prakaraṇa is the Upanishad” - we have not so far come across any reliable, trustworthy evidence.

THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE IN THE THEORY THAT MĀṆḌŪKYOPANISHAD IS GAUḌAPĀDA’S TREATISE

Secondly, the Western scholar, Deussen, has imagined that - (a) to say that Shri Śaṅkara had believed Māṇḍūkyopanishad to be an Upanishad there is no evidence; (b) Gauḍapāda himself might have written that part of the treatise. For this surmise of his, the two logical devices which are his mainstay are: (i) In the Bhāshya sentence - ‘वेदान्तार्थसारसहायपृष्ठमिद् प्रकरणचतुष्टयम् ओमित्वेक्षकारतिं इति आरम्भे’ - there is an indication to suggest that Māṇḍūkya is included in the four Prakaraṇas; (ii) Shri Śaṅkara has not quoted or exemplified Māṇḍūkya as Śruti (scriptural text) anywhere at all. But, at the same time, Śaṅkara having
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exemplified Māṇḍūkya as Gaudapāda’s work also is not to be seen anywhere. In the sentence, which Deussen has illustrated, it is also possible to interpret it to mean - “The four-some Prakaraṇa treatise beginning with the (Upanishad)” - also. Shri Śaṅkara has quoted one Kārikā of Āgama Prakaraṇa (1-16) as also one Kārikā from Advaita Prakaraṇa (3-15) (to be an authoritative statement by those who know the traditional method of teaching) in Sūtra Bhāṣya (1-4-14 ; 2-1-9). If it were true that just as the verses quoted, like ‘अनैते र्लोक भवनति’ - (meaning, here in this context these verses are there) - the Upanishad too had been written by Gaudapāda himself, then in that event, there is no scope whatsoever to divine the cause (reason) for the prose portion, which is to be commented upon, being brief, whereas the poetry portion, which is the commentary (elucidatory), being elaborate ; just as there is in vogue a practice, among the authors of Sanskrit literature, of writing the prose portion elaborately and abridging the same matter in poetry - there is no contrary practice to be seen anywhere. [It is not possible even for those who assert that - “Both the prose portion and the Āgama Prakaraṇa are, together, the Upanishad itself” - to adduce a convincing reason for the verses quoted here to be so elaborate. For, the system that is seen in the Upanishads is quite contrary to this]. In addition to all this, Shri Sureshwarā, who is a direct disciple of Shri Śaṅkara having vociferously called Māṇḍūkya a Śruti is to be seen in his Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika (3-8-26). It being so, there is no hurdle or difficulty whatsoever to be seen in believing or assuming that - “Māṇḍūkya is a Śruti ; the four Prakaraṇas of Āgama, Vaitathya etc. are together the work of one and the same author.”

THE THEORY THAT GAUDAPĀDA WAS A BUDDHIST IS A FALLACY

An author by name Ānandagiri, who has written a sub-commentary on Māṇḍūkyopanishad Bhāṣya as also on the commentary on the Kārikās, has mentioned that he has written a sub-commentary on the Gaudapādiya Bhāṣya (of Śaṅkara). He has further stated that - “Māṇḍūkya is a Śruti” - “Prakaraṇa-chatushtāya is the resultant fruit of the Vidyā that Shri Gaudapāda-chārya earned as a boon by invoking Nārāyaṇa (Shri Vishṇu)”. It is quite evident here that this traditional legend must have been
invariably there in vogue even prior to Ānandagiri. Even so, another Western thinker, Wallaser, has opined that because there are a few verses (Kārikās) in Alātashānti Prakaraṇa which are the replicas of certain verses found in the treatise - “Tarkajwāla” - written by a Buddhist by name - ‘Bhāvaviveka’ - the statement that there existed an author by name - ‘Gauḍapāda’ - is itself ridden with doubts. It is already mentioned that Prof. Surendra Nath Dasgupta has opined that Gauḍapāda had respect or adoration for Buddhistic methodologies. It is not clearly known as to what exact supporting evidence there is for this modern scholar to discard or refute what Sureshwara and others have very clearly declared that - “The Kārikās are verily the work of Gauḍapāda.” It is not possible for us to disregard or disrespect what Šāṅkara has eulogized and remembered at the end of his Bhāshya viz. that (Gauḍapāda) was his ‘Paramaguru’ (grand-preceptor). It is quite probable for a doubt of the type - ‘Whether the author of the Kārikās had a name - Gauḍapāda - or not?’ - to arise ; for, as he hailed from a region by name - ‘Gaudadesha’ - he might have been quite popular and called by the name - ‘Gauḍapāda’. But especially the difference or distinction that exists between the philosophical teachings of the Kārikākāra and the Buddhists is not so very unclear or obscure as to be neglected or disregarded. Because of the facts :- (a) In the Alātashānti Prakaraṇa Gauḍapāda has profusely and predominantly used Buddhistic logical devices to refute the doctrines of other schools ; (b) he has utilized several Buddhistic technical terms found in their treatises - even some indiscreet or unwary people of our country too have called the Kārikākāra ‘Pracchannabouddha’ (meaning, pseudo-Buddhist).

Therefore, here is an arduous attempt by Shri Satchidānandendra Saraswati Swamiji, of revered memory, to totally wipe out any traces of doubt that in the methodology of Māṇḍūkya Kārikās there is a dubious blending or mixture of Buddhistic teachings, but at the same time, with a view to helping Tattwajijñāsus (genuine seekers of the Ultimate Reality of the Self) discern and divine the unique and extra-ordinary methodology that is implicit in Vedāntic texts of this type, the salient topics of this treatise have been divided under various heads and briefly described hereunder.
Because in this Chapter the traditional methodology of propounding the Absolute Reality is adopted and followed in order to explain Māṇḍūkyopanishad, this Prakaraṇa has earned this name. In this Chapter there exists an exposition of the method of Avasthātraya (the three states of Consciousness). The waking Ātman (Self) is called ‘Vishwa’, meaning, Ātman who has the entire gross world of duality perceived in the waking as His Upādhi (adjunct) ; the dreaming Ātman is called ‘Taijasa’, meaning, the Self who has the entire subtle world seen in the dream as His Upādhi ; the deep sleep Ātman is called ‘Prajña’ or ‘Avyākrita’, meaning, Ātman who is the very cause for the entire universe. Thus one and one Ātman alone is appearing in three different forms (1-1). Because in each of these Avasthās the entire Jñeyarāshi (gamut of things that can be known objectively) is hidden or implicit, these Vishwa, Taijasa and Prajña are called Ātman’s ‘Padas’ (quarters). But the Paramārtharūpa (Absolute, Ultimate form) of Ātman is extremely different or distinct from all these three forms (1-10 to 1-15). All these three forms are the Asatya (false) forms appearing in Ātman due to Anādi Māyā (beginningless illusion) ; they do not exist in reality (1-16).

Because this Ātmatattwa (Absolute, Transcendental Reality of Self) is devoid of Vāchya (that object which can be named by speech) and Vāchaka (that subject which pronounces the named by speech) Bhāvas (concepts), this Reality is being called ‘Ōmkāra’ and ‘Ātman’. The essence of teaching of the Āgama Prakaraṇa is: ‘This Ōmkāra or Ātman is Shiva (the ultimate personified Truth which is auspicious, benign) alone, who is Prapañchōpashama (devoid of the world of duality) - (1-24 to 29). Because this very methodology of Avasthātraya is taken up for the purposes of drawing conclusions in the fourth and last Chapter of Ālatashānti Prakaraṇa (4-57 to 90), it becomes established that the subject-matter for both these Prakaraṇas is one and the same. This Prakriyā (methodology) which succeeds in establishing Ātmavāda (the doctrine of the innermost Self) through the three universal experiences of the three Avasthās (viz. waking, dream and deep sleep) is not acceptable in the least to the Buddhists.
Preface

VAITATHYA PRAKARANA

In this Chapter, after expounding and establishing the truth that both the Avasthās of waking and dream are identical in all respects (2-1 to 10), it has been demonstrated effectively that all Dvaita (duality) is Kalpita (imagined, misconceived) in Ātman alone (2-11 to 38). This tenet also which propounds that - 'Ātman is the Adhishṭhāna (substratum) for Prapañchādhyāsa (the misconception or delusion of the world of duality)' - is totally opposed to the Buddhistic 'Nairatmyavāda (theory of essencelessness of our own Being as Self or, in short, Nihilism)'.

ADVAITA PRAKARANA

In this Chapter first the Jātabrahmavāda (theory of Brahman being born or having birth) of certain proponents - who used to argue that - 'Brahman is born in the forms of Chetana (sentient) and Achetana (insentient) beings; the Īivas attain Brahmaswarūpa (the essential nature of the ultimate Reality) by means of Upāsana (meditation) - is refuted and then the (Vedāntic) teaching that - 'The creation that is indicated in the Śruti is merely an Upāya (device, plan) to teach the Aikya (unity, identity) of Īva (transmigratory soul) and Paramātman (the Supreme Self) - (3-10 to 27). The Swamata (the traditional philosophy of Advaita Vedānta of his own school) which is of the Satkāryarupa [nature of propagation of the tenet that 'Sat' (the Reality) Itself as the cause or substratum appears as an effect] is clarified (3-27, 28) by expounding the Vedāntic teaching - "Brahman may, by virtue of Māyā (illusion), be born in the form of the world of duality; but Asat (unreal thing) can never be born either in reality or through Māyā." "If one cognizes or Intuits that - 'Ātman alone is Satya (the Ultimate Reality)' - the mind becomes (or is rendered) Amanas (no-mind)" - this tenet is demonstrated (3-29 to 39). Further, it has been instructed that Madhyamadhikāris (practitioners who belong to the middle-grade qualifications) also can cognize this Tattwa (Ultimate Reality) by means of Manōnigraha (an Intuitive method of giving up one's innate identification with his inner instrument of Mind in its entirety) - (3-40 to 46). Thus this Prakaraṇa - which, in truth, firmly establishes Advaita (non-dualism) by deliberating on Śrutiyaṛtha (the tenets of the Upanishads) and by Yukti (logical devices
based on Intuitive Experiences) ; and after refuting by clear-cut, unambiguous statements the fallacious doctrine of *Asatkāryavāda* (the doctrinaire theory that *Asat* or unreal thing itself is born), which acknowledges *Sadāvartavāda* (the Vedāntic tenet of *Sat* or Ultimate Reality of Brahman or Ātman Itself appears to have been born as the world of duality and the Jīvas living in it) - can never be acceptable to any Buddhist whosoever he may be.

**ALĀTASHĀNTI PRAKARĀNA**

The *Abheda* (non-difference) among *Jñātṛu* (the knower), *Jñeya* (the object to be known), *Jñāna* (the knowledge) concepts or categories has been expounded in this Prakaraṇa in a subtle and serene manner both in the *Upakrama* (introductory part or preamble of the treatise) and the *Upasamhāra* (conclusive part) portions (4-1, 4-99). Because the Dvaitins are arguing one against the other among themselves and since there is no possibility whatsoever of one's logical devices being accepted by any opponent, all Dvaita philosophies are *Mithyā* (false or fallacious) ; whereas, the Advaita philosophy, which expounds that - "*Paramārtha* (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality beyond all empirical dealings, concepts or categories as It is beyond time, space and causation) is not opposed to anything whatsoever" (3-17, 18), that was briefly propounded in Advaita Prakaraṇa - is itself being described here in detail and thereby the *Ajātivāda* (the Vedāntic tenet of Brahman or Ātman is devoid of birth) is firmly established (4-2 to 23). First, the doctrines of *Vaibhāsikasoutrāntika* (the school of Realism among the Buddhists), who believe in the reality of the external things or objects, are refuted from the viewpoint of the *Vijñānavadins* (the school of Idealism among the Buddhists), who believe in the reality of the external things or objects, are refuted from the viewpoint of the *Vijñānavadins* (the school of Idealism among the Buddhists), who acknowledge only the internal mental concepts or ideas to be real (4-25 to 27) and, then by their own method of dialectics their *Vijñānavāda* is refuted (4-28) ; finally the Vedāntic method of *Ajātivāda* is elaborately expounded (4-29 onwards). It is never possible for anyone - whosoever he may be - to build up or show any relationship between the Buddhistic *Pratītyasamutpada* (dependent origination), which propounds that *Avidyā* (ignorance) and other concomitant categories are born one from the other, and the Vedāntic *Ajātivāda* (theory
of no birth or creation), which establishes that for Advitiya Atman (non-dual Self) there is no birth whatsoever from the Paramarth (Absolute) viewpoint.

Those present-day research scholars who have reckoned a similarity of methodologies between the Manadukya Karikas and the Buddhistic texts have not evidently taken into consideration the commentary of Shri Saikaracharya. It is quite plausible for logical-minded people to question in the manner - "Knowingly or unknowingly, the Bhaskarakara might have interpreted the Karikas in a totally different manner, is it not?" It is for the sake of removing the doubts of such people alone, without taking recourse to or depending upon the Bhashya, but merely on the examination of the Gaudapada Karikas alone it was convincingly proved above that there is no relationship or similarity whatsoever between the methodologies of the Karikas and of the Buddhistic treatises. Especially if one discerns the teachings of the Bhaskarakara (i.e. Shri Saikara), the bare fact that - 'The Karikas have, in truth, championed the cause of the Vedantic Prasthanatraya methodology alone' - becomes crystal clear. It is true that at certain places there is an apparent similarity between the words used in the Karikas and the Buddhistic texts; but, there is no similarity of meaning of those words at all. Just as Badarayana (the author of Vedanta Sutras) has in his Sutras used words like 'Pradhana', 'Pratyaksha', 'Anumana' - which are technical terms belonging to alien schools of philosophy - so as to suit the Vedantic methodology, Gaudapada too has utilized Buddhists' technical terms with a different meaning altogether to suit Vedantic tenets.

Since in this Prakara it is to be found that first by means of the Buddhistic logical devices the doctrines of other disputants are refuted and then 'entrapping', as it were, Buddhists too by their own logical device their doctrines are also refuted - in certain contexts of this type certain Buddhistic logical devices being seen is not surprising or contradictory. We need not discuss or deliberate upon the controversial topic - 'Whether Ashwaghosha, Nagarjuna and such other Buddhists lived before or after Gaudapada.' Even those who affirm that Gaudapada himself came later than those Buddhist scholars will be constrained to give their consent to the above-mentioned conclusion. For, it is not possible
for anyone to assert that, while an opponent’s argument is being refuted, merely, on the count that his technical terms as also his logical devices are utilized in the deliberations or discussions, it does not at all amount to accepting the opponent’s argument or doctrine.

IS ALĀTASHĀNTI PRAKARĀNA AN INDEPENDENT TREATISE?

Some scholars have imagined or inferred - on the ground that in the beginning and at the end of this Prakarāṇa there are invocatory verses and the profuse usage of Buddhistic terminology and logical devices - that this Prakarāṇa is a separate independent treatise by itself without having any relationship whatsoever with the preceding three Chapters. The shallowness of this theory also becomes clear by virtue of the above-mentioned logical devices. Śaṅkara has called this Prakarāṇa ‘Śāstra’ (scripture) - (4-1, 4-100). But merely on that count it cannot be affirmed that this Chapter is in itself a separate text; if it is asserted in that manner, then it becomes contradictory to Śaṅkara’s own promise or proclamation made at the beginning that he would write a Bhaṣya to all four Prakarāṇas. Hence, just as the 15th chapter of Bhagavadgītā is said to be ‘Śāstra’ with the implicit meaning of ‘the essence of Gītāśāstra’ (15-20), in the same manner here too this Prakarāṇa, which signifies the very essence of the Śāstra of the form of Maṇḍūkyopanishad, is called by Śaṅkara, the Bhaṣyakāra, ‘Śāstra’ - thus we have to reckon. Since it is already mentioned that the tenets which are expounded in the other three Chapters are themselves being conclusively established in this last Prakarāṇa, let us stop this consideration here.

FOR THE BUDDHISTIC PHILOSOPHY TOO THE UPAISHAD ALONE IS THE ORIGIN

If we thoroughly and deeply observe, it will have to be inferred that for the Buddhistic philosophy to spread out and be propagated on the strength of logical devices the Upanishad itself is responsible in a circuitous manner. For; among the Buddhists in the beginning there were no canonical texts which were predominantly logical in their approach; they were mainly instructing about - ‘Dvādāshaniḍāna or Bhavachakra’, ‘Shila’,
‘Samādhi’, ‘Prajñā’ - only. In fact, their extra-ordinary tenet (theory) is that Ātman does not exist. Even so, after the first century A.D. the logical device of refuting the existence of the world of duality (Prapañcha-nirākaraṇa Yuṣṭik) became strong among them. The reason for this is : A Brahmin by name ‘Ashwaghōsha’ was defeated in a logical contest and was ‘converted’ to Buddhism; he evolved a new Siddhānta (philosophical tenet) called ‘Tathāta’. He argued in the manner - ‘In all of us there are two parts - (i) one part as the Samsāri or transmigratory existence and (ii) ‘Bhūtatathāta’ (meaning, that entity which exists as it is) - another part; Samsāra is Asatya (false, unreal); ‘Tathāta’ is having an essential nature which cannot be said to be Satya (real) or Asatya (unreal).’ It need not be pointed out as to how near or close is this tenet of his to the Upanishadic theory of ‘Kutasthanirvishesha Ātman’. However, after Ashwaghōsha his theory did not gain strength. In Buddhistic texts like ‘Laṅkāvatāra’ etc. although this very doctrine called by a different name of ‘Tathāgatagabhan’ is signified, therein it has been very clearly stated that - ‘This doctrine or theory is instructed as a first lesson to ignorant people who believe that ‘Ātman’ exists, but it is not absolutely true.’ Let it be so. All the logicians who came after Ashwaghosha went on strengthening the ‘Prapañcha-nirākaraṇa-vāda’ (theory of negating the real existence of the world of duality or diversity). Especially, scholars like Nagarjuna, Chandrakirti etc. conjoined new logical arguments to further strengthen this doctrinaire theory. Anyway, between the twin theories of ‘Brahmasatyatwa’ and ‘Jaganmithyātwa’ found in the Upanishads, the second one, viz. Jaganmithyatwa (the falsity of the world of duality) became firm and ensconced through the Buddhists. Because they did not acknowledge the Upanishadic lore as Prāmaṇa (authoritative source), among them the principal doctrine which expounds Brahmasatyatwa (the Absolute Reality of Brahman) paaled off without being given any encouragement or support.

The Buddhists are adepts in expounding the Prapañcha-nirākaranavāda (theory of negating the reality of the world of duality). In answering the question - “When the world of duality is very clearly perceptible and is in our experience to be real, how at all can it be said that it does not exist?” - the Buddhists
raise all kinds of surmises or conjectures about the world of duality which the uninitiated, ignorant people say that it is in their experience and then they demonstrate that these conjectures or concepts cannot survive the onslaught of logic. This method is their main dialectical device. In fact, Shri Gauḍapādacharya has utilized this very device in the Alātashānti Prakaraṇa and by means of that dialectical exercise he has turned the tables on the Buddhists, so to speak, by refuting their methodology also. He has refuted the whole gamut of theories propounding the reality of dualism and thereby demonstrated the greatness and glory of Vaidikatarka (logic used in all the scriptural texts). Those well-known research scholars who do not know this secret are afflicted by a delusion which prompts them to believe that in Vedānta there is an admixture of Buddhistic tenets.

Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣhya on the Kārikās

It has already been intimated that since Gauḍapāda’s Kārikās are quite ancient there is every scope to get deluded to believe that one part of them is the Upanishad and the other part is a Buddhistic Prakaraṇa. It is quite certain that had there not been any Bhāṣhya written by Śaṅkara on this Prakaraṇa-chatusṭṭaya (the four Chapters) it would have been very difficult for Vedāntins also to discern the reality or veracity of this secret. For, we find sufficient support in Shri Sureshwarāchārya’s ‘Bṛhadāranyaka-bhāṣhya Vārtika’ to prove or establish the fact that - “Some so-called Vedāntins prior to Śaṅkara were actually commenting on this treatise (i.e. Māndūkya Kārikā) - which expounds predominantly Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) alone as Vastutantra (to be cognized as it is in esse and not to be conceived or imagined) - as if it is Upāsanāpara (meant for purposes of meditation).” In this Vārtika, the opinions of those who had believed the 38th verse of the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa and the 46th verse of the Advaita Prakaraṇa to be Jñānābhyaśapara (meant for repetition of the Intuitive Knowledge) and were quoting them for this purpose (Bṛ. Vā. 4-4-887, 888) have been refuted. Even to this day it is to be seen that among Advaitins themselves there exist several bizarre differences of opinion as far as the Vedānta Siddhānta is concerned. It being so, it becomes quite essential here in this context to bring to the notice of the readers certain
important topics which are implicit in the Kārikābhāṣya. By this the Jījñāsus (true, sincere seekers), who wish to discern the profound teaching of genuine Vedāntic Siddhānta (final spiritual teachings) that are implicit in the Kārikās are sure to benefit a great deal.

IS ADVĀITA (NON-DUALISM) ŚĀASTRASIDDHA (ESTABLISHED ON THE SUPPORT OR BASIS OF SCRIPTURES) OR TARKASIDDHA (BASED ON LOGIC) ?

In Vedānta the essence of the entire universe is called 'Brahman'; the Vedānta Siddhānta - as a philosophical system - teaches that - “Brahman is the Ātman (Self) of all of us; It is Advitiya (non-dual) and is Nirvishesha (devoid of any attributes whatsoever).” The Vedāntins say that this Siddhānta is known from the Upanishads alone and it cannot be known either by Pratyaksha Pramāṇa (perception as a valid means of knowledge) or Anumāna Pramāṇa (inference as a valid means of knowledge). In order to signify that Brahman can be known only from the Śāstra (scriptural text) of the form of Upanishads the special term “Oupanishada” (the adjectival form of Upanishad) is used in the Śruti (scriptural text); whereas in the Brahmasūtras the special term of Śāstra Yōni (the scriptures being the womb or birth place) is used. All this appears to the predominantly logical-minded or highly rational people of this modern science age to be a contradiction. These logical-minded people opine: “For those who believe in the Vedas, Brahman may be Śāstraika Vedya (that which can be known only from the Śāstras); but can Buddhists and such others - who do not have any faith in the authoritativness of the Vedas - accept this tenet? No. For this reason, Gauḍapāda relied on the Vedaprāmāṇya (Vedas as the authoritative, canonical texts) and signified the Paramārtha (the Absolute Reality of Brahman) in the Āgama Prakaraṇa and then for the sake of those who do not believe in that (i.e. Vedaprāmāṇya) he has established his Siddhānta in the remaining three Prakaraṇas exclusively (merely) on Yukti (logical devices). Shri Śaṅkara also has written like that alone.”

If we deeply observe, it would appear that this queer opinion is formulated because these so-called ‘rational people’ have not meticulously examined and properly deliberated upon Śaṅkara Bhāṣya, as also they have not discerned the basic nature of the
Pramāṇatarkas (logical systems which rely on the valid means of knowledge) and their mutual differences and distinctions. For, Śaṅkara’s vehement statements to the effect that he has established Advaita by means of both Śruti and Yukti are to be found in the Kārikābhasya of all the four Prakaraṇas; for example:

(1) प्रथमं प्रकरणम् आगमप्रधानम्।
(2) आगममात्र तत्। तत्र उपपत्तापि हैतस्य वैतम्य शक्यते अवधार्यितम्। इति द्वितीयं प्रकरणम् आरम्भते।
(3) अर्थात् किमागममात्रेण प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, आहोस्वितु तत्केणापि इति। अत आह-शक्यते तत्केणापि ज्ञातुम्। तत् कथम्। इति अर्थात्प्रकरणम् आरम्भते।
(4) शास्त्रोपपत्तिभ्याम्, अवधारितत्वात् अवधारितदर्शनं सम्पन्नदर्शनम्। तद्वार्तवात् मिथ्यादर्शनम्। अन्यत्।
(5) ओऽकारनिर्णयद्विधेभन आगमं प्रतिभास्य अहैतस्य बाप्पविषययोद्वैतव्याप्त्ति सिद्धस्य, पुनं अर्थात् शास्त्र्युक्तिः साधारण निर्षारित्वम्। “एवतुदुर्म सत्यम्” (३-४८) इति उपसंहारः। कृतं। अते। तत्स्यतस्य आगमार्थाय अहैत्तदर्शनस्य प्रतिपक्षपूया:। द्वैतिनं। वैनाशिकाचर्।

Here above in the fifth sentence we should keep in mind the conclusion drawn by saying - “Advaita Darshana is Āgamaṁartha (the prime purport of the Śāstra) alone”; for, although Advaita or non-dualism is established by means of Yukti, for it, in the main, Āgama (Śāstra) alone is Pramāṇa (authoritative source) - this fact becomes clarified by this statement. Not merely in the first Āgama Prakaraṇa but in the remaining three Prakaraṇas too (2-31; 3-11, 12; 4-90) Upanishads have been quoted. It is also quite reasonable that in the last three Prakaraṇas - which are predominantly logical in their treatment and approach - Yukti has been given a higher place or importance.

It should not be objected in the manner - “If one argues by assuming Śāstrapramāṇa, how at all can the Siddhānta become acceptable to the rest of the disputants?” For, here there is no occasion whatsoever for believing the Śruti sentence to be a Pramāṇa (valid source of knowledge). Although in the Karma Kāṇḍa (the ritualistic portion of the Vedic lore) such a circumstance arises, since the Vastubōdhakavākyas (sentences which teach or expound the really real, Absolute Entity of Ātman or Brahman) of the Jñāna Kāṇḍa give rise to Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) alone which is Vastvanusāri (in consonance with the
Ultimate Reality *in esse* no one - whosoever he or she may be - can ever possibly refute or negate It. One may ask - “If so, where is the need for Tarka (logic)?” The Naiyāyikas (exponents of Nyāyas or axiomatic science) proclaim that one should accept an Anubhava (experience) born out of a Pramāṇa only after its veracity and validity are examined and investigated thoroughly by means of Tarka. Hence just as that experience (knowledge) which accrues from using Pramāṇas like the Pratyaksha (perception), Anumāṇa (inference) etc. is examined or investigated by means of Tarka and then only we accept a principle to be universal, in the same manner that knowledge which accrues from the Āgama-pramāṇa (valid source of Śāstra or scripture) is also to be examined and explored by means of logical devices and only then to determine the truth is quite reasonable. Śāstra is Bōdhaka (that which instructs, teaches), while Tarka is Shōdhaka (exploratory, investigatory). For that reason alone Shri Śaṅkara has written in his remaining Bhashyas also that - “What is established on the strength of Āgama (Śāstra) and Upapatti (logical device) itself eventually becomes sustainable as Paramārtha (Absolute Reality).”

**THE MANNER IN WHICH ŚĀSTRA SIGNIFIES OR EXPOUNDS THE PARAMĀRTHA**

The answer that Shri Śaṅkara has given to the question - “How does the Śāstra (scripture) signify or expound Brahman (the Absolute Reality) which is of the essential nature of Ātman (Self)?” - is highly subtle and profound, needing a great deal of deliberative analysis. Since there is no cause giving rise to any function of speech in Brahman, it is not possible at all to signify It by means of speech. Hence, through signifying in the manner - “In It there does not exist any special feature or attribute which appears due to misconception” - the Śāstra expounds It. Due to, Avasthātraya (the three states of Consciousness, viz., waking, dream and deep sleep) the qualities like Antahprajñatwa (internal awareness) etc. are Kalpita (imagined, misconceived) in Ātman. By sublating or rescinding this superimposition (Adhyārōpa) alone the Ātmaswarūpa (the essential nature of the innermost, Absolute Self) has perforce to be signified; the purport behind the rescission or abrogation in this fashion is to signify, denote that Ātman is Avasthātrayātita
(beyond the ken or purview of the three states Consciousness) alone and not to indicate that Ātman is one having a separate and distinct Avasthā (state of Consciousness) called Turiya (fourth comparatively to the three referred to as universal experiences). In fact, because Advaita (non-dual Reality) is the very Self (i.e. core of Being) of the Jijñāsu (the ardent seeker) and is verily the Āspada (substratum, support) for the whole gamut of Dvaitavikalpas (imagined phenomena of duality) which are Adhyasta (superimposed on Ātman) - just as the rope is the substratum for the snake imagined or misconceived due to Bhrānti (delusion) - by abrogating or sublating what is Adhyāropta (superimposed) alone, Advaita Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of non-dual Self) invariably and unfailingly accrues. Since Ātmaswarūpa is contiguous with all Vikalpas (imagined phenomena), there is no need whatsoever for a Pratyaya (mental concept having the stamp of certainty or conviction) of Ātmaswarūpa to accrue or arise afresh. If the Śāstra denotes or depicts that such and such a Dharma (quality or special attribute) does not exist in Ātman, it does not at all thereby entertain an opinion or motive to indicate that an ‘opposite’ or contra of that Dharma exists in Ātman. For, any Dharma whatsoever existing eternally in Ātman is never to be found.

Hence, the function of the Śāstra is exclusively to rescind or abrogate the Ajñāna (ignorance) pertaining to Ātman. Let it be any Pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge) - its function lies exclusively in removing, abrogating the Ajñana with regard to the Prameya (the object of knowledge) ; but to believe that in addition to this, another function of objectifying the Prameya and illumining it - subsists for it is fallacious indeed ; because the knowledge or cognition of an object accrues spontaneously and automatically, so to speak, by virtue of Ajñānanāśa (sublation of ignorance), it is not a Pramāṇaphala (fruit, resultant produced by valid means). Therefore, Paramārtha Tattwajñāna (the Intuitive Knowledge of the Absolute, Transcendental Reality of the Self) accrues merely by Anarthaprapachāntvritti (abrogation or rescission of the world of duality, which is the cause for all mundane miseries and mishaps) which are Ārōpita (superimposed) on Ātman ; and for this purpose neither any Pramāṇāntara (other valid means) called ‘Sākshātkāra’ (materialization or actualization
of an esoteric experience) nor any *Sādhanāntara* (other spiritual practice or discipline) of the type of *Prasaṅkhyaṇa* (repetition of an exercise) etc. is needed whatsoever.

**THE AJÑĀNA THAT IS RESCINDED BY ŚĀSTRAIC JÑĀNA**

Ajñāna (ignorance) is of two kinds; (a) an insensate and indolent sleep in which the *Tattwa* (the Ultimate Reality) is not known at all; (b) a dubious, delusory dream in which all things or phenomena are misconceived (1-15). ‘Agrāhāṇa’ meaning, not knowing or cognizing, is the cause for *Anyathāgraṇaṇa* (erroneously knowing or misconceiving) - (1-15). In *Sushupti* (deep sleep state) the cause alone exists, while in the waking and dream states both the cause and the effects exist; but in *Turiya* who is devoid of *Avasthātraya* (the three states of Consciousness), meaning, the *Shuddhātman* (Pure, Absolute Self), both these do not exist (1-11, 14) To believe that both these (i.e. Agrahaṇa and Anyathāgraṇaṇa) exist in Ātman is *Viparyāsa* (misconception), *Bhrānti* (delusion) - (1-15). All these above tenets are very clearly written in both the Gauḍapāda *Kārikās* and Śaṅkara’s *Bhāshya* on them. Even so, such an indubitable and unmistakable statement the present-day *Vyākhyaṇakaras* (post-Śaṅkara sub-commentators) have misconstrued in the manner: (a) *Kāraṇājñāna* means ‘Mūlāvidyā’ - a particular *Āvaraṇavishesha* (a special feature of engulfing or covering). Because it has been propounded in the Kārikās that -(1) ‘Agrahaṇa’ means not knowing the Tattwa or Absolute Reality of the Self; (ii) since it is the cause for the *Vishēṣajñāna* (knowledge of various manifest phenomena) of the waking and dream, this *Agrahaṇa* is being called ‘*Kāraṇāvidyā*’ (the causal ignorance in a potential or seed form) in deep sleep. In the *Shuddhātman* (Pure, Absolute Self) called ‘Turiya’ also this *Agrahaṇa* exists; but due to that there is no possibility whatsoever of *Anyathājñāna* (misconception, erroneous knowledge) arising - not in the least - it is not, really speaking, *Kāraṇāvidyā* (1-13). Hence, in the Kārikās there is not even an iota of scope for this fallacious *Mūlāvidyāvāda* (theory of the substantiability of the causal ignorance).

Further, in some *Vyākhyaṇas* (sub-commentaries) it is found that *Avyākṛtanaṁmarūpabija* (the unmanifested seed form of names and forms), which hâs to be perforce conceived to be the cause
for the manifest appearances of names and forms of the world of duality, is itself called ‘Māyā’ (illusion) and Mulāvidyā (the substantial causal ignorance). But since in the Bhāshya sentences like - ‘अविद्याकृतनामरूपमयास्वरूपण’ and ‘अविद्याकृत्तमयापौजेजोत्प्रातानाम’ - it has been clearly stated that Māyā, which is the Bīja (seed form or cause) for names and forms, is itself said to be Avidyākṛita (brought about by ignorance), it evolves that - “Māyā itself is Adhyāsta (misconceived)” - and hence it will not be in accordance or consonance with the Bhāshya to assert that - “Māyā is Mulāvidyā which is the substantial cause for Adhyāsa (misconception).” Therefore, in this manner too it becomes fully established that in the Kārikā Bhāshya there is no scope whatsoever for the theory of Mulāvidyā.

**AJĀTIVĀDA (THE DOCTRINE OF BIRTHLESSNESS)**

The doctrine that -“Ātman is, in the Absolute sense, Janmādi-vikārarahita (devoid of changes or mutations like birth, growth, death etc) ; as also He is Praśāntichopashama (devoid of the world of duality)” - is called ‘Ajātivāda’ in Vedāntic parlance. In Māṇḍūkya this doctrine alone has been propounded as its ultimate purport. To the doubt of the type - “The world of duality comprising sentient and insentient phenomena is appearing in Ātman to all of us, is it not ? What will be its fate ?” - the solution that - “The entire world that appears to us is - just like a dream - Mithyā (false, unreal) ; in the Absolute sense, all this is verily Ātman alone” - was provided in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa. In the Upanishad - just like Vaishwanarātman (Ātman having the waking as an adjunct is called by this name) - for Taijasātman (Ātman having the dream as an adjunct) too it has been taught that there are Saptāṅgas (seven limbs or parts, macrocosmical in their proportions or magnitude) and Ekōnavimśatimukhas (19 doorways, microcosmically speaking) and this aspect itself - it can be inferred - has been explained in detail in that second Prakaraṇa.

For the doubt that - “In other Śruts it has been propounded that the Jīvas (transmigratory souls) are born out of Brahman and by Upāsana (meditation) they attain Brahma Sāyujya (merger with Brahman), how come this contradiction ?” - a consolation has been provided in the Advaita Prakaraṇa. Just as the empty
space (*Ākāśa*) due to adjuncts like an earthen pot etc. appears to have been born, in the same manner Jīvas too - due to their adjuncts of the forms of the body, the senses, the mind etc. - appear to have been born. Just as, in truth, the empty space itself is the ‘essence’ of adjuncts like the earthen pot etc., these *Upādhis* (adjuncts) of the body, the senses etc. also are verily Ātman alone. Since the body, the senses etc. in their respective forms are - just like the dream body, senses etc. - *Mithyā* (false, unreal) alone, to conclude that Ātman is *Advitīya* (non-dual), *Aja* (birthless), *Niśprapañcha* (devoid of the world of duality) there is no impediment or difficulty whatsoever. In fact, the *Srīṣṭi* (creation) that has been propounded in the Śrutis is this *Māyikāsṛṣṭi* (illusory creation) alone. For the Śruti there is no *Paramatātparya* (the ultimate or absolute purport of teaching) in propounding ‘Srīṣṭi’; it is merely an *Upāya* (device) utilized to help discern Ātman’s *Ekatva* (non-dualism, oneness of the Self) but not to teach that *Dvaita* (duality) is *Satya* (real). For this reason alone, in the Śrutis Ātmaikatva (non-dualism of the Self) is eulogized, praised - whereas *Nānātva* (manifolds) is decried, refuted. Upāsana and its resultant fruit of Brahmasāyujya have been taught in the Śrutis for the sake of those *Adhikāris* (qualified practitioners) entertaining *Avidyādṛṣṭi* (the viewpoint of ignorance), as they are not able to cognize the *Paramārtha* (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality of the Self); hence, for the Ajātivāda which the Śruti propounds as its ultimate purport there is no danger or damage caused.

Here an objection of the type - “Proponents of other schools of philosophy like Sānkhyans, Kaṇādas (Vaisheshikas or proponents of Vedic Atomic theory), Jains and Buddhists etc. have also expounded the *Paramārtha* (the Ultimate Reality) by means of *Yukti* (logical devices), is it not? Now, this *Vaidikavāda* (theory taught by the Vedic lore) which propounds that - ‘Ātman is *Aja* (birthless), *Nishprapañcha* (devoid of the world of duality)’ - is opposed to their philosophical doctrines, is it not?” - may arise. It is true that the other disputants accept the theory of cause and effect, but as regards the topic - “How is the effect born from the cause? What are the essential natures of ‘cause’ and its ‘effect’?" - they are not unanimous in their theories; on the other hand, they are mutually opposed to one another. Not only
that, the defects that the proponent of one school points out in the doctrines of a rival group are insoluble or irrefutable; from this itself, the fact that Ajātivāda is correct gets evolved. But the satisfactory solution that - "To the Advaita philosophy - which propounds that all duality is born only magically or illusorily and that birth in itself is not Paramārtha or absolutely real - no brand of dualism whatsoever can possibly be antagonistic" - is depicted in the Advaita Prakaraṇa in brief and in the Alatashānti Prakaraṇa in detail. For all these reasons, both in the Kārikās and the Bhāshya it has been fully established that ‘Ajātivāda’ is irrefutable.

THE REALITY BEHIND PRĀTIBHĀŚIKAVASTUS
(ILLUSORY PHENOMENA)

It has been propounded both in the Kārikās and the Bhāshya (1-16, 17; 2-2; 3-19, 24, 27) that - "In the Ajātivāda, the tenet that - ‘Neither the Jīvas nor the Jātavastus (gross things) are born at all’ - is Paramārtha (Absolutely real); that they are ‘born’ is Māyika (illusory)’ - is it not? In order to elucidate this theory they have adduced illustrations of the rope-snake etc. Here in this context - we have already indicated - the Vyakhyanaprasthana (post-Sureshwara school) has interpreted ‘Māyā’ as Mūlāvidyā. The followers of that school have adapted and utilized this universally acknowledged illustration in a distorted, bizarre manner in propounding their new doctrinaire, dogmatic theory called - ‘Anirvachaniya Padarthotpatti’ (the birth of a thing which is indescribable or indefinable as real or unreal) to render it highly controversial. Their opinion is: “The Prātibhāśika Vastus (illusory objects) like the rope-snake etc. are the Pariṇāma (transformations, metamorphoses) of Avidyā (ignorance) which is called ‘Tūlāvidyā’ or ‘Pallava Vidyā’. By virtue of this illustration alone the doctrine that the world of duality is Māyika, meaning, Mūlāvidyāpariṇāmi (that which is transformed by means of Mūlāvidyā or a substantial causal Avidyā or ignorance) is established.”

For this doctrine there is not even an iota of support either in the Kārikā or the Bhāshya. In the Kārikā it is written: “Just as people misconceive a rope to be a snake or a streak of water etc. because they have not cognized it as a rope - Ātman also
is misconceived in various ways. Just as when people determine
that - 'It is a rope alone' - and there exists that rope alone,
similarly from the Nishchayadrishti (viewpoint of conviction and
determination) Ātman alone exists” - (2-17, 18). In the Bhāshya
there are sentences of the type - “The imagined snake miscon­
ceived in the rope due to Bhrānti (delusion) does not really exist
and by virtue of Viveka (discrimination) it does not vanish” ;
“The rope-snake etc. which are the misconceptions of the mind
do not merge in the rope etc. nor are they born from the rope
etc.” ; “Just as the conglomerations of the earthen pot etc. are
born from that very Akāsha (empty space), in the same way from
Paramātman (Supreme Self), who is analogous to Akāsha, the
gross conglomerations like Pṛithivi (earth) etc. as also the internal
conglomerations within us which are Karyakāraṇarūpa (of the
forms of effect and cause) are misconceived to have been born
just like the rope-snake.” If we examine these sentences, it can
be emphatically and affirmatively said that neither in the mind
of the Kārikākāra nor of the Bhāshyakāra there was even an iota
of this wild imagination of Prātibhāsika Utpatti (birth of an
illusory object). Even during the time the rope-snake etc. are
imagined (misconceived) in the rope etc. and they appear, at that
moment too, in reality, the rope-snake etc. are not born (physi­
cally) ; in the same manner, even if it is said that - ‘From Ātman
the world of duality, is born’ - it is - just like the rope-snake
- merely an appearance alone. This alone is the purport of
teaching of the Śruti (2-31 - its Bhāshya ; 4-42 - its Bhāshya ;
4-49 - its Bhāshya). Even the statement that - ‘Ātman is Aja’ -
is not made from the Paramārthadṛṣṭi (viewpoint of the Abso­
lute Truth) ; for, Vedāntins first assume the Avidyādṛṣṭi (view­
point of ignorant people) to the effect that there exist objects or
things which have birth, and on the basis of this viewpoint alone
they propound that - “Ātman is Aja ; He does not have birth
just like the other objects or things.” Therefore, from the
Paramārthadṛṣṭi - ‘Ātman is not Aja ; He is Nirvisheshachinmātra
(Pure, Absolute Consciousness without any special attributes)
devoid of any Dharma whatsoever’ - and this tenet alone is the
essence of Ajātivāda that has been proclaimed both in the Kārikās
and the Bhāshya.
THE OBJECTION AGAINST MĀYĀVĀDA

For those who are totally immersed, as it were, in Dvaita-satyatwabuddhi (innate belief that duality is Absolutely real) - it is very difficult to trust that Prapañcha (the external gross world of duality) is Vitatha (false), Mithyā (unreal), Māyika (illusory) - as propounded in the Kārikās and the Bhāṣya. The logical argument that - “If everything is Mithyā, then what is said to be Mithyā also is rendered Mithyā and thereby it amounts to saying that everything is verily Satya alone” - is being always forwarded by such rabid Dvaitins. God only knows why it does not flash to their mind that - “If everything is accepted to be Mithyā, then the defect, that they point out, also is rendered to be Mithyā” -? Further, somehow it has not been discerned by them that the concepts - “Everything is Mithyā” and “What is called ‘Mithyā’ is also Mithyā” - are not mutually opposed ones.

There is yet another objection raised by Dvaitins against Māyāvāda. That is strengthened and presented in recent times by the late Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, and it says: “The opinion that - everything is Mithyā - runs in and through all Gauḍapādas’ works like warp and woof. A logician bent upon refutation, for the heck of it, may opine that - ‘But, the Śāstra - which propounds that a Mithyā Jīva, in order to evade a Mithyābandhana (false bondage) which exists in a Mithyā Prapāñcha (false world) and to attain a Mithyārūpa Paramapurushārtha (the ultimate goal of all human existence which is itself Mithyā), is carrying on Śādhana - itself (i.e. the Śāstra) may be Mithyā’.” This refutation is not at all a new one. For this both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara have given an answer (1-18 - its Bhāṣya) - viz. “The concepts like Śāstra and Shishya etc. are assumed tentatively for the purposes of spiritual instruction alone, but they are not at all Paramārtha.”

But Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, without taking into consideration this answer, has formulated a ‘Siddhānta’ of his own and has, in the process, expressed an alien opinion which renders the Kārikā Bhāṣya Siddhānta itself topsy-turvy, so to speak: “Between the theory which propounds that - ‘It is an inscrutable secret as to how the Nirvikāra Paramārtha without changing Its Svabhāva appears in the form of the Jagat’ - and the theory that
- 'The entire universe is a mere mirage', which refutes the existence of the world, there is a great difference." Neither the Kārikākāra nor the Bhāshyakāra had believed that the sentence - which smacks of timidity - to the effect - "It is an inscrutable secret as to how the Paramārtha appears in the form of the world of duality" - is acceptable to Tattwa Śāstra ; it is quite evident that such an opinion suggestive of the person's weak-mindedness is of no utility whatsoever for the seekers of Paramapurushārtha. (a) It is in everyone's experience that the waking world exists in the waking only and not in the dream or in the deep sleep ; (b) the truth that Ātman exists in all the three Avasthās as He is without undergoing any change or mutations whatsoever is also Anubhavagamya (discernible by virtue of Intuition). Barr-ing these two experiences, no other Padārtha (entity) exists whatsoever and hence the Jagat (world of duality) is Mithyā, a false appearance that appears in Ātman ; those people who do not have the Pūrṇadrishti (the comprehensive, plenary viewpoint of the Absolute Reality) are dealing with Ātman Himself as the world of duality and not that Ātman has got transformed into the world form - this Siddhānta in consonance with Intuitive Experience gets evolved. If this excellent, profound Shroutatarka (a logical method enunciated in the Śrutis themselves) is branded as 'an inscrutable secret' by those who cannot digest and divine it, then genuine Vedāntins may show some compassion and a sense of pity towards their this lack of discrimination ; what else can they do ?

Dr. Radhakrishnan has expressed a Virōdhābhāsa (a contradictory negative feeling that one begets in his workaday transactions if he follows the Māyāvāda), in the following manner : "It is not possible at all for those who take part in the competitive sport called 'life' to do so by believing that this sport is a mere show or appearance, and the prizes or presents that we win here are mere zeroes ; everyday saying that - 'No object exists really, there is no value whatsoever for anything' - and keeping those very objects with us, we have perforce to carry on our daily transactions - this aspect is the prime defect that exists in this theory." To say that the whole universe in which we live is a 'competition' and that we are engaged and engrossed in this competitive sport with the objective of achieving prizes may be
an acceptable statement to the people brought up in the Western civilization which keeps its competitive transactions as its front-line motto and which is predominantly guided by empirical sciences. But it is not in keeping with our Indian culture and ethos which are predominantly spiritual in their approach to life.

Although the *Kāmyakarmas* (actions or rituals done to get a desire fulfilled) which are stipulated in our scriptures are said to yield fruits like heaven etc., even those are decried to be *Avarakarmas* (low-grade, inferior acts), and then for the sake of those discriminative people who aspire for *Paramapurushārtha* (the prime purport of human existence) *Karma Yōga* has been instructed in the Bhagavadgītā. If we merely remember this profound teaching, the *devil of a desire to acquire prizes* in this worldly sport will get bewitched, as it were, and vanish into thin air. It is quite but natural that people full of desires slog for prizes; but that *Śāstra* (authoritative text) which encourages and applauds such ambitious people cannot be given the honourable name of a ‘Śāstra’.

Further, if the Vedāntic statement that - “The world of duality is Mithyā” - is interpreted as - “No object really exists; no object has any value whatsoever” - then it amounts to doing a great injustice to this theory. For, when it is said that objects are Mithyā, the purport is not that the objects do not have any value at all; it means that they are all, in truth, *Brahman* (the Absolute Reality) alone. The apparent values that we have conceived when compared to the ‘value’ of the Transcendental Entity are zeroes indeed. Those people who assert that - “It is impossible for people, who have realized that everything is verily Brahman, to carry out any worldly transaction” - will have to be dubbed as those who have undertaken the task of not only refuting or decrying Gauḍapāda’s Siddhānta but also the esoteric teachings of Shri Krishṇa, the Gitāchārya. To those who have meticulously studied the Bhagavadgītā verse - ‘निवकर्मण निबहायि’ (Gitā 4-24) and Śaṅkara’s Bhāshya on it will be able to discern the truth that we have expressed here. In the case of those people who have thoroughly understood the Gitōpadesha that - “Although Jñānis are performing all Karmas, in reality they are not performing any Karma whatsoever” - the misconception that -
“By virtue of the Jñānis’ empirical transactions, a prime defect attaches itself to the current theory” - will also vanish.

Before concluding this topic we will examine yet another sentence of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan: “The world of duality may be an inscrutable secret as well as an indescribable or indefinable phenomenon. But by this the fact that - a distinct Reality, which has subsumed within Itself this world as also which exceeds and is beyond this world, necessarily exists - gets established; but the doctrine that the entire world of duality is a mere dream will never evolve out of it.” We have already demonstrated the shallowness of the statement that - “The world is an inscrutable secret.” Neither Gauḍapāda nor Śaṅkara has argued that the world is a mere dream on the basis of the world being an inscrutable secret. Both of them have established in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa by virtue of logical devices in consonance with universal experiences that - “Between the dream and the waking, in any manner or aspect, there does not exist any difference or distinction whatsoever.” Those who point out a defect or deficiency in Gauḍapāda’s teaching should perf ore show the defects in his logical devices or arguments; at least, they should show as to which is that special feature that exists in the waking but not in the dream. But without fulfilling this task if they merely express that this theory cannot be accepted, it will fizzle out into a mere statement but will not amount to a criticism or contradiction of the Siddhānta.

WITH REGARD TO THE DREAM THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN GAUḌAPĀDA AND ŚAṆKARA

On the strength of a statement by Shri Śaṅkarāchārya in his Brahmaśūtra Bhāṣya (2-2-19) to the effect that “Between the waking and the dream, there is Vaidharmya (difference in their natures)” Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and some others have inferred that there is a difference of opinion between Shri Śaṅkara and Shri Gauḍapāda. Shri Kōkileśhwara Śaṅstri has even undertaken the dubious task of showing that to Śaṅkara the distinction between the waking and the dream was acceptable, by distorting

1. The statements of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan that are mentioned here are taken from his book - “Indian Philosophy.”
and misinterpreting certain Bhāshya sentences in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa.

But, if one examines from an unbiased viewpoint it is not possible at all to point out any difference of opinion between the two traditional Āchāryas. Further, nowhere in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa Bhāshya or anywhere else (i.e. in any other Prakaraṇa Bhāshyas) Shri Śaṅkara has expressed explicitly that Shri Gauḍapāda’s opinion is not acceptable to him. In fact, in the Sūtra Bhāshya Shri Śaṅkara has reverentially called Shri Gauḍapāda “One who knows the Sampradāya (traditional methodology of dissemination) of Vedāntārtha (the real purport of the scriptures)” - (Sūtra Bhā. 1-4-14, 2-1-9). Hence it has perforce to be interpreted that in the Sūtra Bhāshya the statement to the effect that there exists a difference between the waking and the dream is made only from the Vyavahāradṛishti (empirical viewpoint). His own Bhāshya statement - ‘अतो वैशेषिकमिदं सन्यस्त मायामात्रतम् उद्दितम्’ - (Sūtra Bhā. 3-2-4) purporting to say that ‘The waking, just like the dream, is Māyika indeed’ - is in keeping with this interpretation.

THE MANONIGRAHA THAT IS TAUGHT IN ADVAITA PRAKARAṆA

In this regard many different opinions have arisen among the present-day Vedāntins. Hence it becomes a necessity to examine a little as to what exactly the Kārikākāra and the Bhāshyakāra have stated about this topic.

(1) “When (the practitioner) does not make any Saṅkalpa (volition) by virtue of Ātmasatyānubōdha (the spiritual instruction about the Ultimate Reality of the Self), then (his) mind attains a state of ‘no-mind’.” - (Kā. 3-23).

(2) “One should cognize the innate nature of the mind which is Nigraha (identification with it is given up) and Nirvikalpa (which is not having or entertaining any concepts whatsoever). The nature of the mind that exists in Sushupti (deep sleep) is different; for, therein the mind gets Laya (merged); but when it is Nigraha it does not get merged.” - (Kā. 3-34, 35).

Some people have believed that the overall meaning of the above Kārikās is: If the mind is made Nigraha (not grasped or suppressed) the Samādhi (Yōgic trance) that accrues has been
explained here and the Mūlāvidyā that exists in Sushupti does not exist in Samādhi. We have already demonstrated that the Mūlāvidyā vāda is not known to the Kārikākāra or the Bhashyakāra. The tenet that - “In Sushupti too, just as in Samādhi, the Advaitatma swarūpa (the essential nature of non-dual Self) alone exists” - has been stridently proclaimed in the Kārikā Bhāṣhya, the Gitā Bhāṣya and the Śūtra Bhāṣya (2-1-9, 3-2-7). Besides, since this is a Jñāna Prakaraṇa (a chapter exclusively dedicated to Self-Knowledge or Intuition) we have to perforce discern it to mean - “Cognizing or Intuiting the Ātmasatya (the Absolute Reality of the Self) by means of Viveka (discrimination) and achieving Chittanirōḍha (giving up identification with the mind Intuitively) is itself called here by the name ‘Nigraha'. Therefore, just like Dvaita (duality, manifoldness) appears to be real as usual when one wakes up from deep sleep, Dvaita when it gets Bādhita (sublated, falsified) by means of Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) it does not at all appear to be real. This alone is the difference that is pointed out here. We should reckon that the subtle distinction that has been depicted between Prajñā (the Self with the deep sleep state as His adjunct) and Turiya (the Absolute Self without any attribute or association) in the Āgama Prakaraṇa is itself being delineated here in a variant manner.

Now, let us examine the topic itself that is discussed in the 40th Kārikā of the Advaita Prakaraṇa alone:

(3) “For all Yōgis, Abhaya (fearlessness), Duḥkha Kshaya (complete riddance from misery), Jñāna (Self-Knowledge, Intuition), Akshaya Shānti (peace or quietude that never diminishes) - all these are within the purview of the mind’s Nigraha.” - (Kā. 3-40).

What is the essential nature of Manōnigraha that is taught here? This topic is worth deliberation. For, while explaining this Nigraha in Kārikās 3-42 to 46, an opinion to the effect that - “If the four hurdles, viz. Laya, Vikshepa, Kashāya and Sukhaswāda, are surmounted the mind becomes Brahman (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality)” - is found. Some people describe that it is taught that - here in this context - “(a) Nirvikalpa Samādhi has been taught; (b) to one who has experienced that Samādhi and has woken up, till the Prārabdha Karmas get emaciated a blemish
called ‘Ajñana Lesha or Samskāra’ (remnant of ignorance or its latent impression) persists and (c) that after the fall of the mortal coil when the vital force gets merged in Brahman the predominant Mukti (Liberation, Beatitude) called ‘Videha Kaivalya’ is attained.”

But there is no support or substantiation whatsoever for this dogmatic theory either in the Kārikās or Kārikā Bhāshyas or any other remaining Bhāshyas on Prasthānatraya texts. If we reckon that in the sixth chapter of the Gītā just as Dhyāna Yōga has been taught as an Antarangasādhana (internal spiritual practice) for Jñāna Yōga, here too that very Dhyāna Yōga is being instructed by the name ‘Manōnigraha’ - then for Shri Śaṅkara’s opinions expressed in both contexts there will be a complete agreement or reconciliation brought about. This Manōnigraha which is instructed for the sake of middle-grade practitioners is not Upāsana (meditation) which is Purushatāntra (within the purview of the wish or will of the practitioner); by examining through Śūkṣmadṛishti (subtle incisive viewpoint) - just as the evaluation of the worth of a jewel is determined - similarly without dispersing the mind by thinking of mundane objects, without allowing it to get merged (into sleep) by getting fatigued by Ātma Chintana (contemplating upon the Self), without getting satisfied merely by the Ānanda (pleasure, mental happiness) born out of this deep examination - to contemplate upon Ātmaswarūpa with all concentration is itself called ‘Manōnigraha’ as a spiritual practice. This is also called ‘Nididhyāsana.’ Because Advaita Prakaraṇa itself has been commenced by decrying Upāsana, it becomes established that what is instructed here is Nididhyāsana which is quite different from Upāsana. In calling this Nididhyāsana by the name of ‘Upāsana’ there is no defect at all; for, even Jñāna (Self-Knowledge, which is Intuitive and not intellectual or mental), being called by the name of ‘Upāsana’ is to be found in Śrutis and Smṛitis. But we should not neglect or negate the difference that exists between Upāsana which is a spiritual practice to attain Brahmasāyuja (merger in Brahman) in Lōkāntara (other world after the fall of the mortal coil) and this Upāsana which is said to be the cause for Ātmasatyānubōdha (the spiritual instruction about the Self being the Ultimate Reality) here and now in this very life. For that reason alone, while
concluding the purport of Advaita Prakarana the Bhāshyakāra has stated: "These Manonigraha etc., creation which is likened to Mrillōhādi (clay, iron etc.) and Upāsana are said to be Upāya (devices) to help cognize the Paramārtha (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality) and not Paramārthasatya (themselves the Absolute Reality)."

THE REFUTATION OF DUALITY THAT IS TO BE FOUND IN THE KĀRIKĀS AND THE BHĀSHYA

Both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara have refuted here and there the doctrines of Vaisheshikas, Śāṅkhyans, Buddhists, Jains, Mīmāṃsakas etc. We have to determine through cautious deliberation as to what is the benefit gained from this refutation. For, just as for the Buddhist Shunyavādins, Śāṅkhyans, Vaisheshikas etc. who have necessarily to refute the rival doctrines in order to demonstrate that their own respective doctrine is correct - for Advaitins, there is no such need at all of any refutation. For the Dvaitins (dualists) since duality or manifoldness is real in the absolute sense, even after establishing their Siddhāntas (final spiritual teachings) there remains the task for them to show or prove the rival doctrines to be defective and unsustainable. But from the standpoint of the Advaitins, since all duality is Māyā Kalpita (conceived due to illusion) from this Kalpitadvaita (imagined or misconceived duality) there is no harm or danger whatsoever caused for Advaita (3-17, 18); therefore, by virtue of establishing Advaita it amounts to refuting Dvaita. Even so, Dvaita has been separately refuted, the reasons being: (a) Since Dvaita Siddhāntas are mutually contradictory, Dvaitabuddhi (the sense of duality being real) becomes, in its wake, the cause for Rāgadwesha (likes and dislikes) - (3-17 - its Bhāshya); (b) since Advaita is the substrate for all imaginations or concepts, it is always Shivaswarūpa (of the essential nature of auspiciousness of the Lord Almighty) - (2-33 - its Bhāshya) - thus to indicate to the Mumukshus (seekers of Liberation here and now) this has been done; (c) since the Dvaitins have followed the wrong or erroneous viewpoint opposed to the Vedic teachings, in order to indicate that if their philosophies are examined in the proper deliberative method - they are clearly rendered as illogical and untenable - (3-13 - its Bhāshya). This opinion has been signified repeatedly by the Bhāshyakāra in the following sentences:
The refutation or decrying of Upāsanas which are stipulated in the Śāstras themselves is for the ultimate purport of indicating the greatness or profundity of Ajātivāda and not with the intention of showing that those Śādhanas are useless in all respects. For that reason alone, both the Kārikākāra and the Bhāshyakāra have expressed that for low and middle-grade practitioners the Śruti, out of compassion, as it were, stipulate Karmas and Upāsanas (3-16); for Shrōtriyas (those who listen to the discourses on Śrūtis) with gross intellect Sṛishṭi (creation) has been accepted so as to be quite helpful and convenient for their Śādhanas like Karma etc. (4-42). Seen from this viewpoint, the common Siddhānta of both the Kārikākāra and the Bhāshyakāra is verily - “Dvaita is Vyāvahārikasatya (real from the empirical viewpoint) and Advaita is Paramārthasatya (Absolutely Real).”

This preface has already been a long-drawn one but was felt to be necessary to root out certain deep-seated misconceptions on the part of preachers and practitioners alike. It need not be gainsaid that in a big treatise of this magnitude many topics, statements, expressions or phrases are repeated ad nauseam irritatingly, disconcertingly; but the subject being highly subtle and esoteric, repetition of certain technical Vedāntic words so as to suit different contexts is more a virtue that a vice. In this regard I crave the indulgence of the readers and request them to bear with me. But before concluding it I have to express my heartfelt gratitude to Sri Swāmi Bhūmānanda Tīrtha, who readily agreed to write a foreword to this magnum opus at short notice and his observation about the book are truly in the nature of a morale-booster to me. I would be failing in my obligatory duty
if I do not record here my sincere thanks to the Trustees of Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Holenarsipur and M/s. L. M. Graphics for all the help rendered by them. If even a few seekers and students benefit by this gem of a text my efforts will be considered to be fruitful.

Holenarsipur  D.B. Gangolli
.12.11.97       Translator
THE ESSENTIAL GAUḌAPĀDA

WHO IS SHRI GAUḌAPĀDĀCHĀRYA?

Till today no one knows historically as to who was this Shri Gauḍapādāchārya. However, Advaitins while remembering the traditional teachers (Guru Parampara) recite a verse in which it is said that Shri Śūka had a disciple by name ‘Gauḍapāda’. However, Wallaser, a foreign Indologist, has opined that, that name is conceived in keeping with a general traditional convention in the northern parts of the country and that there was no individual by that name. On the strength of two epithets of ‘Gauḍa’ and ‘Drāvida’ used for Shri Gauḍapāda and Shri Śaṅkara, respectively, by Shri Sureshwarāchārya, a known direct disciple of the latter in his work, ‘Naishkarmyasiddhi’, we have to imagine or infer that Shri Gauḍapāda was a famous Vedāntin in the region called “Gauḍadesha”. Dr. Vidhushekharā Bhattacharya has imagined that ‘Gauḍa’ was his name and ‘Pāda’ was an honorific given to him out of veneration. Even in the several ‘Śaṅkara Vijayas’ now in vogue there is no help coming forth with regard to this name. On the whole, this riddle is not yet solved.

NAME OF THIS PRAKARĀNA

It is said that in some hand-written old manuscripts pertaining to this first Prakāraṇa it is called ‘Āgama Shāstra’ and the commentary on it, ‘Āgama Shāstra Vivaraṇa’ (AS. p.231, 234, 236, 244). Although this name of ‘Āgama Shāstra’ is not in vogue among the Advaitins, Āṇandagiri, one of the Tikākāra (critical commentator), has mentioned a verse: ‘सप्तप्रति ग्रंथप्रणयप्रयोजन-पदर्शनपूर्वकं परमगुरुनु आगमशास्त्रव्याख्यातस्य प्रभुदूल्खेन व्यवस्थितानु प्रणयलक्ष्मीं (Māṇḍūkya Bhāshya Pushpīka 223), it can be surmised that during this commentator’s time this name also was in usage. In these days, it has become a convention to call this text by the popular name of ‘Shri Gauḍapāda Kārikās.’

OTHER WORKS BY SHRI GAUḌAPĀDA

Some people opine that the Bhāshya or commentary on ‘Śaṅkhya Kārikās, Uttaragītā and a couple of other works have
been written by this Āchārya, but there is no satisfactory evidence to affirm that he is the author since there is a great difference between the style of exposition of the Kārikās and the style evident in these works. Hence, it has to be concluded inevitably that the author of these treatises is not Shri Gauḍapāḍāchārya.

IS MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANISHAD TOO A POURUSHEYA GRANTHA (SCRIPTURE TEXT WRITTEN BY A HUMAN BEING) LIKE ĀGAMA PRAKĀRĀṆA

Although the followers of the traditional method of teaching (Sāmpradāyikas) firmly believe that ‘Māṇḍūkyā’ is an ‘Upanishad’, some modern research scholars, who have a pronounced proclivity of determining the historical backround by means of inferential and logical deductions alone, have imagined that this is a work of human origin alone. Deussen, a Western scholar on Indology, has opined on the Strength of the Bhashya excerpt by Shri Śaṅkarāchārya - “वेदांतार्थसारसंग्रहमभूतमि प्रकरणचतुष्टयम् ‘अभिमित्येतद्वधारितादि’ आरम्भे” - that the phrase - ‘अभिमित्येतद्वधारि’ - belongs to the main text of the four Prakaraṇas written by the author, Shri Gauḍa pāḍāchārya.

To substantiate further this above contention of his, Deussen has taken recourse to the argument that Shri Śaṅkarāchārya has not exemplified Māṇḍūkyā as a Śruti (Upanishad) anywhere in his Bhāshyas. But as against this argument, neither Shri Śaṅkara has mentioned this part of the Upanishad as a work by Shri Gauḍapāḍā nor the other Vedāntins belonging to his Sampradāya (tradition) as well as any other acknowledged commentator having opined like that is to be seen anywhere in the whole gamut of Sanskrit literature. Therefore, this influence is to be considered as belonging to the realm of wild imaginations alone.

Late Dr. Vidhushekhara Bhattachārya has written in his “Āgama Shāstra” which he has published in both English (1943) and Sanskrit (1950) languages, that the Kārikās are together the original or first text compiled and that some one has composed, on the strength of some ancient Upanishads, the ‘Māṇḍūkyo-panishad’ which has become famous in present times as a scriptural text. Further, he has opined that in this Upanishadic portion attempts to systematize the various topics and aspects in
both the Karikās and the Upanishads, to amend as also add new topics for the purposes of elucidation are to be seen. To show that this opinion too is a figment of sheer imagination it is sufficient if we understand the meaning of the Verse by Shri Sureshwaračārya in his Brīhadāraṇyaka Vārtika (a sub-commentary on his preceptor Shri Śaṅkarācārya’s Bhāshya on that Upanishad), viz. “एषोन्तर्यमयेष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाययौ। माण्डूकेयश्रुतिवच इति स्पष्टप्रयोगः” (Brī. Vā. 3-8-6, p. 1294), in which he has named ‘Māṇḍūkya as an ‘Upanishad’ in very clear unambiguous terms, Not only that ; Dr. Bhattāchārya has not shown or exemplified any authoritative and convincing statement to prove his contention that Māṇḍūkya is a recent work. This defect in his theory the readers should discern.

IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ĀGAMA PRAKARAṆA AND THE UPAŅISHAD

Dr. Bhattāchārya has given two main reasons to substantiate his theory and they are : (1) If Āgama Prakaraṇa is the Commentary on the Māṇḍūkyopanishad, then what was propounded in the prose portion should have been explained in the Karikās without exaggeration. But that is not so. (2) It can be discerned that the Karikās existing originally, the Upanishadic part has been interpolated later only after comparing the prose and poetry portions.

Without giving into these considerations which are purely of academic interest and more an exercise in futility, we should not forget a general counter-argument which can be raised in this regard. First and foremost, the Karikās are not a commentary, word by word (Anavayakrama) on the Māṇḍūkyopanishad giving the meaning of each and every word and then determining the purport of the whole sentence. If it were so, Shri Śaṅkarācārya would not have written his Bhāshyas on the Upanishadic Mantras or verses. Without understanding this important aspect, Dr. Bhattāchārya has allowed his wild imagination to formulate puerile objections like: ‘Why has not the Karikākāra explained this word ?’ ; ‘Why is this word different in the original text and its commentary ?’ etc. It is not that his objections cannot at all be answered satisfactorily but they are not so important and valid
to be gone into full detail here in this text. We will leave that
vain task to academicians.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UPANISHAD
AND THE ĀGAMA PRAKARĀṇA

Any needless controversy raised by modern research schol-
ars or academicians who surmise or contend that Maṇḍūkyya is
a text compiled by an individual in recent times and for the
Kārikās the main authoritative source is Brīhadāraṇyaka Upanishad
alone is without any valid evidence worth serious consideration
by the true seekers. Suffice it to say that from time immemorial
the traditional teachers have taken Maṇḍūkyya as one of the
principal ten Upanishads selected by Shri Śankara for writing his
famous time-honoured Bhashyās. It can be unquivocally asserted
that Maṇḍūkyya Upanishad has itself served as the original source
for Shri Gauḍapāda to compile his famous Kārikās; besides, in
order to prove that his explanatory commentaries in the form of
Kārikās are fully in consonance with all Vedāntas (Upanishads)
beyond any shadow of doubt or ambiguity the Āchārya has in
various contexts quoted and exemplified excerpts from Taittirīya
and Brīhadāraṇyaka Upanishads in support of his conclusions and
teachings.

DELIBERATION ABOUT ÖMKĀRA IN THE KĀRIKĀS

Dr. Bhattachārya has imagined further that: “Only after
completing the deliberation on Ātman’s ‘Pādas’ like Vishwa,
Taijasa and Prājña in the Kārikās (in the 19th Kārikā, to be
exact), a comparison has been drawn between Vishwa, Taijasa,
Prājña (the three Pādas) and Akāra, Ukāra, Makāra (the three
Matras). But in the Upanishad (Maṇḍūkyya) at the outset itself the
description of Ömkāra has been started. The subject-matter which
is the object of a device (Upeya) in the Kārikā is itself, men-
tioned first and then alone Ömkāra which is the device has been
taken up for deliberation and this is quite reasonable; the author
of the prose text, having been influenced by the Chhāndōgya,
Taittirīya and other Upanishads, has elevated Ömkāra to a higher
status; because in the Brīhadāraṇyaka Upanishad there is no
Ömkāra Upāśana (meditation on Ömkāra) Shri Gauḍapāda, the
author of ‘Āgama Shāstra’ (meaning, the Kārikās in toto), has not
given the pride of place to Ömkāra and has himself added that at the end of the first Prakaraṇa (Chapter).”

It need not be gainsaid that all these are wild conjectures akin to an attempt to draw a picture in empty space alone. We have emphasized above the fact that Maṇḍūkyya Upanishad alone is the original source for the Kārikās and that in order to bring home the purport or the precepts taught in that Upanishad alone Shri Gaṅḍapāda has independently written the four Prakaraṇas. We have already explained that with the introductory remark - ‘अजैते श्लोका चवन्ति’ - ‘Here in this context, these Ślokas (verses or Kārikās) explain this topic” - Shri Gaṅḍapāda has written the Ślokas of the ‘Āgama Prakaraṇa’ so as to agree with the different topics mentioned in the Upanishad as also that there is a very innate coherence between the Upanishad and this first Prakaraṇa in so far as deliberation on certain topics is concerned. In the Kārikās the reason for the deliberation on Ömkāra being given at the end is not the absence of Ömkāra Upāsana in the Bṛhadāranyaka Upanishad. Not only that, therein it is eulogised that Ömkāra is the cause for the whole of the Vedas.

In the Maṇḍūkyopanishad Ömkārōpāsana (meditation on Ömkāra) has not been elaborated upon predominantly indeed; similarly, in the Kārikās too Ömkārōpāsana has not been expounded. Here in the Kārikās Ömkāra means not merely a word or sound alone; it is verily the Paramārtha (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality) beyond the name (Abhidhāna), the named (Abhidhēya) as also all mundane transactions (Vyavahāra).

* Take details from M. Up. Manjari.

In truth, the first Prakaraṇa (Chapter) among the four Prakaraṇas written by Shri Gaṅḍapāda going by the name of ‘Āgama Prakaraṇa’ has the exclusive purport of determining the essential nature of this Ömkāra. In the Upanishad for this purpose of determining the subtle meaning of Ömkāra alone, at the beginning itself Ömkāra has been taught and then after having expounded that Ömkāra is nothing but all-Comprehensive and all-pervasive Brahmātma Tattva (the Absolute Reality of Brahman or Ātman), that very Ātman (Self) alone is taught to be Ömkāra from the predominant view point of the name and further it is explained that in this context there is no difference whatsoever between the three Pādas (quarters) and the three Mātras (alpha-
bets). In order to elucidate this secret alone in the Kārikās first the Ātma Tattwa or the Ultimate Reality of the Self is determined to be the ‘Turīya’ (the fourth) and then only the deliberation on Ōmkāra is begun. One can discern beyond any shadow of doubt or ambiguity the essential nature of Ōmkāra in consonance with the Kārikā teaching from the commentaries on 1-26 to 29.

Here in this context, Bhāshyakāra Shri Śaṅkara has commented that in an indirect manner (Avāntara Tātparya) for the sake of middle and low grade Adhikāris (seekers) Ōmkāra Upāsana has been mentioned. The relevant Bhāshya excerpt is to be found in the commentary on the 12th Mantra as follows: “मन्दमध्यमविविधं तु प्रतिच्छायाभावानां सन्मार्गादिनां संयस्तिनां मात्राणां पदानां च कृत्तसमानविविधं यथावतुपाप्यनां: ओऽकारे ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तिये आलम्बनीपवति” - Meaning: Hence we have also commented on this Kārikā in the same manner. For that reason herein it should be understood that there is no contradiction at all.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF ĀGAMA PRAKARĀNA

There are many more topics, which are to be examined and deliberated upon, and which pertain to the methodology of teaching adopted in the Kārikās. They will be taken up while explaining the purports of the next Prakarāṇas and their respective introductions according to the contexts and relevance. At present for the sake of the seekers (Jījñāsus) remembering the essence of the teachings of the Āgama Prakarāṇa we will briefly mention them: (1) Here in this Prakarāṇa in order to enable us to cognize or Intuit the Ultimate Reality of Ātman (Self) as It is the determination of the essence of Ōmkāra has been carried out in the main. Hence one should not take Ōmkāra to be merely a word or sound; Ōmkāra is, in truth, the Absolute, Ultimate Reality (Paramārtha Tattwa) which is perennially devoid of the three Avasthās or states of consciousness; which is neither a name (Abhidāna) nor the named (Abhideya) and which is devoid of the divisions or distinctions of the Known (Grāhya) or the Knower (Grāhaka). This Reality has been called ‘the fourth quarter’ (Turīya Pāda) which It is being described through the quarters (Pāda Vivarana) and alphabet-less Ōmkāra (Amātra Ōmkāra) while It is being described through the alphabets ‘A’,
‘U’, ‘M’. Both in the seventh and the twelfth Mantras of the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad and in the ‘Turiya Kārikās’ and the ‘Praṇava Kārikās’ (which names we have added to these respective Kārikās) this Ōmkāra alone is taught.

(2) Āgama really means - By adopting the traditional (Sāṃpradāyic) methodology of Superimposition and Rescission (Adhyārōpa Apavāda Nyāya) - to wit, although they are not real in the Ultimate analysis (i.e. from the standpoint of the Pure Consciousness of the Witnessing Self) the three states of Consciousness, viz. the waking, the dream and the deep sleep, which appear to be every one’s experiences in the workaday transactions are conceived as if they are really the characteristics or the qualities (Dharmas) of Ātman in the forms of three Pādas and three Mātras, and thereby the seeker is made to realize (Intuit) that that Ātman (Self) exists and thereafter once he is able to Intuit the Absolute Reality of his own innate Ātman or Self in order to dissuade him from really taking the Pādas and the Mātras to be the characteristics or qualities of his Ātman the Shāstra (Upanishad) now rescinds or falsifies them. Thus in a very Intuitive, comprehensive but subtle manner both the Upanishads and the preceptor (Guru) well-versed in the Shāstraic and Sāṃpradāyic method of teaching the Transcendental Reality of Ātman (Brahman) is taught in its very essence as It is and the genuine seeker comes to Intuit It.

In order to bring home this Chaturtha (the fourth, which is nothing but the Ultimate Reality or Paramārtha) Tattwa, in the Mantra :- “प्रपन्जोपसम शातें शिवमहैतं चतुर्थ मन्यन्ते स आत्मा” - Meaning, “(Those who Know the Ultimate Reality - who have realized the Self in His essential nature) call this non-dual (Advaita), who is devoid of this world of the forms of the states and the ownership of those states, devoid of the name (Abhidāna) and the named (Abhideya) explained above, who is unto Himself peaceful (nay, verily an embodiment of peace or quiescence) and of the very essence of Bliss (Paramānanda Swarūpa) alone - ‘the fourth’ ; That Reality Itself is Ātman”. In the Upanishad it has been enunciated that : “अमान्त्रसतुष्ठोव्यवहाराः: प्रपन्जोपसम: शिवो अद्वैत एवमोकार आत्मैव” - Meaning : “Ōmkāra which is devoid of the Mātras, the fourth and beyond the reach of Vyavahāra or mundane workaday
dealing, is, in truth, Advaita or non-dual (having nothing else as second to It) indeed, devoid of the world (of duality) of the names of the alphabets and their respective forms, which is auspicious and propitious; thus Ōmkāra is nothing but Ātman alone." This teaching alone is established and elucidated in the Turiya Kārikās as well as in the Praṇava Kārikās found in the first Āgama Prakaraṇa - Ātman is devoid of the Prapañcha (world of duality) of the three Avasthās, meaning He is devoid of Avidyā (ignorance) of the dual forms of Agraha (non-comprehension or ignorance) and Anyathagraha (misconception) (1-15). Ōmkārātman is devoid of the world of duality of names (Abhidhana Prapañcharahitāhā), meaning Ātman alone of the very essence of Absolute Bliss (Paramānanda Swarūpa), devoid of all kinds of divisions." In the Chhāndogya Upanishad the Upadesa or spiritual teaching expounded in the statement...

The statement to the effect that - “Prajaña is the cause for the birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world of duality”, thereby superimposing causation, sustenance & dissolution of the world of duality on Ātman is done only from the viewpoint of Avidyā alone, and in order to drive home this truth Shri Gauḍapādāchārya has written a Kārikā as follows : “अनादिमाया सुधो यदा जीवः प्रवृत्तात् । अजयनित्रस्थपन्तेऽदृश्यते तदा ।” - meaning : “Jīva is asleep owing to eternal Māyā (illusion), seeing a dream; when he wakes up to Jñāna or Self-Knowledge (Intuitive experience) attained with the aid of the teaching by the Shāstra or Upanishadic lore and the Āchārya (preceptor well-versed in the traditional methodology of teaching), then he cognizes the Ultimate truth that this Ātman or Self is Aja (devoid of the Avidyā Nidra or sleep called Avidyā or ignorance) which, in turn, is the non-comprehension of the Absolute Reality), is Advaita (one in whom there does never exist any kind of world of duality)." Here in this Kārikā the difference between the viewpoints with regard to the Ultimate Reality of Brahmātman of the Jñānis (Realized souls) and the Ajñānis (common people ignorant of their very
essence of Being as the Self, Ātman) in a very clear manner. This very meaning is conveyed in certain other words in the Bhagavadgītā verse: “या निशा सर्वभूतानां” (G. 2-69). How to Intuit this Absolute, Ultimate Reality of the Self has been propounded in the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad in the following words: “सत्वात्मात्माः सत्त्वात्मां य एवं वेद” - meaning, “He who Intuits or cognizes (Ātman) will enter or merge into, (become one with) Ātman in the form of Ātman” ; in the Āgama Prakaraṇa this teaching has been condensed in the words: “ओऽकारे जिदेते सन स मुनिनेतरे जनः”, meaning: “He who has Intuited Ōmkāra alone is a Muni, the rest are not Munis. To wit, he who Intuits his own Self (Ātman) who is devoid of the world of duality (Prapaññcharahita), birthless (Aja), non-dual (Advitīya) as He is in essence culminating in Intuitive experience (Anubhava), he alone is a Muni, meaning he is a holy man (Mahātma) who has attained that non-dual silence (Mouna) of the very essence of Intuitive experience (Anubhava) which is beyond the reach of speech and mind, in truth, which is speech of the speech and mind of the mind.

The really qualified people for Intuiting the essential nature of Reality of Ōmkāra, propounded here, are only those aspirants (Jījñāsus) who have acquired extreme renunciation (Vairāgya Sampannaha). Those Sannyāsins (recluses) with middle-class qualifications are fit for contemplating upon the identity between the Pādas and Mātras of Ōmkāra as Upāsana (meditation), while those Sannyāsins belonging to a lower grade are fit for the Pratikōpāsana (meditation on the symbol) of Ōmkāra. Although it can be ascertained from authoritative sources like epics and mythological texts that those Mumukshus or aspirants for Liberation who have not acquired the above-mentioned qualifications - also can by remembering divine names like Rāma, Kṛishṇa etc. achieve purification of the mind or Chittashuddhi and thereafter according to each one’s capacity attempt to deliberate upon the Ultimate Reality (Tattwa Vichāra), this fact has not been stated here.

In retrospect, thus in the Āgama Prakaraṇa the quintessence of the Upanishad has been briefly mentioned. To elaborate upon this teaching on the strength of Shāstra and Yukti and bring
home the subtle teaching alone is the main goal of the next three Prakaraṇas.

(Taken from the Introduction to the other three Prakaraṇas) -
[Facts about the Four Prakaraṇas compiled by Gauḍapāda].

It is not possible to reckon from Śrī Śaṅkara’s Bhāshyas that the complete treatise comprising the four Prakaraṇas authored by Śrī Gauḍapāda by way of a commentary on Māṇḍūkyopanishad bore one comprehensive name or title. In fact, Śrī Śaṅkara has called the treatise ‘Prakaraṇachatusṭaya’ alone. But the commentator on Śrī Śaṅkara’s Bhāshya by name ‘Ānandagiri’, while explaining an invocatory verse by Śrī Gauḍapāda, has stated :

“संप्रति प्रण्यप्रणालययन्तिपरंपरायन्ति परमप्राप्ति आगममशास्त्रवाज्ञानतत्स्य प्रणेतुः नेत्ते व्यवस्थितान् प्रणामति” - meaning :- “He (Śrī Śaṅkara) salutes his grand-preceptor (Śrī Gauḍapāda) who was the expounder (Praṇetru) of Āgama Shāstra after stating the benefit of his commentary (Bhāshya)” - (Māṇḍūkya Bhāshya p. 223). The topic as to who this Ānandagiri also has become controversial. For, it has become conventional or traditional to call many famous sub commentaries (Vyākhyānas) or Upanishad Bhāshyas to be those of Ānandagiri alone. If the opinions expressed in those commentaries are compared, we get sufficient evidence to conclude that this person by name Ānandagiri is not one but many. Let it be anything. We can reasonably believe that during the times of the commentator Ānandagiri who wrote his sub-commentary on Māṇḍūkya Bhāshya the Kārikā Grantha (by Śrī Gauḍapāda) was having the name of ‘Āgama Shāstrā.’

Āgama means a Pramāṇa (valid means of Knowledge) of the nature of spiritual instruction which is other than the Pramāṇas like Pratyaksha (percepts), Anumāṇa (inference) etc. but which is Sāṃpradāyic (traditionally handed down from the teacher to the taught). Hence the purport implicit in this name of Āgama is the fact that Śrī Gauḍapāda has written this Prakaraṇa Chatusṭaya comprising many Kārikās (verses) keeping in mind the Upanishadic teachings alone in a predominant sense. The fact that the treatise is fit to be called ‘Āgama Shāstrā’ can be justifiably substantiated only by means of an Intuitive deliberation on the subject-matter of the Prakaraṇas.
For instance: In the first ‘Āgama Prakaraṇa’ the Upanishadic instructions alone are propounded predominantly. Although herein Yukti (logical devices) are utilised to some extent, they are all Gouna (of secondary importance). But though (comparatively speaking) in the next three Prakaraṇas Yukti alone is given all the predominance, the Upanishads and their teachings have been invariably given their pride of place as the canonical, authoritative sources. The Upanishadic description of Ātman as:

“नान्तःप्रर्ण न बहिष्क्षज्ज नोपवयत: न प्रज्ञानघनं प्रर्ण नाप्रज्ञां”

meaning: “Ātman, as He is in the dream state, is not internally conscious (Antahprajāṇam) ; as in the waking state, He is not externally conscious (Bahishprajāṇam) ; ......... as in the deep sleep state, He is not without Consciousness (Aprajāṇam) - is taken as an authoritative source; further discerning the Upanishadic description of the dream, Ātman, just like the waking Ātman, in similar words like ‘Saptāṅga’ or one endowed with seven limbs and ‘Ekānavimshati mukhaha’ or one having nineteen openings or doorways, Shri Gauḍapāda has called both waking and dream states as dream alone; and finally with a view to describing Ātman who exists (pervades) in all the three states is in truth without any taint or obligatory relation whatsoever with any of the three states Shri Gauḍapāda has depicted ‘Turiya’ (the fourth one when compared to the three states meaning the witnessing Pure Consciousness alone) with such characteristic features as Ajam (birthless), Anidram (devoid of deep sleep), Asvapnam (devoid of dream), Advaitam (non-dual) in these three Prakaraṇas.

If the fact that the special features of ‘अजमनिद्रामस्वन्नम्’ (G.K. 1-16, 3-36, 4-81) are mentioned in Āgama Prakaraṇa, Advaita Prakaraṇa and Alātashānti Prakaraṇa is remembered, then we can get convinced that this treatise (by Shri Gauḍapāda) is not only the ‘Āgama Shāstra’ which expounds the real purport of the Upanishads, but also a Shāstra which depicts the ‘Sāmpradāyic Siddhānta’ or the traditional methodology of teaching the Ultimate Reality as handed down from time immemorial from the Guru to the Shishya indeed. Especially the word ‘Advaita’ (non-dualism) is to be found in all the four Prakaraṇas.

SHRI GAUḌAPĀDA’S SAMPRADĀYA

Treatises on Advaita written prior to the times of Shri
Gauḍapāda are not available now. His treatises bristle with the technical terms used in Buddhism texts as well as their logical devices (Yuktis). Therefore, some research scholars devoted to finding out the textual teachings of Buddhistic treatises and Shri Gauḍapāda’s works have imagined that for Advaita Philosophy Buddhism itself is the source. In his book - “History of Indian Philosophy”, Shri Dāsgupta has not only surmised that Shri Gauḍapāda has borrowed ideas from Buddhistic treatises, but also has gone so far as to allege that Shri Gauḍapāda was himself a Buddhist! Shri Vidhushekhar Bhaṭṭācharyya, another renowned Indian writer (philosopher) has propounded that in view of the similarity of the technical words used by him and the Buddhistic texts, Shri Gauḍapāda has championed the Viññānavāda (of the Buddhists) alone.’ But these contentions are rendered untenable if we observe the fact that Shri Gauḍapāda has himself expressed the opinion that his tenets are supported by those of ancient (traditional) teachers and this purpose alone he has specified in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa by statements like “Vedānteshu Vichakshanaïhi” (2-31); “Munibhirvedapāragaihi (2-35). In several Śāṅkara Bhāṣyas too (viz. Gitā Bhāṣya 13-22, 13-13, 18-50; Brīhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya 2-120 ...) at many places reverential references to amount preceptors well-versed in the Sāmpradāyic methodology of teaching have been made; in the Sūtra Bhāṣya (1-1-17, 3-2-21) the teachings of Nirvishesha Brahmacāldins (theory of the ultimate Reality of Brahman being devoid of any special features whatsoever) are taken up for discussion and adopted. Because (a) general tenet of Advaita (non-dualism) by various preceptors are referred to and refuted and (b) the Nishprapañcha Brahmacālda or theory of Brahman being devoid of any world of duality is examined and expounded to be Sāmpradāyic in several statements found here and there in the Bhāshyas - it becomes evident that Shri Gauḍapāda never formulated afresh (or invented) the Ajādvayātmavāda or the theory of Ātman as the ultimate Reality being birthless and non-dual. Besides, from the sub-commentaries on G.K. Bh. 2-32, Brī. Bh. 2-1-20 by Ānandaśīma and from the commentary on ‘Samkshepa Shārīra’ by Madhusūdana Saraswati it is established that ancient preceptors like Brahmānandi, Dravidāchārya etc., were belonging to this school of Advaita philosophy or Sampradāya. Therefore, because
of all these evidences it can be inferred that Shri Gauḍapāda’s Sampradāya co-existed with other contemporary Advaita schools for a long period of time.

GAUḌAPĀDA’S SIDDHĀNTA Vs BUDDHISTIC VIJÑĀNAVĀDA

The basic source for Buddhistic Siddhānta is Anātmavāda. But whether in the ancient or Buddhistic works (a) neither the Intuitive deliberation on Ātman who is of the nature of Netinetyātma (not this, not that) as described in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka and Shvetāśwatara Upanishads Sarvabhūtastha (who is pervading all things and phenomena) and ‘Sākshichaitanya’ (witnessing Pure Consciousness) - (b) nor the Intuitive deliberation on the ‘Avasthātraya Sākshi’ (the Witnessing Consciousness of the three states of Consciousness) as described in the Māṇḍūkyya, Chāndogya and Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishads have been examined in the least; it being so, how and on what grounds at all can it be sustained to argue that the ultimate Reality of Ātman which Shri Gauḍapāda has propounded (quite in consonance with the Upanishadic and his own traditional school’s time-tested spiritual teachings) as ‘Ajānindrāswapna has evolved out of either Buddhistic Vijñānavāda or Yogāchāravāda?

We will be be constrained to conclude that those who argue and allege that there is similarity between Vijñānavāda and Shri Gauḍapāda’s Vāda have not taken into their reckoning the contrary or disparity between these two theories. For the benefit of our readers, we will mention here under some verses of Buddhistic teachings and try to depict the striking disparity between the purport implicit in them and the opinions of Shri Gauḍapāda:

(१) अपूतपरिक्लोणति हर्ष्यः तत्र न विद्यते ।
शून्यता विद्यते तत्र तत्स्यामपि स विद्यते ॥

This verse is taken from Maitreyanātha’s ‘Madhyānta Vibhāga’. The commentator of this text has stated: (non-existent or false decision) necessarily exists. Just as in the Rajju or rope there does not exist Sarpaśwabhāva or snake nature whatsoever, but the rope exists in the Rajjuśwabhāva or rope nature alone similarly the Vijñāna called Abhūta Parikalpa invariably exists; but in it the categories or concepts of Vishayi or subject and
The Essential Gauḍapāda

Vishaya or object especially do not exist; even in the Vishayavishayabhāva Shūnyatwa or void in which both concepts of subject and object do not exist there exists Vijñāna or intellectual Consciousness or awareness?

In the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, Shri Gauḍapāda has written:

अपूर्वात्मानिन्द्रेशोऽस्ति हूर्य तत्त न विद्यते।
ह्रामपांव स बुद्धवेभ निनिनिर्यो न जायते।

Its Purport: Neither the Jīvas nor the Chitta (mind) are form; to say that they exist is mere Mithyābhītinivesha (deluded staunch belief). The Vijñānavādins purport is first to demonstrate that Vijñāna (intellectual awareness) alone exists and the repute the doctrine of the Shūnyavādins that everything is Nishswabhāva (of the nature of essencelessness). Shri Gauḍapāda in 4-28: ‘तत्स्मा जायते चित्तं चित्तंदृष्टं न जायते’ has opined that neither the Chitta or mind nor the Jīvas exist apart from Brahman which is Akhaṇḍachaitanya or immutable, imperishable pure consciousness, can these disparate teachings be reckoned as one and the same? The mind alone exists inside (internally); that alone appears as the external objects - this is the opinion of the Buddhistic Vijñānavādin;

Dīnāgā has written in his treatise called - “Ālambana Parikṣā”;

यदन्तेजयर्थं तु बहिर्वदवभासते।
सोंयथं विज्ञानरूपत्वात् तत्प्रत्ययत्यत्यायं च।

- in very clear terms. This opinion is refused in the Sūtra Bhāshya. But Gauḍapādācārya has stated in his Kārikā 4-67:

उभे द्वायन्यदृष्टेः तेः किं तदस्त्तीति चोच्चयते।
लक्षणाश्रुत्युपयं तन्मत्तेव ग्रहाते।

He not only states that both the mind and its perceived object are mutually dependent but also that both the waking and the dream are states of the same kind as also shown that both are Mithyā or false; further he has established that for both these states of consciousness Ātman alone is the substratum. All these facts have been affirmed in the Vaitathya Prākaraṇa.

Vasubandhu, a Yōgāchāra Vijñānavādin, has stated that -

“The empirical or waking consciousness (Pratyaksha Buddhi)
might have been like the perceptible knowledge accruing in the dream. When a person becomes conscious in the manner - 'I have perceived such and such a thing' - actually there is no Pratyaksha or Perceptible object; Where the external objects too are Kshanika or ephemeral, momentary, then where is the question of any perception? such a dogmatic theory or concept is not to be found anywhere in Gauḍapāda Kārikās. In Vasubandhu's opinion people are experiencing a long dream; in the trance (Samādhi) called "Lōkottarajñāna" people come to cognize that there exists 'Vijnapti' or consciousness alone. But Gauḍapāda's opinion is "Both waking and dream are states of consciousness of the same kind; Loukika (waking), Shuddha Loukika (dream) these are not knowledge (Jñānas) of different levels each from the other. Although deep sleep or Sushupti is a state of 'Lōkottara' (a state in which there is no Vyavahāra or transaction whatsoever) if the waking consciousness to the effect - "All the three states of consciousness are Māyika or magical, illusory" - is attained by one then he cognizes (Intuits) that Advaitātman or non-dual Self who is Aja or unborn, Anidra or devoid of sleep and Aswapna or devoid of dream.

While commenting on Gauḍapāda Kāraka 1-16:

- Shri Śaṅkara has explained in this manner, Between Manonigraha (3-40) that Shri Śaṅkara (and Gauḍapāda) has mentioned and the Lōkottarajñāna of Vijñānavādins there does not exist any relationship or similarity whatsoever, and this fact is very clear indeed.

It also becomes quite evident here from the comparative analysis or deliberation carried out by us so far that: "There does not exist any relationship whatsoever between Vijñānavāda and the Vedāntic teaching that - The non-dual pure consciousness (Advaita Chinmātra) which is Ajānīndrāswapna or devoid of birth, sleep and dream alone is satya or real".

ALĀTASHĀNTI CHAPTER AND SHŪNYAVĀDA (NIHILISM)

In the fourth and last chapter called 'Alātashānti' Shri Gauḍapāda, following or adopting Avītanyāya also called Vyatireka-
nyāya or aphorism based on dialectic distinction or exclusion, has shown that his own (traditional school of) Advaita Philosophy is fully or undoubtedly established by the numerous aim dialectic squabbles, quarelling between protagonists of Sāṅkya and Vaisheshika schools, on the one hand, and between the Bālyāstītadins or realists and Vijnānavādins or Idealists, on the other. Further, following the same Advaita Siddhānta Shri Gauḍapāda has refuted the dogmatic theory propounded by some among the Vedāntins, Viz. Bandha or Bondage and Moksha or Release, Liberation are Paramārtha or Absolutely real. As we have previously stated, in two Prakaraṇa or chapter too he has unequivocally demonstrated by once again Intuitively examine the methodology of the three Avasthas of Jagrat, Swapna and Sushupti that - “His own teaching his Ajātiveda or theory of non-birth of Ātman is in consonance with Vedāntic spiritual science”.

In all these respects although between this chapter and the previous three chapters there exists a relationship of complete agreement, late Shri Vidhushikhāra Bhatṭāchārya has been deluded and deceived by the mere fact that in this Alātashānti Prakaraṇa Shri Gauḍapāda has used predominantly or rather excessively, Sanskrit words which occur in Buddhistic texts and has misconceived the theory that - “Shri Gauḍapāda’s teachings are truly those of Vijnānavādins” in his own English and Sanskrit works called “Āgama Shāstra” published in 1943 and 1950, respectively. The calcutta academician has further quoted many sentences from Buddhistic texts and has vainly endeavoured to prove that - “The Buddhists have lent on hire, as it were, their theories and themes to Shri Gauḍapāda’s treatise (of Māṇḍūkya Kārikās)”.

Because we have already demonstrated the wide distinction and difference that exists between Vijnānavāda of the Buddhists and ‘Brahmātmavāda’ which is of the very essence of Kūtastha Vijnāna, this deliberation on Shri Vidhushakhara Bhatṭāchārya’s opinion may be stopped.

But another academician date Shri T.R.V. Murthy (formerly of the Benares Hindu University) the another of - ‘The central Philosophy of Buddhism, without accepting Shri Bhatṭācharya’s opinion has thought out and projected his own new Siddhānta:
'It is indulitable that the tenets of Mādhyamikas and Yōgāchāras (two schools of Buddhism) have influenced Shri Gauḍapāda’s Kārikās’. But neither in respect of the language of the first three chapters nor in respect of the methodology adopted for the various topics in there exists anything in the best which is opposed to Vedānta; it is also not to be seen that having accepted the fourth chapter as Vedānta neither the Vedāntins nor the Buddhists have illustrated the Kārikās (in this chapter); that fourth chapter must have been written by some unknown Buddhist alone. It cannot at all be stated either that Vedāntins were influenced by Buddhists or that Buddhists have acknowledged any opinion of Vedāntins; for the Sampradāya or traditional methods of teaching of both are different. Therefore, it may be overruled that only the two aspects of Mādhyamikas Paribhāsha or technical terms and Prakriyā or methodology only have been adopted used by the Vedāntins.

From one point of view it can be accepted that in this theory there exists a little part of truth. Because the statement to the effect that - ‘Alatashānti Prakarāṇa must have been written by some unknown Buddhist’ - is merely a figment of imagination, we can discard it.

Because the verses of the previous Prakarāṇas as well as the methodology of Avasthātraya is exists in this fourth chapter also, it becomes exigent as also expedient to acknowledge it to be a part of the whole treatise alone. Further, the theory propounded by Shri Murthy that - “The distinction of Vyavahāra (empirical, sphered) and Paramārtha (the Transcendental Absolute Reality) did not exist in the Advaita Vedānta nor did Vivartavāda prior to Shri Gauḍapāda - is without any proper support or proof. For, we have already demonstrated the truth that the Sampradāya of Shri Śaṅkara’s Siddānta did exist even before (the time of Shri Gauḍapāda). In order to over that - “There existed in addition to proponents different Advaita Siddhānta, Nirvisheshavādins even before Shri Gauḍapāda’s time, and with a view to establish the teachings of his own traditional school of practise pure Advaita Vedānta by refuting the tenets of other Advaitins Shri Śaṅkara wrote his Bhāshyas - the Sūtra Bhāshya is sufficient. Even in Shri Sureshwarāchāryas ‘Sambandha Vārtika’ there is sufficient
support available for this assumption. Therefore it has to be universally and invariably accepted that both these theories of Shri T.R.V. Murthy are without proper support.

Now let us ponder over the question - “Is it possible to detect or discern the ‘Nirvisheshavāda’ or Absolute, non-dual method of teaching delineated in Vedānta Shāstra without being influenced or induced by Buddhistic teachings ?”.

In the Upanidhads off and on through the method of refutation of characteristics other than or alone to its own essence of pure being in the manner - “Asthulam (not gross), Anum (not small)” ; “Neti, Neti (Not this, not that) etc. The Tattwa or ultimate reality being described is to be seen. If the Sampradāya Granthas and Āchāryas or traditional (authoritative) texts and preceptors were there, why should not this traditional methodology of teaching be evolved or formulated directly from the Upanishads without any influence of the Buddhists being cast on it ? It being so, by adopting a method of negation in the manner - ‘Not this, not that’ where was the need for Shri Gauḍapāda to surrender himself is the Buddhists for the purport of finding out the methodology of Intuiting the Absolute Reality (Tattwa) ? Instead of this, why could not we surmise that Buddhists themselves borrowed this methodology from the Vedāntins ? Gautama Buddha had discovered merely the sequential order of Dwādasha Nidāna or twelve diagnostic symptoms which are evolved on the basis of “Pratītya Samutpāda” or dependent origination (meaning, if one category exists the other one is produced or born) - a cause effect phenomenon (NJīttanainīthika Bhāva or Kāryakāraṇa Bhāva). It being so, how come among the Mādhyamika Buddhists scholars like Nāgārjuna etc., all of a sudden (to wit, without any extraneous influence) the spiritual philosophy of Nihilism (Naihswabhavya Siddānta) flashed in the mind ? There was no support whatsoever of any previous traditional authoritative texts (Sāmpradāyika Granthas) for them ! In fact, a less known truth is that Mādhyamika Buddhists like Nāgārjuna etc. were previously Brahmins (Hindus) and later on became Buddhists. Under the circumstances, having realised the fact that the Upanishadic ‘Ekatwavāda’ or theory of Monism or Unitary Reality was opposed to ‘Anātmaavāda’ or theory of the world of Reality being real, why cannot it be assumed or surmised that
they shunned the Upanishadic theory and adopted the methodology of ‘Dvaita Nishedha’ or refutation of duality formed in it to suit their own Siddhānta?" If this question is raised, there need not be any surprise whatsoever. In truth for this kind of a surmise actually there is acknowledgement and support lent by Prog. Dasgupta and others. Further, Prof. T.R.V. Murthy too has accepted this argument that - “Thus just as there exists support for the inference that Vedāntins were influenced by Buddhists, in the same way there equally exists support for the inference that the Mādhyamika Buddhists were influenced by the Upanishadic methodology; it being so, in this matter no decision can be arrived at” (CPB-109) For this reason alone, we have hesitated to accept the theory of those proponents that - “For the fourth Prakaraṇa of Alatashānti (of Shri Gauḍapāda) Nāgārjunas Madhyama Kārikā was the main source”.

THE BUDDHISTIC TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

Another thought-provoking topic has remained and that is: “What is the reason for the abundant usage of Buddhistic technical terms (Pāribhāṣhika Shabda) in Shri Gauḍapāda’s Kārikās? In fact, he has even utilized or pressed into service ‘Nāgārjuna’s unique methodology, called ‘Chatushkōti Prakriyā’! What is the plausible reason for this?

Finding out a satisfactory answer to this intriguing question becomes quite necessary and important. To those sagacious people who are capable of divining the plausible cause by Intuitive insight the truth that - “For this too there necessarily is a cause” - cannot but flash. First and foremost, there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that this traditional Āchārya (Shri Gauḍapāda) was not fully conversent with or knowledgeable about the Vedāntic technical terminology as, also the profundity and subtlety of the Vedāntic ‘Prakriya’ or traditional methodology. It can safely be avered that in the first three chapters of Shri Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya Kārikās neither the Buddhistic terminology nor their methodology exists. This fact has been acknowledged by Prof. T.R.V. Murthy but (unfortunately) with regard to the Alatashānti Prakaraṇa he has erroneously arrived at a conclusion, mainly basing his arguments on the fact that this fourth chapter is bristling with Buddhistic terms and logic or dialectics, that -
"The Alatashānti Prakaraṇa must have been written by some Buddhist only". There is room whatsoever to doubt that due to any dearth or total absence of any Pārībhāṣhikā Shabdas or Prakriyā (in his traditional school of Advaita Vedānta) Shri Gaudapāda was thus compelled to borrow technical words as well as the methodology from schools alien to Vedic traditions; in truth there might have lurked in his 'heart' some other profound reason than this peurile, immature surmise, and this alone seems to be rational and justifiable. In fact, this is one of the 'essentials' of Shri Gaudapāda’s teachings which has prompted us to name this treatise as - "The essential Gaudapāda".

The main reasons for Shri Gaudapāda using ‘Avitanyāya’ exclusively in the fourth chapter and propounding his teachings predominantly based on dialectious are: Sāṅkhya, Vaisheshikas, Bāhyāstītavādāins (Realists) among the Buddhists, Yogāchāra Vijñānavādāins (a school of Buddhism only), - all these were, at least to some extent; Darshanakāras or founders of their respective schools of philosophy who, focussing on their own individual viewpoint, perspective or vision, brought into vogue their respective philosophical methodology; even the Shūnyavādāins (among the Buddhists) - championing the cause of Nihilism (Dharma Naḥisśwabhāvya) on the lone premise of dialection of the form of Vītaṇḍavāda or perversed or spurious logic, captious criticism, are, in truth, not adopting any methodology of the other Darshanakāras but on the other hand, they are bent upon refuting all the viewpoints taking recourse to their own Vītaṇḍavāda (Tarka) with a view to establishing Nihilism - are truly Dvaitins obstinately presenting or guarding their own viewpoint.

Now, this main defect of formulating and founding their own schools of philosophy exclusively based on viewpoint, intellectual reasoning and wrangling but totally obivious of the fact that any Reality - if at all it has to be acknowledged as such - has to be Sārsvatrika or universal, as also Nitya or eternal (not an entity in time and space) is to be detected initialy from this it evolves that merely based on Tarka (logic) or Anumāna (inference) this universal Reality cannot at all be known. It can only be Intuited by the exclusive, unique, Vedāntic method of ‘Anubhāvāṅga Tarka’ or discriminative reasoning based on Intuitive experience (Anubhava). These teachings belonging to his
own traditional methodology of Advaita Vedānta was fully known by Shri Gauḍapāda and it was handed down to posterity by him and was later fully established and ensconced by in its pristine purity by Shri Śaṅkarāchārya and his direct disciple Shri Sureswarāchārya.

Against this background and the state of affairs prevailing in the spiritual circles we can now discern the fact as to how the great wisdom befitting a true āchārya was demonstrated by Shri Gauḍapāda to meet all the challenges posed by these array of alien schools and scholars who were adepts in dialectics in their own right. Hence in order to show exclusively the truth that - “Owing to their mutual squabbles and disagreement among these Dvaitins or dualists it evolves that all their doctrines are mere Vikalpas or erroneous concepts or theories ; further it evolves that for all such Vikalpas that Aja (unborn) Advaita (non-dual) Ātma Tattwa (absolute Reality of self of the essence of pure consciousness) which is the substrate, is Itself the Paramārtha (the Transcendental, ultimate Reality)” - Shri Gauḍapāda has written the fourth chapter in this fashion. This logical methodology is itself called ‘Avītanyāya’.

While using this method of dialectics in the fourth (Alātashānti) Prakāraṇa one of his main purposes was : “Because of the main reason that in the Buddhistic philosophy the principal sects who are exponents of dialectics are Vijñānavāda (Idealism) and Shunyavāda (Nihilism), it can be demonstrated convincingly by means of their own logical devices his own Advaita gets established without any Virōḍha or opposition and Vivāda or counter argument”. Thus for Shri Gauḍapāda to have utilized the Buddhistic methods of logic this alone was the cause.

Now, the reason for Shri Gauḍapāda to have used the Buddhistic Paribhāsha is : To make it known that the technical terms that they have used are fully suitable and capable of signifying the more profound Tattwas or truths expounded in Vedānta. How this purpose has been achieved we have shown at varies in the commentaries of the Kārikās. The fact that Vedāntins utilize the Paribhāṣhika shabdas or technical terms of other (rival) schools of philosophy with their own different and subtler meaning or indications is clearly revealed by Bādarāyana Śūtras. There cannot be any doubt about this fact being clearly realized by
those who have discerned as to how words like ‘Pratyaksha’, ‘Anumāna’, ‘Pradhāna’, ‘Anu’ etc. are utilized in the Brahma Sūtras to indicate totally different meaning (to suit Vedāntic teachings).

**ĀGAMA TARKAS OF GAUḌAPĀDA AND NĀGĀRJUNA**

Shri Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntin, while Shri Nāgārjuna is a Mādhyamika Buddhist; and hence both have exemplified their respective texts as Pramāṇa or authoritative evidence - Shri Gauḍapāda has quoted Upanishads, while Shri Nāgārjuna has mentioned Buddha’s sayings in the forms of ‘Nikāyas’ and ‘Sūtras’, ‘Chandrakeerti, the commentator of the Sūtras, has praised Nāgārjuna in the manner - “Sakalalokalokottara Pravachana Nitaneyārtha Vyākhyaṇa Nipuṇa”. But one special feature : For Gauḍapāda ‘Āgama’ his traditional authoritative text (Upanishads) alone are most important; hence, he has written his Āgama Prakaraṇa (his first chapter in the form of a commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad) first and only then has followed it up with his three Prakaraṇas, viz. Vaitathya, Advaita and Alātashānti, which are predominantly dialectical in approach and style.

For Nāgārjuna dialectics alone is important; Only after having refuted on the strength of logical devices certain viewpoints he has quoted Buddha’s sayings in support of his opinion. The strong profound statements are called: ‘Nitārtha’ by Buddhis, while Gauḍapāda has called such statements ‘Nishchita’, ‘Yuktīyukta’.

Whereas for Nāgārjuna logic is to be given pre-eminence and the waking state alone is the subject-matter for deliberation. The form or nature of Nāgārjunas logic is to interpret as though Buddha had taught Pratiṣṭha Samutpāda (dependedt origination) and the Naishiswābhāvya (essencelessness) of Dharmas (percepts) and accordingly argue out. His Siddhānta or philosophical teaching is: “The Kārya Kāraṇa Bhāva or the cause - effect categories never exist; ‘Apratitya Samutpanna Vastu’ or an entity or substance which is of dependent origination does, not at all exist; hence a substance that is ‘Ashūnya’ or not void or without essencelessness does not at all exist” - (Mādhyamika Kārikā 24-19). Whereas for Gauḍapāda the form or nature of logic is only to examine the three states of consciousness viz., waking, dream
and deep sleep with a view to demonstrating the truth that -
“Advaita or non-duality alone is the Siddhānta or the final spiritual teaching which helps cognize that - (a) Turiyātma or Absolute self who is Avasthātrayātīta or beyond the three states of consciousness alone is the ultimate Reality - as also’ (b) Jīva or the transmigratory soul is, in the Absolute Intuitive sense (Paramārtha), Brahman alone”. In the ultimate analysis, his Siddhānta is : “That Ajātma Tattva or Reality of unborn self, devoid of any association (Samparka) with the empirical Kārāṇa Bhāva or cause effect categories, is Itself the Absolute, ultimate Reality (Paramārtha)”

For Nāgārjuna there is no greater Sādhana or means instruments of action than Tarka or logic ; for Gaudapāda there is no greater Sādhana than Upanishads which teach in accordance or consonance with Anubhava or universal Intuitive experience. According to Nāgārjuna’s opinion Naihīswābhāya or void or essenceless alone is Ajāti or devoid of birth or creation, whereas for Gaudapāda Ajādvitiya Ātman or unborn, non-dual self alone is Ajāti or without birth.

“For the word ‘Shūnya’ not only there is a meaning of ‘Naihīswābhāva’ (essencelessness) but also the meaning of ‘Buddhyātita Nirvikalpaka Paramārtha’ (the ultimate, Absolute Reality, which is non-conceptual and beyond the intellect). ‘Prajñā Pāramita’, ‘Jñānamadvayam’, :Tathāgatabhūtakōi’, ‘Buddhamāṭru’ - all these are the nomenclatures for Paramārtha Tattva or the ultimate reality. Hence to say that ‘Shūnya’ means ‘Naihīswābhāva’ it is not proper” - thus T.R.V. Murthy opines. But we have shown in our explanatory dissertation that this opinion is itself not proper. For, (Abhisamayālankārālōka 408-499) - in this sentence since it is very clearly meant that Prajñāpāramita is itself Pratītyasamutpanna, it has been further clarified that it means ‘Nīhswabhāwa’ (essenceless) and ‘Māyōpama’ (analogous to magic, illusion). In the same text on page 144 it has been proclaimed that - “Nirvānānapi Pratīvishishtam Dharmakāyamadvaya Jnānaswabhāvam Māyāśupana-samānām Vaddami” - purporting to mean Advayajñāna also is of the essential nature of Māyā, Svapna.

In the same manner, a selected sentence from Di(n)jāgana’s work called ‘Prajñāpāramita a pindārtha Nirdesha Grantha’ runs
like: “Prajñāpāramitā Jñānamadvayam sā Tathāgataha ; Śādhaya tadarthya yōgena Tacchatyadem Granthamārgayōho” - Here for the phrase ‘Advaya Jñāna’ the meaning (Mukhyārtha) and secondary meaning (Gouṇārthā) of the word ‘Prajñāpāramita’.

When the Buddhists themselves are affirming that ‘Advaya-jñāna’ or non-dual knowledge is ‘Māyōpama’ or analogous to magic, illusion, if one imagines that it signifies Paramārtha is not proper and this is very clear. The word ‘Bhūtakōti’ has been used for the ‘Dharmakāya’ or spiritual body of Tathāgata (Buddha or the realized person) ; merely on that count Prajñāpāramita cannot mean Paramārtha or the ultimate reality ; the purport behind calling it ‘Buddhamāṭṛu’ is not that it is a material cause for anything. In fact, the reason for calling like that is to indicate that if one worships it Buddhatwa or realization is attained. Why say more ? All these statements strengthen the doctrine that - “Prajñāpāramita is Nīḥśwabhāva”. The Shūnyavādins Buddhists have expounded that - “(Māhyamīka Kārikā Vṛthi 22-16, P. 162). Thus it is not possible at all for anyone to show or prove any comparison between the Shūnyavāda which preaches that - “Everything is Nīḥśwabhāva or essenceless” and Vedānta which expounds that - “The substratum for all Vikalpas or erroneous mental concepts is Āja (unborn) Advaya (non-dual) Brahma (ultimate reality)”

PARAMĀRTHASATYA AND VYĀVAHĀRIKASATYA

In the opinion of Shri Gauḍapāda, ‘Vyāvahārikasatya’ means that (apparent) reality or Satya which is Pramāṇa Vedya or known, cognized through a means of knowledge which appears in the waking state. This teaching as also that - “Ātman of the form of Sākshi is himself the Paramārthasatya or Transcendental, ultimate reality” - Both these tenets have been demonstrated in the Sūtra Bhāshya by Shri Śaṅkarāchārya. But in the opinions of Nāgārjuna and other Buddhists “Shūnya is itself Paramārthasatya ; all else is Samvrāti satya - (meaning, that which is believed by common people to be real)”.

Kumārila Bhatta in his “Nirālambanavāda” refuted the above Buddhist theory in the manner - “It is never acceptable if it is said that Samvrāti is a kind in Reality ; if it is Samvrāti it is not satya, if it is satya then it is not Samvrāti”.

PARASARA: Kṛṣṇa is the one who manifests a thousand faces, degrees, and forms; and all of them are unique. How can one of them be the ultimate reality? And how can it be that one of them is ultimate reality and the other not? There are a thousand faces, and each face is unique. But the face of Kṛṣṇa is different from the face of Kṛṣṇa. He is the ultimate reality. So Shiva is not the ultimate reality, nor is Brahma.
CONCLUSION

Shri Gauḍapāda has established by taking as his central authoritative source the Māṇḍūkyya Upanishad, which though smallest in size (only 12 Mantras or verses) among all the Upanishads yet the most famous one, the following profound Siddhānta by means of logic fully in consonance with Anubhava (universal Intuitive Experience) : “On the support of Anubhava of Avasthātraya or three states of consciousness, Ātman of all of us is verily Ajādvaya Brahman alone which is Nityaniravastha or eternally devoid of any state ; That alone is the Paramārtha satya”. Further, he has not only clarified as to what exactly is the wide difference between the predominantly perverted logic - oriented Vijñānavādis and Shūnyavāda, on the one hand, and Vedānta on the other, but also has convinced all true seekers about the facts that : (a) Vain logic can never stand its ground all through ; (b) all the devices adopted by the logically-oriented Darshanas or schools of philosophy are all meant for the worship (Ārādhana) of Paramātman, who is propounded in Vedāntic spiritual science as Devadeva or god of all other gods and Īśwareshwara or Lord of all other lords.
THE ESSENTIAL GAUḍAPĀDA

āGAMA PRAKARAṆA

I INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Among those principal ten Upanishads on which Shri Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda had written his profound commentaries to make them universally familiar Māṇḍūkya is one. Although this Upanishad is the smallest in size among them, in its spiritual contents it is the greatest, nay the most convincing text. In the first place, this Upanishad is, on the pretext of examination of the three states of Consciousness, verily the quintessence of all the Upanishadic lore. Secondly, having been totally fascinated by its profound spiritual teachings Shri Gauḍapādāchārya, an exponent belonging to an ancient line of traditional teachers well-versed in the Vedāntic methodology of expounding the Ultimate Reality of Brahman or Ātman, wrote this magnificent treatise - comprising 215 verses - which have become universally famous as ‘Kārikās’ divided into four Prakaraṇas or Chapters - with the sole purport of revealing the secret teachings of this concise Upanishad for the benefit of genuine seekers. To the best of our knowledge, the world teacher, Shri Śaṅkarāchārya, who was the foremost spiritual preceptor who by revealing the less known, implicit Vedānta Prakriyā (methodology utilized in the Upanishads) which was Sāmpradāyic (traditionally) through his Prasthanatraya Bhāshyas and who had helped Jīnāsus (true seekers) to discern the Vedānta Siddhānta, had kept in view the subtle teachings of these Māṇḍūkyopanishad Kārikās alone as his main treasure trove and inspiration and had rendered this yeoman service to all humanity.

In addition to presenting before the serious students of Vedānta the real purport of Shri Śaṅkara’s Bhāshyas on these Kārikās, it is also intended in this treatise to examine thoroughly the various contradictory opinions as also raging controversies that have been spread throughout our country by alien schools and scholars with regard to those spiritual teachings propounded in these Kārikās and then prove the opponents’ views as fallacious and ill-found. For this purpose the real
purport of the various Kārikās will be explained and established on the basis of universal Intuitive Experience and logical arguments or devices in consonance with it.

**SALIENT FEATURES OF THE FOUR PRAKARĀNAS**

It will be highly beneficial to discern or divine the extraordinarily profound tenets that are implicit in the four Prakaraṇas distinctively. The first Prakaraṇa is called ‘Āgama Prakaraṇa’. Because the methodology of teaching (the Vedantic truths) handed down according to the traditional (Sāmpradāya) line of teachers is revealed on the pretext of writing a commentary on the Upanishad, this Chapter is called ‘Āgama Prakaraṇa’, which is befitting indeed in this regard. Āgama means the Upanishad which teaches the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality), as also the traditional methodology of teaching It which is implicit in that Upanishad - both these aspects are called by that name. Although in this Prakaraṇa, Upapattis - meaning, the Yuktis (logical arguments or devices) utilized to solve certain doubts that may arise in between the textual verses - are conjoined to the Upanishadic verses, here the Āgama alone is important and is given the pride of place and Upapatti is given the second place.

The next Prakaraṇa is Vaitathya Prakaraṇa. ‘Vaitathya’ means ‘not being like that’. Dvaita (duality) - meaning, the world which appears to be full of diversity and is divided into manifold aspects - although it at first sight creates an impression, a belief that it really exists as it appears, when we adopt a Śāstra Drishi and deliberate upon it, we come to realize that - “The world of duality or diversity is ‘Vitatha’ (that which is not like that), it is a mere false notion or misconception” - this teaching is brought home to our minds in this Prakaraṇa. Because this fact is demonstrated following a logic in consonance with or approved by the Śāstra, this Prakaraṇa is called ‘Vaitathya Prakaraṇa’. In this Chapter although Yuktī (logical devices) only are given predominance, here too the authoritative support of Śāstra has not been discarded; here too ‘Āgama’ is invariably being followed or adopted. This fact has to be borne in mind.

The third Chapter is ‘Advaita Prakaraṇa’. Because Dvaita is shown to be a mere false appearance it amounts to rendering
Dvaita as not really existing, and it is concluded thereby automatically that *Advaita* (non-dualism) alone is the *Paramārtha* (Absolute truth). Even so, in order to remove doubts to the effect - "Like Dvaita why should not Advaita too be false? If it is contended that because Dvaita is opposed to Advaita the former is false, then on the same score because Advaita is opposed to Dvaita, why cannot Advaita too be said to be false?" - this Chapter which establishes the *Advaita Satyatwa* (the Absolute reality of non-dualism) is begun. Although like the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa here too Yukti alone is given predominance, nevertheless, Āgama is not discarded or neglected. Anyhow, through these first three Prakaraṇas the Advaita spiritual teaching expounded in the Upanishad is fully established adopting the traditional methodology of pedagogics.

Further, the fourth Chapter is called *Alātashānti Prakaraṇa*. A relevant doubt of the type - “Because there exist in this world schools of philosophy (*Darshanas*) which are opposed to the Vedas, what convincing proof is there to assert that whatever is taught in the *Vaidik Upadeshās* (Upanishadic, spiritual instructions) alone are the ultimate final verdict? Even those who are not Vaidikas, are also forwarding their respective ‘Āgamas’ - meaning, their own respective spiritual preceptors’ doctrines - and *Yuktis* in keeping with them, is it not so?” - may pose itself before us. Solving this doubt, it is affirmed in this Chapter that - “Because those various logical arguments (*Yuktis*) are mutually opposed to one another, there is no worthwhile essence or substance in them; on the other hand, there is no possibility whatsoever for the Advaita Siddhānta to be opposed to any *Darshana* - whatsoever it may be - nor is there any possibility of any internal squabbles or contradictions within Advaita itself”. Further, it evolves that - “Vedānta Siddhānta can be acknowledged without any apprehensions or inhibitions whatsoever, because it is demonstrated quite convincing here in this Chapter by means of Yukti that Dvaita is *Mithyā* (false)”. Although in this Prakaraṇa mere logical arguments utilizing it is disclosed as to how the remaining *Darshanas* are mutually opposed to one another, eventually it is proved to the hilt that the Vedāntic methodology is opposed to none even from the standpoint of the Āgama also. The prudent student should ever remember this fact too.
Thus the first Prakarāṇa, being of the nature of a commentary on the Śruti (Māṇḍūkyya Upanishad), is Āgama pradhāna (predominantly Śastraic and traditional in its approach and treatment of the subject matter), while the remaining three Chapters are Tarkapradhāna (predominantly logical or dialectical in approach), because they have invariably and unfailingly utilized that Intuitive logic implicit in the Śrutis as also any other empirical forms of dialectics not opposed to that ‘Śrutyanugrahitā Tarka’ (logical devices approved by the scriptures). Because all these four Chapters help Intuit or cognize the truths enunciated and expounded by Vedānta Śāstra, these Chapters have been called ‘Prakarāṇas’ in the spiritual circles. The word ‘Prakarāṇa’ means any write-up which pertains to any one part or aspect of the Śastraic teachings and which thereby provides another elucidatory commentary to the Śastraic topic. Here in this context, to expound that Advaita Tattva (non-dual Reality of Ātman or Brahman) is the Śāstrārtha (real, ultimate purport of the scriptures) and confirming it by means of Upapatti is the Kāryāntara (extraneous purpose).

I ĀGAMA PRAKARĀṆA

We have already stated that the first Chapter called ‘Āgama Prakarāṇa’ written by Shri Gauḍapādāchārya has been given that name because - (a) He has kept in mind the spiritual teachings of the Māṇḍūkyya Upanishad predominantly as his authoritative source for it ; (b) in this Chapter he reveals the traditional methodology of teaching adopted by the line of preceptors (from time immemorial) belonging to his Sampradāya (school of philosophy viz. Advaita Vedānta). Hence, it amounts to saying that because in the Upanishad it has been propounded that through the determination of the purport of Ōmkāra the method of cognizing the Ultimate Reality of Ātman has been elaborated, the Āgama Prakarāṇa has to be understood by following the sequential order of the Upanishad Mantras. For this reason alone, Shri Gauḍapāda has taken up the first six Mantras together and with the purport of explaining their teachings, has written the Kārikās pertaining to the Pādatraya (three quarters).

THE FIRST SIX MANTRAS OF THE UPA尼ISHAD

ओमित्तेतद्वर्णिदं सव तस्योपयायां भूतं भवन्त भविष्यादिति सवर्मोकार एव।
Meaning: (1) “Here these verses exist: The Vibhu (Omnipresent Lord) having the extroverted cognition (consciousness) is Vishwa; One who has the introverted cognition is Taijasa; is verily a (consummate) lump of Consciousness. is Prājña. One alone is of these three kinds - thus He is said to be.”

THE BHĀSHYAKĀRĀ’S MAṆΓALA ŚLŌKA

Commentary: Perhaps, because he has written Bhāshyas to the Māṇḍūkyopanishad as also to the four Kārikā Prakaraṇas, Shri Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda has here, in this context, written two Maṅgala Ślokas (invocatory verses at the beginning of the treatise). For this reason, we have utilized the first verse for the Upanishad and the second for the Kārikās. The Bhāsha commentator has raised a doubt that in the fourth part of the second verse there is no ‘Vṛttalakṣaṇa’ (sign of continuity) and has provided a consolatory explanation saying that in it there is ‘Gāthalakṣaṇa’ (sign of a religious verse, but not belonging to any Vedas).
The Essential GaurJapada

The purport of the Maṅgala Śloka: “May the Sarvātma (Self of all) - after having enjoyed the pleasures born out of gross objects, then by means of His Jyoti (Light of Consciousness) having enjoyed the other subtle objects which are spread out or projected by His mind, thereafter slowly sustaining and subsuming all of them in His own essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness and eventually giving up all particular features becomes entirely devoid of the whole gamut of characteristics - may that Turiya (fourth, relatively) protect all of us!”. This verse too is akin to the invocatory verse, written prior to the Upanishad commentary, in its purport or meaning. In the first verse itself a little deeper meaning becomes evident. On the whole, the principal meaning of all this is that the Turiyātma mentioned in the Upanishad is Himself Brahman.

In order to explain the meaning of Ātman’s three Pādas (quarters) Shri Gaudapādāchārya has written nine Kārikas. The student will do well to reckon the meaning of the Kārika sentence - “The Vibhu who has an extroverted consciousness is Vishwa” - to be the same as that of the commentary by Shri Śaṅkara on the third Upanishad Mantra; for the Kārika sentence - “One with the introverted consciousness is Taijasa” - take the commentary on the fourth Mantra; and for the Kārika sentence - “Similarly, one who is Ghanaprajña (lump of Pure Consciousness) is Prājña” - take the commentary on the fifth Mantra.

The meaning of the Kārika sentence that - “One alone is said to be of three kinds” - is: Although Ātman is non-dual (i.e. One without anything second to Him), those knowledgeable teachers say that - ‘He is appearing as of three forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña’. For the textual phrase - “Tridhā Sthitaha” - the commentary is: “He appears as if to exist in three kinds”; for the alternative textual phrase (found in another recension) “Tridhā Mataha” - the commentary is: “Although in reality, that is, from the Absolute viewpoint, He is one and one alone, the ignorant people are misconceiving Him to exist in three different kinds.”

**WHAT IS TO BE COGNIZED BY THE DISTINCTIONS OF VISHWA, TAIJASA AND PRĀJNA?**

For this Shri Śaṅkara has written a sentence the meaning of which is; “Because - (a) all the three states of Consciousness (Avasthās) are being experienced one after another; (b) we are
recognizing Him in the manner - 'He Himself is myself' - by means of memory - it is established that ‘Ātman is distinct from the three Avasthās ; He is one and one alone (non-dual) ; He is Shuddha (Pure, Absolute), Asaṅga (non-attached or unrelated) - this is the purport here ; this has to be deduced on the strength of illustrations such as the big fish etc."

Here in this context there are quite a number of topics which are to be discerned and cognized. As per the Bhāṣṭya statement that we remember in the manner : “A vasthas are coming and going one after another ; they are three in number ; He alone is myself” - although it may at first sight appear to be true, Śrī Śaṅkara does not at all have the ultimate intention of conveying this meaning.

To wit : Although it is true that, in general, to all us it appears that the Avasthās are coming and passing away one after another and they are three in number - these Avasthās are not coming one behind another in one common substrate or denomination of time, nor are they appearing to exist one by the side of another in one common space. Therefore, to reckon them to be ‘three’ in number is wrong. If a clock strikes three sounds to indicate three hours, that flow of time in which the first sound was heard by us, in the same flow of time alone the second and the third sounds are being heard by us. Because we are individuals distinct from the clock we are able to count the sounds of the clock as one, two and three. But here the one flow of time which is the substratum or support for all the three Avasthās does not exist at all ; there is no one who can count them as one, two etc. Anyway, that all the three Avasthās are coming and going in a sequential order is not in our experience at all ; the phenomenon that - “I myself who experienced the waking, after waking up, am experiencing this ; apart from these two Avasthās I am separate” - is not in our experience. Therefore, the statement that - “Ātman is having the three Avasthās in a sequential order” - is not in consonance with universal experience.

In the same manner, even the concept that we cognize in the manner - “That person himself is myself” - on the basis of memory is also not acceptable to experience, and this truth is determined only by Intuitive deliberation. To explain, what is
experienced in the past to remember that in one time continuum is called ‘Smrītī’ (memory). For the memory of the type - “This morning I ate some food; but now I am hungry” - which occurs in the evening - there is support of the past experience. It is also quite reasonable if on a Sunday morning to one who has taken his food, in the evening its memory being there; for the one particular period or point of time like ‘Sunday’ is the support for both the consumption of food and the memory of its consumption. But pertaining to the illustrated (Dārśtrāntika) Ātman, it is not at all like this. Here in this latter case, it is true that a feeling of the type - “I myself, who saw the dream after waking up, am seeing the external world” - to accrue; but there is no time flow or continuum whatsoever which is common to both dream and waking. Besides, it is in the experience of every one of us that in each of these Avasthās, one each but different time continuum exists. The explanation as to how this is to be reckoned will be more elaborately deliberated upon in the commentary on the second Prakaraṇa. In the same way, there is a hitch to say that - “The ‘I’ of the dream is being reckoned to be the ‘I’ of the waking”. For, the ‘I’ that ‘existed’ in the dream is different or distinct from the ‘I’ of this present waking in so many respects. This fact too will be made very clear in the commentary of the second Prakaraṇa. On the whole, because of the facts that - (a) both the Avasthās do not ‘exist’ in one and the same time continuum; (b) there is no ‘I’ which is a common witness to both the states - to assume that there is a ‘Pratyabhijñā’ (recognition) of the type - “That person (in the dream) alone am I” - is not proper; therefore we can conclude that this opinion too is not the real intention of teaching of the Bhāshyakāra (i.e. Shri Śaṅkara).

In that case, for the sentence which is written by Shri Śaṅkarāchārya what exactly is the ultimate purport? This question will be answered now. The Avasthās can be deliberated upon or considered from two viewpoints. One is a viewpoint which witnesses them on the strength or basis of and in accordance with Anubhava (Intuitive Experience); in fact, this alone is the proper, reasonable one. For, everyone of us will necessarily have to acknowledge the truth - that
'Intuitive Experience has a greater value and validity than memory (Smṛiti). The other viewpoint: Vyavahāra means the phenomena that appears to our mind in the waking and the manner in which we all talk, express or communicate in accordance with that. Because - (a) this viewpoint is common or natural to all (universal) in their ‘Avichāra Dasha’ (state of non-discrimination or ignorance) ; (b) it is proper for a person, who wishes to examine these states from the Śāstra Drishti (viewpoint of the scriptures or Upanishads), while teaching or expounding the Tattva (the Ultimate Reality), to do so on the basis or strength of the knowledge which the common run of people have acquired in their Vyavahāra (to wit, the workaday experiences and notions) - to follow and deliberate upon this Vyāvahārik viewpoint alone first becomes quite justifiable. When we observe from this viewpoint, because to all of us (i.e. universally) it appears as though we are all having (experiencing) the three states of Consciousness like waking, dream and deep sleep as also when one among them exists (or in being experienced), no other state exists and it appears as though these three states are coming and going one after another, Shri Śankara has stated, on the basis of this (aparent) regular recurrence or repetition (Paryāya) of three states of Consciousness, that Ātman experiences them. Even from this viewpoint, even after these states come and go and when any one of them is being experienced, because our essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness exists as It is, it evolves from this that these states of Consciousness are not part and parcel of Ātman’s essential nature.

Similarly, each one of us thinks in the manner - ‘I myself, who saw the dream, am awake’ ; ‘I myself, who did not know anything in deep sleep, am now, in the waking, seeing the external world and am cognizing the internal mental condition’ - and deducing from these that - ‘That person, who experienced those dream and deep sleep states, is myself indeed’ ; each one of us on the strength of memory is recognizing that - ‘The essence of the previous state is that of the present one alone’ ; each one of us is believing that - “The states, especially are different and distinct.” Even considering from this Vyavahāra Drīṣṭi, it evolves that - “Ātman is...
separate from the three states of Consciousness.” In fact, no one will or does agree if it is said that - ‘What one person experiences, another remembers, is it not so ?” Therefore, it is to be concluded that - “This Ātman who is experiencing the three states one by one and is remembering the previous experience now is one and one alone.” In the same way, even though it appears as if that - “He is experiencing these three states” - when He wakes up, neither a taint even of the bizarre experiences of the dream nor the ignorance of the deep sleep actually have caused any stain or stigma whatsoever to Ātman. Hence, it evolves that - “Ātman is Pure.” Not only this ; the relationship with the waking state is not there in the least for Ātman in the other two states. Similarly, the relationship of the dream state is not there in the other two states ; the relationship of deep sleep is not there in the other two states ; Therefore, in His very essence Atman is Asanga (unattached or unrelated or Absolute, Transcendental). It amounts to saying that just as a plastic emulsion-coated (water-proof) cloth is not soaked or wetted by water, the three states of Consciousness can never taint or touch Ātman with any of their characteristics or features.

In this manner, it is the opinion of the Bhashyakāra (i.e. Shri Śaṅkara) that even when the Vyavahāra Drīshṭi is followed or adopted, what the Śruti has expounded as Ātman’s essential nature to be like - ‘He is transcending or beyond the three states’ etc., becomes intelligible or comprehensible. This alone is his purport and not that he has any resolute attachment in persisting to affirm that - (a) the three states of Consciousness have the support of one and the same time continuum ; (b) they have the regular recurrence (Paryāya) of appearing one after another ; (c) among the states there exists the memory of one in another ; (d) this memory is actually of the essential nature of remembrance alone. Just now we need not consider these controversial topics like - (i) Whether the three states have the substratum of time or not ? (ii) Whether they are actually occurring one after another or not ? (iii) Whether there is any scope or chance of the memory of the dream and the deep sleep states occurring in the waking or not ? All these will be taken up for detailed deliberation in the second Chapter or Prakaraṇa.

So far, on the strength of the Vyāvahārika Drīshṭi it has
been determined that even if we analyse and deliberate upon our Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) it is tantamount to accepting that - ‘Our Ātman is beyond (transcendental to) the three states, is One, Pure and unrelated.’ If we discern the fact that even the inviolable or infallible Śruti - which is propounding the Tattva (Ultimate Reality of Ātman, Brahman), keeping Sārvatrikānubhava (the universal Intuitive Experience) alone as the basis - is a valid means or proof (Pramāṇa) for this teaching, then it becomes clear that this determination alone is the correct one. For instance, in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad it is stated thus : ‘तद्वष्ट्र महामात्य उभे कूले अनुस्मरिति पूर्वं च अपरं च एवेतेवां पुरुषं एतात्मावत्तात्तुसंस्कृति स्वनांत्य च बुझानं च ॥’ (Bri. 4-3-18). Just as a big fish like a whale, without being washed away by the turbulent current of a river, freely, leisurely roams about from one bank to the other, not depending upon either of the banks nor having anything to do with them and thereby we may reckon it to be ‘Asaṅga’ (unattached, unrelated) ; because the mud of either bank has not stuck to the fish, we may also reckon it to be ‘Shuddha’ (pure, clean) - in the same way, this Ātman too, though He appears to enter and experience the waking and the dream states one after the other, He is beyond and is surpassing both of them, remaining pure and untainted by them. Thus on the analogy of this illustration of a big fish the Śruti is teaching us the essential nature of Ātman.

In the same vein, there is yet another Śruti : “तद्वष्ट्रासिद्धाचारो श्योनो वा सुपुषो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तं संहत्य पश्ची सत्त्वायायं विद्ययं एवेतेवां पुरुषं एत्तमा अन्त्यभावति यथा पुषो न कम्भन कामं कामपि न कंभन स्वच्छं पश्चाति ॥”, meaning : Just as a falcon or a hawk, after having wandered about in mid-air and getting exhausted, folds up its wings, returns to its nest and enjoys complete rest - in the same way, this Ātman, after having carried out varied transactions either in the waking or in the dream, gets exhausted and then enters into deep sleep alone ; therein He does not see anything ; desiring anything, He does not slog for attaining it - (Bṛi. 4-3-19). This Śruti sentence is clarifying the truth that - ‘For Ātman the Kāma (desires) and Karma (actions) that are apparently seen to attach themselves in the waking and in the dream are not at all related’. Therefore, the Siddhānta (spiritual philoso-
phy) that we comprehended by following the Vyavahāra Dṛṣṭī and examining the three states of Consciousness is established to be correct on the evidence of the Śruti teaching itself.

THE MEANING OF THE NAMES LIKE ‘VISHWA’ ETC.

It is necessary to determine here the exact meanings of words like Vishwa, Vaishwānara, Taijasa, Prājña - which are used in the Kārikās and the Upanishad. For, in the texts which have become popular these days (like the Tattwāviveka of Pañchadahasi 17, 24, 29 ; Siddhāntaleshasaṅgraha 92-100 - Choukhamba ; Vedāntasāra pp. 42, 46 ; 63-64 ; 69-70) there is in vogue a convention of teaching that - ‘Vishwa’, ‘Taijasa’, ‘Prājña’ are the names for Vyāshti Īīva (the individual, microcosmic soul), and in that order they are the selves identifying themselves with waking, dream and deep sleep states, respectively, and ‘Vaishwānara’, ‘Hiranyagarbha’, ‘Īśvara’ are, in that order, the different Samashti (macrocosmic lords of those three states). Besides, the translations of the Hindi text - ‘Vṛttiprabhākara’ by Śādhu Nishchaladasji are very popular in our country. In that text, it has been propounded that the words ‘Hiranyagarbha’ and ‘Vīrāt’ are used to refer to Īīva and Īśwara in different contexts and that these references become justifiable, on the basis of ‘Shaktivrītti’ (in the sense of power) to Īīva and ‘Gauṇavrītti’ (in the secondary sense) to Īśwara. In addition to this, it has been written therein that - “In the Māṇḍukyopanishad it has been taught that ‘Trividhajīvas’ (the three types of Īīvas) have to be meditated upon as identical (Abhedachintana) with ‘Trividha Ishwaras’ (three types of Īśwaras)” ! Further, it has been mentioned that - “The Māṇḍūkya Vachana has the ultimate or prime purport in teaching mere Abhedachintana alone and not that therein the Tattwa (the Ultimate Reality of Ātman ) has been taught in consonance with Vastuswarūpa (the essential nature of the Reality as It is in esse)” ! (Vṛi. Pra. pp. 353-355). By these interpretations there is every scope for more confusion being caused in the minds of the Jijñāsus (seekers). For these reasons, it becomes quite necessary here to deliberate upon the real purport behind these Pāribhāṣhika Shabdas (technical terms).

Can the words - ‘Vaishwānara’ and ‘Hiranyagarbha’ -
be used as Jīvavāchaka (those signifying the transmigratory soul)? In the present text of Māṇḍūkya, how are these terms used? - this question let us examine. With regard to this topic Shri Śāṅkara has written in his Brīhadāraṇyaka Bhāshya (1-4-6) :

"Pāpmadāha (destruction of sins, demerits), Bhaya (fear), Arati (absence of pleasure), Janma (rebirth) etc. - because these have been mentioned in the Śrutī they have perforce to be said to be Samsārivāchaka (referring to a transmigratory soul) alone; even so, here there is a special feature. The non-dual Paramātman alone exists in the Absolute sense, but He is being dealt with both as a Samsāri due to association with adjuncts and as in His essential nature as Asamsāri; from this point of view, for Paramātman alone these words are used due to association with adjuncts. The dealings of Hiranyagarbha being one and of many forms are also of this nature alone. All the Jīvas too, in the same manner, as they appear with adjuncts are Samsāris as also of many or various forms; but from the Paramārtha Drīshṭi they are all Paramātman alone. In the case of Hiranyagarbha, especially, because the adjunct is infinitely or exceedingly pure or subtle, He is being called in Śrutis and Smṛitis ‘Parameshwara’ alone; He is referred to as ‘Samsāri’ rarely at some places. For Jīvas only - because of their abundance of impurities in their adjuncts, mostly the dealings as Samsāris are many, but from the standpoint of their Nirupādhikarūpa (essential nature devoid of all forms of adjuncts) they are all of the very essence of Paramātman indeed”. (Brī. Bh. 1-4-6, its gist).

Secondly, if we deliberate upon the question - “In what manner have these words been used in the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad and in the Āgama Prakaraṇa Kārikās which are of the form or nature of a commentary on it?” - then there does not exist any Pramāṇa (valid evidence) whatsoever to say or conclude : “In Māṇḍūkya Upanishad, an Abhedachintana has been taught between the Vyāshṭi Jīvas and Īśwara of Samsāṭirūpa”. In Māṇḍūkya it has been instructed in the manner - “Ōm - this letter is all this”; “All this is verily Brahman”; “This Ātman is Brahman” - in order to give an explanation of Īrmkāra as also the Brahmatmaikya (the identity between Brahman and Ātman), and further in it there exist sentences which propound that the entire world of duality that appears to all of
us is verily ‘Omkāra’ or ‘Brahman’; but there are no words like ‘Upāsīta’ (one should meditate), ‘Dhyāyet’ (one should contemplate) etc., which stipulate by way of an injunction Dhyāna (meditation, contemplation), anywhere in the text. In the case of the Kārikās too, there is no trace of statements like - “Vishwa should be meditated or contemplated upon as Virāl” - to be found anywhere. In his Bhāshyas Śri Śaṅkara has stressed the point that all these four Prakaraṇas are ब्रजन्तार्थसारसंज्ञाः - meaning, ‘The quintessence’ of the teachings of Vedanta’ - indeed, and not that they describe Upāsanas. He has said : The determination of meanings of Omkāra is: “Ātmattawpratipatypayabhūtam” - meaning, “It is a device (Upāya) for attaining Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge or Experience) of Ātmatattwa (the Ultimate Reality of Ātman)” and not that either in the Upanishad or in this Prakaraṇa the Pranava Chintana (meditation on Omkāra) has been considered. Even if we realize the meaning of the sentence occurring in Muktikopanishad : नामःव्रजेन्द्रेष्वे यथा मुनुश्वरां विमुक्ते - meaning “For Mumukshus Māndūkya alone is sufficient to enable them to attain Mukti” - we will have to reckon that from time immemorial the opinion that this Upanishad teaches Jñāna which is instrumental in attaining Sadyo’dmukti (i.e. Liberation in this very life - also called Jīvanmukti in Vedāntic parlance) has been acknowledged on all hands. Therefore, it is proper to reckon that both the Upanishad and the Kārikā have the one singular purport of teaching the Vastuswarūpa.

Further, if we examine the query - “The word ‘Vaishvānara’ used in the Upanishad and the word ‘Vishwa’ used in the Kārikā - between these two words does one indicate Samashti (macrocosmic aspect) and the other Vyashti (microcosmic aspect)?” - to conclude in this manner, we do not find any support or valid evidence. The word ‘Vaishvānara’, as used in the Chāndogya Upanishad, is the name given to Brahman alone who is Upāsya (the object of meditation). Śrī Śaṅkara has stated that the qualifying word ‘Saptāṅga’ (endowed with seven limbs or parts) which is described in the Upanishad, is applicable or suitable only toĪśwara with proper reasons. While dealing with the etymological deduction (Vyutpatti) of the word
'Vaishwanara', Shri Śaṅkara has stated: - 'विश्वेषां नरणाम् अनेकधा
नवनात् वैश्वानर:’ - meaning, “Because He enables all Jīvas to carry
on their mundane affairs in various ways, He is called
Vaishwanāra’; ‘यद् वा विश्वस्व अस्ति नरस्व इति वैश्वानरः; वैश्वानर एव
वैश्वानरः; सर्वपिण्डाल्यमान्यतर्पतः’ - meaning, “The human being who is
Vishwa (the universe) is Vishwanara; to the word ‘Vishwanara’
itself when the Swārthapratyaya (by virtue of a particular gram­
matical usage indicating a subjective aspect) it gets converted into
‘Vaishwanara’; because He is Abhinna (non-different from all
embodied souls, He is called Vaishwanara”. Therefore, it be­
comes definite, certain that the Śruti which has used this word
of ‘Vaishwanara’ does not at all refer to Jīva.

In the case of the Kārikās of Shri Gauḍapadāchārya, espe­
cially, the word ‘Vishwa’ is found, but the word ‘Vaishwanara’
is not found. It is reasonable and proper to expect this teacher,
who has undertaken the task of explaining the Upanishad, has
indicated the meaning of the word ‘Vaishwanara’ by the word
‘Vishwa’. In the same way, it is proper indeed to reckon that the
words ‘Taijasa’, ‘Prajña’ are significant terms for Parameshwara
alone and not for Jīvas. Only then, what has been expounded in
the Upanishad as - “Vaishwanara’, ‘Taijasa’ and ‘Prajña’ are
Ātman’s three Pādas (quarters)” - fully agrees with what Shri
Gauḍapadā has explained with all his heart as - “These three are,
in fact, indicating one and the same Ātman and not that each one
refers to one part of Ātman” - and further it becomes fully in
agreement with the meaning of his statement - ‘एक एव त्रिष्व स्मृतः’;
meaning - “Those who are knowledgeable (seers) say that one
and the same (Ātman) Parameshwara exists three-fold”.

In the same way, the word ‘Taijasa’ as also the word
‘Prajña’ - both are the same in the Upanishad and the
Kārikā. In the Upanishad just like Vaishwanara, Taijasa also is
said to be ‘Saptāṅga’. Therefore, therein to interpret ‘Taijasa ’ as
the Samashtirūpa (macrocosmic form) of Īswara alone is proper.
In the Madhubrahmaṇa of Brīhadāraṇyaka (2-5) there is a phrase :
“वस्त्रायमस्य धृतव्या तेजोमयोर्मुन्तमयः पुरुषः” - meaning, “This Purusha
who is existing in the earth and is full of resplendence, and
immortality” and in this manner, while mentioning identity between Ādhiadiva Purusha (tutelary macrocosmic Deity) and Adhyātmā Purusha (spiritual microcosmic Being) in every recurrence of the words, because it has been invariably stated by adducing Tejōmāyatwa (abundance of brilliance), meaning - Chinmātratwa (very essence of Pure Consciousness) to both equally, it becomes quite reasonable here in this context also to reckon that - just like the word ‘Vaishvānara’ - the word ‘Taijasa’ also has been used as ‘Adhidaivapara’ (in tutelary macrocosmic aspect) alone. Further, in the Bhāshya on the Upanishad, because it has been stated that - “For Taijasa (Purusha) a Consciousness which is replete with Vāsana (latent impressions) alone that which is experienced” - we have perforce to reckon that therein the Ātman who is a Witness to the Consciousness of latent impressions is referred to.

Now, with regard to teaching that - “The word ‘Prājña’ is truly one which signifies Parameshwara” - there does not remain any doubt whatsoever. For, in the remaining part of the sentence itself the Śruti is affirming : “एष सर्वेषः एष सर्वजः”, meaning - “He Himself is the omnipresent Being, He Himself is the omniscient Being” - etc. in clear, unequivocal terms. Besides, the word ‘Prājña’ is being used at various places in the Brahma (Vedanta) Sūtras (1-4-5......) as signifying Parameshwara alone. The Bhāshyakāra (Shri Śaṅkara) too has vociferously declared that - ‘प्राज्ञ सत्त्विमात्रम् अपयेर्वात्माः रूपम् इति प्राज्’ - meaning, “Because the Pure Consciousness is the extra-ordinary nature of this Purusha alone, He is called Prājña”. In the Sūtra Bhāshyaa too Shri Śaṅkara has written : ‘प्राज् परमेश्वरः; सर्वज्ञत्वलक्षणं प्रज्ञा नित्यमवियोगात्’ - (Sūtra Bh. 1-3-42), meaning - “Prājña means Parameshwara; for, the Consciousness which has the characteristic feature of omniscience subsists in Him without leaving Him or departing from Him”. For these various reasons, we have to dismiss the weird interpretation of many present-day authors of Vedantic texts who say that - “Prājña means Prāyena Ajñaha (one who is abundantly steeped in ignorance)” - and who have wildly imagined that he is the Jīva who is identifying himself as the possessor of deep sleep state - as untenable, being opposed to the Śruti as well as to the Bhāshyaa.
BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM DETERMINATION OF THE MEANINGS OF NAMES LIKE VISHWA, TAIJASA ETC.

By all such deliberation what is the decisive meaning arrived at? It is: The words ‘Vaishwanara’, ‘Taijasa’ and ‘Prajña’ used in the Śruti are the various forms of macrocosmic aspects of Īśwara; and those very forms have been called Vishwa, Taijasa, Prajña, respectively, in the Kārikās too. These Vishwa etc. are not terms signifying Jīvas; neither are Vishwa and Vaishwanara are terms signifying Jīva and Īśwara, respectively. Nowhere either in the Upanishad or in the present Kārikās the terms like Vishwa, Taijasa etc. are stated to be the names of Vyāshti Jīvas or microcosmic individual souls. These are verily the names of Parameshwara with adjuncts. The benefit that accrues by determining in this manner is: It will amount to our discerning (the teaching) that - “To the non-dual Parameshwara alone, who is associated with gross, subtle and causal forms of adjuncts, these three different epithets of Virāt or Vaishwanara, Vishwa; Hiranyagarbha; and Prajña or Īśwara who is of the essential nature of Avyākṛtātma (unmanifested Self), respectively, have been addressed. In the following verses this very opinion alone will be clarified.

THE INTUITIVE EXPERIENCE (ANUBHAVA) OF VISHWA, TAIJASA ETC. EXIST IN THE WAKING STATE TOO

Meaning: In the doorway of the right eye Vishwa, within the mind Taijasa and in the space within the heart Prajña - (thus) in the body He exists in three forms.

It should be remembered here that Vishwa, Taijasa, Prajña - these names are not utilized exclusively for the purport of signifying three different Ātmans who are associated with the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. On the other hand, they are specifically utilized to indicate the truth - “One and the same Paramātman, by virtue of His association with adjuncts, has acquired these three distinct forms”. This teaching has been clarified in this Kārikā by Shri Gauḍapādāchārya. For that reason alone, here the waking state alone has been taken up for consideration.
“Vishwa exists in the doorway of the right eye” - this expression does not at all mean that He has taken a position in the eye. In fact, in various places in the Upanishads (e.g. Brihadāranyaka 5-5-4; Chhāndogya 4-15-1) it has been stipulated that the practitioner should meditate upon Paramātman as existing in the eye. In that context the literal meaning that - ‘Paramātman actually exists in the eye’ - is not intended to be conveyed. Let us see what Shri Śaṅkara has stated in his Bhāṣya on the Chhāndogya sentence: अबिलिकृतिपुरुषो दृष्टये निम्बत्‌चार्यण्य:, भ्रात्च्यादिदिसाधनसंपत्ते: शान्तिविवेकिमिः दृष्टेन्द्रज्ञा - meaning: “To those discriminative persons - who have turned their senses within, who have acquired spiritual disciplines like Brahmachārya (celibacy) etc. and who are tranquil in their minds - the Drashtṛ (seer) of this Drishti (sight), i.e. Ātman who witnesses the sight - appears”. Therefore, “Vishwa exists in the eyes” - means He illumines directly the cognitive (perceptive) faculty of the eyes by means of His Chaitanya or Pure Consciousness. Although in the Upanishad the statement - “He is endowed with 19 cognitive doorways” has taken into account the remaining senses while describing Vaishwānara, here the mention of only the ‘eye’ is intended as an Upalakṣaṇa (an implication of all five senses) ; here it should be discerned that He is the Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness) of the cognitive faculties of all the senses. The mention of “the right eye” is to indicate the fact that in the Vedas mostly the right eye alone is selected ; may be, it has been stated in that manner because especially the right eye in people possesses a superior sharpness of sight. In fact, for stipulating by way of an injunction - the Purusha (celestial Being) who exists macrocosmically in the Sun and, microcosmically speaking, the Ātman who exists in the right eye - should be meditated upon as one and the same Parameshwara by the name ‘Satya’ - this alone is the purport. In any case, that Paramātman who is being called ‘Vaishwānara’ from the macrocosmic view-point is Himself our Ātman who is illuminating our cognitive consciousness in the senses. Not discerning this truth people in general are misconceiving their own Being divisively in the manner “I am the Jñātru or cognizer who knows the external objects through the means of my senses” - this is the purport of this sentence.
For the sentence - "In the mind He exists as Taijasa" - a similar interpretation should be made. Giving up his perception of the external objects through the senses, when he is experiencing happiness and miseries in his mind alone internally, one who is illuminating the mental cognition of the form of Vrittis (thoughts, concepts) is verily Ātman, is it not? In the case of the cognition of one who is seeing the gross objects with his eyes, actually by virtue of the (internal) mind and the (external) senses conjointly becoming one valid means or medium of knowledge the cognition of the object is accruing; but when happiness and misery and such other psychic phenomena are being experienced by the mind, there is no relationship of the outer senses at all to our cognitive knowledge. Therefore, herein the subtle cognition alone became the object for the Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness). By virtue of this difference in His adjunct Ātman Himself is called 'Taijasa' indeed. In addition to this, the microcosmic mind is important for Jīva in his Lingasharīra (subtle body); by means of this alone the Jīva begets his fruits according to the nature of his Karman and has to attain other bodies (in other births) - (Brihadāranyaka 4-4-6). Hiranyagarbha who is endowed with the adjunct of macrocosmic Mind is Manomaya (of the very essence of Mind) - (Bri. 5-6-1). He has to be perforce meditated upon in the mind only. Because this Sākshi alone who is implied by the association with the adjunct of the mind has been called 'Taijasa' in the Upanishad, it is proper to have stated that - "One who exists in the mind is Taijasa".

Now, what is meant by - "In the space of the heart exists Prājña" - is to be considered, is it not so? If the phrase - 'Hridayākāsha' - is to be translated literally, then it has to be interpreted as 'the space existing within the heart' only. Although in the waking both the body and the heart within it are invariably existing, because this expression has been used to explain the present topic of 'Prājña's experience', this meaning or interpretation does not suit. When both the mental transactions of experience (Anubhava) and memory (Smarana) have ceased, the essential nature of Being that exists (subsists) alone is called 'Prājña', is it not so? Just as when in deep sleep there do not exist any mental transactions, Ātman exists in His essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, in the same way in the waking
state too when Ātman exists in the ‘Tūshanmsthi’ (a state wherein there are no mental transactions whatsoever) He actually exists unto His essential nature of Pure, Absolute Chaitanya (Consciousness in esse). Therefore, our calling Him ‘Prājña’ is rendered to be correct. But how can the statement - ‘He exists in the space of the heart’ - be justified?

The answer to this query is: Here the word ‘Ākāsha’ (space) means Shuddhatman (Pure Ātman) who is exceedingly subtle like space. This convention of using this word ‘Ākāsha’ to refer to Paramātman is in vogue in the Upanishadic lore. For example, in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka during the debate between Gārgi and Ajātashatru the question that - “When he is asleep where was the Vijñānamaya Purusha?” - (Bṛ. 2-1-16) - was raised and in answer - ‘Taking all these cognitions of the senses along with the distinct knowledge which manifests itself in the Antahkarana (mind), He exists in the space which is within the heart” - it is stated thus. While explaining the meaning of this Śruti sentence, Shri Śaṅkara has written in his Bhāṣya thus: ‘The answer to this query is: Here the word ‘Ākāsha’ here one’s own Paramātman is denoted; he rests in that Ākāsha called ‘Ātman’ who is his own essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness and devoid of any characteristics of Samsāra (transmigratory existence)’. In the following sentence too Shri Śaṅkara has stated: “He exists in mere space - is not its meaning; for, the support of another Śruti sentence from Chhāndōgya, viz. ‘My dear, then he has become one with Brahman called ‘Sat’ - also, will be available for this our interpretation. Discarding the distinct nature brought about by association with the adjunct of Lingashārīra (causal body Jīvātmā), he rests in his essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness which is devoid of any distinct characteristic, and Absolute, Pure; this is the meaning”. Therefore, the real meaning of the third sentence of the Kārikā is: “When there do not exist any mental modifications or transactions of the forms of experience and memory (Anubhava-smaranarūpa Manōvyāpāra) all of us really (actually) exist in our Hridayākāsha, meaning Paramātma.
Swarūpa (the essential nature of Supreme Self). Vaishvānara who exists in the waking condition, Taivas who exists in the dream condition and Prājñā who exists in the deep sleep condition - the Intuitive Experience of all these three (macrocosmic Beings) invariably exists in our waking experience indeed. “By association with the adjuncts of the senses he is Shāriratma (embodied soul), by association with the adjunct of the mind he is Liṅgātma (subtle-bodied soul) and when both these adjuncts are absent and he rests in his essential nature of Pure Being without cognizing anything whatsoever he is Sushuptatma - thus even in our waking we are able to recognize or realize” - in this manner if we ratiocinate and try to give up our identification with these microcosmic (Vyashti) adjuncts (Upādhis), then the Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness or Principle, who is implied by these, alone is our essential nature per se. Even the concept that this Sākshi is invariably confined by these cognitions of the body and the senses is also a Bhrānti (delusion) indeed. For, this cognition or Intuition of our Sākshi Chaitanya (Witnessing, Absolute Consciousness) has verily transcended the body and is witnessing the entire universe itself (in the holistic sense). Therefore, if we cognize the fact that the entire waking world (Vishwa) is an adjunct to this Sākshi, then this Ātmā who is appearing to exist in our body is Himself ‘Vishwa’ (Vaishvānara) - it amounts to saying. Just like the microcosmic adjunct of the body (Vyashti Liṅgopādhi), if we Intuit that the whole gamut of the macrocosmic Mind itself is an adjunct to this Sākshi, then this our Ātman Himself, who appears as if being encircled by the subtle adjunct, is verily ‘Taivas’ ( Hiranyagarbha) - it amounts to saying. In the same way, when Ānubhava (experience), Smarana (memory) - these adjuncts do not exist whatsoever - although it appears that we do not have any cognitive knowledge whatsoever - then it is tantamount to deducing that - “The Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness) - who directly Intuits or cognizes in the manner - ‘No knowledge or experience whatsoever appears’ - with the aid of our Nirvikalpānubhava (Pure, Absolute Intuitive Experience) - is Himself the ‘Prājñā’ who is verily our Ātman”. Therefore, what we averred that - “One and the same Paramātman exists in three kinds in our waking body” - is also substantiated indeed.

The statement that is made in the first Kārikā to the effect
that - "One and the same Ātman exists in three aspects as Vishwa in the waking, Taijasa in the dream and Prājña in deep sleep" - is itself being once again reiterated here in the manner - "In the waking too, in the same manner, to one and the same Person the three types of distinct forms like Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña accrue" - and the reason for this repetition here is intended to instruct the truth that - "Ātman begets distinct forms by virtue of His association with adjuncts alone, but in His very essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness there do not arise or come into being these three distinctions whatsoever." There is scope for the common run of people to get deluded in the manner - "First when we are awake our Ātman begets a particular form; then when the dream comes we attain another form; thereafter when the deep sleep comes yet another form we acquire" - is it not so? There is no room whatsoever for such a delusion! Ātman exists unto Himself as He is in esse. Even if three people imagine in the manner - "This is the Sun who appears through the door of this house" - there do not exist three Suns at all, is it not so? In the same way, Ātman Himself does not in the least acquire different forms - being endowed with the adjuncts of the body and the senses in the waking, merely the mind in the dream and a total absence of any cognitive knowledge in the deep sleep. Just as the Sun who supplies light to everyone is one and one alone, Ātman who provides (sustains) all the Avasthās by virtue of the Light of His Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) is one and one alone (non-dual). These very same adjuncts can be cognized in the waking too; then in that event, the truth that - "Ātman is one and one alone" - will become all the more clear, evident; and this alone is the purport of the Kārikā.

IS IT PROPER TO SAY THAT IN THE WAKING TOO THE ANUBHAVA OR INTUITIVE EXPERIENCE OF VISHWA ETC. EXISTS?

Here in this context a doubt may arise: If by virtue of being endowed with various adjuncts like waking, dream and deep sleep alone these epithets of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña have been given, then how at all the statement that - 'In the waking state alone the experiences of these three exist' - can be proper? In that event, does it not amount to saying that when the waking state alone is existing the dream and the deep sleep states too exist?
For this, the solution is: Because the true purport behind the above-mentioned explanation has not been discerned, this doubt has raised its head. In fact, by virtue of an association with adjuncts like the senses, the mind and Ajñāna (ignorance) alone the states of waking, dream and deep sleep are appearing as though they are experienced by Ātman. All this has been stated from the waking viewpoint alone and not from the viewpoints of the respective states. For, neither in the dream in the manner - “Now I am seeing (experiencing) a dream” nor in the deep sleep in the manner - “Now I am sleeping, am not cognizing anything whatsoever” - anyone ever experiences; in truth, while in the dream one feels in the manner - “I am awake at present” - only, and in deep sleep no feeling whatsoever exists. Therefore, because we are getting the distinctive discrimination or recognition of ‘dream’ and ‘deep sleep’ in the waking alone, it amounts to saying that the concepts or feelings of Avasīthātraya (three states of Consciousness) are occurring to us in the waking alone. The scrutinies of the types of - “Last night I saw a dream” or “I had deep sleep. I did not have cognition of anything whatsoever” - are possible to be carried out in the waking by one who has the distinctive cognition of the body alone. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in the statement made to the effect - “In the body He exists in three kinds”. Thus Ātman, who is appearing as distinct as one embodied, Himself in His essential nature as the Witnessing Consciousness assumes the macrocosmic forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, in the manner in which it has been so far shown, and that this truth the Upanishad is teaching is the purport of the Kārikā.

THE OBJECTIONS AND SOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO THE EXAMINATION OF DEEP SLEEP

Here in this context some people who follow the Vyākhyāna Prasthāna (the methodology of the post-Śaṅkara sub-commentators) have raised a doubt pertaining to the scrutiny that is carried out about deep sleep in waking and their answer to it also is as follows: That the Sākshi who exists in deep sleep is Himself to be found in the dream as well as in the waking is accepted on all hands. What accrues in waking is Smaraṇa (the memory) of the Sākshi, of Sukha and Ajñāna that exist in deep sleep. Memory is a phenomenon which occurs when after the
experience is destroyed, the latent impressions (Samskāra) arise in a different period of time due to a special cause. The memory of the form of - “Then I experienced in such and such a manner” - accrues to us because after Anubhava (the experience) has vanished, now in a different period of time the Samskāra of that experience has arisen in us, is it not so? But what exists in Sushupti is the Sākshi’s experience alone. And since there is no destruction whatsoever to the Sākshi, the Anubhava did not vanish at all; then, wherefrom can the Samskāra come? If there is no Samskāra how at all could the memory accrue?

Thus raising a doubt of this type, what consolation those disponents have suggested is : The experience that accrues in Sushupti is that of ‘Ajñāna’ which exists in that Avasthā [Here in this respect the opinion of these disponents is that - “This Ajñāna is not Jñānābhāva (the absence of Jñāna), but a particular type of substantial, positive Anirvachaniyāvāya (indefinable ignorance)]. By virtue of the association with an adjunct of the form of Chidābhāsa (false appearance of Consciousness) that arises in this Ajñāna, the false conceptual experience of the type of Ajñāna, Sukha and Sākshi arises in us. Since that Jñāna is acquired in all the three Avasthās, three different states, by the destruction of a previous particular Ajñāna, the Chidābhāsa that exists in it also gets destroyed and another Ajñānāvasthā (state of ignorance) is caused as well as another Chidābhāsa which exists in it. Therefore, by the revival of a particular Samskāra born out of the destruction of the respective Chidābhāsa in the waking there is every possibility for the memory of those three phenomena, viz., Sākshi, Sukha and Ajñāna to arise.

Neither the doubt nor its solution described so far is to be found, not a wee bit of it, in the Kārikās especially. The Ajñāna that these disponents have conceived has not been signified or suggested anywhere by the Kārikākāra (i.e. Shri Gaudapāda). Both the phenomena of the Avasthās of Ajñāna getting destroyed and the different Avasthās getting born are indeed, like the imagination of Ajñāna, mere figments of imagination. For, no one ever has the experiences of the type - “In Sushupti I have such and such an experience”; “In the dream it (Avasthā) gets transformed or changed”; “In the waking another form of Avasthā is attained”. It need not be gainsaid that Shri Gaudapāda,
on the strength of the three Avasthās which are in everyone’s experience as well as the experiences that accrue to every one in those Avasthās, has convinced us about the Intuitive Experience of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājñā, but he has not mentioned an Avidyā which some disputants have misconceived and which is riddled with raging controversies and has never thereby tried to cause untold and needless difficulties to Jijnāsas (true seekers). The Avidyā (which is conceived by these Vyākhyanakaras) has not been considered or reviewed at all in any Śruti (Upanishad) nor any trace of it can be found in Shri Śaikara’s extant Bhāshyas. Hence, giving up the consideration of this wild imaginary doctrine of these disputants here, it is better if we pursue our study of the Kārikā meanings.

In that case, if a question to the effect - “What about the memory of the type - ‘In deep sleep I did not know anything’ - that accrues in the waking?” - is raised, the answer to it is : This is a mere misconception. For example, merely by the phrase - ‘A hare’s horns’ - although a concept of the type that - ‘A particular animal called a ‘hare’ has horns’ - may be formed in the mind, those persons who have actually seen a hare are convinced in the manner - “That animal has no horns at all” - and further they have a steadfast, settled belief of the type - “This phrase is a mere misconception ; there is no hare anywhere with any horns as suggested by the phrase.” In the same manner, in the case of Sushupti the memory that accrues to us in the waking should be understood. Shri Sureshwaraśārya also has expressed the same opinion in his Brihadāraṇyaka Vārtika.

न सुषुप्तिगच्छानं नाज्ञासिषितिः स्मृतिः
कालायवविशालत्वात् ध्यात्मस्यभावात् ।
न भूतकालायवक्र प्रत्ययदन्ति चागमित्वरोपनकृष्टवः
स्वार्थदेश: परायोऽश्चो विकल्पत्तेन स स्मृत ||

(Bri. Vā. 1-4-300, 301)

The purport of these two Vārtikas is : “In Sushupti there is no experience whatsoever ; ‘I did not know’ - is not at all a memory. For, there is no intervention or interposition of phenomena like time, space, causation etc. therein. It is not possible to say about what exists in Ātman per se that it belongs to past
time, is it not so? Pratyagâtman (the innermost Self) can never possibly touch either past time or future time; for, time also is verily an object for Ātman; that which is Parārtha - like the rope-snake, having been misconceived in another, appears completely being within its control - that phenomenon is stated to be a mere Vikalpa (misconception) appearing in a thing which is Svārtha (a real entity independently existing) like the rope. Therefore, the statement - “I did not know anything therein” - is also a mere Vikalpa indeed.

Thus, it is tantamount to concluding that the scrutiny of the dream and deep sleep states is a particular type of Vikalpa alone that is entertained by virtue of the waking viewpoint only in the waking body alone. In that case, if it is contended that - “It amounts to saying that the deep-seated beliefs like - ‘We have dreams; we have deep sleep too’ - have no supporting evidence” - we have to give an answer separately. The Śrutis do not - in the ultimate analysis - have the prime intention of teaching that to all of us really, actually the three states accrue. In fact, the ultimate purport of all the Śrutis is invariably to expound their unique Siddhānta (final spiritual teaching) of - “Ātman does not have any Avasthā whatsoever, in reality” - but prior to that, first by assuming tentatively the staunch belief that all of us entertain in the manner - “We all have the states like waking, dream etc.” - from the Vyavahāra Drishti (empirical viewpoint) alone and thereafter examining the Avasthānubhavas (universal experiences of the three states) to enable us to Intuit that Ātman is devoid of any Avasthā. This truth we will further clarify while considering the meaning of the Turiyakārikās. For the time being, this much should be kept in mind: “Vyavahāra” means the Pratyaya (cognition) that accrues to us in the waking and the Vyapadesha (utilizing the words) that we do. From this Vyavahāra Drishti, we all have a strong conviction to the effect - “We have the three states of Consciousness like waking, dream and deep sleep” - is it not so? If we scrutinize the experiences of these states - the experiences that accrue to us within a particular state - we come to Intuit, cognize that: (a) Our Ātman is not distinct as an embodied entity; (b) whatever appears in a particular Avasthā is only an adjunct that is associated with that Ātman. On the strength and support
of this Intuitive knowledge alone, Ātman who is in these states has been named ‘Vishwa’, ‘Taijasa’ and ‘Prājña’. Now if we observe from the Paramārtha Drishti (Absolute viewpoint) - that there is no valid evidence or means of proof to show that dream and deep sleep states occur - is also true indeed. Then, in that event, it is tantamount to concluding that there is no valid proof to assert that there exists a waking state distinctively, separately. For, only when dream and deep sleep phenomena exist, one can say that waking exists, is it not so? If seen in this light, because it amounts to saying - “Ātman is Nityaniravasthā (eternally devoid of any states)” - there does not remain any doubt whatsoever. This truth we will further scrutinize and describe while considering Turiyakārikās.

ENJOYMENTS FOR VISHWA ETC.

विश्वो हि स्थुलपुकेत्यं तैनसः प्रविष्टिकमुक्।
आनन्दपुक् तथा प्राङ्गित्रिष्या भोगं निजोधत।।३१।।
स्थुले तपस्ये विर्भः प्रविष्टिकं दु तैनसम्।
आनन्दश्च तथा प्राङ्ग विष्ण तृप्ति निजोधत।।३२।।

Meaning: Vishwa is eternally an enjoyer (eater) of gross things; Taijasa is the enjoyer of a variety of things, and Prājña is the enjoyer of bliss. Thus know that the enjoyment is of three kinds. The gross (enjoyment) produces satisfaction or satiation to Vishwa, what is various (produces satiation) to Taijasa and bliss produces satiation to the Prājña. Thus know that satiation is of three kinds.

Commentary: Although the meaning of the verses (Kārikās) mentioned here can be known from the explanation of the meanings of words like ‘Sthūlabhuk’ etc. which are found in the Upanishad, the delineation of the type - “The enjoyment is of three kinds; the satiation is of three kinds” - is not clarified there. For the Bhoktru (enjoyer) of the waking, enjoyment lies in a gross object; for the enjoyer of the dream, enjoyment is of subtle objects and for the enjoyer of the deep sleep, it is Tāmasa Bhōga (slothful, indolent enjoyment born out of Ajñāna or ignorance), is it not so? If we discern here in this context what is explained in the fourth Mantra, viz. the cognition (Prajñā)
itself of these objects is the Bhōjya (enjoyment) for Vishwa, Taijasa etc., then the statement - "Enjoyment is of three kinds, satiation is of three kinds" - becomes meaningful. In all the three Avasthās if Sākshi is one and the same it amounts to saying that the cognition of the appearance of the triad, viz. Bhōktru (enjoyer), Bhōga (enjoyment), Bhōgya (enjoyed object) is verily that of Ātman; to wit, the Intuition or cognition (Prajñā) of the enjoyment or experience of a particular state becomes an object invariably to the light of the nature of Intuitive Experience (Pure Consciousness) of Sākshi, it should perforce be assumed that Ātman who is the Witnessing Pure Consciousness is called 'Bhōktru' for courtesy's sake alone. From this it evolves that Trupti (the satiation) that accrues to the respective Bhōktru of that particular Avasthā by enjoying the respective Bhōga is verily Ātman's Ānandaswarūpa (essential nature of Bliss) which manifests itself at the end of any form of action of enjoyment of an object. When the Vṛitti (mental concept) which arises at the end of an enjoyment is born and disappears, this Ānanda (Bliss of Ātman) manifests itself spontaneously in the form as Trupti (satiation). Just as the Prajñā (cognition) of the forms of gross object, subtle object etc. is totally an object to the Witnessing Ātman, in the same way the Vṛitti of the form or nature of Trupti that accrues to the Bhōktru is an object to Him only. From this deduction, here it is mentioned that there exist three kinds in Ātman's Trupti. That is all.

THE FRUIT ACCRUING FROM JÑĀNA OF BHŌKTRU AND BHŌGYA

Meaning: The one who cognizes - that which is the Bhōgya (the object of enjoyment) in all the three Dhamas (regions) and that one who is said to be Bhōkta (the enjoyer) - both these, even if he enjoys he will not get tainted by it.

Commentary: Here what has been termed as 'Bhōktru' (the enjoyer) for courtesy's sake is Paramātman alone who is the Avasthasakshi (Witnessing Consciousness cognizing the three states). The object (of enjoyment) of the forms of Sthūla (gross)
and Süksma (subtle) termed as Bhōgya (enjoyed object) also is His only. The Bhōktru is not different, one each for the different states. In the same way, the Bhōga (enjoyed object) too is not different for each state. One and the same Bhōktru - by virtue of the fact that He is having Sthūla Prajñā (gross cognition), Süksma Prajñā (subtle cognition) etc. which are objects to Anubhava (Pure Consciousness) - has been given the different epithets like Vishwa, Taijasa etc. That very totality of objects of the nature of names and forms has attained the three different forms as Bhōgya with names like Sthūla, Süksma and Änanda. But in Âtman’s essential nature of Chaitanya as a result of illuminating the respective object (of enjoyment) there does not occur any special feature, change whatsoever. The common people have superimposed upon (misconceived in) Chidātman, who is of the very essence of Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness), the Vishesha (particular characteristic features) that result from the Bhōga (enjoyment) in the Bhōktrurūpa (form of the enjoyer) of the empirical region (Vyavahāra). That is all.

Here in this context there lurks a secret tenet. Although on the face of it the meaning of the Kārikā appears to suggest that - “Âtman who is the Bhōktru in all the three Avasthās of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti is one and the same; the Vishayaprajñā (cognition of the objects) which is Bhōgya (the enjoyed thing) is also one and the same” - if we observe it Intuitively, in Sushupti there does not exist any distinction of Bhōktru and Bhōgya whatsoever. For, in that state or condition the various knowledges or cognitions have, without being distinct, become one unitary Pure Consciousness to merge in Âtman; in the same manner, the Änanda (Bliss) which is the object for Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) has also merged in Âtman alone. Hence, the statement that - ‘I’ in all the three Avasthās the Bhōktru is one and the same, Bhōgya also is one and same’ - is, in fact, from the waking state viewpoint. But if we observe Intuitively, it is tantamount to concluding that one and one Âtman alone appears as the manifold distinctions of both Bhōktru and Bhōgya.

When observed from this viewpoint, to the Jñāni who has realized Intuitively the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality of Âtman), there is no taint whatsoever from Bhōjana (enjoyment). For, the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge or Experience) of the type - “I am verily
Ātman who is devoid of the divisions or distinctions of Bhōktru and Bhōgya” - has accrued to him. Even when this Jñāna has not accrued, one who has cognized the truth that - “The names and forms which are the Bhōgya in the three Avasthās are, in their essence, one and the same” - he too will not be tainted by (the defects or demerits of) Vishaya Bhōga because of his attaining the cognition, Intuition to the effect that - “By dint of the Jñāna, which is of the essential nature of Ātman’s Chaitanya, I am enjoying or experiencing the object”. Although to the common run of people this Jñāna is not there, one who eats his food with the deep feeling or staunch belief of the type - “One and the same Paramātman alone, in the forms of Vaishwānara, Taijasa etc., is the Lord, Master for the Bhogas that accrue in the three Avasthās; I am offering this oblation of the form of this food to Vaishwānara” - to such a Sātvika (one endowed with Satva Guṇa or virtuous qualities) there is no taint of any defect or blemish that may exist in the Bhōjya [To wit, Bhōgya means the object of Intuitive Knowledge or Anubhava; Bhōjya means the food that is eaten - this difference in the meaning of the words is mentioned in the Sanskrit grammar. Here in this context the word Bhōjya might have been used to indicate both the meanings: (i) Those who eat their food with chaste feelings do not get tainted; (ii) To Ātman who is of the nature of the Witnessing Consciousness all this is verily like Bhōjya food. Some people have, for this reason, conceived of a variant reading like ‘Yad Bhōjyam’] - thus a fruit for such a belief can also be imagined for this Kārikā by way of a secondary purport (Avāntara Tātparya).

### III ŚRISHṬI KĀRIKĀŚ

**Meaning:** “(Previously) Existing Sarvabhāvas (objects in their entirety) - to them alone is Utpatti (creation or birth), this is certain. The Purusha (Being) called ‘Prāṇa’ creates everything distinctively, the rays of Chetas (Pure Consciousness) too.”
RELATIONSHIP OF THE TEXT

From hereon Kārikās pertaining to the topic of creation will appear. The relationship of this textual portion is: Although the forms of Ātman which are appearing to be experiencing the three Avasthās of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti are seemingly different or distinct, all the three are, in reality, not different, distinct. It has already been indicated that the Ātman who is illumining all the Avasthās is one and the same. For the purpose of engendering this cognitive knowledge, it has also been demonstrated that the three forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña accrue to Ātman by virtue of an association with the different adjuncts of the three different Avasthās. In order to clarify the truth that - "Really speaking, these three forms are not different. That Paramātman, of the essence of Prājña who exists in Sushupti, is Himself appearing in these three different forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña" - the Śruti, in the sixth Mantra, is stating - 'प्राच सत्त्वादेन्त सर्वस्य सर्वात्' "This (Ātman alone who exists in Sushupti) is Sarveshwarā, meaning - Sarvajña."

In this manner it has been described in this Mantra, is it not so? How is this proper? It is but natural for the common people to doubt in the manner: "Because our form of existence in Sushupti is engulfed in ignorance, it is an extremely inferior form". Just as we have believed that in the waking we are different as embodied beings and in the dream we are different being associated with different minds, in the same manner we all have believed that in our Sushupti we are different endowed with different Ajñāna. But the Śruti in order to dislodge this staunch, deep-seated belief among all of us exaggerates, rather exalts, our Swarūpa by teaching that - "In reality, your essential nature is not divided by or different from the Avasthās; in the waking your essential nature of Being is Vaishwānarābhinna (not different from, i.e. identical with, the macrocosmic Being of Vaishwānara), in the dream It is Taijasābhinna (not different from, i.e. identical with, the macrocosmic Being of Taijasa) and in the deep sleep It is Prājñābhinna (identical with the macrocosmic Being of Prājña)"."
PRĀJÑA MEANS PARAMESHWARA ALONE

Prājña is the name for Paramātman who is Chidātmaka (of the very essence of Pure Consciousness). In deep sleep our essential nature of Pure Being appears as if It has given up completely Its association with the external adjuncts and has become one with Parameshwara Himself, who is of the very essence of our Paramārthātman (Ātman, the Ultimate Reality). In order to indicate this teaching it is stated in Brähadāraṇyaka Upanishad 4-3-21: ‘अर्थ पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वको न बाह्यं किञ्चन वैद नान्तरम्’ - meaning: “Since this Vijnānamaya Purusha (self of the nature of intellectual wisdom is embraced by Prājñātma in deep sleep, He remains, exists without cognizing anything, either external or internal”. The misconception of the type - “In deep sleep we exist in the dense darkness of Ājñāna or ignorance” - is entertained by all of us quite naturally, is it not so? The ground reality is not like this at all. The Śrutī is convincing all of us about the real state of affairs in the manner - “(In deep sleep) all of you exist bereft of any obligation or binding whatsoever of the gross body, senses etc. as also of the subtle mind”. In his Bhāshyās Śrī Śaṅkara, while explaining the meaning of the words ‘Purusha’ and ‘Prājña’ used in the Śrutī, says: ‘तत्र पुरुषः शाश्वेष्: स्मार्थः। तत्स्य वैदित्त्वात्। बाह्याभ्यान्तराविष्टस्मातः सति सत्तत्रत्वेष्यसंभवत्। प्राज्ञः परमेश्वरः। सर्वज्ञत्वलक्षणया प्रज्ञया नित्यम् अविष्कारत्॥। - meaning: “In this sentence ‘Purusha’ necessarily means Shārirātma (embodied self); for, he alone is the cognizer. Because there is a possibility of his cognizing what is external and what is internal, it becomes tenable to say that in deep sleep he exists without knowing or cognizing in that manner. Here ‘Prājña’ means Parameshwara alone; for, the relationship with Prājña or Consciousness of the essential nature of omniscience (Saravajñatvarūpā) is never leaving Him” - (Sūtra Bhāshya - 1-3-42).

Not merely in deep sleep, but as and when the relationship with an adjunct is disengaged from this Jīva - in all such circumstances, in reality, he (Jīva) becomes one with Parameshwara Himself who is called ‘Prājña’. Avasthās (empirical states) like Samādhi, swooning, death etc. are illustrations for this. In those states too this Vijnānātma (embodied self or Jīva) has become
one with Prājña alone. For that reason alone, Brīhadāraṇyaka Upanishad (4-3-35), while describing Utkrānti (departure from the body or death), has stated: ‘अथ शारीर आत्मा प्राणेनात्मात्माधारुः उत्सर्जन् याति’ - meaning: “Just as a fully loaded cart rolls away making screeching noise, in the same way this embodied self, being supported by Prājñātma, traverses making a harsh sound” - from the Vyāvahāra Drishi, and ‘तेजः परस्य देवतायम्’ - meaning: “The Jīva merges in Paramātman who is the Paradevata (transcendental, Absolute deity or divinity” - from the Paramārtha Drishi. While writing the meaning (purport) of that Sruti, Śri Śaṅkara says: “तदेवः क्रमेण उपसंहते स्वयमां प्राप्ते च मनसि तत् श्रीरोपर्युषुपुलकालवत् निमित्तोपसंहारात् उपसंहित्यमाण: सत्याभिप्पतिसिद्धवेकस्तु चेतु उपसंहित्ये सदेव संपदाते न पुनःदेहान्तरस्य सुपुज्जादित्वं उत्तिष्ठति। यथा लोके सभ्ये देशे वर्तमान: कथनिदिव अथवं देशं प्राप्तः तत्ततपि इतरस्तु अनात्मः।तस्मादेव मूलात् सुपुज्जादित्वं उत्थाय मृत्युः पुनःदेहजालम् आत्मितवि।” (Chh. Bhā. 6-8-6), meaning: “Thus when the Vāk (speech) merges in the mind, the mind in the Prāṇa (vital force), Prāṇa in the Tejas (effulgence, radiance), Tejas in Paramātman - in this sequential order if we recede unto ourselves and when the mind (in its entirety) merges in, or becomes one, with its very source of Paramātman, then the Jīva, who existed in that mind, as a result of the sublation or falsification of his adjunct (Upasamhāra of the Upādhi, viz., body, mind, senses) recedes unto (his very source of Paramātman) just as at the time of deep sleep the mind etc. are completely withdrawn. Then ‘सत्याभिप्पतिसिद्धवेकस्तु’ (with the Intuitive Experience or cognition of the type - ‘Now I am becoming one with Sadbrahma’ - if he recedes unto his very essence of Being, once again - unlike waking up from deep sleep - he does not wake up with the intention of obtaining another body. This is just like one, who is in a region which is insecure with a multitude of fears ; when he reaches a secure place devoid of any fear of danger, he does not return to the former place. But the other person who is not an Ātmajña (knower of the Self) wakes up once again from that very source of Brahman alone just as he has woken from sleep and even after death he gets caught in the net of the body”.

In any case, it amounts to concluding that in this manner
in deep sleep all Jīvas without having any cognition whatsoever become one with Prājña, meaning Parameshwara. All this has been stated from the Vyavahāra Drīshṭi on the assumption of the knowledge that - “All Jīvas beget states like Jāgrat, Svapna, Sushupti, one after another”. But in the present context of the Māndūkyōpanishad, Shri Śaṅkara has determined in the manner - “Because Ātman has been called ‘Vaishvānara’ having been associated with the adjunct of the waking state, ‘Hiraṇyagarbha’ having been associated with the adjunct of the dream state and ‘Prājña’ having been associated with the adjunct of the deep sleep state - the Pratyagātman or innermost Ātman who exists in the respective state is taught to be verily of the essential nature of Vaishvānara, Taijasa etc. indeed” - in his Bhāṣya on the occasion of commenting on the qualifying phrase ‘Saptāṅga’. Therefore, Ātman of the deep sleep state attaining the form of ‘Vaishvānara’ who is endowed with the waking state is dealt to be the ‘Srishti’ or creation alone brought about by Avyākṛitatma (Ātman who is in the unmanifested seed or causal form). Having followed this principle alone, Shri Gauḍapāda, the Kārikākāra, has written the Śrishtivākyas. In the Upanishad too in the sixth Mantra it has been stated : “This one alone is Sarveshwara, this one alone is Sarvajña, this one alone is Antaryāmi, this one alone is the Yōni (womb, cause); is He not the cause for Prabhavāpyaya (birth and death) of Bhūtas (empirical entities) ?” - Is it not so ? From that Ādhidaivika Drīshṭi (viewpoint of the tutelary macro-cosmic deity or viewpoint of the celestial plane) alone here also in these Kārikās the deliberation on creation has been commenced.

WHAT IS THE PROPRIETY IN CALLING AVYĀKṚITĀTMA PRAṆA ?

In this Kārikā Prājña has been called ‘Praṇa’ also, is it not so ? How is this proper ? By describing here the purport behind the discussion that Shri Śaṅkara has made with regard to this topic, there is an added advantage. In the Upanishad : “प्राणेत्रिक्तात् प्राणं च त्रुणः प्राणं श्रोत्रः प्राणं स्मृतं स्मा स्वारं संवृक्षे” - (Chh. 4-3-3) - meaning : “Vāk (speech), Chakshus (eyes), Shrōtru (ears), Manas (mind) etc. - all these senses become one with Praṇa in deep sleep” - because of this Śruti statement, the first
A consolatory explanation is that the word ‘Prāṇa’ also can be addressed to Sushuptātmā. But in Sushupti Prāṇa is not manifested at all, is it not so? In truth, Prāṇa Itself is protecting the body of the sleeping person; otherwise, it amounts to saying that there is no difference whatsoever between Sushupti and Maraṇa (death)!

The present Śruti is stating: “In the case of the Sushuptātmā He is Avyākṛita (in an unmanifested form); from Him alone the world of duality is born”. Besides, we can also cognize in our Intuitive Experience the fact that - “The state of Sushupti and the Avyākṛitasthiti (unmanifested state) of Pralaya (dissolution of the world) are one and the same”. To wit, no one ever has or can have the experience of the type - “Sushuptātmā exists in such and such a region or space and in such and such a time” ; for the Avyākṛitātmā too who exists in Pralaya there does not exist any distinction or division caused by the time and space categories. Therefore, as stated in this Śruti, it is proper to conclude that there does not exist any difference between Sushuptātmā and Avyākṛitātmā. It is reasonable indeed to aver that this Ātman is called “Prājña”. For, ‘Prajña’ means Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness). It has already been shown on the valid evidence of Bhashya that - “Because Sushupta appears this Avasthā (deep sleep) by means of His very essence of Pure Consciousness, it is proper to say that He is called ‘Prajña’.” It being so, the doubt to the effect - “How is it proper to call Sushuptātmā who is unmanifest (Avyākṛita) by the word ‘Prāṇa’ which signifies manifestation?” - remains unanswered. Further, the other doubt that - “How can we reconcile the Śruti statement that - ‘All the senses become one with Prāṇa in the Sushupti state’ - with our Intuitive Experience?” - also remains as it is unanswered.

The purport of the solution provided by the Bhāshyakāra for these doubts is : Sushupti can be observed from two viewpoints. From the standpoint of those who are seeing a person sleeping, all the senses belonging to the sleeping person have ceased their respective functions and are remaining still; it also appears that Prāṇa (the vital force) alone as usual is carrying on its functions. Seen from this viewpoint, it amounts to saying that the vital force (Prāṇa) of the Sushupta (sleeping person) is Vyākṛita (manifest
alone). But the viewpoint of examining our own states of Consciousness of each one of us subjectively by our own Intuitive Experience standpoint is itself a superior criterion. For, then and then alone we directly Intuit or cognize the experience of the essential nature of our Avasthās. When observed from this Intuitive Experience viewpoint, the experience of the type - “I am an embodied person, I am asleep now; just now, though all my senses are not functioning, even so my Prāṇa alone is carrying on its functions incessantly” - is not there at all for the sleeping person; in fact, then the identification with or ownership of our body, senses, mind etc. is totally extinct. Therefore, it is reasonable indeed to say that even for those who have identification with their bodies Prāṇa is unmanifest in Sushupti. For this reason alone in Brīhadāranyaka Upanishad (2-1-17) it is stated: “When this person is asleep, taking this consciousness (Vijnāna) of the senses along with his consciousness of the Antahkarana (mind) he remains, exists in Hridayākāśa (literally meaning, space within the heart), meaning Paramātman. When he withdraws those Karānas (i.e. Bahihkarana and Antahkarana) he is given the epithet - ‘Svapiti’ - meaning, existing unto Himself. Then Prāṇa has Grihita (taken over or seized)......”. Hence, it amounts to saying verily that “In the Absolute sense, in Sushupti even the Vyākrita Prāṇa (manifest vital force) has become extinct or one with Prājñā who is the Avyākritātman”. Thus it has also been affirmed in the Koushītakibrahmaṇāpanishad. It has already been mentioned that at the time of death Prāṇa merges in Paramātman, is it not so? Hence, it should necessarily be accepted that therein Prāṇa remains as Avyākṛta alone, is it not so?

THE REASON FOR WAKING UP FROM SUSHUPTI

If a question is now posed to the effect - “Thus if Prāṇa becomes unmanifest alone both in the deep sleep state and death, then how at all can the phenomena of - ‘once again waking up and attaining other bodies in future births’ - be reconciled ?” - then here in this context there is a secret that is to be reckoned. Even when the respective Upādhis (adjuncts) exist in the forms of Vaishwānara, Taijasa etc., in reality they all invariably exist totally pervaded or permeated by Paramātma Chaitanya (the Pure
Consciousness of the Supreme Self) alone. Just as although a slab of ice is completely pervaded by water alone it is given a separate, distinct name as 'a slab of ice' (in our empirical transactions), in the same manner although all the Upādhis which are of the characteristics of Anātman or not-Self are pervaded by Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) alone, for the sake of those people who are not capable of cognizing, Intuiting this truth all at once, the Śruti keeps on teaching in the manner: First, it accepts the phenomenon of Sōpādhikatwa (association with an adjunct) being there from the Adhyārōpa Drīṣṭi (viewpoint of deliberate superimposition) and then it reveals that the settled belief of the absence of any cognition of a second thing is due to the fact that in universal experiences like deep sleep, death, swoonings etc. everything has become one with the Paramātma-swarūpa. Not knowing this secret the ignorant people believe that in the waking and in the dream the external world appears divided into different forms of things whereas in the deep sleep alone, exclusively, and especially, there does not appear any world of duality whatsoever. In reality, despite the truth that our essential nature of Pure, Absolute Being is ever of the nature of non-dual Pure Consciousness (Advitīya Chaitanya) - just as people are seeing water alone in the two distinct forms when they say - “In the sea in one region there is a mountain floating in the form of an iceberg” - similarly, although all of us ever exist in our essential nature of Pure Being alone, we believe that we are associated with a world of duality. This truth will become clearly discernible in the near future when we consider the commentary of the Srīshṭi Kārikās as well as later on while deliberating upon the commentary on Turiya Kārikās. Let it be. From the standpoint alone of those people who believe that both in the waking and in the dream Ātman is associated with the adjunct of a manifest world of duality, the Śruti describes in the manner: (a) Just as in Pralaya, in the Sushupti too the manifest world exists in the (potential or latent) unmanifest seed form; (b) and again - just as in creation and sustenance the world gets manifest once again - in the waking and in the dream the world gets manifest. From this viewpoint alone the present Māṇḍukya Śruti describes Prājñā with details like - "He is Ekiḥhūta (has become unitary, non-dual); is Prajñānaghana (has become a solidified
lump of Pure Consciousness)” etc. It being so, there is no scope whatsoever for doubting in the manner - “If the Jīva becomes one with Prājña in Sushupti, what is the cause for him to wake up and to assume Jīvatwa?” For, although Jīva ever exists in the essential nature of Paramātman, the ignorant people are believing in the manner - “We are Jīvas” - in the waking and in the dream because of the association with the adjuncts misconceived due to Avidyā; although in deep sleep there does not exist any adjunct whatsoever - because then they are not cognizing the truth that they actually exist in their own essential nature of Brahman - therein they believe that they are associated with Ajñāna (ignorance).

HOW IS IT THAT PRĀJÑA IS SIGNIFIED BY THE WORD ‘PRĀṆA’?

Let it be; from the reason mentioned above, it amounts to saying that in Sushupti really the Vyākṛta Prāṇa (manifested vital force) does not exist at all, is it not so? If so, what is the reason for calling Prājña by the name ‘Prāṇa’, who is Sushuptātman? Unless and until a suitable, satisfying solution is given to this doubt, it does not amount to having given a proper answer at all to the question - “In the present Kārīka why is this name of ‘Prāṇa’ used at all?” Hence that (solution) we will explain to some extent now according to the Bhashya of Śrī Śaṅkara.

In the Chhāṇḍogya Śruti while clarifying the meaning of the sentence - “Tattwamasi” (“That thou art”) - which is the spiritual instruction given by the father (Uddālaka) to his son Śvetaketu - Jīva has been called ‘Manas’ and Prājña by the name ‘Prāṇa’. The Upanishad (Chh. 6-8-2) states: “Just as when a person who has caught a bird ties a string to its body and is playing with it, the bird flies about hither and thither and even if it flies far away (from him) to the extent the long string allows it, unable to free itself from the control of the string that is in that person’s hands, getting fatigued or defeated, out of despair finally it comes back to the starting point of the string held by the bird-catcher and sits on his hand - in the same way, Jīva, being tied down to the adjunct of his mind and having wandered about in the waking and in the dream wherever the mind roams about in all directions and finally in the Sushupti (deep sleep) takes refuge
in Sadbrahman alone called ‘Präna’ and attains Vishrānti (quiescence, tranquillity)”. The mind is an adjunct to the Jīva, while Präna is an adjunct to Sushuptatman - from this Vyavahāra Dṛishṭi the Upanishad has called Jīva - ‘Manas’ and Brahman who is in Sushupti - ‘Präna’. Just as the bird is controlled, restricted by the string in the hands of the bird catcher, similarly Jīva is tied down to Paramātmán’s Swarūpa; however, much the Jīva goes far away from Paramātmán, he cannot exist apart from Paramātmán; finally, he has perforce to merge into the Paramātma Swarūpa and attain peace, quietude. For, that essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness-Bliss alone is his (Jīva’s) real, ultimate essence of Being - this truth the Śrutī is expounding here with the help of an illustration. Anyway, here the name of Präna does not signify or refer to Vyākrita Präṇa (manifest vital force); in fact, it is another epithet for Prājña alone. On the strength of the Śrutī Pramāṇa (Upanishadic evidence) we should discern in this manner.

SATKĀRYAVĀDA

Now, we may endeavour to know the meaning of the Kārikā by analytical deliberation. We have by now understood that the Ātman of the waking state really exists as Vishwa (or Vaishwānara), the dream Ātman as Taijasa (or Hiranyagarbha) and the deep sleep Ātman as Prājña (or Avyākṛitātman). The Kārikākara (Shri Gauḍapāda) has begun to delineate as to how this Parameshwara (Supreme Lord) with names like Avyākṛitātman, Prājña or Prāṇa brings about creation.

The meaning of the first half of the verse is: Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña - all these phenomena, being already in existence, come into being. If they are already existing, what exactly is the meaning for the statement - “They are born again”? No one reckons in the manner - “That which already exists - that alone is born”? This doubt may arise here in this context. The satisfactory solution for this is: Although they exist in their Paramārthaswarūpa (essential nature of Pure, Absolute Being), then they do not exist in the Māyārūpa (illusory forms) called ‘Avidyākṛita Nāma Rūpa’ (‘names and forms projected by ignorance’). All these are already existing in a form without distinction alone in Avyākṛitātman; but at the time of creation, they
assume the illusory forms of names and forms projected by or conjured up by Avidyā and manifest themselves.

Any body may raise the question: “Even so, the Māyā of ‘names and forms’, which did not at all exist in the beginning, came into being, is it not so?” Not so. For, after birth the Māyārupa manifests; before birth this Māyā exists in a Bija Rūpa (seed form). That seed also exists having been projected, misconceived alone by Avidyā. For, we have already stated that—“Ātman ever exists in His own essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, as also the ignorant people only misconceive in Him the creation or birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world”. When that which already existed as water, later on appeared in two distinct forms of water and foam, don’t we say that the foam which in the beginning existed in the form of water and later on manifested itself in the form of foam? In the same way, this is to be understood. If we observe deeply, even now foam means water alone; even so, in our empirical workaday transactions we distinguish in the manner—pure clear water, impure dirty foam, is it not so? In the same manner, here in this context too in the beginning (i.e. before creation), Absolute; Pure Brahman of the very essence of Pure Existence (Sanmātra) alone existed; after creation ensued, the three distinct forms called ‘Vishwa’, ‘Taijasa’, ‘Prājña’, which were caused by Nāmarupa Māyā misconceived by Avidyā, came into being. Just as water alone exists in the form of foam also, even when assuming the forms of Vishwa, Taijasa etc. their Paramārthaswarūpa, viz. Shuddhātmāsvarūpa (very essence of Pure Being-Consciousness of Ātman) exists as It is per se. Even so, we may plausibly transact in the manner—“Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña came into being” —from the viewpoint of Māyā (illusion) of names—and forms which appear as projected or conjured up by Avidyā. This very concept has been described in the Śruti in the manner: “In the beginning Brahman alone existed; thereafter, Hiranyagarbha and Virāt—these were born”. Therefore, what has been stated viz. “Vishwa, Taijasa etc. which already existed came into being”—is proper, justified.

In this manner describing origination, birth is called ‘Sat-kāravyāda’. Sāṅkhyanas also have used the nomenclature of Satkāravyāda; but their opinion or doctrine is not Yuktiyuta
(associated with reason, logic); for, in that *Darshana* (school of philosophy) its followers have used this nomenclature on the basis of a concept, dogma that - "Already existing *Pradhāna* (primordial matter) itself got transformed or metamorphosed into forms like Mahat, Ahankāra etc." If an entity gets repeatedly transformed, then what is its real form? - this question cannot be determined. It does not also appear to be acceptable if it is stated: "Pradhāna, which is insentient, inert itself created by itself in different forms". But in the *Satkāryāvāda* which the Vedāntins acknowledged (and propound) such a defect does not exist whatsoever. For, in deep sleep Ātman alone existing and He alone appearing in waking and dream, associated with a world (*Saprapāścha*) - both these phenomena are in everyone's experience indeed, and hence to say in the manner - "Ātman alone is assuming various forms in this manner" - will surely be in consonance with universal experience. Thus, because when Ātman, who was in the beginning *Nishprapaścha* (devoid of the adjunct of the world), later on appears as *Saprapāścha* (endowed with the adjunct of a world) there does not take place any mutation whatsoever in His essential nature and His originally existing *Swarūpa* alone appears in His *Kāryavāstha* (created new state) - we have perforce to determine conclusively that the *Upādhi* (adjunct) of names and forms which appear in waking and dream or in *Srishti* (creation), *Stithi* (sustenance) is invariably Māyā alone, which is projected by ignorance (*Avidyākalpita*) - a mere false appearance alone. There is a phenomenon of the common people imagining a snake in a rope, water in a mirage out of misconception, is it not so? Just as there exists every scope for people to imagine in objects like a rope, mirage - phenomena like snake, water, respectively, in the same way there exists invariably every scope for ignorant people (*Avidyāvantas, Ajñās*) to misconceive names and forms in Ātman who is Pure, Absolute. This alone is called by Vedantins "*Avidyākalpita Nāmarūpa Māyābija*". Every one will have to admit, agree unavoidably that - "The snake etc. which are 'born' from this Bija or seed do exist always in their true essential natures of rope etc." ; for, without any real entity having been a substratum or support no *Vikalpas* (imagined things) whatsoever they may be - like snake etc. have been ever witnessed by anybody in this world.
Even the snake when it appears is verily, in essence, a rope only; the mirage water even when it appears is verily, in essence, a sandy waterless desert indeed, is it not? Therefore, that Āspada (substratum, support) in which a particular phenomenon is imagined - that substratum [To wit, that entity on which there is superimposition or Adhyārōpa - that entity as the substratum is being called ‘Adhisthāna’; this usage is in vogue in many present-day Vedāntic texts. But Shri Śaṅkara uses the word ‘Adhisthāna’ with the meaning of body, Āshraya (support) only; the entity which is the substratum for Adhyārōpa (superimposition) he calls, to a large extent, ‘Āspada’ in his Bhāshyas. Therefore, in this treatise we too have used the word ‘Āspada’ in this sense or with this meaning only] - existing in its essential nature alone - is born from the Māyābija (illusory seed) of names and forms projected by Avidyā [To wit, some Vyākhyaṇakāras (post-Śaṅkara sub-commentators) have opined that - “Avidyā itself is Maya; the statement - ‘born out of Māyābija’ - means that - ‘imaginary things are born from Avidyā or ignorance, which is Anirvāchya (indefinable, indescribable). With regard to this interpretation - which is purely dogmatic - since it has no support whatsoever of Śruti statements, Bhāshya, Yukti and Anubhava, we have discarded it here as there is no need of its discussion or deliberation]. It is reasonable to accept this Satkāryāvāda.

In this manner, from Prajñā both Vishwa and Taijasa are born by virtue of Avidyākṛita Nāmarūpa Māyābija; to wit, it amounts to saying that one and one Paramātman alone appears in three forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prajñā. If we see from the macrocosmic viewpoint, because there is no entity whatsoever which is not subsumed by forms like Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, there does not remain any object at all for creation. Therefore, - because it is taught that ‘Prāṇa creates these three phenomena alone’, it amounts to having specifically indicated that - ‘He has created everything else.’ It should hence be understood that this fact alone has been explained in the second half of the verse.

The statement - “Prāṇa creates everything” - means that He causes the birth or coming into being of all phenomena of the forms of sentient and insentient things. In the Bṛihadāranyaka
(Mādhyandina Recension 2-1-23) it has been stated that - “Just as a spider, without desiderating any other external cause as an aid, is born in the form of a thread of its own saliva which is not something other than itself, and just as from a fire of one singular form many small sparks of fire fly off in all directions, in the same manner from this one Prāṇātmāna the senses (Prāṇas) like Vāk (speech) etc., the Lōkas like Bhūhu, Bhuvaha, Svahaha etc., deities like Agni etc., all creatures (Bhūtas) from Brahma to a blade of grass are born - in each and every Jīva as distinct Ātmans who appear with different adjuncts in the forms of Vishwa, Taijasa etc.” According to this Śruti statement, this Prāṇātmāna alone creates the insentient gross things, the adjuncts of the sentient Jīvas, the Jīvas - all these appearing as distinct objects. Just as from the Sun thousands and thousands of light rays emanate, from this Prāṇātmāna various beings (Jīvas) appearing in different bodies, like deities, human beings, inferior creatures etc. - all of them are born.

Although all these sentient and insentient (animate and inanimate) phenomena appear to be different, separate from Prāṇa, in reality (in the Absolute sense) they are not different at all. Just as, though the Sun is one and one only, by virtue of various adjuncts of Jalāśhayas (water containers) hundreds of ‘watery Suns’ - meaning, reflections of the Sun - may appear to be different from him, in the same way these Jīvas, by virtue of their different bodies as adjuncts, appear to be different or distinct from Paramātmāna, as also mutually among themselves - they appear to be different. Even when they are appearing like that, just as all the Sun’s reflections appear depending upon the Sun alone, and further, in the ultimate analysis, apart from the Sun’s existence those reflections do not have any independent, separate existence at all - in the same way apart from this Prāṇa neither any Jīvas nor their Upādhis (adjuncts) exist in the least. All these, existing in the Prāṇātmāraṇa alone, appear to be different from Him, as also, among themselves, each appears different from the other. This teaching alone we have to discern from the Śrīshṭi Vachana (statements pertaining to creation). Whatever things are born, none of them exists whatsoever apart from the Prājña, who is the cause for everything; even so, appearing as if all of them are different, their creation has taken place.
Meaning : (7-9) Some people who deliberate upon the subject-matter of creation reckon that creation is Vibhūti (magnificence, splendour); some others imagine that it is akin to dream and illusion; those who are having a steadfast faith in creation opine that creation is Prabhu’s (the Lord’s) wish; those who are deliberators on the topic of time reckon that creation is by Time; some others say that creation is for enjoyment, while others think it is for sport, pastime. This is indeed the essential nature of the Divine Being. For the Āptakāma (one who has obtained all that he wished), how can there be any desire?”

DIFFERENT OPINIONS ABOUT CREATION

Creation is caused by Prājña; the effect, existing in the beginning in the form of Prājña alone, later on It appears in Avidyākalpitamāyārūpa (an illusory form projected by Avidyā). When actually the creation takes place, the Jivas are appearing in different forms; while Intuitively deliberating upon each and every Jiva’s Swarūpa (essence of Pure Being-Consciousness), if the three states of Consciousness are discerned, then from the viewpoints of the various states each and everyone of them can be divided into Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña. Thus, although creation is appearing in various queer forms, in reality, all this is Paramātman alone; but in the form It appears It is verily Māyā (illusion) alone - this is the Kārikākāra’s opinion. In the statement - “Prabhavaha Sarva-bhāvānām Satām” - meaning, “For all objects or phenomena which are already existing alone there is creation” - in this statement all this explanation mentioned above is implicit. In order to elaborate upon this teaching the opinions of others, in contrast, are being enumerated by Shri Gauḍapāda.
“Some people say that creation is Vibhūti (great might, superhuman power)”. Their opinion is that Parameshwara, the Lord Creator, in order to manifest His Vibhūti, creates the world. But some others do not accept this opinion. For, by showing His Mahimā (glory or supremacy) to others there is no benefit accruing, or purpose served, for Him; nor is there any harm to Him by not showing His glory to others. ‘Īśwara’ means not a Samsāri (transmigratory being) like us, is it not so? Like the unrefined or uncultured people why should He show off His Lordship or supremacy? Apart from this, before the creation takes place there exists no one other than Īśwara. To whom, shall we say, does He wish to show His Vibhūti and for that purport He creates? Shall we say that to create in that manner is His Svabhāva (essential nature)? That too is not proper; for, if it were so, He would have had to keep on creating indeed. These disputants may argue out in the manner: “In order to grant the fruits of Dharma (righteous actions) and Adharma (unrighteous deeds) of Jīvas, Īśwara creates; hence, when the Jīvas’ Karmas become ripe enough, then He creates. Besides, is not Īśwara, who is omniscient, independent? How at all can we bind Him by clamping a restriction or stipulation of the type that - ‘He should always be creating?’” - But those who assert in this manner that He creates in relation to the Karmas of Jīvas (Karmasāpeksa), will have to give up the contention that creation is His Svabhāva; for, what is relative to or dependent upon another cannot be said to be ‘Svabhāva’. Apart from this, those who say that ‘Īśwara is merely Nimitta Kāraṇa (an efficient cause) for the world and that He wishes to exhibit His Vibhūti and thereby for that purpose He creates’ - if these disputants contend that - “Because this world of duality is an effect, just as for effects like a clay pot and pitcher etc. a potter who is endowed with Shakti (strength, power) and Jñāna (knowledge, intelligence) is a pre-requisite cause, similarly for this world (an effect) an efficient cause of an Īśwara, who is Sarvajña (omniscient), Sarvashakta (omnipotent), is necessary” - on the basis of inferential logic, then by that very token of inferential logic it will have to be conjectured perforce that - ‘Just as the potter has a body and desire for enjoyment, in the same way Īśwara too will have to possess these (Upādhis)’. As otherwise, if one seeks to establish Īśwara’s ex-
istence on the strength of Śruti Pramāṇa like the Prashnōpanishad statement - (6-3) : “(Īśwara) reflected and saw” - then because other Śruti statements like - “I will become many”, “I will be born in the form of the world” - (Taittirīya, Chhāndogya) - say that - ‘Īśwara mentally resolved’ - and thereby it will have to be accepted perforce that - “Īśwara is not merely the efficient cause (Nimitta Kāraṇa) but also the material cause (Upādāna Kāraṇa)”.

In that doctrine, because Īśwara Himself became (got transformed, metamorphosed as) the world, it amounts to saying that apart from Him there does not exist anything whatsoever and then this argument of ‘Vibhūtiṣṭikhyāpanapakṣa’ (avowing, proclaiming Īśwara’s Vibhūti) will crumble.

Thus even after this doctrinaire theory that Īśwara, the Lord Creator, in order to proclaim (Khyāpana) His Vibhūti (glory, supremacy), brings about creation (of the world of duality), there still remains another kind of Vibhūti theory to be considered here. To wit, those who used to accept Sāṅkhya’s Pradhāna were arguing in the manner : “Pradhāna or Prakṛiti, without any dependence upon or aid from Īśwara, by itself gets transformed into the form of the world. By virtue of showing in various ways its Vibhūti, Prakṛiti provides Bhūga (enjoyment) and Mōksha (Liberation), which are called Purushārtha (the ultimate goal of human existence) to Purushas (selves).” This was the Sāṅkhya’s doctrine, which is refuted in the Brahma Sūtras. To an inert, insentient Pradhāna there cannot possibly be a desire accruing to provide Bhūga and Mōksha to Purushas. Besides, to say that an insentient (Achetana) thing without the help of a sentient being (Chetana Vastu) by itself transforms itself in order to proclaim its Vibhūti - is opposed to Lōkānubhava (universal experience). For, no one has ever seen either a cart, without there being a bullock or a cart-driver, by itself moving ; nor clay, without the help of a potter as also in the absence of the wheel, stick etc., by itself getting transformed into various forms of pot, pitcher, etc. This doctrine is, in addition, opposed to the Śruti ; for, the Śrutis are teaching that Brahman Himself created the world. They are further teaching that He Himself became Mūrtavastu (things with forms) and Amūrtavastu (things without forms), Chetana Bhāva (sentient beings) and Achetana Bhāva (insentient things), Satya Bhāva (really existing entities) and false appearances.
In this manner, the Srishti Chintakas (thinkers of creation) have variously conceived their respective doctrines. For those Vivekins or Intuitive deliberators, who are ratioincating about the Paramārtha Tattwa (the Ultimate, Absolute non-dual Reality), this query: “How at all did this creation take place?” - has no meaning whatsoever. For, irrespective of the fact that whether it is assumed that Īśwara is the efficient cause alone for the world or actually He got Himself transformed into the world - no doctrine can ever possibly remain Nirdushta (irrefutable or inviolable) at all.

Although on the face of it the Śruti may apparently seem to state that - ‘Īśwara gets transformed into the form of the world’ - that statement is not in consonance with either Yukti (reasoning), or other Śruti teachings. In fact, this former is completely in contrast to these latter two aspects. In the first instance, this doctrinaire theory is opposed to Yukti in that: If it is said that Īśwara gets transformed (Pariṇāma), it amounts to saying that He is made up of parts (Sāvayava) and non-eternal (Anitya), like clay, gold etc. Because of the component parts of a thing getting less and less in number progressively, things get destroyed, is it not so? If it is contended that Īśwara, associated with a subtle state of the dualistic world, is Himself getting transformed - it amounts to saying that Īśwara always exists being associated with names and forms; then, in that event, the transformation of names and forms is verily Īśwara’s transformation and thereby it amounts to accepting that the defects of these names and forms are those of Īśwara alone. Further, if it is argued that Īśwara in His pure form (Shuddha Rūpa) does not get transformed but His special qualities or characteristics (Visheshānas) only get transformed, then it amounts to saying that Īśwara is not at all a cause (for the creation of the world). Thus it amounts to saying that Īśwara Pariṇāma Vāda (theory of Īśwara’s transformation) is opposed to Yukti.

Secondly, this doctrinaire concept is opposed to Śruti teaching also. To wit: ‘इन्द्रो मायापि पुरुषाः पुरुषं ईयते’ (Brihadāranyaka 2-5-19), meaning: “Parameshwara by virtue of magical, mystic powers is appearing as if He is endowed with many forms”; owing to misconceptions people are reckoning Parameshwara to...
be of various kinds of world forms - thus the Śruti is very clearly declaring. Therefore, in the sense of Īśwara becoming the Jagat, the statement that - “Īśwara creates the Jagat” - is Māyāmātra (mere false appearance) indeed.

**THIS IS SIMILAR TO SVAPNA (DREAM) AND MĀYĀ (MAGICAL, ILLUSORY) - THUS SOME WHO KNOW THE TATTWA IMAGINE**

This alone is the correct, proper concept. For, in the Śruti (Upanishads) too it has been taught, expounded in this manner alone. This fact will be more elaborately explained in the third Prakaraṇa. The benefit that accrues in conceiving that this is Māyā, Svapna - is: Just as by scrutinizing either Māyā or the reality of the dream there is no worthwhile fruit whatsoever accruing, in the same way by ratiocinating upon the question - “How at all this creation took place, and why it was caused?” - no fruit whatsoever is ever possibly attained. But by Intuitively deliberating upon questions like: “Which is that real substrate for this Māyā?”; “Which is that Satyam (Ultimate Reality) which is the substratum for the false appearances seen in the dream?” - there is a great benefit. To wit, let us suppose that a magician throws up a rope-ladder, holding a weapon in hand appears to climb up that rope-ladder and vanishes into thin air without being seen by anybody. Further, if he creates an impression among all of us that he is having a duel with some one and eventually falls down being cut into pieces and once again if he appears to gather himself up and rise up - then by deliberating upon the question - “What is the secret of that magic?” - with all enthusiasm, is there any benefit accruing to us at all? No. Therefore, becoming indifferent in this matter and feeling - “All this is verily Māyā alone” - the wise people will attempt to find out the answer to the worthwhile question: “Where is the real magician?” In the same way, we will not bother about the task of deliberating upon questions like: “Which were all the things or phenomena that appeared to us in Svapna or dream?” or “How did those appearances come into being?” We will discard the consideration of the dream appearances thinking in the manner - “All those phenomena seen are not real; in the dream I alone existed but all else was a false appearance” - and deter-
mine that - “All those false appearances merely appeared in our singular essential nature of Pure Being alone.” Is it not so?

Just like these illustrations only we must reckon creation too. Just as the Māyāvi (magician) threw up a rope-ladder and holding a weapon in hand climbed it up and having conjured up a vision as if he had a duel with some one and later made it appear that his enemies cut up his body and its pieces fell to the ground - and the magician made all this to appear merely as a phantasmagoria, in the same way we must discern in the case of Dārśhrāntika (the illustrated case). The three states of waking, dream and deep sleep are, like the rope-ladder of the illustration, mere appearances; Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājñā - these appearances of various forms of Ātman which are seen along with Upādhis of the three states, respectively, are, like the Māyāvi who was on the rope-ladder, mere false appearances only. This alone we call by the name of Prapañcha (world) which is ‘created’. All this creation is a mere appearance seen just like a magical show or a dream. In that case, what is the reality behind this? To wit, the magician, without actually being any of those appearances which he conjured up before us, was standing on the ground indeed by our side remaining as he was, is it not so? In the same way, our Paramārthaswarupa Ātman, without being either these states of waking, dream and deep sleep or these Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājñā which appear within them, respectively, is of an essential nature of Pure, Absolute Being-Consciousness quite different or distinct from all those queer forms. We must divine that He, who caused or brought about ‘creation’, is Himself the Pure, Absolute Reality behind all these appearances.

But those people who have staunchly believed or determined that creation is absolutely real have imagined it in various ways. To wit, some proponents have imagined, believed that - “Parameshwara is Sarvashakta (omnipotent). Satyasankalpa (whatever He wishes, it occurs then and there); therefore, by that Prabhu’s (Lord’s) Itchhāmātra (mere wish) alone all this creation has taken place; His mere wish alone is enough for the creation of the world; no other accessory or material is needed at all by Him.” Some others are ‘Kālachintakas’! In their opinion, all this world has come into being by virtue of Time alone. ‘Birth’ means - ‘What was not existing in the past time appears in the
present time’ - is it not so? For any thing or any creature to be born sufficient time limit is needed; a seed sprouting, growing as a sapling, giving out its foliage, finally bearing flowers and fruits - all these events take place in their stipulated times alone. People have believed that things last for certain durations of time. Therefore, because all things being born in time, last for a duration in time and eventually get destroyed in time alone - it evolves that Time alone is the cause for everything. Thus the Kālachintakas opine. Even this theory cannot stand against the onslaught of reason, logic. For, let it be any object, plant or creature; for their birth, time alone is not the singular cause. For a plant, only if there are other accessories like a seed, fertile ground, manure, water - then only it is having a ‘birth’; similarly, for creatures too those relevant different conditions and causes become necessary. Therefore, we are constrained to say that time is, in fact, Sādhāranakāraṇamātra (a mere ‘common cause’) only.

Some people think that Īśwara creates for His own Bhogārtha (purpose of enjoyment) or for the sake of the creatures’ Bhogārtha; some others opine that He creates for the purpose of Kṛiḍā (sport). But will it be proper to say that just as people construct a house or a farm etc. for their enjoyment, in the same way Īśwara constructs this world and then enjoys the objects in them? All the Īśwaravādins (people who acknowledge the doctrine of a Lord Creator) agree and aver that ‘Īśwara’ means Sarvaswatantra (totally, absolutely independent), Nityatṛpta (eternally satiated) only. It being so, how is it possible to imagine as to which desire for any enjoyment He has at all? If we imagine anything in that manner, then it will amount to saying that before the creation Īśwara, without having any enjoyment, was discontented, meaning - He was ‘Anīshwara’ (not a Lord). Is it not so? Therefore, this theory too is not proper.

In the same manner, the concept that - Īśwara creates for Kṛiḍārtha (purport of sport) - also will not be in consonance with Yukti (reason). Just like children, to say that - ‘In order to get rid of ennui or boredom Īśwara has cast this game of creation’ - will not be proper. For, if we imagine like that, then we will have to discard the acknowledgement that He is a Sarvajaña (omniscient), Nityatṛpta (eternally contented). We can-
not also argue in the manner that - "Just like great wealthy people, kings and highly-cultured people etc. also, without expecting any material benefit, merely for recreation indulge in sport or hiking, why should not Īśwara indulge in creation (for recreation)." For, even in the case of such big wealthy people there exists invariably some sort of a benefit or purpose which we may not be able to discern all of a sudden. The wise people utter a maxim that - "Without expecting any benefit or purpose, not even an idiot engages himself in any activity." Even so, can it not be contended that for the sake of those Jīvas who are yet to be created, Īśwara brings about this creation? But there will always be counter-arguments of the type - "Before creation which Jīvas are there? For whose sake is He creating?"

Although this theory may seem to be proper from the Vyāvahārika viewpoint of assuming the distinctions of Jīvas, the gross insentient things and Īśwara, those people who have begun this search of finding out the truth or veracity of creation - if they, at the outset or prior to their deliberation itself, assume distinctions of Jīvas, Īśwara etc. - it would not be quite a rational approach.

Anyone may ask: "Because it has been mentioned in the Šāstras that Īśwara creates the world, we can assume it to be so, is it not so?" - There is no defect whatsoever in assuming in that manner by those who have complete faith in the Šāstra. The statement that - "Parameshwara, on account of His wish or desire of the type - 'Let the Jīvas attain the enjoyment of the fruits according to their Karmas!' - creates" - is agreeable; it is true that it is a satisfactory answer meant for the middle-order seekers. But, even then, if it is surmised that - "Īśwara, in order to dispense or grant Karmaphalas to Jīvas or realizing that for their sake it is proper to provide their objects of enjoyment, creates" - then we will be constrained to assume that - "Just as the parents for the sake of their children try to provide toys, properties, money and make proper arrangements for their education etc., similarly Īśwara for the sake of Jīvas attempts to provide all desired facilities by means of His creation." Then in that event, just as there will be necessarily Pravartaka Dōshas (defects of instigating, prompting) of the type of love and attachment towards the children on the part of parents, similarly we will have to imagine that in Īśwara too such defects exist. Apart from this,
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that Śāstra which says that - "Īśwara creates the world" - is itself propounding in the manner - "That Brahman alone thou art"; "All this is verily Brahman" etc. also. Therefore, it amounts to saying that apart from Parameshwara neither there exists any world whatsoever nor any Jīvas, is it not so? In that argument in some people there may even arise a doubt of the type - "Why should Īśwara create at all?" Hence, although the various concepts pertaining to time, fortune, enjoyment, sport etc. may, to some extent, explain the tenet of creation, it is not possible to assert that they are satisfactory answers or solutions in all aspects to this question of creation.

Therefore, it is not possible to imagine that Īśwara who is Āptakāma (one who has all his desires fulfilled) has any kinds of desires, wishes whatsoever. This is, in fact, that Paramātman’s Svabhāva (essential nature) alone; the creation of the type - "Paramātman appears as this form of Jagat" - is part and parcel of the Vastusvabhāva (essential nature of the Ultimate Reality). thus Shri Gauḍapāda has propounded.

Here in this context, what exactly is meant by Svabhāva is to be deliberated upon in some detail. If we interpret this word in the manner - "For Īśwara creating is itself a Svabhāva or essential nature" - then it will amount to saying that Īśwara will have perforce to be always carrying on creation; for, the essential nature of a Vastu (entity) can never change. Apart from this, when we observe from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi or Absolute viewpoint - everything is verily Brahman, apart from Paramātman there does not exist anything else whatsoever. Therefore, the sentence - "This is Paramātman’s Svabhāva" - we have to understand in the manner: Although rope etc. exist as they are, just as on account of people’s Avidyāsvabhāva they appear as something else - to wit, because of not reckoning it to be a rope it appears as a snake - similarly a sea-shell appears as silver, the clear sky appears as polluted, the desert as a mirage - all these invariably appear differently due to Aviveka (a lack of discrimination) only. In the same way, because people are not able to cognize the truth that all this is Paramātman alone, this phenomenon in front of them is appearing as the world. It is quite but natural for unknown or unrecognized things to appear as different combinations or conglomerations, is it not so? In the same way,
it is but natural that unknown Paramātman too appears in the form of the manifold world. This alone is the import of the sentence mentioning ‘Svabhava’.

So far it amounts to our having commented upon the Upanishad statement pertaining to Prājña - “For the Bhūtas or creatures He alone is the source of origination and dissolution.” It is also tantamount to affirming here that the creation that is brought about by Paramātman is not Paramartha (absolutely real) but it is a false appearance seen by those who do not have Ātmajñāna. This alone is called Māyā Satkāravāda (the theory of magical creation by Paramātman). This will be explained in the forthcoming Prakaraṇas.

IV TURIYA KĀRIKĀS

Meaning: “(Turiya is) not that which cognizes the internal (objects), not that which cognizes the external (objects), not what cognizes both of them, not a mass of cognition, not cognitive, not non-cognitive. (It is) unseen, incapable of being spoken of, ungraspable, without any distinctive marks, unthinkable, unnameable, the essence of the knowledge of the one Self, that into which the world is resolved, the peaceful, the benign, the non-dual, such, they think, is the fourth quarter. He is the Self, He is to be Known.”

Meaning: (10) “Here these verses are to be found: Turya (the fourth) is the Isāna (Lord) for removing all miseries, He is the Prabhu (Master), imperishable, the non-dual Reality who exists in all phenomena, Deva (brilliant Deity), said to be Vibhu (all-pervading Entity).”

TURIYA ĀTMAN IS NON-DUAL

So far we have explained the purport of six Mantras of the
Upanishad. Now in order to indicate the purport of the seventh Mantra some Kārikās are begun. ‘अत्रेते स्लोकः भवति’, meaning - “Here these following verses are to be found” - this phrase is used to indicate that from hereon another Prakārana (topic) has begun. In the Upanishad Mantra the three epithets used, viz. Vaishwānara, Taijasa and Prājña - are meant for signifying the ‘three quarters’ (Pādas, literally meaning footprints) of Paramātman. It should be discerned that one and the same Sakshi who exists in all the three states is being called by those names. Although the Upādhis or adjuncts are classified as Sthūla (gross), Sūkshma (subtle), Kārana (causal), Paramātman is one and one alone; in this seventh Mantra His real essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness which is Nirupādhika (devoid of any adjuncts whatsoever) has been enunciated. The three quarters (Pādas) like Vishwa, Taijasa etc. have been mentioned only as a device for signifying this Absolute essence of Pure Being-Consciousness (Paramārthaśwarūpa); in the Śruti this Swarūpa alone has been called ‘Brahma’ and ‘Oṃkāra’. If this much teaching is remembered, the purport of the present Kārika will become clear. Turya (For all the words like Turya, Turīya, Chaturtha - the meaning is ‘fourth’ alone) - this Paramārthātman (Absolute Self) - who is said to be the fourth because He is apart from these three imagined forms - Īshāna, Prabhu (Lord, Master) for removal of all miseries; because in Him there do not exist any adjuncts which are conjured up by Avidyā, merely by cognizing this Swarūpa all miseries (of Samsāra) will vanish once for all. Without knowing Him - never at all will the Samsāraduhkha be eliminated, got rid of. The Śruti statement to the effect - “When it is possible to roll up the sky (empty space) like a sheet of leather, without cognizing this Deity, Divinity the Duhkha may come to an end!” - (Śwetāśvatara 6-20) - is mentioned with this purport only.

There is no scope for anyone to doubt in the manner: “Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña - are these not different forms of this Paramātman? If so, by them does not misery get destroyed?” For, Vishwa and Taijasa are Witnesses (Sākshi) for both Sukha and Duhkha. Because Prājña is the cause for everything, we have to discern that He is the cause even for Duhkhadārshana (wit-
nessing act of misery). Especially Prājña in that condition (state) is verily Ānandamaya (of the very essence or embodiment of Bliss); even so, there is a 'probability' of His giving scope for Duhkha to appear in the forms of Vishwa and Taijasa. These latter two - though they are witnesses of Sukha also, there is emaciation, destruction for this Sukha and there also exists a Duhkha signifying that - "There is a greater Sukha than this." Therefore, all the three quarters called Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña have been reckoned here as 'Duhkha' alone. One who removes or destroys all those Duhkhas is verily this Turiyatman. For, to those who have cognized, Intuited the truth that - "This Turiya is Himself the essential nature of Pure Being of those forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña" - the Intuitive Experience of the type that - "Turiyatman is verily Nityanivruttaduhkha (of the very essence of being eternally rid of misery), Nityānandaswarūpa (of the essential nature of eternal, perennial Bliss)" - becomes crystal clear.

He (i.e. Turiyatman) is 'Avyaya' (devoid of emaciation); not only because He has got rid of forms like Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, but also because this - His Ānandaswarūpa exists perennially forever, without undergoing any change; for this reason also it is said: "He is a Prabhu (Lord, Master) who is responsible for the removal of all Duhkhas (miseries)." The reason for this His Swarūpa being 'Avyaya' is because He is Nirvikāra (immutable); because He is without any parts (Niravayava) in Himself intrinsically, there is no possibility whatsoever of any change taking place. In that case, if it is contended that due to an external cause He may possibly be transformed, changed - then it is reconciled by saying that - "He is Advitiya (non-dual); He is without anything second to Him." The word 'Advitiya' does not mean that He is one, solitarily alone; it means - 'He is Vibhu or supreme, He alone exists everywhere'. He is Deva (divine, self-effulgent) - not with a Swarūpa, which has to be illumined by another entity. Although here a meaning for each and every special characteristic that has been mentioned in the Mantra has been given, the quintessence that has to be grasped from the Mantra has been clarified - this fact we have to keep in mind.
Meaning: “It is being accepted that those Vishwa and Taijasa are bound by cause and effect categories; but Prājñā is bound by cause only. Both these do not exist in Turya at all.”

THE CATEGORIES OF SĀMĀNYA (GENERA) AND VISHESHA (SPECIES, PARTICULARS) AMONG VISHWA ETC.

In their essential nature of Pure Being all the three of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājñā are verily Turyātmanas. In that nature of theirs there does not exist any special or particular features whatsoever. But by virtue of the forms which appear to exist due to association with respective Upādhis projected by Avidyā, Shri Gauḍapāda is expounding here a traditional methodology involving the categories of Sāmānya (genera) and Vishesha (species, particulars) with a view to teaching the Ultimate, Absolute Reality (Tattva) of Turīyātman. If observed deeply (Intuitively), Turīyātman alone is Nityasiddha Padārtha (eternally existing Entity or Reality). Since there do not exist any particular or special characteristics in His essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, it is not at all possible to signify Him by means of any special features whatsoever; because those seekers of the highest calibre or qualifications cognize Him merely on the basis of Āgama (traditional and Śāstraic method of teaching the Ultimate Reality of Paramātman), there does not arise any need of any device whatsoever to indicate, or instruct about, Ātmatattwa. For that reason alone, in the Upanishad by the system of Āgama exclusively - to wit, by sublating all the different superimpositions of the type of - “He is not Antahprajñā (inwardly conscious), etc.” - alone this Chaturthātman (the fourth Ātman or Absolute, Supreme Self) has been taught. In spite of this, for the sake of Alpaprajñās (people with mediocre intelligence), utilizing the Pādatrayas (three quarters of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājñā), which are Kalpita (deliberately superimposed merely for the purpose of teaching the subtle entity of Ātman beyond all mundane, empirical phenomena), as the doorways (means or a device) and by adopting a traditional methodology called ‘Anvaya’ (agree-
ment) - ‘Vyatireka’ (pointing out features in which there is disagreement) Krama (system) the Absolute Reality has to be taught. Now it is a fact of life that common people out of a delusion (Bhrānti) misconceive a rope to be a snake, or a crevice in the ground or a streak of water etc. in poor light or visibility, is it not so? Making those very misconceptions as the basis for a pedagogic device, utilizing the methodology or system of ‘Anvaya’ and ‘Vyatireka’, the essential nature of a rope can be made known. To wit: “This object might also be a snake, also a crevice in the ground, or a streak of water too. If it were really a streak of water it should have actually flown further down; because that is not the case, it cannot be a streak of water. If it were a snake, there should have necessarily appeared on one side a hood or head and on the other side a tail; since this too is not a fact, it cannot also be truly a snake. Hence, it appears to be a crevice in the ground indeed” and so on. In this manner by collating the common features (genera) among those various imaginary phenomena as well as in contrasting the different characteristics that appear to exist in each one of them, at least the person, who is having or entertaining several doubts as to what that phenomenon in front of him could be, will be able to minimise his misconceptions. In the same way, in the present context too in order to help the Jijñāsas (seekers) to derive the Intuition of the Absolute Reality by means of teaching the Sāmānya-Vishesha Bhāva as applied to the deliberately superimposed forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, these Kārikās are begun.

“VISHWA AND TAIJASA (ĀTMANS) ARE BOUND BY EFFECT AND CAUSE CATEGORIES”

Kārya (effect) means what is a resultant fruit; Karāṇa (cause) means what is efficient to bring about that effect. In the present context Kāraṇa means ‘not having known’ alone. For all the three - Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña - Tattwāgrahapan (not having cognition of the Reality) - such a Kāraṇa is Samāna (common) to all the three. Because the common run of people have not cognized, Intuited the Ultimate, Absolute Reality of Turīya alone, they have misconceived in (superimposed upon) Turīyātman the various (apparent) forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and
Prājñā, is it not so? If we see from the really real viewpoint of the Tattwa (Absolute Reality of Pure Witnessing Consciousness), Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājñā are not at all three different forms; all these three are indeed the Turiya (fourth i.e. Absolute, Transcendental) non-dual Ātman alone. Therefore, the Kāraṇa of the type of Tattwāgrahaṇa (not having cognized the Reality) is common to all the three forms. In fact, this root cause of Tattwāgrahaṇa is itself - from the Pāramārthik viewpoint - the originating (sprouting) seed form of Anyathāgrahaṇa (wrong knowledge or misconception) of the type of reckoning the Absolutely real Turiya or Ātman to be (something other than what It really is as) Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājñā, which are found with special characteristics.

Because it is stated that - ‘Agrahaṇa is the seed, Anyathāgrahaṇa is the resultant fruit’ - there is a possibility of misconstruing it to mean, just as the seed sprouts and grows into a tree and then gives out fruits, in the same manner, that Agrahaṇa has given rise to Anyathāgrahaṇa. For that reason alone, Shri Śaṅkara has in this context written his Bhashya in the manner: “तत्त्वातितिबोध-प्राप्तेऽहि बोधज्ञेऽनिभितम्” - meaning: “The seed of the nature of ‘not cognizing the Reality’ is itself the Nimitta or cause for being Prājñā, is it not so?” Just as not cognizing it to be a rope is itself the cause for misconceiving that entity alone to be a snake, in the same manner to reckon (misconceive) Pure, Absolute Ātman Himself to be ‘Prājñā’, ‘Jagatkārāṇa (the cause, the seed form for the world of duality)’ - the absence of the Intuitive Knowledge of, or not being able to cognize, Ātmaswarūpa is itself the Nimitta (root cause). Therefore, it has been stated: “Prājñā is Kāraṇabaddha (bound by being a Kāraṇa or cause)”. But in the case of Vishwa and Taijasa, especially, not only ‘not knowing or cognizing the Ātmatattwa’ is there but also, in addition, there is scope for misconceiving Him alone to be of the form of another - to wit, ‘He is Vishwa with Šhūla Upādhi’ and ‘He is Taijasa with Sūkṣma Upādhi’ - called ‘Anyathāgrahaṇa’ in Vedāntic parlance. This is a special feature here. Thus, the category of cause called ‘Agrahaṇa’ is the common feature for all the three forms, viz. Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājñā; but
for Vishwa and Taijasa, in addition, there exists the special feature of having Anyathāgrahaṇa also.

To a query that - “If it is affirmed that both Vishwa and Taijasa are bound by Kāraṇa and Kārya, then it amounts to saying that both of them are associated with the same, common Upādhi ! If so, how at all can one distinguish and discern in the manner - ‘This one is Vishwa, this one is Taijasa’ - ? ” - we have already given an answer. By virtue of His Sthūla Upādhi one is Vishwa and by virtue of His SūkhSHA Upādhi one is Taijasa - these two (Ātmans) do possess these distinctive features and hence it is quite possible to distinguish their features and thereby it is quite possible to distinguish between them. Since both those Upādhis appear due to Anyathāgrahaṇa alone, the teaching that both of them are ‘Kāryakāraṇabaddha’ (bound by effect and cause categories) is proper indeed. Thus the conception of the distinctions of Vishwa and Taijasa is also mooted from the waking standpoint alone ; in the ultimate analysis (considered from the Absolute Intuitive viewpoint) the decision of the type - “Between the two there does not exist any distinctive characteristic whatsoever” - taken on the basis of a subtler or superior viewpoint, has been deduced by the Kārikākara (Shri Gauḍapāda) in the second Prakaraṇa, and hence that topic may be discussed threadbare in that context only.

Here it should not be doubted in the manner : “Tattvāgrahaṇa means Abhāva (the concept of a non-existent thing) of the type of - ‘not having cognized a thing’ ; now, how at all can this non-entity be surmised as a cause ? How can it be proved that Prājña etc. are bound by such an Abhāva ?” It is not at all the intention or purport of this Kārikā to teach that - “Agrahaṇa is, in reality or actuality, a seed” (taking its literal meaning) and “Prājña is bound by that.” We have already stated that Prājña means Parameshwara who is the Jagatkāraṇa (cause for the world). The statement that - “Just as due to the cause of not having cognized the reality in the manner - ‘This is verily a rope’ - that uncognized, unknown rope itself appears as a snake, in the same manner because we have not cognized in the manner - ‘This is Nitya-shuddhabuddhamukta (eternally Pure, Conscious and Liberated) Paramātmā alone - that unknown Paramātmā Himself is appearing as Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña ; from the standpoint of
Pramātru - who, in turn, appears from the waking viewpoint - to aver that Sushuptatman is Kāraṇabaddha while Jāgratātman and Svaṃnatman are both Kāryakāraṇabaddha” - is also justifiably correct. This subtle teaching will shortly be clarified in full detail: When it is said that - “Parameshwara is a cause for the world (Jagatkāraṇa)” - it is meant that - “Just as the rope itself appears as the snake, Parameshwara Himself appears in the form of the Jagat” - alone. To the question that - “In that case, in reality, or actually, the creation of the manifold world has not taken place at all, is it not so ?” - we have already provided a satisfactory answer. If the seeker deliberates on the explanation given for the Kārikāvākyas - ‘स्वप्नायासस्तुत्पदत’ - (1-7) ; - ‘देवदैव स्वप्नवोधय’ (1-9) - this becomes clear and comprehensible. In the near future too we will provide an elaborate solution for this doubt.

TURIYĀTMAN IS DEVOID OF THE TAINT, BLEMISH OF AVIDYĀ

So far we have explained the methodology of applying the concepts of Sāmānyya (genera) and Vishesha (species, particulars) among Vishwa, Taijasa and Prajña. Now let us endeavour to cognize the essential nature of Turyātman. The statement that - “Both these are not established to exist in Turiya” - means either the concept of seed (Bījahāva) called Agrahana (non-comprehension) or the concept of resultant fruit (Phalabhāva) called Anyathāgrahana (misconception) is not established to exist in Ātman, who is the fourth (relatively). Because Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña - all these three forms (appearances) are superimposed upon Paramātman Himself who is Pure, Absolute (non-dual), ‘Shuddhātman’ alone is called ‘the fourth’ (in relation to the three) ; but in the absolute sense, it should be reckoned that in actuality the intension is not that Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are three (in number) and Turya, who is alongside those three, is the fourth. Just as the Dharmas (distinctive characteristics) of the misconceived forms like a snake, a crevice in the ground or a streak of water etc. do not in the least taint or tarnish the real rope, which is the common substrate (Āspada) for them, in the same manner the bondage or binding of both Kārya and Kāraṇa concepts does not touch or taint Turyātman.
A DOUBT: HOW CAN THERE BE AVIDYĀBANDHA FOR VISHWA, TAIJASA AND PRĀJÑA?

Now yet another doubt: It has been previously stated that Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are the epithets given to Paramātman alone due to the distinctions of the Upādhis (adjuncts). It being so, here in this context the statement that—“Prājña is Kāraṇabaddha, while Vishwa and Taijasa are Kāryakāraṇabaddhas”—is contradictory to the former, is it not so? To this also we have already given a convincing solution. Kāraṇabaddha means—‘One who is associated with an adjunct of Kāraṇa; to wit, a Sākṣi (a Witness) to the Kāraṇa (cause, seed form)’; Kāryakāraṇabaddha means—‘(Ātman) who are having, or associated with, adjuncts of the forms of Kārya and Kāraṇa, meaning those who are Sākṣi (Witness) to them. In the form of Sākṣi although they are not different or distinct in essence in the least, first indicating that from the standpoint of their respective adjuncts they are distinct, one from the other, thereafter it is shown that this conventional methodology of Samanya-Vishesha is adopted especially to help cognize the truth that—“Turyātman alone is the Tattva (Reality, essence of Pure Being) of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña.” This fact also we have already stressed.

Here some people may entertain a doubt of the type: “In that case, why is it that in the Kārikās—‘Kāryakāraṇabaddhas’ and ‘Kāraṇabaddha’ are mentioned—indicating Bandha (bondage)? Kāraṇa means Agrahaṇa (non-comprehension), Kārya means Anyathāgrahaṇa (miscomprehension, mistaking one to be another)—in this manner you have explained. Who is having these Kāryakāraṇāvidyās? To Paramātman who is of the essential nature of Sākṣi (Witnessing Consciousness) how at all can this Ajñāna be justifiably attached? In both the Śruti and the Kārikā because Ātman who exists in the three Avasthās is Himself called Vaishwānara (or Vishwa), Taijasa and Prājña, does it not amount to saying that Vishwa, Taijasa etc. themselves also invariably have the experience of the Avasthās?” To this long-winded objection too, although we have already provided a satisfactory answer, if the solution is elucidated in full details once again to suit the doubt raised here, then the real import of Turyātman may become crystal clear. Hence we will tackle this doubt part by part and provide convincing solutions:
(A) TO WHOM DOES AVIDYĀ ATTACH ITSELF?

Who has this Avidyā called ‘Agrahaṇa’? And who has the Avidyā called ‘Anyathāgrahaṇa’? These Avidyās are not there at all for Turiyātman; this truth has been enunciated very clearly indeed in the Kārikā itself. We cannot also accept the concept or theory that Avidyā exists for Shuddhiatman (Pure Self or Being-Consciousness) since this is a self-contradictory proposition on the face of it. It is not possible too to say that Kāranāvidyās are there for Prājnā and others alone; for, the disputant himself affirmed that they are misconceived in Turiya by virtue of Avidyā of the forms of Agrahaṇa etc. No one can say that - “The snake misconceived in the rope - because it did not know that it was the rope - possesses Avidyās of the forms of Agrahaṇa and Anyathāgrahaṇa,” is it not so? Similarly, the statement that - “To Prājnā, Taijasa and Vishwa, who are misconceived in Turiya alone, this Avidyā attaches itself” - cannot be acceptable, is it not so? This is the first doubt.

The solution for this is: In the empirical sphere or our workaday world (Vyāvahāra) the person who is desirous of Intuiting, cognizing the Absolute Reality has perforce believed in the manner - “I am having the experiences of waking, dream and deep sleep”- is it not so? To such a person alone there exists this Avidyā. That person who entertains an earnest desire of the following type alone is the properly qualified seeker for the Vedānta Jñāna, viz: “In deep sleep I do have Ajñāna (ignorance) of the type of - ‘I do not cognize anything therein’; in the dream I am seeing a false phenomenon and believing it to be real alone, I am carrying on transactions therein; in the waking, though I am seeing real objects and am experiencing happiness and misery born out of enjoying those objects, there exists this Ajñāna which the Śāstrajñās (people well-versed in scriptural studies) say to be of the nature of not having cognized the Advitiya Paramātman (the non-dual Supreme Self). Now, about the Intuitive Experience (Anubhava) of the type - ‘In deep sleep I am not cognizing anything at all’ as also the Experience of the type - ‘In the dream I am cognizing another thing’ - are these both Experiences belonging to my very essence of Pure Being (Swarūpa or Svabhāva), or they being false concepts, is there anything quite distinct from these but which is verily my Svabhāva?” To such
a Jijñāsu alone there is Avidyā. Addressing this sort of an Adhikāri (fully qualified person) both the Śāstra (spiritual texts) and Āchārya (preceptor who is well-versed in the traditional methodology of spiritual teaching) instruct in the manner: “In deep sleep not cognizing anything and in the waking and the dream cognizing something extraneous or external object - both these phenomena are verily Avidyā. This Avidyā of the forms of Kārya-Kāraṇa is not at all your essential nature of Being (Śvabhāva); you are definitely, decidedly Turīya alone who is Nityashuddhabuddhamuktā.” When Ātmajñāna which is the resultant fruit of that Upadesha (spiritual instruction) accrues, then from that viewpoint no one has Avidyā whatsoever.

In the Present Kārikā after superimposing the forms of Vishwa, Taijasa etc. on Ātman and signifying the Pure Being of Ātman’s essential nature, this deliberate superimposition has been rescinded and the essential nature of Turīyātman, as He really is, has been expounded. This traditional unique method of teaching called ‘Adhyārōpa Apavāda (Nyāya) Prakriyā’ has been explained at several places in this text.

(B) HOW ARE VISHWA AND TAIJASA SAID TO BE BOUND?

For this doubt we will provide a solution by means of properly explaining and analysing the purport of the Kārikā alone. The meaning (purport) of the sentence quoted as an illustration in the manner - “The rope itself is the snake” - is: In the same sense you have to reckon the meaning or import of these sentences (about Vishwa, Taijasa etc.). What you had imagined to be a snake is, in truth, a rope alone, is it not so? In the same way, the discerning seeker or student should understand (cognize the truth) that - “The Āvivekins (non-discriminating ignorant people) have believed themselves to be really Kāryakāraṇabaddha, is it not so? ‘We are bound by Kāryakāraṇa Ajñāna’ - in this manner it is appearing to them, is it not so? They are, in truth, Vishwa -Taijasa Ātmans only; one who is appearing as Kāraṇa-Ajñānabaddha is verily Prājña alone” - In this manner alone the various words used in the sentences have to be connoted and the intended purport should be comprehended. The statement that Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña have Avidyā is contradictory to Śruti teaching; for, in the Śruti both Vishwa
and Taijasa have been described as of Parameshwara Swarūpa alone with special characteristics of Saptāṅga (seven limbs). To say that they have Avidyā is not at all proper or tenable. To say -“Parameshwara has Avidyā”- is a self-contradictory statement.

In the alternative, for the sentences - “Prājña is Kāraṇabaddha” and “Vishwa and Taijāsa are both Kāryakāraṇabaddha” - another meaning can be suggested. Because the cause called ‘Agrāhaṇa’ is itself the cause for Prājñatva (the abstract concept of Prājña), this Prājña is Kāraṇabaddha, meaning, He is related to or associated with Kāraṇatva (the concept of causation or cause-hood). In the Absolute sense (to wit, from the Absolute Intuitive viewpoint of the Ultimate non-dual Reality of Pure Being-Consciousness), Paramāṭman is not Kāraṇa (i.e. He being non-dual Absolute, beyond all empirical transactions, there cannot ever be any causation that can be attached to Him). This is the real intention or import behind these explanations. In the same manner, if it is said - “Vishwa, Taijasa are Kārya-Kāraṇabaddha” - for conceiving them to be Kāryarūpas (of the form of an effect), both Kāryakāraṇa (both effect and cause) are responsible. From the cause of not cognizing the Pure, Absolute Ātman alone, its offshoot, as it were, of Anyathāgrahaṇa (misconception, a mistaken or erroneous knowledge) has arisen. Besides, it has been superimposed deliberately by the Śruti merely for the purpose of teaching the seeker in his ignorant state of not cognizing the Paramāṭma Tattwa, that - “Hiranyagarbha is caused or born from Paramāṭman, while Virāṭ Purusha is caused from Hirayagarbha.” Therefore here also when it is said - “Kārya-Kāraṇabaddha” - it means only - “Kārya-Kāraṇa Sambaddha (related to or associated with effect-cause categories).” In fact, here in this context the word ‘Baddha’ has been used to suit both the meanings of ‘as if being bound’ and ‘having the relationship of It is Śrī Gauḍapāda’s prime purport or intention here to signify that - “In order to help the Jīvas rid themselves of the misconception of their innately having the bondage of Avidyā (Avidyābandha) superimposes deliberately the relationship of Kāryakāraṇabāhāvā (concepts or categories of effect and cause) among Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña Ātmans and then to instruct about the Pure (Shuddha) non-distinctive (Nirvishesha) Paramāṭma
Tattwa which is the substratum for all of them, the Śruti as a device (Upāya) has formulated these concepts.”

(C) HAVE THESE VISHWA, TAIJASA AND PRĀJÑA ANY AVASTHĀS?

Now for the doubt of the type — “If Parameshwara too has or experiences the Avasthās of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti, does it not amount to saying that He is also a Jīva who is a Samsāri (transmigratory soul)?” - it amounts to our having provided a solution indeed. For, if we examine on the basis of Intuitive deliberation the essential Reality (substrate) behind the Jīva who is appearing as if he is experiencing the three states of Consciousness of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti, it becomes discernible that he has no Avasthās whatsoever, in the absolute sense. This universal fact of Vedāntic spiritual science will be made clear in due course also. From the Paramātha Drishti Jīva himself does not have Avasthās; it being so, how can Parameshwara, who is the Witnessing Pure Consciousness (Sākshi) of a Jīva’s Avasthā, be associated with or tainted by the blemish of having an Avasthā?

Even in the case of the Jīva by virtue of his misconception alone these Avasthābhōgas (experiencing the states) are appearing; ‘Jīva’ means one who has been associated with the adjuncts of the waking body, senses and mind alone. There is no supporting evidence of any universal experience whatsoever to show that these body, senses etc. (of the waking) exist in the dream or in the deep sleep. If this universal experience is Intuited or cognized properly, then there is no support of any universal experience to imagine or conceive that — “The Jīva who is in the waking experiences either dream or deep sleep.” Therefore, it is tantamount to saying that the usual, conventional belief that — “Jīva alone has the three Avasthās” — is truly a Bhrānti (delusion). It being so when viewed from the standpoint of Intuitive Experience or Knowledge, how at all can those experiences (projected as if to be true by Avidyā) taint or touch Paramātman, who is the Jīva’s Paramārtha Swarūpa (Absolute essence of Being)?

THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP OF AVIDYĀ TO TURĪYA ĀTMAN

In any case, by deliberating on the purport behind this 11th
Kārikā what has been deduced is: Both Agrahaṇa and Anyathāgraṇa which appear among the Avasthās do not at all taint Turiya - the Paramārtha Swarūpa of Ātman who is the Witnessing Consciousness for them; therefore, for Him there is no blemish or defect whatsoever of being associated with Avasthās. This purport alone will be clarified in the next Kārikās.

नात्मानं न पराश्र्येव न सत्यं नापि चानुतम्।
प्राम: किन्यन संवेदिते तुर्यं तत् सर्वदृक् सदा ॥१२॥

Meaning: Prajñā does not know a wee bit either Himself or anyone else, either real or unreal, false. Whereas Turya is always Sarvadṛṣṭ (omni-percipient alone).

THE PURPORT OF STATEMENT THAT PRĀJÑA IS KĀRAṆĀBandha

The purport of this Kārikā has to be discerned following on the previous Kārikā. In this and the next Kārikā, in both, the distinction that exists between Prajñā and Turya is being expounded.

In the Sushuptavastha (deep sleep state) we do not have the cognitions of the type - ‘I’ and ‘another person’ : neither is therein any cognition of the type - ‘This is real, this is unreal or false’ - in this manner is the common people’s belief, is it not so? But the Śruti is teaching that, in truth, (from the viewpoint of Intuitive Experience of Sākshi Chaitanya) this person is Prajñā alone.

IS THERE AjñāNA IN SUSHUPTI OR NOT?

Anybody may get a doubt of the type - “Ajñāna being there in Sushupti is in the experience of all of us, is it not so? It being so, how at all can the Śruti statement to the effect that - ‘Our Swarūpa which exists therein is Sarvajñā or omniscient etc.’ - be said to be proper?” In the past Indra, who was practising Brahmacharya or continence, had this very same question put to Prajāpati. Indra had raised a doubt in the manner - “Here he does not have his own cognition or the cognition of any other being apart from himself; he appears to have been completely lost, destroyed therein. I am not seeing any happiness accruing from the cognition of this Sushuptāman.”
(Chh. 8-11-2). But Prajāpati, on his part, had stated: “The essential nature (Swarūpa) of Sushuptatman is Amrita (deathless), Abhaya (fearless) Brahman alone.” (Chh. 8-11-1) Thus the reason for such a great difference existing between the Śāstra Drishti and the common people’s Drishti is: In Sushupti Jīva has actually become one with Kāraṇa Brahma who is of the very essence of Sadrūpa (Pure Existence, Being).

Sruti is teaching. In the present context of Māṇḍūkya Upanishad too it has been verily expounded that: “In deep sleep, having become Ekībhūta (unitary, non-dual, Absolute) He exists as Prajñānaghana (mass, ‘lump of Pure Consciousness) alone.” (Māṇḍūkya Mantra No.5). Thus in that Avasthā because He has become a non-dual Entity or Reality, invariably there being nothing second to Himself, He does not get any cognition of anything else, nor is there any cognition whatsoever. Just as in the waking if there existed two phenomena like - ‘I’ and ‘another thing’ only and if there existed an Antahkarana (inner instrument of the Mind) which cognizes an object in the manner - “This is such and such a thing” - distinctively, then only there could have been any possibility of cognizing indeed, is it not so? But the Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness or Intuitive Experience), especially, which experiences the deep sleep, does exist therein undoubtedly; however, with what can anything (as an object) be cognized? The Brīhadāranya Upanishad is very clearly explaining that -“Because there is no second thing (to Shuddha Sākshi Chaitanya or Witnessing Pure Consciousness) exists alone, He does not cognize and not because He does not have, or has lost, cognition itself.” (Bṛi. 4-3-30). Therefore, from the standpoint of the fact that - “Sākshi or the Witnessing Principle which is cognizing the deep sleep (experience) is nothing other than the omniscient Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) alone” - the Śruti causing the Witnessing Consciousness of deep sleep ‘Sarvajña’ is fully justified indeed. Even that Sarvajñatwa (omniscience) has been expounded on the ground of the truth that - “In relation to
the phenomena that are appearing in the waking and the dream Prājñā illumines everything” - alone. But when the common people observe from the viewpoint of the waking, on the ground of their apparent apprehension of not cognizing anything whatsoever they think in the manner: “I did not cognize or experience therein anything whatsoever”. Hence there is no real opposition or contradiction at all between the Śāstra Drīṣṭi and the common people’s experience.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PROPONENTS OF VYĀKHYĀNA PRASTHĀNA (POST-ŚAṅKARA COMMENTATORS’ METHODOLOGY) IS NOT PROPER

In this context, some Vyākhyanākāras or post-Śaṅkara commentators have opined: “In spite of the fact that Ātman’s essential nature of self-effulgence truly exists in deep sleep, that Tamas or darkness, gloom, ignorance by virtue of which that Swarūpa or essential nature of His is not being cognized by Him - that Tamas is a particular kind of Anirvacaniya (indefinable, indescribable) Avidyā (ignorance) which is Bhāvarūpa (of the nature of a really existing entity). Because this has enveloped or covered up Ātman, He exists therein not able to cognize His own real essence of Pure Being. If it is not so, and if the Avidyā of the nature of mere ‘Agrahāna’ (non-Comprehension) were to exist therein, then there will arise a problem of there being no reason or cause that can be adduced for not cognizing anything whatsoever therein.” This is their doctrinaire theory. Those who follow these Vyākhyanākāras forward yet another Upapatti or ground, expedient cause to affirm that in Sushupti such a Bhāvarūpa Avidyā actually exists: “By acknowledging the concept that in Sushupti such an Avidyā exists the following facts are evolved, deduced: (i) Therein also both Jīva and Parameshwara exist separately, distinctively; (ii) only Jīva has Avidyā, while Brahman exists in this Shuddha (Pure) nature only; (iii) no one attains Mukti (Liberation, Beatitude) merely on the strength of getting Sushupti; (iv) for that reason alone, it amounts to our finding a tenable reason for the fact of sleeping persons once again waking up; (v) on the other hand, if it is accepted that in Sushupti only Brahman exclusively exists, then to Brahman alone the Avidyā of the nature of - ‘I did not cognize anything whatsoever’ - will attach itself (unavoidably); because merely by
going to deep sleep everyone merges in or becomes one with Shuddha Brahman, therein itself they become Liberated or attain Mukti - such a Anishta or undesirable predicament also will be confronted ; (vi) besides, the conclusion of the type that - ‘There is no cause whatsoever for those who are asleep to wake up once again’ - will become unavoidable.”

This doctrine is not proper. For, in the first place, it has been very clearly affirmed in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad that - “Because this Jīva has become Ekībhūta (one or identical) with Prājña, the Jīva does not get either the internal or external cognition.” If we Intuitively deliberate a little incisively, deeply on this, then there does not exist any Pramāṇa (valid means of proof) even to assert - “There exists a Padārtha or a thing, substance which is of the essential nature of an entity called Anirvāchya Avidyā (indefinable ignorance)” ; although these proponents of this kind of Avidyā are saying that - “This particular Avidyā is in fact Avyākṛtanāmarūpa (unmanifested names and forms) alone” - in the Gaṇapāda Kārikās nowhere ‘Nāmarūpa’ or names and forms have been called ‘Avidyā’; also he has expressly stated that - “Agrahaṇa (not having cognized the Tattva or Ultimate Reality) is itself called Kāraṇa Avidyā; misconception is itself Kārya Avidyā”. In the second place, with the Śruti teaching that - “In deep sleep (Sushupti) Jīva becomes one with omniscient Īśwara” - this doctrinaire theory (of the Vyākhyaṇakāras) does not at all agree i.e. it is not in conformity whatsoever ; besides, even the statement that - “If mere Agrahaṇa exists, it amounts to saying that nothing has covered up or enveloped Ātman” - is also not rational ; for, it is in the experience of every one of us that - (a) when the light of day is gone, in the night nothing being visible to our eyes ; (b) the absence of that light alone being empirically dealt with as darkness.

TURĪYA IS SARVADRIK RŪPA OR OF THE NATURE OF OMNI-PERCIPIENT WITNESS

In the present context there is no need whatsoever to say that to the sleeping people there exists a particular kind of Āvaraṇa or cover of Agrahaṇa which is of the nature of Abhāva or non-existence. For, in Sushupti neither there exists cognition
nor obliviousness; besides therein there is no possibility whatsoever of either the correct, proper knowledge or misconception existing at all. Especially, the statement that - “In Sushupti Jīva and Parameshwara exist separately, distinctively; only to the Jīva therein Avidyā exists” - is totally opposed to the Śruti teaching. For, therein the Jīva is verily ‘Prājña’ alone. ‘Prājña’ means Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) and It is Ātman’s essential nature (Swarūpa) - thus the Śruti is affirming too. The Bhāshyakāra (Shri Śaṅkara) also, while explaining the word ‘Prājña’ has opined that - “In Sushupti without there being any Vīshēṣa-jiīana (particular, distinct knowledge) but there existing a particular kind of Prājña (Consciousness) which is Swarūpamātrā or Absolute, transcendent, Pure-Being per se - is a special uncommon feature.” By virtue of which Chaitanya Prakāsha (Light of Pure Consciousness) we are all experiencing Sushupti - that alone is our real Swarūpachaitanya (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness) indeed. Therefore, Shri Gauḍapāda has stated in this Kārikā that - “That Turya is perennially Sarvadṛīk (omni-percipient)”. Chaitanya which is verily our Swarūpa alone ‘always’ - meaning, in all the three Avasthās exists. It is ‘Sarvadṛīk’-meaning, that Pure Consciousness being everything and, in the Absolute sense, because apart from It there does not exist at any period of time or anywhere any other entity whatsoever, that Pure Consciousness alone is everything and ‘Dṛīk’ - meaning, of the very essence of the Light, Effulgence of Consciousness. Here it should also be discerned that with the prime purport of teaching this Turyarūpa, which is the Paramārtha or Ultimate Reality of Ātman, Brahman alone, the Pādatraya or the three quarters have been superimposed upon Ātman in the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad.

We should not doubt in the manner - “If it is so, then because it amounts to saying that merely by means of going to sleep all people become liberated only, the spiritual instructions of the Śāstra and the Guru will be rendered futile, is it not so? It will also be tantamount to accepting that there is no cause whatsoever for those who are asleep to wake up at all, is it not so?” For, without having discerned the truth that - “Our Turyātmāswarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness of Turyātman) is eternally Sarvadṛīk” - all the disputants or proponents of various theories are usually entertaining this doubt.
Whether it is in the waking or in the dream or in the deep sleep - everywhere this Turya alone exists; when we observe (Intuit) from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi, apart from the Chaitanya of this Turyātman there do not exist these Avasthās like waking, dream etc. at all; just as in the waking the sea-shell or nacre itself appears in the form of silver, this Chaitanya Itself appears in the distinctive forms of Pramāṭru, Pramāṇa and Prameya indeed. Therefore, even the ‘Pramāṭru Rūpa’ (form of cognizership) which is cognizing everything in that Avasthā (i.e. waking) is, in truth, a reflection (Ābhäṣa) alone of this Turyātma or Chaitanya. Why say more? Even what we call ‘Jāgrat Avasthā’ is also the Ābhäṣa only of this Chaitanya; there does not at all exist any Jāgrat Avasthā apart from Turyātmataattwa; similarly, apart from Turyātman neither there exists whatsoever Svapnāvasthā nor the reflection of the world comprising Pramāṭru, Pramāṇa etc. because of the mental projections which appear within that Avasthā; whatever appears to exist therein is verily an Ābhäṣa (reflection), false appearance of this Turyātma Chaitanya. Especially in Sushupti, it is known to everyone that the distinctions or divisions of Pramāṭru (cognizer), Pramāṇa (means of cognition) and Prameya (object of cognition) themselves do not exist at all. This fact we have already clarified while explaining the meaning of the second half of the Karīka. For this reason alone, it was stated in the previous Karīka (1-11) that both Agrahaṇa and Anyathāgraḥaṇa cannot at all be established or proved to exist in Turya. It being so, we should reckon the fact that the purport behind the Bṛhādāranyaka teaching - “There is no Viparilōpa (total disappearance or loss of perception, cognition of the percept cognizer), is it not so?” - (Bṛ. 4-3-23) - is itself being restated in the sentence: “That Turya is always Sarvadrik” - in the Karīka.

It is very clear now that to those who have gained the Intuitive Experience of this Tattwa there cannot at all be any apprehension of a doubt of the type - “In Sushupti alone Liberation (Mukti) has to be attained; further, there will not be any cause whatsoever to be adduced for one to wake up at all!” What is the meaning of saying that to Ātman who is Nitya Niravasthā (eternally devoid of any states), Nityamukta (eternally Liberated) Sarvadigrūpa (omni-percipient) has ‘Sushupti’? What is the meaning of the statement - “That He has to attain Mukti
afresh” ? What is the meaning of the statement - “One wakes up from Sushupti” ? Since such questions are clarified in the next Kārikā, this discussion is enough. For the nonce, it will be sufficient if it is realized that - “For the sake of those persons who have not yet cognized that they are ‘Nityaniravasthas’, ‘Nityamuktas’ - for such Jīnasus only first conceiving the Ātmabhedas (distinctions of Ātman) of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, then to that Jīva himself who exists in Prājñasthitī (state of Pure Consciousness) here it has been taught about his Ajñāna as also for his Turīya, or essential nature per se of Pure Being-Consciousness, ‘Sarvadṛṣṭigrūpa’ has been taught.” Although in deep sleep they are themselves verily Prājña, to those alone who have not cognized that Tattva or Ultimate Reality the empirical states of Consciousness (Avasthas) occur - meaning, the mundane Vyavahāric trans-action to the effect - “They are occurring” - is being carried on; but for waking up from deep sleep, the Ajñana that exists in deep sleep is not the cause; we have to determine in the manner - “The absence of the Intuitive cognition to the effect - ‘Therein I have become one, identical with (Eklībhava) Prājña’ - is itself responsible for misconceptions of the type - ‘I slept, I woke up’.”

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PRĀJÑA AND TURĪYA

Meaning :- “Not cognizing duality (Dvaita) is common to Prājña, and Turīya. Prājña is associated with Bijanidra or deep sleep comprising the seed potency, cause of duality, but that (sleep) does not exist in Turīya.”

In this Kārikā, keeping in mind a particular doubt, a solution has been suggested. That doubt is: “Just as Prājña has association with Avidyā of the form of Agrahaṇa, in the same way Turīya also has that very same association with Avidyā, is it not so? It being so, how at all can it be asserted that Prājña alone is Kāraṇabaddha or bound by cause?”

The solution for this doubt is: “Prājña is associated with Bijanidra.” Not knowing the Ultimate Reality of the Self (Tattwa) alone is Nidra (sleep). Since this alone is the seed form for the
Visheshajñāna (distinctive knowledge) in the Vishwa and Taijasa Avasthas, it is called ‘Bijanidra’. “Prājña is Kāraṇabaddha, is associated with Bijanidra” - to this sentence, keeping in mind the explanatory commentary for the 11th and 12th Kārikās alone, the correct purport must be discerned. In Sushupti by virtue of his Bijanidra - meaning, the Ajñāna or non-comprehension of the nature of not having Intuited the Ultimate Reality of the Self - with which he is fettered, Jīva - from the Paramārtha Drishṭi - is verily Prājña ; in order to indicate the subtle teaching that - “The misconception of the type - ‘In deep sleep I am associated with a sleep of the nature that I did not cognize anything” - is itself an impediment for the conviction, Intuitive Knowledge of the type - ‘Then I was Prājña alone’ -” exclusively here in the Kārikā it has been stated that - ‘Prājña is associated with Bijanidra.’

THE FORMS OF JIVATWA ETC. OF ĀTMAN ARE CAUSED BY THE UPĀDHIS OR ADJUNCTS

We should not think, reckon that -“The Jīva who is in Sushupti has this Bijanidra ; this knowledge alone is the cause for the concept of an Avasthā called ‘Sushupti’, and not that the Jīva actually experiences an Avasthā called ‘Sushupti’.” Assuming an adjunct of an Avasthā called ‘Sushupti’, to the Jīva therein (in Sushupti) Prājñatwa has been superimposed, is it not so ? If this truth is discerned, then Jīva is not in reality (from the Absolute viewpoint) one who is having Sushupti Avasthā ; in the same way, Prājña too, in the Absolute sense, is not Prājña ; then it amounts to accepting that his Paramārtharūpa or essential nature of Being is Turiya alone. Therefore, what was stated, viz. “Prājña has Bijanidra ; that (Bijanidra) does not exist in Turya” - is proved to be correct. The subtle point that has to be discerned here in this context is : We should never believe, think that - “There are three Ātmans like Jīva, Prājña and Turya ; Jīva has Nidra while Prājña, being totally different, distinct from him, is Ayyākṛta (unmanifest seed form) and is the cause for the world of duality ; but Turiya is verily Ātman, totally different from both these, devoid of Nidra and of any association with Avidyā.” For the specific purpose of rescinding, sublating Jīvatwa (soulhood) which is superim-
posed upon (or misconceived in) Ātman who appears as Jīva in the Vyavahāra or workaday transactions, the Śruti (deliberately) first superimposes ‘Prājñatwa’. Thereafter, in order to rescind or sublate that deliberate superimposition or imputation of Prājñatwa upon that very same Ātman, the Śruti once again superimposes ‘Turīyatwa’. From the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi, in Ātman there is no Jīvatwa at all; neither is there Prājñatwa nor Turīyatwa in Him. By virtue of the Upādhi or adjunct of Prāṇadhāraṇa (endowed with Karālas like senses and mind, carrying on empirical transactions) - Jīvatwa; by virtue of the Upādhi of Jagat Kāraṇatwa, i.e. being the cause for the manifest world of duality - Prājñatwa; in relation to Bahishprajñatwa etc. (i.e. from the viewpoint of the experiences of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti being there for Ātman) - Turīyatwa - these three concepts are misconceived in Ātman. Because all these Upādhis are appearing from the Avidyā Drīṣṭi alone, from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi (in the ultimate analysis based on Intuitive Experience) Ātman is not Jīva, not Prājña, not Turīya even; He is verily the Advitiya Tattwa or non-dual Absolute Reality who is Prapañchopashama or devoid of any trace of the world of duality indeed.

Meaning: The first two are associated with dream and deep sleep; in the case of Prājña especially, (he is associated with) deep sleep devoid of dream. To those who are totally convinced about the Ultimate Reality deep sleep is not seen in Turya, neither is Svapna or dream seen at all.

THE ESSENTIAL REALITY OF ‘SVAPNA’ AND ‘NIDRA’

It has been previously explained that when it is said that - ‘Prājña has Kāraṇa Bandha’ - it means that He has Bijanidra. Now it is being clarified as to what is meant by: ‘Vishwa and Taijasa have Kārya Kāraṇa Bandha.’

‘The first two’ - (in this Kārikā) means - ‘Vishwa and Taijasa (Ātman)’ - they are associated with Svapna and Nidra, i.e. dream and sleep, respectively. Prājña has Asvapna
Nidrā (deep sleep devoid of dream). People do not know as to what exactly is Nidra or deep sleep; for, while they are asleep they are not having any specific, distinctive experience (Visheshā-nubhava) at all. In the same manner, the common run of people have not deliberated upon, discriminated as to what exactly is Svapna (dream) and have jumped to a conclusion. They keep on saying that - “When we are asleep all sorts of bizzare appearances like phantasmagoria are falsely seen by us; that queer state itself is Svapna or a dream.” Shri Gauḍapāda, the Kārikākāra, has signified that - “Although the common people’s knowledge or belief of ‘not having cognized anything whatsoever therein’ is proper, in the true sense (in the ultimate analysis on the strength of Intuitive Experience) not having cognized, Intuited Ātmatatwa (Ultimate, Absolute Reality of the Self) is itself Nidra (deep sleep).” In the same way, Shri Gauḍapāda has indicated that - “Although there is partially some truth in what the common people believe in that Svapna or dream is merely a ‘false appearance’, in the true sense or ultimate analysis, seeing Ātman wrongly (or misconceiving Him) in a different, alien form is Svapna or a dream.” Though this truth will be clarified in the next Kārikā we are stating it here so that the readers are kept informed in advance. In the Māṇḍūkyōpanishad it has been very clearly taught that - “Where (he) does not entertain any desire (Kāma) and where (he) does not see any dream whatsoever (Svapna) - that alone is Sushupti or deep sleep” - (Māṇ. Mantra 5). On the strength of that Śruti statement only Shri Gaudapāda has written here that - “Prājña is associated with deep sleep devoid of dream.”

Thus by our proper understanding of the words - Nidrā (deep sleep) and Svapna (dream) what is eventually established is: Both the forms, viz. Vishwa and Taijasa, of Ātman are appearing associated with Svapna and Nidra. Just as the person, who has not cognized (the reality of) a rope, is deluded (Bhrānti) to misconceive it (the rope itself) as a snake, in the same way because of our not having cognized Ātman in His real essential nature alone we are seeing (misconceiving) Him as Vishwa as well as Taijasa. By this Intuitive deliberation the doubt of the type - “How can there exist dream and deep sleep in the waking?” - will vanish into thin air. For, Nidra or deep sleep
means (now) ‘not knowing, cognizing the Reality of Ātman’, *Swapna* (dream) means ‘to grasp, cognize It wrongly (misconceive) in a different form’. Just as these Nidrā-Swapna phenomena exist in what the common people call ‘dream state’, in the same way they exist in what they call ‘waking state’ also. Therefore, it is stated here that - “The first two are associated with Swapna - Nidra.” In the Śruti the special characteristics or features of ‘Sāptāṅga Ekanāvimśatimukha’ - (Māṇḍūkyya 3, 4) are equally applied to Vaishvānara and Taijasa, and for this equal treatment the above-mentioned teaching alone is the cause. If we further delve deep into the matter and observe Intuitively, what the common people call ‘waking’ and ‘dream’ states are both one and the same indeed ; both are dreams alone - this teaching Śri Gauḍapāda has clarified in the next Vaitathya Prakāraṇa. Though that truth is for nonce kept aside, if it is discerned that the teaching that “Vishwa - Taijasa forms of Ātman are appearing by virtue of Swapna-Nidrā states alone” - is propounded here, then it is sufficient.

**THE WRONG THEORY OF VYĀKHYĀNAKĀRAS**

The post-Śaṅkara commentators (Vyākhyānakāras) keep on asserting that for the Ātmarūpa (essential nature of the Self) that exists in the three Avasthas, there are three different Upādhis. It is their theory that - “In the deep sleep state (Sushupti Avasthā) an indefinable (Anirvachaniya) Kāraṇāvidyā (causal ignorance), in the dream state (Swapna Avasthā) both Avidyā and its effects of mind (Antālklara) and in the waking state (Jāgrat Avasthā) Avidyā, its effect of mind (Antālklara) and the conglomeration of the body and the senses (Sharīrendriya Saṅghāta) - all these three are the Upādhis for Ātman.” Because what these disputants have acknowledged as their theory of Avidyā is grossly opposed to Śruti, Kārikā, Bhāṣhya, Yukti and Anubhava - this erroneous dogmatic theory need not be reckoned here in this context by Jijñāsas. In fact, in all the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep there invariably exists the Nidrā of the type of ‘not knowing or cognizing the Ultimate Reality of the Self’ ; in the waking and the dream states there exists a *Swapna* of the type of ‘seeing Anātmadrishya or phenomenon of not-Self totally different, distinct from Ātman.’ If we interpret the Kārikā in the manner that
- “By virtue of a sleep (Nidrā) of Ātmājñāna or ignorance, non-comprehension of the Reality of Self alone the dream (Svapna) of seeing Anātman or not-Self is appearing” - then it amounts to our having brought about perfect harmony or reconciliation (Ekavākyata) between the Sruti teaching and the Kārikā explanation. In addition, it will be in consonance with Yukti (critique of reason) and Anubhava (Intuitive Experience). How it is so we will clarify when interpreting the meaning of the following Kārikās.

**IN TURIYĀTMAN THERE DOES NOT EXIST ANY KIND OF AVIDYĀ WHATSOEVER**

Thus it amounts to saying that for Vishwa and Taijasa Ātmans Svapna-Nidras only are the cause; for Prajña merely Svapnarahita Nidrā is the cause, is it not so? It evolves, from this, that - “In Turya, which is Paramārtha or the Ultimate Reality and to which all these three forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prajña are deliberately imputed, those persons who are established in the realization of the Reality do not see Nidra or sleep, nor do they witness in the least Svapna or dream which perforce appears because of that Nidra.” Turyātman is Nityachaitanyaswarūpa or eternally of the essential nature of Pure Consciousness; Agraha and Anyathagraha - both these Avidyās are, in fact, illuminated by His Chidprakāsha or Light of Pure Consciousness alone; if we further look in incisively, Intuitively, then it becomes established that just as the misconceived snake is, in a manner of speaking, completely pervaded by the rope alone, in the same way both these Avidyās are pervaded by Turya’s Chidprakāsha and there by it becomes evident that their Paramārtha or real essence of Being is Turya alone. It being so, how can these Avidyās exist in Him at all?

**Meaning:** To one who misconceives It is Svapna, to one who does not cognize the Reality it is Nidrā. The wrong knowledge of both these - if it gets destroyed, then (the Śādhaka) attains the Turiya (fourth) Sthāna (abode).
HOW IS TURIYA ATTAINED?

In has been stated that those who have cognized, realized, after due determination, the real essence of Being of Turiya neither Nidrā nor Svapna is seen, is it not so? There is no question of raising a doubt of the type that - "When can we determine and cognize Turiya? The states of waking, dream and deep sleep are continuously occurring to Man, is it not so? How is it at all possible to determine Turiya distinct from these states?"

For, the deep-seated comprehension that the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep are really three separate experiences is itself responsible for this doubt; we have already clarified that Nidrā (sleep) means not having cognized, realized the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality), while Svapna (dream) means wrongly understanding or misconceiving. Although we are all eternally Nityachaitanyalakshaṇa Turiyātmaswarūpas or of the very essence of Turiyātmā of the special characteristic of eternal Pure Consciousness, quite contrary to this nature we have believed all along in a topsy-turvy manner - once as 'I am awake', once as 'I am dreaming', and once 'I am in deep sleep'. This Viparyāsa (contrariety, inconsistency), Viparitajñāna (misconception) - meaning, knowing in a topsy-turvy manner - should be got rid of; then only, instantly we attain the Turiyapada or Beattitude indeed.

'TURIYA' IS NOT AN AVASTHĀ

Because in the Kārikā it has been stated that - "तूर्यों पदमस्तुले" - meaning, "He attains the position of Turiya" - there is a possibility of getting a delusion of the type - "Turiya means a position, state or situation; we have to earn or attain that state, situation or position which is beyond the waking, the dream and the deep sleep." There are also the adherents of the Vyākhyāna-Prasthāna who are invariably propagating that - "There exists a particular 'Nirvikalpa Samādhi' - an Avasthā or state in which there is no Vyavahāra or empirical transactions or functions attached to Ātman." Some people believe innately that this 'Nirvikalpa Samādhi' is itself 'Turiyāvasthā.' But this is not a correct knowledge. Shri Śaṅkarāchārya has, in this regard, written in his Śūtra Bhāshya in the manner - "न चायं व्यवहाराभावोउक्स्माविशेष
Turīyatwa is eternal

Therefore, these phenomena of waking, dream and deep sleep are not three different Avasthās or states at all; neither is it called ‘Turīya’, the fourth, because that which is ‘Turīya’ is a separate Avasthā apart from those three. Just as it has been expounded in the present Kārikā ‘not having cognized, realized the Ultimate Reality (Tattwa)’ - is itself Nidrā or sleep, and ‘misconceiving or wrongly reckoning It (Tattwa) to be something other than what It is’ - is itself Svapna or dream. In these two the whole gamut of the experiences of all Avasthās or states without any exception whatsoever are subsumed. To believe or reckon that these two also are Avasthās occurring in time as events one after the other is wrong; both of them are verily Viparyāsas or inconsistencies, contrarieties; false notions indeed. We should not imagine that in the waking and the dream state our Knowledge, Consciousness (Jñāna) has blossomed forth, while in deep sleep It has shrunk or shrivelled up. As Shri Sureshwarāchārya has written in his Sambandha Vārtika:

‘असंकुचिततित्तप: प्राणे स्वप्नप्रबोधत:। तथाप्रभुद्वोधाना: प्राणवत् स्वप्नबोधयोऽऽ।’

- (Sambandha Vārtika 1085) - meaning - “Just as in the waking and the dream states, similarly in the deep sleep too Ātman’s Chitkamala or lotus of Pure Consciousness exists without getting shrunk or stilled; just as in the deep sleep, similarly in the waking and the dream that Chitkamala exists without blossoming.” Ātman’s ‘Chitkamala’ means ‘Chidrūpa’ or Pure Consciousness per se; It is not something which never at all attains or undergoes distinctive mutations, changes of the type of shrinking (contraction) or blossoming (decrease or increase). Turīya means our Paramārtha Tattwa or the Absolute Pure Being; in all
Avasthās It exists invariably and inexorably as of the very essence of Kūtastha (perpetually immutable) Nitya (eternal) Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) ; we get a Viparyāsa or false, contrary knowledge (misconception) to the effect - “In the deep sleep cognition (consciousness) has vanished ; in the waking and the dream It manifests Itself” - as a result of our imagining an Upādhi or adjunct in Ātman because of our Avidyā. In addition, there exists in us, quite deep-seated too, the Viparyāsa to the effect that - “Avasthās are three in number”. Assuming the Māyāsaṅkhyā or magical illusory numericals of three as applied to the macrocosmic forms of Ātman in the three Avasthās only this Shuddhātman or Absolute Self (Pure Being-Consciousness) is called ‘Turiya’ - that is all.

THE METHOD OF VIPARYĀSAKSHAYA OR GETTING RID OF MISCONCEPTION

Although the Turiya Swarūpa is perennially existing (as our very essence of Pure Being-Consciousness), as and when the Ajñās or ignorant people, who have not been (till then) able to cognize by means of their intrinsic Intuitive Experience (Sākshāt Anubhava), falsify, sublate the superimpositions (Adhyārāpās) one by one, they keep on approaching the Turiyaprapti (attainment of Turiya), in the following order :

(i) Because they are associated with (attached to) the ‘I’ concept (Pramātrurūpa) conjured up by misconception (Adhyāsa), the macrocosmic Vishwa and Taijasa Ātmans are affected by Anyathāgrahaṇa of the nature of seeing duality ; when, in the Absolute sense (Intuitively), the Chinmātraswarūpa or the essential nature of Pure Consciousness which is the Witnessing Principle (Sākshi) of the respective Avasthā is Itself cognized as his own Self, that Svapna Viparyāsa of the nature of Dvaitadarśana will be on the wane.

(ii) Although from the standpoint of the waking and the dream the Agrahaṇa of the nature of ‘not seeing the duality’ exists in deep sleep, even therein because that Chinmātra which is the Witnessing Principle is verily his Self, when the cognition (Intuition) of the type - “I do not have either Grahāṇa (comprehension) or Agrahaṇa (non-comprehension)” - accrues, then the Nidrāviparyaya of the nature of Agrahaṇa will get ematiated.
(iii) Although the embodied selves (Sharīrātmas) who appear in the waking and the dream, in their apparent forms, are seen in different, distinctive forms, when the cognition of the type - "For all the conglomerations of bodies and senses etc. (Kāryakaraṇasaṅghāta) which appear in the waking state Vishwa alone is the Ātman, while for all conglomerations of bodies and senses etc. which appear in the dream state Taijasa alone is the Ātman" - accrues, then the Svapna Viparyāsa of the nature of Anekātmagrahāṇa (misconception of seeing many selves) will be got rid of.

(iv) Although the division, difference of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña Ātmans due to the association with different Upādhis of waking, dream and deep sleep states, respectively, is being seen, when the Intuition of the type - "In their Pāramārthikarūpa or Absolute essential nature devoid of any Upādhis whatsoever, all of them are really one and the same Self" - is attained, then the Svapna Viparyāsa of the nature of seeing the distinctions of Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña Ātmans will be destroyed.

(v) Although seen from the waking viewpoint it appears as if the waking, the dream and the deep sleep states are different as also are real, when the Intuition that they mutually digress from one another (Anyonyavyabhichārita) accrues, then the Svapna Viparyāsa of the nature of the comprehension of the reality of the difference among the three states (Avasthātrayabheda-satyatwagrahānārūpa) will get destroyed.

(vi) Although for the non-dual solitary Ātman, who is the Witness for the three Avasthās, from the viewpoint of the Pramātru or 'I' notion, Sadvitiyatwa or being endowed or associated with duality, manifoldness is seen, when the Intuition that - "The three Avasthās are false appearances only; because Ātman exists everywhere in His essential nature of Pure Consciousness alone He is verily Turīya who is non-dual Pure Consciousness indeed" - accrues, then the Svapna-Viparyāsa of the nature of the comprehension of a Selfhood endowed with duality (Sadvitiyatmatwagrahāna) will get diminished.

Thus Svapna of the form of Anyathāgrahaṇa and Nidrā of the form of Agrahaṇa - both these are actually Viparyāsas, and hence when they are destroyed by the adoption of the method of Adhyārōpa-Apavāda as described above the Jījñāsu attains
Turīyapada alone. Although Turīyatman is Nityaprāpta or eternally attained, by means of Viparyāsakshaya this Prāptaprāpti is attained.

अनादिमायया सुक्तो यदा जीव: प्रवृत्ये ।
अज्ञानिन्द्रप्रस्तवनप्रदेहु चुच्यते तदा ११९६।।

Meaning: “When the Jīva, who is sleeping as a result of beginningless Māyā or illusion wakes up, then he cognizes the non-dual (Self) who is Aja (birthless), Anidra (sleepless) and Asvapna (dreamless).”

TURĪYAPĀPTI MEANS ROOTING OUT THE ANĀDIMĀYĀSVAPNA ALONE

The Intuitive Knowledge (Jñāna) of the Turīyaswarūpa or essential nature of Turīya which is the resultant of Viparyāsakshaya mentioned in the previous Kārikā is expounded here.

Jīva, who is a Samsārī (transmigrating soul) seeing two types of Māyā Svapna or magical, illusory dreams of the types - Bijanidra of the nature of Tattwāgrahaṇa and of the nature of Anyathāgrahaṇa of which the resultant fruits are dream and deep sleep; and begetting waking and dream which are the effects of Avidyā, he is seeing various kinds of Viparyāsarūpa Svapnas in the manner - “This man is my father, this one is my son, this one is my grandson; this is my farm, house, money, wealth; these are my employees, this is my granary and this is my cattle wealth - etc. - all these are mine; by means of these I am secure and strong, by these I am doomed.” Thus this belief, concept of the Jīva being a Samsārī is a Svapna or dream projected, conjured up by beginningless Māyā. All this is the resultant fruit of Avidyā of the nature of Agrahaṇa and Anyathāgrahaṇa alone, and not anything that is really existing at all.

When an extremely compassionate or kind-hearted Āchārya (preceptor) who has gained the Intuitive Experience of the Vedāntārtha or the Reality taught by the spiritual science of Vedānta awakens this Jīva with spiritual instruction of the type - “Oh dear, you are not this Kartru (agent of action) or Bhoktru (enjoyer) who keeps on performing righteous acts (Dharma) and unrighteous deeds (Adharma) and experiencing pleasure (Sukha) and misery (Dukkha); you are verily the Tattwa or the Reality
which is *Paramārtha* or Absolute, Transcendental; get up, become wakeful, why are you muttering in sleep?" - then to this Jīva will accrue this waking called *Turiyajñāna*.

**TURIYĀTMA SWARŪPA**

Then, (at that stage of spiritual progress) what is that Intuition or cognition that will accrue to the seeker? It is:

(a) This Ātman is Aja or birthless; He is Kūṭastharūpa or of the very essence of Absolute immutability devoid of any changes either internal or external; (b) how is He Aja or birthless? Because, He is devoid of Bijanidra which is the root cause for changes like birth, death etc. and hence He is Anidrā (sleepless). Because Turiya is eternally of the essential nature of Chitprakāsha or self-luminary, self-effulgent Pure Consciousness, He is perpetually, perennially devoid of sleep, is it not so? Even when Agrahaṇa (non-comprehension) was superimposed upon Him, He was the Witnessing Principle (*Śākshi*); that sleep could not be defined or described as either His Swarūpa (essential nature of Being) or something other than Himself and was, in fact, existing as of Mithyārūpa or a false nature. Even then, in the ultimate analysis or absolutely speaking, the essential nature of that sleep also was Ātman alone (i.e. Pure Being-Consciousness); (c) now especially when considered from the standpoint of this Swarūpa, He is eternally devoid of sleep, and for that reason alone He is Asvapna. From Bijanidra, of the nature of Agrahaṇa, alone the dream called 'Anyathāgrahaṇa' is caused or projected, is it not so? When seen from the viewpoint of the Reality it amounts to determining that there is nothing like sleep at all; and so where can there be any scope for the existence of Svapna or dream? (d) thus because He is Anidrā and Asvapna alone, we have stated previously that He is Aja, to wit, devoid of mutations like birth, death etc. It being so, He is Advaita or non-dual. In Him duality of any variety, viz. *Sajātiya* or belonging to the same species, *Vijātiya* or belonging to another species, or *Svagata* or inherently within oneself - does never exist even the least bit. Thus in this manner when the twin Viparyāsas (misconceptions) of Avidyā of the *Jijñāsu* (seeker of the Ultimate Reality of Ātman) are got rid of, he is said to have been 'awakened' and thereby cognizes the Absolute Reality of his Self.
EVEN THIS VIPARYĀSAKSHAYA IS REFERRED TO ONLY FROM THE VYAVĀHĀRA DRISHTI

We should not anymore entertain any misconceptions like:
(i) Because it is said that—"Jīva is asleep by virtue of ‘Anādīmāyā’ or beginningless illusion"—this sleep is, in the Absolute sense, exists from time immemorial; (ii) because it is stated that—"When the Jīva wakes up"—this waking of the nature of Jñāna has perforce to accrue in a particular period of time in the future; (iii) because it is mentioned that—"Then he Intuits Advaita or non-duality which is Aja, Anidrā and Asvapna"—at a particular point of time this Turiyābodha or Consciousness of Turiya accrues. For, Turiya (the Absolute Reality beyond the three Avasthas and hence called ‘the fourth’ relatively here) is not at all related to empirical categories like time-space-causation; when even Avidhvritta itself is Kālātita or beyond time, how at all can there be any relationship whatsoever of time for Turiya? Because the categories of time-space-causation being projected by virtue of Avidyā are mere appearances which are ‘Māyārpavishesha’ or with forms having various special characteristics totally illusory in nature, events like Janma or birth, Nāsha or destruction, death etc. which occur depending upon those time-space-causation categories have necessarily to be Māyārūpa or of the nature of illusion alone. This conclusion becomes unavoidable, is it not so?

Therefore, when we consider from the Paramārtha Drishti, time-space-causation concepts, and Janma-Nāsha which occur depending upon them—all these are Svapna or a dream indeed; because Jīvatwa or soulhood is Svapna, whatever he (Jīva) is conceived of having like—Viparyāsa-jñāna (wrong knowledge), Samyajñāna Utpatti (attainment of correct Knowledge of Reality) and Anādīmāyāsvapna Nāsha (destruction of the dream projected by beginningless illusion, magic)—all these are phenomena which are invariably susceptible to be sublated without doubt. The true Intuition (that is propounded by the Vedāntic spiritual science) is: “This Jīvabhāva or concept, deep-seated belief of soulhood is never there for me; concepts like Agrahaṇa and Anyathāgrahaṇa which have to be destroyed never existed, do not exist even now, nor can they possibly exist in future too; when these rudimentary categories of time-space-causation
are themselves not existing at all; which is that Ajñāna or ignorance that has to be got rid of? And which is that Jñāna or Intuitive Knowledge that has to accrue? Therefore, what has been stated here as ‘waking up from Māyāsvapna’ is undoubtedly from the Vyavahāra Drṣṭī alone; this conclusion is to be drawn.

Meaning: “If the world of duality really existed, then it might vanish; no doubt about it; this Dvaita or duality is Māyāmātra or mere illusion; from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality Advaita or non-duality alone is sustained.”

ĀTMAN IS ETERNALLY NISHPRAPAṆCHA (DEVOID OF THE WORLD OF DUALITY) AND KUṬASTHĀDAVITA (ABSOLUTELY AND IMMUTABLY NON-DUAL)

(i) Some Advaita adherents without reckoning the real import of the Śruti statement that - “Ātman is Prapaṇchōpashama, Shānta, Shiva, Advaita” - is nothing but Ātman’s Nityasiddhaswabhāva or eternally established essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness have opined that - “After obtaining the Jñāna taught by the Śāstra, a new, fresh Jñāna called ‘Sākshātkaśāra’ has to be attained and only then the world of duality will vanish.” This is an erroneous understanding on their part.

(ii) Some others believe that - “After the Vākyajñāna or knowledge arising out of hearing the sentence the seeker should necessarily practise Upāsana or mental meditation and by means of Upāsana alone the Paramapurushārthā or the ultimate goal of all human endeavour, existence can be achieved.” This doctrine has been refuted in the third chapter - ‘Advaita Prakaraṇa’ - of this treatise.

(iii) Yet some others have imagined that - “Even after Ajñāna is removed by Jñāna, its menace is unavoidable; in order to completely get rid of Ajñāna, Sādhanas like Prasaṅkhyaṇa etc. are to be practised.” This theory will be refuted and the problem solved convincingly at the end of the second chapter - Vaitathya Prakaraṇa.

(iv) But so many others aver that - “Because even after the
dawning of the Vākyajñāna, this Dvaitaprapāṇcha continues to exist invariably, Ātman cannot attain the cognition of Advaitatattwa. Therefore, for the purpose of Prapañchavilaya or dissolution of the world of duality there still remains a Sādhana to be necessarily practised."

Now we will show the defects in their doctrinaire, dogmatic theories:

What is meant by Prapañcha? Is it the really, actually existing duality, diversity? If so, then it is very clear, evident that it is not possible at all to drive it out of existence by any means or practices (Sādhhanas) - whatsoever they may be. For, what really exists can never go out of existence. If it is contented that - "Existing things or material objects are being destroyed, is it not so?" - then it is to be understood that in this case it is not an absolute destruction without any residue of or unaccompanied by any concomitant ingredients (Niranvayanāsha). When we say that a thing or material object is destroyed, it means, in the ultimate analysis, that the matter comprising it has undergone a transformation only, not that it totally became essenceless. If we break-up a wooden chair, it becomes actually some wooden pieces; if those pieces are burnt, then they assume the form of ash etc. Even if this ash is put in water and then it is stirred up, the ash particles invariably remain in a subtle, invisible form in that water. Why say more? Even when this whole visible, manifest world of duality is said to be destroyed at the time of the annihilation of the universe (at the time of the Kalpa) by the Śrutis, the Smritis and Purāṇas or the mythological texts, they purport to say that they remain in a subtle, potential state of 'Avyākṛta (unmanifest) Nāmarūpa (names and forms)' and time after time they once again get manifest as the world of multiplicity, diversity called 'Vyākṛta Nāmarūpa Prapañcha'. Therefore, to say that an existing world is to be made 'Vilaya' or totally extinct, essenceless is opposed to our empirical experience, it is also opposed to logic.

Even so, if these disputants persist in saying that - "This world of duality, diversity can be made 'Vilaya' by some sort of a Sādhana" - then, it will have to be unavoidably accepted that so far no one has by means of such a Sādhana attained Mukti or Liberation. For, if any one person had dissolved, an-
nihilated (Vilaya) the world without leaving any remnants whatsoever, now we could not have possibly seen any world at all. It is not like that at all, is it not so? Therefore, it is proper and tenable to say that - “An existing world of duality can never be made ‘Vilaya’ by anybody.”

In that case, how is it proper, reasonable for Shri Gauḍapāda to have said - “The Prapañcha projected by Avidyā can be destroyed by Vidyā” - ? Has he not stated that - “If the Anādimāyā Svapna of the nature of Agrahaṇa, Anyathāgrahaṇa is done away with (Kshaya) the seeker attains Turiyajñāna or swarūpa” ? - Thus anyone may raise an objection. We have already given a satisfactory solution for this objection. Though from the Vyavahāra Drishti this Avidyā and its Avidyākārya Prapañcha, meaning the world conjured up or projected as an effect of that Avidyā, are appearing at present, they do not in reality exist. This entire Dvaita is Māyāmātra or mere illusion; really, absolutely existing Entity is Advaita or non-duality alone. This alone is the philosophical teaching (Siddhānta).

THERE DOES NOT EXIST PRAPĀ Crafting ; NOR THERE IS ITS NIVRUTTI (RIDDANCE)

Therefore to believe that - ‘Prapañcha really exists’ and then to reckon that - ‘By means of a particular Sādhana it has to be dissolved’ - both these concepts are wrong. The ‘Nivrutti’ of the world of duality does not mean its disappearance. For, in deep sleep the world is not seen by any one of us; even so, it once again becomes visible, appears. Therefore, real ‘Prapañcha-pravilaya’ or ‘perpetual dissolution of world’ means only ‘Māyāmātra’ or merely as a false appearance and to cognize the falsity of this world in the manner - “This is merely a false appearance (of duality); apart from my Swarūpa or essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, it does not exist by itself (independently)” - alone.

Those who believe (quite persistently) that - “There exists a Prapañcha in Ātman ; however, it will be ‘dissolved’ or ‘removed’ by a particular kind of Sādhana” - should first get rid of this ‘Bhrānti’ or delusion, misconception by deliberating (Intuitively) on the illustrations, figurative analogies, like the ‘Nivrutti’ of rope-snake and ‘Māyā Nivrutti’ or falsification of an illusory
vision cast on people by a magician. This discriminative exercise has to be repeated mentally so as to comprehend the possibility of falsification or sublation of a mere superimposition on Ātman Consciousness. Take for instance the example of the rope-snake. The 'snake', which we have imagined, conceived in the rope by our deluded mind, does not really, actually exist during the time of its appearance and then by means of the true Jñāna or realization, cognition to the effect - “This is only a rope” - that ‘snake’ does not disappear. For, there never existed a snake at any time. In the same way, by mesmerism or hypnotism those objects or phenomena which a magician may conjure up externally like an elephant, or any other wild animal so as to be seen by all the onlookers actually do not exist at that time, nor do they disappear after the magician withdraws or removes his magical spell.

All false appearances - of whichever objects they are the projections, i.e. mental images viewed as objective reality - exist at all times in the actual form of that substrate-object alone; in the forms in which they appear they do not at all really exist, nor later on do they disappear or become extinct also. In the same manner, the phenomenon of the world too - because it is also misconceived in Ātman (Pure Being-Consciousness) due to Ajñāna (a lack of Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) - really exists at all times, nay eternally, as Turiyātmarūpa alone. In its form of appearance it never exists whatsoever, nor does it disappear or get dissolved also.

With regard to the subject-matter indicated by the Kārikā: “If the world existed, then it was possible for it to disappear” - some disputants have raised a doubt of the type - “If it existed, could it vanish? It is proper to say that what exists that entity does not get destroyed, is it not so? Why did the Kārikākāra write in this manner which is quite opposed to universal experience? ‘If it existed, it would have disappeared; because it does not go, it does not exist’ - such a (ridiculous) statement which discriminating (wise) person will utter?” This is the doubt. We have already provided a satisfactory solution to this. In our workaday world the really existing things or objects may be subject to a transaction of the type - “Now they exist; but in a few days they may get destroyed.” With regard to mere false
appearances no one deals in the manner - “They exist’ - or “They get destroyed.” Similarly, because this duality also, from the Absolute standpoint (Paramārtha Drīṣṭi), a false appearance (misconception) only, to reckon in the manner: “Only after (an actual event or occurrence of) the world of diversity totally disappearing or being destroyed, Ātman becomes or is rendered, as it were, Nishprapañcha or devoid of a world of multiplicity” - is wrong indeed. It is affirmed in the Kārikā that -“All of us are eternally, perennially devoid of the world of multiplicity.” Therefore, here in this context there is no scope whatsoever for any doubt.

विकल्पो विनिवेत्तेत कल्पितो यदि केनचित्।
उपदेशादर्थ बादो ज्ञाते द्वेते न विद्यते।

Meaning: “If this misconception were entertained by anyone, then it might have disappeared, destroyed. This theory is meant for instruction only ; when it is signified, there is no duality at all.”

ESPECIALLY THE DIVISIONS OF ŚĀSTRA, PRECEPTOR, DISCIPLE DO NOT EXIST IN ĀTMAN AT ALL

Now yet another doubt: “In truth, Ātman is of ‘Nitya-shuddhabuddhamukta’ essence of Being ; in Him there does not exist any world of duality whatsoever. To those who are seeing a dream because of ‘Anādi Māyā’ there is a ‘Viparyāsa’ of the type - ‘I am experiencing Avasthās of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti’ - caused by the Kārya-Kārāṇa Avidyās. By means of Tattwopadesha when the right knowledge accrues, they will get established in the essential nature of Pure Being of Ātman realizing in the manner - ‘Nishprapañcha Türīyātman Himself am I ; I am Aja, Anidra, Asvapna’ - this in essence is the doctrine that has been enunciated so far, is it not so ? If it is so, then to the extent of - the Śāstra and the Āchārya who propound the teachings and the disciples who receive that spiritual instruction, teaching necessarily being there for this empirical transaction - at least, there will have to be perforce duality, is it not so ? If you do not accept at least these distinctions of Śāstra, preceptor etc., then your transaction of the type - ‘From such and such a Śāstra or from such and such a preceptor I attained this Nirvishesha Advaita Jñāna’ - will be also rendered false, unreal only. Is it not so ?”
The solution for this doubt is: These concepts of Śāstra, preceptor, disciple are not akin to the world of duality, multiplicity that the ignorant people have misconceived in Ātman. In fact, no ignorant persons have misconceived these in Ātman at all. On the other hand: This distinction or differentiation of Śāstra, Āchārya, Shishya has been (deliberately) superimposed (Adhyātānīpita) in Vedānta especially for the purpose of spiritual instruction (Upadesha). That is all. When a big building is being constructed the workers erect a scaffolding all around the walls, but when the structure is completed they remove the scaffolding, is it not so? In the same way, this differentiation of Śāstra, Āchārya and Shishya is conceived from the viewpoint of Adhyātānīpita (superimposition) deliberately for the purpose of spiritual instruction. Both the Śāstra or the preceptor who teach the Ātmātattva to the ignorant people do so in the manner - “You are a Shishya, I am (the Śāstra) Āchārya or Guru; you do not know the Reality, I will teach you. This entire world is misconceived in Ātman. If you cognize this truth, then you are That eternally non-dual Ātman alone” - in this manner the preceptor instructs. For those who instruct about the Ultimate Reality of Ātman, Brahma, because the Intuitive Experience of the type - “All duality or diversity is indeed Mithyā or unreal, false; its real essence of Being (Swarūpa) is Ātman alone” - invariably is established in them, this deliberate superimposition of differentiation will not be responsible for their (apparent) Samsāritwa or transmigratoriness. While in the game of Chess the pawns are being assumed to be ‘elephant’, ‘camel’ etc. and are dealt with as such various symbolic representations, although the players very well know the reality in the manner - “All these pawns are wooden figures; this one is not really an elephant, nor is that pawn a camel” - merely for the sake of the sport (recreation) they carry on this transaction of assuming the various pawns as ‘an elephant’ or ‘a camel’ etc., in the same way, the omniscient Śāstra (Veda) or Āchārya, knowing full well the Ultimate Reality behind this apparent phenomenon of the world of duality alone, are carrying on the Vyavahārik (empirical) dealings of Śāstra, Shishya etc. Therefore, the fact that - “These (deliberate superimpositions) are not at all misconceptions which are the resultant effects of Ajñāna, nor is there any need for their removal, dissolution” - will
become clear merely by cognizing (Intuitively) the Turiyātmata.  
"For the statement - ‘After cognizing, there will not be Dvaita or duality’ - the meaning is not at all - ‘Earlier there existed duality’; when the Intuition accrues - ‘This thing did not exist at any time at all’ - this truth also will become quite evident” - In this manner alone that statement has its ultimate purport.

**IF ONE PERSON GETS LIBERATED (MUKTA) UNIVERSALLY EVERYONE DOES NOT ATTAIN MUKTI**

As a result of the above explanation one more doubt will raise its head here. That is : “If one Jīva by means of the spiritual instruction attains the Jīna, the entire world or universe will, as a consequence, get dissolved, and then all the Jīvas have necessarily to attain Mukti or Beatitude, is it not so ?” - in this way, the ignorant people may doubt ! But, in the ultimate analysis really there is no Dvaita at all ; in the Absolute sense the non-dual Turiyātman alone exists. When seen from this Intuitive transcendental viewpoint there is no room for the above doubt at all. For, the doubting Thomas who thinks in that manner with that parochial viewpoint himself would not remain then. On the other hand, considering the issue from the Vyavahāric viewpoint, just as (in the rope-snake illustration) if one person who has misconceived a rope to be a snake gets rid of his false notion, there will never be any impediment or restriction for another person to entertain a delusion of mistaking the same rope to be a snake, similarly even if one Jīva Intuits that he is Nishprapāñchatman, by virtue of the Avidyā that others have, that very Ātman keeps on appearing as Saprapāñcha or associated with a world of duality. From the Vyavahāra Drīshṭi, the Śāstra is instructing each and every human being separately ; but from Paramārtha Drīshṭi, there are no misconceptions whatsoever even of the Śāstra, Āchārya and Shishya. Especially to doubt in the manner - “Even when one particular Jīva is Liberated, still other Jīvas, many in number beyond count being there, it becomes imperative for each and every person there will have to be perforce a separate Avidyā and thus it will amount to saying that there exist many Avidyās, is it not so ?” - is truly ridiculous. For, in the doctrine that - “Though in the Absolute sense (to wit, seen from the Intuitive Experience viewpoint), Advaita or non-dualism alone exists, by dint of Avidyā
alone duality is misconceived and appears” - even the surmise of a phenomenon of Avidyā existing is itself conjured up by Avidyā alone. It being so, to conjecture Avidyā, which is invariably the cause for all empirical transactions, to be ‘one’, ‘many’ (to wit, thereby involving and including it within the ambit of the empirical categories of time-space-causation which are themselves projections, nay products, of Avidyā) is inexcusable, stark ignorance indeed!

CONCLUSION

What is established by the deliberation carried out with regard to the Kārikās considered so far is: “Because in Ātman the world of diversity, multiplicity of the form or nature of an Avasthā does not exist in the least, in Him neither any Jīvatwa, which is itself a special characteristic of an experience within an Avasthā, nor any Īśwaratwa, which is of the form or nature of the Sākshi or Witness of any Avasthā, exists whatsoever. As stated in the Śruti - ‘अपरापर्यम् प्रभु’ - (Māndūkya Mantra 2) - this Ātman is verily Brahman alone, Nirupādhika (devoid of any adjunct), Nirvishesha (devoid of any special characteristics).

V MĀTRĀTRAYA KĀRIKĀS

UPANISHAD

Meaning : “This is the Self which is of the nature of the syllable ‘AUM’, in regard to its elements. The quarters are the elements, the elements are the quarters, namely the letter ‘A’, the letter ‘U’ and the letter ‘M’.” - (8)

“Vaishwānara, whose sphere (of activity) is the waking state, is the letter ‘A’, the first element, either from the root ‘Ap’ to obtain or from being the first. He who knows this, obtains, verily, all desires, also, he becomes first.” - (9)
Taijasa, whose sphere (of activity) is the dream state, is the letter ‘U’, the second element, from exaltation or intermediateness. He who knows this exalts, verily, the continuity of knowledge and he becomes equal; in his family is born no one who does not know Brahman” - (10)

Prajña, whose sphere (of activity) is the state of deep sleep is the letter ‘M’, the third element, either from the root ‘Mi’ - to measure or because of merging. He who knows this measures (knows) all this and merges also (all this in himself)” - (11).

Meaning: “Here these verses are found: If there is an intention of mentioning ‘Atwa’ or going, wandering for Vishwa, when it is assumed to be a Mātra or element - then the Sāmānya or genus of being Āditwa or first is Utkata or powerful, abundant; also the Āptisāmānya or genus of obtaining, fulfilment, completion is abundant.”

THE MĀTRA OR ELEMENT OF AKĀRA IN AUM(ŪM)KĀRA

Just as the Karikās which explained the Pādatraya Śrutis were considered so far, now we will take up for deliberation the Karikās elaborating upon Mātrātraya Śrutis. So far those Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña were expounded as Ātman’s three Pādas (quarters) giving predominance to the ‘named aspect’ of the pedagogic method (Abhidheyapradhāna). Now those very macrocosmic forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are being called and expounded as Ōmkāra’s (which is the mnemonic symbol for Ātman, Brahman) Mātrātrayas or three elements,
letters, giving predominance to the 'name aspect' (Abhidhānapradhāna method of teaching). On the earlier occasion just as Turīyātman Himself was in truth (in the Absolute sense) Paramātman who was not the 'named' or Abhidheya, and just as from the Adhyārōpa Dṛṣṭi (viewpoint of deliberate superimposition) only those Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājñā Pādas were superimposed for the nonce and later were sublated (Apavāda), in the same way here too it will be taught that Ōmkāra Itself in the Absolute Transcendental sense is the Paramārtha (Absolute Reality of Ātman) sans Abhidhāna; in It, only from the Adhyārōpa Dṛṣṭi, the elements (Mātras) of Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra will be superimposed purely for the purpose of teaching and eventually they will be rescinded (Apavāda). The elaboration of this teaching will be made later on while explaining the 24th Kārikā. Now the essence of Ōmkāra’s first element of Akāra will be signified.

As stated before, although Vishwa is really Turīya Himself, merely to facilitate its comprehension (by the Jijñāsu), it was conceived as Ātman’s first Pāda, quarter, in the same way assuming the Absolute Reality of Turīya as Ōmkāra - that very Vishwa alone - although He is verily Ōmkāra devoid of the divisions, distinctions of Abhidhāna and Abhidheya - is assumed to be the 'Akāra' form of the first Mātra or metre, element of the Ōmkāra merely to facilitate the Jijñāsu’s comprehension.

Even when assuming Vishwa as Akāra thus merely from the Adhyārōpa Dṛṣṭi, the seeker should perforce reckon it giving predominance to the two genera (Sāmānya) of ‘Āditwa’ (being first) and ‘Āpti’ (being all-pervasive) for Vishwa. Then it will be discerned that there is no difference whatsoever between Vishwa and Akāra. Just as Vaishvānara has pervaded the whole universe Akāra also, because the letter ‘A’ is itself attaining the forms of all Varnas or letters of the alphabet, is thereby all-pervasive. Just as for one who cognizes Turīyātma Vaishvānara is the first instrument or means (Śādhanā) of knowing, similarly for one who wishes to Intuit Ōmkāra this Akāra becomes the initial Śādhanā. Only after cognizing this first step, the other Mātras can be comprehended.
Meaning: "In the matter of comprehending Taijasa as identified with 'U', that is to say, when Taijasa's identity with a letter is apprehended, the similarity of excellence is clearly seen, and of being intermediary also is equally clear."

THE UKĀRARŪPA MĀTRA

Just as in the past it has been explained in the case of Akāra which is identical with Vishwa, here too in the same way the Ukāra is to be comprehended as identical with Taijasa.

Meaning: "In the matter of Prajñā's identity with the letter 'M', that is to say, when Prajñā's identity with a letter is apprehended, the similarity of being a measure is seen to emerge plainly, and so also does the similarity of absorption."

THE MAKĀRARŪPA MĀTRA

The Makāra which is identical, non-different from Prajñā should be understood in the same manner as we did in the case of the previous two Mātrās. Between the Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra which have been mentioned so far, on the one hand, and Vishwa, Taijasa and Prajñā, on the other, there does not exist any distinction whatsoever. The purport in calling Vishwa, Taijasa and Prajñā by letters or names like Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra, respectively, is to teach the doctrine that - "Just as from the Vyavahāra Dristi they (Vishwa etc.) are Abhidheya (nameables or named objects), similarly Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra are their Abhidhāna (names), respectively; in their true essence of Being per se there exist neither Abhidhāna nor Abhidheya whatsoever. If a person, who stands at the top of a well, transacts in the manner - "This well is so much deep", and if another person at the bottom of the well transacts in the manner - "This well is so much high" - these phenomena or concepts of height and
depth are not at all two realities, entities (to wit, as if they are two distinct objects) - here too it should be comprehended.

Meaning: “He who knows, with firm conviction, the common similarities in the three states is a great sage, worthy of adoration and salutation by all beings”.

Meaning: “The letter ‘A’ leads to Vishwa; so also the letter ‘U’ leads to Taijasa; and the letter ‘M’, again, leads to Prājña. That which is beyond the letters, there remains no attainment.”

THE BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MĀTRĀS

As we have explained so far, one who cognizes on the strength of Intuitive Experience (Anubhava) in the manner - “Between Vishwa and Akāra, between Taijasa and Ukāra and between Prājña and Makāra - comprehending the similarities (genera) between these pairs, just as a diamond expert examiner detects the real quality of the diamond after constant concentration in the manner - ‘This jewel which is shedding or diffusing brilliance hither-thither is one alone (to wit, self-effulgent); apart from it there do not exist any rays of brilliant light’ - and so, the entire mass or phenomenon of an Avasthā comprising both these Abhidhāna and Abhidheya is verily Ātman who is associated with the respective Avasthā only” - such a person will himself become Vishwa indeed. This meaning is indicated by the sentence - “Ākāra leads (such a person) to Vishwa.” This alone is the purport behind the invocatory verse (Mangala Slōka) of the Upanishad in which the Āchārya has stated that - “Vishwa has pervaded the Sthiracharasamīha (the conglomeration of movable and immovable phenomena) with His rays of Chaitanya or Pure Consciousness as also He enjoys gross pleasures.” One who Intuits the truth that - “This (Vishwa) alone is Taijasa and
Prajña; through them to cognize Ōṃkārātman He (i.e. Vishwa) is the first device. He is also ‘Ādi’ or the beginning” - will be led to Vishwa by Ākāra. In this manner by means of discerning Intuitively the ‘Ākāra Artha’ or real meaning of the first Mātra one who realizes the Ōṃkārātman will attain the Intuitive Experience in the manner - “I am verily Vaishwānara.”

In the same manner, comprehending the real import of the Mātrā “U”, if the seeker cognizes the truth that just as by the Utkarsha (excellence) of Akāra this Ukāra has arisen, similarly if the subtle aspect from Vaishwānara is excelled or sublimated (Utkarsha), then Taijasa alone subsists; just as Ukāra exists as an intermediate entity between Akāra and Makāra and is similar, identical with both of them, Taijasa also is identical with Vaishwānara and Prājña - if one merges Akāra in Ukāra and Vaishwānara in Taijasa - this Ukāra will lead such a person to Taijasātman; it enables him to attain the Intuitive Experience of the type - “I am verily Taijasa or Hiranyagarbha who is the in dwelling consciousness within the Svapna and who is Sarvaprapaṇcchopahita or having the whole universe as an adjunct.” In the same way, one who comprehends the similarity between Ukāra and Makāra by virtue of their Māna (measure) or Laya (merging, identity) as explained in the commentary on the Upanishad - to him this Makāra will help attain the realization or Intuition of the type - “I am verily Prājñātman, Avyākṛitātma, who is devoid of any time-space categories and the world of multiplicity, but who is having only the Karṇatwa (causation) as His adjunct.” Because Taijasa is, through Prājña, a doorway to Intuit Ōṃkārātman, He is the second Mātra. In the same way, for one who has merged Vishwa and Taijasa unto His Pure Being-Consciousness, Prājña Himself is verily the third Mātra of Ōṃkārātman.

Although in this Jāna Prakaraṇa or Chapter devoted predominantly to Intuition Upāsana (meditation which is Kartṛutantra and Avidyātmaka in its essence) is not relevant in the ultimate analysis, in a secondary sense, for the sake of low and middle class seekers it has been mentioned. This fact has to be remembered here.
VI PRAṆAVA KĀRIKĀS (Upanishad)

Meaning: "The partless Īm is Turiya - beyond all conventional dealings, the limit of the negation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Īm is thus the Self to be sure. He who knows thus enters the Self through his Self."

Anvēte śloka bhavati -

Omākar paḍaśa viśvāta paṭa maṭra n sangāya: I

Omākārān paḍaśa jātā na kīṭādipyā caiva devānū 

Meaning: "Here the following verses are found: One should know Īm, quarter by quarter; (for) there is no doubt that the quarters (of the Self) are the letters (of Īm). Having known Īm, quarter by quarter, one should not think of anything whatsoever."

PARAMĀRTHĀ ṪMKĀRAJÑĀNI IS A KRITAKRITYA;
DEVVOID OF THE DIVISIONS OF ABHIDHĀNA, AND
ABHIDHEYA THAT REALITY WHICH IS BEYOND ALL
EMPIRICAL DEALINGS IS VERILY ṪMKĀRA

Between the letter (Matra) of ‘A’kāra and the quarter (Pāda) called ‘Vaishvānara’ there does not exist any difference whatsoever; it should not be conceived that Akāra is the Abhidhāna (name) and Vaishvarana is its Abhidheya (the nameable object). Ūmkāra means the Turiyātman alone; Ūmkāra’s Matras means really the Turiya’s Matras only. Therefore, this Ūmkāra should be cognized quarter by quarter or letter by letter - both these mean the same thing. By the statement - “quarter by quarter one should cognize” - it means that if one Intuits deeply, Vishwa is verily Taijasa alone and that Taijasa is Prājña indeed. Finally, it has to be determined that Prājña in the ultimate analysis is really Turiya or Ūmkāra alone.

Thus for one who has Intuited (the Ultimate Reality of Ātman or Turiya or Ūmkāra) by this subtle process of merging (Laya) each quarter (Pāda) or each letter (Matrā) there does not
remain anything else whatsoever which has either to be cognized or performed (by way of a Sādhana). For, in the case of a seeker who has Intuited to culminate in his plenary experience (Anubhava) in the manner - “That Absolute Transcendental Reality (Paramārtha) which is Nityanirupādhika or perennially devoid of any adjuncts, Nirvishesha or devoid of any special characteristics, Abhidhānabhidheyaṭīta or beyond the distinctions of name and namable object and Nirvikalpa or devoid of any mental concepts alone is myself” - there is no possibility whatsoever of subsisting as either a Pramātru (cognizer) or Kartru (agent of action). Hence, he will remain without thinking about anything ; meaning, for such a Jñāni (Realized soul) there is no botheration or anxiety whatsoever to be caused either by any Ishtaprāpti (a desirable thing to be acquired) or AnishtaniVṛitti (getting rid of an undesirable source of misery). It is tantamount to this Ōmkāra Jñāni possessing no body at all (to wit, his Adhyāsa or misconception to the effect of his identifying himself as the body is sublated, falsified) and as a result there is no occasion for him to worry about endeavouring to acquire anything for the sake of his physical body or to do away with anything that is not desired. Because he cannot possibly have any Samsāritwa (transmigratoriness) - there is no possibility of his entertaining any botheration or anxiety of either attaining any fulfilment of a desired objective in other births (Janmāntara) or other worlds (Lōkāntara), or getting rid of any undesirable hardships. It further amounts to his having cognized everything that had to be cognized, as also having done everything that had to be done in this human existence.

युज्जीत प्रणवे चेतः प्रणवो ब्रह्म निर्षयम्।
प्रणवे नित्युकस्य न भयं च विचारते क्षचितः।

Meaning: “One should concentrate one’s mind on Òm, (for) Òm is Brahman beyond fear. For a man, ever fixed in Brahman, there can be no fear anywhere.”

प्रणवो द्वारं ब्रह्म प्रणवस्थ परः स्मृतः।
अप्रणवोनन्तरोद्भाद्योनपरः प्रणवोव्ययः।

Meaning: Òm alone is the inferior Brahman ; and Òm
alone is considered to be the superior Brahman. Ōṁ is without an inside and an outside, and without a front (effect), a behind (cause) ; and It is undecaying."

**ōmkāra which is Paramārtha (absolutely real) itself has become the forms of para brahman and aparā brahman**

Here the Intuitive Knowledge of Ōṁkāra is being eulogized. That ‘Apara Brahma’, which has been recommended in the Śruti by way of an injunction in the manner - “Meditate on It as associated with such and such qualities” - for the sake of low and middle class seekers, is verily this Prāṇava alone, this Ōṁkāra alone. That Parabrahma too, which has been expounded in the Śrutis in the manner - ‘Not this, not that’ - by refuting the names and forms misconceived because of Avidyā for the sake of the highest type of seekers, is verily this Ōṁkāra alone. This Prāṇava alone has been dealt with as Apara Brahma being associated with Upādhis (Sūpādhika) and as Para Brahma, being devoid of any adjuncts (Nirupādhika) in the Śrutis.

Because it has been stated in the Prashnōpanishad (Chapter 2) that - “Those who meditate on Para and Apara Brahmans through this Pratīka or symbol of Ōṁkāra attain the respective Brahmans” - this Paramārtha Tattwa or Absolute Reality also has been given the nomenclature of “Prāṇava” figuratively implying It.

If we observe It Intuitively, It is neither Parabrahma nor Aparabrahma. It has no cause, nor there exists any effect of It. Within It there does not exist anything else which belongs to another species ; externally to It also there does not exist anything whatsoever which is distinct or different from It. Therefore, It is Avyaya or without emaciation, degeneration ; for, there is nothing whatsoever which is susceptible to get emaciated either within or without It (Munḍaka 2-1-2). Akhaṇḍ-eka-Rasa Chinmātra or It is verily Pure Consciousness which is impertible, and of one and the same essence of Being, is it not so?

**सर्वस्य प्रणवे ह्यार्दिर्मव्यमनतस्तथैव च ।**
**एवं हि प्रणवं ज्ञात्वा व्यस्तते तदनन्तरम् ॥२२॥**

**Meaning:** “Ōṁ is indeed the beginning, the middle and
the end of everything. If Ṣmah is cognized in this way indeed, then only one enters It (attains identity with It).

**FOR COGNITION OF PRANĀVA IDENTITY WITH PRANĀVA ALONE IS THE FRUIT**

For all the phenomena which appear as if they are actually born - just like an elephant projected by mesmerism by a magician, like the rope-snake, like the water of the mirage and like a dream - this Pranāva alone is the birth (creation), sustentation and dissolution; in all these three Avasthas It remains in the essential nature of the Absolute Reality of Pranāva alone. One who cognizes in this manner immediately thereafter - without any lapse of time whatsoever in between - enters into that Pranāva. Or why should it be surmised that he enters into It? Here it should be discerned that in the Absolute sense the Intuitive Experience or Knowledge to the effect - “I ever exist as the very essence of that Pranāva” - is itself being dealt with in the conventional empirical usage of ‘entering into (Merging with).’

Meaning: “One should Know (cognize) Ṣmah to be Iswara seated in the hearts of all. The wise one who cognizes the Ţmāra as all-pervading grieves not anymore.”

**PRANĀVA ALONE IS PARAMESHWARA WHO IS SEATED IN EVERYONE’S HEART**

The seeker should cognize that - “Iswara Himself, who is lodged in the hearts of all the Jivas, who is the support, sustenance for memory and experience and who abides in the Antahkaraṇa - is this Turiyātman, this Pranāva who is the Witnessing Principle of that Antahkaraṇa indeed.” The Śrutis like - “This Deity who is this Vishvakarma or creator of this universe, Mahātma or great one is ever existing, dwelling in the hearts of people’ - (Śvetāśvatara 4-17); “That this Ātman Himself is the one who exists in the heart” - (Chhāndogya 8-3-3), as also the Smṛiti like - “Oh, Arjuna, Iswara dwells in the hearts of every creature” - (Gītā 18-61) are expressing this same opinion alone.
Thus the discriminative person (Viveki) who cognizes that Entity which pervades everywhere like the empty space (Ākāsha) is nothing but Ōṅkāra alone, being convinced at heart in the manner - “Lo, this Self of mine Himself is the Turiyātma, Pranava who is all-pervading indeed” - will never grieve at all. For, to the person who has cognized the all-pervasive non-dual Ātman alone to be himself, meaning, his very Pure Being-Consciousness, there does not exist anything else which becomes the cause for grief. Śrūtis like - “One who Intuits, cognizes Ātman does not grieve at all” - (Chh. 7-1-3) etc. are authoritative sources for this teaching.

Meaning: “The Ōṃ, without measures and possessed of infinite dimension, is the auspicious Entity where all duality ceases. He by whom Ōṃ is Known, is the real sage, and not any other.”

PRAṆAVA WHO IS AMĀTRA IS THE TURIYA WHO IS APĀDA

Now Shri Gauḍapāda is concluding his commentary on the last Kārikā as also the quintessence of the Upanishad:

This Paramārtha Tattwa of the form of Ōṅkāra is Amātra (devoid of letters, measures); to wit, It is devoid of the distinctive forms like Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra as also Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, which have been indeed (deliberately) superimposed, assumed in this Paramārtha or Absolute, Transcendental Reality alone. In order to teach, expound the truth of this doctrine alone the Śruti deliberately superimposed first these forms and later rescinds them.

This Reality is devoid of the Māstras themselves; besides, It is verily Anantamātra (of infinite, endless measures, dimensions) also. Because It is not comprehended either by the senses or the mind, there is no possibility whatsoever of associating any division or distinction of the type - “This entity ends here at this juncture or point” - to It.

This Prāṇava is the Upashama (extinction, cessation) of Dvaita or duality, multiplicity, to wit, It is devoid of either the
duality of the forms of divisions or distinctions of *Avastha* (state) and *Avasthāvanta* (one endowed with the state) or the duality of the forms of *Abhidhāna* (name) and *Abhidaheya* (nameable object). In It the *Dvaita Prapañcha Duḥkha* or the misery which is associated with the world of duality does not exist in the least; therefore, It is *Shiva*; to wit, It is of the nature of Paramānanda or supreme Bliss devoid of Sarvasaṃsāradharma or all the characteristics of transmigratory existence.

Only that person who has cognized that Ōṃkāra which is non-dual as mentioned above - he alone is a Muni and not any one else. “One who has attained the *Ātmajñāna* (Intuitive Experience or Knowledge of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness) and (at the same time) has achieved the *Nirāsa* or sublation, falsification of the *Anātmanpratyaya* or the concepts of not-selves without any residue or remnants whatsoever is sure to become a *Muni* (a sage); to wit, he will be one who has attained the *Mouna* (an attitude of silence, taciturnity) of the nature of *Ānanda* (Bliss) which is its fruit.” - (Brihadāranyaka 3-5-1) - thus the Śruti says. As stated in the Mahābhārata Udyoga Parva 43-60) ‘मौनान्त स मुनिनिर्मिति नारण्यवसननामविनः। स्वल्पकृष्ण तु भो वेद स मुनिश्रेष्ठ उच्च्यते॥’ - meaning, ‘Merely by silencing speech alone he cannot become a Muni, nor by living alone in solitude in a forest does he become a Muni; only that one who has cognized the essential nature of the Self will be called ‘Munishreshṭha’ or the best Muni.”

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VAITATHYĀ PRAKARĀNA

I. RELEVANCE OF THIS CHAPTER

In the Śruti Ātman is said to be “Prapañchopashama, Advaita.” In the Kārikās too it has been taught that - ‘ज्ञाते दृश्यं न विचित्रे’ - meaning, “If one Intuits (the Reality) then there does not exist any duality at all.” In the seventh Mantra of the Upanishad the Paramārtha Tattwa (Ultimate Reality of Ātman, Brahman) was first called ‘Brahman’ from the predominant standpoint of Abhidheya (nameable object) and then it was expounded that in that form of Turiyātman (the fourth Absolute Reality compared to the three macrocosmic forms of Vishvatma, Taijasātma and Prājñātma) there is no Prapañcha or world of duality (to wit, the variety of empirical transactions of the type) of seeing the waking or the dream or the deep sleep. In the same way, that same Tattwa being initially called ‘Ōmkāra’ from the predominant standpoint of Abhidhana (name) later it was taught that in that Ōmkāra devoid of Matras (letters, measures) there is no Vāk-prapañcha (duality of speech) of the type of Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra which was briefly described in Mantra 12. Thus the very spiritual teaching to the effect that - “No world of duality or diversity of the forms of Abhidhāna or Abhidheya does ever exist in whatsoever form in the Ultimate Reality” - was propounded in the Kārikās - ‘ज्ञाते दृश्यं न विचित्रे’ - (Kā. 1-18) and ‘इतप्रयोपयो स्व: शिवः’ - (Kā. 1-29). The doctrine of the Chhāndogya Upanishad of the type - “(That Paramārtha Tattwa) is the one and one only without anything else second to It” - (Chh. 6-2-1) is this very teaching indeed.

In truth, in the Āgama Prakarāna the explanation of the Absolute Reality has been made in accordance with the Śruti teachings alone. While signifying the Śruti teaching what has been taught in this Vaitathya Prakarana also has been pointed out at various places. For, what has been expounded in the Śruti as well as in the Āgama Prakarāna is mere ‘Āgama’ alone, meaning, taught in the traditional, conventional methodology of spiritual instruction. That Paramārtha (Absolute Reality) which is taught in that context as Turiyatattwa and also as Ōmkāra adopt-
ing, following the Sāmpradāyic (traditional) system - called Adhyārōpa Apavāda Prakriya - being our very Ātmā alone, It is Svataḥsiddha or self-established ; not having cognized It as It really exists, the common run of people quite naturally have superimposed upon It both the experiences of the three states of Consciousness like the waking, the dream and the deep sleep and ‘Abhidheya’ or namableness, objectivity. In the case of superior highly-qualified seekers, merely by mentioning before them this teaching that - “This Adhyārōpa or superimposition - to wit, the projected or conjured up form - does not exist really in Ātmā of the essence of Pure Being-Consciousness” - the purport of the Śrutī teaching is Intuited by them. But in the case of those for whom merely by such statement, enunciation the real import of the spiritual teaching does not become completely comprehended - for the sake of such seekers, with a view to clarifying those subtle teachings - this Prakaraṇa has been started. The previous Prakaraṇa (Chapter) was ‘Āgama-pradhāna’ or predominantly based on the Śrutī teachings as handed down from the teacher to the taught in a traditional manner ; now this second Chapter is ‘Upapatti-pradhāna’ or predominantly based on dialectical reasoning.

Although this Chapter is Upapattipradhāna in its approach and treatment of the subject-matter, it should all through be remembered that here not merely the logical devices or arguments (Yuktis) have been utilized, but here also an attempt has been made to explain, delineate the real import of the Śrutī teaching, as also the logical devices have been exemplified in consonance with the traditional Vedāntic methodology alone. How this difficult task has been undertaken effectively and efficaciously, we will point out at various places while explaining the Kārikās. In the Upanishad the Ātmā who has the adjuncts of the waking and the dream states was described with special characteristics of ‘सप्ताङ्गः: एकोनिविशतिमुखः’ - meaning, “One who has seven (macrocosmic) limbs, and 19 doorways.” - (Mantras 3,4). Because those special features have been stated to be common to Ātmā who is associated with adjuncts of the waking and the dream states, although from the Vyavahāra Drīṣṭi it appears as if those Upādhis (adjuncts) are different alone, in reality (i.e. from the Transcendental Absolute Viewpoint) both are similar (nay, identical) ; it
was indicated therein that for the waking state there does not exist any difference from or superiority over the dream state. How can that be true? It is known and accepted on all hands that "Waking appears to be real, while dream is false" - is it not so? In order to solve this doubt by first showing that both these states are identical in all respects and then with a view to clarifying the fact that waking experience is Mithyā or false (as much as the dream experience) - this Chapter has been started. For this reason alone, since this is 'Vaitathya' (i.e. waking too is false) 'Prakarana' - a Chapter which elucidates this fact - it can be said that a fitting name has been given to it.

II. SVAPNA VAITATHYA KĀRIKĀS

Meaning: "The wise declare the falsity of all objects in a dream because of the location of the objects inside (the body) and because of (their) contraction."

THE OBJECTS THAT APPEAR IN THE DREAM ARE FALSE BECAUSE OF INADEQUACY OF SPACE

"The Puṇḍitas or wise people indeed opine that because the objects which appear in the dream exist within (the body) those phenomena which appear outside and inside are both Vitatha (false), not existing in that manner." In this Chapter, showing that all that exists in a dream is Mithyā (false), it has been then undertaken to expound that just like the dream the waking too is Mithyā. For, some non-discriminating people think that dream too is real only. 'Although what is seen as the dream may be real, the phenomena that appear within it can never be real' - is the opinion of the discriminative people. The reason that has been adduced here in this Chapter in answer to the question - "How is it that they are not real?" - is: "Because they are inside." The purport here is that because all those things seen therein are within the body, they are all false.

Here there may arise a doubt: Just because they exist within a room those things like a pot, cloth, etc. which exist therein are not rendered false at all! Here in this present context
merely on the ground that they exist 'within,' can it be said that all the dream objects are false? A solution for this is: Because they are 'Samvrita' or confined within a small, inadequate space, they are false, unreal. The word 'Samvrita' means, 'that which is contracted, compressed'. The dream occurs within the body itself, is it not so? But, within that dream, all things like a mountain, an elephant and a big forest appear. If it were true that therein actually a mountain existed, how could they at all exist in a restricted place (space) within the body? What is the size or dimension of the body and what is the size, dimension of an elephant or a mountain (comparatively)? Therefore, because they appear to exist in extremely constricted place or space, it amounts to saying that those objects like an elephant, a mountain etc. are false appearances alone. A consolatory explanation of the type - "Therein he merely sees a mountain, but not that actually therein a mountain existed" - cannot be forwarded; for, therein it appears as though the viewer is on one side and the objects like the mountain, the elephant, the forest - etc. appear to exist in front. It being so, how can it be reasonable to say that therein one did not see a mountain, an elephant etc. at all? In any case, it amounts to saying that because of the fact that within a very restricted space both the dream and its phenomena are seen, those things must necessarily be false appearances alone.

This same opinion has been conveyed by Shri Bādārāyaṇāchārya in his 'Shārirakamimānsā' (i.e., Brahma Sūtras) by the aphorism - 'मायापार्वत्कालिकविज्ञाननिंदावत्' (3-2-3) - meaning: "The creation of the dream is merely magical, illusory; for, therein it is not completely, fully manifested." Material objects have necessarily to have the requisite amounts or proportions of time, space and causation for their existence, and they should not be destroyed or sublated - these are the pre-requisite conditions to be fulfilled if those objects are to be real, is it not so? But in the dream, for those huge objects like a mountain, an elephant or a forest to exist in reality there is no sufficient space within the body and this fact is very clear indeed. For the cart seen therein and for such other appearances, there do not exist the senses like the eyes etc. which are responsible or necessary for seeing them; nor do the raw materials like the wood and the
carpenter who can construct the cart exist therein whatsoever. Therefore, there is no proper cause for them at all; there is no sufficient time also; besides, all of them are sublated. All these details are being indicated in the next Kārikā. Hence, the statement that - "All the appearances seen in the dream are verily Mithyā or false, unreal" - is proper indeed.

देशान्तरण निर्माण न होते ।

Meaning: "Besides, one does not see places by actually going there, for the time is not long enough. Moreover, every dreamer, when awakened, does not continue in that place (of dream)."

FOR THE PHENOMENA OF THE DREAM THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT LENGTH OF TIME

In order to drive home the idea that - "Because there does not exist sufficient length or duration of time the dream phenomena are Mithyā (false)" - here another doubt has been deliberately raised and that is: "What was stated in the previous Kārikā, viz. 'Because the dream phenomena exist in restricted space they are false' - is not proper; after going to another place alone the dream phenomena are seen - why cannot we conceive in that manner?" Let us assume that - while sleeping at night only one sees a dream in which he has travelled to a distant forest and has been wandering about therein. At that juncture why can't we imagine that the dreamer actually, really goes to a forest away from the body? - This is the opinion of the questioner. He may doubt in the manner that - "Going out of this body he wanders about" - (Bṛhadāranyaka 4-3-12) - this statement of the Śruti is there to substantiate, is it not so? In that way, we may assume that the Jīva (actually) leaving behind the body only goes out somewhere, is it not so?

But that is not proper; for, there did not exist enough duration of time for the dreamer to go to a far-off place. There are instances of seeing a dream in which one, who is in an eastern region, is seen to have travelled to a northern region. To go to that forest from the eastern region by walk according to the actual time taken, several months will be needed to reach that
forest; can it be proper to imagine that by merely sleeping so much time had lapsed or passed? How at all will it be possible to accept that in one night he went to that far-off forest and returned also? Therefore, because there does not exist enough duration of time in the dream, to say that therein he has actually travelled to those far-off places is not tenable at all.

**ON WAKING UP, TIME AND SPACE CATEGORIES ARE SUBLATED**

There is yet another reason to conclude that in the dream one does not actually travel to a different place and sees the phenomena existing in that region. If one persists in saying that one who has slept at a place in the eastern region, had during the dream actually gone to a northern region - he should have woken up in the northern region only; but the real situation (ground reality) is not like that; he wakes up in the eastern region alone. Apart from this, one who has slept at night may dream as if he has wandered about in the forest during the daytime; if that alone was the reality, one who dreams that he has roamed about during the afternoon - if he suddenly wakes up at that instant, it should necessarily be afternoon only, is it not so? It is not at all like this in our common experience; getting up at that dead of night and remembering the dream experience of having travelled during the daytime, the person wonders at that queer experience. No one thinks that in such a small duration of time one whole day has passed and another night has arrived.

Another point: Let us assume that a person who slept at night sees a dream in which he meets his friend, who resides in another town, during the daytime and then wanders about in that town. If that person tells his friend - “I had come to your place in my dream yesterday when it was noon time and we had met at noon at this particular place” - does that friend say - “Yes, of course, I had met you there only” - and agree with him? No, not at all. Why even the person who had slept does not at all believe that he had really met his friend at that spot. Therefore, it amounts to saying that in this manner too there did not exist sufficient duration of time. In fact, the person who has slept and woken up believes in the manner - “All this is a mere dream,
not real." Hence, the dream was *sublated, falsified*. Especially for the Śruti - "Leaving behind the body, he goes to another region and wanders about" - the real intention, purport is not in the literal meaning at all; in fact, its real import should be understood to be: (Therein, in the dream) there does not exist any relationship with this (waking) body whatsoever; further, it appears as if we are roaming about at some place. Another Śruti sentence says: "Within his body alone, he is wandering about freely as he likes" - (Bṛihadāranyaka - 2-1-18); and this statement appears to be in full agreement with every person's experience too. Therefore, *in dream no one goes to any other place whatsoever; therein there existed another time series (or flow of time) indeed* - this alone is the correct interpretation and reckoning. It amounts to saying that quite in accordance with what we reckon in our Vyavahāra or workaday dealings as - "All that appears therein is a false appearance only" - it is proper to reckon that the dream phenomena are false, unreal alone.

अभावरथ रथां दृष्टे व्यायपूर्वक तथा।

वैतन्त्यं तेन वै प्राप्तं स्वप्न आहुः प्रकाशितम्।।

Meaning: "Besides, the absence of chariot etc. is heard of in the Upanishad from the standpoint of logic. They say that the falsity arrived at thus (by logic) is reiterated by the Upanishad in the context of dream."

**FOR THE DREAM OBJECTS THE PROPER CAUSES ALSO DO NOT EXIST**

The Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad says: "Therein the chariots do not exist; nor do the horses yoked to the chariot exist, nor do the roads exist; even so, he creates (therein) the chariots, the horses as also the roads. Therein pleasures, joys and raptures - none of these exists. Even so, he creates pleasures, joys and raptures. Therein there do not exist tanks, wells or rivers; even so, he creates tanks, wells and rivers" - (Bṛi. 4-3-10). Therefore, within the dream sufficient time and space do not exist; therein the relevant causes or conditions to cognize the objects and to perform acts do not exist. Because only after the senses like eyes, ears etc. have ceased to operate, the dream occurs, therein neither the senses nor the aids for eyes to see etc. like the brilliant stars,
sun, the moon etc. do not exist. Therein to manufacture things like a cart etc. neither the requisite raw materials like wood etc. nor the proper implements like a chisel, hammer etc. exist; then, wherefrom can the Jiva acquire the ability within such a short period of time to manufacture such things? Therefore, we have to assume that as a result of his respective Karmas the mental concepts, thoughts of seeing such phenomena arise for the time being to the dreamer. The objects seen in the dream are falsified as soon as the person wakes up - to wit, the cognition that they were not really existing is gained; not only that, in the dream itself the fact that one particular thing becoming an object for a different mental concept in the manner - "Not this, that thing" - is quite popular, familiar.

Thus assuming that which is universally familiar only, the Śruti is stating that - "Therein no chariots existed." If we observe deeply, the intention behind this Śruti statement is: Neither to affirm that in the dream material objects actually exist, nor that they do not exist - whatsoever. On the other hand, the Śruti, having corroborated, for the purpose of explanation only, that fact which is universally, familiarly known, viz. - that all the phenomena of the dream are false as known to all human beings - has begun to expound that therein Ātman is Svayaṁjyōti (self-effulgent, self-illumining). "Although in the dream there do not exist a body, senses, external objects or the illuminating brilliant objects like the sun, the moon etc. which are aids to the senses to perceive the objects, the Antahkaraṇa or internal instrument of the Mind alone has metamorphosed itself into the forms of all those phenomena. Now, because those mental concepts (Vṛittis) are being witnessed by Ātman by means of His self-effulgent Light of Chaitanya or Pure Consciousness, which is verily His real essence of Pure Being - He is Svayaṁjyōti Swarūpa" - thus to expound this profound spiritual teaching alone is the real intention behind the Śruti statement. Even so, the Śruti corroborating what is universally familiar as something materially, actually false, propounds that - "Whatever appears in the dream is verily false, unreal, but Ātman who illumines those phenomena is of the essential nature of self-effulgent Light." This fact has been pointed out by the Kārikākāra.
WHAT IS THE REASON FOR ESTABLISHING SVAPNA MITHYĀTVA OR FALSEHOOD OF DREAM?

Here a doubt may arise in the minds of the readers, and that is: No one ever thinks or believes that a dream is real. It being so, what was the reason for writing these three Kārikās to establish the tenet - "Dreams are false?"

The solution for this is: Certain dreams which are significant in their content do occur. The exponents of dream science opine that - "If a person gets a dream of such and such a nature, such and such a fruit will accrue." In fact, people often do express opinions that according to the dream significance they had certain actual experiences. Apart from this, many scholars of Vedic Knowledge do raise objections of the type - "A dream, which is created or caused by Īṣwara who is Satyasankalpa or whose volitions or wishes always become true, how at all can it become false, unreal (Mithyā)?" Some proponents of other philosophical systems too do adduce certain logical devices to assert that dreams are real and exemplify it by means of certain experiences also. If their proposition itself becomes the real, spiritual fact or truth (Siddhānta), then this Vaitathya Prakāraṇa itself will be rendered redundant, improbable. Hence, at the outset there arose a need for establishing the Svapna Vaitathya or falsity of a dream. In due course, we will examine the objections of these various theorists or proponents and demonstrate as to how their dogmas are without any worthwhile essence. For the nonce, assuming that the belief of the majority of the people that dreams are false has been proved on the strength of many Śruti statements as also logical devices (Yuktis), it will suffice if the teachings of the foregoing text are reckoned, discerned.

III JĀGRAT-SVAPNA EKATWA KĀRIKŅAS

अन्तःस्थानाय भेदानां तस्मान्ज्ञागिर्ते स्मृतम्।
यथा तत्र तथा स्वने संवृत्तत्वेन भिन्नते।

Meaning: “Therefore, (here too) the distinctions that exist in the waking, just as therein (i.e. within the dream) Vaitathya (falsity) is taught. But in the dream it is different because it is Antahsthāna (existence within the body) as also it is Samvṛita (contraction).”
AN INFERENTIAL METHOD TO DEPICT THAT WAKING IS MITHYĀ OR FALSE

Now Shri Gauḍapāda is endeavouring to establish, on the basis of the illustration of the dream, the teaching that waking too is Mithyā (false, unreal) alone. There is apparently no possibility of accepting in their literal sense either the first half or the second half of this Kārikā. If the first half Kārikā is translated literally, it means: “Therefore, because the differences are Antaḥsthāna or existing inside, they say - ‘in the waking’ -”; and for the latter half literally the meaning is: “Just as it is there, similarly in the dream, because there is Saṃvṛita or contraction, difference exists.” These sentences do not become meaningful, coherent at all. For, the concept that this verse (Kārikā) has the real purport of teaching that - “Just like the waking, the dream is similar” - becomes evident from these sentences; but, the actual situation empirically is opposed to this indeed. Only after it is established that a dream is false, this verse has been written, is it not so? Therefore, ‘Tasmāt meaning, ‘Thus because the dream is false’ - in this manner alone the meaning of this sentence has to be comprehended. According to the Bhāshya written by Shri Śaṅkara for this verse, the reconciliation will have to be understood in the manner: ‘तत्स्मात् यथा तत्र स्वप्ने तथा जागरिते भेदानि वैतत्त्वयः स्मृतम्। (स्वप्ने) अन्तःस्थानातू संवृत्तेन च भिन्नते।।’ - meaning: “There is a difference between the waking and the dream; the dream objects exist in a contracted space inside (the body) ; but in the waking it is not so. Even so, because the waking is just like the dream alone, those waking objects - just like the dream objects only - are false; thus the knowledgeable people say.” In this sentence, the one hurdle, difficulty in comprehending its purport is that the conclusion: ‘The dream is not like the waking; therefore, just like the dream the waking too is false’ - does not seem to be possibly rational. Here in this context Shri Śaṅkara has explained the real purport behind this sentence in the following manner:

जागृहृद्यनां भावानां वैतत्त्वयः इति प्रतिज्ञा। दृष्टत्वात् इति हेतुः। दृष्टत्वादुपर्यं इति दुष्टान्तः। यथा तत्र स्वप्ने दृष्टयानां भावानां वैतत्त्वयः तथा जागरिते: पिदृष्टत्वंविशिष्टमिति हेतुपूर्णः। तस्मात्जागरितेषु पिदृष्टयं स्मृतम् इति निगमनम्।
Meaning: “The objects which appear in the waking are false - is the Pratijñā (major promise) ; for, they are objects (for the sight) - this is Hetu (Logical reason) ; just like the phenomena seen in the dream - this is Drishtānta (illustration) ; just as the phenomena in the dream are false, in the same way it is so in the waking - this is Upanayan (application of Drishtānta - the fourth term in logic, syllogism) ; therefore, the objects appearing (seen) in the waking too are false - this is Nigamanam (conclusion). Existing inside and existing in insufficient, contracted space - are the two features that are distinct, different with regard to the objects of the dream. Being a phenomenon (object of sight), being unreal or false - are the features common to both the states.”

HOW IS IT JUSTIFIABLE TO GIVE DREAM AS AN ILLUSTRATION IN SUPPORT OF AN INFERENCE?

There is a possibility of a doubt arising, of the type - “In this inferential deduction utilizing dream as an illustration - is it proper ?” For this the consolatory explanation is : Viewed from the standpoint of the waking there are many dreams ; all of them are Antahsthāna or occurring within the body. They are, in fact, showing phenomena which appear to exist within the body in a contracted space. Because it is impossible for huge phenomena like a mountain, an elephant etc. to exist either within our body or within the subtle nerves in it, to say that they are mere false appearances is rational too. Therefore, giving the dream as an example in this context is quite tenable.

OBSESSIONS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO THE REASON MENTIONED IN THE BHĀSHYA

Now then, “What is the meaning for the reason given (in the Bhāshya) - viz. Because it is an object appearing ?” - this question has to be deliberated upon. (a) For this phrase - ‘because it is an object appearing’ - if it is interpreted as - ‘because it appears to the dream intellect’, then because the objects which appear to the dream intellect are really existing in the dream that cannot be the cause for Mithyātwa or falsehood here. Some
people may argue in the manner - "First of all because the dream intellect itself is false; because in the waking it gets sublated and because for the waking person the dream objects appear to be false alone - that cause is the proper one only; but because the dream intellect is not an object for the dream intellect itself, it becomes real alone since it is not a phenomenon objectified. Especially in the case of the waking objects, because they are not objects to the dream intellect the inference that they too are unreal or false will be wrong. (b) To say that - "A thing being an object to the waking intellect alone is 'Drishyatwa' or objectivity" - also does not become proper. For, in the waking all the phenomena of the dream have been sublated; because they (the dream phenomena) are objects to the memory (Smṛiti) which occurs in the waking mind (intellect), it does not at all become justifiable to adduce them as an analogy or illustration for the phenomena which are objects for the waking experience (Anubhava). (c) It is also not possible to doubt in the manner: "Merely being an object (Drishya) alone is the cause; the dream phenomena are objects for the dream mind, while the waking phenomena are the objects for the waking mind. In any case, being an object to the mind or intellect is the common factor for both the states, is it not so?" For, this cause does not attach itself either to the waking mind or the dream mind; to wit: whether it is the waking mind or the dream mind, neither of them is an object to any mind or intellect at all.

Apart from this, if it is contended that - "Drishyatwa or being an object (objectivity) is itself the cause (Hetu) for Mithyātwa (falsehood)" - then in that case it will have to be admitted that - Because in Śruti's like - ‘Ātman should be found out’ - (Bṛi. 2-4-5) ; ‘Brahman who is Aprameya or not an object has to be cognized in one and the same manner’ - (Bṛi. 4-4-20) etc. - both Ātman and Brahman have been stated to be ‘Drishya’ or object alone they too are false, is it not so?

To this doubt the answer is : The Sākshiprākāshyatwa or the self-effulgence or self-illumining capability of the Witnessing Pure Consciousness is Itselves ‘Drishyatwa’ or being an object - this alone is the real intended purport here. Sākshi (Witnessing Principle or Consciousness) is ‘Nityadrigrūpa’ or one who is perennially of the nature of a seer or witness; He alone is
witnessing the waking state just as He is witnessing the dream state. For this conclusion the Śruti also is a strong support. The Kāthaśa Śruti states that: “Having realized that great and all-pervading Self, by virtue of whom a man perceives the objects in both the dream and the waking states” - (Kaṭhāpanishad 2-1-4). Because in the present Māṇḍūkya Upanishad (Mantras 3 and 4) also it has been propounded that the Vaishwānara who illuminates the extroverted consciousness and the Taijasa who illuminates the introverted consciousness are both endowed with “seven macrocosmic limbs and nineteen microcosmic doorways” - that Ātman or Pure Consciousness alone is verily Sākshirūpa or the Witnessing Principle indeed. Ātman alone is, in truth, the Vaishwānara, who illuminates the waking, as well as the Taijasa, who illuminates the dream; because they are objects (Drishya) to that Sākshi the dream objects are not existing apart, separate from Him, and in the form they appear they are false; in the same manner, the waking objects too are objects to that very Ātman alone who is of the essence of a Witnessing Consciousness and hence they are false - we can surmise in this manner. If it is questioned in the manner: “If it is so, what will be the plight - of the Śruti which says that - ‘Ātman too is Drishya alone’?” - then, in that context the Śruti has to be interpreted to have the real intention of teaching that Ātman has to be comprehended to be ‘Adrishya’ or not an object, on the strength of one’s Intuitive Experience alone (Anubhava). For, the Śruti is preaching Ātman to be Adrishya first and then instructs the seeker to cognize Him to be Adrishya alone.

Some people have advanced an argument of the type - “Here because there is no motive of Drishyatwa whatsoever, we have to discard it and adopt a tenet like ‘संवृत्तं न भिज्जते’ in its place.” But the waking objects are not ‘Saṁvṛita’ or contracted; whereas in the case of the dream objects because they appear within the body alone one may even say that they are Saṁvṛita. Antahsthāna (being or existing inside), Saṁvṛitatwa (existing in a contracted space or region) - these two are the special characteristics applicable to the dream only. These two aspects cannot at all be made applicable to the waking objects. Therefore, it is proper to adopt the motive of Drishyatwa according to the Bhāṣyā interpretation.
(Objection) : In the present context the motive of Drishyatwa is not to be found in the verse also, is it not so ? Wherefrom did the Bhāshyakāra adopt this interpretation adventitiously ?

(Solution) : We have mentioned already a consolatory explanation for this. In the Śruti it has been propounded that in both the waking and the dream equally there exists an Ātman endowed with 19 doorways, is it not so ? Keeping that very teaching in mind here, it has been stated that Ātman illumines equally the Consciousnesses of both these states and because those two states are Dṛishya or objects* to Ātman both of them are equally false only. Hence, if these words are interpreted according to the Bhāshya statement, then the meaning intended by the Śruti will be discerned.

Here there is yet another secret teaching : Although Shri Śaṅkara has borrowed, as it were, the motive of Drishyatwa from the Śruti and has given it a form to suit an inferential methodology with regard to a Śruti sentence, to the effect that - "Just like the dream the waking too is false" - and written his commentary, in truth this is not an inference at all. For, if we deliberate upon the question as to who is it that witnesses theVyāpti or universal, invariable concomitance or pervasion in the manner - "Wherever Dṛishyatwa (objectivity) exists in all such instances there exists Vaitathya (a feasibility of inferring, concluding that it is false)" - then the waking Pramāṭru (cognizer) has not witnessed it at all ; for, the memory of the type - "Now I have come to the dream from the waking" - can never accrue to anyone. The fact that - "This universally-pervasive witnessing capability has actually accrued to the dream Pramāṭru" - also cannot be asserted ; for, that (dream) Pramāṭru is quite distinct, queer in essence, compared to the waking Pramāṭru ; for him therein adjuncts like body, senses, mind etc. are totally different indeed. No one has ever seen that dream Pramāṭru waking up in that queer form itself. Because there does not at all exist anyone who has witnessed the universal concomitance or pervasiveness (Vyāpti) in this manner, the undesirable (illogical) conclusion that - ‘One who infers in this way himself does

* (Please refer to the commentary on the verses 4-36 and 4-66 wherein the words ‘Chittadṛishya’ and ‘Taddṛishya’ are explained).
not exist - confronts him. Even so, it is quite familiar to everyone
that the memory of the type - “I was seeing a dream up till now
and now I have woken up” - is experienced by everyone.
Invariably accepting the Intuitive Experience of the type that -
“Because for this Ekatwajīnāna or unitary Intuitive Knowledge to
accrue there has to be perforce one and the same Kartṛu (agent
of action or ‘I’ notion), that Ātman who witnessed the dream
is Himself appearing in the form of the waking Pramāṭṛu ;
even so, He exists in His essential nature of Sākshi (Witnessing
Pure Consciousness) even now” - we can establish the truth
that - “In both the Avasthās Ātman exists equally (identically)
; because the Avasthās are false, their relationship,
association does not taint Him in the least.” We have to
discern that in order to teach this lesson alone Shri Gauḍapāda
has mentioned here ‘Antah-sthānatwa’ etc.

THERE IS NO DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN
WAKING AND DREAM

(Doubt) : Because of facts like - “Dream is a state which
occurs inside (the body) ; since it occurs in a contracted space
the objects which appear therein are false” - etc., was it not
earlier stated that there does exist a difference between the
waking and the dream?

(Consolation) : Yes, it was mentioned. That was suggested
for the sake of the common run of the people as a device to
enable them to cognize the Ultimate Reality of Ātman. If ob-
erved from the Absolute Intuitive viewpoint even that differ-
ence between them is not absolutely true. The Kārikākāra (Shri
Gauḍapāda) to whom both the states are equal has the ultimate
purport, intention of teaching, expounding the spiritual tenet of
- “Between these two states there does not exist any differ-
ence whatsoever.” For that reason only, he has composed this
verse to suit this his purport alone. To wit - ‘सत्यात् ज्ञातिरै भेदानां
वैत्यं स्मृतम्’ - meaning - “The knowledgeable opine that the
objects which exist in the waking are false indeed.” How is it?
- in answer (he states) : ‘अतःस्थानात्’ - meaning : “Because they
exist within one’s body.” (In support) it has been stated in the
Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa 2-8-10 that - ‘अतःस्थितित्र्ये लोकः। अन्ताविश्लेषिद्
Vaitathya Prakaraṇa

 ignorant - meaning: "All these beings exist within (Ātmā) ; the entire universe exists within (Ātmā)." Since this world is objectified by Ātmā (Pure Consciousness) we cannot say it is Ātmā ; since it is not seen apart from Him, nor is it seen existing independently by itself anywhere and hence it is not different from Him. Thus because the waking world - just like the dream world - cannot be affirmed to be either separate from Ātmā or identical with Him - both these states are equal in all aspects.

(Doubt) : In that case, saying (knowing) that the waking is false, was it proper to give the example of the dream ?

(Solution) : Here in this context, keeping in mind (assuming) the experience of the common people only the illustration of the dream (experience) is given as an example, but not with the intention of propounding, in the ultimate analysis or from the Absolute Intuitive standpoint, that both these states are of different natures in their essence per se. In truth, if it is examined from the Intuitive Experience viewpoint even the dream during the period of its actual experience in esse was being cognized as ‘waking’ alone. From the standpoint of that dream experience it also appears as if therein :- “Apart from this waking there exists a dream ; this dream occurs in a contracted space within the body.” It is true that to all of us it appears as if the dream is sublated in the waking. But when we are reckoning the dream as ‘waking’ within, that dream (within the first dream) which appears to occur within, also in the same manner is believed to be falsified indeed. Therefore, in reality there does not exist any difference whatsoever between the waking and the dream. This truth will be clarified in the following Kārikās.

Some people doubt in the manner - “In the Shārīraka Mīmāṃsā there is disparity, in that in Sūtra 2-2-29 what has been expounded as - ‘The waking objects are not like (i.e. similar to) the dream objects’ - is opposed to the explanation given here.” That is not proper. For, Buddhists, who have accepted the fact that there exists distinction between these two states alone, have proclaimed that in the waking too the external objects do not really exist. Their logical argument is not tenable ; for, they themselves have acknowledged dissimilarity between the two
states: This, in truth, is the purport behind the Sūtra. The Sūtrakāra (Shri Bādarāyanāchārya) has not stated there anything opposed to the present Kārikā.

THE IMPORTANT PURPORT OF THE KĀRIKĀ

In any case, we should not forget the fact that in this verse really taking inferential deductions alone in a predominant sense any teaching has been propounded. If this inferential deduction alone were true, then it will have to be assumed that the Parōkshajñāna or knowledge of something invisible, unknown of the type - “Waking has to be false just like dream” - alone will become the last word here in this regard. In whatever manner we may look at it, because the prime purport of this Prakaraṇa is indeed that - “In our Intuitive Experience we do not reckon any distinction whatsoever between the waking and the dream states” - it is not proper to determine that this teaching is mere inference. Even so, with the intention that the common people with ordinary intelligence should also attain an insight into this Intuitive Knowledge of the Absolute Reality, here in this context we have to discern that the Bhashyakāra (Shri Śaṅkara) has written the meaning of the verse in this form of an inferential proposition.

Meaning: “Inasmuch as the diverse things are (found to be) similar on the strength of the familiar grounds of inference, the wise say that the dream and the waking states are one.”

THE WAKING AND THE DREAM ARE EQUAL IN ALL RESPECTS

Now the author is signifying the fruit of the logical device of the form of inference which was mentioned in the previous Kārikā. The senses, the mind etc. which appear in the dream and the waking states are of the nature of Grāhaka (cognizing or comprehending instruments); both the objects and the Sukha (happiness, pleasure), Duḥkha (grief) that accrue from them are of the nature of Grāhya (objects of cognition). This familiar
reason is applicable to both the Avasthas.* "There does not exist any difference whatsoever between these two; hence, all the phenomena that appear therein are false alone" - are the features common to both. Because the dream too during the period it is seen appears as waking alone, for the two distinct phenomena of Ādhyātmika and Ādhibhoutika, which appear therein quite similar to the waking, there does not exist any difference whatsoever. From the standpoint of the Avasthā which we are calling 'waking' between these two, it is real and the dream is false; if we discern (Intuitively) as to how in these respective Avasthas these phenomena are appearing, then these two are equally false indeed. How this truth can be reckoned is clarified in the explanation of the meaning of the next Kārikā.

Meaning: "That which does not exist in the beginning and the end is equally so in the present (i.e. in the middle). Though they are on the same footing with the unreal, yet they are seen as though real."

BECAUSE THERE EXIST BEGINNING AND END FOR THE DRISHYAS (APPEARANCES) THEY ARE FALSE

The dream does not appear to us always; existing for a while, it disappears. We all have accepted it to be false. Therefore, because waking too appears and then disappears it becomes established that it is false alone.

Here a doubt: 'When the dream ends it is false, now we are really awake' - in this manner we clearly cognize: But just as the dream is sublated on waking, similarly we have not seen the waking being false and getting sublated in any other Avasthā. It being so, how at all can we accept both these states to be equal (in all respects)?

The solution for this is: The dream too during its period

* (To wit, 'Dṛishyatwa' is a reason which is invariably common to both; a more familiar reason is there viz. 'Grāhya-Grāhakatwa.' This fact has been mentioned here as a supporting device for Anumāna or inference).
appears as (real as) waking alone. From the standpoint of that dream, at that instant, it appears as though there is another dream within that (first) dream and that inner (second) dream appears as though it is sublated in the (first) dream which we have (then) believed to be waking alone. In the same way, just because from the standpoint of the state which we have at present believed, reckoned to be waking, the state which appears to be the dream within alone gets sublated - to believe that this state alone (indisputably) is the waking and that it never gets sublated is wrong. For, even when the dream within the (first) dream was sublated that (first) dream which had the other (second) dream in its womb, as it were, was then believed by us to be 'waking' alone, never to get sublated indeed. Even so, that (first dream) state is false now.

(Doubt) : This is not proper. For, even in the illustration mentioned by you, it amounted to saying that only the dream was the one which got sublated but not that the waking got sublated. In one night alone it is possible for many dreams to occur ; although they are different or queer each from the other, all of them eventually get falsified in the waking. But in the same manner, in one day alone many wakings do not occur nor do they get falsified at all ; is it not so ? Even if any one out of obstinacy maintains that - "This waking phenomenon too is a delusion; the belief that - all the objects that exist in it are really existing - is also a delusion" - because all the people have acknowledged the fact that dreams are many and the objects which exist in those dreams do not have any mutual relationship whatsoever, it amounts to saying that the spiritual (philosophical) teaching that - "Waking and dream are equal in all respects" - is rendered to be wrong alone, is it not so ?

For this the solution is : Whichever state that we reckon as a dream does not at all appear to be a dream at that time ; on the other hand, (during that period) all that dream is appearing as 'waking' alone. Observed from this standpoint, because all the states appear to be, then at that instant, waking alone - to determine the state which appears as waking to be not a dream - we do not have any proof whatsoever. Besides, just as the objects of the dream can never enter into the waking, in the same way the waking objects can never cross over into
the dream. The objects belonging to the dream world are undergoing changes during the dream time; but we cannot doubt in the manner - "The waking objects are steady, is it not so?" Although it has been determined from the standpoint of the physical sciences that the waking world is also undergoing changes, mutations every moment, we believe that it is steady, that is all. In the same way, we have believed that the dream objects during the dream time are steady alone; or, in the alternative, by virtue of certain changes that occur in the waking even if we believe those (waking) phenomena to be non-eternal we never reckon them to be false - in the same way, in the dream too we reckon that the dream objects are non-eternal only, but no one at that dream time reckons in the manner - "All this is false, for this is a dream" - at all. Therefore, in this respect too there does not exist any distinction whatsoever between the waking and the dream.

Another consideration: Just as the dream appears and then vanishes, in the same way the waking too appears and vanishes. While the special type of explanation for "अत्यन्तस्मानान्" was being given we had clarified the tenet that - "Both waking and dream exist in Ātman alone" - (Refer to commentary on Kārikā 4 above). What we have believed to the effect that - "The dream appears only for a short period, while the waking lasts for a long time" - is invariably from the waking viewpoint only. But whether it is the waking world or the time that appears to exist within it - they can never squeeze, or sneak in, into the dream world. This fact we will further clarify (in the commentary on the 14th Kārikā). It being so, because the state which we are believing (reckoning) to be waking also, just like the state which we are believing to be dream, is appearing and vanishing in Ātman alone, it is not possible for us to assume the literal meaning of the phrase - "in the beginning as also in the end" - and to apply or attach a time-bound chronological order of the type - "waking precedes, dream follows" - to the states. However in both the states, the awareness of the type - "The whole of the dream is sublated, while the whole of waking remains without sublation" - especially persists doggedly. But if observed Intuitively in order to detect as to which is waking and which is dream, we do not at all have any exclusive, uncommon
significance. Therefore, what we have stated - that the two states are equal in all respects is correct, justified.

सप्रभोजनता तेषा स्थव विप्रतिपश्चाते ।
तस्मादात्यत्वत्तेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः ।

Meaning: “Their utility is contradicted in dream. Therefore, from the fact of their having a beginning and an end they are rightly held to be unreal.”

CATEGORIES OF CAUSATION AND UTILITY OF OBJECTS OF ANY STATE ARE CONFINED TO THE RESPECTIVE STATE ALONE

Here a doubt: The statement that - “Because the phenomena of the waking have a beginning and an end they are false” - does not appear to be correct. For, as the false appearances, like nacre-silver and rope-snake etc., that are seen in the waking exist only at the time of their appearance, we may even ascribe Mithyatwa (falsity) to those phenomena for which there is a beginning as also an end. In fact, after they are falsified or sublated, all the people do agree by saying - “They did not exist really.” But from real silver things like ornaments, utensils etc. can be made. If a real snake bites a man the poison spreads in his blood stream and it causes death. In the same way, the food available in the waking satiates hunger; water quenches thirst. It being so, because the waking objects have a beginning and an end we can, if we so wish, say they are ‘unreal’; but can we reasonably say that they are, like the nacre-silver, rope-snake etc., false? The nacre-silver is of no utility, nor has the rope-snake ever bitten anybody; where is the comparison between these false phenomena, on the one hand, and the real objects like silver and snake, on the other?

Solution for this: The causation categories concerning objects like food and drink existing in the waking are sublated in the dream. One who has had a sumptuous meal and has slept, in his dream feels exhausted, weak from hunger. One who has drunk enough water here in the waking and has slept, may in his dream suffer from excessive thirst parching his tongue. It is quite familiar that a person who has become completely satiated by eating food and drinking water in a dream, on waking, finds
that satiation not being there at all, is it not so? What is the difference between these events? **There is a beginning and an end to waking, similarly the dream too has them; in this regard, between these two states there does not exist any difference, distinction whatsoever.** In fact, to say that — "Because they exist for a short duration, they are Anitya or non-eternal (or unreal)" - is also not proper. For, all of us have acknowledged that a dream is a mere false appearance. When we are awake no one ever thinks or believes that the dream world might be existing somewhere in an unknown region. In the same manner, **when the dream lasts, it is reasonable to infer, conclude that the waking world does not exist anywhere at all.**

Now yet another objection: There are reports that modern psychologists examine and analyse the mental habits and proclivities of patients and cure mental diseases or ailments. Apart from this, certain Yōgis are claiming that they can enter into the dream world, can cognize the news, events therein and can come back and report. It being so, it amounts to saying that the waking mind is capable of being responsible for the causation factors of the dream objects too. But **no one from the dream world coming to our waking in this manner is in our experience.** Therefore, it does not appear to be proper to say either because the dream appears only for a short while it is false; or only the waking state is like the dream false, is it not so?

Solution for this: This is not proper. For, those psychologists as well as Yōgis are trying to examine the dream from the waking standpoint only. While himself being in his waking state, the doctor - who by knowing what another person saw in his dream is endeavouring to diagnose - has not gone out of his own waking and has not wandered, ventured out anywhere else, is it not so? In the same way, to say that the Yōgi, without accepting the waking and the dream are distinct Avasthās, entered into (another’s) dream state is meaningless, ridiculous! Is it not so? **Till one has the memory of the waking all those experiences that accrue must necessarily (belong to or) be waking alone, is it not so?** It being so, the memory of the type - "I can examine the dream"; "I have entered into the dream state
and have returned to waking" - is invariably an assessment of the dream based on his waking viewpoint alone. But the question - "What is the real dream experience?" - has to be cognized from the dream experience viewpoint alone. Therein, the concept of the type - "This is actually a dream" - does not exist at all; in fact, it creates a deep, innate belief to the effect that it is waking alone. With regard to the Avasthā which appears to be a dream while one is in his waking, every one has perforce to accept the fact that he felt in the manner - "During that period it appeared to me as waking alone." It is also certain that no one reckons at that time in the manner - "I have come from the waking state to this dream state." Therefore, it is doubly established that what you opined as the dream examination is actually from the waking standpoint alone. Apart from this, for a particular psychologist in his dream itself there is a possibility of his having dreamt in the manner - "This is waking; let me learn from this sick person about his dream experiences and then let me try to cure him of that disease." Merely on that count it cannot at all be determined that the first dream existed in that second dream which appeared to have occurred therein, is it not so? Hence, to believe that waking exists in dream too is merely a delusion indeed. Therefore it becomes fully established that - "Howsoever deep we fathom, the two Avasthās like waking and dream have a beginning and an end; because they do not at all exist one in the other, they are false states alone which appear for a while.

Here in this context some people have adopted a different recension of - 'सप्रयोजनतातं तेषां स्वप्नेश्चिनि प्रतिपद्धते' - meaning: "The fact that the waking objects are of utility is seen (cognized) in the dream also." But because to the following sentence of "आच्छादनः" - both states having beginning and end this recension does not agree, this latter is not proper. If we adopt the present form of the Kārikā as given in this text, then the rational explanation to the effect - "Just as the objects which appear in the dream, although they appear to be of utility - Artha Kriyākāri (causation and utility categories) - in the waking, all that knowledge is sublated - similarly although here (in the waking) the objects appear to be of utility, this knowledge is invariably sublated in
the dream. For, it is in everyone’s experience that one who has eaten food and has got satiated in the waking appears in the dream to be hungry” - becomes evident and expedient.

Meaning : “The unique attribute is a mere appearance of the experiences in a particular state, as it is in the case of the dwellers in heaven. This he experiences by going there, just as one, well informed, does in the world.”

MERELY BECAUSE OF THE APPEARANCE OF A UNIQUE ATTRIBUTE THE DREAM CANNOT BE RECKONED TO BE TRUE OR REAL

(Objection) : To say that - “Just like the dream is the waking state” - is not proper ; for, in the illustration of the dream not only what is seen in the waking but also, in addition, certain unique attributes exist. It. being so, how is it proper to say that the waking is just like the dream?

(Solution) : It is true that qualities or attributes which are not seen in the waking may appear to exist for Ātman in the dream. Therein it may appear as if one is seated like Lord Indra on an elephant with four tusks, or one may realize therein that he is, like three-eyed Maheshwara, having three eyes. Though this is true, it is the rule of law of the region (Sthānidharma) - meaning, a quality unique to that Avasthā, but not at all a Svataḥsiddha Dharma or self-established quality. When the dream exists only, it (this unique or exotic quality or characteristic) appears, but not that it actually is attached to Ātman’s essential nature. Although a stick dipped in water appears to be crooked because of the refraction of light, in reality the stick therein has not become bent, and when the stick is lifted up above the water it is seen to exist as before (straight, and not crooked or bent) ; observing this, on this analogy, we can understand, comprehend this truth. In the same way, what is seen in the dream as though it was a queer unique quality truly belongs to the adjunct of the dream alone ; for, as soon as we wake up that appearance is sublated.

In the first half of the Kārikā what is stated as - ‘अपूर्व


ś्वानिवर्मणो हि’ - is a usage of a neutral gender in the common translation which is a unique idiomatic feature of the Sanskrit language. If it had been stated as - ‘अपूर्व: स्वानिवर्मणो हि’ - what would have been the transliteration - that meaning we have to take in this context. Those queer characteristics this Ātman alone witnesses therein. Just as on the strength of a habit of seeing such phenomena for a long time Ātman sees in the manner - “These are such and such objects” - here in the waking and is recognizing the things, in the same way on the strength of a habit of the dream state Ātman is seeing those queer things therein.

The Svapnātman (called ‘Taijasatman’ in Māṇḍūkyya Upanishad) reckons in the manner - “I am seeing these things here for a long time” - and not that He cognizes in the manner - “These, phenomena have come into being here anew just now.” If observed Intuitively, therein the habit formed on the strength a long-standing impression does not exist whatsoever ; those are really false, unreal phenomena which are witnessed because of the dream influence or domination. Even so, He is seeing them therein just as He is seeing real objects here in the waking ; therefore, merely on this ground of uniqueness the dream is not rendered to be true, real ; for, as soon as we wake up it becomes clearly seen that all those phenomena are false alone.

On the whole, what is to be discerned here is : When we observe from the waking viewpoint the fact that - “The unique or queer qualities that we see in the dream are phenomena which are bizarre and irrational when compared to the conditions here in the waking” - it may appear to be totally wrong, illogical to comprehend, reckon this waking to be equal to that (bizarre) dream state ; but because of the fact that during the dream time all that experience therein is, like the waking experience, certain and convincing, merely on that one count we cannot imagine any difference (inequality) between the two states. For, whatever Avasthā in which we see a world of duality is being experienced by us all that occurs or strikes as if it is verily waking experience (to wit, as real) only and not in the manner - “This is a dream (to wit, unreal)” - at all. Thus the Vedāntic truth that - “In all respects the Avasthās or states of Consciousness which we are calling ‘waking’ and ‘dream’ in our workaday
dealings are identical, equal” - will be explained in the following Kārikās.

Therefore, what we said that - “Because both states have beginning and end (Ādyanta), these two states of waking and dream are false” - is correct.

Meaning : “Even in the dream state itself, anything imagined by the inner consciousness is unreal, while anything experienced by the outer consciousness is real. (But) both kinds of things are seen to be false.”

Meaning : “Even in the waking state, whatever is imagined by the inner consciousness is false and whatever is perceived by the outer consciousness is true. It is reasonable that both these should be unreal.”

IDENTIFICATIONS OF THE TYPE OF ‘INSIDE’ AND ‘OUTSIDE’ IN BOTH STATES ARE EQUAL

(Objection) : Although in what is reckoned as waking just like the dream ‘differences or distinctions, do appear, in the waking we actually perceive the objects externally outside ourselves. But in the dream the phenomena are appearing internally within us. Thus there exists distinction between these two states, is it not so?

(Consolation) : Observing from the waking viewpoint it is true that this distinction is seen; but, while we are actually experiencing the dream this distinction is not striking, flashing to us in the least. Therein too internally - that is, in our Antahkaraṇa or mind only - the phenomena which are appearing are false. The distinctions of the objects which are conceived by the mind are merely imaginations; they appear to be ‘false’ indeed. Externally - that is, as if existing outside our body - those objects which appear strike as if they are really existing indeed. But just as it becomes certain as soon as we wake up that both these appear-
ances (to wit, internal and external phenomena) were false only, in the same way it is proper to surmise, infer that these phenomena of the waking too are false alone.

Here in this context one important, unique teaching that has to be discerned is: Everyone of us has strongly believed during the deliberation that — “Waking, dream and deep sleep — these three states occur to me alone.” When observed from this standpoint, the fact that these three phenomena are Vṛittis (concepts) alone which occur in our Antahkarana is being signified by the Kārikākāra here by words like — “Śvapnavṛitti” and “Jāgradvṛitti”. In the Śruti what is explained in the manner — “The waking Ātman is Bahishpraśṇa” and “The dream Ātman is Antahpraśṇa” — is from this viewpoint alone. In fact, what we have reckoned in the manner that — “Waking is an Avastha which occurs when by the help of the senses the external objects are perceived” and “Dream is an Avastha which — without the functioning of the senses, by the force of Vāsanā or latent impressions — appears within us alone by virtue of the functioning of the mind” — is also from this viewpoint alone; the opponent has accepted and thereby put forth the objection by following this viewpoint only.

But, when we deliberate on the strength of the experience (Intuitively) of the respective state, there does not appear any difference or distinction whatsoever between these two Avasthas. For, in both the Avasthas it appears as though we possess all these paraphernalia, separately, distinctively, like body, mind, intellect, ego, memory, five vital forces (Pañchapraṇas), ten sense organs. With a view to inculcating this viewpoint upon our mind, the Śruti has adduced the qualification of ‘एक्कोनविशालितमुखः’ (one who has nineteen doorways) to both the Ātmans (to wit, to Vaishvānara Ātman and to Taijasa Ātman). The purport behind that qualification is the fact that we reckon within those two Avasthas that the (respective) Ātman is endowed with nineteen adjuncts like mind, intellect etc. By following this tenet how we should comprehend the meanings of the qualifications like ‘Antahpraśṇa’ and ‘Bahihpraśṇa’ has been signified by Shri Śaṅkara in the following manner:
Meaning: “One who has the Prajñā or cognition (consciousness) of an object outside, external to himself is Bahishprajñāḥ. One whose cognition (consciousness) which, being conjured up or projected by Avidyā, appears as though having external objects - (He is called Bahishprajñāḥ).”

Meaning: “When compared to the senses, the mind is internal or inside, much more than those senses; because He has a cognition which is of the nature of their latent impressions, He is called Antahprajñāḥ.”

According to the above Bhāshya sentences it becomes evident that the waking cognition or consciousness and its offshoot of cognition of the form or nature of latent impressions (Vāsanārūpa) - both are projections of Avidyā and are appearing associated with manifested objects (worlds of duality) and without any manifested duality but of the nature of latent impressions (Vāsanāmaya), respectively. Further, if we comprehend the subtle meaning of the phrases - ‘स्थूलपुक्त', ‘अविद्यापुक्त’ - all the doubts will be removed. The Bhāshyakāra (Shri Śaṅkara) has stated that - “Because of the fact that Vishwa is Savishaya, a Prajñā or cognition which is gross is Bhōjya or to be experienced or consumed; but in the dream especially (to the Taijasa) mere pure Prajñā is Bhōjya.” From this, it amounts to saying that the Prajñā or cognition is itself the Bhōjya and Vishwa, Taijasa are the Bhōktrs or consumers, enjoyers. This leads to the clear conclusion that both Vishwa and Taijasa Ātmans are illuminating the cognitions or awarenesses of their respective Avasthās as forms of Pure, Absolute Witnessing (Sākshi) Consciousness indeed. To those people who keep this subtle teaching in mind it will now become very clear that - “In both the Avasthās what appears as ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is to the respective
Prajñā or cognition; but to the Sākshi who witnesses (per-vades or illumines) even those Prajñās there does not exist either an inside or an outside.”

Thus because both the Avasthās are appearing as of one and the same form or nature - to wit, from the standpoint of the respective Avasthā because both of them invariably comprise two divisions of the types of Sat (real) and Asat (false, unreal) - it becomes tantamount to accepting that it is quite reasonable, justifiable to determine that both these states are of equal existence, reality alone. Based on the waking standpoint and assuming the distinctions of ‘waking’ and ‘dream’ alone, here in this context it is stated that - “It is proper to say that both these are false.” But if we - according to the explanation given for the qualification of ‘Antahsthanātta’ previously in Kārika 4 - entertain the opinion that - “That which exists within Ātman” - then there does not exist any difference or distinction whatsoever between these two Avasthās. For, in both the Avasthās those objects which are ‘inside’ or ‘within’ appear as of real nature and those objects which are ‘outside’ appear as of false, unreal nature, and in this respect both are equal indeed. Further, the feature of both these Avasthās, during their respective periods, appearing as ‘waking’ alone is also equal to both. Therefore, because it is not possible at all to specify or detect in the manner - “This is dream”; “This is waking” - it is reasonable to discern that these two states which appear in (superimposed upon) one and the same Ātman (Pure Absolute Consciousness) are verily false, unreal - just as in one and the same rope the phenomena that appear to exist in various forms of a snake or a crevice in the ground etc. are truly Vikalpa or figments of imagination alone.

III THE ABSOLUTELY PURE ĀTMAN ALONE IS THE SUBSTRATE FOR ALL IMAGINATIONS

उष्मयोपि वैतस्वः भेदानं स्यान्योपयिदि ।
क एतानूः बुध्यते भेदानं को वै तेषां विकल्पः ॥४४॥

Meaning: “If all objects in both the states be unreal, who apprehends these objects and who is indeed their creator?”
OBJECTION AGAINST THE TENET THAT BOTH WAKING AND DREAM ARE UNREAL

Here an objection: If it is so, it amounts to saying that to imagine the distinctions of 'waking' and 'dream' is itself a Bhrānti or delusion alone. Even if it is accepted that both these states are mere appearances, still the question that - “To whom does this delusion accrue?” - remains. Your conclusion, judgement is that the waking cognizer (Pramātru) is, like the dream cognizer, imagined, is it not so? If it is so, who is it that imagines like that? And, who is it that, by means of deliberation, determines and discerns in the manner - “This is not real”? Yet another doubt. If we have to misconceive a stump of a tree as a human being, both those objects have to be real only. If you say that - “There is no tree, nor there is a human being; but the tree itself is being misconceived as a human being” - then it would not be proper at all, is it not so? However, you have determined and declared that the objects that appear in both the states are verily false, unreal! Here, how at all can there be a distinction of the type - “First there is Bhrānti; and later on it gets sublated and the correct knowledge accrues” - brought about? In addition to this, only to a person who is endowed with cognizing means like the senses, the mind etc. there can be either delusion or the correct knowledge which can sublate it, is it not so? But in your spiritual teaching all the means of cognition like the senses, the mind etc. which appear in both the Avasthās have become (have been deduced to be) false alone; how is this tenable at all?

In any case, thus by remembering a dream to determine that both the waking and the dream are false there is invariably a necessity of a Jñātru (knower) who is the substrate for the memory (Smṛiti) and knowledge (Jñāna). In order that this Jñātru obtains Bhrānti and Nishchayajñāna (conviction) there have to be necessarily things which are objects for him. In order that he misconceives and then determines as to what is proper or real, he should necessarily possess Karaṇas (instruments) of knowledge. In your Siddhānta which proclaims that none of these really exists, this distinction of delusion and its sublation does not suit at all, is it not so? - This alone is the essence of the objection.
Meaning: “The self-effulgent Self imagines Himself through Himself by the power of His own Māyā. The Self Himself cognizes the objects. Such is the definite conclusion of Vedānta.”

THE FACT THAT BOTH THE REGIONS ARE FALSE IS ESTABLISHED BY ĀGAMA (ŚĀTRA)

For this objection mentioned above the solution is: We are not expounding the tenet that these two Avasthās are false, unreal on the strength of any illustration following dialectics. This teaching is being divined and discerned by us from Āgama (Śāstra, Śruti) alone. We are merely formulating, by means of the logical devices known from those Śrutis, this above teaching, that is all. In the Āgama Prakaraṇa, propounding with regard to Vaishvānara and Taijasa that both of them are - “सत्ताङ्गोऽन्नविशिष्टमुक्तः” - meaning - “Endowed with seven (macrocumimic) limbs, nineteen doorways” - both the Ātmanas are described equally alike. Therefore, it has amounted to saying that the Āgama has hinted, suggested that both these Avasthās are equal, identical alone. That very teaching we are suitably mentioning by logical device only. That is all.

Now, if we examine in accordance with Āgama (the traditional methodology handed down pedagogically from time immemorial adopting the Śāstraic reasoning) both the Avasthās which all of us are dealing with empirically as ‘waking’ and ‘dream’ are, in truth, being experienced by us in one and the same manner; and this fact of life is universally acceptable. It is not possible at all for any logician worth his salt to refute this. In both those Avasthās the respective Pramāṇa within them deems that the world at large is perceived by his senses alone. He is also thinking, believing that the objects which exist outside are real (entities which really exist) and the phenomena which are conceived, imagined inside are Asat or false, unreal. It is also in everyone’s experience that when one of these Avasthās accrues the other does not exist at all. Even so, it is possible for an
innate identification of the type - “I woke up from a dream; dream is false, this waking is the real experience” - to accrue in both the Avasthās. It is absolutely certain now that although the Pramāṭrū (cognizer) of the waking did not at all exist in the dream, the one who is having the innate identification of the type - “I am awake” - is himself misconceiving (wrongly reckoning) in the manner - “I myself saw the dream”. Therefore, it became expedient for us to determine that - “Both these Avasthās were illumined by a Sākshi who is totally distinct from Pramāṭrū; that Sākshi Himself now is experiencing in the form of a Pramāṭrū both the Avasthās.”

ĀTMAN HIMSELF IS THE SUBSTRATE FOR THE IMAGINATIONS OF THE FORMS OF THE THREE ĀVASTHĀS

Hence, the one who has witnessed the two Avasthās is Sākshi Himself. The fact that - “In Ātman alone these two Avasthās and the distinctions of Pramāṭrū, Pramāṇa and Prameya that exist in them are merely imagined” - is irrefutable, incontrovertible indeed.

It being so, the logical arguments and questions of the type “How at all can Ātman - without having any association or relationship whatsoever with anything else, and existing as Absolute, Pure, Transcendental and without performing any acts whatsoever - imagine this distinction of Pramāṭrū, Pramāṇa and Prameya in Himself? The Pramāṭrū, who is endowed with Karāṇa or means of action is tied down, confined to the respective Avasthā; whereas the Sākshi exists without any contact or relationship with the Avasthā. It being so, who is it that imagines these Avasthās and the different phenomena which are seen divided in the forms of planes like Ādhyaṭmika (corporeal), Ādhībhoutika (physical) etc.? Without the Karāṇas how could Ātman see at all? Without the real things existing, how could the false phenomena which appear to be like them be imagined at all?” - are all truly sophism, fallacious casuistry! In fact, because these two Avasthās appearing in this manner is in everyone’s experience as also their apparent realities are appearing and vanishing, the logical conclusion drawn to the effect that both of them are false, unreal is itself the incontrovertible logic. Logic should always be in consonance with universal experience (To wit, in this context it is the comprehen-
sive Intuitive Experience of the Sākshi Chaitanya) and not opposed to it. Therefore, Ātman alone is the really existing Entity; although in Him alone this distinction of Jñāṭrū, Jñāna, Jñeya appears within these two Avasthās, in the form in which this distinction appears it is false, unreal indeed; it should be determined that its substrate in the absolute sense is Ātman alone who is the Witnessing Pure Consciousness. This alone is the Vedānta Siddhānta or the genuine spiritual teaching of Vedānta.

ĀTMAN CONCEIVES EVERYTHING BY VIRTUE OF MĀYĀ

Because there does not exist any stronger logic which strikes down this conclusion which is arrived at on the strength of universal Intuitive Experience (Anubhava), those superlative, highly-qualified seekers on the strength of this much Intuitive deliberation, discrimination alone will decide, determine that—“Ātman is the Ultimate, Absolute, Transcendental Reality; both the waking and the dream states are false, unreal—mere false appearances misconceived, imagined in Ātman alone; therefore, their essential nature is Ātman alone.” Even so, for the sake of satisfying or appeasing the minds of middle and low grade seekers, devotees, here Shri Gauḍapādāchārya has stated that—“Ātman by virtue of His own Māyā has imagined, conceived Himself in Himself alone.”

What is meant by Māyā? To this question the answer is: Although Ātman is ever devoid of any kinds of mutations like birth, death etc. and is verily non-dual, names and forms are imagined as if they belong to Ātman’s essential nature (Swarūpa) by dint of Avidyā; it is not possible at all to affirm them in the manner they appear to be either as Ātman Himself or independent entities existing apart from Ātman. Just as in the illustration it seems that although foam, from the standpoint of its real essence, is water alone, in the form it appears it is neither water nor is it a substance existing independently apart from water—similarly these names and forms—observed from the viewpoint of workaday transactions (Vyavālīra Drīṣṭi) conjured up by Avidyā— it is not possible at all to assert that they are verily Ātman or they are different, separate entities apart from Ātman. Such names and forms which are thus indescribable, indefinable (Anirvachaniya) are called by various synonyms as Prakṛti, Bija
(seed form) for Samsāra, Ātman’s (Īśwara’s) Shakti, Māyā in Śrutis and Smṛitis. When observed from the waking viewpoint in the Ātman who exists in deep sleep there exists a ‘seed’ called ‘Agrahaṇa’, which is of the nature of ‘not comprehending anything’; from that ‘seed’ the ‘Anyathāgrahaṇa’, which is of the nature of perceiving Ātman Himself in a different form, exists in both waking and dream; since we have so far established that both these Avasthās are indeed (in their essence) one and the same Avasthā, in the dream, which is having these two forms, this Anyathāgrahaṇa appears to exist. In order to expound this implicit teaching alone in the sixth Mantra of Māṇḍūkya Upanishad, Prājña was stated to be:—“He alone is the Prabhavāpyaya or place of origin and dissolution of all beings”. With a view to further elaborating that very fact here it is stated that—“Ātman conceives (all of them) by virtue of His Māyā.” This one phenomenon itself is called ‘Agrahaṇa’—meaning, non-comprehension, from the Adhyātmika Drśti (the viewpoint of the subjective, corporeal aspect) and from Bāhyadṛṣṭi (the external viewpoint) it is called “Māyā Bija” meaning, mystical seed form. Just as to a person suffering from the defect, disease of cataract if one moon alone appears as two, from the introverted Adhyātmika Drśti it is called a Bhrānti or delusion brought about by the defect of the eyes and from the extroverted viewpoint of what is seen it is dealt with as ‘the second moon’, is it not so? In the same manner here too we should understand, discern it.

THE WRONG CONCEPTS OF THE PROPONENTS OF VYĀKYĀNA PRĀSTHĀNA

Failing to comprehend, discern the real intention, purport of this Kārikā which is written in order to clarify the tenet that—“Ātman who is the substrate, basis for the concepts of the two Avasthās of waking and dream is the one non-dual Absolute Reality”, the post-Śaṅkara Vyākhyaṇakāras have raised a doubt here in this context and on the pretext of providing, suggesting a solution for it have, in fact, whipped up a big controversy itself; their doubt is—“Who is it that imagines? Is it Brahman or are they the Jīvas?”

The solution offered for this doubt by a section of the Vyākhyaṇakāras is: (1) The Jīvas themselves are those who
imagine. Because Jīvatwa or soulhood is itself imagined, before the imagination there would not be any Jīva and thereby it becomes quite expedient, logical that only after imagination ensues the Jīvatwa follows and only after Jīvatwa is established the imagination can ensue; thus a doubt about this kind of a defect of mutual dependence (Anyonyāshraya Dōsha) may arise here. But because all this is Māyika or the product, projection due to illusion and that in the case of Māyā no defect whatsoever attaches itself here in this context, there is really no defect at all. Merely because a Māyāvi or magician appears to have cut-off his own head, really he has not done so, is it not so? Similarly here also we must understand, or, in the alternative, from one seed a tree and from that tree another seed - thus each from the other in a perennial series they can be born, is it not so? In the same way, Jīva and Avidyā - their series is perennial. Therefore, here there is no defect whatsoever. This is another logical device to solve the doubt.

Some others say with regard to this topic :

(2) Brahman Itself is imagining here. The solution to the query “To Brahman which is of the very essence of Pure Consciousness (Jñānarūpa) how could Avidyā attach itself?” - that these disputants proffer is: When it is said - “Brahman is Jñānarūpa” - there is no import of the type - “The knowledge that is engendered by the Šruti” - at all; for, that knowledge is non-eternal, while the Knowledge which is verily the essential nature of Ātman is eternal. Similarly, it does not also mean - “A form devoid of Avidyā” ; for we have not accepted such a tenet at all. Further although the interpretation that - “Jñānarūpa means that which is endowed with the essential nature of Chaitanya or Pure, Absolute Consciousness” - suits Brahman, but because that essential nature subsists for all Jīvas, there does not exist any difference whatsoever between this essential nature and Avidyā. Now, against this theory the opponents point out a defect: If it is assumed that Brahman alone imagines Jīvatwa - then it would amount to saying that if one Jīva attains Mukti everyone else will perforce have to attain Mukti. For, apart from Brahman Jīvas do not at all exist; hence, if Brahman’s Avidyā vanishes it amounts to saying that everyone’s Avidyā disappears. Or, in the alternative, even for one who has attained the Brahmbhāva
or essential nature of Brahman, there cannot accrue Mukti; for, those proponents of that theory have accepted that for Brahman alone there is Avidyā. Therefore, it is tantamount to saying that even after the Self-realized Souls (Mukta Jīvas) have attained the essential nature of Pure Consciousness (Brahmabhāva), Avidyā invariably subsists indeed. For this objection the solution that is offered by Brahmāvidyāvādins (proponents of the theory that Avidyā attaches to Brahman) is: This objection is not proper. For, we have not accepted the tenet that—"Apart from Brahman there exist many Jīvas"—at all. Therefore, in our doctrine if the Avidyā that has affected Brahman in the form of Jīvatwa is removed, only one (Jīva) attains Mukti. In contrast to this, in your doctrine if the Avidyā that projects Jīvabheda or distinct Jīvas is reckoned as one and one alone, then the defect of the type—"If one attains Mukti, everyone else perforce will have to attain Mukti"—becomes unavoidable. If you contend that each person has one separate Avidyā, then you are confronted with the Gouravadōsa or defect of (not attaching the proper dignity, respect and esteem for Sastravākyā) for imagining many Avidyās. Apart from this, because Jīva is imagined (misconceived) in Brahman, you have to perforce accept that he is Jadarūpa (of the nature of insentience, being inert); further, you have to accept that because he is conceived, he is invariably with a beginning (Sādi). Hence, the doctrine that—"Jīva is the substrate for Anādi beginningless Avidyā"—cannot be sustained. If Avidyā is removed, Jīvas will have to be destroyed; then, there is no scope whatsoever for Muktas to exist; if it is contended that Avidyā never gets destroyed, then it will amount to saying—"Vidyā is Avidyā alone"; for, you have accepted the tenet that by virtue of Vidyā, Avidyā is not destroyed. Further, you offer another solution that—"In the case of Māyā there is no Anupapatti or absence of reasonable grounds"—is it not so? In that case, Muktas also can have Kalpana or imagination; for, you have yourself accepted that in the theory of Māyā there is no defect whatsoever. In any case, the opinion of these Brahmasrītavidyāvādins (proponents of the theory that Brahman is the substrate for Avidyā) is that—"Thus if the tenet that 'By means of Vidyā, Avidyā is removed'—is to be sustained, then we have to conceive that to Brahman alone Avidyā
attaches.” In this manner, the followers of these two rival theories are seen to be pointing out such other many defects and discrepancies in each other’s doctrines.

THE DEFECTS IN VYĀKHYĀNA PRASTHĀNA

Now we have to examine as to which of these two opinions has Shri Gauḍapāda accepted. For, if we read the Kārikā - “When the Jīva wakes up” - (1-1b) he appeared to have accepted the Jīvāśhrītāvidyāvāda or the theory that Jīva is the substrate for Avidyā. Because he has also stated that - “The deity called Ātman has imagined Himself by Himself” - here it appears as though he purports to say that Paramātmān Himself is the substrate for Avidyā. Just as saying - “A job can be done this way, as also that way” - we cannot affirm that - “The essential nature of an entity may be this way, as also it may be that way” - and hence we cannot at all conclude that both these statements are correct ; therefore, it becomes evident that we have to deliberate upon the question - “Between these two, which opinion is correct ?”

Here in this context, our considered opinion is : Both these theories are not relevant here. For, this Prakaraṇa has not been written to decide the question - “Which is the substrate for Avidyā ?” In fact, its genuine purport is to demonstrate that - “Dvaita (duality, multiplicity) in its entirety is false, unreal” - and then to determine, establish the Āgamārtha or the purport of the Śruti, Upanishad which is nothing but - “Advaita (nondualism) itself is the Vedāntārtha or ultimate teaching of Vedānta.” Hence the deliberation on Avidyāśhraya (substrate for Avidyā) is not the real meaning of this verse. In truth, this deliberation is in vain too. For, by this exercise in futility of determining the question - “Who is the substrate for Avidyā ?” - there is no benefit whatsoever accruing to us. On the other hand, instead of any benefit accruing, because it would amount to our accepting the tenet that - “Avidyā really exists - it will be totally opposed to Āgamārtha and thereby from this deliberation an undesirable result alone will accrue to us. The Upanishad Mantra No. 7 : “He is not Antahprajña (one who is having internal Consciousness) nor is He Bahiḥprajña (one who is having external Consciousness)” - propounds the truth that - “Ātman
is not the substrate, support for Vidyā or Avidyā” - and there­from establishes the teaching that - “He is Advaita alone.” Shri Gauḍapāda in Kārikā (1-18) has affirmed that - “If anyone has imagined a wrong concept, then it would necessarily have to be banished.” If in this context he has stated that - “Ātman has imagined distinctions in Himself” - then it would amount to his contradicting his own earlier statement, teaching. Therefore, it becomes certain that because in this manner it is Anarthakāri or lands us into unwanted situation or predicament, this is not the really intended purport of the present verse.

THE REAL, GENUINE MEANING OF THE VERSE.

The real purport behind this verse is : We have already declared that the real intention of this Prakaraṇa is to show the veracity of the truth that : “All duality, diversity is false, unreal” - and thereafter determine and proclaim the Vedāntic teaching that - “Advaitātman alone is the Absolute, Transcendental Reality.” Between these two tenets the first one, which purports to unravel the spiritual truth that all the phenomena that appear within the waking and the dream are in essence false, unreal, has been brought home to our mind by the subtle Intuitive deliberation that has been carried out so far. But until now the profound truth of Vedānta, viz. - “The non-dual Ātman Himself is verily the Ultimate Absolute Reality which is their true essence of Being” - which is the second tenet - has not been expounded. For that purpose, here an objection has been initially raised, viz. : If both these Avasthas are said to be false alone, it amounts to saying that there does not exist any Reality whatsoever ; for, apart from the phenomena that appear distinctively within these two Avasthas there does not exist any other object or entity whatsoever. We cannot also doubt in the manner - “The one who experiences both these Avasthas is left out, is it not so ?” For, the one who experiences the Avasthā is the Pramāṭru ; just as the Prameya (in the Avasthā) is false, the (respective) Pramāṭru is also false only. That thing whose being or existence changes - to wit, not existing as it is at present and having got its being or existence mutated so as to make it disappear - that thing is verily called ‘false’ (Mithyā), is it not so ? The Pramāṭru who exists in the waking is not
there in the dream, vice versa the dream Pramātu does not exist in the waking; this fact is by now very familiar, and so, in consonance with our Intuitive Experience (Anubhava) we have to perforce acknowledge that these two Pramātu are both false appearances alone. It being so, apart from these two Avasthās there does not remain any Reality whatsoever in its own form which is the substrate for those imagined phenomena which appear within these two Avasthās; nor there exists any Jñātu or Knower whosoever who cognizes these two Avasthās; therefore, those who affirm that the two Avasthās are false appear to have fully adopted the teachings of the Shūnyavādins or Nihilists (a sect among Buddhists) alone, is it not so? - This, in fact, is the doubt raised in regard to the purport behind the Prakaraṇa.

The solution for this doctrine is: In Śrutis like Kaṭhōpanishad (2-1-4) it has been propounded that - "One and the same Ātman cognizes both the waking and the dream (Avasthās); that Sākshi (Witnessing Pure Consciousness) alone is Ātman." In fact, this Ātman being self-effulgent, self-illuminating is the substrate for the Vikalpas or false appearances which are seen in the two Avasthās. That very Ātman is the substrate for the false phenomena which are mentioned later on (from 2-20 to 28). The essential nature of Being of that Ātman is truly of the nature of Nitya Chaitanya or eternally Pure Consciousness. That Swarūpa Chaitanya (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness) alone is illumining the various phenomena within these two Avasthās. Let us assume that in poor light when any particular person mistakes, misconceives a rope lying on the ground to be a snake; another person demonstrates to him that it is a rope only and thereby the former cognizes it to be a rope and is convinced about it. Here in this instance, first having wrongly reckoned it as a ‘snake’, later on when someone instructed him about the ‘reality’ the former determined it to be a rope only; merely on that ground, there does not occur any change whatsoever in the Swarūpa or essential nature of Being of the cognizer, is it not so? In the same manner, here too it should be understood.

Here in this context any one may raise this objection: In the illustration the one who is deluded to believe it to be a snake
as well as the one who determined it to be a rope is one and the same person. But in this illustrated case it is not so. The one who misconceives, imagines different objects appearing in the dream is a different person, while the one who determines the Reality in the waking is different, is it not so?

This objection is not proper. For, in the illustration the mind and the senses of the person who has misconceived the rope to be a snake are associated or afflicted with a defect; but when he determines in the manner - “This is truly a rope alone” - there does not exist any such defect whatsoever either in his mind or his senses. Even so, in the real essential nature of Being of the person, who first was deluded by reckoning it to be a snake and later who determined it to be a rope, there is no difference whatsoever. In the same way, here too although there exists distinction between the dream Pramāṭru and the waking Pramāṭru, in the Sākshi which is the essential nature of the perceiver there is no change whatsoever taking place. Both these Pramāṭrus of the dream and the waking are perceiving the distinctions existing in the respective Avasthā by the benign grace alone of that very same Ātman who is of the essence of Chitprakāśha (light of Consciousness). He alone is the substrate for the memory of the dream and the determinative knowledge that occurs in the waking. Neither the waking Pramāṭru nor the dream Pramāṭru is different, distinct from the Sākshirūpa Ātman. For the proclamation of the type of - ‘नन्योज्ज्ञप्ति द्रष्टा नन्योज्ज्ञप्ति श्रोता नन्योज्ज्ञप्ति मन्त्रा नन्योज्ज्ञप्ति विज्ञाता’ - of Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad (3-7-23), meaning - “Apart from this Sākshirūpa Ātman there does not exist any Drashti (seer), Shrōtṛ (hearer), Mantrā (imaginer), Vijnātṛ (discriminator) at all” - this alone is the reason. Therefore, just as the Buddhists aver that for the Jñānasruti (knowledge from memory) there does not exist a Kūṭasthātman (Absolute Immutable Self) as a substrate - we have not followed their tenet here at all; the Śruti statements like - “Ātman is the Mind of the mind” (Kena 1-2); “By which the mind also is objectified (that alone is Brahmā)” - (Kena 1-2, 6) - are the supporting evidence for this conclusion. Hence this is the final conclusion of Vedānta science; by taking the non-dual Ātman alone, who is cognized, Intuited by virtue of the Upanishadic
teachings, as the basic fundamental, we have argued here that both the Avasthās of waking and dream are false; but not basing our arguments on mere, fallacious logic.

IN BUDDHISTIC PHILOSOPHY NEITHER A MISCONCEIVER (VIKALPAKA) NOR KNOWER (JñāTṛU) WHO IS COMMON TO BOTH AVASTHĀS IS ESTABLISHED

Among the Buddhists - Bāhyavastusattāvādins (Realists), Kshāṇikavijñānāvādins (proponents of Momentary Idealism or Consciousness) and Śūnyavādins (Nihilists) - these are the three main groups. Among the proponents of the theory that - “A thing exists” - there are again two theories. “Mind (chitta) itself is the Jñātru (knower)” - is the theory of Vasubandhu. “Indriya Sanghāta or the conglomeration of the senses alone is the Jñātru” - is the theory of Vasumitra. These two disputants have acknowledged the tenet that - “Although the external objects are Kṣaṇika or of momentary existence, the Vastu (entity) that is the support or substrate for them is Nitya (eternal).” Both these theories may, somehow to a little extent, be sustained with regard to the waking objects; but there do not exist any body, senses and mind which are common to the two Avasthās of waking and dream at all; in a particular Avasthā the body, senses etc. that are confined to that respective Avasthā appear and they disappear along with that particular Avasthā. Therefore in these theories one singular Jñātru is not established at all. Since in the Kṣaṇika Vijñānavādins’ theory the Vijñānasantāna (the series or continuum of intellectual Consciousness) is one alone, somehow it may be made suitably applicable to the waking transactions in the manner - “One Jñātru is established”; but because the Vijñānasantāna that exists in dream is quite different, distinct from the Vijñānasantāna of the waking, it has to be perforce accepted that these are different only. Apart from this, it is established on the basis of universal experience that by means of the Vijñāna or consciousness of the waking the Vijñānasantāna of the dream is falsified, sublated. It is true that the Vijñānavādins have accepted the teaching that - “The Manovijñāna or intellectual, mental consciousness or awareness exists in one and the same form; and the Ālayavijñāna or seat, receptacle of consciousness called Chitta (mind) remains one and the same continuously till the attainment of Nirvāṇa or Liberation, Beati-
tude”; but when both the dream mind and the waking mind are not appearing to be of one and the same form, then it is not possible to imagine, conceive them to be one and the same at all. It is not possible to affirm that in all the three states one and the same mind persists uninterruptedly; for, it is in everyone’s experience that for both the waking and the dream their respective categories of time and space as also the phenomena belonging to the respective Avasthā are totally different. Especially in the deep sleep state there is no experience whatsoever of any concepts of time-space-causation and of various phenomena. In any case, thus it is tantamount to concluding that either in the theory of Sarvāstiva customs (Realists) or in the theory of Vijnānavādins (Idealists) it is not established that there exists one who imagines, conceives both the Avasthās of waking and dream.

Now, even the theory of the Shunyāvādins - who aver that all the phenomena which appear either within (internally, mentally) or without (externally, perceptually) are invariably essenceless - is, just like the opinion of the Vijnānavādins, full of defects only; for, in their theory also the teaching that - “The Dharmas (Drishyas) or various phenomena that exist in both the waking and dream Avasthās are merely Shūnya or essenceless” - cannot at all be demonstrated, proved. For, an attempt to prove that - “On the basis, strength of Pratītya Samutpāda - one thing appearing in relation to another (dependent origination) - it amounts to establishing the fact that the phenomena do not have any independent (Swatantra) existence (Astitva)” - alone is the logical device adopted by the Shunyāvādins. But it is not possible at all for anybody to assert that dependent upon the dream phenomena, the appearance of the waking phenomena is established, and vice versa, dependent upon the waking phenomena,

* [One particular Vyākhyānakāra, i.e. post-Śaṅkara commentator, has interpreted the word - ‘Dvayakāla’ - to mean of the form of grasper - grasped (Grāhaka - Grāhya Rūpa). But it appears that he has not himself ‘grasped’ the real import of this word ‘Dvayakāla’ as well as the word ‘Bahīhi’ at all. Therefore, we have not examined their commentary at all. With regard to the various tenets that are established by this Kārikā in connection with time, refer to the Introduction.]
the appearance of dream phenomena is established. For, when one of them exists or wherein one of them exists - the other never appears.

Further, on behalf of the Shūnyavādins what Chandrakīrti* has objected in the manner - "The opponents are not mentioning the Ātmalakṣaṇa or characteristics of the Self by actually cognizing the Ātmascarūpa or essential nature of the Self" - is not acceptable to Vedānta Darshana or Vedāntic philosophy; this defect can be, at best, levelled against the doctrinaire theories of schools like Śāṅkhya, Yōga etc. which try to establish the Ultimate Reality of Ātman on the strength of Anumāna or inferential logic. That is all. To Śāṅkhya's their teachings about Prakṛiti, Purusha and the Prakṛiti-Purusha Samyoga (relationship between Prakṛiti and Purusha) are all invariably perennially inferential knowledge. But in Vedānta on the strength or valid authoritative source of the Śruti sentence - "Ātman is Aparoksha or directly to be Intuited, is one who is the innermost Reality of everything" - (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3-4-1) - it is accepted that Ātman is Swayamprakāśa or self-effulgent and Aparoksha in consonance with universal Intuitive Experience and not that there is any attempt to attain the Ātmasiddhi or Intuitive Knowledge of the Self by valid means of special characteristics. Following the spiritual teaching of - "Both the Pure Consciousness (Intuitive Experience) and the Ātman who Intuits is not known by you" - (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3-4-2) Vedāntins are affirming that - "Ātman is the subjective Knower who Intuits, cognizes everything and not that He is an object for any valid means of knowledge or cognition at all." Therefore, it should be realized that no objection of any kind can be levelled against the Vedānta Siddhānta or spiritual teaching of Vedānta.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF THE KĀRIKĀ

In any case, what is important in this Kārikā is this much: In Sushupti (deep sleep) Ātman appears to have become 'Ekibhūta' or undifferentiated and a mass of Consciousness (Mantra 5); in the waking and the dream He appears to be imagining various phenomena. But because being the substrate for all special characteristics He is illumining even their non-existence too by means of His own Pure Consciousness in all the three
states, this Ātman exists in His non-dual essence alone bereft of any special characteristics whatsoever. Hence He is Nirvishesha or devoid of any special features. This truth is expounded in the Turiya Mantra (7) by means of refuting all special characteristics. However, those distinctions which have been refuted in the manner - “Nāntahprajña” meaning “He is not internally conscious” - are not to be reckoned to exist only in the waking and dream and not in the deep sleep - this is not, in fact, relevant here; the ultimate purport behind the refutation lies in propounding that - “A non-dual Reality devoid of birth is alone the Absolute, Transcendental Truth; apart from It there does not at all exist anything else whatsoever.”

Here the quintessence of the verse is: “The non-dual Ātman Himself appears in the forms of the concepts as also the Jñātṛu or Cognizer, Knower etc.” In the statement - “Kalpayatātmanātmānam” (meaning - “He imagines Himself by Himself”) - it is intended to convey the idea that - “The one who is imagining - He is Ātman alone.” The phrase - “By Himself” - suggests that apart from Him there does not exist any instrument of knowledge; the phrase - “Himself” - signifies that apart from Him there does not exist any imagined object. We should interpret the sentence - “स एव बुद्ध्येत” - meaning - “He alone cognizes” - in a similar manner only.

On the whole, it means - “There is no bondage of the type of Avidyā, Kāma, Karma etc.”; this truth will be elaborated upon in Kārikā 2-36.

**WHICH ARE THOSE THINGS THAT ARE IMAGINED IN ĀTMAN?**

विक्रेतयस्य भावानतिर्थिचे ज्ञवस्थितानि।
नियतांश्च बहिस्थितं एवं कल्पयते प्रभुः।११३॥

**Meaning:** “The Lord diversifies the mundane things existing in the mind. Turning the mind outward, He creates the well-defined things (as well as the undefined things). Thus does the Lord imagine.”

**THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE IMAGINED PHENOMENA**

While imagining how in what manner does this Ātman
carry out this imagination? Of what various kinds are the distinctions of the phenomena imagined in Ātman? The answer is: Those empirical mundane objects like sound, touch etc. which lurk in the mind as well as the objects, phenomena mentioned in the scriptures are of the nature of latent impressions (Vāsanārūpa); He imagines them in various ways. Earth, āir etc. which are fixed, definite entities - meaning, known objects - He imagines being extroverted, imbued with external Consciousness. In the same way, being endowed with internal Consciousness He imagines the indefinite, uncertain objects existing only during the period of imagination in various forms; endowed with internal Consciousness, he imagines in various ways concepts, feelings like desires, yearnings etc. Ātman alone is the Lord: One who is the cause for the various entities to come into existence.

When the mind is extroverted, the objects which appear are fixed, definite - meaning, they appear as entities with forms devoid of change; when the mind is turned inwards, meaning in states like the dream as well as wishful thinking within etc. those phenomena, which appear within the mind alone and during that particular period, are indefinite, disorderly. Thus because there exists the distinction of the mind being extroverted and introverted - although the forms of the phenomena that appear are invariably varied, manifold - all of them are verily imagined; it means that for all of them Ātman alone is the substrate.

Meaning: “Things that exist internally as long as the thought lasts and things that are externally related to one together with the other, are all merely imaginations. Their distinction is not caused by anything else.

ALTHOUGH THE SPECIAL FEATURES BROUGHT ABOUT BY TIME-SPACE CATEGORIES EXIST, ALL PHENOMENA ARE VERILY IMAGINARY

Here a doubt: “The conclusion that - ‘Just like the phenomena appearing within, the phenomena appearing without (externally) are also imaginary’ - does not seem to be proper.
For, the internal wishful thinking or yearnings may be said to be imaginary, because they belong to the Chittakāla or mental period of time; meaning, they exist only when the thought (Vṛitti) arises in the mind (and also last till that thought endures). But that is not so with regard to the objects that exist outside; they have Dvayaṅkāla, meaning - one object exists as long as the other object exists. Between a mental concept of a delicacy and the one which is actually cooked and served to many people is there no difference at all? “With regard to the actual existence of things which we have imagined within ourselves even we do not have a staunch belief; those things being imagined, conceived in the manner - ‘It must be like this’ - ‘It must be like that’ - as soon as the imagined idea, thought ends, we clearly reckon, realize in the manner - ‘They were not actually existing (in time, space and with proper cause-effect relationship); we ourselves have imagined, conceived them.’ The things which are seen by us in the external region are also seen by others and are steady, aren’t they?” Thus any one may raise a doubt.

But this doubt too may not stand the test of Intuitive reasoning. For, here also we may adduce the illustration of the dream. Although when examined from the waking viewpoint the whole of the dream experience appearing to occur within our mind itself is true indeed, when considering the dream from the dream viewpoint per se (i.e. Intuitively as the dream experiencer) it becomes certain and convincing that a waking state which is distinct, different (Vilakṣaṇa) from the dream does not at all exist in the least. The dream at or during the time of the dream experience appears as waking alone (to wit, therein no one ever questions the reality or veracity of that experience; in fact, that experience being as real as the one in our waking is identical in esse. This truth is being driven home quite convincingly to all and sundry irrespective of faith, sex, culture, caste, race, nationality etc. by this Avasthātraya Prakriya, which is the real clincher in all spiritual teaching, taking one to the acme of all Knowledge and Happiness). Therein in dream internally some objects (phenomena) of Chittakāla - meaning, each object existing in one particular point of time as a concept and later completely disappearing along with that concept - are appearing; but outside therein the
things of the *Dvayakāla* - constant, steady - are appearing. "*Dvayakāla Vastus*" means constant objects which appear as if one object exists along with another or amidst many other objects (all in one time series). When we say - "They talked to us as long as they were with us" - there is an implied meaning that they, we as also many other things around - all existed together. However, with regard to the concepts or thoughts that we entertain within our mind - none of them whatsoever exists along with another concept, idea at all; in fact, they are transient, inconstant phenomena which appear and vanish into thin air. Even so, we have no doubt whatsoever about the fact that all of them do exist as figments of imagination. Apart from this, the universal truth that - "The phenomenon called 'waking state' does not exist anywhere in the least during the period of the dream experience" - is to be accepted on all hands unreservedly as a more comprehensive, pervasive logical device (*Vyāpaka Yukti*). Therefore, in the waking too, just as it is in the dream, both the internal and the external phenomena (*Drishyā*) are all imaginary indeed; merely on the ground of their having the distinctions of belonging to Chittakāla and Dvayakāla, to assert that they are not imaginary at all there cannot be any evidence to be found.

अत्यत्क एव चेन्नस्तु स्कुटात्ए एव च ये बहि:।
कल्पितात्ए एव ते सवै बिशेषत्विद्विधियाण्ते।१५१॥

**Meaning**: "Those objects that appear as obscure inside the mind, and those that appear as vivid outside, are all merely created by imagination. Their distinction is to be traced to the difference in the organs of perception."

**ALTHOUGH THERE IS THE DIFFERENCE OF BEING UNMANIFEST, VIVIDLY MANIFEST ALL PHENOMENA ARE IMAGINARY ALONE**

Within the mind, in the form of mere subtle impressions (*Vāsana Rūpa*) some phenomena exist; and some other phenomena appear to exist outside quite vividly, clearly. Merely on that ground, people believe that the objects which appear vividly are real, whereas the unmanifest, invisible objects within the mind are unreal. But what is the ground reality? All those phenomena
are imaginary alone. Even here, the dream illustration fully suits, fits in. For, in the dream too at that period of time we are believing those particular things which appear to exist actually, vividly external to us to be real, while those phenomena appearing in the form of subtle impressions within the mind to be unreal. Even so, we all are knowing that both of them are imaginary only; for, in the waking state none of them is to be seen. We have all accepted the ground reality that both of them did not actually exist and they were mere false appearances seen in a dream. Therefore, here in this context, for the distinction of ‘being unmanifest’ and ‘being vivid, clear’ their being actually real and unreal is not the cause; those things which are perceived by the senses are vivid, clear, while those which lurk or are hidden in the mind are false. By virtue of the distinction in the senses this difference is seen alone and not that this distinction is the cause for their not being imaginary.

From the deliberation that we have made so far another conclusion gets evolved. That is: Because of the fact that in both the waking and the dream states the temporal features of the type of - ‘now’, ‘before’, ‘in future’ - as well as the spatial features of the type of - ‘here’, ‘there’ - are being seen by us equally, in an identical fashion - those particular time-space-causation categories are confined to their respective state alone; in reality, (in the ultimate analysis) there do not at all exist any states called ‘waking’ and ‘dream’, neither does any temporal or spatial relationship exist between them nor any cause-effect relationship between them. Remembering this, if we observe from the Paramārtha Drishti (i.e. the Absolute, Transcendental, Intuitive Experience standpoint), then the spiritual, philosophical teaching gets evolved, viz - “There does not exist any mutual difference, distinction whatsoever between waking and dream.”

Meaning: “First He imagines the Jīva (individual), and then He imagines the different objects, external and personal. The individual gets his memory in accordance with the kind of thought-impressions he has.”
THE CONCEPT OR THOUGHT OF JĪVATWA (SOULHOOD) IS THE ROOT CAUSE FOR ALL CONCEPTS

From the deliberation that we have carried out so far, this much has been determined: "In the Avasthas (waking and dream) the objects which appear outside do not have any special features different from those phenomena which are conceived within the mind; and, as both these are imaginary we cannot conceive of any distinction whatsoever between them. Even so, the external and the internal concepts are mutually responsible for each other. By virtue of the latent impressions (Vāsanās) lurking in the mind the external distinctions of percepts are seen. By virtue of the experience of the external percepts the internal (conceptual) impressions are being engendered." Thus the common run of people are believing; what is the root cause for this?

For this question the answer is: First of all, people in general imagine, conceive in the manner—"I am a Jīva who performs righteous and unrighteous acts and then enjoys, experiences their fruits." Thus in this manner they first of all conceive of Jīvatwa or soulhood in Pure Ātman, just as a snake is conceived in a rope. When it is stated here—"First, (in the beginning) they imagine, conceive"—it does not mean—"the first priority over everything else temporally." For, a universe comprising the whole gamut of distinctions like—time, space, causation, action, means of action, fruits—is appearing co-evally, co-existentially with the waking state. Therefore, the expression here—"They first of all conceive of, imagine Jīvatwa"—means that by forging ahead with the concept of Jīvatwa, then on the strength, basis of that rudimentary concept (called in Vedāntic parlance as Ahamkāra or 'I' concept) all other concepts are entertained.

Thus beginning with the Jīva-concept at the head (rather root) of all other thoughts and on the strength (foundation) of that fundamental 'I' concept the other concepts like Prāṇa or vital force etc. are entertained by the people; in fact, for conceiving in the manner—'internal concepts' and 'external percepts' this basic Jīvatwa-Kalpana or concept of 'I' as a transmigratory soul alone is the support. In the category of external concepts (percepts) we should include the movable and immovable, animate
creatures and plants and inanimate, insentient objects like the rocks, stone, sand etc. and the objects of the stellar region like sun, moon, stars etc. (Ādhidaivika or Divine plane). On the other hand, the internal concepts mean Jñāna (knowledge), anxiety or eagerness, desire, wonder, mental feelings, emotions etc. - all such different concepts.

If it is asked - “What is the cause for this Kalpana or concept?” - the answer is: “To the Jīva, as mentioned above, whichever experience accrues - its memory is engendered ; in the same way, to him whichever memory is born - an experience of that accrues” - thus we should discern. From such causes of enjoyments like food, drink, flower and fragrance etc. - the fruit known as ‘Tripti’ or satisfaction, satiation accrues - thus this ‘Anubhava’ (experience), which is conceived, is the first ; from it the concept of a ‘Smṛiti’ (memory) in the manner - “For both these there is a relationship of cause and result or effect” - is engendered ; and once again from this concept of a Smṛiti another concept of an Anubhava ensues. Thus as we go on with this series of concepts, we entertain yet another comprehensive concept in the manner - “This is the action ; these are the means of this action.” Then, the concept of the type - “For this action performed with the aid of these means, instruments of action such and such a fruit has accrued. Then the concept - “As a result of this, this fruit accrued.” From this evolves a concept that - “For these - action, means of action and the fruit of action - there exists a relationship.” Again, as just now stated - Anubhava and Smṛitis - follow. Thus the external and internal Anubhavas or experiences (percepts) and Smṛitis (memories) are occurring continuously in a series. Thus just as the Kāṭhaka Śruti states: “Because he cognizes the Dharmas or phenomena as being different from himself, he (Jīva) is pursuing them alone” - (2-1-14) - although the ignorant Jīva, in reality (in the ultimate analysis, from the Absolute Transcendental viewpoint), is the essence of Pure Being of Ātman who is Absolutely Pure and non-dual, he imagines in all such manner and struggles in the Mithyā Saṁsāra or false appearance of transmigratory existence.

We should not doubt in the manner - “In all such ways does anyone imagine only those things which do not exist at all?” Here in this context too the illustration of the dream is
available to drive home the point in question. Although therein only the individual person (i.e. the dreamer) exists in reality, his imagining in himself a new Jīvatwa or life which does not at all really exist is in everyone’s experience. The who is a Brahmin in the waking, in the dream he may experience as if he is a Vaishya or a low-caste rustic or a heathen; now in the waking one who is enjoying good health and who is strong and sturdy may in the dream appear to be suffering from a disease and to be a lame or blind person. Therein (in the dream) one may imagine in the manner - “I am living (existing) here in this way alone for such a long time. To end in such a plight such and such a thing was the cause; in future I will endeavour in such and such a manner and attain a better condition” - etc. and conceive of the relevant memory and experiences, the relevant action, means of action and their fruits and the relevant supporting concepts of time, space and causation; and further he may believe that they really exist therein (at that period of time). Even so, the moment he wakes up, the falsifying or sublating knowledge of the type - “All that was a mere dream; I was believing a false appearance itself to be real at that time” - accrues, is it not so? In the same way, now at present in the dream called ‘Samsāra’ which is Avidyākalpita or conjured up by ignorance we are all imagining phenomena like - we as Jīvas; time-space-causation categories; action - means of action - fruits; various experiences etc. ; for all these imaginations the basic concept of Jīvatwa which we have conceived of in the manner - “I am a Pramātru (cognizer), Kartrū (agent of action), Bhōktru (enjoyer)” - is the substrate, support. If we observe from the Paramāṭha Drishti then it becomes evident that all this is verily beginningless ‘Adhyāsa’ or misconception which has taken place in the Nityashuddhabuddhamukta Advitiyātman indeed.

AN ILLUSTRATION FOR MISCONCEPTIONS AND THEIR REMOVAL

अनिष्टिता सथा रज्वरूपकारे विकल्पित।

सर्वधारारिक्षितविस्तदात्मा विकल्पितः।१६७॥

Meaning: “As a rope whose nature has not been well ascertained is imagined in the dark to be various things like
a snake, a streak of water, etc., so also is the Self imagined variously”.

Meaning: “As illusion (of the rope) ceases and the rope alone remains; when the rope is ascertained to be nothing but the rope, so also is the ascertainment about the Self”.

FOR THE MISCONCEPTIONS IN ĀTMAN THE ANALOGY OF THE ILLUSTRATION OF A ROPE-SNAKE

The fact that - ‘For all imaginations the Jīvatwa Kalpana or ‘I’ concept alone is the substrate (root cause)’ - we have already mentioned, is it not so? Now we will signify as to what is the cause for this Jīvatwa Kalpana. In our workaday world there are instances of the common people misconceiving a rope as a snake, is it not so? What is the reason for it? It is ‘not knowing a rope definitely to be a rope’ alone. In poor light or in dusk people may misconceive (imagine) in various ways a rope to be either a snake or a streak of water or a crevice in the ground. We all know for certain that for all those various misconceptions the absence of the definite knowledge of the type - “This is a rope indeed” - is the cause; for, those who have reckoned the rope as a rope only with certainty do not at all entertain any misconception. In the same way, for the misconception of the nature of a false notion of the type - “I am a Sāṃsārī who performs Dharma (righteous acts) and Adharma (sinful acts) and experiences, enjoys their resultant fruits” - to occur, the absence of the definite knowledge of the type - “I am the Advayātman (non-dual Self) who is of the essential nature of Nityashuddhabuddhamukta (eternally Pure, Conscious and Liberated) and Asāṃsārī (one devoid of Sāṃsāra)” - alone is the cause.

AN ILLUSTRATION FOR THE SUBLATION OF THE MISCONCEPTIONS IN ĀTMAN

Just as when the light comes or when the light emitted from a bright object spreads and we determine a rope in its real form in the manner - “This is indeed a rope”, all those misconceptions
formulated about it vanish; in the same way, here too (in the illustrated case) we must reckon that as soon as the determinative Intuitive Knowledge pertaining to Ātman is attained, all those misconceptions, which were appearing, do disappear. Just as if any person who knows the ground reality affirms a rope to be a rope alone and on the strength of his statement we get rid of the fear and trembling born out of the misconception (of a snake), in the same way those seekers (Jijñāsus), who listen to Śruti statements like: “Not this, not that” (Bṛi. 4-4-22); “All this is Ātman alone” - (Chh. 7-25-2); “For this Brahman neither there exists a cause nor an effect, neither an interior nor an exterior; this Ātman alone is Brahman” - (Bṛi. 2-5-19); “He is birthless within and without” - (Mṛṣñaka 2-1-2); “This embodiment of Pure Consciousness alone is all-pervading, birthless, devoid of old age and death, immortal, fearless - He is Brahman” (Bṛi. 4-4-25) etc. - attain the Intuitive Knowledge of Brahman and all the misconceptions that have been caused disappear.

Here in this case there exists a distinction between the illustration and the illustrated. That is: For the seer, the rope is an object of knowledge (Jñeya) existing outside; on the other hand, Brahman happens to be the essential nature of Being alone of the Jijñāsu. Even after listening to a statement with regard to the essential nature of the rope, there remains the necessity of determining after the proper inquiries as to whether it is really a rope or not? But Brahman was Ātman alone in the past, is Ātman even now and will be Ātman in the future too. Therefore, some people here may entertain a doubt of the type - “How come we do not cognize our own Ātman?” For this doubt the solution is: To know, cognize Ātman does not mean to know, perceive Him just as we perceive an externally existing object like a rope etc. through our senses. Our essential nature of Pure Being (Swarūpa) perennially exists in Its self-effulgent, self-illumining Nitya Chaitanyakaswarūpa or essence of eternal Pure Being-Consciousness. Even so, we have misconceived - due to Avidyā which is natural - that we are of the nature of Pramāṭru or cognizer associated or endowed with the body, the senses and the mind. When both the Śāstra and the preceptor instruct us in the manner - “You are not of the nature of Kartru-Bhoktru; neither you are of the nature of a Pramāṭru endowed with a body,
senses etc. ; but you are of the essential nature of the Witnessing
Consciousness who is ever observing, objectifying all these phe-
nomena” - we give up the identification (deep-seated ownership)
and rest established in our real essence of Pure Being-Conscious-
ness. Only to this extent the similarity with the illustration of the
rope should be accepted or adopted, and it should not be mis-
construed that there is any intention, real purport of teaching to
the effect that just like the rope our Ātman is an object for any
Jñāna (knowledge) or that we have to sublate actually an igno-
rance (Ajñāna) about Him and have to attain afresh a knowledge
about Him (intellectually) ; this topic will be further clarified in
the next Prakaraṇa.

THE THEORY AVIDYA AS THE MATERIAL CAUSE
OF THE WORLD AND ITS REFUTATION

The manner in which some followers of Vyākhyānapraśṭhāna
(post-Śaṅkara commentators’ methodology) have explained the
illustration of the rope-snake mentioned here is : Both the rope-
snake and its knowledge are Avidyātmaka (projected by or of the
essence of Avidyā which is indescribable, indefinable (Anirvachaniyā)
as either Sat or real and Asat or false, unreal. Because the
snake is seen, it is not Asat, but because it is falsified, sublated
by Jñāna it is also not Sat. To say that the two qualities of Sat
(existence) and Asat (non-existence) - exist in one and the same
object is a contradiction. Therefore, the snake is also not Sadasat
or real-unreal. It is something Anirvachaniyā, totally different
from all these three. Because the known snake (Jñeya Sarpa) is
indefinable, it amounts to saying that its Jñāna too is Anirvachaniyā,
which means - “An appearance which cannot be determined
and defined as either ‘existing’ or ‘non-existing’.” Because
both the snake and its knowledge are not existing always, it
amounts to saying that they are Kārya or effects which appear
during the interval (temporarily). Therefore, for these effects not
only there must necessarily be a Nimitta Kāraṇa (efficient cause)
but also an Upādāna Kāraṇa (material cause) also. If this cause
is real just as clay etc., then its effects like pot, pitcher etc. will
necessarily have to be real ; both of them will have to be
perforce known through certain Pramāṇas or valid means of
knowledge. Therefore, if we wish to solve this undesirable
predicament the Upādāna (material cause) for both the rope-
snake and its knowledge will necessarily have to be the indefinable Ajñāna alone. Both Bhrānti (delusion) and Samshaya (doubt) are Ajñāna alone; because of the reasons that they do not subsist through the Kārya (effects) and they are Sādi or with a beginning, they desiderate a different cause; then needing another second cause for that first cause, further a third cause for that second cause - thus a series of causes (Kāraṇa Parampara) will become a necessity also; in order to avoid this logical defect of an absence of finality or conclusion, it should be reckoned as Jñānabhāva or absence of knowledge; because it is of the nature of Abhāva (non-existence) also, one has to accept the proposition that Ajñāna which is Anirvachaniya, Anādi (beginningless) but Bhavarupa (of an existent nature) alone is the Upādāna Kāraṇa (material cause) for both this rope-snake and the rope-snake knowledge also.

This explanation is unsustainable, untenable. For, neither the rope-snake nor its knowledge is a substance, material object existing apart from the rope; the common people imagine the rope itself to be a snake and think in the manner - “Now we have got the knowledge of a snake” - and not that they believe or accept the fact that these imaginary concepts are truly, actually material things or that they necessarily should have a cause; further, it would not be reasonable for them to do so. Shri Gauḍapadāchārya also, who has written the Kārikā, has stated that because of the fact that the rope is not determined in its true form, that rope itself is being misconceived as a snake, a streak of water etc. only; he has not at all mentioned or propounded that they are the Kārya of the Anirvachaniya Avidyā. Further, if we follow the method of explaining the illustration by the Kārikākāra, then for the Dārśāntika (illustrated) the simple, straight-forward and spiritually purposeful meaning (opinion) of the type - “All that exists is the Paramātma Vastu alone; in It all the various components like Prāṇa etc. (mentioned later in the 19th Kārikā) are misconceived alone” - becomes the most appropriate, suitable one. For that reason alone, while explaining the opinion of the Chhāndogya Upanishad the Bhashyakāra (Shri Śāṅkara) has said:

“Brahman of the very essence of Pure Being (Sadrūpa) Itself is being transacted in the manner of Abhidhāna (name), Abhidheya
(named object) with concepts totally different from It. Just as in our workaday world a rope itself is being transacted as a ‘snake’ because of a Sarpabuddhi or snake-consciousness or concept; or, just as due to a misconception that it is different from clay, we deal with the clay itself using words like ‘a lump of clay’, ‘pot’ - etc. ; further, just as for one who has reckoned, realized it to be a rope by dint of discrimination the snake, its name and concept too - all these (superimpositions or misconceptions) get sublated ; and just as for those who have by means of discrimination cognized it to be clay the word-concepts like ‘pot’ etc. get falsified, sublated - in the same manner, for those who have Intuited It to be Sadbrahman by means of discrimination the word-concepts like ‘separate effects’ (other than its cause or substrate of Brahman) will get sublated.” - (Chh. Bhāshaṇa 6-2-3).

Therefore, in the present Kārikās there is no room whatsoever for the theory that - “For the world (of duality) Avidyā is a material cause (Upādāna Kāraṇa)” - to be adopted. Just as the rope - when it is not determined in its definite, real form - is being misconceived as a snake etc. ; and when its real essential nature is determined or cognized, no misconception whatsoever remains, leaving behind the rope (in its true existence) - in the same way, Ātman too, till He is not determined in His real essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, is being misconceived as Prāṇa, etc. But especially when He is determined in the manner - “He is really Advitīyātman alone” by virtue of Vedānta Vijñāna or Vedāntic Intuition - then He subsists as non-dual Pure Being-Consciousness, devoid of any misconceptions whatsoever.

FROM THE ABSOLUTE VIEWPOINT UNITY ;
FROM THE MĀYĀ VIEWPOINT MANIFOLD MISCONCEPTIONS

Meaning: “(Ātman) is misconceived, imagined as Prāṇa and such other innumerable phenomena. This is that Deity’s (divine Being’s) Māyā or mystical show, He is Himself deluded by that.”
ALL IMAGINATIONS (VIKALPAS) ARE MĀYIK OR ILLUSORY

Just as when it is not determined to be a rope, that very rope is being misconceived as a snake, a streak of water etc. - in the same way, this Ātman also is being misconceived in the forms like Prāna etc., which are mentioned in due course and many more such various forms. Even so, in reality (in the ultimate analysis) He is always of one and the same essential nature indeed.

Here in this context any one may raise a doubt of the type : In the rope-snake illustration etc. the things like snake, streak of water etc. exist separately, independently by themselves; only exclusively in the rope alone they are imagined, misconceived. If it were true that - “The snake does not exist anywhere at all” - no one would have misconceived the rope as a snake out of Bhrānti or delusion. Bhrānti means to reckon one thing to be another; if that other thing is proved not to exist anywhere, how can this Bhrānti take place at all? No, it cannot. But in the present illustrated instance, is it not true that Vedāntins affirm that common people imagine, misconceive Ātman Himself as Prāṇa and such other forms only which do not exist anywhere at all? How at all can this be suitable, tenable?

For this the consolation is: Merely on the strength of illustration of the type of rope-snake we are not trying to establish or expound either Ātman’s unitary existence (Ekatwa) or the fact of all the other phenomena being imaginations, misconceptions. For all that we affirm, there is the support of Anubhava or universal Intuitive Experience. Merely on the strength of TARKA or logical arguments what can be established at all? In deep sleep, we have the Intuitive Experience of: ‘Ātman - who is of Chaitanya Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness), who is unitary, non-dual alone - Himself am I’; while in the waking and dream, although that very Ātman of Chaitanya Swarūpa exists as He is, the other imaginary phenomena, which are of the nature of misconceptions alone, are also seen. When both these things are seen on the strength of Intuitive Experience, it can never be proper to forward an illogical argument of the type - “How is this possible at all? This too does not suit or is not in agreement with logic, is it not so?” Therefore, using the proper logical device we should determine
that - "Just as the ignorant, deluded people misconceive a rope itself to be a snake, or a streak of water etc., in the same manner the ignorant people - although Ātman exists unto Himself as non-dual in His essential nature of Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) - misconceive Him alone as ‘Prājña’ etc."

(Question) : In that case, in Ātman, who is eternally Pure, Conscious and Free, phenomena or appearances which do not at all exist anywhere are appearing, is it not so ? How should we reconcile this apparent anomaly ?

(Answer) : All this is ‘that Deity’s Māyā or mystical prowess.’ In the workaday world a magician by profession will demonstrate as if a tree in empty space has blooming flowers ; merely on that count, are there trees which exist in space blooming with flowers ? Not at all. In the same way, although that Paramātman exists alone by Himself eternally Pure, He appears as if He is endowed with the conglomeration of the body and the senses as also being associated with the triad of action, means of action and its fruit. He appears to be enjoying the transmigratory life in a world of duality which is totally different from Himself. Previously in the Āgama Prakāraṇa also (1-17) it was expounded that - “This Dvaita or duality or diversity is mere Māyā or Illusion” - is it not ? In this Vaitathya Prakāraṇa too was it not stated in 2-12 that - “That Deity called ‘Ātman’ by virtue of His Māyā or mystical power imagines Himself in various forms” - ? In that manner, everything here also should be discerned. Although Ātman exists in the Absolute form of Parameshwara alone, He appears as if He is deluded by His Māyā. Meraly because his Kalpita Rūpa or imagined (misconceived) form of Jīva - in which the special characteristic (Dharma) called ‘Antahkarana’ or Mind is misconceived (Adhyasta) - appears to exist controlled by Bhrānti or delusion, there is no harm done at all to that Paramātman’s real nature of Pure Being-Consciousness. To Him, who is always eternally Witnessing the three states of Consciousness by means of His Absolute, Pure Consciousness as the Sākshi, no trials and tribulations of this illusion of the transmigratory form (Samsāra) have really (in the Absolute sense) been caused at all ; for that reason alone, Bhagavān Shri Krishṇa has taught Arjuna in the following manner : ैः दैवी ह्वोषा गुणमयी मम माया दुर्स्वयम्। मामेव ये प्रपधने मायामेतां तत्निति ते॥

Vaitathya Prakāraṇa 161
The Essential Gauḍapāda

(Gītā 7-14) meaning: “This Māyā of Mine which is of the nature of three qualities (of Satwa, Rajas and Tamas) and difficult to cross, belongs to Me, the Divine Being. Those who surrender unto Me alone are able to cross this Māyā”. In any case, there is no taint whatsoever of the whole gamut of Māyā Drishya or illusory phenomena, which appear in the three Avasthās of waking, dream and deep sleep, to Ātman, Paramātman. One who determines (so as to culminate in his Intuitive Experience) that - “All these phenomena are verily Māyika or illusory, a mere phantasmagoria; to Me (who is the Pure Being-Consciousness of Ātman) these phenomena of Sāmsāra appearing within the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep do not at all afflict, taint in the least; I am really the eternally Pure, Conscious, Free Absolute Being alone” - in such a person, in reality, there are no misconceptions occurring at all. That aspect of the spiritual teaching that: “Just as - although in the rope the misconceptions like a snake, a streak of water etc. are appearing (i.e. they are superimposed upon it) - in actuality, they are not at all related in the least to the essential nature of the rope, in the same way to the essential nature of non-dual Ātman none of these Vikalpas or imaginary concepts like Prāṇa etc., which are superimposed upon or misconceived in Him, actually taint Him in the least” - this tenet alone is relevant here in this rope-snake illustration.

Some Types of Imaginations Made in Ātmaswarūpa

प्राण इति प्राणविद्वेद्भूतानीति च तत्त्विदः ।

गुण इति गुणविद्वस्तत्वानीति च तत्त्विदः ।१२०१।

Meaning: “Prāṇa, say those who know Prāṇa, and Bhūta or material object, say those who know it; Guṇas, say those who know Guṇas; and Tattwas, say those who know them.”

पादा इति पादविद्वेद्विषयः इति तत्त्विदः ।

लोका इति लोकविद्वेद्वेदः इति च तत्त्विदः ।१२१।

Meaning: “Pādas, say those who know Pādas, Vishayas, say those who know them; Lōkas say those who know Lōkas; and Devatas (deities), say those who know them.”
Meaning: “Vedas, say those who know Vedas; and Yajñas, say those who know them; Bhūkṛtu or enjoyer, say those who know Bhūkṛtu; Bhūjya or the object enjoyed, say those who know it.”

Meaning: “Sūkṣhma (subtle), say those who know what is Sūkṣhma; and Sthūla (gross), say those who know it to be so; Mūrta (with form), say those who know what is Mūrta; and Amūrta (formless), say those who know it to be so.”

Meaning: “Kāla (Time), say those who know Time; and directions, say those who know them; theories, say those who know theories and Bhuvanas (worlds), say those who know them (14 worlds).”

Meaning: “Mind, say those who know the Mind; intellect, say those know it to be so; Chitta (memory), say those who know Chitta; and Dharma (righteousness) and Adharma (unrighteousness), say those who know them.”

Meaning: “Twenty-five principles or categories, say some; while others say, twenty-six; some say, it comprises 31 categories, while others say, it comprises of infinite categories.”
Meaning: “People, say those who know it to be people; Āshramas (stages in life), say those who know them; Linga (sex), say those who know it to be of masculine, feminine or eunuch sexes. Some others call it as Para and Apara.”

Meaning: “Srishti (creation), say those who know creation; Laya (dissolution), say those who know dissolution; Sthiti (subsistence), say those who know subsistence; but He has always been all these.”

THEORISTS ALSO HAVE IMAGINED VARIOUS CONCEPTS IN ĀTMAN

Not only the common run of people of the world but also the various philosophers as also theorists (thinkers) have conceived their own respective religious or spiritual tenets which are truly imaginations misconceived in Ātman. This is the sum and substance of these above mentioned Karikas.

THE EXPLANATION OF WORDS LIKE PRĀŅA ETC.

“Prāṇa”, the word first used in these Kārikās, means “Prajña”, who alone is the Kāraṇatma or the Self who is the primordial cause. All else are His effects, offshoots. The reason why Prajña has been called ‘Prāṇa’ has been explained in the previous Prakaraṇa (page 38).

“Bhūtas” means Prithvi (earth), Ap (water) etc.; “Guṇas” means Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; “Tattwas” means the 25 categories which the Sānkhyans enumerate - only these are the cause for the manifold world - thus various disputants or proponents of various theories were asserting.

Various theories, objects, worlds, deities, sacrifices, enjoyer and the enjoyed objects - all these are the various categories or concepts to which several proponents of spiritual doctrines have given predominance in empirical or religious transactions. The
relevance of these theories in this context is rather incomprehensible.

"Sūkṣma" means the subtle state of the Bhūtas or five primordial elements; "Sthūla" means the gross elements and the body, the senses etc. which are caused by them; Chārvākas or Materialists had greater belief in Bhūtas or primordial elements since they were perceptible objects or things. "Mūrta" means the theory of those who believe that Parameshwara is with form; "Amūrta" means the theory of certain people who used to argue that Ātman did not have any form whatsoever; this theory is presented by Shūnyavādins or Nihilists - thus opine certain people; but there does not seem to be any proper evidence or support for that opinion. For, it has been found out from the texts like Nāgārjuna Kārikās etc. that the doctrine of the Shūnyavādins is: "In all appearances, whatever they may be, there is no stuff, substance at all."

Those who have given predominance to time are astrologers; predominance is given to cardinal directions in the school of philosophy called 'Svarōdayavādins'. Theories (Vādas) are beliefs in Dhatu Vāda (to wit, metals, mantras etc. contain in them the secret of immortality); Bhuṇaṇas means the 14 worlds which are the regions of enjoyment of fruits of Karmas; Manas (mind) say Naiyāyikas (followers of the school of philosophy called Nyāya); Buddhī or intellect say Sāṅkhyaṇs (followers of another school of philosophy called Sāṅkhya); Chitta or idea say Yōgins - thus one and the same Antaḥkarāṇa or Mind, psyche is given different names by different sects of philosophy based on different causes, reasons. The Kshaṇikavijñānavaṇḍins (a sect among the Buddhists) have imagined that this Chitta or psyche alone is momentary, transient and that it appears by itself both as the grasping agent (Grāhaka) and the grasped object (Grāhya). That the Dharmādharmas or virtues and vices are the causes for all Karmaphalas or fruits of actions is the doctrine of Mīmāṃsakas. Sāṅkhyans say that Purusha is the 25th category, whereas Pātañjala Yōgins propound that Īśwara is the 26th category and Pāshupatas believe that Īśwara is the 31st category.

Thus the various proponents of different philosophies have imagined various concepts in one and the same Ātman. The purport of this present text is neither to find out the various
theories nor to determine their validity, veracity or otherwise. One and the same Ātman, who is Nirvikalpa or beyond imagination or concepts, has become various concepts like Prājña etc. It is enough if the seekers understand, discern the fact that all these are mere imaginations, misconceptions; that there is no difference whatsoever between the imaginary phenomena appearing in a dream and these various concepts when they are considered or examined from the Paramārtha Dṛṣṭi. The Kārikākāra has expressed this very opinion at the end when he says: "सत्वे चेह तु सर्वदा" (In this everything is imagined always).

THE FRUITS OF MITHYĀJÑĀNA (MISCONCEPTIONS) AND SAMYAJÑĀNA (INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE)

Meaning: “Anyone to whom a teacher may show a particular object (as the reality) sees that alone. And that thing, too, protects him by becoming identified with him. That absorption leads to his self-identity (with the object of attention).”

Meaning: “Through these things that are (really) non-different (from the Self), this one is presented as though really different. He who knows this truly grasps (the meaning of the Vedas) without any hesitation.”

THE EFFECT OF MITHYĀJÑĀNA

Many differences, distinctions beyond count like Prāṇa etc. are imagined, misconceived in the non-dual Reality of that Ātman, is it not so? For all of them Ātman alone is the Paramārtha or Ultimate, Absolute substratum, essence of Pure Being; only the respective special form merely appears due to misconception, that is all. Without discerning this secret the various disputants believe steadfastly in what appears to them as real, to be the Ultimate, Absolute Reality and they preach the same doctrine to others
also. When any preceptor teaches his pupil that a particular tenet among all these various concepts as the Ultimate Reality, then that teaching will be held firmly in the mind of the pupil in the manner - “This alone is the Ultimate Absolute Reality; this alone is my Swarūpa or essence of Being” - or “This alone is the means for attaining my ultimate goal of the present existence (Purushārtha)”. Just as the convicts in a prison are securely bound, shackled by the jailors and are prevented from escaping, in the same way that very belief, concept itself is firmly binding that pupil and is creating a faith in him to the effect that all other tenets are unreal, false. Previously in 2-19 it was stated that: “This is the Māyā of the Deity; by this he alone is deluded” - is it not so? Accordingly, each and every person is holding on obstinately to his respective misconception indeed.

THE EFFECT OF SAMYAJṆĀNA

But these Prāṇa etc. do not at all exist apart from Ātman; just as the rope itself is imagined in various forms like a snake, a streak of water etc., these too appear as if they exist independently apart from Ātman, and one who conceives (cognizes) in this manner is the one who has properly understood, discerned the purport of the Veda texts.

One should not doubt in the manner: “Although the misconception of the snake does not exist in the rope, a real snake invariably exists somewhere (in the empirical world); but as regards the misconceptions like Prāṇa etc., apart from Ātman, they do not at all exist anywhere, is it not so? Then, how does the illustration suit or becomes relevant in the present context?” For, this phenomenon conceived in the form of ‘this snake’, when we say - “This snake which is appearing before me” - it does not exist ‘anywhere’ in reality. In the same way, these phenomena of Prāṇa etc. which have been described above do not at all exist anywhere, being in the same predicament or situation. In the illustration the snake may exist (as a real object, entity in the empirical region) somewhere; but in the form of - “This snake which appears herefore” - it (i.e. the rope-snake) does not exist whatsoever, and in the same way, all the misconceptions of the type of Prāṇa etc. in the apparent forms they appear do not exist anywhere at all. Therefore, there exists
positively, a parallel, proper relevance between the illustration and the illustrated.

Thus one who has determined in the manner - “Ātman alone really exists; none of the misconceptions (Vikalpas), whatsoever they may be, in the form in which they are appearing exists at all either in Ātman or anywhere else” - will be endowed with the capability, qualification of determining the true purport of the Vedantic texts as it really is. In fact, he is the one fully qualified person who can comparatively weigh and evaluate, determine the respective purports behind the Karmavākyas or statements pertaining to religious rites, rituals etc., Upāsanavākyas or statements pertaining to the Vedic meditations as also the Jñānavākyas or statements pertaining to Self-Knowledge; all the rest - however much they might have studied the Mīmāṁsā Śāstra (texts of Jaimini’s school of philosophy which propose to inquire into the etymological and ritualistic aspects of the Vedas) - will not have the Intuitive Knowledge to discriminate and determine as to which is Paramārtha or Absolute Reality and which is merely empirical, transient (appearance).

**KĀRIKĀS DEVOTED TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE PURPORT OF THE PRAKARĀNA**

स्वप्नमायेऽष्ट् धृती गन्यवर्तनांगे यथा ।
तथा विश्वमिदं धृतं वेदान्तेऽविचारणे: ।१३१।

**Meaning:** “Just as dream and magic are seen to be unreal, or as is a city in the sky, so also is this whole universe known to be unreal from the Upanishads by the wise.”

**THE FACT THAT DUALITY IS FALSE APPEARANCE IS ESTABLISHED BY THE VALID MEANS OF VEDĀNTA (UPANISHADS)**

In this Prakaraṇa it has been expounded that duality is unreal (Asat), is it not so? For this exposition, there is Prāmāṇya (the valid means of evidence) provided by the Upanishads. This is not merely a futile imaginative exercise of building a castle in the air. Just as, though the dream phenomena as well as the magically-projected phenomena do appear to be real, they are in truth unreal, false; just as in the phenomena called ‘Gandharvanagara’ or a celestial city seen in the sky or empty space there
are appearances of a commercial street, houses, multi-storeyed buildings, men and women roaming about etc., and all of a sudden that whole phenomenon of the celestial city disappears in a jiffy - in the same way, this universe is a mere false appearance, and this truth the scholars, wise people (Panditāḥ) have cognized on the validity, authority of the Upanishadic sentences. If we observe the statements of Śrutis like: "All this universe was, in the beginning, Ātman alone" - (Aitareya); “Where there appears to be duality there one may see another; may hear another, may smell another, may touch another, but where this Jñāni is verily (himself) the Ātman alone who can see what and with what......?” (Bṛihadāranyaka) etc. - it becomes evident that their real ultimate purport of spiritual instruction is that all the phenomena of the manifold universe are merely a false appearance indeed.

न निरोधे न चोत्पत्तिनं ब्रह्म न च साधक: ।
न मुनिसुन्तं वै मुक्त इलेङ्वा परमार्थता।१३२।।

Meaning: “There is no dissolution, no origination, none in bondage, none striving or aspiring for salvation, and none liberated. This is the highest truth.”

THE WHOLE GAMUT OF EMPIRICAL TRANSACTIONS IS THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF AVIDYA

Although what has been conclusively established in the previous verse itself to the effect that both the waking and the dream states are of the same category on the strength of logical devices, this conclusion alone is not the prominent purport of this Prakaraṇa; for, merely by indicating this much there is no benefit accruing at all. In order to determine exclusively the real essential nature of Ātman which has perforce to be cognized (Intuited) by means of Āgama or the implicit, subtle methodology traditionally handed down through a long line of preceptors well versed in the Upanishadic pedagogics, the profound teaching that - 'All duality, diversity is Mithyā' - is propounded. Because of the fact that if one cognizes that Truth it amounts to his getting rid of Avidyā, Kāma, Karma and the transmigratory life’s experience of the nature of Sukha and Duhkha, as also the Ātmaikatwa Jñāna or the non-dual Self-Knowledge becomes beneficial, fruitful.
How is it? To explain, if one Intuits the truth that - "All duality is false, unreal; Ātman alone is the Ultimate Reality" - and if it is further determined that both Loukika (empirical, secular) and Vaidika (scriptural) transactions in their entirety are invariably the subject-matter of Avidyā alone, then there does not at all exist anything like birth, growth, death etc. Therefore, it amounts to concluding that there is no one at all who is bound (by transmigratory existence); nor is there any one who performs, practises Adhyātma Sādhana or spiritual disciplines. To one who is born there is bondage, is it not so? To one who is bound there is a need of Sādhana, is it not so? Therefore, it amounts to concluding that there is neither a Mumukshu or a seeker of Liberation or salvation, nor a Mukta or one who is Liberated. Is it not true that the quintessence of all Loukika and Vaidika Vyavahāras is: By performing such and such a Sādhana such and such a fruit, benefit should be acquired? Only to a person who fully believes that Utpatti or creation and Pralaya or dissolution of the world of duality, diversity are really occurring, this above Vyavahāra also really exists. But to one who has decided that all these are, like a dream, false alone - just as to one who has woken up the gains and losses or the happiness and misery accruing from the dream transactions do not affect at all - no transaction, whatsoever it may be, is really real in the ultimate analysis (Paramārtha).

If the question - "To one who has attained the Paramārtha Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) how can there be no Utpatti (creation) and no Pralaya (dissolution)?" - is raised, the answer is provided convincingly based on Śruti statements like - "Where one sees as if there exists duality, there one sees another" - (Bṛi.) ; "To one who has the knowledge that here Bheda or diversity, distinction exists, he obtains death after death" - (Kaṭha) ; "All this is Ātman alone" - (Bṛi.) etc. To objects which really (empirically) exist, there is birth and there is destruction also; but to a false appearance like a hare’s horn there does not ever exist any birth or destruction, is it not so? Observed from the Paramārtha Drishti, the Absolutely existing (i.e. non-dual; Transcendental) Ātman can never have birth or death whatsoever. For any object or substance there can be destruction caused either from another object or substance; or by the mutation of its own
constituents or ingredients it can be destroyed; to Ātman, who does not have both these pre-requisites or conditions and who is Absolutely, Transcendentally as also non-dually existing (by Himself, unto Himself, for Himself, so to speak) how at all can there be any destruction?

It is true that in our workaday world those objects and creatures which are perceived to exist are born and are destroyed; it has been already demonstrated, explained that all those are like the rope-snake, misconceptions imagined in Ātman (2-29). All phenomena like rope-snake, nacre-silver etc., because they are mere mental imaginations only - neither do they get their birth in the rope, nacre etc., respectively, nor do they merge in the latter indeed and get destroyed. Further, no wise (discriminative) person ever imagines that misconceptions like the rope-snake etc. are born in one’s mind alone or that they get destroyed therein in the mind itself.

We cannot also affirm that the phenomena like the rope-snake etc. were born due to a blending of both the mind and the external objects like rope etc. and then got destroyed. We have already refuted (in the commentary on the 17th Kārikā of the previous Prakaraṇa, 1-17) the doctrinaire theory which propounds - "From Avidyā Shakti both the rope-snake and its knowledge are caused and destroyed" - based on the strong reason that it is contradictory to universal experience. On the same basis, because the world of duality is a mere imagination (misconception), it (i.e. world) is not really created, born; nor does it get destroyed anywhere or end up in any other entity. Thus we have to determine.

ALL DUALITY IS A FIGMENT OF IMAGINATION INDEED

Any one may here in this context raise the question: "How can it be said that all this world of diversity is a mental imagination alone?" The answer to this is: Whether in the waking or in the dream, if the mind is quivering, vibrating - then duality, diversity is seen appearing; but if it is not so, as is the case in Avasthās or states like Sushupti (deep sleep) and Samādhi (trance) etc., duality or diversity is not seen. Therefore, all duality or diversity is verily Manovikalpa or vibration (volition) of the mind alone.
(Doubt) : The fact of duality being independent is also to be cognized by the Karana or instrument, medium of the mind alone. This much is the truth and not the (far-fetched) doctrine that - 'Duality, being the mind’s figment of imagination, does not seem to be rational, tenable.' Merely on the ground that in the darkness of the night objects are not seen, and in the light of a lamp they are seen, it cannot be understood, reckoned that by the lamp alone the objects are produced or brought into existence; or, in the alternative, merely on the ground that blind people cannot see objects, it does not amount to saying that apart from the eyes the external objects do not exist at all, is it not so? In the same way, here in this present context too why can it not be assumed that the mind is merely a valid means to know, cognize duality?

(Solution) : Not so. Although in darkness the objects are not seen, not visible, or to the blind people the sight or form of the objects is not visible, people can touch the objects and determine, decide, in an alternative manner, that they exist. But it is not so in the case of duality; if there is no mind, it is not possible, in any manner, to determine that duality exists. If the mind exists, duality appears or is seen; if it is not there, duality does not appear; hence, it is established that the phenomenon of duality, diversity is mind’s imagination or misconception alone.

Here there is an important point that the true seeker has to perforce keep in mind: When it is said that - “If the mind exists, duality exists; if it is not there, duality (too) does not exist” - there is a scope for misinterpreting this statement to mean - “Duality is a phenomenon different or separate from the mind; and in duality the mind is not included.” But, the ground reality is not like that at all; the mind is included in duality only; or, it is rational and proper to decide, determine that mind and duality are one and the same. Atman, in His very essence of Pure Being-Consciousness, is non-dual (i.e. having nothing else second to, or other than, Him; there does not at all exist the division or distinction of Grahya (that which is objectified, comprehended) and Grahaka (that which is the objectifying subject or cognizer). The significant word “Advaita” - connotes the subtle concepts of - (a) nothing else similar to It exists; (b) another entity or thing apart from It (Reality of Atman) does not exist
at all; (c) within it there does not exist any distinction or division at all— all these profound meanings are signified by that one pregnant word. To the mind the distinctions of itself being the 'I' (subjective consciousness), the senses and the sensate external world of duality are always visible. To the Jīva (soul), who is utilizing this mind in the external world of diversity, it appears in the manner— "Like me, there exist many other Jīvas." This alone is being called by us as "Dvaita". In any case, thus because all this duality, diversity is the misconception (imagination) of the mind only, Dvaita (diversity) does not really exist at all; therefore, what is taught in the Kārikā, viz.— "There is no Nirōdha or dissolution; nor is there Utpatti or creation,"— is proper indeed.

The real purport behind the expression— "This is Paramārtha (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality)"— is: "In that Entity in which there does not exist any concepts or categories like 'Nirōdha', 'Utpatti' etc. That alone is Paramārtha."

THE DIFFERENCE (CONTRAST) BETWEEN THE BUDDHISTS’ THEORY OR DOCTRINE AND VEDĀNTA

Here in this context there is a secret which has to be discerned: The examples, illustrations of Svāpna, Māyā and Gandharvanagara, mentioned in the previous Kārikā, keep on coming in the Buddhistic Vaijñānavāda texts. The deliberation on the Abhāva or non-existence of Nirōdha (dissolution), Utpatti (birth, causation) etc. mentioned in the present Kārikā is well-known as mentioned in the Buddhistic Shūnyavāda (Nihilistic) texts. The invocatory verse in the Madhyamika Kārikā written by Nāgarjuna runs like this:

अनि श्रीमुनुपादमुच्छदमरायततः।
अनेकार्थमोक्षार्थमोदयमपरंगमम॥
यः प्रतीत्यस्मात्ततद्र प्रपन्धोपशमं शिवम्।
देशायामास संबुद्धस्तं चदे चदतां चरम्॥

Thus for reasons like— (a) to a great extent there appears to be similarity of word usage in the Buddhistic texts; (b) to those people, who do not examine with all concentration and discrimination by the mind it appears as though there exists innumerable sentences in Gauḍapāda Kārikās with a similarity of
meaning too - some people have opined that Shri Gauḍapāda has borrowed his Siddhānta (spiritual teachings) from Buddhists alone; and some others were of the opinion that Shri Gauḍapāda entertained an opinion that - "Buddhistic Siddhānta itself was Upanishadic Siddhānta." Some scholars, who have not been able to discern or divine the traditional methodology of Shri Śaṅkara's Advaita Siddhānta, or those, who are opponents of Advaita philosophy, have even levelled the serious allegation that - "Shri Gauḍapāda and his followers who are Advaitins are 'Prachhanna Bouddhas' (meaning, though they are secretly following Buddhism, they have hidden this fact and have dubiously professed themselves to be Vedāntins)." Because of the fact that this allegation is logically associated with the whole Kārikā text, only after all the deliberation of this text is completed the validity and veracity or otherwise of this allegation can be truly and elaborately deliberated upon, discussed either in the appendix or in the introduction. For the nonce, it is quite necessary that one knows this much, viz.: When the Vijnānavādins (Idealists) use the illustrations of Svapna, Māyā etc., their purport (intention) is that - 'Apart from Vijnāna (mental consciousness) the external object does not exist'; when the Shūnyavādins (Nihilists) use them, their opinion is that - 'For any phenomenon (appearance) there is no real essence of Being.' But when the Vedāntins use the very same illustrations it is their teaching that - 'Each of the illustrations of Svapna, Māyā (magic) or Gandharvanagara (celestial city in the empty space) indicates the truth that there invariably exists a real substratum for a false appearance.'

In the present Kārikā the sentence which states that - "There is no Utpatti, no Pralaya, no Badhha, no Sādhaka, no Mumukshu, no Mukta" - its purport is: "Just as it is taught in the Upanishad that all the Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) of Avasthātraya (three states of Consciousness) is imagined (misconceived) in Advaita Ātman (non-dual Self) and that this non-dual Ātman alone is the Paramārtha (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality); that all the rest of the duality is a mere figment of imagination (Vikalpamātra) appearing in Him; just as the Shūnyavādins opine that duality is essenceless (Nissāra) or just as the Vijnānavādins say that all this (manifold world of duality) is a mere momentary
mental concept - here in this context there is no such opinion at all. Neither the *Abhidhāna Prapañcha* (world of names) nor the *Abhidheya Prapañcha* (world of named objects, phenomena) in their respective forms of appearance is *Paramārtha* (really Real, Absolute Entity); all these are *Avidyākṛita Vyavahāra* (empirical transactions projected because of *Avidyā* or ignorance). In the Shūnyavāda or theory of Nihilism no object or substance whatsoever is really existing (essenceless) at all; in Vedānta, however, although as long as the empirical, mundane transactions exist or continue the *Vyāvahārikā Prapañcha* (empirical, material world) is dealt with as if it is real, its real essence of Being, in the ultimate analysis (i.e. from the Absolute Reality viewpoint), is Advitiyātman alone."

**HOW CAN IT BE SAID THAT ŚĀSTRA IS PRAMĀṆA OR VALID MEANS FOR ADVAITA**

Here in this context a doubt may arise: To say that Śāstra (Upanishadic lore) indicates (teaches) non-duality is a Vyāhatōkti, meaning a contradictory statement. For, Śāstra becomes Pratipādaka or that which propounds or expounds, and Advaita is Pratipādya or that which is propounded, and if this kind of duality is accepted, then non-dualism cannot be established, proved; if it is not accepted, how at all can one assert that Advaita is Śāstrasiddha or established on or through the valid means of the Śāstra?

(Consolatory Explanation) : With the help of the rope-snake illustration we have already (2-17, 18) given a detailed solution for this query. Unless and until the reality (substratum) of the rope is accepted or acknowledged, there is no scope whatsoever for the imaginations (misconceptions) like the snake, a streak of water etc. to appear; for, any false appearance (misconceived or superimposed phenomenon) - whatever it may be - can never appear (manifest) without there really being an Āspada (substratum, support) at all. Merely on this ground alone, the Śāstra which refutes the (reality of) duality or diversity also can be proved to be the valid means for Advaita (non-dualism).

(Objection) : This solution is not proper, rational. For, just as the imaginary concepts like the snake, a streak of water etc. the rope too is invariably an imaginary concept in its cause.
Therefore, assuming - without any valid proof - the rope to be a *Paramārtha* or Reality devoid of any *Vikalpa* or misconception, if one goes on arguing, then it becomes illogical, irrational.

**(Solution)**: Not so, when we conceive of objects in various ways like - “This is a rope”, “This is a snake”, “This is a streak of water” etc., although the object existing in front of us is not a Vikalpa, there in that region or spot there invariably exists a particular substance which is perceived by us and which we address as ‘this’ but which is not at all an imagined thing (*Avikalpa Padārtha*). Now, keeping that entity (which serves as the substratum) as an illustration, example, to propound that *Advaita* is the substratum for all sorts of mental concepts is not at all illogical or improper. On the other hand, to argue that a thing which is addressed by us as ‘this’ and which is perceived by us before us is itself not existing amounts to opposing universal experience (*Anubhava*). Even in the case when one obstinately affirms that that substratum too does not exist, then because of the fact that - one who says that such a thing does not at all exist or one who exhibits his misconception saying that all these are mere imaginary concepts alone - in both cases at least the disputant has perforce to admit that he himself exists, here there is no scope whatsoever for the vain argument that everything is *Shūnya* or essencelessness.

**(Doubt)**: Here there is no proper semblance or relevance between the illustration (*Drishtānta*) and the illustrated (*Dārshtāntika*). For, in the illustration a substance called ‘rope’ is an object for the *Pratyaksha Pramāṇa* or valid means of perception. But in the case of the illustrated Ātman, the *Siddhāntins* (Vedāntins who propound Advaita) keep on affirming that He is not perceived by any valid means. It is quite reasonable, logical too. How is it possible at all for any Vikalpas to arise in Ātmavastu or the Entity of the Self which is ever, eternally *Aprameya* or imperceptible, unobjectifiable ?

**(Solution)**: This is not at all a defect. For, the fact that our Ātman exists is popular, familiar; only with regard to the question of what exactly is His real essential nature of Being there is no certainty, definite cognition, that is all. There is no rule of law at all that the entity in which people entertain a misconception should necessarily be determined through
a valid means *(Pramāṇa)*. If it has been cognized, reckoned through the means of perception in the manner - "This is a rope" - in that entity who will ever misconceive it to be something else? Only if a thing is generally *(perfunctorily)* known in the manner - "this", but if it is not determined in the perfect manner in answer to the query - "What is 'this'?" - then alone people imagine, guess in the manner - "This is a rope" ; "This is a streak of water" etc., is it not so? In the same way, we all have the common, general form of experience 'I' ; with regard to it none of us has any doubt whatsoever. No one can ever doubt in the manner - "Do I exist or not?" We are perceiving every now and then special features like - 'I am a happy person' ; 'I am a miserable person' ; 'I am a fool' ; 'I am born' ; 'I will die' ; 'I was a young man' ; 'I am an old person' ; 'These are my people' - etc. The 'I' which is Ātmarūpa or of the nature of self-consciousness, awareness is accompanying all these thought-constructs, mental concepts. Because 'Sukhitwa' (happiness) and 'Duhkhitwa' (misery) etc. are universally-acknowledged experiences alone, the Śāstra need not undertake the task of establishing or proving their validity at all ; it is also universally known that they do not always exist in the self-consciousness. Further, with regard to this specific form of 'I' notion or concept - that too is universally established ; that too the Śāstra need not endeavour to establish or prove. But it has *perforce* only to determine the question - "What exactly is the real essential nature of this Ātman or self of the nature of 'I' concept? In fact, this is what the Śāstra unravels or reveals. Because Ātman is not an object for any kind of knowledge (to wit, He can never be objectified as a known concept or percept, and hence the Śrutis emphasize the truth that He is 'Aprameya'; it is not possible for the Śāstra to delineate in the manner - "Ātman is such and such an entity" ; in truth, the Śāstra has not at all undertaken this impossible task. However, the Śāstra by propounding that the special characteristics, which are appearing to exist in Ātman (Pure Being-Consciousness), do not at all belong to His essential nature of Being in the manner - "'Neti, Neti'" - (Not this, not that) - *(Bṛhadāranyaka)* ; "Asthūlamanānu" - (which is not gross, which is not subtle) - *(Bṛ.)* etc. refutes, rejects all those Dharmas or qualities, characteristics which do
not belong to Him in the least, and by such negation alone (negatively, so to speak) the Śāstra helps indicate our Ātman or Self.

**THE VALIDITY OF NEGATING SENTENCES**

We should discern the truth that scriptural sentences like - “Not this, not that” ; “Not gross, not subtle” etc. - merely refute the respective misconceived form exclusively and achieve the fruition of their purport, but we should never assume that they indicate or imply the Abhāva or non-existence of a special characteristic or another special feature different from it or opposed to it. ‘Ajñāna’ means the absence or lack of Jñāna, or it may mean also ‘misconception, wrong knowledge opposed to Jñāna.’ If it is said : “This is not gold”, it may also imply that “It is brass” ; but, in that same manner, when it is said in the case of Ātman - “Not this, not that” - there is no opinion or teaching whatsoever implied, of the type - “Something else.” If it is stated - “Ātman is not Sukhi” - its purport is not at all - “Ātman is Duhkhi” ; for, the Śāstra attaches equal relevance to both the statements viz., - “Ātman is not Sukhi” and “Ātman is not Duhkhi”. In Ātman no special characteristic form or quality whatsoever ‘really’ exists. Therefore, in reality there is no special distinction in Ātman at all ; in fact, in distinctionless Ātman alone all distinctions or special features are imagined, misconceived - and this alone is the purport behind all Nishedha Śrutī or scriptural statements of negation. In Avasthās or states like Sushupti (deep sleep) and Samādhi (trance) etc. we are not seeing any distinct quality or characteristic whatsoever in Ātman (Pure Consciousness). Therefore, the Śāstra does not indicate directly, positively in the manner - “Ātman is of such and such distinctive nature, quality - etc.” ; merely after stating - “Ātman is not this, not that” - by refuting qualities, characteristics not belonging to His essential nature, they (scriptures) stand vindicated in communicating their ultimate purport. Merely on this count the scriptures or Śāstra is said to be a Pramāṇa or valid means to signify or teach the subject-matter of Ātman, i.e. Self-Knowledge. For this reason alone, Shri Dravidāchārya, one of the ancient preceptors belonging to his traditional line (Sampradāya) of teachers, had written the Sūtra
or aphorism: “सिद्धम् तू निवर्त्तक्षं” (Merely because of their refuting, removing those Dharmas or qualities which do not belong to Ātman, the Śāstra Prāmāṇya or validity of the scriptural texts is established) - this Shri Śaṅkara has expressed in his Bhāṣhayas.

**IN ĀTMAN DVAITA (DUALITY) WHICH IS INAUSPICIOUS DOES NOT EXIST AT ALL**

भावैरस्त्रित्रेवायम्यायेन च कल्पित: ।
भावा अप्यथ्येनैव तस्माद्यथात्वा शिवाः।१३३।

Meaning: “This Self is imagined to be the unreal things and also to be non-dual; and these perceived things are also imagined on the non-dual Self. Therefore, non-duality is auspicious.”

**THE PRIMA FACIE ARGUMENT OF DVAITĀDVAITAVĀDINS**

It has been stated in Kaṭhōpanishad 2-3-2 that - “The Ātmatattva or the Reality of the Self, devoid of Pralaya (dissolution) etc., is Itself Paramārtha or the Absolute Reality” - is it not so? Ātman is being seen, the imagined phenomena like Prāṇa etc. are also being seen. It being so, how at all can it be determined that Ātman alone is the Ultimate Reality and not Prāṇa etc.? The Advaitins may doubt in the manner that: “Because we have assumed that appearances (phenomena) exist, there is no benefit accruing, is it not so?” But whether there is any benefit or not, it is true that Dvaita (duality), like Advaita (non-duality), is appearing. Therefore, it is proper, legitimate to assume that both these are real indeed.

(Doubt by Siddhānti): Both Dvaita and Advaita cannot possibly exist in one and the same entity; for, they are opposed to each other. Therefore, it should be declared that Dvaita is unreal. Is it not so?

(Opponent with prima facie viewpoint): Not so. In a tree the manifoldness of many branches is seen; in the sea the variety of waves, bubbles etc. is seen. Therefore, it amounts to saying that there is no opposition, contradiction between Dvaita and Advaita. Apart from this, it is not correct to say that there is no benefit accruing from Dvaita. Just as there exists a benefit of the attainment of Mōksha (Liberation) from Ekatwajñāna (Knowledge
of Unity), there exists the benefit of the conduct of *Loukika* (mundane, empirical) and *Vaidika* (scriptural, religious) transactions from *Nānātwa* or manifoldness also.

**REFUTATION OF DVAITĀDVAITAVĀDA**

This theory, doctrine is not proper. For, although it is true that misconceptions like *Prāṇa* etc. do appear, it is not possible to affirm that they are real, because their essential nature does not exist ever as it appears. Just like the misconceptions of a rope-snake, a streak of water, they are getting sublated, falsified. Just as the real essential nature (empirical entity) of the rope exists, subsists as the substratum for all mental, misconceived concepts, Ātmaswarūpa eternally, perennially exists as the substratum for all misconceptions like *Prāṇa* etc. Further, just as the rope itself is misconceived (wrongly imagined) to be the appearances, Ātman is being misconceived as *Prāṇa* and such other forms. Not only is it true that just as those Vikalpas get sublated each by the knowledge, cognition of the other, these *Prāṇa* and such other misconceived forms get sublated; but further these misconceived forms do not appear whatsoever in Avasthās or states like Sushupti, Samādhi etc. Although it is true that in the Śrutī (Upanishad) the Sushuptātman is called ‘*Prājña*, ‘*Prāṇa*’, then (i.e. in deep sleep state) He is not at all cognized or Intuited in any distinctive form with special features whatsoever. It is true that by comparing with special forms existing in Jāgrat and Svapna we have to say that He (Ātman) therein (in deep sleep or trance) remains in His Kāraṇarūpa or causal seed form; but because in Sushupti no special distinctive form really appears therein, Ātman exists as Advitiya or non-dual (one without anything else second to Him) ; in Him therein no division, distinction of the forms of *Grahyā* (grasped, comprehended object) or *Grahaka* (grasping, comprehending subject) whatsoever appears.

(Doubt) : We should aver that the phenomena which appear in Jāgrat and Svapna are Ātman’s ‘Prachalitarūpas’ or forms which are set in motion, i.e. in vogue alone, is it not so ?

(Solution) : This concept especially cannot at all be acceptable to anyone; for, Ātman is Kūṭastha, in Him there can never occur any mutation whatsoever. Therefore, all the phe-
nomena which appear in Jāgrat and Svapna are (due to) the natural proclivity, tendency of the fickle mind; just as when there is a lamp the brilliance, glow of the light that is seen, in truth, belongs to the lamp alone, in the same manner it amounts to saying that only when the mind exists the duality, diversity that is seen or which appears belongs to, is related to, the mind alone. In due course (4-73) the Kārikākāra himself states that the Dvaita (duality) of the form of Grāhyagrāhaka is a mere vibration of the mind. Because of that fact, we should not conclude that - “All this amounts to Vijñānavāda alone”. We will indicate the vast distinction between Advaita which propounds that - “In the Kūṭastha Ātman both the mind and the Dvaita that appears as an object to it are Kalpita or misconceived, imagined” - and Vijñānavāda in due course. Let it be. On the whole, Ātman, remaining perennially in one and the same form or nature, is Himself imagined both in the form of the false, unreal phenomena of Prāṇa etc. and in the form of the Paramārtha (Absolute, Transcendental) Sadrūpa (of the essence of Reality, Pure Existence) Advayātman (non-dual Self). That is all, and it should not be reckoned that the rest of the phenomena really exist as separate, distinct entities and - just like a thread passing, running through different flowers - Ātman, alone exists in all substances, objects.

ALL PHENOMENA ARE, IN THE ABSOLUTE SENSE, THE NON-DUAL ĀTMAN ALONE

(Objection) : That Ātmatattvā which exists as the Sadrūpa (Pure Being, Existence) in Avasthās like Sushupti, Samādhi etc. Itself gets transformed in various forms with special features in Jāgrat and Svapna. The sea itself gets transformed into various forms like waves, foam and bubbles etc. and is appearing in those distinct forms, is it not so ? This is also just like that only. Besides, there is a Śruti sentence (Taittirīya 2-7) saying : “That Ātmatattwa Itself created Itself.” Just as the Paramātmatattwa, which is analogous to the sea water of the illustration, really exists as Sadrūpa, in the same way these various phenomena with distinct features, which appear after being transformed in the waking and the dream, analogous to the various distinct forms like the waves, foam etc., are indeed Sadrūpa alone, is it not so ? How is it proper to say that phenomena (Bhāvas) are false,
unreal? If this alone is true, then it amounts to admitting that Upanishads are exclusively the valid means (*Pramāṇa*); *Karmakāṇḍa* - because it signifies phenomena which are *Asadrūpa* (of the form, nature of unreality) - though a part of the *Vedas* (just like the *Jñānakāṇḍa* which comprise the Upanishadic lore) - is rendered *Aṇṇāṇa* (invalid), is it not so?

(Solution): This is not proper. For, those phenomena like Prāṇa etc., remaining as non-dual alone, are imagined indeed. Even when imagining in the manner - “They exist in the various forms of Prāṇa etc.” - they do not at all exist without giving up or discarding their *Advayātmāsvarūpa* (the essential nature of non-dual Self or Pure Being-Consciousness) which is *Paramārtha* (Absolute, Transcendental Reality). This truth we have previously (2-30) indicated already. These phenomena of Prāṇa etc. do not exist in their respective distinctive forms giving up the support of or apart from Ātman (Pure Being-Consciousness), is it not so? Even when they have manifested in the forms of appearance, nothing else does exist anywhere at all. It is not possible to aver that - “In that case, let it be said that Ātman too is *Kalpita* (imagined) only!” Because, a Vikalpa (concept, imagined thing) can never exist without an Āspada (substratum). An imagined rope-snake etc. cannot be said to be imagined without it having an entity or a substance (*Vastu*) which is a substrate for it, is it not so? Hence, it is not possible for anyone to assert that Ātman too, who is the support, substrate for all imaginations (*Kalpanas*), is Himself an imagined thing, a concept. For that reason alone, the Śruti is stating: “That is *Satya* (real), that alone is Ātman” - (Chhāndōgya 6-8-7). Further, it has to be determined that because for all kinds of mental concepts It (Self) is the Witnessing Consciousness (*Sākshi*), It is not imagined; for, in reality (i.e. from the standpoint of universal Intuitive Experience), without Sākshi being there, no object (*Padārtha*) can ever appear at all.

(Doubt): In that case, what is the purport behind writing the Kārikā in the manner: “He is also imagined in the *Advayarūpa* (non-dual form)”?

(Solution): The meaning of that statement is not that - “He (*Ātman*), existing non-dual is also *Kalpita*”. Just as for all the
various imaginations (concepts) of individual cows (i.e. the species) the Śāmānya (genus) of ‘Gotwa’ (cowness) exists as a substrate - the Śāmānyarūpa (the category of genus, which appears to exist persistently in all phenomena of the form of duality, is also Kalpita (imagined or conceptual) alone; for, in Ātman, in the absolute sense, these categories or concepts of Śāmānya (genus) and Vishesha (species, particular) do not exist in the least - in fact, this is the (intended) purport of that statement.

Now, the prima facie statement of the opponent that - “Ātman being of the essential nature of Dvaitādvaita alone is proper; only then, both the Karmakāṇḍa and Jñānakāṇḍa acquire Prāmāṇya (validity, authority)” - is in all respects improper. For, Ātman is always, perennially Niravayava (devoid of parts), is Eka (unitary, non-dual). It should not be doubted here in the manner - “In that case, Karmakāṇḍa is rendered invalid!” For, by assuming the universally familiar duality or diversity alone if Karma or action is stipulated by way of an injunction, the Karmakāṇḍa invariably acquires validity; but there is no cause whatsoever to imagine that - ‘In order that the validity of the Śāstra be upheld or established, duality has perforce to be real only.’ Besides, once it is determined that Advaita (non-duality) alone is real Dvaita (duality), which is of the form of Kriyā (action), does not subsist at all; only if in that manner duality subsists, it could be asserted that Dvaita has necessarily to subsist in reality, is it not so? The Śruti (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-5-15) is very clearly declaring that no duality whatsoever exists from the standpoint of the Jñāni when it says: “When from the viewpoint of this Jñāni everything became Ātman alone (i.e. Pure Being-Consciousness, the Ultimate-Absolute Reality), then there with what can He see what?” - thus, it is not possible to imagine, infer that the fact that there is no Vyavahāra (empirical transaction) was mentioned exclusively pertaining to the states like deep sleep and trance etc.; for, Vidya or Intuitive Knowledge denotes, depicts an Entity, Reality which always (perennially) exists and not a particular thing or phenomenon which exists (appears) in an Avasthā. Besides in Śrutis like - ‘Ātman is Adrishta (imperceptible), Avyavahārya (beyond the realm of workaday transactions), Prapañchōpashama (devoid of the world
of duality), Shānta (tranquil), Shiva (auspicious), Advaita (non-dual), He is cognized as the fourth. He alone is Ātman, He should be cognized” - (Māṇḍūkya 7); “That alone is Ātman, That alone thou art” - (Chhāndōgya 6-8-7) - etc. it is expounded that Advaita is not restricted exclusively to any one state. Therefore, it is proper, reasonable only to say that - “Ātman is not transformed into the forms of phenomena like Prāṇa etc.; all those phenomena, existing as Ātman alone who is of the really Real (Absolute, Transcendental) essence of Pure Being-Consciousness, are appearing in those various forms.”

ADVAITA ĀTMAN ALONE IS OF THE ESSENCE OF AUSPICIOUSNESS

Thus, for reasons like: - (a) Ātman is the substrate for all mental concepts, (b) His essential nature of being non-dual never changes - even when the imagined phenomena are appearing, the non-dual nature itself is ‘Shiva’ or of Mangalaswarūpa i.e. the essential nature of auspiciousness; the mere imagined phenomena are Amangalaswarūpa (of the nature of inauspiciousness). For, just like the rope-snake etc. they are the cause for Anartha (calamities, life’s troubles and travails) like Bhaya (fear), Shūka (misery) etc.

Meaning: “This world, when seen from the standpoint of the Self, does not continue to be diverse. Nor does it exist in any manner in its own right. Nor do phenomenal things exist as different or non-different (from one another or from the Self). This is what the realizers of Truth have cognized.”

THE INAUSPICIOUS MANIFOLDNESS DOES NOT AT ALL (EXIST REALLY)

Nānātwa means manifoldness i.e. things being different from one another; where that (such manifoldness) exists there is invariably inauspiciousness. For instance, from beings like a tiger, a thief etc. which are different from us, inauspicious experiences like fear, terror etc. accrue. But if we properly examine, observe
the phenomenon of duality or diversity, then we can discern that it is nothing but of a nature of Ātman (Pure Being-Consciousness). Just as when viewed, observed in the light of the lamp the snake (i.e. rope-snake) is verily seen as a rope, in the same way if we see (cognize, Intuit) with the light of Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge), then Dvaita is verily Ātman or Pure Being-Consciousness; the former is not existing separately at all. Then, especially in its apparent form of duality it does not at all exist; all that exists is verily Advaitātman (non-dual Self) - and is this not called 'Jñāna'?

Now, although in the Vyavahāra Avasthā (waking, empirical state of Consciousness) the Vikalpas (imagined things, phenomena) invariably appear to be distinct from one another, observed from the Paramārtha Drishti even the Vikalpas, distinct from one another, do not at all exist. The Vikalpas - like a snake, a streak of water, which are imagined in the rope, no one ever thinks, reckons to exist really, invariably being distinct from one another - is it not so? People, in general, have believed that a horse is really existing distinctly, separately from a he-buffalo; but with regard to the imagined (misconceived) rope-snake etc. - which are mere appearances - no one ever believes with regard to them in the manner - "These are fit to be cognized in the manner - 'This is different from that'." Therefore, they are not distinct from one another; nor one can affirm that all of them (i.e. such misconceived phenomena) are one and the same too. In the same way (if this line of Intuitive reasoning is pursued to its fruition, finality) we can never assert that those Vikalpas are different, distinct from Paramātman (Supreme Self) or non-different. Previously in 2-30 it was true that it was stated: "Although all these Bhāvas (phenomena) are Aprīthak (non-different), He (i.e. Ātman) is cognized to exist separately indeed"; but the intended purport behind that Kārikā was only to strengthen the truth, teaching that - "The non-dual Ātman alone exists; none of the apparent phenomena whatsoever exists really" and not at all with any opinion of expounding a teaching that - "All apparent phenomena do exist without change apart from Ātman." Therefore, there does not exist any opposition, contradiction between the teachings of that Kārikā and the present Kārikā. In any case, thus apart
from Ātman all the rest of the categories or concepts or phenomena - everything else - are merely misconceptions indeed. They are not different, distinct from Paramātman, nor are they one with Paramātman. Among themselves too, they are not different from one another, neither is it ever possible to affirm that they are all one and the same; no phenomenon - whatsoever it may be - from the Paramārtha Drṣthi - is distinct separate at all. Therefore, the non-dual Ātman is perennially of Mangalaswarūpa (essential nature of auspiciousness); it is now established that whether within or outside Himself (i.e. Ātman) there does not exist any cause whatsoever which gives rise to Amangala (inauspiciousness).

DELIBERATION ON THE ESSENCE OR REALITY OF DIFFERENCE, DISTINCTION (BHEDA TATTWA) IS NEEDLESS

Some among the thinkers - adept in the deliberation on the essential nature (or reality) of distinction or difference - first assuming that all empirical phenomena exist distinctively or separately from one another, undertake to examine the doctrine of those who opine that - "Difference, distinction is to be established exclusively on the valid means of perception." They further endeavour to discuss the topic after imagining (assuming) a question that - "Whether the concept or category of distinction, difference is a Dharma (quality, characteristic) or Swarūpa (essential nature of Being) of separate entities, objects?" But after it is determined in the manner - "All the phenomena which are appearing to us are mere misconceptions; they are misconceived in (superimposed upon) the non-dual Ātman" - 'there is no scope whatsoever for this discussion. In any case, the final candid determination, decision of those who have cognized the Ultimate Reality of Ātman (Self-realized souls) is: "As a result of any phenomenon (or misconceived object of appearance) which is Adhyārūpita (superimposed) upon the non-dual Ātman, there is no taint of Amaṅgala (inauspiciousness) whatsoever affecting or adhering to the latter." There is no harm or danger being posed by any Yukti (logical device) or Anubhava (experience) - whatsoever they may be - to this truth, teaching.
THIS ABSOLUTE REALITY WILL BE INTUITED BY
VEDÂNTINS WHO ARE ENDORED WITH A COMPOSED,
CALM, CONCENTRATED MIND

Meaning: “This Self, that is beyond all imagination,
free from the diversity of this phenomenal world, and non­
dual, is seen by the contemplative people, versed in the Vedas
and unafflicted by desire, fear and anger.”

PEOPLE WHO ARE QUALIFIED FOR ADVÂITÂTMA JÑÂNA

Although in this manner this Ultimate Reality is devoid of
any blemish, stigma of Amangala (inauspiciousness) whatsoever
and It is our very Ātman (Self) alone, this Advayātma Tattwa
(non-dual Reality of our Self) is not Intuited, cognized by every­
one. For, those, in whose Antahkarana the latent impressions,
proclivities of duality are very strong or deep-seated, are unable
to dissociate themselves from, or discard, their Dvaitasatyatwabuddhi
(steadfast belief in the reality of duality or diversity), which is
having a vice-like grip on their intelligence from time immemo­
rial. Because defects like - (a) having attachment in things which
are desirable, and having hatred in undesirable things ; (b) a fear
complex that things wanted by them may get destroyed or the
apprehensions that some particular impediment or risk may
entail them ; (c) a pronounced, burning desire for things wanted
by them and if any hindrance, impediment to that desire is
encountered then indignation, wrath etc. - are abounding in their
mind, although this Ultimate Reality which is non-dual and aus­
picious is verily their Ātman (i.e. their innate essential nature of
Pure Being-Consciousness in esse), they are incapable of cognizing,
discerning It. Only to those persons, who are devoid of these
above-mentioned defects, drawbacks and who are always ratioci­
nating, ruminating in their minds about this Paramâtmatattwa
alone and who have cognized, Intuited this Vedânta Tattwa (Ulti­
mate Reality expounded by the Vedântic, Upanishadic texts) which
is in truth the goal of all Vedas exclusively, this Tattwa (Reality)
which is devoid of any trace or taint of Dvaita and which is
Advaita and Mañgalakara (auspicious) will be cognizable.
This opinion is clarified in the following Muṇḍaka Upanishad sentence and such other Śruti sentences, viz. ‘वेदान्तस्वयं सत्यश्चिन्दुः संयोग्यादाय: सुदृढःसत्त्वा:’ - (Muṇḍaka 3-2-6) - meaning: “Only those Jñānanishthas (people who are fully established in the Self-Knowledge) who have determined convincingly the Tattwa (Absolute, Ultimate Reality of the Self) by means of Vedāntavijñāna (Vedantic Intuitive Knowledge or Experience) and who have attained Sattvashuddhi (purification of the mind, heart) will attain the Paramāṁritatwa (the Absolute, really real immortality).” This phrase of a verse, viz. “वोतमाप्यव्याप्ती:” - meaning: “Those who are devoid of attachment, fear, anger or hatred” - is seen in Gītā (4-10); there in that context too, it has been stated that - “To those who are purified by means like Jñāna (Self-Knowledge), Tapas (meditation, austerity) Bhagavattatwa (the Absolute Reality of Paramātman) becomes cognizable.”

THE TRANSACTIONS (BEHAVIOUR) OF A VIDWAT SANNYĀSIN (REALIZED SOUL)

तस्मादेवं विदित्वचेतो योजनेिन स्मृतिम्।
अद्वैतं समप्रायं जडवल्लोकमाचरेऽऽ००६।।

Meaning: “Therefore, after knowing It thus, one should fix one’s memory on (i.e. continuously think of) non-duality. Having attained the non-dual, one should behave in the world as though one were dull-witted.”

IF NON-DUAL ĀTMAN IS INTUITED, ONE GETS ESTABLISHED IN ĀTMASMṚTISANTATI OR CONTINUOUS CONTEMPLATION OF THE SELF

It is spiritually instructed for the benefit of Mumukshus, who are genuine spiritual practitioners, in the manner - “Because of the fact that in this manner by means of Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) the Anartha (life’s torments and traumas) in the form of Dvaita (duality) are totally destroyed in all respects, one should determine Intuitively that this Ātman (Pure Being-Consciousness) exists in this manner and should engage his memory (i.e. constantly remember) in non-duality; one should achieve the inclination, keen interest of the mind exclusively for (the ultimate goal of) cognizing the non-dual Reality alone.”
Or, in the alternative, the spiritual teaching can also be interpreted as: “By cognizing this non-dual Ātman one should endeavour to establish his mind firmly, steadfastly in remembering the non-dual Ātman.” If the second meaning is accepted and reckoned, then because it becomes self-established that - “Once Jñāna or Self-Knowledge is attained that alone will thrive, persist in the seeker’s memory” - here in this context the teaching that - “This Ātman’s Knowledge (Intuition) has to be perforce attained” - is most important. On the strength of Śruti sentences like - “This Ātman is Brahman” - (Māṇḍūkyya 2) ; “It is the opinion of the Knowers (of Reality) that the One who is Prapañchopashama (devoid of the world), Shānta (tranquil), Shiva (auspicious), Advaita (non-dual) is Himself the fourth ; He alone is Ātman” - (Māṇḍūkyya 7) - which expound Ātmajñāna if one acquires the Intuitive Knowledge of Advaita Ātman, then the Dvaita Jñāna (knowledge of duality, diversity) which is opposed to the former and is false, unreal (i.e. misconceived) will by itself disappear, get sublated ; if it is falsified (i.e. got rid of), then because the defects like Rāga (attachment), Bhaya (fear) etc. can never exist, there is no scope whatsoever for the Dvaitasmṛiti (remembrance of duality to be real) to exist as it does at present. Therefore, then the Advaitasmṛiti alone will get set, established. Hence, to say, here in this context, that it is stipulated by way of an injunction in the manner - “One should acquire Advaitasmṛiti” - is not proper ; for, Advaitātmān as well as the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) about Him remains devoid of Kriya (action), Kāraka (means of action), Phala (fruit of action) indeed.

THE ERRONEOUS DOCTRINES THAT EVEN AFTER THE ATTAINMENT OF VĀKYAJÑĀNA (KNOWLEDGE BORN OUT OF ŚRUTIVĀKYA) ONE SHOULD PERFORM OTHER SĀDHANAS

Here in this context anyone may doubt in the manner: “First, one should cognize Advaitātmān by means of Śāstra ; in order that cognition to become steadfast or strong, one should repeat the Smritisantarati (continuous remembering Advaitātmān) - thus here it is stipulated as an injunction.” In fact, some disputants have expressed their opinions thus vociferously.

But this opinion is not proper ; for, as we have already stated that it is not possible at all for the Dvaitasmṛiti to subsist
or remain once the Advaitajñāna is attained. It is not possible also to doubt that - “It may be that that Jñāna has not become steadfast, strong.” For, where is the cause for doubting in the manner - “If a sentence is Advaitātmāparā or concerning the non-dual Ātman, then from such a sentence the correct, proper Ātmajñāna or Self-Knowledge is not produced” - ? True, some people do doubt in the manner - “By means of a sentence Aparokshajñāna (direct Intuitive Knowledge) does not accrue”. But, just as in the parable that - “Some ten dull-headed people were crossing a river ; after they reached the opposite bank of the river, while counting their total number, each one counted the external nine persons only leaving out to count himself and all of them were agitated and anxious as they thought one of them (the tenth man) has been drowned in the river, out of ignorance ; at this juncture a wayfarer counted in order each one of them and convinced each one of them in the manner - ‘You are the tenth person.’ Instantly, each one obtained the Aparokshajñāna that - “I am myself the tenth (missing, left-out) person” - in the same way, here also when the Śruti instructs in the manner - “The Turiyātman, devoid of any duality, diversity whatsoever, alone is thyself” - instantly for the Aparokshajñāna to accrue there exists no hurdle, impediment whatsoever.

(Doubt) : If in this manner merely by Vākyashravaṇa (listening to the sentence) the correct knowledge of the entity as it really is (Yathārtha jñāna) were to accrue, the stipulation of further Śādhanas like Manana (ratiocination, reasoning), Nididhyāsana (contemplation) by way of injunctions (Vidhi) in the Śruti will be rendered futile, purposeless, is it not so ? Further, the Śruti having stipulated yet other Śādhanas like Shama (control over the mind), Dama (control over the senses), Brahmacharya (celibacy) ; Yajña (sacrifice), Dāna (charity), Tapas (meditation, austerity) etc., according to this doctrine, becomes worthless, futile, is it not so ?

(Solution) : Not so. Because, Manana and Nididhyāsana also are needed in order to cognize Ātman properly. In the case of one who does not possess the superlative capacity, qualification of attaining Jñāna merely by Shravaṇa alone, for such a practitioner Manana as well as Nididhyāsana is needed. Because of the fact that by means of acquiring perfectly spiritual
(purificatory) practices, disciplines like Shama, Dama etc. his mind, intellect gets mature and thereby the Aparokshajñāna accrues, these being stipulated as injunctions is not futile or fallacious. Because in texts like Gītā etc. it has been propounded that for those qualified seekers who perform Sādhanas like Yajña, Dāna, Tapas the beneficial fruit of Chittashuddhi (purification of the mind by way of giving up attachments, dislikes for external objects and other desires) is obtained and thereafter the qualification, capacity of attaining Jñāna is attained - those Sādhanas also being stipulated does not become futile at all.

IS THERE ANY NEED OF ANY SĀDHANA FOR SHABDAJÑĀNA OR KNOWLEDGE ACCRUING FROM WORDS

Some people like Brahmasiddhikāras (Maṇḍana Mishra’s followers) have here raised a doubt of the type: If a Vākya (a sentence) is Nirdushta (inviolable, irrefutable), then it is not proper, logical to say that for the word knowledge to accrue Sādhanas like Yajña (sacrifice) and such other rituals are needed. Anyone who has the capability of interpreting a sentence as also the familiarity with Nirukta (one of the six Vedāṅgas, that which contains glossarial explanation of obscure words, especially those occurring in the Vedas, or etymological interpretations), Vyākaraṇa (grammar) etc. can reckon the meaning of a sentence. Is it not so?

This doubt is not proper. For, if anyone’s mind is not sufficiently refined (i.e. being rid of impurities like fickleness and extrovertedness, and being full of mundane desires etc.), then it cannot discriminate, determine that such and such alone is the meaning of a sentence. If it is contended that because a sentence is Nirdushṭa its meaning should necessarily accrue to everyone, then there is no cause or scope whatsoever for disagreement among various disputants with regard to the meaning or interpretation of a sentence. It is not reasonable to imagine, infer that merely on the ground of one possessing the exquisite, excellent instruments needed for Jñāna (Knowledge) even a person who does not have ‘Chittashuddhi’ (purified mind, heart) can attain Jñāna. For, even if one of the finest pair of spectacles is used, utilized (i.e. available for use), either by a blind person or an illiterate person, the skill or excellence of reading by means of the spectacles can never accrue. Therefore, the Siddhānta (final
spiritual teaching) is that - “Only to a properly qualified person alone the Vedas or sacred scriptures can communicate, convey the proper meaning and knowledge implicit in them, and not that to all and sundry the subtle knowledge born out of the interpretation of the Vedic (or Vedāntic) sentences will accrue.”

Another point: The Absolute, Ultimate Reality that the Vedānta Vākyas expound is Ātman who is the innermost entity in everything. But by nature the common run of people are engrossed invariably in examining the external objects through their senses alone. Therefore, only to those, whose Chitta (mind) is withdrawn from external objects of perception by means of Vairāgya (renunciation) and whose mind has acquired the inner ‘Intuitive vision’ by becoming Antarmukha (introverted) and has become capable of cognizing Ātman who is Atīndriya (imperceptible to the senses), nay who is beyond the reach of the senses and the mind - to such persons alone the cognition of the real purport of the Vedāntic sentence will accrue. For that purpose alone those who are spiritual practitioners should acquire Chittashuddhi through the performance of Yajña, Dāna, Tapas and Pratyagdrishi (inner Intuitive vision, viewpoint) through the disciplines of Shama, Dama etc. Although among the Śadhakas for those who have very sharp intellect (superlative discriminative mental faculty) by means of merely listening to the Vedāntic sentence once the full import and subtle Intuitive significance of the sentence may accrue, those who have impediments like Agrahana (non-comprehension), Samshaya (doubt), Anyathāgrahana (misconception) with regard to the Padārtha (the Reality, entity signified by the words) have necessarily to repeat Sravana (listening to Vedāntic texts) and have to practise assiduously so as to imbibe the scriptural reasoning; and these requirements are rightly to be anticipated in them.

Therefore, the statement that - “Knowing that Advaitatmata-tattva is extremely subtle and all-pervasive, those seekers who wish to Intuit that Absolute Reality should necessarily practise Sarvakarma Sannyāsa (giving up, renouncing agentship of all actions) as also endeavour to observe disciplines, spiritual excellences like Shama, Dama, Uparati, Titiksha, Shraddhā, Samādhāna (i.e. Shaṭka Sampat) etc.” - is quite reasonable indeed.
JÑĀNI REMAINS WITH NIRAHĀMKAṆA (NON-EGOISM)

In this manner one who has Intuited Advaitatmatattwa (i.e. a Jñāni, Self-realized one) cognizes, finds out that “Ātman, who : (a) is beyond (the six mutations of life) hunger, thirst, grief, attachment, old age, death ; (b) is beyond all empirical transactions ; (c) is of the very essence of Pure Being which is Sākshāt (direct), Aparoksha, (Intuitive) ; (d) is devoid of continual changes like birth, death etc. - Himself am I” - and thereafter carries on all workaday transactions as if one who is not knowing anything at all. Without exhibiting in the manner - “I am a Jñāni of such and such a calibre” - with regard to the abundance of Jñāna (Self-Knowledge), Vidyā (erudition), Dharmāsakti (deep devotion, attachment to religious virtues, righteousness) etc. and lives on without any defects like Dambha (hypocrisy), Darpa (pride, insolence) etc. whatsoever. Just as the Śruti - 'तस्मात् ब्राह्मणः पाणिडिः निरिष्य बालेयेन निष्यासेन' - (Bṛi. 3-5-1) - has stated, after attaining Ātma-jñāna in its plenitude he (i.e. a Jñāni) lives like an innocent lad. In order to delineate the behaviour of such a Jñāni, Shri Śaṅkara has quoted two verses in his Sūtra Bhashya (3-4-50):

गूढगमिश्रितो विद्यामङ्गात्मचरितं चतुर् ।
अनूक्तविवक्षापि मूकवच्च महां चतुर् ॥

यें न सन्तं न चासनं नासुतं न बहुशुव्रतं ।
न सुवृत्तं न दुर्वृत्तं वेद कस्थितं स ब्राह्मणं ॥

(Meaning : “The Jñāni who has observed a secret set of religious virtues (Dharma) maintains his behaviour without making it known to anyone ; he is roaming about on earth like a blind man, like an ignorant one, like a dumb person. He who is not known to anyone whether he is a Satpurusha (a holy man) or Asatpurusha (a wicked, unholy man), whether he is one who

1. In the Ashwamedha Parva verses 46-52 of Mahābhārata Epic it is stated :

गूढगमिश्रितो विद्यामङ्गात्मचरितं चतुर् ।
अमृतो मूढः सुवृत्तं चरेद्वर्धमदूस्यत् ॥
has not listened to and learnt Śāstra or one who has excessively
listened to the Śāstra, whether he is of a good behaviour or of
a bad behaviour - such a one alone is a Brāhmaṇa.”)

Meaning: “The Yati (recluse, mendicant) should have no
appreciation or greetings (for others), and he should be free from
rituals. He should have the body and soul as his support and he
should be dependent on circumstances.”

WHEN JÑĀNA ACCRUES PARAMAHAMSAPĀRIVRĀJYA BY
ITSELF, AUTOMATICALLY, ACCRUES

In the previous Kārikā it has been stated that the Jñāni
should behave like a Ṛja (dull-witted person), is it not so?
What kind of behaviour is that? To this question an answer is
provided here in this Kārikā.

The statements like - “without praise, without salutations or
prostrations” - are meant to denote that - “He does not have any
actions whatsoever which have to be (ordinarily) performed to
satiate either the deities or the sages.” It indicates that for him
there is no stipulation of performing a Hōma (sacrifice), Pūja
(worship) etc. for propitiating a deity and whatever such rituals
may be there ; in the same way, the statement that he does not
have any ‘Svadhākāra’ signifies that the annual rites to satiate
‘Pitrus’ (manes, ancestors) also do not entail him. It amounts to
saying that for the Yati (i.e. Sannyāsin) none of the scriptural
rites or rituals like - “Putrotpatti” (getting progeny) for the
conquest, success in Manushyaloka or this empirical world, Karmas
meant for “Pitrulōkajayaprāpti” (success, conquest in the world
of manes) and Upāsanas (meditations) meant for “Devalōkaprāpti”
(attainment of divine, celestial world) - whatsoever is enjoined to
be performed. Because he has attained the Intuitive Knowledge
to the effect - “I am of the very essence of Nityamukta or
perennially liberated state” - for him henceforth there are no
‘other worlds’ to be attained ; nor are there any more spiritual
Sādhanas remaining for him to be performed. Just as the
Bṛhadāranyaka Upanishad says : ‘एते वै तपात्मानं विदित्ता ब्रह्मणा:
The purport of this Śruti statement is that since for the Jñāni there is no desire whatsoever for the three worlds, he renounces entirely all the Karmas and the Upāsanas and adopts a way of life of a *Paramahamsaparivṛṣṭaka* (i.e. a wandering mendicant or monk who has no mundane possessions).

For this reason alone, such a *Jīvanmukta* (a Realized Soul in this very life-span) is eulogised in the Smṛiti in the following manner:

\[ \text{मिर्घिष्ठमनार्थं निर्मलमका}} \text{मस्तुतिम्} \]

\[ \text{निपुंक बनने: सरैस्त देवा ब्रह्मण विदुः} \]

- (Mōksha Dharma 245-24).

**Meaning**: “He does not have any desire whatsoever; he does not perform any action with any desire for the attainment of its fruit at all; there is no need for him to prostrate before any deity, nor is there any need for him to praise any deity. He is freed from all kinds of bondages. The deities reckon such a one as the true *Brāhmaṇa* (Brahmin).”

For him there is no place to pinpoint and say - “This is his home” - as in the case of a householder. His living place means ‘*Chalāchala*’; here ‘Chala’ means the body; for, this keeps on changing repeatedly; ‘Achala’ means Ātmatattwa which is Kūṭasthanitya. When by virtue of his *Prārabdha* (fate, destiny) the forgetfulness of Ātmatattwa occurs and when due to the cause of taking food etc. the *Bāhyasmṛti* (memory of external objects) occurs, then the home is the body alone which is Chala. But when there is no rise or occurrence of external, extroverted memory in this way, then Ātmatattwa alone is his home; meaning, in his essential nature of *Ātman* (Pure Being-Consciousness) he rests steadfast, fully established quite naturally, habitually. Hence, he is called ‘*Chalāchalaniketa*’. For this reason alone, it has been stated in the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* (2-21-10) that: One who is a Sannyāsin should “give up the Agni (hearth); should remain without a known living place or home”.

Such a Jñāni will be “*Yādricchhika*”, meaning - he is content with whatever is easily available, procurable without any
restrictions, constraints as regards his necessities of life like Koupīnam (a strip of cloth worn over the privities), a covering cloth, food etc. There are Smṛiti sentences to support this: “Koupīna and covering cloth - these he should wear sufficient for his needs” - (Goutama Dharma Sūtra 3-18); “Some people say that things which are thrown, discarded here and there should be cleaned and used” - (Goutama Dharma Sūtra 3-19). The meaning of the Gītā sentence - “He is satisfied with Yadricchhā from whatever is easily obtained” - (Gītā 4-22) - is this alone. This purport is described in detail in Moksha Dharma as:

नित्युत्तिम्निर्मायकः परित्यज्य शुभाशुभे।
अरण्येः विचरैकाको येनकेनविदाशितः।। - (Mō. Dh. 242-2).

Meaning: “Without praise, without prostration, giving up Puṇya (merits), Pāpa (demerits) eating whatever food is available, roam about in the forest in solitude”.

In this Kārikā, Paramahamsapārīvṛājya which is spontaneously self-established by Ātmajīna (Self-knowledge) devoid of any association with any Kriyākarakaphala and which is attained by one who has Intuited, realized Advaitātmatattwa has been explained. For this the Śruti statement: ‘एतद्ध स्म वै तत्पूर्वे विद्वान्। प्रजाः न कामयते किं प्रजया कारिण्याभो येशं नो०यपात्माश्च लोकः’ - (Bṛ. 4-4-22) - meaning: “Those who are Jñānis inquire and think in the manner - ‘By progeny what is to be achieved by us? This alone is our Ātman, this alone is our Lōka (world)’ - live without desiring for progeny” - is the authoritative source. In this same Śruti (Bṛ. 4-4-22) further it is propounded that an accessorial aid to Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) is this ‘Pārīvṛājya’, which is of the form of ‘Sarvakarmasannyāsa’ in which the practitioner has to renounce all mundane, empirical rites and rituals as well as accessories like Yajñōpavīta (sacred thread) etc. necessary for them, and is itself recommended for those who are still continuing their efforts to Intuit the Tattwa. Therefore, the ultimate purport of the Kārikā is that - A ‘Mumukshu’ (seeker of Liberation, Beatitude) who wishes to Intuit Advaita Tattwa should perforce be endowed with extreme Vairāgya (renunciation, detachment from and disinterest in worldly matters).”
Meaning: “Examining the Reality in the context of the individual and in the external world, one should become identified with Reality, should have his delight in Reality, and should not deviate from Reality.”

METHOD OF ACQUIRING TATTWANISHTHĀ

Previously, it had been stated that the seeker should practise ‘Smriti Santāṇa’ or continuous, relentless remembering (contemplation) of Advaita (non-duality, Pure Absolute Being-Consciousness), is it not so? Here a doubt arises: “Only after the mind stuff assumes the form of the external object, the knowledge or cognition of the object ensues? But Ātman does not have any form at all! It being so, how at all is there any possibility of any Ātmākāra Vṛitti or a mental concept of the form of the Self being acquired? If it is not there, then how at all can one attain Ātmajñāna?”

For this, the solution is: ‘Ātmajñāna’ does not mean - ‘acquiring the mental concept of the form of Ātman’. For, Ātman is Himself, without being dependent upon anything else, familiar (i.e. innately, intrinsically known universally). It being so, where is the need at all for a Vṛitti (mental concept, thought-construct) about or pertaining to Him? Since He is verily the Self (Intuitive non-dual Being, Experience per se) of the ‘Jījñāśu’ (the seeker of this Self-Knowledge), He does not have any hindrance, impediment obstructing His cognition. When the Avivekins (non-discriminative, ignorant people) have allowed themselves to be attached to or bound by thoughts about aspiring for or hankering after the external (transient) objects alone, they naturally have acquired a deep-seated misconception, is it not so? To get rid of this alone is Atmajñāna needed. Everyone entertains the concept of ‘I’; but in it there is intricately included a misconception which has blended (mysteriously, as it were), with Anātman (not-Self) which is not one’s real Self. Getting rid of this misconception alone is the genuine Ātmajñāna in esse.

It being so, we should first discern that - “All the constituents like the body, the vital force, the senses, the mind, the
intellect, the ego etc. - which are Ādhyātmika (of the corporeal plane) - just like the rope-snake, dream and magic - are mere imaginary false appearances; their reality (substrate) is Ātman alone." In the same way, we should cognize that - "The earth, the water etc. - which are Ādhibhoutika (of the material, physical plane) and their effects are all false appearances alone in the forms in which they are perceptible; their essential nature is really Ātman alone." Thus we should cognize that the world of duality (Jagat) which appears externally and the body, the senses etc. which appear internally - all these are - just as it is stated in the Śrutis, viz. ‘ऐतदल्यभिदं सर्वं तत्त्वं स आत्मा’ - (Chh.), meaning “Everything is Ātman alone....” - ; ‘वाचाराम्भः विकारे नामवेयम्’ - (Chh. 6-1-1), meaning “Everything is merely a vain transaction of words, speech; all changes are mere names and forms” - in their perceptible forms unreal, false alone.

Thereafter, on the validity, veracity of the of the Śruti sentence - ‘तत्त्वं स आत्मा तत्त्वमिसि’ - (Chh. 6-8-7) - we should become one with the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality) Intuiting in the manner - “For all this world of duality which is being seen and for me - Ātman is the Sadbrahma alone (i.e. the really real substratum). That Paramārtha Tattwa alone I am.”

In this manner, after discerning that - “Everything is Akhaṇḍa Tattwa (immutable, impartible Reality) devoid of a within and a without, and that alone is my essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness” - one who is delighting relentlessly is ‘Ātmārāma.’ One who has cognized the Ātmatattwa in the manner that - “Below, above, behind, in front, to the right, to the left - everything is Ātman alone” - (Chh. 7-25-2), and ruminating, ratiocinating about It alone, who is ever delighting as an Ātmārāma with the Intuitive Experience of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness - such an enlightened person remains steady, steadfast without slipping away from Ātmatattwa. This alone is called “Ātmanishtha”

THE OPINIONS OF SOME VEDĀNTINS HAVING MISCONCEPTIONS

(1) Bhāvanāsanchayavāda or Theory Of Attaining Mōksha By Means of Suppressing Heaped Up, Accumulated Imaginations, Concepts:
Failing to discern the truth that - “The Paramārtha Tattwa is eternally non-dual; Ājñāna alone is the solitary impediment in the path of cognizing It” - some people had interpreted this Kārikā in a different manner. What they opined was: “By accumulating Ātmabhāvana or concepts about the Self if the seeker attains Samādhi, then, as a result of this, Moksha is attained. If the mind (Chitta) is fickle, wayward, then it amounts to the seeker having slipped down from the Tattwa; but if all the Chittavrittis (mental concepts) are Nirūdha (suppressed, repressed), and Samādhi (trance) is attained, then it is tantamount to the seeker having become one with the Tattwa alone; by means of Vedānta Vākya (Upanishadic sentences) if the seeker cognizes the truth that - ‘I am Brahman’ - and practises that Jñāna itself repeatedly (Anusandhana) then he attains Samādhi and becomes one with the Tattwa Itself. His Chitta (mind) melts down all duality (Dvaita) and turns itself towards non-duality (Advaita) and finally itself gets merged in Advaitātmatattwa.”

This opinion is not proper, correct. For, by the valid means (Pramāṇa) of the Vedas (i.e. the Upanishads here in this context) once a seeker attains the Vijñāna (Intuitive Knowledge, Experience) of the type - “I am myself Advaitāman” - there does not subsist, remain any other Ātmadarshana (Intuition of the Self, Reality) separately; thereby, there is nothing else whatsoever to be done, performed in order to obtain It afresh, or anew. In the case of those who affirm that - “Merely by means of (listening to) the Vedavākya, Ātmajñāna is not attained or It does not accrue” - Veda (scriptural texts) are rendered Apramāṇa (invalid, unauthoritative). If by means of Sādhanas like Dhyāna (meditation) etc. the Chitta (mind) is endowed with Samskāra (refinement, purification) and thereafter if the Chitta is destroyed, it amounts to this Dhyāna being rendered futile; if it is not so and if it is accepted that even in the Muktyavasthā (state of Liberation) Chitta exists in its Swarūpa (essential nature of Being), then Advaita is never established at all; for, it amounts to accepting that even then the two (dual) Tattwas (entities) of Ātman, Chitta do exist indeed. If it is contended that - “Only after the Chitta has transformed, metamorphosed all Dvaita (duality, diversity) into Advaita (non-duality) it (Chitta) also gets destroyed and hence there is no cause, scope for this doubt at all” - even then,
because of the fact that it amounts to Advaita becoming a product of a Śādhanā of Dhyāna, that Advaita (Tattwa) is rendered to be Anitya (non-eternal). Shri Sureshwarāchārya, the author of Brihadāraṇyaka Vārtikā has pointed out many such defects in the doctrines of these ‘Ekadesha Vedāntins’ (Vedāntins with lop-sided views, opinions) and has finally declared: “The Bhāvana (concept, belief) of the type - ‘I am a Samsāri (transmigratory soul)’ - persists in a Jīva without a beginning (Anādi) ever since Kōṭikalpas (crores of creations); if such a deep-seated belief, concept were to be destroyed merely by a Bhāvana practised for a brief time in one particular Janma (birth), then what Pramāṇa (evidence, valid proof) is there to assert that by dint of that practice made in a brief period of time the Vāsana (latent impression) continues to exist eternally? It being so, what this Bhāvanāsanchayavādins propound as their doctrine is not correct, proper. By this means there can never be a deliverance, liberation from such Anartha (calamity) at all - (Bṛ. Vā. 4-4-778, 79).”

It being so, one who is a Jījñāsu (seeker of Self-realization) should not entertain the misconception that - “I will become the Tattva (Ultimate Reality of the Self) by means of a Śādhanā (spiritual practice entailing performance of something either at the body level or at the mental level) and thereafter I will try not to slip down from the Tattwa.” Ātman is verily our Swarūpa (the essential nature of Pure, Absolute, non-dual Being-Consciousness), is it not so? What is meant by saying - ‘slipping down from one’s essential nature of Being’ - ? What is meant by attaining such a state of ‘not slipping down from the Tattwa’ by a Śādhanā? It is not proper to believe erroneously (or to entertain a misconception) in the manner - “For Ātman who is of the essence of Ekarūpa (one and the same nature) there exists a possibility of giving up His essential nature because of Chitta Vikshepa (mental aberration) and sliding, slipping down; or, one’s essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness as the Self is to be obtained, attained afresh, anew in states like Samādhi etc.” In truth, if one (i.e. the genuine seeker) attains the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge, Experience) of the type - “I am ever (eternally, perennially) of the very essence of Brahman, Ātman” - alone, it is tantamount to being one with Tattwaswarūpa; then only, there
is no question of ‘slipping down’ from Swarūpa indeed. For the Gītā statement - “Parameshwara exists equally in all Bhūtas (creatures and objects) ; even if they get destroyed, He is not destroyed ; one who has cognized this truth - he alone has verily cognized the Truth” - (Gītā 13-27) - this alone is the purport, intended meaning.

(2) The Theory That Even After The Attainment Of Jñāna There Can Be Dvaita :
In this context there is a need for examining the opinions, doctrines of some more Advaitavādins who propound a cause for Moksha.

One particular group of Advaitins say : “Moksha is acquired by the mere removal of Avidyā, which is the Upādānakāraṇa (material cause) for the Adhyāśapraṇāha (continuous flow of misconception) of the type - “I am a Kartrtu (agent of action), a Bhōktṛtu (an enjoyer). Therefore, if Avidyā is Nivṛtta (removed, is got rid of) by means of Brahmavidyā, then merely the Nivṛitti of Kartrutwa, Bhōktṛtwa etc. will ensue but not Sakaladvaita (the whole gamut of duality). Even so, by means of Brahmavidyā, Pramātrutwa (cognizership) is got rid of. Then the world like Prithivi, Ap etc. is not perceived by him. Just as those who do not have certain sense organs do not perceive the respective sensations like Shabda (sound), Sparsha (touch) etc., in the same way here too it should be reckoned. Therefore, although the external world of Prithivi, Ap etc. exists as before, the Jñāni attains mere Dvaitanivṛitti alone but not Prapañchanivṛitti at all.”

This opinion, theory is not correct. For, at the outset what these proponents have imagined as ‘Avidyā which is Adhyāsopādāna (material cause for the misconception of the ‘I’ concept) is itself not established to be true, real ; in that case, where is the question of that Avidyā being destroyed by means of Nidyā? Sometimes these people keep on saying that - “Ayyakrīta which is the state of the seed form of the world is itself this Avidyā”; but to say that that is the Upādānakāraṇa (material cause) for Pramātrutwa (‘I’ notion as the cognizer) there is no authoritative statement or supporting proof whatsoever. Apart from this, only to one who has Pramātrutwa there occurs, accrues the cognition, knowledge of the Prameya (perceived object) ; but to say that - “There exists a Prameya devoid of a
Pramāṭru” - is meaningless, ridiculous. It being so, the statement that - “Even after the Adhyāsa (misconception) of the Pramāṭrutwa is removed, the entities like Prithivi, Ap etc. which are Prameya continue to exist” - is rendered meaningless indeed.

Here anyone may raise a question of the type - “Merely by the removal, disappearance of one individual’s Pramāṭrutwa, can it be possible to affirm that the whole world like Prithivi, Ap etc. will become extinct?” But this doubt is not correct. For, the world (that we have assumed to be existing really, actually before us) is merely an imagined world alone projected due to misconception; apart from it no other world really exists at all. If that misconception is removed, got rid of, then the truth that - “The phenomenon of the world of duality never existed, nor was it removed” - will become very clear. This fact was previously (1-16) clarified. If it were the case that a really existing world does not appear, then merely on that count it does not amount to saying that one has attained Nishprapaṅchātma Darśana (Realization of the Self devoid of the world of duality). Merely on the ground of a form not being perceptible to a blind man, who will ever transact in the manner that - “Form does not exist anywhere in the world at all” - ? In the Śruti Ātman has been described in the manner - ‘प्रणवोपययमेव शान्ते शिवमद्वैतम’; it is a sentence which signifies a Nitya Satya (an eternal Truth) indeed. Therefore, the argument that - “Even after one attains Ātmajnāna the Dvaitapraṇāṇcha invariably exists” - is untenable.

(3) The Theory Of Advaita Being Visible to Anubhava Engendered In An Avasthāvishesha:

There is another opinion; that too is opposed to Yukti (logical devices). The doctrine of the proponents of this theory is: “Although Tattwajñāna removes, destroys all Karmas, Avidyā and Rāga, Dvesha etc. that are produced, it is not capable of doing away with Prārabdha Karma which is Śrutisiddha (established on the authority of the Vedas). Therefore, as long as the impediment of Prārabdha Karma exists, It (Tattwajñāna) is not capable of removing Dvaitapraṇāṇcha (the world of duality, diversity). The concept that - “The Jñāni is also invariably seeing, perceiving duality; at the same time, he is also endowed with Brahmātmānubhava (the Intuitive Experience of Brahman-Ātman)” - is self-contradictory, is it not so? - for this kind of an
objection there is no scope here. For, in the state of Asamprajñāta Samādhi (a trance in which there does not exist any distinct knowledge, consciousness) there exists Ātmaikatvadarshana (Intuition of non-duality of Ātman); but being within the control, grip of Prārabdha Karma on other occasions (i.e. when not in Samādhi state) there invariably exists Dvaitaprapāṇchadarshana also. Therefore, the objection of the type - ‘Because Dvaitadarshana is Vyabhicharita (changing, transient) it is Mithyā (false, unreal) only; as long as the body exists, who can, and how, attain Aparoksha Darshana (direct, Intuitive Knowledge, Experience)?’ - cannot plausibly raise its head here. For, only to a person who has got a body while the Prārabdha Karma is yielding its fruit the Aparoksha Jñāna has perforce to accrue. From our historical texts it is learnt that great sages like Vyāsa and many others, though they were embodied, were Aparokṣa-jñānis. Hence, even for a Tattwadarshi (one who has realized the Ultimate Reality of the Self) the Dvaita Prapañcha may invariably be perceptible.” This is the opinion of these proponents.

This doctrine also is not correct. For, if it is accepted that - “At one moment Dvaita is seen and at another moment it is not seen” - then it amounts to saying that there may be Chyuti (ruin, loss) affecting, or accruing to, Ātman’s essential nature. Apart from this, because an Anishta (undesirable result) of the type - “One who possesses a body will perforce have to have Pramātrutva (cognizership, ‘I’ notion, egoism); Dvaitadarshana also will necessarily have to exist” - is faced with, if one asserts, quite opposed to this logical deduction, saying that there can be Advaitadarshana simultaneously, coevally - then it becomes grossly self-contradictory. It is also not proper to deduce that - “Because of facts like - (a) Sages like Vyāsa etc., who were embodied, were stated in the Śastras to have attained Aparokṣa-jñāna; (b) from historical records also it was learnt that they were Aparokṣha-jñānis, on the strength of Śrutarthapatti Pramāṇa (the valid logical means of inference based on Śruti statements - used to account for this apparent contradiction) and hence we are constrained to imagine that even for those who are embodied there can accrue Aparokṣa-jñāna and at the same time, together with it, by virtue of Prārabdha Karma Dvaitadarshana also may accrue to him.” For, if the Śāstra expounds statements with
contradictory meanings then it will be rendered *Apramāṇa* (invalid, unauthoritative).

Here one *doubt*: The concept that a body exists; the phenomenon of Dvaitadarshana exists - both these are the offshoots, effects of *Mithyājnāna* (misconception). But because for a Jñāṇī there can never be any Mithyājnāna, even if Dvaita appears *as if* it exists, in reality all that is *Mithyā* (false, unreal) indeed. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the Jñāṇī there does not at all exist any Dvaita, is it not so? Merely because it appears as if there exists Dvaitadarshana, what is the impediment for Jñāṇa?

*(Solution)*: This *alone* is the correct Intuitive Knowledge. Merely, on determining the truth that - "The whole gamut of duality is false, unreal" - in consonance with *Anubhava* (Intuitive Experience of Pure Being-Consciousness), it becomes tantamount to (acknowledging) saying - 'Advaita alone is *Paramārtha* (Absolutely real)' - and hence even after Pramatītwa is sublated, falsified there is no question whatsoever of believing at any time in the manner - "Ajñāna (ignorance) persists; or even after Ajñāna is removed, Ātman has two distinct states, viz. in one He perceives Dvaita and in another He does not perceive Dvaita." This alone is the finally established (time-tested) Siddhānta.

(4) The Erroneous Teaching, Doctrine That A Jñāṇī Also Has To Practise Advaitasmriti (Memory of Non-Duality) Incessantly:

For this same verse some have written the following commentary: The statement that - 'By means of Jñāna that accrues from the Vedānta sentences Avidyā is destroyed' - is verily true. But even so, as a result of the fact that Avidyā existed from time immemorial even this *Vākyajanya Jñāna* (i.e. knowledge born out of the Vedāntic sentence) is falsified, sublated by Avidyā. To explain, Avidyā is of *two types*: What exists as a natural phenomenon is one Avidyā, what has come into being during an interval, for a period in time, is another Avidyā. The latter kind of Avidyā which has come into being during an interval envelops (*Āvarana*) the object which is *Anātman* (not-Self); this vanishes as soon as Jñāna accrues. But in the case of the other natural Avidyā (*Swabhāvikāvidyā*), which exists from time immemorial, it is not so; even after it is removed by Jñāna it reappears or
rears its head, so to speak. Because it is in everyone's experience universally that even in Jñānis defects like Rāga (attachment), Dvesha (hatred) etc. (to wit, they are indeed the "offshoots of Avidyā only) are seen sprouting out - (just as a blade of grass which has dried up during the winter, comes to life during rainy season) we should reckon that, in the same manner, Avidyā reappears recurrently. Therefore, the adherents should not remain satisfied merely knowing (intellectually) this Ātmatattva by means of Śāstra texts; they should keep on regaining that Advaitātma Smṛiti (memory of non-dual Self) repeatedly. This opinion alone is signified by, implied in, the verse: "तत्त्वज्ञानात्मिकं दृष्ट्वा" For this opinion there is support of the following Śruti also: 'तमेव धीरे विज्ञाय प्राणः कुर्वीत ब्रह्मः' - (Bṛ. 4-4-21). meaning - "Even after cognizing that Ātman alone one who is a Vivekin (discriminating seeker) should attain Prajñā (the Intuitive Consciousness)."

This opinion too is not correct. For, in our workaday world when people have misconceived (wrongly cognized, imagined) a sea-shell or nacre as silver, the real cause for this misconception of 'silver' is simply the person not having cognized that sea-shell properly, correctly, that is all; but not that apart from the knowledge or otherwise of the sea-shell there exists separately the knowledge and ignorance of the false silver - none of us can ever acknowledge this far-fetched, bizarre concept. People mistake or wrongly reckon a sea-shell alone to be 'silver' because of Bhrānti (delusion), is it not so? In the same manner, when a simple, frank explanation of the type - “Because people have not properly Intuited Ātman as He is, He alone is seen by them in the Mithyākāra (false appearance, form) as the world of duality" - is sufficient (to drive home the subtle teaching, truth), if it is misinterpreted in a totally different, distorted manner, imagining Vidyā(s)vidyās of the types - Jñāna which cognizes Anātman and the false, wrong knowledge which has accrued as a result of not cognizing Anātman, respectively, then it smacks of Gouravadōsha or defect of not attaching the proper dignity, respect, esteem for Śāstravākyā.

Anyone may raise a doubt here like: "In our workaday world, there is a transaction of treating Pratyaksha (perception), Anumāna (inference) as Pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge), is
it not so? Therefore, we should accept that there exist separately Vidya and Avidyā pertaining to Anātman, is it not so?” But, although before we wake up - in the dream transactions, which appear therein to be real alone, the Vastuvibhāga (divisions or distinctions of objects) like ‘What is real’ and ‘What is false, unreal’ as also the Jñānavibhāga (divisions or distinctions of knowledge) like ‘correct knowledge’ and ‘wrong knowledge, misconception’ are appearing as if they are true - because of the fact that all that was merely a dream, on waking we determine that all those transactions were false alone; in the same way, it is reasonable and proper for Vivekins (wise seekers) to determine, decide that both the Pramāṇaprameya Vyavahāra (transactions involving the cognizer and the means of cognition) and the Satyamithyādivibhāga Vyavahāra (transactions of dividing real and unreal or false phenomena) appearing due to Ātmāvidyā (ignorance or lack of the Self-Knowledge) are false, misconceptions only.

Now, these proponents say that - “Because Rāga and Dvesha caused by Avidyā are seen to be existing in Jñānis too, it should be accepted that even after the ignorance with regard to the Self is sublated (by Jñāna) it sprouts out again” - is it not so? Our rejoinder to this is: “One in whom appear Rāga, Dvesha etc. he has not really attained Advaitātmabhāva (the Intuitive Experience of non-dual Self, Pure Being-Consciousness) at all. It being so, the statement that - ‘Even after Avidyā is sublated, falsified it reappears and strikes down, destroys Vidya or Self-Knowledge’ - is extremely ridiculous. This school of philosophy existed even prior to the Vārtikākāra (Shri Sureshwarachārya, one of the direct disciples of Shri Śaṅkarāchārya). The manner in which this fallacious doctrine has been refuted by him is: “If Avidyā exists as before, even after Jñāna accrues, then what is the Pramāṇa (valid proof) to affirm that even after that Avidyā is destroyed it once again does not reappear?” (Bṛ. Vā. 4-4-914); “Between Vidyā and Avidyā there exist the Bhava (concepts) of Bādhaka (sublator) and Bādhyā (sublated); in fact, this is the relationship that exists between them; it being so, how can the Avidyā which is itself sublated ever falsify or sublate Vidyā which is the sublator? There is nothing like fire, which burns out wood, is itself being burnt out by wood, is it not so?
Even when it was existing, this Avidyā did not destroy Vidyā; it being so, to affirm that after it (Avidyā) was actually destroyed it can sublate, falsify Vidyā, what Pramāṇa (proof) is there?" - (Bṛ. Vā. 4-4-915, 916, 917). Therefore, to assert that - "Avidyā rears its head again and again; and in order to destroy it Vidyāsmṛti has to be constantly observed, practised" - can never be proper, rational.

(5) The Doctrine Of The Mādhyamikas

A verse which is like a replica of this Kārikā had been composed by Mādhyamikas (followers of a school of Buddhism), viz.: ‘शून्यमात्यतिकं यश्य पश्य शून्यं बहिर्गतम्। न विद्यते सोपथि कस्थितयो भावयति शून्यताम्॥’ - (Mādhyamika Vṛṣṭti, p. 1124) - meaning: “Recognize that which is inside as Shūnya (i.e. essenceless); recognize that which is appearing outside too is verily Shūnya alone. (Recognize also) that no one - who cognizes, reckons that everything is Shūnya - exists.” - This is, in fact, the literary meaning of this verse. Here in this context unless and until it is determined as to what exact meaning has been adduced to this word ‘Shūnya’ by these proponents, we cannot determine the essential teaching or otherwise of this doctrine. If these people have called the Paramārtha (Ultimate, Absolute Reality) Itself, which cannot possibly be described or defined by any statement or words, by the word ‘Shūnya’, then the phenomena which appear to us within and without in our workaday world are not real in the forms they appear. We can interpret this verse in a particular manner so as to mean: “The essential nature of Reality of this world of duality which appears distinctively in the forms of Prāṇatru, Pramāṇa and Prameya is Shūnya.” Then, in that context, it amounts to merely saying that “Shūnya” means another name for that Tattva (Ātman) which the Vedāntins expound. Then it will have to be perforce accepted that there will not exist any difference, distinction between the tenets of the Vedāntins and those of these Mādhyamikas. Otherwise, if it is contended that apart from the Turiyātman, which is describerd and propounded in the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad as being ‘Prapañchopāșama’ (devoid of the world of duality), ‘Śānta’ (tranquil), ‘Śiva’ (auspicious), there exists separately an entity or phenomenon called ‘Shūnya’ - then it amounts to saying that -
“Being devoid of *Vastusvabhāva* (essential nature, stuff of an entity or an existing substance) is itself Shūnya.” Since we have to take up this second meaning itself for elaborate examination and discussion in the fourth Prakaraṇa, let us stop this topic here. Mentioning merely that such a phenomenon of Shūnya can never be established in any manner, we will proceed in our deliberation.

**BEING ONE WITH THE REALITY, GETTING FULLY ESTABLISHED IN IT ONLY ONE SHOULD NOT SLIP DOWN FROM THAT TATTWA**

Now, the purport behind the second half of this Kārikā has been mentioned in a brief axiomatic manner alone. The gist of this latter half of this verse is: “One (the true seeker) should determine that all duality is *Avidyākalpita* (projected or conjured up by ignorance) in the manner in which this teaching has been expounded in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, and should himself remain, stay put being one with Tattwa; *Advaitātmanishṭhā* (consummate, steadfast establishment in the non-dual Self of the very essence of Pure Being-Consciousness) which is Itself the *Tattwa* (Ultimate, Absolute Reality) - one should be absorbed in It.” Since this topic of Advaita Tattwa is being explained in full detail in the next, i.e. the third, *Prakaraṇa* (called Advaita Prakaraṇa) we conclude this second Prakaraṇa here.
III ADVAITA PRAKARĀṆA

1. RELEVANCE (RELATIONSHIP) OF THIS PRAKARĀṆA

Hitherto it has been depicted that what is determined in the Upanishads as the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality) of Ōmkāra in the manner - “It is devoid of Mātras, the fourth, not suitable for Vyavahāra, wherein the Prapañcha has come to nought, Shiva (auspicious), Advaita (non-dual)” - is verily Paramārtha beyond speech and mind. In the same way, in the Kārikās of the “Āgama Prakarāṇa” it was mentioned here and there that - “Ātman is Advaita (non-dual).” Thus what was mentioned there to the effect that - ‘Ātman is non-dual’ - was merely Pratijñā (a proclamation, proclamation), but it was not substantiated by adducing Yukti (logical, dialectical arguments). There, no logical devices whatsoever were adduced and it was merely proclaimed with the opinion (belief) that the superior class of seekers of Self-Knowledge would, merely by means of Śravaṇa (listening to the scriptural pronouncements) of the type - “Ātman is Advitiya” - immediately Intuit the Reality of the Self.

Similarly, it was mentioned merely by way of a proclamation that Dvaita (duality) really does not exist in the manner - “If one cognizes the Tattwa, there does not exist any Dvaita” - (1-18). If it is said that the Paramārtha is “Advaita” - it means that (a) It alone, singularly and exclusively, is Paramārtha, as also (b) in It there does not exist even the least taint of Dvaita; between these two subtle meanings, although the superior class of seekers who are endowed with sharp intellect may determine or discern the truth that Ātman has no taint whatsoever of duality merely on the basis of Āgama (i.e. Śāstraic methodology of teaching in a traditional manner) of the form of spiritual instruction (Upadesha) - the low or inferior class of students may not grasp the real import of this subtle truth. They may, on the other hand, doubt in the manner - “When the duality is being actually perceived, if it is stated that Ātman does not have any relationship whatsoever with it (i.e. duality), how at all can we believe it ?” For the sake of such people, too, it has been already explained as to how Dvaita is false by means of Tarka (logic,
reasoning) in consonance with śruti statements; as also by means of illustrations of svapna (dream), māyā (illusion), Gandharvanagara (a celestial city) etc. - phenomena like ‘Drishti-twa’ (appearance as a percept), ‘Adyantatwa’ (concepts of a thing having a beginning and an end) were exemplified. Though svapna etc. do appear, there is not the least bit of any taint of these phenomena to Ātman which is the substrata for them; because these phenomena like svapna, māyā, Gandharvanagara do not at all exist before they appear and after they are sublated also, they are invariably false indeed. In the same manner, the duality that is appearing in Ātman also is ‘Vitatha’ (that which does not exist in reality as it appears). This truth was also depicted in the second chapter of ‘Vaitathya Prakaraṇa.’ By virtue of this tenet it was also determined that the kāryarūpa (the form of Its effect) of Advaitatma (non-dual self) is false.

Now, if it is demonstrated that - ‘Ātman by His very svabhāva (essential nature of Being) is devoid of any kāraṇatwa (category of being a cause); in Him there does not exist even an iota of kāraṇatwa for dvaita; He is by Himself alone (absolutely) Paramārtha (the transcendent reality)’ - then it may certainly be possible to establish the truth that Ātman, in the predominant absolute sense alone, is ‘non-dual’. For, only if it is demonstrated in that manner it can surely be decided that - “The Paramārtha, which is invariably the innermost self of everything, has perforce to be non-dual” and thereby the ajñāna (ignorance, lack of correct knowledge) with regard to Paramārtha will totally be sublated, negated. As otherwise, merely if its kāryarūpa (form of effect) is shown to be false, there may still be a doubt of the type - “In It there may be really kāraṇatwa (category of being a cause)” - lurking in everybody’s mind. Because there is an axiomatic truth that - ‘Wherever kāraṇatwa exists there invariably kāryatwa has to arise’ - even after it has been demonstrated that the kārya (effect) is false, the people with mediocre intelligence may doubt that ‘Dvaita Vaitathya Siddhi’ (the establishment of the truth of duality being false) has not been completely achieved. This opinion has been mentioned in the Brihadāraṇyaka Vārtika (of Shri Sureśvarāchārya) in the manner:
Meaning: “Paramātman has two forms of Kāryarūpa and Kāraṇarūpa; both these are born due to the Avidyā about that Ātman who is Sarvāntara (innermost Being of all); therefore, if that Avidyā is destroyed - they too get destroyed.”

This opinion has been revealed in the Kārikā too, which states: “If the misconception with regard to these two phenomena gets destroyed, he attains to Turiyasthāna (the fourth Absolute position)” - (1-15), is it not so? Because in the Śruti - “He is not Prajñānaghana (a lump of Consciousness)” - (Māṇḍūkya Upanishad Mantra 7) it has been indicated that the ‘Prajñāswarūpa’ (essential nature of Consciousness) which is of the form of a cause is also not present in Ātman, it is true that it amounts to both the categories of cause and effect being negated alone; but it was stated only by way of a Pratijñā (proclamation), that is all. Therefore, when a doubt of the type - “Whether the truth that Ātman is of an ‘Advaita’ Swarūpa devoid of both cause and effect categories has to be known merely by means of Āgama (Śāstra) alone or is it possible to discern it by means of logical dissertation?” - arises in our mind, in order to demonstrate that this truth can also be discerned by means of logic this third Chapter called ‘Advaita Prakaraṇa’ has been begun.

In fact, this Chapter has not been commenced with the lone purport of demonstrating that - ‘Advaita can be established by means of logical reasoning (discrimination) also.’ Some people may doubt in the manner: “Even after we have accepted the fact that both the phenomena of cause and effect are false, why cannot it be deduced that - ‘If Dvaita is false, Advaita also is false’?” Buddhists like Nāgārjuna etc. who are proponents of ‘Śūnyavāda’ (theory of essencelessness) have undertaken the task of establishing the theory that - “No viewpoint - whatsoever it may be - is proper.” Therefore, some people may possibly doubt in this manner: “Since Vedānta too is negating both the categories of cause and effect, it is also championing the cause of that Śūnyavāda alone. In order to remove such a doubt also, here it has become quite necessary to demonstrate the fact that - “By means of Tarka also the universal and eternal
truth that Advaita is Paramārtha can be established” - in a convincing manner.

THE PLACE OF TARKA

Because it is stated that - “Advaita can be signified by means of Śruti and it can be established by Tarka (reasoning, logic)” - it should not be concluded that Tarka also, along with Śruti (Śāstra Pramāṇa), is an independent Pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge). In the Śruti, which is the authoritative source for the Āgama Prakaraṇa, since Advitiyātmaman is self-established the special features of Avasthātraya which are superimposed upon Him (i.e. Advitiyātmaman or non-dual Self) are sublated (falsified, negated, rescinded) and the truth that - “Ātman is of Advaita Swarūpa (of the very essence of non-duality, i.e. having nothing second to Himself)” - has been clearly explained. Therefore, to some extent, the Śruti also has followed Tarka (reasoning) alone and has, for the sake of the superior class of seekers, instructed the self-established ‘Tattwa (Absolute, Transcendental Reality). That very truth was explained fully in the Āgama Prakaraṇa Kārikās. Since here in the present Chapter (Advaita Prakaraṇa) too - having followed or adopted that kind of Tarka which is adopted with felicity in the Śruti but in consonance with universal Intuitive Experience (Anubhavāṅga Tarka) so that it does not contradict It, the impediments like Samshaya (doubt), Viparīta Grahanā (misconception, wrong knowledge) are rescinded, negated and the real purport of the Śruti alone has been signified - it has been affirmed that - “By means of Tarka also Advaita can be established.” That is all. This explanation should be suitably made applicable to the second Vaitathya Prakaraṇa also.

Because Ātmatattwa is not a Prameya (object of perceptual knowledge), It cannot possibly be established by any Pramāṇa whatsoever ; because It is Swatahsiddha (self-established), there is no need whatsoever for establishing It by means of any Pramāṇa. Even so, for the sake or benefit of those seekers who are endowed with limited or low-grade intelligence (discriminative faculty) and are having predominantly an extroverted viewpoint, the Śruti, adopting the ancient time-tested traditional methodology of ‘Adhyārōpa Apavāda Nyāya’ (axiom of Superimposition and Rescission), deliberately superimposes on It certain
Dharmas (special features or attributes) which do not really exist in It and relatively rescinds certain other Dharmas, showing that they do not exist in It. Those preceptors who are well-versed in this traditional methodology of teaching are utilizing as an aid to this teaching the empirical logical arguments (Loukika Tarka) in consonance with that methodology. Therefore, in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, in order to clarify the truth that - ‘Ātman is Advaita’, first Dwaitamithyātwa (the truth that duality is false) was indicated and then the Kāryarūpa (the form or category of effect) was rescinded by means of Tarka; but here in the present context the Kāraṇarūpa (the category of cause - as a superimposed special feature) is rescinded, refuted. Thus, because Advaita Tattwa is self-established alone, It reveals Itself to the properly qualified seekers without any hindrance or hurdles whatsoever indeed.

2. AJĀTI PRATIPĀDANA PRATIJṆĀ
(PROPOSITION OF THE EXPOSITION OF NON-BIRTH)

Meaning: “The Dharmaha (follower of a Dharma or one who has religious aptitude) who has relied upon or taken resort to Upāsana (mental meditation) rests (exists) in latabrahma (a reality or entity which has a birth) in which everything was Aja (unborn) prior to creation. Thereby, he is said to be Kripaṇa (a wretch, a mean person). Therefore, I will tell you as to how (Brahman or the Absolute, Ultimate Reality) which is Akārpaṇya (not mean) and is having or endowed with uncaused or unborn Samata (quiescence, equanimity), though It is being born everywhere, is not being born, even the least bit.”

THE BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM CONDEMNING AN UPĀSAKA

In the Upanishads Brahman has been instructed, taught in
two forms: (a) the *Upāsyarūpa* (form of an object for mental meditation) endowed or associated with adjuncts which are the effects of names and forms; (b) the *Jñeyarūpa* (form of object of Intuitive Knowledge). Between these two forms what is described in the Śruti in the manner - ‘मनोमयः प्रणाशरीरे पारुपः सत्यसंवक्त्य आकाशात्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वायसः सर्वस्यः’ - (Chhindogya 3-14-2), meaning - “One who is endowed with mental concepts, thoughts; with *Prāṇa Sarīra* (having the subtle body comprising the vital force); with *Bhā* (Chaitanya) *Rūpa* (of the nature of the Light, Radiance of Pure Consciousness); with *Satyasaṅkalpa* (having volitions which really, unfailingly fructify); like the empty space (*Ākāsha*) all-pervading and subtle; having a body - devoid of any attributes like *Rūpa* (form) etc.; with the totality of *Karmas* (actions) which are found in the form of macrocosmic universe; with the totality of all desires found in the world; with all the fragrances found in the world; with all the tastes found in the world.......” - is that of “Sōpādhikarūpa” (form endowed with adjuncts, attributes); what is described in the Śruti in the manner - ‘नेति नेति’ - (Bṛi. 2-3-6), meaning - “Not this, not that”; ‘अस्थूलमण्यमहुःस्मदोधर्मः’ - (Bṛi. 3-8-8), meaning - “Not gross, not subtle, not short, not long”; ‘अशान्तरमण्यमर्मममयम्’ - and ‘नान्तःप्रजः न बहि-प्रजः’ - (Māndūkya 7), meaning - “That which is devoid of sound, touch, form and taste and which is indestructible”; “That which does not have any internal consciousness, or external consciousness” etc. - is that of “Nirupādhikarūpa.” Between these two forms, because the Upāsyarūpa is stipulated specially for the purport of Upāsana alone, this is not belonging to or related to the Brahma Swarūpa; whereas because the Nirupādhikarūpa is being Intuited universally even in states like *Sushupti* (deep sleep) and *Samādhi* (trance), it belongs to or pertains to Brahma Swabhāva. Because in the Vaitathya Prakarana it has already been established by means of Tarka in consonance with universal experience that - “Those objects seen only in the waking and the dream alone - none of them is Paramārtha” - it is proper indeed to determine or decide that - “Savishesha Rūpa (the form associated with special features) does not belong to the Brahma Swabhāva.” For that
reason only it was demonstrated, by means of suitable Yukti, in the previous Chapter itself (2-31) that the distinctions of the type of *Utpatti* (causation), *Pralaya* (dissolution), *Baddha* (bound), *Mukta* (liberated) etc. are not absolutely real (*Paramārtha*). Hence, it evolves by itself (obviously from all this) that the *Brahma Swarūpa* which is stipulated for the purport of *Upāsana* does not belong to the essential nature of *Being of Brahman*.

Some people who have not known this secret opine: “What is stipulated by way of injunctions in *Vedānta* (Upanishads) is *Jñāna* alone of the form or nature of *Upāsana*; the *Saprapaṃcharūpa* (form associated with the world) of *Brahman* is itself *Paramārtha*; ‘*Brahman* is born in the form of the world of duality’ - thus the *Śruti* has also stated in the *Śrishti Prakaraṇa* (Chapter devoted to Creation) and hence a *Jīva* has to perform meditate, upon *Saguṇeshwara* (the Lord associated with different qualities) and attain *Paramapurūṣārtha* (the supreme goal of human existence). In the Upanishads there exist many sentences which describe the *Brahma Swarūpa*, is it not so? In all of them there exists exclusively the description of *Brahman*, but it is not the purport of the *Śruti* to indicate that merely by knowing *Brahman* intellectually, one attains *Mokṣa* - thus they interpret the purport of the Vedas. Further it is their contention that - “The *Śrutis* like ‘स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः’ - (Māṇḍūkya Mantra 7), meaning - ‘He alone is *Ātman*, one should cognize Him’; ‘सोउन्नेष्टवः स विज्ञासितवः’ - (Chh. 8-7-1), meaning - ‘He should be searched out, He should be cognized’; ‘आत्मवेदोपपाति’, (Bṛ. 1-4-7), meaning - ‘One should meditate upon Him as *Ātman* alone’; ‘आत्मा व अरे द्वस्तम्’ - (Bṛ. 2-4-5), meaning - ‘Oh dear, *Ātman* alone should be perceived’ - etc. are sentences which stipulate by way of injunctions that one (i.e. the seeker) should perform *Upāsana* of *Ātman* by virtue of this *Upāsana* the *Adrishta Moksha* (liberation which is invisible and posthumous) which is mentioned in the Śāstra will accrue, or *Avidyā* will be destroyed.”

Because the root cause for their this erroneous contention is the *misconception* of the type - “*Brahman* is really of the essential nature of getting transformed into the form of the world
of duality" - alone, this third Chapter of Advaita Prakaraṇa has been begun for the prime purport of removing (rooting out) this Bhṛanti (delusion) and at the same time signifying the Paramārtha Swarūpa of Brahman.

THE PURPORT OF THE FIRST VERSE

Those people who have known (Intuited) Brahman or Ātman who is Nitya (eternal) and Aja (devoid of birth) assume, reckon that ‘Dharma’ (meaning Jīva) [The word ‘Dharma’ is used in Vedāntic parlance to mean ‘Jīvātman’ or a soul; for instance, refer to Kathopanishad 2-1-14] who thus exclusively or entirely resorts to or relies upon Upāsanās alone in the manner : (A) “I am an Upāsaka (meditator) ; I have to meditate upon Brahman and attain the Sāyujya (merger) of Brahman” ; for this, the following Śrūtis are the authoritative sources -‘देवो भूत्वा देवान्येयति य एवं विद्वानेतुपासेत’ - (Bṛ. 4-1-7), meaning - ‘One who meditates upon this Brahman in this manner becomes the deity and attains the merger into of Devatas (deities) ; ‘एष म आत्मासंपवृद्धय एतद्वहृतामिति: प्रेताभिसंभवितास्मि’ - (Chh. 3-14-4), meaning - “This alone is the Ātman who is in my heart ; after leaving this world and I transmigrate, I will reach Him’ - etc. (B) “Before the creation took place all this was Brahman alone which was devoid of birth. Now I am existing in Brahman which is born in the form of the world ; by performing Upāsana I will reach that very Brahman alone” - for this opinion the following Śrūtis are the authoritative sources : ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। चेत जातानि जीवन्ति। यत् प्रयत्नप्रसशिवाशनि।

तदृ विद्विज्ञासत्। तदृ प्रकृति ।’ - (Tai. 3-1), meaning - “From which alone all these creatures are born, by which alone after being born they are thriving, that which finally they reach and become one with It - that Entity you cognize ; that alone is Brahman” - thus one has cognized an Alpabrahma (limited, inferior Brahman) who is Parichhinna (divided) - and hence they consider him to be a Kripaṇa (wretched, low-class person) and Dīna (sorrow-stricken, ruined or spoiled man). As against these Śrūtivākyas there are also other Śrūti statements which signify that the Upāsya Brahman is not Paramārtha. To wit : ‘अथ योज्या देवतापपासेतेजन्यसा-चन्द्रहस्मिति न स वेद’ - (Bṛ. 1-4-10), meaning - “One who is
meditating in the manner - ‘This deity is separate, I am separate’ - thinking that the deity is different or separate from himself - he does not know the truth” ; ‘यो वा एतद्वर्ण गाम्यिनिद्विचारस्मिल्लोके जुहोति बजते तपस्तयते बहूनि बर्षसह्यायन्तवदेवाय तदृ भवति, यो वा एतद्वर्ण गाम्यिनिद्विचारस्मिल्लोकाल ईति स कृपणः’ - (Bṛ. 3-8-10), meaning - “Oh Gārgī, one who, without cognizing this Brahman devoid of destruction, performs in this world a Hōma (one kind of sacrifice), performs Yāga (another kind of sacrifice), who does penance for many thousands of years to such a person all those are practices which yield fruits which are non-eternal, ephemeral ; Oh Gārgī, one who, without cognizing this Akṣhara Brahman (Ultimate Reality devoid of destruction), leaving this world and transmigrates, he is Kṛipāṇa (a wretched fellow)” - This Śruti is the authoritative source for the above statement. For the teaching that - “The Brahmarūpa which is Upāsya is not Paramārtha” - the Ṭalavakāra Śruti is the authoritative source : ‘यद्रास्तान्यप्यातं बैन बागपुखलते । तदव्रस्त ब्रह्म तनं बिद्रे नेदे बिदितपुसापसे ॥’, meaning - “That which cannot be indicated by speech, but by which speech itself is being stated - That alone you cognize as Brahman ; that which people meditate as ‘this’ (as their object) - that is not Brahman (at all).”

THE PHENOMENON OF JANMA (BIRTH) IS FROM THE AVIDYĀ DRISHTĪ ; AJĀTI ALONE IS PARAMĀRTHA

Because one - (i) who without being able to know (cognize) Ātmā who is devoid of any changes or mutations of birth whatsoever, either internally or externally ; and (ii) by virtue of Avidyā, believes that he is Dīna (miserable, sorrow-stricken) and has staunchly reckoned that : “I am born ; I exist in the born Brahman ; (iii) by resorting to or relying upon the Upāsana of that Brahman, in due course of time (in future) I will reach Ajātābrahman (the birthless, unborn Reality)” and (iv) has thereby misconceived his own Self, who is verily the eternally-attained Brahma Swarūpa, as one who has not yet attained that Brahma Swarūpa - is a Kṛipāṇa (a wretched, worthless fellow) ; I will now tell you about that Akāṛpāṇya or Brahman which is devoid of Kripanatwa and is birthless ; one who has cognized that Reality is called a ‘Brāhmaṇa’. ‘अथ व एतद्वर्ण गामिनिद्विचारस्मिल्लोकाला
The Essential Gaudapāda

३१ति स ब्राह्मणः’ - (布莱. 3-8-10), meaning - ‘Now, one who has
cognized this Akshara (indestructible Entity, Reality) and leaves
this world and transmigrates, he alone is a Brāhmaṇa’ - this Szruti
is the authoritative source for this statement. The cause for this
Kārpaṇya is invariably “to believe or reckon that Brahman is
endowed with the divisions of ‘Upāśya’ (object meditated upon)
and ‘Upāsaka’ (the meditator)” ; the real essential nature of
Brahman is opposed to that. For, the Shruti states that - “Where
another thing does not appear (is not seen), where another thing
is not heard, where another thing is not cognized - that alone is
Bhūma (the ground Reality, the Absolute Reality as the substra-
tum of all apparent appearances). That which is Bhūma - That
alone is Amritam (immortal, deathless)” - (Chh. 7-24-1). There-
fore, that Entity - attaining (cognizing) which the Avidyākṛita
Kārpaṇya (wretchedness caused by ignorance) is removed, rooted
out - that ‘Akarpaṇya’ (Entity - devoid of wretchedness) I will
tell you. That alone is ‘Ajāti’ (unborn, birthless Entity) ; for,
That Entity has no birth whatsoever. It has acquired Samata
(quiescence, equanimity) ; for, It has no Vaiśhambha (incongruity,
divergence, disparity) caused by any limbs, constituents or parts.
A thing which has components, parts - its parts invariably have,
or undergo, changes and hence the thing will necessarily have a
birth (Jānma). For instance, clay, having components or parts, is
born in the forms of pot, pitcher etc. ; a seed having components
is born in the forms of plant and tree. But this Brahman -
because It is devoid of components or parts - cannot possibly
have disparities or ups and downs ; in fact, It can never be born.
Hence, This alone is ‘Akarpaṇya.’

Here a doubt may arise : On the strength of Shruti sentences
like - ‘तदात्मानं स्वयम्कुलत’ - (Tai. 2-7), meaning - ‘That created Itself
by Itself’ ; ‘तदेक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायते’ - (Chh. 6-2-4), meaning - ‘It
wished : I will become many, I will be born’ - etc. Brahman is
known to be having birth, is it not so ? This world comprising
Ākāsha (empty space), Vāyu (air) etc. - is seen to have been born
(created), is it not so ? The Vedāntins also cannot possibly accept
any other thing except Brahman as the cause for the world of
duality, is it not so ? It being so, how at all can it be proper
to affirm a rule of law in the manner - “There is no phenomenon called Janma (birth) at all” - ?

To this the solution is: Because, as exemplified above “There is no Janma whatsoever for the Paramārtha Tattwa” - is itself the inviolable truth, even the fact that - “Its appearance as if It is born (created)” - is projected or conjured up - when observed from Avidyā Drishti alone. Though the rope exists as it is, its appearance in the Vikalpas (misconceptions, false imaginations) like a snake etc. is seen to exist, is it not so? Although the moon is one and one only, due to a defect of the eyes it appears as if there are two or three moons, is it not so? Merely on the ground of the appearance, does anyone believe that in reality, actually there existed a snake, as also actually there existed two or three moons? No, not at all. Similarly, although there does not exist anything else whatsoever as a second entity apart from Parabrahman, nor are there any divisions whatsoever within Itself - that Parabrahman appearing as if It is being born as various primordial elements like Ākāsha, physical entities and as Jīvas endowed with various conglomerations of the body, the senses etc. is itself called ‘Janma’.

In that case, what is the plight of the Śruti statements like - “Brahman is born as Jīvas and the Jagat” - ? To this question, the answer is given in the next Kārikā.

3. THE JANMA ETC. OF THE WORLD IS ĀVIDYAKA (PROJECTION OF IGNORANCE)

Meaning: “Just as the empty space is born in the forms of Ghaṭākāśa (pot spaces), similarly Ātman is ‘born’ in the forms of Jīvas; just as the Ākāśa is born in the forms of Ghaṭa etc., Ātman is born in the forms of Sanghātas (conglomerations). For birth this is an illustration (demonstration).”

TO SHOW THAT JĪVAS ARE BORN GHAṬĀKĀSHA
IS THE ILLUSTRATION

It has already been stated that to conclude that Brahman is
not born is itself ‘Ākārpanya’, is it not so? For this conclusion both the reason and an illustration have been mentioned here. Because Paramātman is, just like Ākāsha, subtle and devoid of components or parts, He is Sarvagata (all-pervading) and Nitya (eternal). Thus when it is stated in the Śrutis that - “He exists in the forms of Jīvas” - the Śrutis imply that just as the Ākāsha exists in the forms of Ghaṭākāśa, Paramātman too exists in the forms of the Jīvas. Their real import is: “Existing in Its very Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness) Brahman exists in the Jīvarūpa also in this body.” In Śrutis like: “Having created it, (Brahman) entered into it only” - (Taittirīya) ; “This Parameshwarā has entered herein up to the end of the nails” - (Bṛi.) ; “He tore asunder the membrane of the skull and entered through this doorway” - (Aitareya) etc. because of the fact that it is being very clearly stated that - “That very Brahman has entered into this body in the Jīvarūpa” - we have to perforce interpret them as indicating that Jīvas are not really born at all.

The Śrutis do not have their final or real purport in stating that Jīvas are born. Some people may here raise a doubt saying: “In some Śrutis it has been very clearly stated that Jīvas are born, is it not so?” For this too, keeping this illustration of Ghaṭākāśa in mind, a consolatory explanation may be given. Just as the Mahākāśa (the vast empty space) which is existing everywhere, when the earthen (empty or hollow) pots are produced, appears as if it is born in the forms of Ghaṭākāśa (the empty space within or in the hollow space of the pot), similarly Paramātman also existing in His own Swarūpa, when the adjuncts like the body, the senses, the mind etc. are born - appears as if He is born in the Jīvarūpa. When we properly observe, just as, it becomes clear that though the Mahākāśa exists as Mahākāśa alone, when the pots are ‘born’ the empty spaces (Ākāshas) within them may appear to have been born due to Bhrānti (delusion) ; in the same way, we have to conceive that those Śrutis have the real purport of denoting that Paramātman appears as if He is born in the Jīvarūpa ; but the Śrutis do not at all have any purport in saying that actually or really the Jīvas are born.
Anyone may get a doubt of the type - “Just as in the illustration the adjuncts like the earthen pots are born, the conglomerations of the body, the senses etc. are really being born and hence why should it not be imagined that through those media of adjuncts the Jīvas too are really born?” But even the adjuncts also are not really born at all. For, the earthen pot is in reality earth, is it not so? In fact, Ākāśha itself (i.e. the subtlest primordial element) gets transformed in the order of Vāyu (air), Agni (fire), Ap (water) and finally into Pṛithvi (earth) and appears in the form of the earthen pot. It being so, it amounts to saying that Ākāśha - with the adjuncts of earthen pots etc. - meaning the adjunct of Ākāśha itself - has been produced in distinct forms. In the same way, the conglomerations of the body, the senses etc. - just as the Ākāśha itself appears in the various forms of Ghaṭa etc. - are projected by Avidyā in Brahman alone and hence neither the Jīvas, who are endowed with adjuncts, nor the body, the senses etc. - which are the adjuncts, are born at all. Just as the rope-snake etc. - all of them are imagined (misconceived) in Brahman due to Avidyā; because such depiction alone is the real, final purport of the Śruti, it has no real purport in teaching or expounding that Brahman gets transformed into Chetana (sentient, animate) and Achetana (insentient, inanimate) forms. This truth will be further explained in some more detail later on. For that reason alone it has been stressed in the Śruti that - ‘स य एशोपियैतद्वित्यापिएद सत्यं तत्त्वं स आत्मा तत्त्वमिसि’ - (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning - ‘This subtle Reality is there, is it not so? This alone is the essence of all this; That alone is Satya (real), That alone is Ātman, That alone art thou” - and reiterated that Brahman alone which is of the form of the cause of the world is the Reality; Jīva is really Brahman alone (in the ultimate analysis).

1. This Kārikā has been quoted by a Buddhist by name Shantaraksit in his treatise “Mādhyanikālaṅkāra Kārikāvyākhyāna” - as found in a Tibetan translation of the treatise.
BOTH AT THE TIME OF DISSOLUTION (PRAKYAYA) AND SUSTENANCE (STHITI) JIVAS ARE VERILY AJABRAHMARUPAS

Just as the adjuncts called 'Ghata' etc. which are thus Avidyākṛita (projected by ignorance) are born and thereby Ākāsha appears as if it has been born in the forms of Ghaṭākāsha, in the same way although Brahman exists as It is, by virtue of the creation or birth of the Dehendriya Sanghāta (conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.) which is Avidyākalpita (imagined due to ignorance) It is appearing as if It has been 'born' in the forms of Jīvas - this truth has been demonstrated by means of Yukti so far. In the same way, in these two Kārikās it has been propounded that - “Jīvas are really Brahma Swarūpas alone even during Pralaya (dissolution of all creation) and Sthiti Kāla (the life-span of the soul).”

Just as when the objects like a pot, a pitcher etc. are born it appears as if Ākāsha also has been born in the forms of Ghaṭākāsha etc., in the same way when the adjuncts of the pot etc. are destroyed, it appears as if the Ghaṭākāshas etc. have merged in the Mahākāsha (the vast empty space). Just as by virtue of the adjunct of many pots, the Mahākāsha appears as if it exists as many forms of Ghaṭākāsha, in the same way, by virtue of the adjuncts of many conglomerations of the body and the senses, many Jīvas appear as if they are separately and distinctively transacting indeed. Just as from the Paramārtha Drishti (the Absolute viewpoint) the Mahākāsha remaining as Mahākāsha alone, only due to the association with Upādhis and out of Bhrānti (delusion) it appears as if it is experiencing or undergoing Utpatti (birth), Sthiti (sustenance, existence) and Pralaya
(dissolution, merger) in the forms of Ghaṭākāśa, in the same way Brahman - although It exists eternally without any transformations or mutations of the types of Janma, Sthiti and Pralaya or death - It appears as though, in the forms of many Jīvas, It is experiencing Utpatti, Sthiti and Pralaya. For this reason alone as the Śruti says: “This Purusha when being born begets a body and is acquiring the relationship with Sharīrendriyas which are the cause for Dharma (religious merits) and Adharma (religious demerits); when He is leaving the body and transmigrating He dies and is giving up the relationship with the Sharīrendriyas” - (Bṛi.) - by virtue of an association with a body alone Jīvas appear to be having Janana (birth) and Marāṇa (death). Because of the fact that the conglomerations of the body, the senses etc. are verily Avidyākṛita (projections, misconceptions caused due to Avidyā), for Jīvas - in the predominant sense (i.e. from the Paramārtha Drishti or Transcendental viewpoint) - it amounts to saying that there do not exist any Janana (birth) and Marāṇa (death) whatsoever.

WHY DO THE CATEGORIES OF ACTION, FRUIT AND ENJOYMENT APPEAR TO BE DIFFERENT?

Anybody may raise a query of the type; “Thus in the form of Brahman if Ātman is one and one alone, in our workaday world of various transactions it appears as though there exist many Jīvas and to each one of these Jīvas, in keeping with his own respective Karma, different enjoyments of the fruits are accruing, is it not so? How at all can this be reconciled?” For this query too a consolatory explanation based on the illustration of the Ghaṭākāśa alone has to be mentioned. Because of the fact that if one pot is having relationship with dust, smoke etc. the respective Ghaṭākāśa also appears to be tainted with impurities like dust, smoke etc. but all the other Ghaṭākāshas do not at all have even this apparent relationship whatsoever; in the same way, it is appearing as though for each Kāryakarana Sanghāta (conglomeration of action and means of action) there exists one each Jīva separately, as also each Jīva is having relationship with different Sukhas and Duḥkhas. The fruit of one’s Karma does not accrue to another.
THE IMAGINATION OF JĪVATWA AS ALSO THE IMAGINATION OF MANIFOLDNESS OF JĪVAS ARE OPPOSED TO REASON, LOGIC

Here in this context, both Śāṅkhyaıı and Vaisheshikas were doubting about the following defect in the teachings of Advaitins: In the doctrine of those who affirm that in all the bodies one Ātman alone exists - if one Ātman gets Sukha all other Ātmans too perforce should get Sukha. If one gets Duḥkha all others should perforce get Duḥkha only. But in our workaday world such a thing is not seen to be happening. Therefore, those who accept the principle of proper system for Sukha and Duḥkha have invariably to acknowledge that Ātmans are many alone.

This doubt is not proper. For, in the doctrines of the Śāṅkhyaıı it has been accepted that the Purusha is Nirlepa (devoid of any taint or smearing) and that Sukha and Duḥkha etc. are the qualities of the intellect (Buddhi). At the same time, because they have accepted that Ātman is Chinmātraswarūpa (of the essential nature of Pure, Absolute Consciousness) there is no authoritative, reliable source or support whatsoever in their philosophical teachings to imagine any difference among Ātmans. The Śāṅkhyaııs used to say that - “Because the Prakṛti was separately, distinctively providing each Purusha (self), Bandha and Moksha, we acknowledge that Purushas are many. Further because of the facts that for each one of them Janana (birth) and Maraṇa (death) etc. are different or separate, as also at one and the same time, in one and the same manner all Purushas do not engage themselves in Karma - it has to be perforce accepted that Purushas are many” - This was their argument. But, as stated in the Kārikā, since that Bahutwa (manifoldness) can be made applicable by the illustration of the Ghaṭākāsha alone, there is no justification or propriety in imagining many Purushas merely on this shallow ground. The Śāṅkhyaııs also were saying that - “The Bandha-Mōksha Vyavahāra (transaction of bondage-liberation) is not Paramārtha (absolutely real).” It was their doctrine indeed that for Prakṛitis alone there were Bandha and Mōksha. Apart from this, Shri Bādarāyanāchārya has proved that the doctrine that - “Pradhāna which is Achetana (insentient, inanimate) is the cause for the world of duality” - is illogical by adducing many arguments in his “Shaṅkraka Mīmāṁsā.” Therefore, the doctrines
of the Sāṅkhyanāns cannot possibly withstand the onslaught of reason or logic.

Coming to the ‘Vaisheshikas’ doctrines now, they used to contend that - “Qualities like Itchhā (desire), Dwesha (hatred), Sukha (happiness), Duḥkha (misery), Jñāna (knowledge), Prayatna (effort), Dharma (righteousness), Adharma (unrighteousness), Sāmskāra (latent impressions) - are all belonging to Ātman and they were all different for each and every Ātman.” Since these disputants had opined at the same time that - “Because in Ātman there does not exist any defect whatsoever and thereby since Sāmskāras (latent impressions in the mind) which are the cause for Smṛiti (memory) cannot possibly exist in Ātman, He is Sarvagata (all-pervading)” - it is not possible at all for them to establish the fact that - “Such and such a body belongs to such and such a person.” No one can ever establish a systematic theme of Sukha and Duḥkha in the doctrines of these disputants. Apart from this, it is the theory of the Vaisheshikas that - “Ātman is a Dravya (substance) ; and Itchhā etc. (mentioned above) are His Guna (qualities).” It is their opinion that because Guna (quality) and Guni (entity endowed with or having that quality) are proved to be inseparable and inherent, there exists an eternal relationship called ‘Samavāya’ (inherence) between them. If this eternal relationship of Samavāya is ever existing, then Moksha can never accrue ; if they exist in different places or regions, then the doctrine that - “Itchhā etc. are the qualities of Ātman” - itself will vanish into thin air. Especially if it is opined that the essential nature (Swabhāva) of Ātman are the Guna, then there can never at all be any relationship whatsoever between them. Because the Vaisheshikas were asserting that the Samavāya Sambandha also was a separate, different Padārtha (substance, substantive entity), there has necessarily to exist another Sambandha (relationship) between that Samavāya Sambandha and Ātman ; then in that event, there would have to be perforce yet another relationship between that and Ātman - thus there will not be any finality reached at all. In any case, this doctrinaire theory of the Vaisheshikas cannot be sustained by reason (Yukti). Therefore, neither according to the Sāṅkhyanās’ nor the Vaisheshikans’ philosophical doctrines the Ātmanānātwa (manifoldness of Ātman) gets established.
THAT ĀTMAN HAS SUKHA AND DUHKHA IS OPPOSED TO UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE

These philosophical systems (schools) were in vogue in ancient times. Although they are not existing today, there do exist Vedāntins as also other Dvaitins (dualists) who profess the cause of the theory of Ātmanānātwa. But their opinions are opposed to universal experience. For, the contention that Ātman has relationship with Sukha and Duḥkha is rendered false in states like Sushupti and such other states. It is a fact of universal experience known to everyone that in deep sleep Ātman does not have the experience of Sukha. Some Dvaita Vedāntins stubbornly start affirming on the strength of the memory of the type - “I slept happily” - that therein too Ātman does have the taint of Sukha and Duḥkha. But because of the fact that in the experience of deep sleep it is quite familiar to everyone that therein there does not exist any cognition whatsoever of distinctions like ‘I’, ‘You’; ‘Sukha’, ‘Duḥkha’ - etc. to disregard this universal experience and, on the other hand, to attach all importance and value to the ‘memory’ that accrues in the waking with regard to this phenomenon of deep sleep in their reasoning is very clearly vain logic indeed.

Anybody may raise an objection of the type - “To the question that - ‘If it is asserted that Ātman really does not have any relationship whatsoever with Sukha and Duḥkha, there will be a doubt as to who is having Bandha; besides, in order to evade the Samsāra Bandha to whom should the Śāstra instruct?’ - To such other queries there is no solution whatsoever forthcoming from Ātmaikatwāvādins (proponents of the theory of Ātman being non-dual), is it not so?” But this objection is not proper. For, to this objection too by means of the illustration of the Ghatākāśha - as mentioned in the present Kārikā - a solution can be provided. Just as by virtue of a relationship with Upādhis like the Ghaṭa (pot) etc. even when defects like dust, smoke etc. are imagined to exist in Ākāsha due to Avidyā but actually to the Mahākāsha their taint is not there even the least bit and never at any time, in the same way even when the Ávivekins (non-discriminative people) have imagined that Jīvas too in the Vyavahāra Avasthā (state of empirical, mundane existence, meaning the waking state), by virtue of their association with the
conglomerations of the body and the senses, are having Sukha and Dukkha, from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi - in the non-dual Paramātman who is of the essential nature of Nitya (eternal), Shuddha (Pure, Absolute), Mukta (liberated) there does not at all exist even the least bit of relationship with Bandha or Moksha etc. In fact, Dvaitins also often accept the Drīṣṭi Bheda (different viewpoints) of Vyavahāra and Paramārtha. Even Dvaitins also acknowledge that in order to teach or propound the truth that - “When the Dehadharmas (qualities belonging to the body) are being misconceived (Adhyāsā) in Ātman, even though it appears as though Ātman Himself is having birth, old age, death etc., from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi, Ātman does not at all have Janma, Jarā, Maraṇa etc.” - alone the Śāstra exists, is it not so? In the same way, in the teachings of Advaita Vedāntins too because they have acknowledged the fact that the Śāstra is there with a view to teaching that - “Although due to Avidyā it is imagined that Ātmans are many and that they have Samsāritwa, from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi Jīvas do not at all have any Bandha, Mōksha etc.” - there is no contradiction in their philosophical teachings.

In any case, in this manner, just like the illustration of the Ghaṭākāśa and Mahākāśa for Ātmans in the Jīvarūpa, both Utpattyādi (birth etc.) and Samsāritwa (transmigratory existence) are Kalpita (imagined, misconceived). Because in the Absolute sense it can be stated that - “Ātman is one and one alone (i.e. non-dual) ; He is Nityamukta (eternally free, liberated)” - it should be concluded, discerned that the doctrinaire theories of Dvaitins who imagine that Ātman and Anātman are absolutely real (i.e. existing really, distinctively) are not proper.

Meaning: “Further, just as phenomena like form, action and name are distinctively separate here and there but only empty space (Ākāśa) does not have any distinctions, in the

1. Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Calcutta, has inferred that in a Tibetan transliteration by Bhavya called “Tarkajwālā” there exists a Kārikā with the same opinion.
same way, there should be a decision (arrived at) with regard to Jīvas.”

**EMPIRICAL TRANSACTIONS OF TREATING NAMES, FORMS AND ACTIONS AS DIFFERENT, DISTINCT**

(Doubt) : In the doctrine of Dvaitins who say that Ātmans are many, the fact of each person having a different name, each one having a different form or appearance, each one having a different action - thus each of these aspects being real separately becomes suitable, applicable. But in the Advaita Siddhānta (philosophy of non-dualism) which propounds that Ātman is one and one alone how at all can all these aspects mentioned above be applicable? To provide a mere consolatory explanation to this doubt, saying that - ‘All this appears due to Avidyā’ - is not proper. For, when it is really and undoubtedly being perceived (by all) that Jīvas are actually distinct, one from the other in the matter of names, forms and actions, if we go on imagining that all those things are merely Avidyākṛita - then whatever becomes inconvenient or unsuitable to the Vedāntins’ tenets - all that can be nonchalantly brushed aside on the strength of this theory of ‘Avidyākṛita’, is it not so? Anybody who follows tenets which are in consonance with universal experience - how can he accept this kind of a doctrine?

(Solution) : For this a convincing solution is : Even for this doubt also it amounts to our having provided an answer by means of the illustration of the Ākāsha. Although the vast empty space is one and one alone, due to the differences or distinctions of Upādhis like a pot, a pitcher, a large room etc. we imagine in our workaday dealings that the pot-space, the pitcher-space and the room-space are all different and various; and we think that they are having different forms so that relatively the pot-space is small, the pitcher-space is bigger, while the room-space is the biggest; similarly, we imagine in our workaday transactions that we can bring a little quantity of water in a pot for drinking purposes, store large quantities of water in the pitcher and sleep and live in a big room - thus we think of various acts of utility. Just as in one and the same vast empty space the distinctions of names, forms and actions are imagined (conceived) due to the differences of the Upādhis (adjuncts) alone, in the same way to
accept the tenet that - ‘Due to the cause of the adjuncts like the body, the senses Jīvas are also imagined to have different names, forms and actions’ - there is no defect whatsoever. Therefore, Advaitins have determined the truth that - ‘In one and the same Ātman thus the distinctions of name, form and action are misconceived only.’

Meaning : “Just as for the Ākāsha, Ghaṭākāśha is neither a Vikāra (a mutation, transformation) nor an Avayava (component), in the same way for Paramātman too Jīva is neither a mutation, transformation nor a component, part.”

(Objection) : The illustration that is given here is itself not proper or relevant - thus any Dvaitin may doubt. For, the various phenomena of names, forms and actions that are seen in the Ghaṭākāśha etc. are actually existing distinctively, is it not so ?

(Solution) : This is not proper. For, Ghaṭākāśha is not a real effect or resultant change of Ākāsha. Just as an effect of an ornament takes place from gold, no one ever thinks or will accept the veracity of the statement that the vast empty space itself has undergone a change or transformation to become the congested, restricted pot-space, is it not so ? Does anyone say that just as the Kāryarūpas (forms of effect) like foam, bubble, ice etc. are caused from water, from the cause of Mahākāśa (vast empty space) the effect of Ghaṭākāśha (pot-space) has occurred ? Or, does anyone say that just as to a tree the branch is a component - of the real Ākāsha imaginary phenomena like Ghaṭākāśha etc. are parts or components ? In any case, for the Ākāsha all the phenomena like Ghaṭākāśha etc. are neither Kāryarūpa (forms of effect) nor Avayava (parts) ; for, Ākāsha itself is an entity without parts. It being so, it should perforce be admitted that due to the association with adjuncts alone the various names like Ghaṭākāśha, Karakākāśha, Apavaraṇakākāśha etc. and their respective forms and functions too appear as though they are different and varied, indeed. In the same way, it can never be stated that Jīvas are the Vikāras (distinctive, mutated forms) nor Avayavas (constituents, components) of Paramātman. Therefore,
it amounts to saying that the common run of people are trans-
acting in the manner that Ātmans are distinct and various due to
misconception alone.

THE MISCONCEPTIONS THAT SOME DISPUTANTS HAVE
ENTERTAINED WITH REGARD TO JĪVAS

Some ancient Vedāntins like Bhartṛpurapraṇīcha etc., despite
all this being expounded so, had imagined that because Jīvas
have been called ‘Vijñānamayas’ (full of consciousness) in the
Śrūtis, the Jīvas are verily the Vikāras (mutations) of Paramātma-
chaitanya (the Pure Consciousness of the Supreme Self). Because
of the fact that in the Śruti it is stated that - "Just as the sparks
fly off from fire, from Paramātman are born the Jīvātmans" -
Jīvas are the Anmsha (a part) of Paramātman - thus some others
had interpreted it. Even today some Dvaitins are saying that
Jīvātmans are actually the Anmshas alone of Paramātman. All
this is not proper. For, since Paramātman does not possess any
Avayavas, it will be wrong to understand or reckon that Jīvas are
either the Vikāra or Anmshas ; especially if Ātman is reckoned
to be ‘Sāvayava’ (endowed with parts) there will be opposition
to the Śruti which states that Ātman is ‘Eka’ (one and one only)
and Advitiya (non-dual) ; because anything that is Sāvayava has
perforce to be Anitya (non-eternal), these disputants will be
confronted by an undesirable inference or concept that Paramātman
is Anitya and Vināshi (destructible, mortal). Some other modern
(present-day) Vedāntins have imagined a relationship of Prakāra
(mode, manner) and Prakāri (a thing endowed with that mode)
between Paramātman and the Jīvas. But because it is not pos-
sible at all to imagine whether Dravya (substance) and Guna
(quality) are Bhinna (different) or Abhinna (non-different),
their theory also is defective. Some others have imagined that
Jīvas are the embodiments of Paramātman, and just like the sun
and his rays Paramātman is Anmshi (one endowed with parts) and
Jīvas are Anmshas (the parts) ; all these are mere concepts,
imquisitions alone and have no support whatsoever of any
Śruti or Yukti or Anubhava. Hence there is no necessity of
examining or considering their doctrinaire, dogmatic theories at
all. Therefore, it should be discerned that by virtue of the
Upādhis projected by Avidyā alone the empirical transaction
of Jīvabheda (manifoldness and distinctions among Jīvas) has arisen.

\begin{align*}
\text{तथा भवति बालानों गगने मलिने मले:} & 1 \\
\text{तथा भवत्यविद्वानामात्मापि मलिने मले:} & 11811
\end{align*}

Meaning: “Just as for the boys Ākāsha is polluted by impurities, in the same way for the ignorant people Ātman too is impure with impurities.”

THERE ARE NO IMPURITIES LIKE KLESHA (DISTRESS) ETC. IN JĪVĀTMAN

(Objection): Let it be that Jīva is neither a mutation nor a part of Paramātman; merely on that count can it be said that Jīva himself is Paramātman? Paramātman means Ātman who is of the essence of Nitya, Shuddha, Buddha, Mukta; not one like the Jīva who is associated with impurities like Klesha (misery, distress), Karma (action), Phala (fruit) and is verily endowed with Antahkarana (Mind) which is the native place for their Vāsanās (latent impressions). It being so, to say that both of them are one and the same is a contradictory statement, is it not so? In Paramātman Kleshas like Avidyā (ignorance), Rāga (attachment) etc. do not exist, nor Karmas which are of the forms of Puṇya (merit) and Pāpa (demerit); nor does He have any taint of Karmaphalabhoga (enjoying the fruits of actions) nor its Vāsana (latent propensities). These are facts which are Śrutisiddha (established by the scriptures). Therefore, the tenet that “Paramātman means the Parameshwara whom all the Jīvas have to meditate upon and become blessed by Him” - alone is correct. In some Śrutis it has been stated that Paramātman Himself is the Ātman of everyone; but if their literary meaning itself is taken to be the Tattwa (Absolutely real or True), then it will be rendered to be an extremely contradictory statement and hence it appears to us that to say that ‘Those statements are ‘Arthavāda’ (of secondary importance) sentences which have been used for the purpose of eulogising, praising Upāsana’ - is proper.

1. Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhaṭṭāchāryya has written that this Kārikā is quoted by Śāntarakṣita in his ‘Madhyamakālaṅkāra Kārikā.’
(Solution) : It is true that if, as you have said, there were really these Klesha etc. in Ātman, we would have had to accept this indeed. But the truth is not like this at all. It has been already established on the analogy of the illustration of the Ghatākāśha that Ātman, whom the common run of people are reckoning to be a Jīva, is actually Nityashuddha (eternally pure), but Avivekins (non-discriminating, ignorant people) only believe Him to be a Saṃsāri. Therefore, the concept that Jīva has Klesha and such other tribulations of transmigratory existence is verily Avidyākṛita and not Paramārtha (really real). Just as the non-discriminating people believe that Ākāsha has pollution, they are misconceiving Jīva to be having Klesha etc. Although from our Vyavahāra Dṛishi it is appearing that Ākāsha possesses a blue colour, those people who have discrimination decide that empty space has no colour whatsoever, is it not so? In the same way, those who have cognized the Reality of Ātman will never believe that He has Saṃsāra Dharmas. Although Avivekins are rushing towards a mirage with the intention of drinking water, thinking that in that region there exists water, the people who know the ground reality decide in the manner - “This is verily a mirage; there does not exist any water here” ; in the same way, Vivekins decide that in Ātman there does not at all exist Saṃsāritwa. Even the empty space being polluted in the lower regions or the water of the mirage etc., which the Avivekins have misconceived to exist, really do not exist, is it not so? In the same way, the misery and other tribulations of Saṃsāra that the common people have misconceived to exist, do not exist at all in reality in Ātman - thus the seekers should discern.

Meaning: “In all aspects like dying, being born, going and coming, standing - in all the bodies the Jīva exists in a manner not different from Ākāsha.”

ALL PHENOMENA LIKE JANMA, MARAṆA ETC. OF JĪVA ARE AVIDYĀKRITA

The topic which was explained with the help of the illus-

1. In some books herein there is a text like - ‘चाकासोनाबिलक्षणः’
tration of the empty space so far is being concluded here. If the pot gets destroyed then the pot-space or Ghaṭākāśha does not get destroyed; neither when the pot is produced that empty space is born; if the pot is carried away to some other place, the empty space does not travel along with it. Or if the pot is brought back the empty space does not return along with it. If the pot rests where it is, it cannot be said that the empty space has stood still. Neither the good qualities nor the defects of the pot taint in the least the empty space. Whatever changes may occur in the pot, the empty space remains (Unaffected) as it is. Is it not so? Ākāśa is a Dravya (substance) which has no relationship with any other thing - called in Vedāntic parlance ‘Amūrtā Dravya’ (formless substance); for this reason too, observed from the Absolute viewpoint, because even the phenomenon called ‘pot’ is a form of Prithivi (element earth) only - which is the Kārya (effect) of the subtlest primordial element of Ākāśa alone - none of the Dharmas (qualities or special features) of the earthen pot can possibly touch or taint Ākāśa. In the same way, that - “None of the Dharmas of the Sharīrendriya Sanghāta (conglomeration of the body, the senses) taints Ātman” - is the Siddhānta (philosophical teaching) of Vedānta.

Meaning: “The conglomerations, like the dream, are created by Ātmamāyā (the illusory, magical power of the Self). There is no logical proof (Yukti) whatsoever to say (assert) that some of them are superior to the remaining groups or all are equal to one another.”

ALL THE BODIES ARE ĀVIDYAKA (PROJECTIONS OF IGNORANCE)

So far it has been explained in accordance with the illustration of the Ghaṭākāśha that though Ātman is Aja (devoid of birth), Advaya (non-dual), by virtue of His apparent association with Upādhis (adjuncts) like the Dehādi Saṅghāta (conglomerations of body and the senses) He appears as many Jīvas and as endowed with various Samsāra Dharmas from the Avidyā Drīshṭi; it has also been propounded that, just as the empty space itself
has assumed the forms of the pot etc., Ātman Himself appears as the Dehādisaṅghāta due to Avidyā. Even so, because of the fact that there is every scope for the Avivekkins, who believe that the various special forms projected by names and forms are real only, wrongly believe (misconceive) that the earthen pot etc. are verily the transformations or mutations of the empty space, and similarly that the bodies are the special forms of transformation of Ātman only - in order to fully establish the teaching that all of them are invariably Mithyā (false) this verse has been written.

Just like the earthen pot etc. the Dehādisaṅghātas, which are the adjuncts of Ātman, are false indeed; for, they are projected by the mind or imagined due to Avidyā, just like the dream bodies and bodies conjured up by magic (Māyākṛiti Dehas). No one believes that either the pots etc. appearing in a dream or the pots etc. conjured up by magic (Māyā) are really the Pariṇāmavisheshas (special features caused by transformation). For, they are confined to the false Svapnāvasthā (dream state) or Māyāvasthā (illusory state). In the same way, the Sharīrendriya Saṅghātas too are projected by the Nāmarūpamāyā (illusory power of names and forms) which is itself caused by not cognizing Ātman, and hence there is no reason whatsoever to reckon that they are real. It is not possible for anyone to stubbornly believe or reckon that the bodies which appear in the dream as also the bodies that are conceived or projected (illusorily) by a magician do really exist apart from Ātman, is it not so? In the same way, there is no supporting proof or evidence whatsoever to assert that the bodies of various Jīvas who appear in the waking do exist apart from and independently of Ātman. They too are the effects of Nāmarūpamāyā, which appears due to the cause of not cognizing Ātman. In the previous Vaitathya Prakaraṇa itself it has already been mentioned (explained) that - “People who are well-versed in Vedānta (philosophical science) say that all this world of duality exists just like Svapna, Māyā as also Gandharvanagara (celestial city)” - (2-31); is it not so?

THE BODIES APPEAR TO BE SUPERIOR OR INFERIOR BECAUSE OF AVIDYĀ ALONE

Here a doubt may arise: The Kāryakāraṇa Saṅghātas do not exist in one and the same degree or manner in all the Jīvas.
It is stated in the Śāstra that by virtue of Puṇya (superior Karmas) one begets a meritorious body, by virtue of Pāpa (sinful) Karmas one begets the bodies (birth) of low-class animals and by virtue of mixed Karmas the human bodies are acquired. Therefore, due to a difference in the degree of their Dharmas (merits) and Adharmas (demerits) among the Jīvas, in the matter of enjoying Sukha and Duhkha there has arisen a difference in degree. It being so, can it be said that all these bodies are, like the dream bodies or illusorily projected bodies by a magician, false appearances only?

(Solution): This doubt is not proper. For, there is no cause to imagine that either by virtue of Dharma or Adharma there exists a difference in degree among the bodies of creatures; or because they are all created out of the primordial elements, all the bodies are equal in all respects. For, invariably among the conglomerations of the body and senses appearing in the dream as also among the conglomerations of the body and senses which are imagined due to Māyā - at that moment it appears as though there exists a difference in degree in the same manner; but those conglomerations of the body and senses are not at all real. In the same way, when observed from the Paramārtha Drishti, among the waking bodies too which are the effect of Niḥmarūpa Māyā, caused by not having cognized the Ātman, there is no room at all to believe that there exists really any difference in degree or any equality in all respects.

THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION THAT EXIST AMONG THE VEDĀNTAVĀDINS

Giving the illustration of the Ghaṭākāśa in the present Karikās, it has been propounded that in non-dual Ātman, by virtue of the apparent association with the Upādhī, Jīvatwa is misconceived (Kalpita), is it not so? In the Brahmāsūtra Bhāshya it has been decided that just like the sun’s reflection (Pratibimbha) Jīva is the Ābhāsa (reflected, false appearance) alone of Paramātman; he is not virtually (actually) Paramātman, nor is he different from Paramātman. In order to indicate that in the Vyāvahārikāvasthā (waking state wherein all empirical transactions ensue), in which Jīvas appear to be different, their distinct bodies are engendered so as to enjoy, experience the fruits of
Pāpa (demerits, sins) and Punya (merits, righteous acts) in accordance with their respective Karmas, here in this context the *illustration of Ghatākāśha* has been given; in the Śūtra Bhāṣya, however, the illustration of the sun’s reflection has been given in order to signify that one Jīva’s Karma cannot taint or affect another Jīva. By association with an adjunct if the water shakes the Pratibimbha or reflection (of the sun) too appears to be shaking; just as this shaking does not relate to or affect all the other reflections, similarly in the case of the Jīvas too their respective Karmaphalas (fruits of actions) belong to the respective Jīvas only. In order to indicate this truth in the Śūtra Bhāṣya the *illustration of the Pratibimbha (reflection)* has been given. In any case, these two illustrations have been mentioned with the prime purport of explaining, elucidating the teaching that among the Jīvas one’s Karmaphala does not affect or occur to the other Jīvas and not with the intention of teaching that actually, really Jīva is a part of Brahman (or Ātman) or he is a reflection of Brahman. Not cognizing this truth, the present-day Vyākhyānakāras (post-Śaṅkara commentators) have propounded their ‘Avacchedavāda’ following the Ākāśha illustration and ‘Pratibimbavāda’ by following illustration of sun’s reflection and have thereby brought about two warring factions and have given rise to a raging controversy. With a view to explaining the opinion of a gloss called ‘Pañchapādikā’ on Shri Śaṅkara’s Śūtra Bhāṣya, a treatise called ‘Vivarana’ was written by Prakāśhāma Yati. His opinion about this topic, in a quintessential form, is:

In the doctrine of those who imagine the relationship between Jīvas and Brahman akin to Ghatākāśha and Mahākāśha, because Brahman, who is within the Brahmanḍa (the created macrocosmic universe) like the Ghaṭākāśha, is rendered Apūrna (incomplete, imperfect), and thereby has become Paricchinnā (limited, circumscribed) - Brahman who has not become Avacchinnā (separated, distinct) will perforce have to exist apart from the macrocosmic world (Aṇḍa); in that event, the statement of the Śruti - “Brahman is Sarvagata (all-pervading), Sarvaniyāmaka (controller of everything)” will not be tenable. For, an Anavacchinnā Brahman (impartible, unseparated Brahman or Self) cannot possibly exist in a region wherein the Avacchinnā Jīvas (partible, separated souls) exist. But in our doctrine which propounds that - “Jīva is
the Pratibimba alone of Brahman” - since in one and the same container of water (Jalāshaya) the Swābhāvika Ākāsha (natural empty space) as also the Pratibimbākāsha (the empty space of reflection) can co-exist - and thereby since Brahman can in His own essential nature coexist in the region where the Jīvas exist there is no defect whatsoever.

The Avacchedavādins (proponents of the theory of separate existence) point out a defect in the doctrine of the Pratibimbavādins in the following manner: Because Jīva is a Pratibimba it is not possible for him to cognize in the manner - “I am Brahman who is Bimbbarūpa (of the form or nature of a bright orb).” Apart from this, because the Bhrama (delusion) with regard to the object of the Pratibimba (reflection of the orb) suits only to one who is of the form or nature of Bimba (a sentient, self-illumining object) alone, these disputants will have to perforce accept that to Brahman alone by means of Tattwajñāna (knowledge of the Reality) Ajñāna Nivṛtī (deliverance, liberation from ignorance) accrues. Besides, even if it is accepted, as these disputants propound, that there exists Aikya (oneness) between Bimba and Pratibimba, different from Brahman, who is different from Bimba, Jīva himself has invariably to be appearing separately. Further, of Brahman who is Amūrta (formless) - how at all can a Pratibimba be born or produced? - This is the objection of the Avacchedavādins.

In the pristine pure Vedāntic methodology of Shri Śaṅkara there is not even an iota of scope for the dry dialectics of these two warring factions among the modern Vedāntins. For, no one can ever compel or constrain, stipulating that there should necessarily exist a comparison or similarity between an illustration and the illustrated example in all respects and aspects. As per the Vedānta Siddhānta no one accepts that - “Jīva really exists separately from Paramātman.” Therefore, there is no scope or cause for raising a controversy of the type - “Whether a Jīva, like the Ghaṭākāsha, is Avacchinna (separate) or like the Pratibimba which appears in a mirror or water, he is a reflection of Brahman?” Because of the fact that the Bhedavyavahāra (empirical dealings of differentiation) of conceiving Jīvas and Brahman as separate entities is itself Avidyākalpita (a projection, product of imagination due to ignorance), it has been attempted in the Šrutis
to show that - “Jīvaswarūpa (the essential nature of Being of the soul) is really not different from Brahman” - That is all.

In the present context, both the illustrations of Ghaṭākāśa and Pratibimbā are completely suitable or applicable. Because the illustration of the Ghaṭākāśa has been shown to be suitable in the original text itself, there is no need whatsoever for examining it once again. The relevant aspect in the Ākāśadṛśīṣṭānta is: “Because Paramātman, like the Ākāśa (vast empty space), is having Nityashuddhabuddhamukta Swabhāva (the essential nature of being eternally Pure, Absolute Consciousness - Liberated), the defects that people - with a deep-seated, staunch viewpoint or standpoint of the different, various Upādhis alone - have superimposed upon (misconceived in) Him due to Avidyā do not - nay can never - taint Jīvātman.” Now, if the Pratibimbā illustration is considered, just as the sun, by virtue of his relationship with the adjunct of water, appears to acquire or assume the difference of the form of a reflection and to acquire qualities or special features like becoming big or small, in the same way although Ātman, who is one and one alone, by virtue of His relationship with Upādhis, like different Kāryakāraṇa Sanghātās, acquires the Chidābhāsārūpas (false appearances of Pure Consciousness) as also the Dharmas of those Upādhis, in His real essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness-Bliss He does not have any Vikāras (mutations, transformations) whatsoever and exists in one and the same form which is Nitya Shuddha (eternally Pure, Absolute). This is the relevant aspect here.

In any case, because of the fact that by means of these two illustrations also the truth that - “Although for the Aja (unborn) Advaya (non-dual) Paramātman by virtue of an apparent association with an Upādhi Jīvatwa is appearing, from the Paramārtha Dṛṣṭi He exists in His pristine Avikāraswarūpa alone” - is established, it is not proper or justifiable for Vedāntins merely on the basis of illustrations (just like the other Tārkiṇa Darshānakaṇās or founders of alien logical systems of philosophy) to create among themselves discordant or differing opinions in this matter and quarrel.
4. FOR THE TENET THAT - ‘BRAHMAN IS AJĀDVAYÀ SWARŪPA’ - THE VALID SUPPORT OF ŚRUTIS

Meaning: “The various sheaths like Rasa etc. are described in Taittirīyaka (Upanishad), is it not so? That Parajīva who is the Ātman for all of them is Himself the one whom we have shown to be like Ākāśha.”

THE TAITTIRĪYA ŚRUTI’S PRAMĀNA FOR THE TEACHING OF ĀTMAIKATWA (NON-DUALISM OF THE SELF)

In order to signify that - ‘Whatsoever has been propounded about the subject-matter of Ātmaikatwa (the non-dualism of the Self) so far is having the authoritative support of the Śruti’ - the following text has been written. Some Vedāntins are arguing “Although the truth that - ‘Ātman is Prapañchōpashama (totally devoid of the world of duality), Shivaswarūpa (of the very essence of auspiciousness) and Advaita (non-dual)’ - has been demonstrated, depicted in the first Āgama Prakaraṇa, all that has been mentioned by the Śruti as Upāsanapara (meditation-oriented). All the Upanishadic sentences have the final purport of teaching Upāsanas only and by showing this fact alone there will be full agreement; otherwise, this will be contradictory to Śruti sentences which clearly mention about Jīvotpatti (creation of Jīvas) etc.”; and by their influence the true seekers should not be misguided or confounded and fail to discern the genuine spiritual teaching of Ajādvayātman (unborn, non-dual Self). For this prime purport alone so far it was demonstrated that Ātmaikatwāda (theory of the non-dualism of the Self) is fully in consonance with Yukti (logical device) with the help of the illustration of Ākāśha alone. Now the following text is being begun to depict the truth that - “All the Upanishads have the one prime purport of teaching Aja-Advitiya-Ātman; they are not there to propound Jātabrahman (the Ultimate Reality endowed with birth).”
First of all, this Kārikā has begun to illustrate the authoritative support of Taittirīya Upanishad. In the Ānandavalli Chapter of that Upanishad the five sheaths covering Ātman have been propounded one by one in the order of ‘Annarasamaya’, ‘Prāṇamaya’, ‘Manomaya’, ‘Vijñānamaya’, ‘Ānandamaya’. The word ‘Kōsha’ means a covering sheath of a sword. Just like the sheath covering a sword the five Kōshas of the type of Annarasamaya etc. have ‘covered up’ Ātman. Paramātman exists in all of them like the life-force - thus it has been propounded there. That very Paramātman is depicted here by the illustration of Ākāsha.

(Doubt) : Here in this Upanishad statements like ‘अन्नरसमया आत्मा प्राणमयाः’, ‘अन्नरसमया आत्मान्यमयाः’ - etc. depict Ātmans, is it not so ? What evidence is there to show that herein the Kōshas have been taught ?

(Solution) : Here the reason for calling the Prāṇamayādi sheaths Ātmans is : It is stated like that by assuming for the time being what appears to the Avidyā Drishti (viewpoint of the ignorant people) ; that is all. For the common run of people it appears as though the body which is Annamaya (full of, i.e. a product of, food that human beings eat) is itself their very essential nature of Being. When they come to cognize that this concept is not reasonable, they believe that Prāṇamaya Kōsha is their Ātman. In this same way they go on believing the Manomaya and Vijnānamaya etc. to be Ātman or the Self. Therefore, adopting their this viewpoint, the Upanishad calls these Prāṇamaya etc. one by one ‘Ātman’ and the really real Ātman alone, who is innermost to everything and the substratum for everything, ‘Puccha Brahman’ (the Reality at their back, tail end, i.e. their very sustaining Entity). Therefore, in this context it has been taught that Paramātman, who is really the innermost Entity beyond these five Kōshas, is Himself ‘Ātman’ of all of us. Not even an idiot will think that for one body really there exist five Ātmans, is it not so ? Therefore, it is proper indeed to reckon that in the Upanishad it has been taught in the following manner : First, from the viewpoint of the ignorant common run of people, to imagine each one of the Kōshas to be Ātman by indicating progressively that the preceding covering is merely a body and
currently what is taught is the real Ātman; and finally, from the Paramārtha Drishti (i.e. viewpoint of the Absolute Reality, Intuitive Experience standpoint) it is propounded that Paramātman Himself who is innermost to all else is verily our Ātman (one's innermost Self as his very core of Pure Being).

Or, in the alternative, for this verse we may interpret it and comment on it in a different manner. In the sentences of the type - ‘अन्योजन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः’ - meaning, “There exists another Ātman called ‘Prāṇamaya’ within this person” - that Ātman who is endowed with the respective Upādhi of the form of that Kōsha is indicated here. In our workaday world also it is seen that in one and the same Ākāsha there ensue empirical transactions of the type - ‘Ghaṭākāśa’, ‘Karākāśa’, ‘Avaparākāśa’ - when it is associated with adjuncts like the pot, the pitcher, a room, respectively, and, by virtue of this transaction a misconception is entertained to the effect that these Ghaṭākāśa etc. are different, distinct - is it not so? In the same way, here in this context too by virtue of the association with Upādhis like the body, the vital force etc. Ātman becomes an object for empirical transactions of treating Him as Annamaya, Prāṇamaya etc. As a result of this, the people may believe variously in the manner - “Ātman is Annamayātman, Prāṇamayātman etc.” In order to stress the fact that - “The Śruti undertakes to teach in the manner - ‘This Self is the Mukhyātman, devoid of any Upādhi and innermost to all else.’ This very Ātman is being taught as: That which is ‘Satyam (real) Jīnaṁ (conscious), Anantam (endless) - is this Brahma - ” - it has been conceived in the Śruti that Ātman is having the special features of the five Kōshas and it states that: "Within this Ātman there exists another Ātman called Prāṇamayātman" - and such other sentences. That Ātman about whom it has been stated in the Śruti to be a Kāryarūpa Ātman associated with Upādhis like Annamaya Kōsha, Prāṇamaya Kōsha etc. - and since all these Kōshas are like the rope-snake etc., imagined or misconceived due to Avidyā, for all of them He who is Ātman whom the Śruti has described at the beginning itself as ‘Satyajīnānānanta’ - that very Ātman alone we have signified by Yukti (logical device) in the verses like - ‘आत्मा झाकाशवजीवः’.

That is all, and what we have signified is not, like the logicians
say, an Ātman who is imagined or conceived by means of the human intellect. With regard to the Ātman whom the Tārkikas have imagined, to assert that He really exists and that really He is a Samśāri - there is no Pramāṇa (valid source or evidence) whatsoever; but the Jīva, whom we have mentioned, is Sūpādhikātman (Self endowed with an adjunct) alone as mentioned in the authoritative source of the Śruti. Therefore, this doctrine alone should be accepted by Mumukshus - This alone is the prime purport behind this teaching.

Meaning: “Just as we have indicated in Madhujñāna, Parabrahman has been signified in dual forms as ‘in this Prīthivi’ as also ‘in the womb’.”

THE AUTHORITY SUPPORT OF VĀJASANEYAKA ŚRUTI FOR ĀTMAIKATWA

Apart from this, in Madhujñāna - here the word ‘Madhu’ means ‘Brahmavidyā’; for, that knowledge signifies Amṛtatva (immortality) and hence it provides immense happiness, pleasure to Mumukshus. Because that Brahmadvidyā is taught in the ‘Madhubrahmaṇa’ which is to be found in Vājasaneyibrāhmaṇō-panishad (i.e. Brihadāranyaka Upanishad) that is called here ‘Madhujñāna.’ For the expressions, ‘in the Prīthivi’ and ‘in the womb’ - there is a Śruti sentence: ‘यस्यायमप्रत्यएव तेजोमयोग्यमप्रत्यमयः पुरुषो यस्यायमध्यत्मः शारीरस्तेजोमयोग्यमप्रत्यमयः पुरुषोज्ञयेव स योज्ञमाल्यस्य मृत्युभवं सर्वम्’ - (Bṛi. 2-5-1) - meaning - “Although the Upādhis of Prīthivi, Sharīra are different, separate, Ātman who is endowed with them is one only. He, who being Tejomaya and Amṛtamaya exists in Prīthivi, He alone is this Purusha who is endowed with the Upādhi of the body and is Tejomaya and Amṛtamaya; That alone is Parabrahman which has become everything” - In the same way, from the expression - ‘यस्यायमप्रत्य’ up to ‘यस्यायमित्रात्मिनि’ - taking two Upādhis like Adhidaiva and Adhyātma - it has been taught that in both one Parabrahman alone exists. Just as in the verse - ‘आकाशय न भेदोंस्ति’ - (3-6) - we have indicated Ātmaikatwa,
in the same way it has been stated in this Madhubrāhmaṇa also. Therefore, the purport of this exposition is to assert that whatever we have stated is in consonance with the Śruti Prāmāṇa.

Meaning: "Because there exists Abheda (non-difference) between Jīva and Ātman, the teaching that - ‘Those two are non-different’ - being eulogised, whereas the teaching that - ‘Those two are different’ - being condemned in the Śruti becomes equitable, reasonable."

THE SCRIPTURAL LOGIC IN SUPPORT OF ĀTMAIKATWA

Both in the Śruti and in the Smṛti authored by Vyāsa the Aikya (identity) of Jīvātmā and Paramātmā is eulogised by means of Yukti in consonance with the illustration of Ghaṭākāśa as also by means of the Śruti Prāmāṇya of Taittirīya Upanishad ; the Nānātwa Darshana (appearance of the manifold duality) which is seen by the common run of people due to their innate Avidyaswabhāva (innate nature of ignorance) and is conjured up, as it were, by the Kutārīkās (dry-dialecticians) quite in contradiction of the Vedic lore is condemned in the Śruti also. For example:

(a) ‘पूर्वेऽस्मु भूतेऽस्मु विचित्वात् धीरं, प्रेत्यास्माल्लोकादमृता भवति’ - (Kena 2-5), meaning - “Realizing the truth of one and one Ātman alone existing in all the movable and immovable creatures, the Vivekins (those who are discriminative in their aptitude) transcend this Vyāvahārika Lōka (empirical world of duality) and become immortal.”

(b) ‘असि सरिष्णनवस्येष्यवस्थितम्। महानं विघुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरे न शोचिति’ - (Katha 1-2-22) - meaning - “That Vivekin who has cognized Ātman, who is devoid of a body, is eternal in the non-eternal bodies of deities, manes and humans ; and who has comgnized Mahāvibhū (the Supreme all-pervasive Being) exists without any grief.”

(c) ‘यो वेद निहितं गुहायं परमे व्योमन्। सोप्यते सर्वान् कामान् सह। ब्रह्मणा
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- (Taittirīya 2-1), meaning - “Whosoever cognizes that Brahman exists in the Paramākāśa (subtest empty space) in the cave of the heart - he, in the Brahmarūpa (the essential nature of the Ultimate Reality) who is Sarvajña (omniscient), experiences all the desires (the whole gamut of them) - all at once.”

(d) ‘स यो ह वै तत्तरं प्रक्रिये वेद प्रहृदेव भवति’ - (Muṇḍaka 3-2-9), meaning - “One who cognizes this Parabrahman - he verily becomes Brahman alone” - in all these Śrutis the Intuitive Knowledge that - “Jīvātmā alone is Brahman” - is eulogised.

In the following Smṛritis the Abhedājñāna (non-different or non-dual Intuitive Knowledge) is eulogised: (1) ‘क्षेत्रज्ञ चापिः माँ विद्वा सर्वज्ञेषु भारत । क्षेत्रज्ञेषु यत्ज्ञानं मयं मम ॥’ (Gītā 13-2), meaning - “Oh Arjuna, know that the Jīva who exists in all the abodes (bodies) to be Myself alone; it is My considered opinion that the (distinctive) Knowledge of the Sākhtras and the Sākhtrajā is Itsel. the correct Knowledge.”

(2) ‘वर्णपूर्वेऽ cāतस्त्वात्सर्ववृत्ति चात्मनि संपर्कासात्मायाजी वै स्वाराज्यविधिगृहीति’ - (Manu 12-91), meaning - “That Ātmayājī (one who is established in the Self), who has cognized Ātmān in all objects and all objects in Ātmān, attains Swārājya (independent lordship).”

(3) ‘ममान्तरत्न तव च ये चावे देहसंस्थिता । सर्वं साक्षिपूर्वसैं न ग्राहः केनचिच्छु कचिचिछु ॥’ - (Moksha Dharma 351-4), meaning - “This Paramātman who is the innermost Self of myself and yourself as also all those who are embodied souls - is the Sākshi (the Witnessing Principle) for everyone; no one ever can cognize Him.”

(4) ‘यदा समस्तेऽर्द्धे पुण्यानेको व्यवस्थित । तदा हि को भवानु सोज्यमित्येतद् विफलं वचः ॥’ - (Vishnū Purāṇa 2-13-91), meaning - “When in all the bodies one and one Purusha alone is existing, the statements like - who are you? - I am such and such a person - are futile.”

In the same way, in the following Śrutis the Jīvatmanānātwa (manifoldness of Jīvas) is condemned: (a) ‘उदयन्तरं कुस्ते । अथ तत्पव भवति ॥’ - (Tai. 2-7), meaning - “Anyone who brings about even the slightest division will be afraid”.

(b) ‘अथ योज्यां देवतामुपासलेजयोसावयोजहमस्मीति न स वेद’ - (Bṛī.
1-4-10), meaning - “Now, he who performs meditation on another deity in the manner - ‘This deity is different, separate; I am different, separate’ - does not know (the truth).”

(c) ‘अथ वे वेदायस चित्रुव्यराजानास्ते क्षेयलोकाभवनिः’ , meaning - “Now, those who have known it to be different, to them there will be another King (lord) ; their world will get demolished.”

In the following Smritis the doctrine of Bheda (division, distinction) is condemned:

(1) ‘प्रान्तितदृष्टिपत्तापि तत्कौशिपि पृथक् पृथक्’ - (Vishn̄u Purāṇa 2-16-29), meaning - “Those who are having the viewpoint of delusion misconceive one Ātman alone to be different.”

(2) ‘पेदशच तस्याज्ञानकृत्तो भवेदु’ - (Vishn̄u Purāṇa 6-7-95), meaning - “The difference, distinction too is caused by Ajnāna.”

(3) ‘द्वितिनोर्ज्ज्यदर्शनः’ - (Vishn̄u Purāṇa 2-14-31), meaning - “Dvaitins (dualists) are those who are having Mithyādrishti (viewpoint of misconception, false notion).”

Thus the fact that - ‘In the Śastra, the Abheda (non-difference) of Jīva and Ātman has been eulogised and their Bheda has been condemned’ - suits the doctrine of Ātaṃkaṭwa and not the Nānāṭwa doctrine.

The Kudarshanas (vain doctrinaire theories) which the congenital logicians have imagined do not, in this manner, suit the Vedic teachings; they have also been condemned in the Smritis: या वेद बाध्यः स्मृतयो यास्त्व कार्य कुदुल्ल्रः। साविस्त्र निष्फलः प्रेत्य तमोनिष्ठा हि ता: स्मृता।” (Manu 12-95), meaning - “Those Smritis which are alien (i.e. contradictory in their teachings or tenets), and whatever wrong philosophies are in vogue - all those cannot yield any benign fruits after death; (in fact) all of them will culminate in hell.” Therefore, it is tantamount to saying that Advaita alone is the real meaning or final purport of Śrūtis (i.e. the Upanishadic lore).

Meaning: “Before creation, separation or difference between Jīva and Ātman has been mentioned, is it not so?”
That was stated by way of *Bhavishtyaadvṛitti* (a futuristic concept) in a *Gouṇa* (secondary) sense. For, *Mukhyatwa* (predominant sense) is not reasonable, tenable.”

**THE REAL PURPOSE OF THE ŚRUTI DOES NOT LIE IN DEPICTING JĪVA AND ĀTMAN AS SEPARATE**

(Doubt) : The fact that Jīva and Paramātman are separate, different has been mentioned in the Śruti (Upanishads) as also in the Karmakāṇḍa, is it not ? Because one who is *Grāmakāma* (desirous of acquiring land) should perform such and such a *Yāga* (sacrifice) ; similarly *Pashukāma* (one desirous of having many animals) ; *Pitrakāma* (one desirous of having a son) ; *Āyushkāma* (one desirous of having longevily) ; *Brahmavarchasakāma* (one desirous of attaining the lustre, brilliance of the Ultimate Reality or it can also be the vigour of a celibate) - for all such various people with such desires should perform particular Karmas for attainment of particular fruits - in this manner various Karmas are stipulated by way of injunctions, it amounts to having stated that many Jīvas invariably exist. In the same way, it has also been stated in the Vedas that different from Jīvas, *Parameswara*, who is endowed with immense wealth and other excellent divine qualities, also exists. ‘स द्राघार पृथिवीं द्राघुतेमाम्’ (Rigveda 10-121-1), meaning - “He has held together both the earth and the stellar region” - thus also it has been stated, is it not so ? It being so, somehow merely imagining only the Jñānakāṇḍa to be suitable, can it be said that you have evaded (the defect of) contradicting the Śruti ? Apart from this, there are sentences of the type of - “One who has cognized Him transcends grief” - (Chh. 7-1-3) ; “That Ātmān should be searched out, He should be cognized” - (Chh. 8-7-1) ; “One who has cognized Brahman attains the Supreme State” - (Taittirīya 2-1) in the Jnānakāṇḍa also ; are they not denoting that Jīva and Paramātman are different ? It cannot be said that the Jīva, who aspires to get rid of his grief and become *Kṛitārtha* (one who has achieved his goal), is himself Paramātman, is it not ? Is it possible to assert that the Jīva, who aspires to search out Paramātman and cognize Him, is himself Paramātman ? One who by means of Brahmavidyā has to attain *Parama Purushārtha* (the prime purport of human existence) cannot himself possibly be
Brahman, is it not so? In any case, in this manner when in the Śruti itself it has been stated that Jīva and Paramātman are different, how at all can we determine that Ekatwa (non-duality, identity of the two) alone is the tenet suitable to the Śruti."

(Solution): Even before the Upanishadic sentences which mention about creation, the Vedic sentences, which state the difference between Jīvas and Paramātman from the Paramārtha Drishṭi, are not really signifying that difference at all; in fact, they are teaching the Gounabheda (difference in a secondary sense) alone that is apparent between Ghaṭākāsha and Mahākāsha. Merely on the count of there being a sentence, there cannot be any establishment of the existence of any substance whatsoever; the sentence should have Tatparya (culmination in pointing out the veracity) in the object which it intends to signify. For example - “He cooks the rice” - in this sentence the objective or significance is not - “He cooks the already existing cooked rice” - at all; its real purport is to signify that - “He is baking the raw rice so that it gets cooked in the future.” In the same way, here too from the standpoint of the Bhavishyadvr̥tti (sense of a future event) we should reckon that this has been used.

(Doubt): In that case, has it not been stated in the following Śrishti Vākyas (sentences mentioning creation) of the type - “That Entity from which these Bhūtas (objects) are born - that is Brahman” (Tai. 3-1); “Just like the small sparks flying off from fire” - (Bri. 2-1-20); “From that this Ātman the empty space was born” - (Tai. 2-1); “(That imagined: ) ‘I will become many’; ‘It created Tejas (fire)” - (Chh. 6-2-3) etc. - that there was really a creation of the Jīvas and their respective Kāmyakarāṇa Sanghātas (conglomerations of body, senses)? We have already stated that in Karmakāṇḍa also there exist sentences which signify the difference between Jīvas and Paramātman, is it not so?

(Consolatory explanation): Not so. For, these sentences do not at all have the final purport of indicating difference. To wit: First of all, those sentences which are in the Karmakāṇḍa, stipulate as injunctions Kāmyakarmas (rites or rituals performed specifically for the fulfilment of a particular desire), for the sake of those ignorant common run of people who hanker after Karmaphalas, by adopting their standpoint only, as also the Nityakarmas (daily routine rituals) for the purpose of Pāpakṣhaya
(destruction of demerits, sins) for those who are Mumukshus (desirous of attaining Beatitude here and now in this very life); therefore, it cannot be asserted that those sentences also have the final purport of teaching that Jīvas and Paramātman exist separately. For, in that event there arises a defect of imagining two different final purports (Tātparyas) for one and the same sentence. Further, those sentences in the Upanishads which describe the creation and dissolution of the world of duality have invariably the final purport of teaching Ātmaikatwa alone. For, in those very Upanishads, in later portions, sentences like: “That one who exists in this man and in the Āditya (the sun) is one and the same” - (Tai. 2-8); “I am Brahman” - (Bṛi. 1-4-40); “That thou art” (Chh. 6-8-7) - Ātmaikatwa alone has been expounded in very clear terms. We have already shown that in the Śruti, Bhedajñāna is condemned with the support of sentences like - “One who does Upāsana in the manner - ‘This deity is different, I am different’ - does not know the truth” - (Bṛi. 1-4-10). The truth that all Śrutis have the one prime or final purport of teaching Ekatwa (non-duality, identity of Jīvas and Paramātman) will be established in the following texts substantiating this conclusion with Intuitive reasoning. Thus the fact that - “The Śruti sentences pertaining to the creation and dissolution of the world of duality have the prime purport of teaching Ekatwa” - is discerned from the valid but implicit reason that in the Karmakāṇḍa, adopting the viewpoint of the ignorant common run of people as also invoking the Bhavishyadvṛitti axiom, those sentences are used. Therefore, it should be understood that there (i.e. in the Karmakāṇḍa) Gouṇārtha alone is signified.

Further, a doubt of the type that - “In the Jñānakāṇḍa also there are sentences which state that Jīvas and Paramātman are different” - was raised, is it not so? For that too it should be understood that a convincing solution has been provided by this verse. For, there also in those very Upanishads there do exist sentences which stress and affirm Ātmaikatwa alone in the concluding portions.

This verse can be interpreted in another manner: To wit: Although in the Śruti there are sentences which denote the creation of Jīvas and the conglomerations of bodies and senses, they should be perforce understood to have been used on the
basis of Gounaprayoga (usage with a secondary sense) with Bhavishyadvritti; for, in the Mukhyarth (in the predominant sense) there in that context they do not become suitable, tellable at all. To explain: Before the sentence which describes creation there is a sentence:

‘एकाकाः विविधत्वालयम्’ (Chh. 6-2-1), meaning: “One alone without a second to It” - which stresses Ekatwa alone. That very Ekatwa has been stated later on in the manner -

‘तत्सत्त्वं स आत्मा तत्त्वभवं’ (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning - “That alone is real, That alone is Âtman, That thou art” - by assuming Bhavishyadvritti the Sruti states in a secondary sense (Gouna) that Ḫivas are different from Paramātman. This too has been mentioned in consonance with the commonplace viewpoint of the ignorant people of the world alone; therefore, it is also Gouna only. This usage has to be understood in the same manner when it is said: “I am cooking the rice.” (i.e. with the Bhavishyadvritti alone). Therefore, for the Sruti which mentions about the difference between Ḫivas and Paramātman the prime purport does not lie in teaching Bheda or difference.

Meaning: “By means of illustrations of clay, iron, sparks etc. the various kinds of creation have been mentioned, is it not so? That is verily a device alone for the intellect to descend down upon Tattwajñāna; in no way there exists difference.”

THE ŠRUTIS ON CREATION HAVE AIKYA (IDENTITY) AS THEIR PRIME PURPORT

(Objection): Although it is true that prior to creation Ekatwa alone has been stressed in the Śrutis, after the creation takes place all this has verily come into existence, as also the Ḫivas exist as separate entities alone, is it not so?

(Siddhānta): We had already provided a convincing solution to this objection in 3-2 in the manner: “Just as the Mahakāsha has been born as Ghaṭādyākāshas as also the various forms of pots etc., the Ḫivas and the various conglomerations of
body, senses etc. are apparently born” - thus we have to discern. Is it not so? Once again why have you raised it?

(The Opponent who has raised the objection) : This is not proper. For, what you stated as your solution is: “The Šruti has the prime purport in mentioning Mithyāśṛiṣṭi (apparent, false creation) alone; in the absolute sense, it is not preaching creation at all” - is it not so? This statement does not seem to be in agreement with the Šruti; for, in the Šruti the illustrations of clay, iron etc., have been mentioned. In the Šruti illustrations like: “Oh dear, just as if one lump of clay is cognized, it amounts to knowing all the effects that are produced from the clay” (Chh. 6-1-4); “Oh dear, if one ingot of metal (iron) is cognized, it amounts to knowing all the effects made out of the metal” (Chh. 6-1-3); “Just as small sparks are flying off from fire” - (Bṛ. 2-1-20); “Just as a spider emits out its saliva as a thread and later withdraws it; just as from the earth plants and trees are born; similarly from the Akśara all else is born” - (Munḍaka 1-1-7) - etc. - entities like clay etc. which really get transformed only are exemplified and not as in the illustrations of - “Just as Gaṭakāśa” or “Just as the conglomerations of body, senses which are born in the dream” - objects which are seen in false creations are exemplified. Therefore, what is discerned from the Šruti dealing with Śrīṣṭi is: From Brahman which is Aja and Advaya really (actually) all this world of duality is created; now (at present) really Jīvas exist separately (apart) from Brahman indeed. Thus although the Šruti is, in reality, propounding the creation of Jīvas and Jagat you are trying to establish Mithyā Śrīṣṭi alone; therefore, your doctrine is not in consonance with the Šruti.”

(Solution) : To opine in this manner is not justifiable; for, the Śrīṣṭi Šrutis have an alternative meaning too; they do not have the prime purport in teaching real creation.

(a) ‘न जानते ग्रीयते वा विपरस्त्रिक्षायं ज्ञातस्विच्च बभूता कस्थितः।
अजो नित्य: शाक्तातोवर्यं पुराणो न हृत्यते हन्ममाने शरीरि ॥’

- (Katha 1-2-18)

Meaning: “This Ātman of the essential nature of Pure Consciousness is not born; nor does he die. Neither was He
born from anything whatsoever, nor anything is born from Him; He is without birth, eternal, perennially existing, ancient; even if the body is killed He is not killed.”

(b) ‘स च एष महानज आत्माज्योद्वितीयोपयो ब्रह्म’ - (Bri. 4-4-25) - Meaning: “That this Jīva alone is Ātman who is great and birthless; He is devoid of old age, devoid of death, of the nature of the essential nature of immortality, devoid of fear - Brahman” - etc. - such Śrutis are the authoritative sources for this above tenet. Because in these Śrutis, Brahman is taught to be Kūṭasthanitya (Absolute and eternal) pointedly or specifically, it amounts to saying that there is no possibility whatsoever of Brahman getting or being transformed into the form of the world of duality. There are several Śrutis which expound and proclaim that Jīva and Paramātman are one and the same only.

The purpose for giving illustrations of the clay etc. is not to propound the tenet that - “Brahman gets transformed to become the Jagat or world of duality”; for, in Śrutis like - Oh dear, just as if one lump of clay is cognized it amounts to knowing all those things which are made out of clay; just as the phenomenon of Kārya (effect) is a mere name produced by speech and the material of clay alone is the reality” - (Chh. 6-1-1) - because it has been stated that - “All Kāryas (effects) are invariably false and ‘the phenomenon of clay alone is real’” and thus it has been stressed that Kāraṇa (cause) alone is real - we have perforce to determine it in that manner. In the illustrated example too, after stating that - “Tejas, Ap and Anna (earth) - these primordial elements are the effects of Brahman” - the implicit teaching that the products like fire etc., which are born out of them are not different from their respective causes like Tejas etc. is clarified by the Śruti in the manner: “The Agnitwa (fireness) of Agni (fire) is gone. The Kārya (effect) is a mere name brought about by Vāk (speech); the fact that Agni is the three forms is itself the truth” - (Chh. 6-4-1). At the end of it all because the Śruti concludes declaring: ‘ऐतदात्मत्यात्मिद सब तत्सत्त्यम्’ (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning - “This alone is the Ātman (Self) for everything, This alone is Satyam (real)” - and has also stressed the fact that the Parama Kāraṇa (the ultimate cause) of
Sadbrahman alone is the Reality - we have *perforce* to decide in this manner. Therefore, what we have stated, viz. "The conglom­erations of body, senses are created by means of Ātma Māyā" - (3-10) ; "Just as the Ghaṭākāśhas are caused and existing distinctly, similarly we should understand the creation etc. as also differences, distinctions etc. of the Jīvas" - (3-9) - is fully in agreement with Śruti alone.

In that case all this had been stated before, is it not so ? Then why is it that this verse has been written ? - If it is asked like this, we say : Previously it was merely stated that the Śrīshti of Jīvadehādisaṅghāta (creation of the conglomeration of body and senses of the Jīvas or souls) signifies only Mithyāśrishti (false creation). But now it is being shown here that for the Śrutis which describe the birth etc. the prime purport is teaching Ātmaikya (non-duality of the Self) alone. Therefore, there is no defect of repetition.

If it is asked : "For the Śrutis which describe creation, their prime purport does not lie in describing creation, but to signify another topic only - how at all can this conclusion be sust­ained ?" - the answer for this question we will explain now. Based on various illustrations of clay, metal, sparks etc. creation has been dealt with in different Upanishads in different ways, is it not so ? All those various kinds of creation are invariably subtle devices adopted to prepare the intellect so as to be able to comprehend the teaching of Aikya (unity, identity) of Jīvas and Paramātman. Besides it has already been stated that for exemplifying those illustrations the real purport of the Śruti is not to teach that the 'effect' is really born, but only to signify the essential nature of the cause. In the illustrated example also, after stating expressly the Satyatwa (reality) of the Kāraṇa (cause) in the manner - "That alone is Satyam (real)" - it is repeatedly seen to have been reiterated that Jīva is verily Paramātman in the manner - "That alone is Ātman, That alone are you". On the other hand, if it were the real intention of the Śruti of teaching that - "Jīvas really are born" - alone, then it would have amounted to saying : (a) In order to attain Brāhmaśwarūpa the seeker should perforce perform another kind of Śādhanā like Upāsana etc. ; (b) Brāhmaśwarūpa does not exist just now but in the future, in another state of Being, It has to be acquired afresh. If
that were the truth, then a sentence - signifying an opinion that you are already here and now Brahman - of the type - “That alone are you” - would not have been used. But this sentence of - “That alone are you” - which implies that - ‘Here and now you are that’ - is repeated often by the Śruti. Therefore, it becomes established that the Śrishti sentence is actually a subtle device adopted to enable the intellect to comprehend, grasp the truth that - “Jīva and Paramātman are one and the same” - but it has no purport whatsoever in signifying the birth of Jīvas or their manifold forms. For this reason alone, although in each Śruti a different kind of creation has been described, for all of them one and one Ātman alone exists as the cause - this alone is the final purport for the various Śrutis (describing various ways of creation) and hence, since such variant creations are invariably a subtle device alone, there cannot be any defect of their being mutually contradictory entailing this teaching. For this reason alone, in the Brīhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya Vārtika Shri Suresvarāchārya states:

प्रक्रियानियमो नास्ति पुनः ज्ञातिप्रतिपादनः।
प्रतिश्रुतितत्त्वस्व प्रक्रियाणां समीक्ष्यते॥
यथा यथा भवेत् पुनः व्यत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनः।
सा सैव प्रक्रियेह स्वातू साध्वी सा चानवस्थिता॥ (Brī. Vā. 1-4-401, 402)

Meaning : “There is no rule of law to say that the method of creation should be one and the same. For, the important thing or aspect for the Śruti is to teach the Tattva (the Ultimate Reality) to Sādhakas (seekers) alone. In each śruti a different kind of creation has been described. By whatever method of creation if it is possible for the people to comprehend, discern the Pratyagātmatattwa (the Absolute Reality of the innermost Self), that method alone is proper in this Vedāntic spiritual science. The systematization that - ‘The method should invariably be such and such alone’ - is not to be found here.”

THERE ARE ŚRUTIS WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE A DIFFERENT MEANING BUT WITH THE PRIME PURPORT OF SIGNIFYING A PARTICULAR INTENDED OPINION

Here a doubt may arise : How at all can it be proper to
say that the Śruti mentions Śrishti without a prime purport? If there is no real intention of teaching creation, all those detailed descriptions of creation being mentioned at various places will render the Śruti to be invalid indeed, is it not so? Even if we accept the latter contention, then the defect of imagining the Śruti, which is supposed to be Nirdushta (inviolable, infallible), to be unnecessarily Apramāṇa (invalid) entails us, is it not so?

(Solution) : A satisfactory answer to this doubt is: "It is not so. There are instances of the Śruti - in order to signify or point out the meaning in a manner in which it really intends the seekers to interpret or discern its real import - adopting a subtle device or ruse of describing quite a different topic in detail. There is also an axiomatic truth that wherever a fruit or benefit is mentioned in the Śruti (called in Vedāntic parlance as 'PhalāŚruti') in that topic the Śruti invariably has its prime purport. In its proximity itself if there is no mention of benefit with regard to the topic stated by way of a subtle device, then for the SaphalaŚruti (sentence having benefit mentioned) the sentence which is Aphala (not having a fruit) is Aṅga (subordinate, subservient). Thus the purport is to be determined in consonance with a Mīmāṃsā Nyāya (an axiom followed in the exegetical science formulated by the Mīmāṃsā philosophy). That axiom should be adopted here also in this context. Merely on this basis the Śruti is not affected and cannot be said to become Apramāṇya (invalid).

In support of the tenet that in the Śruti there are illustrations too - in order to point out, signify a particular opinion - quite a different topic (apparently as one irrelevant or disconnected with the present subject matter or opinion) being mentioned. To explain: In Brīhadāraṇyaka Upanishad there exists a portion which narrates a Prānasamvāda (a dialogue of the vital force). There in that context the anecdote runs like this: In ancient times once the deities pledged to defeat the demons by recourse to Udgīthā (a recitation of certain Mantras or hymns). They requested Vāk (the organ meant for speech) and such other sense organs one by one to recite (Udgāna). While the sense organs of Vāk etc. were reciting, by the evil influence of the Asuras (demons), each of them got identified with one auspicious topic
each. To wit, when Vāk was reciting the Udgīthā the benefit that accrued from speech it lent to the other sense organs, but in the auspicious act of pronouncing the hymns in a refined manner, especially, it got itself ‘attached’ saying in the manner - “This is mine”. In the same way, because the Asuras went on influencing the other sense organs too with a sinful desire of identification (Ahaṅkāra), they too became afflicted by ‘attachment’ in their respective special functions or faculties. Thus since all the sense organs like Vāk etc. were smeared by sin, they realized that they could not any more recite properly (Udgāṇa) and thereby were not fit to be Upāśya (meditated upon) and finally approached the Prāṇa (Brahman or Ātman who is addressed here as ‘Mukhya Prāṇa’ also) and begged of Him to recite the hymns (Udgāṇa). The Asuras attempted to smear sin on to the Mukhya Prāṇa too, but failing in that attempt finally they themselves were destroyed. For this story being mentioned there - the real purport for the Śruti is: “Because Prāṇa is endowed with qualities like Purity etc. He alone should be meditated upon” - alone and not to state, as mentioned there, in reality there was the association of sin or there was a mutual dialogue among the Prāṇas (sense organs) as its final purport. In the same way, here too it should be determined, decided that the Śrutis do not at all have any prime purport in stating Sṛṣṭi etc., but they all have the one singular purport of teaching that - “Ātman alone is Paramārtha (absolutely real)”.

(Objection) : Even in this above illustration that you have mentioned it appears to be reasonable to imagine that the Śruti has a real purport in every aspect mentioned therein. If we assume Vāgādi to mean the deities who are the presiding authorities for the respective sense organs like Vāk etc., as stated therein, we can interpret it saying that among them there occurred a dialogue and finally the deities decided that among them all Prāṇa alone is all-powerful and supreme; in this manner why cannot it be imagined? Thereby, it does not amount to our imagining Aprāmāṇya to any part of that Śruti, is it not so?

(Solution) : It cannot be assumed like that. For, this Prāṇasamvāda is not to be found in the same form or manner in all the Śrutis. If it were the prime intention of the Śrutis to
signify that Prāṇasamvāda is Paramārtha (absolutely real) alone, then wherever Prāṇasamvāda occurs, at every place this story should have been narrated in one and the same form; but it is not so. That story has been mentioned variously in different contexts. For instance, in the story found in Brihadāranyaka the Vāgādis are Udgītakartṛus (those who are the performers of the recitation); it is described there that they themselves did the Udgāna. But in Chhāndogya Upanishad it is stated that they are Omkāra which is an Avayava (constituent part) of Udgīthā. In the Brihadāranyaka itself in another place (i.e. 6th Chapter) this Prāṇasamvāda has been described in a quite different way altogether. To wit: It is stated therein that once the Vāgādi Prāṇas (sense organs), in order to decide as to who among them was the best, they all approached Prajāpati (the first-born Lord of all creations); He, it is said, told them: “Among you he - who when he leaves the human body and goes out, the body appears to become Amaṅgala (inauspicious, degenerated) - he is the best.” Accordingly, the Prāṇas (senses) one by one left the body but yet the body remained as before; when finally the turn of Mukhya Prāṇa came and He made an attempt to get up and leave, immediately - just like a sturdy well-bred horse wrenches off the ropes tied to its legs, along with the pegs to which they are fastened - the remaining Prāṇas (senses) felt as if they were forced to be pulled out of their respective places, stations and thus Mukhya Prāṇa convinced all of them that He was the best among all of them. In the same way, in the Prashnōpanishad yet another version of the mutual dialogue among the Prāṇas is described. That dialogue, there, is purported to signify the truth that - “The power of keeping the body completely under control belongs only to the Mukhya Prāṇa.” In the Aitareya Upanishad, especially, there occurs a dialogue pertaining to the question: “That Prāṇa (vital force) which if he leaves the body or discards it the body itself will fall away; that one when He enters the body the latter becomes capable of standing up once again - He alone is the supreme among all the Prāṇas.” Just as the deliberation pertaining to which topic a dialogue took place differed in each context and in their details - in the same way, in various aspects like - in which order the Vāgādi Prāṇas were examined,
in the number of the Vāgādi Prāṇas who took part in the dialogue - in different places it is described in different ways.

**THESE ARE NO AGREEMENT IN THE SṚŚHṬI-PRAKĀRAS (METHODS OF CREATION)**

Therefore, since this anecdote is mentioned in each section of the Vedas in a different manner, it becomes determined that there is no deep concern or interest whatsoever for the Śruti with regard to the question of this story being in a set, specific form. In the same way, we should discern the topics of Śrīshṭī etc. For, in one Śruti beginning with Ākāśha the process of Śrīshṭī is mentioned, while in another Śruti beginning with Tejas (fire, Agni) it is described; in some other places Prāṇa etc. have been mentioned first; while in yet other places without following any order Śrīshṭī has been described.

**FOR THE SṚŚHṬI ŚRUTI THERE IS NO OTHER FRUIT OR BENEFIT AT ALL**

Here too a doubt may be raised; Śrīshṭi has not taken place in one and the same Kalpa (a day of Brahmā, 1000 Yugas or 432 million years of mortals and measuring the duration of the world). Therefore, in each Kalpa it might have taken place in a different manner. Therefore, Prāṇasaṃvāda and Śrīshṭiprakāras mentioned in the Śrutis might have taken place in different Kalpas in different ways. When in this manner the Śruti sentences can be interpreted without any contradiction, unnecessarily imagining that there exists opposition mutually among the Śruti sentences why should any defect of Aprāṃanyā be foisted on them? - In this manner it may appear to some people.

This cannot possibly be the proper Siddhānta (spiritual teaching). For, the defect of imagining that the Vedas have stated anecdotes which do not serve any worthwhile purpose or yield any benefit whatsoever will perforce entail these opponents. For, in the illustration in the Prāṇasaṃvāda barring the one topic (teaching) that - 'Mukhya Prāṇa Himself is supreme' - even by knowing the remaining story part no benefit or utility whatsoever is likely to accrue to the Śrūtras (listeners). If the truth (teaching) that Prāṇa is supreme is cognized by the seekers, there invariably exists a benefit of knowing that by performing Prāṇoḍpāsana (meditation on Prāṇa) one can acquire the fruit of that Upāsana.
In the same way, in the illustrated example of Ātmavichāra (deliberation on the Self) also by cognizing the topic of Śrishtī in a suitable orderly manner there cannot possibly accrue any benefit to the Śrōtrus; since all those Śrūtis in the end culminate in propounding Ātmaikatwa (non-duality of the Self), it is quite clear that they have the final goal, purport of Ātmaikatwa Jñāna. In fact, it has also been mentioned in the Śrūtis that if the seeker cognizes Ātma Swarūpa (the essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness of the Self), who is Kūṭastha (Absolutely established), benefits like Abhaya (fearlessness), Shāśhwata Sukha (eternal Bliss) etc. accrue. Hence, as we have stated at the outset, viz. in the vicinity of a Śruti which mentions a Phala if a Śruti sentence which is bereft of any benefit, fruit is found, then invariably the latter is the former Śruti’s Ariga (that which is subservient, subordinate in its import) - accepting this Mīmāṃsā Nyāya, to imagine or infer that Śrishtī Śrūtis are secondary in importance to the Śrūtis which propound or teach Ātmaikatwa is itself reasonable, tenable.

(Question) : Why cannot it be imagined that with regard to Prāṇasamvāda too the real purport is : “In this manner, one should perform Dhyāna (meditation)”?

(Answer) : This is not proper. For, by contemplating in the manner - “Prāṇas quarrelled with one another in a competitive spirit” - no desirable fruit can accrue. In the same way, it will not be proper to infer that undesirable fruits like rebirth etc. will accrue to Śrōtrus from contemplating on Śrishtī etc. There is a rule of law that for Dhyāna a fruit proportionate to its intensity should perforce accrue. We may have to imagine that by meditating or contemplating upon quarrel among Prāṇas the fruit that accrues will be quarrel only! That is not desirable for anyone, is it not so? Therefore, it is proper only to infer that for the Śrūtis on Śrishtī etc. the fruit is invariably Brahmārūpapraṇāti alone. For this teaching there is support of the Śrūti also. To wit : The Śrūti states अप्रेन सोम्य शुक्रगनायथोमुलमन्विच्छाद्यः सोम्य शुक्रगन तेजोमूलमन्विच्छ तेजसा सोम्य शुक्रगन समूलमन्विच्छ । - (Chh. 6-8-8), meaning : “Listen, my boy! From the effect of food search out the cause of water and cognize it; from the effect of water search out, my boy, the cause of fire; from the effect of fire
search out \textit{Sat} (Pure Existence) the cause, my boy”. (This is actually the literal meaning). The implicit meaning of the sentence here is: “For \textit{Prithivi} (earth) \textit{Ap} (water) is the cause; for \textit{Ap} the cause is \textit{Tejas} (fire); for \textit{Tejas} the cause is \textit{Sadbrahma} (the Ultimate Reality of Brahman). Oh my boy! From the effect find out, cognize the cause.” Following the axiom that - “The effect is not different from the cause” - we should decide that Sadbrahma, which is the root cause for everything, is Paramārtha. This alone is the prime intended purport of the Šruti. Therefore, it becomes certain that - “The purport behind the statement of \textit{Utpatti} (creation) is to teach a device to cognize Ātmaikatwa alone; but to reckon that the Šruti also has a prime purport in teaching \textit{Kāryasatyatwa} (reality of the effect) is not proper at all.”

\textbf{Meaning} : “There are three \textit{Āshramis} (People in different stages of life) with different viewpoints called \textit{Hīna} (low), \textit{Madhyama} (middle) and \textit{Utkrishta} (superior). This \textit{Upāsana} (meditation) is instructed for their sake out of compassion.”

\textbf{THE PLIGHT OF SENTENCES PERTAINING TO KARMAS AND UPĀSANAS}

Here a doubt may arise: If the tenet that - “Paramātman who is of \textit{Nitya-shuddha-buddha-mukta-swabhāva} alone is the Ultimate Reality, and all else is false, unreal” - is itself true, then in various Šrutis like - “Oh dear, Ātman alone should be sought out, He alone should be listened about, deliberated upon and contemplated upon” (Bri. 2-4-5); “There exists Ātman who is devoid of sins, is it not? He should be searched out, He alone should be cognized” - (Chh. 8-7-1); “He should take a decision like this” - (Chh. 3-14-1); “One should meditate on Him as Ātman alone” - (Bri. 4-1-7) etc. - why is it, apart from \textit{Jñāna}, Upāsana also is instructed? Why is it Karmas also have been stipulated as injunctions in the manner - “As long as one is alive he should perform Agnihotra Hōma” - etc.? For this, as stated in the 14th Kārikā, this \textbf{solution} may be provided: The Siddhāntin may say that from the standpoint of \textit{Bhavishyadīvṛtti} - to wit,
keeping the fact that - “Later on in the Śruti, Ātmaikatwa will be taught” - in mind, here the difference between Jīvas and Paramātman is mentioned in a secondary sense (Gouṇa). But the present doubt is : “Why is it that the Śruti in this manner assumes a difference which is not real and teaches Karma and Upāsana by way of a Gouṇa Vṛitti (in a secondary sense) ?” In this doubt the opponent’s real intention is indeed : “Instead of assuming that which does not exist and stipulating both Karmas and Upāsanas, why cannot the Śruti directly teach everyone the Ajādvayatattwa (non-dual Absolute Reality) Itself ?”

Another point : In some sentences like - “Ātman alone should be seen” ; “He should be sought out and cognized” ; “One should meditate on Him as Ātman alone” etc. the Śrutis are instructing Jñāna alone, and not as stipulated in the sentence - “He should in this manner Kratu (proposition) - any Upāsana whatsoever which yields a fruit in due course of time. Even so, in those sentences, for the purposes of Ātmadarshana (cognition of the Self), Sādhanas like Šravaṇa, Manana etc. or the Dhyānakrama (method of meditation) called ‘Nididhyāsana’ have been invariably instructed. If the teaching that - “In the Absolute sense Ātman alone exists” - alone is true, then why at all were these Sādhanas stipulated ? - For this doubt too here a solution has necessarily to be provided.

For these the solution is : Because those people who are qualified, are endowed with different grades of viewpoints like Manda (low), Madhyama (middle) and Uttama (superior), they are belonging to different Varnas (castes), having different Āshramas (stages of life) ; being endowed invariably with the superior viewpoint, all persons, are not of the calibre of superior class qualifiers for Tattwajñāna. People with Mandadrīṣṭī means those who desire fruits which accrue in this world of humans as also in the world of the manes (mentioned in the Śāstras) ; for them Karmas are stipulated as injunctions (in the Vedas). Those with Madhyamadrīṣṭī means people who wish to attain Devalōka (world of deities) or through the doorway of Brahmalōkaprāṇī (the world of the first-born, four-headed creator called ‘Brahma’ in the Śāstras) eventually attain Ātmaprāṇī ; for these high-grade practitioners Upāsanas (meditations) which yield Adṛṣṭaphalas (invisible fruits in other worlds) are stipulated. Although for
certain Upāsanas even Drishṭaphalas - meaning, in fruits which will accrue in due course of time in this world itself - do exist, in the main, those people, who are qualified for Upāsanas which yield fruits in the other worlds reached after death, are reckoned here to be those belonging to the ‘Madhyamadṛṣṭi’ category. Those who entertain an aspiration for cognizing Ātmatattwa (non-dual Absolute Reality), which is devoid of birth and is non-dual, and who are endowed with the suitable qualifications for attaining that objective - they are called ‘Utkrīṣṭa Drṣṭi Adhikāris’ (qualifiers with the best viewpoint). For that reason alone, the Śruti states: “This Manushyaloka is to be attained by means of a son alone, by any other means it cannot be acquired ; by means of Karma the Pitṛuloka (world of manes) and by means of Vidyā Devaloka accrue” - (Bṛi. 1-4-16) - in this manner for those who wish to attain a particular Loka the respective Sādhanā is stipulated. Although the sentences like - ‘आत्माको तेषांकी’, meaning - “One should meditate upon Him as Ātman alone” - (Bṛi. 1-4-7) ; “He alone should be searched out, He alone should be cognized” - (Chh. 8-7-1) etc. which are pertaining to Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) are similar in form to Vidhivākyas (sentences which stipulate various injunctions), they are deliberately, purposefully formulated in that manner - just like the Vidhivākyas - in order to turn the senses - which are externally-oriented (towards the material objects and their enjoyments) - of those, who are desirous of the Paramapurushārtha (the supreme goal of all human endeavour and existence), towards the own innermost Self which happens to be the very core of their Being and the Ultimate, Absolute Reality of Brahman. That is all. For the sake of instructing those Uttarādhikāris who by themselves direct their energies and attention to know Ātmatattwa, or those who being prompted by these Vidyārupa Vākyas turn towards Ātman - exclusively these Ātmatattwa Śrutiś like - ‘अत्मात्मा ब्रह्म’ - (Bṛi. 2-5-19), meaning - “This Ātman is Brahman” ; ‘तत्त्वमिसि’ (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning - “That Sadbrahman alone are you” - etc. are mentioned. Therefore, Upāsanas and Karmas are mentioned in the Śrutiś for the sake of Madhyamādhikāris, as also for those endowed with the lowest grade mind and intellect - but not for the Uttarādhikāris.
Here yet another doubt may arise: Why should the Śruti in this manner divide the Śrūtrus (listeners) into three different categories and instruct Jñāna, Upāsana and Karma to people with different qualifications? Why cannot it instruct Jñāna to all the people?

To this the answer is: The Śruti has not brought about any difference or division among the listeners. By their very innate nature, and according to their respective Karmas these qualifiers are having different grades of mind or intelligence. In fact, for the Śrutis all people are alike; the Śrutis’ prime purport is: ‘Let everyone attain the supreme or the highest Advaitatma Jñāna alone!’ But that Jñāna is not likely to be grasped all of a sudden by everyone. The mind-set and the background of their mental make-up among people with Manda and Madhyama Drishtis are varied. Therefore, in accordance with their respective qualifications, and based on the universally familiar Dvaita (duality) alone the Śruti has instructed different Karmas and Upāsanas. For, no one among them wants the Moksha which is the Paramapunushartha. Therefore, the Śruti instructs different Kāmyakarmas (rituals meant to fulfil one's desires) of extremely extroverted Kāmis (people full of mundane, materialistic desires). For those people who are having a pronounced proclivity or sense of pride in the Varna (caste) and Āshrama (stages of life) and thereby who aspire for fruits which accrue only in Parālōka (other worlds to which, they believe, one has to transmigrate after the fall of this body) - to such believers in the Śāstraic instructions the Śruti stipulates, by way of injunctions or commandments, Nitya (daily, routine) and Naimittika (incidental to any special cause) fitting their respective Varna and Āshrama. For those who are introverted and aspire for different fruits the Śruti stipulates particular Upāsanas which yield their respective fruits. Those who show a pronounced detachment towards the fruits of this Manushyalōka as also the hereafter Pitruḷōka - to such people the Śruti instructs Upāsanas needed to attain Devalōka. Thus because there exist people who are qualified and are entertaining different kinds of Phalāsakti (pronounced interest in fruits) but devoid of a suitable capability for Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) - merely on the ground that the Śāstra has instructed either Karmas or Upāsanas according to their respective Vāsanas (latent impressions or proclivities), it
does not face any danger of Aprāmāṇya (invalidity) whatsoever; for, although from the empirical viewpoint based on the familiar differences of Kriyā (action) and Kāraka (means of action) the Śāstra stipulates either Karma or Upāsanas, it does not at all propound that this distinctive division of Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala is Paramārtha (absolutely real) as its prime purport; it keeps on instructing in the manner: ‘For such and such Purushārtha (human objective) such and such Karma is merely a device.’ That is all. Thus because this Sādhya-Sādhana-Sambandha (relationship between the means of action and the result that is possible to achieve) is existing from time immemorial to that extent the Śāstra is verily a Pramāṇa.

For the truth that – ‘The Śāstra does not at all have any prime purport in stabilising the Śādhas (seekers, practitioners) either in the Karmas or in the Upāsanas’ – the strongest evidence is the fact that in the Jñāna Prakaraṇa both Karmas and Upāsanas are condemned invariably. To substantiate this teaching the following Śrutis are the authoritative sources: ‘यो या प्रत्यक्ष गार्गीविद्विदलित्वादिरस्मृतस्य जुझोऽति यज्ञः तपस्यः बहुनि वर्षसहस्राणयतवदेवास्य तद्द्वलनति’ - (Bṛi. 3-8-10), meaning: ‘Oh Gārgī, one who without cognizing this Parabrahman called ‘Akṣara’ performs Hōma (sacrifice) in this world for many thousands of years, performs Yāga (another kind of sacrifice) and Tapas (austerity, penance) that too will be invariably something having an end’; ‘प्रत्यक्षेऽवेदिभिन्दस्ति सूचना जनामुष्यं ते पुरुषेषां यत्नि’ - (Mundaka 1-2-7), meaning: ‘Those idiots who are thinking that this Karma alone is propitious or conducive to prosperity and are praising it alone – they are having repeatedly old age and death’; ‘यद्नस्त न मनुष्ये येनाहुर्मत्ते मल्य। तदेव वर्ष प्रत्यक्ष विभिन्न नेत्रेद्युपासते’ (Kena 6), meaning: ‘That which cannot be contemplated upon by the mind, but That which, they say, cognizes even the mind - That alone you know to be Brahman ; that which (people) meditate upon (making it as an object in the manner) ‘this’ - that is not Brahman’; ‘नैलालो विदितं भवति’ - (Bṛi. 2-1-14), meaning: ‘Merely by meditating on these Purushas like Āditya etc. alone it does not amount to cognizing Brahman.’

Apart from this, it can be discerned on the authority of the Vedānta Vachana (i.e. Upanishadic statements) that both Karma
and Upāsana are Ānga (subsidiary) to Jñāna. The following Śruti sentences are expounding in clear terms that, as stated therein, Karmas and Upāsanas are devices for attaining Jñāna: ‘तत्मेव वेदानवचनेन ब्राह्मण विविधिविशिष्ट्य चतुष्क दानेन तपसा अनाशकेन’ - (Bṛi. 4-4-22), meaning: “By means of the meticulous study of Vedas, sacrifices, charity (philanthropy), penance of the form of severe fasting Brahmins wish to cognize this Ātman”; ‘सबे वेदा तत्तदाममन्ति तपांसि सवाँि च यहदल्हि। यदिच्य्यो ब्राह्मचर्य चर्ति तते पदं संग्रहेण ब्रह्मिमि’ - (Katha 1-2-15), meaning: “Oh Nachiketa, that supreme abode which alone all the Vedas teach, proclaim as their prime purport, which alone all penances proclaim as their goal and desiring to cognize which (the seekers) practise Brahmacharya (celibacy etc.) - that (Reality) I will tell briefly”; ‘य: पुनरेत त्रिम्रात्मेनिस्मैते नावकाश्च च पूरवमण्डियायित रत्नपरं प्रिमिष्टये’ - (Prashna 5-5), meaning: “Further, one who meditates upon this Supreme Self who resides in this city by means of Ömkāra associated with all three parts.....(he) will see that Purusha alone who is Parātpara (greater than the great) and who resides in every body”; ‘उक्तिनिष्ठक इति विमुच्चमान: क ग्रनिष्भिसि’ - (Bṛi. 4-2-2), meaning: “You, who have heard about and known all the Upāsanas, what fruit are you going to get ?” In these two, viz. Karma and Upāsana, Karmas through their being aids in cleansing the mind (Chittashuddhi) and bringing about Antarmukhatwa (introvertedness) are Sādhanas (means of practice) for Jñāna (Self-Knowledge); Upāsanas, which are of the form of Aparabrahmavidyā (meditations on Brahman with various stipulated forms as Its adjuncts) after yielding the fruit of Brahmalokaprāpti (attainment, i.e. transmigrating to the world of the first-born creator aspect of the four-headed Brahma) in due course of time (i.e. at the end of the Kalpa etc. as mentioned in the Śāstra), by virtue of their leading to Jñānaprāpti (attainment of Self-Knowledge) are responsible for Paramapurushārthaprāpti (achieving the ultimate goal of human existence); with regard to Upāsanas, especially of the form or nature of ‘Nididhyāsana’ - here and now while in this body directly they bring about Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge). Especially when Jñāna accrues (dawns i.e. in the form of Intuitive Experience of Pure
Being-Consciousness-Bliss) because all Anatman (not-self) of the nature of Sarīrendriya etc. is rendered false, unreal (sublated) - once again the Śruti does not at all teach either Karma or Upāsana whatsoever.

Thus for the Śruti the Jīveshwarā Tādātmya Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the identity, unity of Jīva and Īśwara) alone is its prime goal; for the sake of those people who do not possess just now the relevant, suitable qualification, the Śruti - out of compassion, as it were, and with the good intention that those people too should acquire stage by stage the requisite capability for this Self-Knowledge - instructs either Karmas or Upāsanas in accordance with their respective qualifications. This alone is the ultimate, final Vedāntic Siddhānta (spiritual teaching).

5. THERE IS NO OPPOSITION BETWEEN ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY AND DVAITA PHILOSOPHIES

Meaning: “Because Dvaitins (dualists) have a steadfast (deep-seated) certitude (resolution) in their own respective systems of philosophy, they are opposed to one another. But this (our Vedāntic system) is not opposed to them.”

DVAITA PHILOSOPHY IS NOT A PROPER SYSTEM

(Objection): Let it be that because Karmas and Upāsanas are meant for the sake of Manda and Madhyama Adhikāris, the Śruti has its prime purport in teaching Advaita alone; but merely on this ground the fact that this philosophy is opposed to the remaining Dvaitins’ doctrines cannot be evaded at all. For, the Dvaita Darshanas (dualistic philosophies) which were established by (ancient and famous sages like) Kapila, Kaṇāda, etc. also have presented their respective philosophies before the Śrōtrus, proclaiming in the manner: “This alone is the proper Jñāna”, is it not so?

(Solution): Not so. For, the Advaita Siddhānta that has been propounded so far is in consonance with Śāstra as also Yukti. Hence, because the remaining philosophies are opposed to
Śāstra and Yukti, it evolves that they are *Mithyā Darshanas* (false, improper systems) alone. Since in the ‘Vedāntamimāṇsā’ (popularly known as ‘Brahmasūtras’) in the second chapter it has been proved quite convincingly that philosophical systems like Sāṅkhya, Vaisheshika etc. are *Yuktibāhya* (beyond universally accepted reasoning or logic), here there is no need to establish that truth once again. In fact, in this very treatise also the truth that - “Dvaitasāmānyya (the genus or generality of dualism) itself is false or unreal” - has been demonstrated. Therefore, in this manner since Dvaita Darshanas are opposed to Śāstra and Yukti there is no scope here to doubt that the Advaita Darshana is opposed to them.

Not only on the ground that the Dvaita Darshanas are opposed to Śāstra and Yukti they have to be *perforce* said to be improper systems, but also because all of them are prone, susceptible to give full scope for *Rāga* (attachment) and *Dwesha* (hatred) they are not proper systems. To wit: Kapila, Kaṇāda and such other *Darshanakāras* (system-founders) have decided that their respective Siddhānta itself is the last word (i.e. the final truth, the absolute Reality). Among them there are two categories: (a) One stipulates a rule of law that - “In this manner alone this is said to be the *Paramārtha* (Absolute Truth) and it is not in any other manner possible.” (b) The second stipulates a rule of law that - “This alone is Paramārtha, not anything else.” For instance: Sāṅkhyaists who follow Kapila’s Siddhānta state thus: “*Pradhāna* which is *Triguṇātmaka* (of the essence of three qualities) in order to yield or provide endless number of Jīvas *Bhoga* (enjoyment) as also *Moksha* (Beatitude, Liberation) gets transformed into various forms like Mahat *Tattwa* etc. For the *Jagat* (world of duality) that alone is the *Upādāna Kāraṇa* (material cause).” On the other hand, *Vaisheshikas*, who adopt the viewpoint of Kaṇāda, opine that: “Just as many cotton threads combine together to form cloth, the atoms alone, incessantly producing effects like *Dvyanuka* (binary), *Tryanuka* (tertiary) atoms in stages, produce the world of duality.” Now these Vaisheshikas do not accept the category or phenomenon of Pradhāna which the Sāṅkhyaists are establishing by inference; the *Satkāryavāda* (theory that an entity which in the beginning existed in the form of Kāraṇa or cause gets transformed into
Kāryarūpa (form of an effect) which is accepted by Śāṅkhyans is not accepted by these Vaisheshikas.

Further, some disciples of Buddha say that five Skandhas, twelve Āyatanas, 18 Dhātus, the external Ādhībhoutika objects and the internal Ādhyātmika objects - all these are real in all the three periods of time. According to their methodology formulated by themselves (i.e. not supported by or taught by the Vedas; hence Buddhism is a Vedābhāya Darshana), although they follow or adopt an atomic theory, they do not acknowledge what Kapādas (or Vaisheshikans) have propounded as Ātman who is a Bhūkṛtu or Īśwara who is omniscient. Some other Buddhists are Kṣanīka Vijñānavādins. Their doctrine is that all empirical transactions are carried on by Vijñānasantāna (a series of concepts or consciousnesses) alone. Further, Arhatas (Jains) say: Jīva and Ajīva - thus there exist only two entities; existing in various forms, these two only are utilized in our workaday transactions. With regard to all matters of discussion or debate, taking recourse to what they call ‘Syādvāda’ (theory accepting - ‘it may be in this way also’) these people aver that there cannot at all be any imposition of a restriction of the type - “Vastutattwa (the essence of an entity or substance) should be in this particular manner alone.” Jīvātman is of the dimension or proportion of the body; he is of a nature having contraction and expansion. This is their doctrine. In any case, in this manner among the Dvaitins there exist hundreds of systems of philosophy. Among them each one expounds his own respective special methodology saying - “This alone is the Tattwa (the Reality), nothing else; this Tattwa is established only in this manner and not in any other way” - and are deeply identified or attached, showing a pronounced affinity towards their own system; besides, they regard the others as opponents, rivals and despise them and their systems. Because of their taking a steadfast stand and showing an innate identification with their respective systems of philosophy alone, they are forced to become opponents to one another.

Thus although the Dvaitins are associated with mutual opposition among themselves, our this Advaita Darshana, which is in consonance with the teachings of the Vedas, is not really opposed to any one of them at all. Just as for one, who has total identification with his whole body, does not at all entertain any
hatred or hostility towards any limb like hand, leg etc., in the same way here too it should be understood, discerned. For, Ātman is the one Ātman to everyone; hence, even though anyone else is staunchly identified with any particular Dvaita Siddhānta, the Advaitin reckons them in the manner - “They too are our own people” - alone. Therefore, since there is no scope or room for Rāga and Dwesha in this Advaita Darshana - this alone is the Paramārtha Darshana (the Absolutely real philosophy): This is the implicit purport here. This very opinion was expressed previously in the Vaitathya Prakāraṇa also in the manner - “Advaya alone is Shivam (auspicious)” - (2-33); now, the same opinion is being established through Upapatti (justification based on proof, evidence).

Meaning: “For, Advaita is Paramārtha (Absolutely real); Dvaita is said to be its Bheda (division, distinction). For them (i.e. Dvaitins) in both ways it is Dvaita alone. Therefore, this (i.e. Advaita) is not opposed.”

TO DVAITA WHICH IS APARAMĀRTHA (UNREAL) ADVAITA WHICH IS PARAMĀRTHA CANNOT POSSIBLY BE OPPOSED

If it is asked: “How is it that this Advaita is not opposed to Dvaitins?” - we answer: For, Advaita is Paramārtha, whereas Dvaita is the distinction, meaning its effect, of the Advaita Tattwa. Just as for the root of a tree, the tree, the branches etc. are effects, in the same way the dual forms are the effects of Advaita alone. For, it is very clearly expounded in the Śruti as: ‘सत्वेभे चौप्रेम्यत्वं आसीदेवणीति …… तदेवतः बहु स्मां प्रजायमेवति ततेजोनेव’ - (Chh. 6-2-2, 3) - meaning - “Oh dear, in the beginning Sadbrahman alone, without anything second to It, existed. It imagined in the manner - ‘I will become many, I alone will be born as Dvaita (many)’ - and created Tejas (fire)” - purporting to suggest that Sadbrahman alone, which is Advayarūpa, came into being as Dvaita like Tejas, Ap, Prithivi etc. Further, there is a Śruti which says: ‘सन्मूलता: सत्वेभेत: सर्वां प्रजां सदायतने: तत्रतिष्ठोऽ’ - (Chh. 6-8-9) - meaning - “Oh dear, for all these effects Sat
(Reality) alone is the root cause ; Sat alone is the support ; Sat alone is the end." In states like Sushupti etc. when the mind does not exist at all there does not also exist any Dvaita (duality) whatsoever ; when in the dream there exists a mind, Dvaita appears. Therefore, just as in the dream by virtue of the movement of the mind the duality that appears is verily the effect of Advaita, in the same way it evolves that the Dvaita that is appearing now (i.e. in the waking state) also is in its apparent form of appearance is Aparamārtha (unreal in the absolute sense), as also it is the projected effect alone of the Advaitatattva (non-dual Reality). Thus, it is not proper to say that in this manner Advaita which is the cause is opposed to Its effects which are not Paramārtha, is it not so ? But, for the Dvaitins especially - in the Absolute sense too it is Dvaita alone, and what is reckoned as Aparamārtha is also Dvaita alone. For instance, Dvaita which the Sāṅkhya have believed to be Paramārtha (Absolutely real, in the ultimate analysis) is opposed to what they are opining as Aparamārtha but which the Kāṇādas (i.e. Vaisheshikans) accept as Dvaita ; vice versa, the Dvaita Darshana which the Kāṇādas have accepted is opposed to the Dvaita Darshana which they are proclaiming as Aparamārtha but championed by the Sāṅkhya. Anyway, in this manner because both the Dvaita schools are of similar doctrinaire theories, between them one is opposed to the other. This fact becomes evident. In this way, in all the theories of the Dvaitins the opponents’ Darshana is Dvaita only as well as the Darshana of the Siddhāntin also is Dvaita alone ; hence, between those Dvaita Darshanas since one cannot withstand the onslaught of the Yukti (dialectical arguments) of the other, both of them have to be inferred as the philosophies of deluded people indeed. For, it is not possible at all to aver that an object exists in two mutually opposed forms or kinds at the same time ; just as it is possible to conjecture that Karmas can be performed in a particular manner as also in some other manner, it is not possible to acknowledge an imagined concept or inference saying that an object may exist in a particular manner as also in some other form also (at the same time). The Siddhānta of any one school of Dvaitins has not been accepted to be the only correct, proper one by the other Dvaitins. If any one of them is accepted as final
and correct, then it could have been concluded in the manner -
"Among the various Darshanas formulated by Dvaitins such and
such alone is the real one" - is it not so? What about the
Advaita Darshana? - For this question the answer is: The
universal Intuitive Experience like that of deep sleep etc. is
in support of that Darshana indeed. Hence, this Advaita
Darshana of ours is not opposed to any Dvaita Darshana
whatsoever.

It being so, because it amounts to accepting the fact that
- “Dvaita DrishTi itself is the Darshana (philosophy) of BhrAntas
(deluded people), whereas Advaita DrishTi is of people devoid
of that BhrAnti” - for this reason alone it amounts to saying that
Advaita (non-dualism) is not opposed to those Dvaitins also. The
Sruti: ‘हस्त्रो मायायिष्युरुपप ईवते’ - (Br. 2-5-19) - meaning - “Paramātman
by virtue of Avidyāprajñā (consciousness projected by ignorance
i.e. misconception) appears in many forms” - is proclaiming that
the Bahrūpatwa (manifoldness of forms) appearing in Ātma
(who is really non-dual) is, in the ultimate analysis, caused by
Avidyāprajñās (false concepts projected by ignorance). Because
for the Śruti, which declares that in deep sleep there does not
at all exist any second thing other than Ātma Chaitanya (Pure
Consciousness of the Self) there is complete support of the
universal experience of deep sleep etc., no one can ever possibly
affirm that Advaita does not really exist. Besides, the Śruti itself
pointedly stresses the truth in very clear terms that in Sushupti
(deep sleep) Advaita alone exists when it expresses that ‘न तु तद्धि
द्वितीयमस्ति ततोन्याद्विति च यत्स्थिते’ - (Br. 4-3-23) - meaning - “Therein
a second thing apart from Ātman does not exist; if it were so,
it could have been possibly seen, is it not so?” Therefore, just
as when a brave warrior, astride an intoxicated or agitated el-
phant, is riding along comes across a mad man challenging him
vociferously in the manner - “I am also riding on an elephant;
I dare you to let loose your elephant towards mine” - because
the warrior has realized that the challenger is a madcap and will
not drive his elephant towards him at all - in the same way, since
the Jñāni (Realized Soul) who has cognized Advaitātman has
realized that all Dvaitins are deluded people, he will not endeavour
to argue with them. That Brahmajñāni is verily the Self for them
also, is it not so? For this reason only, the Advaita that we have accepted is not opposed to the opinions or doctrines of those Dvaitins at all.

THE DISTINCTION THAT EXISTS BETWEEN ADVAITA SIDDHĀNTA AND SHŪNYAVĀDA

Here a special feature: The Shūnyavādins among Buddhists are not at all Dvaitins; for, they refute all the viewpoints of Dvaitins of the type - Sadvāda and Asadvāda etc. and those Shūnyavādins have not embraced any Drīshṭi with deep identification, saying that - “This alone is our Darśana.” Anyone may here raise a doubt of the type - “Therefore, the doctrine of those Shūnyavādins also, who are Advayavādins, is Aviruddha (unopposed to the Dvaitavāda) alone, is it not so? It being so, what is the superior greatness of Advaita Siddhānta?” But Shūnyavādins, on the strength of their own unique doctrine of ‘Pratītya Samutpāda’ - meaning, depending on one thing another thing appearing as being born or, in other words, dependent origination - following purely a kind of critique of reasoning - propound that - “Dvaita in its entirety is essenceless” - and then with the purport of refuting all viewpoints in toto adopt a vain, dry system of dialectics and try to demonstrate to any opponent Anishta Prasakti (the defect of an undesirable conclusion being arrived at). But for the whole gamut of logical or dialectical exercises duality is the main basis or support; therefore, they are unable to refute Dvaita. It is very clearly evident that for those who have undertaken the ominous task of establishing by logical means alone the doctrine of - ‘Logic also is Nisswabhāva (essenceless)’ - invariably an unavoidable defect will entail. Further, if those Shūnyavādins strengthen belief, faith - then anyone may raise a doubt of the type - “How come they are saying by virtue of their tenet that - ‘Everything is Shūnya’ - that it can be objectified by Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) of the nature of Samādhi (trance)?” Now, for reasons that - (a) That kind of (Shūnya) Anubhava is Vaiyaktika (individualistic) - meaning not being a universal experience, equally common to everyone, only occurring somewhere to some people only; (b) Vijñānavādins, who are also Buddhists but opposed to the Shūnyavādins, have from this (essenceless) Anubhava formu-
lated a totally different conclusion by means of *Yukti* or reasoning – the doctrinaire theory of Shūnyavādins being claimed to be Aviruddha to all other schools of philosophy is rendered to be a mere vain promise or pledge alone, and there is no *Sādhakayukti* (logical argument sustaining it) whatsoever.

On the other hand, with regard to this Advaita Siddhānta, on the strength of *Sārvatārika* (universal and equal to each and every person anywhere and at any time) *Anubhava* (Intuitive Experience - not within the purview of the ego alone), because it is determining the ‘*Tattva*’ (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality) on the strong and unshakable foundation of examining the *Avasthātraya* (universal experiences of the three states of Consciousness) employing the two strong means of *Āgama* (Śāstraic teachings handed down according to a time-tested traditional methodology of pedagogics) and *Yukti* (unique logic propounded in the Śāstras themselves), here in this Advaita philosophy there does not exist even the least bit of scope for any kind of *Vivāda* (argument or debate). This is the salient feature of this universally acceptable philosophy. Because all Dvaita Darshanas are mere conclusions drawn on the basis of the waking state viewpoint alone (to wit, it is rendered to be lop-sided, prejudiced and highly coloured, as it were, being based on one part of life’s experiences and not their totality), between them, on the one hand, and Advaita Darshana which determines the Ultimate Reality based on the comprehensive, holistic methodology of the Avasthātraya, on the other, there cannot exist possibly any opposition as such, and hence it is not possible to raise any doubt on this count. To the conclusion of the type - “The object which serves as a source for a reflection is one and one only” - a conclusion, drawn merely based on an appearance, of the type - “The reflections of an object are many” - can never be opposed or contradictory at all, is it not so? Here too we must understand it in a similar way.

\[ \text{मायया पिछिते हृदतनाम्यायाः कथानन ।} \]
\[ \text{तत्त्वतो भिद्यामाने हि मत्त्वताममृत ब्रजेतुः ।} \]

**Meaning**: “This is different because of Māyā alone; in no other manner whatsoever that which is *Aja* (unborn, birthless)
can possibly become different. For, if it could really become different, then *Amritam* (that which is immortal) will necessarily have to acquire *Martyatwa* (mortality)."

**A DEFECT IF IT IS MAINTAINED THAT DVAITA IS REALLY THE EFFECT OF ADVAITA**

"It has been propounded that - 'Dvaita is a distinction of Advaita; it is caused by Advaita' - is it not so? In that case, Dvaita also, like Advaita alone, becomes *Paramārtha* (real), is it not so? From a real seed the tree that grows cannot reasonably be said to be not *Paramārtha* (i.e. unreal), is it not so?" - Thus a doubt may arise in the minds of some people.

In order to remove this doubt Shri Gaudapāda is saying: "This has become different due to *Māyā* (illusion) alone." To wit: To the disputant who maintains that Dvaita also is *Satyam* (real) we put a question: Is it your opinion that the phenomenon of Dvaita is not different from *Advayātmatattva* (the Ultimate Reality of non-dual Self) which is *Sadrūpa* (of the nature of Pure Existence)? Or is it your opinion that it is different? Let it be Satyam alone; from this we (Vedāntins) do not suffer any harm whatsoever. For, we are not at all saying that Advaita is not Satyam. If it is not so, just as the tree is quite different from the seed, if you say that Dvaita is different from Advaita - then that is not proper. For, Ātman is *Niravayava* (without parts or components). Just as the seed gets broken up and becomes a tree, it is not possible to say that Advaita gets broken up and gets transformed into Dvaita. A seed with components may get transformed into different parts like bottom (stem), branch, sub-branch or branchlet etc.; in the same way, clay with components may get transformed into various forms like pot, pitcher, lid etc.; for, there is no hindrance whatsoever for a partible object to get disintegrated and get transformed in this manner. But, *Tattwa* (Reality) which is *Niravayava* (devoid of parts) and *Janmarahita* (devoid of birth) can never get transformed thus in whatever manner. Just as it is said by the Sāṅkhyaṇs that Pradhāna gets transformed in the forms like Mahat etc. - this Ajātmataattwa can never get transformed; just as the Vaisheshikans etc. propound that atoms in the order of Dvyanuṇka etc. become the Jagat also, this Ajātmataattwa cannot become *Jagat* (the world of duality)."
Therefore, we have to conclude that - "Just as one and one moon only appears to be many due to the defect of cataract in the eye, and in poor light a rope appears to be of many forms like a snake, a streak of water etc. - in the same way, Advaita (non-dual Reality), which is existing 'Paramārthically' (i.e. in the Absolute sense) due to Māyā (illusion) alone, appears falsely indeed as Dvaita." No one will ever accept that apart from the one singular moon seen by all the people many moons are really existing and apart from the one rope the false appearances of a snake or a streak of water etc. are really born, is it not so ?

(Objection) : Just as in the manner the Sānkhyans have propounded, why cannot it be said (accepted) that Advaita has really got transformed into the Dvaitākāra (form of duality) ? Or just as in the order the Vaisheshikans have propounded that atoms, in the order of Dvyanuka (binary atoms) and Tryāṅuka (tertiary atoms), become effects - why cannot it be accepted that Advaita has actually become converted into Dvaita ?

(Solution) : To this the answer is : If it were true that Advaita actually, in reality, acquires the Dvaitarūpa and gets born, then necessarily, as a concomitant result of it, Advaita will have to give up, or strip Itself, as it were, of Its Ajatwaswabhāva (essential, innate nature of birthlessness) ; if it is said : "Let it be" - then it will have to be acknowledged that what is Amritā (immortal) becomes Martya (mortal). The teaching that - "Advaita is Amrīta" - is based on the sound reasoning of It being devoid of birth, is it not so ? The purport of the śruti: 'स च एव महान्य आत्माः जेवो दु:मूलोऽसभो ब्रह्म' - (Bṛ. 4-4-25) is - "That this Ātman is Supreme, more pervasive than all else ; is Aja (devoid of birth), Ajara (i.e. devoid of old age) ; Amara (devoid of death) ; Amrīta (of the essential nature of not getting death, destruction) ; Abhaya (fearless). For that reason alone He is Brahma." If it is asserted that, in reality, in the beginning Ātman was Advaita and later on got Himself divided or broken into the Kāryarūpa, then because it amounts to accepting that He is actually born (in time and space and having causation), He acquires thereby Martyatwa (mortality). To assert that - "It is non-dual, and at the same time It is the cause for Dvaita" - is a self-contradiction. For, in order that an effect should occur, there necessarily have to exist many
requisite things or conditions - externally; or, within the thing itself an inherent nature of becoming another should exist. Both these conditions or stipulations are not applicable at all to an Entity of the essential nature of Advaita. If it is maintained that - “That which is Advaita that alone is Dvaitayukta (inherently having a nature of becoming Dvaita or duality)” - then it amounts to saying - just as the statement that fire becomes cold - that the entity gives up its intrinsic, essential nature of Being or Pure existence indeed. Thus this conclusion drawn to the effect that - “An entity’s essential nature itself gets transformed into an opposite state or condition” - is not acceptable to anyone at all, is it not so? Therefore, this doctrine which is opposed to all Pramanas (valid means of knowledge) and which gives scope for all normal empirical transactions to be destroyed or disturbed - should not be accepted.

6. DEFECTS THAT ENTAIL IF JANMA IS ACCEPTED FOR BRAHMAN WHICH IS OF AJASWABHĀVA

अजातात्यैः भावस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः।
अजाते ज्ञातुं पावे मर्यादां कथयेदयति ॥२०॥

Meaning: “To an Entity which is Ajāta (birthless) alone the disputants have accepted a Janma (birth) indeed. An Entity which is Ajāta and Amṛita (immortal) - how at all can It acquire Martyatwa (mortality) ?”

THREE SCHOOLS IN JĀTABRAHMĀVĀDA (THEORY OF BRAHMAN GETTING BORN)

Some people who are the proponents of Jātabrahmāvāda (the Absolute Reality of Brahman being born or having birth) aver that for Brahman which is by Its very essence of Being is Amṛita (immortal) has birth. Among them (1) some say : Brahman is of Dvaitādvaitarūpa (dual-cum-non-dual nature) ; Jīva is the ‘becoming or transformation’ of Brahman ; he is Bhinnā (different) at the same time Abhinnā (non-different) from Brahman. (2) Some others say : By virtue of an association with an Upādhi (adjunct), although Jīva is of a Bhinnābhinnarūpa (different-cum-non-different form) of Brahman, when the Upādhi gets
destroyed he (i.e. Jīva) becomes one with the Paramātman.
(3) Yet some others say: Between Jīvas and Brahman - just as between sparks of fire and fire - there exists a ‘Anśha-Anmśi’ (part-whole) Bhāvārūpa Sambandha (relationship of such categories).

Thus following various methodologies those who have acknowledged the doctrine that for Brahman who is of Ajāswabhāva too there is Janma (birth) - because they have accepted Janma being there alone, it has amounted to their accepting the doctrine of - “Brahman has Martyatwa”. For, to the objection of the type - “That which is born, death occurring is certain ; because It is devoid of birth, an Entity which is by dint of its very essential nature alone is Amṛita (immortal) - how at all can It acquire Martyatwa ?” - those disputants will have to provide a convincing solution indeed. Those disputants too (who are basically logical-minded) do not, nay cannot, accept the theory that - “The essential nature (Swabhāva) itself of a Vastu (entity) changes, mutates” - is it not so ? Hence, there exists this defect in their doctrine.

THE PRESENT-DAY JĀTABRAHMAVĀDINS

Among the present-day Vedāntins some describe the Brahmatattwa in the following manner : “There are two aspects to the body of Brahman, called ‘Chit’ and ‘Achit’. When this Chidachidrūpa body is so very subtle that it cannot be said to be anymore distinct from Brahman, then Brahman exists in Kāraṇāvasthā (potent state of being a cause). When this Brahman which is in Kāraṇāvastha is acquiring the Kārayavastha (state of becoming an effect), because Achidamsha (part of insentient substance), which was existing in the Kāraṇāvastha devoid of any of the phenomena like Shabda etc., with a view to becoming Bhūgya (an object of enjoyment), acquires those Shabda etc. - a mutation called ‘Anyathābhāva’ (a different substantive nature) occurs to its Swarūpa. Because then Chidamsha has perforce to acquire Bhōktṛutwa, which enjoys the fruits of the respective Karmas, it undergoes a change of the type of Jñāna evolving or blossoming. Thus the two forms of mutations called ‘Swarūpānyathābhāva’ and ‘Jñāna Vikāsa’ - are called by virtue of being ‘Vishishta’ (extra-ordinary, special) endowed with special features
- Brahman undergoes such a mutation called ‘Vishishṭa.’ In this way, the mutation of going from Karanāvastha to the Kāryāvastha is common to Brahman who is the Prakāri (endowed with the modes) and Vishishta (that which is endowed with special features), as also to Chidachit which are the Prakāras (modes) Visheshana (special features). In this manner, in saying that Brahman acquires Kāryāvastha from Karanāvastha there is no defect whatsoever” - This is the opinion of these disputants.

In the doctrine of these disputants although the Śrutis state that Brahman by Its very nature is Aja (devoid of birth), it amounts to saying that Brahman has really birth - and this fact is very clear. For, although these people are saying that the Visheshānas only are undergoing change but there is no mutation to Brahman, they never accept that Brahman exists independently, giving up Visheshānas, at some time or the other. Therefore, it is tantamount to their agreeing that Brahman also has Vikāra. Suppose a man has pain in the hand, or in the leg or in the stomach, no one will say that his limb only had the pain but not the person, is it not so?

Here these disputants may say: “स व एष महानज आत्माजगरोद्भयो ब्रह्म” - (Bṛ. 4-4-25) - from this Śruti sentence it is established that Brahman does not have Vikāras like Janma etc.; we have accepted that only to Chidachit, which are the Visheshānas there is Vikāra. Therefore this objection is not proper - thus these people may argue. But a Śruti sentence signifies to us an Entity which already exists only, it is a Jñāpaka (reminder); no Śruti is a Karaka (creator of a new thing); it cannot create anything that does not exist. Therefore, it is not possible to assert merely on the support of a (Śruti) sentence that Brahman is Aja and Nirvikāri. Apart from this, in the above Śruti sentence it has not been stated at all that the Visheshānas (special features) have mutations but not Brahman which is Visheshya (that which is endowed with Visheshānas). It is stated here that - “This Vijñānamaya who exists amidst these Praṇas is Mahān (great, all-pervading), Aja (birthless),” - as previously stated in (Bṛ. 4-4-22), that the Jīvātman himself is Ajara (devoid of old age), Amara (deathless), Amṛita (devoid of an essential nature of dying), Abhaya (fearless); he is verily Brahman. The fact that
for this above Sruti sentence this alone is the intended meaning is ascertained from the next sentence: ‘अमरे वै रहस्य प्रवचन य एवं वेद’, meaning, - “One who cognizes like this, he verily becomes fearless Brahman alone.”

Apart from this, in the Chhāndogya Śruti: ‘तदेक्त गृहु स्वयं प्रजायायित’ - (Chh. 6-2-6) - meaning, “That Brahman wished - ‘I will become many, I will get born’ - in this manner it mentions about the Saṅkalpa (volition) that Brahman had wished to become many. According to the doctrine of these disputants merely, on the ground of the Visheshaṇas becoming many, Brahman especially cannot possibly become many, and hence this sentence will be rendered invalid alone. As otherwise, if it is accepted that Brahman too becomes many - then the Siddhānta (their doctrine) that - “Brahman does not have any Vikāra” - will have to be abandoned. Apart from this, the following Srutis state that, prior to the creation: “All this was Advitiya Brahman alone” - (Chh. 6-2-1) ; “This existed as Ātman alone, nothing else whatsoever existed” - (Aitareya 1-1) etc. and the opponents’ doctrine will be opposed to all the above Śruti sentences. For, in the opponent’s opinion even then (i.e. prior to the creation) it is accepted that Brahman existed as Chidachid Vishishṭa alone ; but the Śruti is affirming that - “Brahman alone existed.”

In the same manner, in Śrutis like - “You alone are That” - (Chh) ; “I am Brahman” (Bṛ.) ; “This Ātman is Brahman” - (Māṇḍūkyya and Bṛ.) etc. it has been reiterated that Jīva is really Brahman alone, but it has not been stated that - “Jīvas are the Visheshaṇas only of Brahman”. Therefore, this doctrine of the opponent of ‘Chidachitprakārārabrahmavāda’ is opposed to those Śrutis. These disputants keep on giving a consolatory explanation for this contradiction : “In the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa it has been very clearly stated that the insentient, inanimate phenomena like Prithivi etc. and Ātman are the body of Para-mātman ; therefore, there is invariably full support of the Śruti for our doctrine”. But this Samādhāna (consolatory explanation) is not proper ; for, the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa which is in Bṛihadāraṇyaka has the prime purport of signifying the Swarūpa of Antaryāmi and not in stating that Prithivi etc. are His body. By depending or rélying upon the Kāryakaraṇas
(actions and means of action) of deities like Prithivi, He becomes their Niyamaka (controller); when the real purport of that sentence becomes fulfilled by indicating that - "Merely in the proximity of that Paramatman who is of the essential nature of Sakshi (Witnessing Principle) all the respective actions and means of actions of everyone are functioning according to regulations" - to imagine a discordant meaning of the type that - "Paramatman has a body too" - exposes this doctrine to what is called 'Gourava Dosa' (meaning, when a single meaning, being inferred for a particular part of a text, the intended purport is fully served, needlessly to imagine the meanings of two different sentences a defect entails). Therefore, it is not reasonable to follow the Antaryami Brahmana, which has no purport at all of signifying Sashariratwa (embodiedness) and to strike down the meaning of Shruti sentences like - 'तत्त्वमस्य' - (That thou art) etc. which have the prime purport of preaching Ekatwa (unity, identity) alone. Therefore, this 'Jatabrahmavada' is not in consonance with Sāstra.

For another reason too this doctrinaire theory can be proved to be Śastraḥsya (alien to the Śāstra or scriptures). In what way? The answer is: In this very Bṛhadāraṇyaka there is a sentence like : एवं वा अर्यमात्रामात्रन्तरोऽर्थाः: कृत्स्न: प्रजानिष्ठ एव' - (Bṛ. 4-5-13). It is very clearly stated here that just as a lump of salt is in all its parts salty only, Brahman is everywhere is of the very essence of Intuition (cognition) alone; as these disputants are stating, there is no statement or relevant sentence which implies that between Brahman, on the one hand, and Jīvas and gross objects on the other, there exists a Sharīri-Sharīra relationship, as also that Brahman has undergone mutations of all kinds. Quite contrary to this, the Shruti sentence : 'मृष्वोः स मूलमाण्योति य इह नानेव पर्यथिति' - (Bṛ. 4-4-19), meaning - "One who sees manifoldness in Brahman gets death after death" - stridently condemns those who see manifoldness or many changes (Nāṇaprakāra) in Brahman. Further, the Shruti is stressing unequivocally in the manner: प्रकृतिवैद्यमेकद्वाप्रवर्त्त द्वम्' - (Bṛ. 4-4-20), meaning - "Because this Paramātmatattwa is not a Prameya (object for cognition) one should not see manifoldness in It; he
should cognize that It is *Ekarūpa* (of one and the same essential nature).” Therefore, it amounts to saying that this doctrine which acknowledges *Nānātwa* (manifoldness) in Paramātman is *Śāstrabahishkṛuta* (expelled by the scriptures themselves) indeed.

Apart from this, for the various statements made by these disputants like:

(a) “For Chaitanya, Chidachit are the body”; (b) for the substance called *Chit* (*Chiddravya*) Chit is a *Guṇa* (quality)” ; (c) The quality (*Guṇa*) of *Chidrūpa* (of the form or nature of Chit) acquires *Samkōcha* (involution, contraction) and *Vikāsa* (evolution, expansion)” - there is no possibility of any proper meaning being attached or made applicable. For, Chaitanya is, like the empty space, a *Tattva* (Entity) which has no taint or touch of anything else. It is also not possible even to imagine that It has any relationship with anything else. Both the words ‘Chaitanya’ and ‘Chit’ have the same meaning of ‘Consciousness’ (cognition), and it is not possible at all to imagine or infer that in Pure Consciousness too there exists an internal and inherent difference. Usually these disputants argue in the manner that because for objects of brilliance or light like a lamp, gem etc. we see them having a *Guṇa* (quality) of *Prabha* (light, brilliance), for the *Dravya* (substance) of *Chidrūpa* (of the form of Chit) also there can be a quality called ‘Chit’. But lamp and gems etc. are *Sāvayavadravyas* (substances having component parts or constituents), whereas Chaitanya is *Niravayava* (devoid of any parts) and is *Sarvavyāpaka Tattwa* (Reality which is all-pervading). It being so, it is not possible at all even to imagine that Chaitanya or Chit is a *Dravya* (substance) or It may have qualities. Apart from this, in states like *Sushupti* (deep sleep), *Samādhi* (trance) etc. without there being any contact with anything else Chaitanya alone is experienced (Intuited) by us. Therefore, the *Yukti* (device) - which endeavours to imagine that Dvaita, which is misconceived in Ātman from the waking viewpoint, is really existing in Ātman - is opposed to *Sārvatrika Anubhava* (universal or everyone’s experience). In the same way, to imagine that even in the *Pralayāvastha* (state of total dissolution) Chaitanya, which is *Nirvishesha* (devoid of any special features) exists alone by Itself and unto Itself - will be quite reasonable. For this reason also to imagine Brahman, which is birthless, non-dual as also
Chaitanyarūpa, to give up its *Swabhāva* (essential nature) and to be born in the various forms of Jīvas and Jaḍavastus is *Kutarka* (vain logic) indeed— which imagines that a Reality, which is of the essential nature of immortality, acquires *Martyarūpa* (form of a mortal being or object). On this count too this Jātabrahmavāda has to be discarded.

\[\text{न भवत्यमृतं मर्य न मर्यमृतं तथा }\]
\[\text{प्रकृतेन्यथाभावो न कथ्यित्र भविष्यति }\]
\[\text{स्वभावेनामृतौ वस्तं भावो गच्छति मर्यताम् }\]
\[\text{कृतकेनामृतत्सत्त्व कर्ण स्वास्थ्यि निश्चलं }\]

*Meaning*: “That which is immortal cannot become mortal; that which is mortal cannot become immortal too. For, the essential nature (of an entity) to become something else is not possible in any manner whatsoever. That disputation in whose doctrine an Entity which is by Its very essential nature is immortal becomes mortal, because in that disputation’s doctrine that Entity which is said to be immortal is invariably produced (artificially), how at all is it possible for It to exist (always) as It is?”

**JĀTABRAHMĀVĀDA IS OPPOSED TO ANUBHAVA AS ALSO TO YUKTI**

It has already been stated in the previous Kārikā that—‘An immortal thing cannot become mortal.’ Therefore, it cannot be acknowledged that Brahman which is ever, eternally of an essential nature of immortality becomes a Jīva who is mortal. Similarly, to assert that Jīva who is of the essential nature of mortality, at some time or the other, becomes immortal is a mere conjecture made, quite opposed to what is seen in our workaday world. In our empirical world of duality none of us has seen at all anybody using any one of, say, a magical gem, a hymn, herb or a root of a plant and converting, transforming a thing which is of the nature of dying into one which is of immortal, deathless nature— is it not so? In case if anybody has, by the employment of magical gems or hymns etc. and by virtue of their magical powers, brought back to life any being or creature that had died,
even there the statement that - ‘The being had died’ - is itself false; it will have to be concluded that what we had believed to the effect that it had died was itself false. For, the essential nature of a thing, substance can never possibly change. Do any discriminative people imagine that the heat that is the very essential nature of fire has got transformed into a cold state and thereby the fire has become cold? Never at all. The Swabhāva (essential nature) changes means the extinction of that Swabhāva; in other words, that substance itself has been destroyed - this is the real import of it. Similarly, if it is stated that - “Brahman is born as a Jīva” - it means that Brahman Itself becomes extinct, non-existent; whereas, if it is stated that - “A mortal Jīva gets transformed into Brahman” - it means a Jīva’s ‘Jīvatwa’ (soulhood) disappears. Jīva himself becomes non-existent or extinct - it means this alone. Therefore, to imagine that Brahman and Jīva are two different entities, as also that one gets transformed into another is totally wrong, improper. Hence, the common people have misconceived Brahman Itself to be Jīva; although Jīva appears as a Jīva due to Avidyā, even now at this very moment he is verily Brahman - to infer in this manner it is quite rational. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the Śrutī sentence ‘त्र्यं चेत ब्रह्मवेद्विश्वासवपि’ - (Mundaka) - as meaning - “Giving up the Jīvabhāva (soulhood) which is projected by Avidyā, a Jīva cognizes, Intuits his real, essential nature as Brahmarūpa by means of Vidyā (Jñāna)” - alone.

Really speaking, the theory that - “Paramātman who is of the Amṛitaswabhāva Himself becomes Jīva” - is not proper at all. For, if that which is in Its essence Amṛita (immortal) is Its very innate nature, then how can it be said that It became Martya (mortal)? The thing which later on becomes Martya should earlier in the beginning too invariably should have been of the essential nature (Swabhāva) of becoming Martya, is it not so? Hence, the statement that - “In the beginning It was immortal” - is also false - we are compelled to deduce. For, a ‘Swabhāva’ (essential nature, core of Being) never changes. In that case, shall we say - “A Kṛitaka (an artificially produced) Amṛitatwa (immortality) that substance had” - ? That also does not suit; for, to say that first being Kṛitaka, later on a thing has become Amṛita
is itself a conjecture—which does not suit anything whatsoever. It becomes an improbable statement indeed like: “Without the King’s command they had acquired ministership.” In the same way, if it is said: “Jīva in the beginning is Martya; by means of Upāsana he becomes (gets transformed into) Amrīta” — it really amounts to saying that that newly-acquired Amrītatwa also is Kṛitaka (artificially produced, i.e. it is false alone); how at all can it be guaranteed that even such a Kṛitaka Amrītatwa in the future will sustain itself? Just as That which is in the beginning Amrīta becomes Martya, this ‘Amrītaswarūpa’ that has been produced artificially may become Martya — in this manner it is reasonable to surmise, is it not? In any case, in this doctrine neither Jīvatwa nor Brahmatwa is Aja (unborn) — meaning — it never exists as it is without any change or mutation. Therefore, it amounts to their saying that — “Amrītatwa (immortality) is never Shāśhwata (eternal)” — and thereby it amounts to these disputants, saying that there does not exist any Mōksha at all!

(Objection): In that case, in your Siddhānta also how can it be accepted that by means of Upāsana Amrītatwa accrues? In the Śruti also it has been stated that — “By means of Upāsana Amrītatwa is attained; from there one does not return” (Chh.) — “To this region of human beings he does not again come back” — (Chh.) — “To them there is nothing like coming back” — (Bṛ.) — in this manner in very clear terms, purporting to signify that — “Immutable Immortality (Nishchala Amrītatwa) alone is attained by Upāsana” — is it not so? If it amounts to saying that the Amrītatwa that is attained by means of Upāsana is mere Kṛitaka only, not only in the opponents’ doctrine but also in everyone’s doctrines, it will amount to saying that for Upāsana an immutable immortality cannot possibly be attained at all! Then in that event, does it not amount to our saying, nay accepting, that the Śruti itself which propounds that — ‘By Upāsana Amrītatwa can be attained’ — is Apramāṇa (invalid)?

Another doubt: If it is said that the Amrītatwa that is attained by means of Sādhana is Kṛitaka and hence it is not the real Mōksha — then how at all can even the Amrītatwa that accrues from Jāna be Swabhāvika (of an essential nature)? The word ‘Swabhāvika’ means ‘one’s eternally existing Swarūpa or essential nature’ only; how can it be ‘Prāpya’ (that which can
be acquired afresh)? That Amritatwa which appears as if it is Aprāpta (not acquired) due to Avidya can be acquired by Vidyā, is it not so? - Thus you (an opponent) may ask. In this theory it amounts to saying - “Avidyā gets destroyed; Vidyā is attained (afresh) - and as a result of this Mōksha accrues.” Even in that event, it amounts to saying that - “By means of a Nimitta (cause) alone the Mōkshanaprāpti (attainment of Liberation) accrues”, is it not so? Are you not saying that anything that is acquired due to a cause is Kritaka (artificially produced) alone?

(Solution) : The ‘Brahmaprāpti’ that is attained by Upāsana is the attainment of Brahmāloka (the world of Brahma, the first-born, Lord of Creation). For the Śruti sentences which say: “From there he does not return to Samsāra” - the real meaning is: “As long as the Brahmalōka exists he does not return” - alone. Because the Śruti states that - “This human being does not attain Āvarta (a state of coming back)” - it amounts to saying (i.e. it implies) that - “There exists another Mānava Āvartaprāpti (attainment of a return to human birth)” - alone. “Here there is no Punarāvṛitti” - this sentence also has the same meaning; for this kind of sentences we have to interpret them to mean - “These people (i.e. the Upāsakas) return to this Samsāra at Kalpāntara (another Kalpa or duration of world, another creation).

“In that case, the fruit amounts to being Kritaka only, is it not so? Can such a thing be called ‘Amṛita’ (devoid of destruction)?” - in this manner one should not doubt. For, in that context the word ‘Amṛitatwa’ is used by ‘Gouṇavṛitti’ (in a secondary sense). In the Purāṇa sentence - ‘अध्यौत संज्ञाय स्थानमूलतं ति भाष्ये’ (Vishnū Purāṇa 2-8-97), meaning - “Until all the Bhūtās (primordial elements get dissolved, the Sthāna (place) which is Shāśhwata (eternal) is also called ‘Amṛitatwa’ alone” - thus it is mentioned. Therefore, because the teaching that the Amṛitatwa which is the fruit of Upāsana stipulated as an injunction (Vidhi) in the ‘Upāsanā Prakaraṇa’ (chapter devoted to meditations) becomes Kritaka is acceptable to us, it does not amount to your pointing out any defect whatsoever there. Whereas, there are some Upāsanas mentioned in the Jñāna Prakaraṇa itself; for them the implicit meaning is: After the seeker goes to Brahmalōka, there in that region itself he gets Jñānaprāpti and attains the
Amṛitatwa in the predominant sense (*Mukhyārtha*) alone. In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* it is stated that Yājñavalkya has questioned King Janaka in the manner: ‘What is the fruit of these Upāsanas that you are performing? By means of these Upāsanas which *Tattwa* (Reality) are you reaching?’ While explaining the real purport implied in this sentence, Shri Sureswarāchārya has written (in his *Bṛi. Vārtika*):

‘उपासनानि सर्वानि परविद्याप्रकारः । क्रममुक्तिकलाजीति क गमिष्यसि गीतः ॥

- (Bṛ. Vā. 4-2-13) - meaning - “For all Upāsanas stipulated in the Brahmajñāna Prakaraṇa ‘Kramamukti’ alone is the fruit; therefore, here Yājñavalkya has questioned in the manner: ‘As a fruit of these Upāsanas where are you going?’” -

Now, a *Samādhāna* to the doubt - “Even to Jñāna how can the Amṛitatwa in the predominant sense be the fruit? By the cause of - ‘Avidyānívritti’ and ‘Vidyāprāpti’ you are saying that Mukti accrues, is it not so?” - has remained to be given. Here we have not at all accepted that the extraordinary events like - ‘Avidyā really exists in the beginning; Vidyā then is born and removes that’ - are really events *taking place in time*. In fact, we have accepted Vidyā and Avidyā only from the Avidyā-vyavahāra Drishti (the viewpoint of the empirical transactions being carried on due to Avidyā or ignorance) alone.

(Doubt) : In that case, you have at least accepted ‘Avidyā Dṛishṭi’, is it not so? Then is it not your opinion that - ‘One who has Avidyā invariably accepts the events of Vidyā-Avidyā’ -?

(Solution) : This is not proper. For, even the statement that - ‘I have Avidyā’ - also is verily Avidyāvyavahāra ; in the Śruti : ‘ध्यात्मतीव लेलयतीव’ - (Bṛi. 4-3-2) - it is implied that both the transactions of Jñāna and Karma are false appearances alone. If it is asked - “Is there no transaction of the type - ‘I do not know anything’ - ?” - in answer we say: Because *Anubhava* (Intuitive Experience) by means of which a person cognizes the import of the sentence - ‘I do not know anything’ - that very Anubhava alone is the real essential nature of Ātman, to say that -‘Ātman is the support for Avidyā’ - is also not proper; that which is the *Vishaya* (object) to a particular person’s Anubhava - how at all can that Vishaya taint or cling on to Ātman who
is the *Vishayi* (subject) and *Anubhavaswarūpa* (of the very essence of Intuitive Experience of Pure Consciousness)? It being so, in the teaching of the *Ajātabrahmavādin* (i.e. Vedāntin) because Amṛtatwa is verily the essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness of the *Jījñāsu* (the seeker), it is not possible at all to prove by any method of reasoning that It (i.e. Amṛtatwa) is Kṛtaka.

7. **AJĀTIVĀDA ALONE IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ŚRUTI AND NOT JĀTABRAHMAMAVĀDA**

Meaning: “Whether *Sṛishti* (creation) is real or unreal - Śruti is equal to both. Therefore, that which is certain and reasonable - that alone can be the meaning or purport of the Śruti and not anything else.”

IS THE LITERAL MEANING OF THE SṛISHTI ŚRUTI SUITABLE (AGREEABLE) TO AJĀTIVĀDA?

(Objection) : In the doctrine of those proponents who say that *Ajātabrahman* (unborn or birthless Brahman) alone is *Paramārtha* how at all can the Śruti which describes *Sṛishti* (creation) be a valid means ? The statement that - “Brahman is Aja (birthless) i.e. an Entity which is not born ; even so, It by ItsSelf assuming another form gets created” - is a self-contradictory one, is it not so ? It being so, it amounts to saying that Ajātivāda is not in consonance with Śruti, is it not so ?

(Solution) : For the Sṛishti Śrutis there is no prime purport in describing creation at all ; in order to preach or expound Ātmākatwa the Śrutis use this methodology of creation as a pedagogic device - thus previously itself (3-15) we have mentioned.

(Question) : In that case, why is it that here again the topic of Sṛishti has been raised ?

(Answer) : This verse undertakes here to deliberate upon and explain as to how the literal meaning of the Śruti which
describes Śrīṣṭi is agreeable to Ajātavāda. Therefore, there is no defect of repetition.

Here in this context the opinion of the Jātabrahmavādin is: (आकार्य: संपूर्ण: ) - meaning: “From that Ātman the empty space was born” ; (तत्त्वज्ञानसूचना) - meaning, “That created Tejas (fire)” - etc. - in this manner the words in these Śrutis are signifying a real event of birth - or an action of creation actually taking place ; but they are not saying that Brahman exists as It is only ; therefore, our doctrine alone is agreeable to the Śruti.

But this is not proper. For, the literal meaning of the Śruti agrees with both the doctrines of Jātabrahmavāda and Ajātabrahmavāda indeed. To wit, the action of creation is equally applicable to both - the real Śrīṣṭi and the false Śrīṣṭi. For instance, Sriman Nārāyaṇa, the Vishwarūpadhara (the Lord, who has assumed the form of the entire universe) has stated: ‘मया द्वैषा मया सृष्टा यन्तरः पश्चिमन नरद’ - (Moksha Dharma 339-45) - meaning: “Oh Nārada, this My form which you are seeing is one created through Māyā (magical power, illusive power)”’. Even for a false birth as in the statement - “In a dream from a pole a demon was born and came out” - this expression of creation being used is in vogue indeed. In the Śruti neither a sentence like - “Ākāsha was really born” nor like - “That Sadbrahman really created Tejas” - is used with a special stress on the expression ‘really’, is it not so ? Therefore, there is no scope whatsoever to stubbornly assert in the manner - “The Śrīṣṭi Śruti propounds a Paramārtha Śrīṣṭi alone.”

(Jātabrahmavādin) : Words have two meanings, called ‘Gouṇa’ (in a secondary sense) and ‘Mukhya’ (in a predominant sense) ; between these, first the Mukhyārtha alone should be adopted ; without a proper reason the Gouṇārtha should not be accepted. Is it not so ?

(Siddhāntin) : Not so. The word ‘Śrīṣṭi’ itself means - 'the Śrīṣṭi or creation that ensues from the Avidyādrishti.' We call ‘Swapnasṛṣṭi’ and ‘Māyāsṛṣṭi’ etc. as ‘Gouṇa’ ; the creation of the five elements like Ākāsha etc., of phenomena like mountain, ocean, creatures, human beings, deities etc. we call ‘Mukhya’. But whether it is Gouṇa or Mukhya, any Śrīṣṭi for
that matter - just as an earthen pot and the pot-space - are created - due to Avidyā only, creation ensues; and to say that 'Paramārthically' (meaning, in the Absolute sense, really) creation takes place - there is no Pramāṇa whatsoever available for us. For that reason alone, the Śruti is proclaiming: 'मात्रां तु प्रकृति विश्वानात्मायेन तु महेष्वरम्' - (Śvetāśvatara 4-10) - meaning: "Prakṛti is verily Māyā (magical, illusory power), Maheshwara Himsclf is Māyāvin (the magician)." If we observe from the Paramārtha Dṛṣṭi the statement that - 'Apart from Paramātman no substance whatsoever is created' - can possibly be established to be true. Ātman is devoid of birth; to say that His Swabhāva (essential nature of Pure, Absolute Being-Consciousness) changes, there is no Pramāṇa (valid means of proof) whatsoever. Therefore, it evolves that all creation is verily Āvidyaka (a projection of ignorance). For this reason alone, we have previously (3-25), stated that - "The Śruti which describes Srīshṭi is merely a clever device to signify Atmaikatwa which is Paramārtha (the Absolute Reality)."

It being so, although the literal meaning of the Śruti is equally applicable and agreeable to real Srishti and Aparamārtha (false) Srishti, that meaning in which the Śruti has its prime purport of teaching as also which fully agrees with Yukti (reason) - we should perforce accept it as the 'Śrutyarthā' and to stubbornly assert that - 'The Mukhyarthā should agree' and to shun both the Śrutis' Tatparya (prime purport of teaching) and a strong, formidable (inviolable) Yukti is not at all justifiable or rational.

EVEN AFTER DETERMINING THE ŚRUTYARTHA IS THERE A NEED FOR YUKTI?

It was stated at the beginning of this Chapter that - "Yukti has been mentioned here in order to indicate that the meaning of the Śruti is in accordance with valid means." But now in the present context it appears as though it is hinted that even after the meaning of the Śruti is determined, there is a need for demonstrating the support of Yukti. It has to be deliberated upon as to what extent this is correct.

A solution for this doubt is: The philosophical teaching (Siddhānta) is: "By deliberating upon the meaning of the
Sruti sentences and then deciding alone one can attain Brahmatma Vijñāna (the Intuitive Knowledge that Brahman and Ātman are one and the same Ultimate Reality) and not by any other means or in any other manner too. It has been taught in the previous Chapters that - “When (the Jīva) wakes up from beginningless Māyā (illusory) sleep he cognizes the Advaitatattva” - (1-16) ; “Just as one comes to cognize that the rope alone is Paramārtha (really real), to determine that Ātman alone is Paramārtha is the Paramārthajñāna” - (2-18). When a doubt of the type - “This is opposed to the valid means of Pratyaksha etc., is it not so?” - was raised, it was decided on the strength of Karikas like - “This Dvaita is merely Māyā (an illusion)” - (1-17) ; “The truth that - this universe is like Māyā (magic), Gandharvanagara (a celestial city in mid-air) is (false) - is found in Vedāntas (the Upanishads)” - (2-31) - that the teaching - “In the Vedāntas it has been propounded that Dvaita is false” - was determined. When the doubt of the type - “In that case, if the Vedantartha is that Dvaita is false alone, then how can the sentences which describe the birth of the Jīvas by mentioning illustrations of clay and metal, as also the sentences which describe the birth of the Jīvas’ Kāryanarana be reconciled ?” - was raised, we provided a Samādhāna by saying that all those sentences we have to interpret in a different manner - (3-13, 3-10, 3-14, 15, 16). Our own tenet of - “Advaita alone is Paramārtha” - was justified with the support of Śruti Pramāṇa (3-11, 12, 13-18) and it was further depicted that Jatabrahmavāda was opposed to Yuktī.

But here how can it be determined that Ajātivāda alone is approved by the Śrutis ? There are also Śruti sentences of the type - “From Brahman the empty space (Ākāsha) was born” - etc. is it not so ? How to determine that the meaning of the Śruti sentence like - ‘स आत्मा स विज्ञेय:’ - meaning - “He alone is Ātman, He alone should be cognized” is :- “One should cognize Advaitātman alone who is Nityajñānarūpa (eternally of the essential nature of Intuitive Knowledge or Pure Consciousness) and Nityājaswarūpa (eternally of the essential nature, devoid of birth) alone” - ? When there exists a Śruti which expounds the birth of Ākāsha etc. from Ātman, how at all can the meaning of -
'Ātman is Nitya and *Prapañchopashama* (in whom the world of duality has become extinct or has subsided totally) alone’ - itself can be accepted? We should not. Therefore, why can’t we imagine that - “Although Brahman is *Aja* (devoid of birth), because It is endowed with many powers It is born in forms like Ākāsha etc.” - ? There are many Śrūtis which state that - “Brahman gets transformed in *Kāryarūpa* (forms of effect)” - while the Śrūtis mention that - “Brahman is *Aja*” - are a few in number only. Therefore, in accordance with Śrūtis like 'तदात्मानं स्वयम्भुस्त' (Tai. 2-7) (It created Itsel itself) and as decided in the Brahmasūtra - 'आत्मकृते यथार्थ' - (Vedānta Sūtra 1-4-36) - meaning : “Brahman which is *Aja* also gets transformed” - it is proper for us to assume thus alone. Hence, it appears to be quite proper to imagine that - “Brahman gets transformed both in the forms of Jīvas and in the form of the Jagat (world of duality)” - This is the doctrine of the Jātābrahmavādin.

For this the counter-stratagem of Shri Gaudapādāchārya is : “That which is *Nishchita* (absolutely certain) as also *Yukti-yukta* (fully in consonance with logic or reason) - that alone can possibly be the Śrūti meaning.” The real purport behind this statement is : That meaning of the Śruti sentence in which the Śruti has its *Tātparya* (prime purport) that alone has to be decided to be the real meaning of the Śruti, but without proper deliberation it is not possible to determine any particular interpretation as the real Śrutyartha. First of all, Tātparyalingas or the stipulated requisites or symbols of determining the Tātparya of a text - called ‘*Upakrama*’ (the promise made in the preamble) and ‘*Upasamhāra*’ (conclusion deduced at the end of the exposition) have to be examined and then the meaning of the sentence has to be determined. In the present context, the question that - “Whether the Śruti’s purport is to propound that Brahman is *Aja* alone or is it to indicate that Brahman gets transformed into various forms of Jagat, Jīvas etc.?” - has to be deliberated upon and a proper answer to it is to be determined. To say that the Śruti has its prime purport in teaching both is not tenable; for, in that event it amounts to saying that - “Brahman is of the essential nature of being born” - as also, at the same time, that
- “Brahman is not of the essential nature of being born” - it becomes evidently self-contradictory. To say - “In that case, let us assume or reckon any one of these two to be the Śruti’s purport” - also, it is not possible; for, in the case of Karma (action), we can imagine, assume in the manner: “This can be done in this way; or it can be done in that other way also.” But it is never possible to imagine or infer that - “The Vastustithi (a ground reality) may be like this; or it may be like that also.” Here in the present context - when once the Śruti which teach that Brahman is Aja signify their real implicit purport, there does not arise any Ākāṅkṣā (aspiration or hankering after) whatsoever about anything; but Śrishtiśrutis are not like this at all. The Śrutis have undertaken the task of teaching exclusively the Brahmāsvarūpa in the manner - “That from which these elements, creatures are born ...... That Entity you cognize; That alone is Brahman” (Tai. 3-1); so as not to entertain any aspiration whatsoever, the Śrutis have not stated merely - “The elements and creatures are born from Brahman” - and have stopped abruptly. We can possibly assume the Śrishti that the Śruti sentences mention to be either Paramārtha Śrishti (the absolutely or really real) or Māyika Śrishti (magical, illusory creation); from that kind of assumptions there is no danger whatsoever posed to the literal meaning of the sentence. Therefore, we should interpret the Śruti sentence which pertains to the occurrence of creation in such a manner that it fully agrees with the meaning of ‘Ajatwa’ that is determined to be the Śrutyartha. In the same way, because the Vedānta Sūtra is there to determine exclusively the Śrutyartha we have to determine the final purport of the word ‘Pariṇāma’ (transformation) that exists in the Sūtra to mean ‘Māyika Pariṇāma’ (illusory transformation) alone so as to be in consonance with the Śruti.

Thus even after the real purport of the Śruti is determined, in order to further establish the veracity of that decision in the manner - “That alone is the subtle (implicit) meaning of the Śruti” - it becomes quite necessary to follow or adopt Yukti (Intuitive reasoning). For, the fruit of Brahma Jñāna has to be in consonance with Intuitive Experience (Anubhava); like the Karma Phala it is not something which accrues in due course of time after death. Therefore, the real
purport of the Śruti should necessarily be determined by Tātparyāniṅgas like Upakrama and Upasamhāra, as stated before; therefore that purport or meaning that was determined should invariably be tested for obtaining a steadfast, unshakeable conviction by means of suitable Intuitive reasonings or methodologies (described in various Śrutis) in the manner - “Is this determined purport in consonance with Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) or not?” Thus determination (Nishchaya) and Yukti (Intuitive reasoning) - from both these that Śrutyarthas which evolves - that alone is the real Śrutyartha. This is the intended meaning, purport behind the Kārikā.

It being so, when the meaning of the Śruti is not determined alone, Yukti becomes invariably a necessity. Those people to whom merely by means of Śruti Vākyā Śravaṇa (listening to the scriptural sentences) the truth that - “Ātmatattwa is birthless” - is not decidedly, convincingly cognized, such of them should utilize Śrouta Yuktis (Intuitive reasoning or methodologies inbuilt or mentioned in the Śrutis themselves) of the type - “The Māyājanma; Jāgrat and Swapna being equal as expounded in the Śrutis” - etc. as also other Loukikayuktis (empirical, workaday reasonings or logical arguments) which are fully in consonance with them, and then only the real purport of the Śruti teaching will have to be determined or decided. But even then it should not be assumed or wrongly understood that Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāṇa (illustration), Arthāpatti (inferential conclusion) etc. which the hardcore logicians have accepted calling it by the name ‘Tarka’ has to be acknowledged. The student of Vedantic spiritual science should invariably interpret all terms like ‘Tarka’, ‘Upapatti’, ‘Yukti’ - to mean ‘Śrouta Yukti’ (scriptural, Intuitive reasoning) in consonance with Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) only.

8. BRAHMAN WHICH IS AJA, ADVAYA AND AMRĪTA IS ITSELF THE ŚRUTYARTHĀ

नेह नानेति चामायादिन्द्रो मायातिरित्यपि ।
अजाययानो बुद्धा मायया जायते तु सः ||२४१।

Meaning : “Because of the facts that : (a) “(Here) there is no Nānātwa (manifoldness)” - thus there is a Śruti ;
(b) “Indra by virtue of His Māyās (magical powers) - (appears as many)” - thus the Śruti states; (c) further it says - “Though birthless He is born in many ways” - (this alone is the Śrutyartha).

FOR THE ŚRUTI MĀYĀŚRISHTI ALONE IS ITS INTENDED PURPORT

To the question: “What is the valid evidence to say that in the Śruti, Ajādvaya Tattwa alone is determined?” - the answer is: If it were true that actually, in reality, creation had taken place, then since Nānātwa (manifoldness) becomes real alone the Śāstra which teaches that - “There is no Nānātwa” - would not have been valid or tenable; but, the Śruti is stressing in the manner: “Here there is not even the least bit of manifoldness” - (Bṛi. 4-4-1). Therefore, the creation that was imagined in order to teach Ātmaikatwa amounts to be Aparamārtha (not really real) indeed. Therefore, we are induced to determine that this too was - just like the Prāṇasamvāda etc. - a well-imagined device alone and the Śrishti Śruti has no intended purport of signifying that actually Śrishti occurred at all. In support of this conclusion is the Śruti statement: 'हस्त्रो माण्याधिः पुरुषमृ ईयते' (Bṛi. 2-5-19) - meaning: “Indra by virtue of His Māyās (magical powers) appears as many forms” - which has utilized the word ‘Māyā’ (illusory, magical power) which signifies, connotes that it is Aparamārtha (not absolutely real).

Here in this context the opponent may raise an objection: In the Vedas the word ‘Māyā’ is used as indicating ‘Jñāna’ (Knowledge). In Yāska’s ‘Nirukta’ (3-9) (text on Lexicon) among the eleven names given for Jñāna this word ‘Māyā’ also is to be found. It being so, how can it be concluded that the word ‘Māyā’ means ‘Aparamārtha’ (not really real) ? For this objection, the solution is: The word ‘Māyā’ found in this context, though it means ‘Jñāna’ alone - the author has utilized it to signify Indriya Jñāna (sensory knowledge) which is Avidyākalpita (projected, conjured up due to Avidyā) alone. Although Pratyagātman (the innermost Self) is one and one only, as also Prajñānaghana (the very embodiment of Pure Consciousness like a lump of salt being salty all over), the consciousness (awareness) that is engendered by means of the senses shows or depicts Him
to be like: (i) the external phenomena; (ii) insentient or gross; (iii) endowed with all kinds of distinctions like *Shabda* (sound), *Sparsha* (touch) etc.; (iv) many *Jīvas* who are having different conglomerations of body, senses etc. brought about by *Nāma* (names) and *Rūpa* (forms); therefore, these distinct awarenesses which are *Avidyāmaya* (of the essence of ignorance) are called by the epithet of ‘*Māyā*’ (illusion); that is all, and *Prajñā* (Consciousness or Awareness), which is verily *Ātmāswarūpā* (the essential nature of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness), is not at all called ‘*Māyā*’. Because of the facts that: (a) the really real (i.e. the Absolute, Transcendental, totally beyond the empirical) *Prajñā* (Pure Consciousness) - though being one and one only - is signified here in the plural sense by the usage of the word - ‘*Māyās*’; (b) in the next part of the sentence: ‘तुष्का द्वस्त्य हरमः शता दसा’ - (Bṛi. 2-5-19) - these *Prajñās* are called ‘horses’ and are stated to be *Ananta* (endless) - and so, for the expression - “by means of *Māyās*” it becomes certain that the real meaning here is: “by means of *Indriya Prajñās* (sensory awarenesses or perceptions) which are of the *Avidyārūpa* (of the nature, form of ignorance)” - alone.

Thus although this *Ātman* appears to have become many endowed with forms of the phenomena projected by the sensory perceptions, there is no harm or danger whatsoever posed to His *Ajādvyā Swarūpā* (essential nature of birthlessness and non-duality). In order to specify this aspect the Śruti clearly states: ‘अयं वै हर्योदयः वै दसा च सहस्त्रिणि चानन्तानि तदेतद्ध्रव्यापूर्वनन्तपरिमल्लोऽभावायमाला च न्यान्तित्युषुषुशासनम्’ - (Bṛi. 2-5-19), meaning: “He alone are those *Prajñās* called ‘horses’; this Brahman is devoid of a cause, devoid of an effect; not having an interior nor an exterior; this *Ātman* alone is the Brahman which is cognizing everyone by means of *Anubhava* (Intuitive Experience, i.e. Pure Consciousness).

Further, there is a Śruti sentence: ‘अज्ञायमानो जहुस्था विजायते’ - (Tai. Āranyaka 3-13), meaning - “Being birthless alone, He is being born in many ways” - is it not so? In this context too the fact that - ‘Janma, which is to become many, is to be discerned as due to *Māyā* only’ - is being indicated in the Kārikā
- ‘मायाये जायते तु सः’, meaning - “By virtue of Māyā alone He is born” - by a significant word - ‘Tu’. In one and the same substance both the events, occurrences like - not being born and being born in many ways or forms - cannot take place simultaneously in the real sense (Paramārtha). If it is asserted in that manner - then it is akin to saying - “Fire is hot, at the same time it is cold also” - and thereby it amounts to the Śruti stating something the meaning of which is contradictory to its own earlier statement. In that event, the Śruti will be rendered invalid indeed!

Thus apart from the two reasons of - (i) Dvaita being refuted, negated ; (ii) stressing the truth that - “Ātman is Aja alone” - since the Śruti mentions a Phala (a benefit, fruit) only to one who has cognized the Ekatwa (identity of Brahman-Ātman as also their being non-dual) - it has to be concluded that this alone is correct and certain. Previously too (3-15) it has already been stated that Sṛishtiḻāṇa (the knowledge about creation) is a subtle device (adopted by the Śāstra) to teach Ātmaikatwa (non-duality of the Self). In this regard the Śruti mentioning a Phalaśruti (statement of benefit or fruit) in the manner - ‘तत्र को भोहः कः शोक एकत्वमुपस्यतः’ - (Īṣa. 6), meaning - “To one who has cognized Ekatwa (non-duality) where is any scope for grief or attachment”; as also the Śruti which condemns Bhedajāṇa (knowledge of distinction) like - ‘मूँगः स मूँगमानोति य इह नानेव पश्यति’ - (Katha 2-1-10), meaning - “One who sees that there exists distinction here, he gets death after death” - should be remembered.

Meaning: “Because the Śruti is condemning the Upāsana of (meditation on) Sambhūti, it amounts to negating birth. By the sentence - “Who will create him once again” - it amounts to negating any cause.”

In the Śruti : ‘अन्यं तमः प्रविष्टति एतसंभूतिमुपासते । ततो भूयं इव ते ततो य उ सम्पूत्या स्ततः ।’ - (Īṣa Mādh. 9) - in this manner the meditation
on Sambhūti (a deity) is condemned. From this it can be discerned that ‘Sambhava’ - getting born - itself is condemned.

Here an objection: This is a discussion about the purport of scriptural sentence found in the Mādhyandina recension of Ishāvāsya Upanishad. Therein it has been criticised in the manner - “Those who meditate upon Sambhūti (a deity) go to a greater Andhaṁtamas (pitch darkness) than the one to which those who meditate on Asambhūti go to”. But there the criticism has not been made merely for criticism’s sake. How is that? To explain: Later on (Īṣa. 11) it is stated: ‘सङ्गृति च विनाशं च यस्तद्विधोपय सह | विनाशेऽयुल्लोल्लां संस्कृत्यांकृत्यांसुते ||’ - meaning - “One who discerns both Sambhūti and Vināśa (Karma - action) in tandem and practises - he will conquer or cross over Mrityu (death) by means of Vināśa (Karma) and by means of Sambhūti attains Amṛtatwa (immortality).” From this it becomes certain that this Śruti has the main purport of signifying the truth that a seeker should combine, blend both these, viz. Sambhūti and Vināśa and practise, as a result of which a superior fruit which is of Amṛtarūpa (nature of immortality) alone will accrue. Here ‘Sambhūti’ means ‘Devatopasana’ (meditation on a deity) and ‘Vināśa’ means Karma (action, ritual); those who practise these can never attain Andhaṁtamas (pitch darkness, greater hell); if it is maintained, that the Śruti’s ultimate purport is only to condemn (merely for it’s sake), then the Śruti will become Apramāṇa (invalid) alone. In the same way, in this Śruti too later on with a view to teaching the Samuchhaya (blending, mixing) of Vidyā (meditation) and Avidyā (Karma, rituals) each of them are found to have been criticised or condemned when performed singly. No one who is a Vivekin can ever accept the statement that - “Those people who practise Vidyā (Self-Knowledge) will attain Andhaṁtamas” - is it not so? It being so, in both these contexts it will be reasonable to adopt the Mīmāṁsā Nyāya (axiomatic truth propounded, adopted by adepts in etymological science): “The criticism has no real purport in criticising that which is being criticised, but to eulogise that teaching which has to be praised (as beneficial for the student or seeker)”. In any case, here there is no room or occasion whatsoever for criticising Sambhava (being born); it being so, with the support of this
Sruti how at all is it possible to champion your imagination that - “Nothing is born” - ?

A solution for this is : True ; as you say, here with a view to teaching that both ‘Samblūti’ and ‘Vināsha’ have to be combined and practised together the Sruti has undertaken to expound in this manner. Even so, the real intended purport of the sentence - “By means of Vināsha (Karma) he crosses Mrītyu (death)” - is : By practising or performing Śāstraic Karmanas (rituals, rites) the practitioner crosses the ‘Mrītyu’ which is of the nature of Loukikajñāna (empirical knowledge) and from that what accrues as Loukikaprvritti (mundane behaviour). Similarly, by means of the Samuchhaya (blending, mixing) of Sambhūti and Vināsha - meaning, combining Devatopāsana and Karma if one carries on his spiritual practices, the seeker will, as a result, acquire a Samskāra (a refinement of the mind) and eventually he will attain the fruit of crossing over or conquering the Mrītyu of the nature of ‘Sādhyasādhhanaiśana’ (a desire for performing those spiritual Sādhanas which yield a Sādhyā or probable result) so that Karmaphaladga (attachment towards the fruit of the ritual or rite) manifests itself. In fact, this alone is taught by the Mantra part of ‘By means of Avidyā he crosses Mrītyu’.

Here one doubt may raise its head : If it is true that ‘Avidyā’ means ‘Samuchhaya’ (blending) of ‘Sambhūti’ (Devatā Upāsana) and ‘Vināsha’ (Karma), then it amounts to saying that it (this Samuchhaya) is really Avidyā alone ; for, both Karma and Upāsana are existing or functioning in the Avidyākṣetra (region of ignorance) alone, and this is verily the Siddhānta (spiritual teaching). How at all is it possible to practise Samuchhaya by blending such Avidyā with Vidyā ? When Adhyātmavidyā (Self-Knowledge), which is like light, dawns Samuchhaya, which is like darkness, cannot at all co-exist, is it not so ? For this doubt a Samādhāna (consolatory explanation)¹ is : As stated so far, by

1. Although this discussion about the objection and its solution is not to be easily understood by every one, for the sake of those who wish to learn the quintessence of the teachings of the Bhaṣya this topic is explained here. The real purport of the sentence here is decided in accordance with the Mādhyandina recension of the Īśāvāsa Upanishad. According to that text - with regard to the Śrutī sentence - “One who cognizes together both Vidyā and Avidyā” - the absolutely real (Paramārtha) Vidyā and Avidyā alone should be accepted. In the
the Samuchhaya of Devatā Upāsana and Karma - one who crosses over Mrītyu of the type of Putra (son), Vitta (wealth) and Karma (ritual, rites) - (Eshaṇa or desire which is of the form of Sādhanā or spiritual practice, Eshaṇa of Sādhyā or the effect of fruits of Manushya Lōka or human world, Piṭru Lōka or world of manes and Deva Lōka or world of deities - both these types of Eshaṇas) - to him alone, by dint of the spiritual instruction of the Upanishads, Vidyā (Self-Knowledge) will necessarily accrue. For this reason, the Mantra portion of - “One who cognizes together both Avidyā and Vidyā” - with this kind of meaning as its purport signifies it. “Together” here means not ‘at one and the same time’ at all ; it really means ‘in one and the same person’ - alone. It being so, although for the sentence - “Those who meditate upon Sambhūti go to a higher Andhamtamas (region of pitch darkness or hell)” the fact that it is Arthavāda (a doctrine of secondary importance or by way of an eulogy) alone is decided for reasons like - (a) it is a remaining aspect of Samuchhaya Vidhāna (stipulations pertaining to blending of the two), as also (b) the fruit of Sambhūtyupāsana has been mentioned - since the criticism of Sambhūti that is found here is mere Arthavāda, should we accept for this sentence only Gounārtha (i.e. a secondary meaning) ? Or because of the facts that - (i) in the sentence - “By means of Sambhūti he attains Amṛtita (immortality)” - the Absolute, real immortality is not at all signified ; (ii) the sentence - “By means of Vidyā he attains Amṛitatwa” - signifies Mukhyāmṛitatwa (the really real Immortality) by way of its prime purport - should we accept here the tenet that the Sambhūti, which yields the fruit of Amṛitatwa projected by Avidyā, is really criticised ? When such a doubt arises, it is reasonable to assume invariably that this Sambhūti that belongs to the Avidyā region itself is really criticised. There-
fore, here in this context to say that Sambhava (birth) is refuted, negated there is no defect whatsoever.

**ŚRUTI IS NEGATING THE CAUSE FOR JANMA**

In the same way, the Śruti: ‘जात एव न जाप्ते को न्यौनं जनयेत् पुनः’
- (Bri. 3, 9-28-7), meaning - “Who is it that makes him born again?” - thus negates a cause which makes Ātman to be born. After concluding the topic of Māyā, it is not possible to really make Jīva, created by means of Māyā, to be born once again, is it not so? Similarly, the phenomenon of Manushya (human being) appearing as a Manushya is Avidyā Kalpana (imagination or misconception projected by ignorance); once that Avidyā disappears, the Jīva is verily Paramātman who is of Nityamuktaswabhāva (of the essential nature of eternally liberated one). Then who is there to make him once again to be born? Even in the beginning he was really not born as a Marushya at all, is it not so? The snake that was seen in a rope due to Bhrānti (delusion) was, even during the time of the Bhrānti, was not born at all; it being so, after the conviction of the type - “This is a rope only” - is born, who can possibly make that snake be born ‘once again’? In the same way, because the Śruti has raised an objection of the type - “Even after determining the truth that the Manushya - who is, by virtue of his very essential nature verily Advitiyātman devoid of birth - realizing in the manner - ‘I am verily Aja-Advitiyātman’ - by means of Intuitive Knowledge, who can ever possibly make him come back once again as Manushya having birth and death?” - it amounts to saying that the Śruti stresses the teaching that there is no cause whatsoever for birth. Here the real purport of the Śruti teaching is: For a thing, which is born due to Avidyā and then which has disappeared due to Vidyā, there is no cause whatsoever which can make it to be born again.

Here there is a point which is to be deliberated upon. In the present context the circumstance in which the Bṛhadāraṇyaka sentence has appeared is as follows:

यस्मूलामाहेश्वरैः न पुनरपवेत्। मर्यादा: स्विन्मूलपुनं वृक्षः कस्मान्मूलात्
प्रवेशितः II जात एव न जाप्ते को न्यौनं जनयेत् पुनः II - (Bri. 3-9-28-6, 7).

Here this is a question which was put by Yājñavalkya to
Brāhmins who were in the gathering or conference. It means: "If a tree along with its root is wrenched off, pulled out, it cannot once again be born. If one who is mortal is pulled off by Death (Mṛtyu) how can he once again from which root be born? Anyone may raise a question here: 'He has already been born; hence there is no need of his being born, is it not so?'

But, "Who is it that can cause his birth 'once again'?" - this is the question raised by Yājñavalkya. In the Bhashya the real import of the question is described in the manner: "There has to be necessarily a root cause for the Jagat as also for Man to be born over and over again, is it not so? Which is that root cause?" It being so, here (in this context) from where can a Pratishedha (negation) come up? - This doubt may rise in the mind of anybody.

For this the solution is: This part of the sentence can be assumed to be an objection. We can also imagine an interpretation of this sentence in the manner: "That one called 'Manushya' is, in the Paramārtha (Absolute, Transcendental) sense, verily Paramātman. When the Śruti has rooted out this Martyatwa (mortality) itself of the Martya (mortal being, i.e. Manushya) by signifying this (eternal) truth, once again how at all can he sprout out and from which root? - such an objection itself Yājñavalkya has formulated as a question and has successfully befuddled his opponents" - Here the opinion is: Just as a tree which is wrenched off along with its roots cannot possibly be born again, in the same way the Martyatwa that is totally rooted out by means of Vidyā, how at all can it be recreated and from which root? Such a root is not to be found at all, is it not? The real purport behind this sentence - realizing it as an objection - is: "Man appearing as Martya (a mortal) is due to Avidyā; when once the root called 'Avidyā' is wrenched off by means of Vidyā, how at all can there remain an event of his being born or dying?" This very opinion is expressed by the Śruti sentence coming in due course in this same Upanishad as follows: "Then the Martya becomes Amṛta; here itself he enters into Brahman" - (Bṛi. 4-4-7).

Now, the purport behind the present part of the sentence viz. 'जात एक न जायते' is: "Being born alone, He remains unborn" - meaning - 'At the very moment when He appears to have been
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born, really He is of the Aja-Advaya-Swarūpa.' Such a one -
who can ever make or cause him to be born? At the very
moment when it is known that He is born, in reality (actually),
it mounts to His not being born - i.e. after Avidyā is completely
sublated, falsified - where is the question of stressing that He is
not born 'once again'? Then, there does not exist any cause
whatsoever which can bring about His birth 'once again', is it
not so? - This is the real intented meaning or opinion of the
author of that sentence, viz Yājñavalkya.

In any case, the real intended purport in the mind of the
person who put the question thus: "After Mrityu (death) roots
out the Martyatwa (mortality) of the Martya (mortal, human
being), once again from which cause does he get born?" - is:
"Without knowing the fact that - 'Man is not really of the
essential nature of being born' - the Brahmins will get deluded
to think that (Yājñavalkya) has asked in answer to this question
a cause for Man taking birth and then will endeavour to find one,
believing that there must be some particular cause. Then it will
amount to my getting complete success in this discussion" - Thus
it was Yājñavalkya's opinion.

Anyhow, thus an objection of the type - "Who is it that
causes him to be born once again" - was raised and the truth
that - "There is no cause whatsoever for birth" - has been fully
established in the Śruti. This, in fact, is the real purport behind
the Kārikā.

तत्स्य नेतिनेतीति व्याख्यात् निद्वुटे यतः ।
सर्वभ्रान्तिवेत्तेन हेतुनागर्ज्ञ प्रकाशाते ॥२६॥

Meaning: "All that was stated in the beginning in the manner - 'That this one is (Ātman) called 'Neti Neti' (Not
this, not that)' - is sublated because of the fact that it is
Agrāhya (incomprehensible); then Ajatattwa (the birthless
Reality) shines by Itself."

SINCE THE SPIRITUAL INSTRUCTION IS MADE BY NEGATING
ALL SPECIAL FEATURES ALONE, AJĀTMAN ALONE IS THE
MEANING OF THE ŚRUTI

To decide that the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality) that the Śruti
intends to teach is Ajādvaya Ātman alone, there is yet another
reason indeed. That is : By negating all special features in the manner - ‘अयत्त आदेशो नैत्त नैत्त’ - (Bri. 2-3-6), meaning - “Therefore now we state the spiritual teaching or instruction about Brahman - ‘Not this, not that’.” What the Šruti has taught - viz. that to cognize ‘Ātman’ it is very difficult ; keeping this fact in view, the Šruti undertakes to instruct that Reality over and over again adopting various pedagogic devices ; thus whatever teachings it has instructed through those devices - all of them the Šruti later sublates, negates. From this extraordinary methodology all those phenomena which may be categorised as ‘being born’ and which become objects for the intellect (Buddhi) - all those things which are Grāhya (comprehended by the intellect) are rendered thereby to have been negated. To wit : In the Šruti sentence - “Mūrta (with form) and Amūrta (without form) are the only two forms of Brahman” - (Bri. 2-3-1) - for the word ‘Satyam’ the object that is signified by it is the ‘Panchabhūtas’ (the five primordial elements of Ākāsha, Vāyu, Agni or Tejas, Ap and Prithivi) and these are divided into two categories of ‘Mūrta’ and ‘Amūrta’ ; thereby from the two Drishtis (viewpoints) of Adhidaiva (the celestial aspect or part of the waking world), Adhyātma (the corporeal aspect or part of it which is the subjective aspect of ourselves within the body) also the essence of these Mūrta and Amūrta are indicated ; thereafter calling the ‘Amūrtarasa’ (of the essence of formless phenomenon) as ‘Purusha’ and teach that these Vishesharūpas (special forms) are having forms of latent impressions like the colour of yellow etc. ; then Brahman, which is described as ‘Real of the real’ - in order to signify Its essential nature, the Šruti has stated : ‘अयत्त आदेशो नैत्त नैत्त न हेतुत्सादित्त नेत्रस्यात्मसादित्त’ - (Bri. 2-3-6). Here by means of two negations of the type - “Neti, Neti” - (Not this, not that) - all special features or characteristics are negated ; the real purport behind this statement is to help the mind of the Jijnāsu (the seeker) to get fully stabilised, established in Brahman alone which is devoid of any mundane dealings of verbal communication involving phenomena like Dravya (substance), Guna (quality) etc. - and which is verily a uniform mass of Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness). Even after instructing in this manner the Šruti - fully aware of the fact that all Jijnāsus cannot possibly discern the Swarūpa (essential nature
of Pure Being-Consciousness of Ātman) which is devoid of any kind of special features whatsoever and is very subtle - in order that they may be helped to concentrate their mind on such a sublime Reality, adopts repeatedly various pedagogic devices and teaches It through various methodologies. To wit : (i) Because the five primordial elements like Prithivi, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu and Ākāsha are each one subtler than the previous one in that order mentioned here, the Śruti indicates that the previous element is woven as the warp and woof in the next higher (subtler) element; then it teaches that in Brahman which is innermost to all else the subtlest element of Ākāsha (empty space) is woven as the warp and woof; that very Brahman is called “Akshara”. The Śruti states : “That Akshara (Tattwa) is not Sthūla (gross), not Anu (subtle); is not short, not long” etc. - (Bṛi. 3-8-8) - and removes all special features. Thereafter, (ii) by means of a system of Sāṅkōcha (the contraction) and Viṅkāsa (expansion) of the Niyantavyadvātās (controlling deities) that very Brahman is once again signified; later on too the Śruti states : ‘स एष नेति नेत्यातन्’ (Bṛi. 3-9-26), meaning - “That this is Ātman called ‘Neti, Neti’ (Not this, not that).” By this, what was earlier (in the beginning) mentioned as a device as in the manner - ‘Prithivi etc. are existing as the warp and the woof in It’, as also ‘The deities are the controlling authorities’ - all such superimpositions are rendered to have been sublated. Thereafter, once again, (iii) in the dialogue between King Janaka and Yājñavalkya, on the pretext of teaching the Ātmārūpas (forms of selves) of the type of Vaishwānara, Taijasa etc., since it is signified that the Nirvishesha Brahman alone is what the Śruti describes as - “That this Ātman alone is this Ātman called ‘Neti, Neti’ (Bṛi. 4-2-4) - ” all the forms of Vaishwānara, Taijasa Āṭmans which the Śruti had indicated by way of a device also stand sublated. Further, once more, (iv) after explaining the truths that Jīva who is full of desires is suffering in Samsāra, and that one who has become Ātmakāma (desirous of the Self) by means of a Sāḍhana (spiritual practice) of giving up, renouncing all Eṣāṇas (desires) attains Mōksha (Beatitude, Liberation) - then the Śruti drives home the truth, teaching that when that Nirvisheshātman the seeker determines as his own Self (Ātman) he attains Mōksha -
that very Nirvisheshātman the Śruti signifies as - “That this Ātman alone is the Ātman called ‘Neti, Neti’ - ” (Bṛi. 4-4-22) only. By virtue of this teaching all the previous devices taught earlier stand sublated. (v) Once more in Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa because by means of illustrations like the sound of a drum etc. using the methodology of Sāmānaya-Visheshabhāva (categories of genus and particular) as a subtle device, that very Nirvishesha Brahmaṇ is pointed out as - “That this Ātman alone is the Ātman indicated as ‘Not this, not that’ - ”. (Bṛi. 4-5-15), it amounts to the device of Sāmānyavisheshabhāva, etc., mentioned earlier are sublated.

THE REASON FOR THE ŚRUTI TO HAVE NEGATED WHAT IT HAD SIGNIFIED OR TAUGHT EARLIER

The answer to the question (that may arise now) that - “Thus what it has taught - all that the Śruti negates ; what is the reason for this ?” - is : Because the subject-matter which it has undertaken to teach is ‘Agrāhya’ (incomprehensible to the intellect or mind) - unable to discern the truth that - ‘An Upāya (device) is mentioned with the exclusive purport of pointing out the ‘Upeya’ (the subtle object meant to be pointed out)’ - with the fear that the seekers may reckon that all the phenomena like Mūrta and Amūrta forms, Prithivi etc. are spread out as warp and woof etc. just like the Nirvisheshātman - the Śruti starts rescinding, negating all the special features it had deliberately superimposed on the Nirvisheshātman by way of a subtle device. If a question of the type - “Brahman is Agrāhya ; therefore, one should not mix up or associate phenomena like Mūrta, Amūrta etc. with Brahman and then cognize It - with this purport alone as its motive the Śruti is negating all that it had mentioned earlier. Now how can this fact be reckoned ?” - is raised, then the answer is provided by the Śruti itself in the manner : ‘अग्रह्यो न हि गूढ़ते’ - (Bṛi. 3-9-26 ; 4-2-4 ; 4-4-22 ; 4-5-15). Thus everywhere the Śruti instructs about Ātman in this manner alone. The implicit teaching in this methodology is : Ātman who has been taught as ‘Not this, not that’ in Madhu Kānda - that very Ātman alone is being signified in this alternative, different device. Merely on this count, it should not be reckoned that here the Upāya also should necessarily be grasped,
discerned just like Ātman, who is the Upeya alone; that is not the purport at all. For, this Ātman does not have any adjuncts (Upādhis) whatsoever; He is Agrāhy (not one that can ever be comprehended by the mind); it is not possible to directly comprehend Him by means of any Upāya whatsoever. It is proper indeed to adopt certain devices at certain places; but that is projected or conjured up by Avidyā; a mere misconception indeed. Only by sublating, negating that misconception the Swarūpa of Ātman has perforce to be cognized (Intuited). To this extent that plays the role merely of an Upāya (subtle device); but the ultimate purport here too is not to associate or mix it with Ātmaswarūpa which is the goal of the device (Upeya) and then cognize Him. For this reason only, it is being taught by the Śruti in the manner - “This one is that Ātman called ‘Neti, Neti’ (Not this, not that).” Hence, because first that phenomenon which is objectified by the intellect (Buddhi) as something born is being taught by means of (or employing) an Upāya (subtle device) and later all those phenomena are rescinded, negated in the manner - “Not this, not that” - it is implicit that - “One who cognizes the truth that - ‘What is signified through Upāya has the Tatparya (ultimate purport, goal) of teaching the Upeya (objective to be known cognized by means of the device) alone; but Ātman, who is the Upeya especially, is one who exists everywhere in one and the same form’ - to such a person Ātmatattwa, which is Aja (unborn) internally and externally, reveals Itself by Itself.”

THROUGH THE UPĀYA OF A FALSE APPEARANCE ALSO A REAL ENTITY CAN BE COGNIZED.

(Question) : How is it possible to cognize Nirvisheshātman who is real through a device which is false?

(Answer) : To wit, for the purpose of knowing the Upeya (object to be known, inferred through the device) alone the Upāya is needed, but there is no compelling need or prerequisite at all that the Upāya should necessarily be a really existing entity. Because before the dawn of Jñāna (Knowledge) the Upāya is a Vyāvahārikasatya (empirically a real entity) that may serve as a device indeed. Just as for the knowledge of numerals the written lines on paper which are imagined to represent the numerals, as also for the knowledge of the alphabets
like A, B etc. aids or accessories like paper, like written lines etc., are serving as devices only - similarly here also it should be understood. Apart from this, except for the negation of the special features which are conjured up by Avidyā no transaction of using any other Pramāṇa is needed at all for the purpose of cognizing (Intuiting) Ātman who is Nirvishesha; for, Ātman is Svayamsiddha (self-established). Therefore, any Upāya it may be, it has to be utilized here only for the purpose of relinquishing and sublating the special feature which has been superimposed (Adhyārōpita Vīshēsa) and not for directly signifying Ātman as such and such. When it is said that a particular Upāya is an Upāya for Ātmajiñāna, it means that the phenomenon which is supposed to be a Vīkalpa (misconception) in Ātman is an object which is invariably to be rescinded alone; just as a rope-snake etc. being a Vīkalpa is said to be an Upāya for the purpose of cognizing (the reality of) the rope, in the same way here too it should be suitably discerned (to wit, the prime purport of using any deliberate superimposition of a quality or special feature that the Śāstra adopts as a doorway, so to speak, is to guide the seeker to trace back its final cause of the Self which happens to be the innermost Pure Being-Consciousness of the seeker and is self-established and self-effulgent). To cognize Ātman means as soon as the Vīkalpa is sublated what manifests by Itself and not what appears as a result or effect of any Pramāṇa Vyāpāra (dealing or usage of any valid means). For, there is no need whatsoever of cognizing through any Pramāṇa Ātman who is Swayamprakāśa (self-effulgent); besides, these Pramāṇas etc. are being misconceived in that Ātman alone and are appearing with His help only.

This truth has been indicated in the Brihadāranyaka Vārtika (of Shri Sureshwarāchārya) as : ‘प्रमाणप्रमाण च प्रमाणार्थ च यद् भवेत्।’ (Bṛ. Vā. 2-4-2, 134), meaning - “Pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge), Apramāṇa (invalid means), anything appearing as Prameya (object for the valid means) - in all these forms Chaitanyakāra (an apparent form of Pure Consciousness) alone is appearing indeed.” Further it is stated : ‘प्रमाणप्रमाण च प्रमाणास्तैत्तिक च। कुर्वल्ये च प्रमाण यथ तद्संभावना कुः।’ (Bṛ. Vā. 2-1-552), meaning - “Pramāṇa, Apramāṇa, appearing like a
Prameya - all these phenomena which are helping us to attain the
cognition of that Entity as It is - how at all can a doubt arise
that such an Entity does not exist ?”

EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE THAT PARAMĀTMAN
IS AN OBJECT FOR PADAVĀKYAS (WORDS AND
SENTENCES TOO)

Here Manḍanamishra, the author of ‘Brahmasiddhi’, and
some others are saying as follows : “Because Brahman is the
object for all percepts or concepts, It cannot be said to be
Aprasiddhi (unfamiliar). For, apart from It there does not exist
any other Jñeyavastu (known entity) at all. Therefore, it cannot
be said that Brahman is not the meaning of the Pada or word.
Śāstra indicates Prapañchabhāva (non-existence of the world), is
it not so ? There, the Padārtha (the substance, entity) is that
which is known to us, Abhāva (its non-existence) also is a known
object only ; if both these aspects are joined together the cog­
nition of the Prapañchabhāva ensues, accrues. Despite this, Brahma­
man is said to be Śāstraikavedya (that which is known exclu­
sively by means of the scriptures) ; for, the fact that there does
not exist any difference or distinction (Bheda) whatsoever is to
be known from the Śāstra alone and this is the reason” - this
is one doctrine. Further, another doctrine is as follows : “In a
far-off island there exist various queer birds of such and such
names ; some of them have legs of emerald, some with beaks
of ruby, some others with wings of gold and silver - thus suppose
there is a sentence ; in this sentence there is reference to a genus
of birds as also its relationship with extraordinary manifold fea­
tures which are already familiar to us and are cognized by us by
means of several other valid means ; since these heterogeneous
features being together is not known through any other Pramāṇa
except this sentence and hence, just as those queer birds’ exist­
ence is known exclusively by this sentence alone, in the same
way the Kāraṇasāmānya (genus of cause) or Sattāsāmānya (genus
of existence, being) known through another relevant Pramāṇa
may become an object of knowledge (Prameya) for a sentence ;
for example, in the Śruti sentence - “From which these elements
(Bhūtas) are born” - (Tai. 3-1) - by interaction (Samsarga) among
different objects, as also in the sentence : “It is not gross, nor
subtle” - (Bṛi. 3-8-8) by distinction, difference (Bheda), because
it is not an object for another Pramāṇa but having special, extraordinary features it may become an object for a sentence. For, all sentences in general are capable of signifying any special feature which has not been cognized by our mind so far."

Thus there are two schools of philosophy which champion the cause of the tenet that ‘Brahman is the object for a sentence (Vākyārtha).’ But these are not the proper tenets at all; for, these are opposed to the Śrutis like: ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसोदेकमेवाहित्तियम्’ (Chh. 6-2-1); ‘यतो बाचो निवर्तने । अप्राप्य मनसा सह’ - (Tai. 2-6) etc. Because Brahman alone exists and there is nothing else second to It, it is not possible to describe It which is devoid of any special features. For, none of the grounds or causes for any Pravṛtti (conduct, activity) like Jāti (genera), Dravya (substance), Guna (quality), Sambandha (relationship) etc. does exist in It at all. Because in It neither Avidyā nor its effects exist whatsoever, there is no scope whatsoever for either difference (Bheda) from or interaction with (Samsarga) another thing which is appearing due to Avidyā only. Hence It (i.e. Brahman) cannot possibly become an object for any word or sentence whatsoever. Because Brahman is Advitiya (non-dual) alone, it is not possible at all to imagine or conjecture any of the three differences (Bheda) in It, viz. Sajātiyabheda (difference in its own species), Vijātiyabheda (difference of belonging to other species), Svagatabheda (difference inherent within the thing Itself) and thereby It cannot be imagined either to be a Kārana (cause) or Satsāmānya (genus of existence). For this reason alone in the Brihadāraṇyaka Vārtika it is stated:

‘पैदंसंसर्गहीनत्वात् पदवच्यार्थतात्समस्य: । दुःसम्मान्यात्स्त आत्मायामात्मैवानुमून्द्वते’ - (Bri. Vā. 1-4-1408), meaning - “Because in Ātman there does not exist any particular thing’s Bheda or Samsarga, Ātman cannot possibly become the meaning (object) for any word or any sentence.” Therefore, the Vārtikākāra (i.e. Shri Sureshvarācārya) has stated that - “Ātman cognizes Himself by Himself by means Anubhava (Intuitive Experience or Pure Consciousness);”
Advaita Prakarana

वा बहुधा कारण सद्भेदिः॥ तस्याःस्तमिनिनिष्ठ्रत्वाद्वात्माःस्मृतैः मेवेदतः॥
भेदसंसारानाथायेवत्तालमाणि श्रुतम्। अनादृत्यान्यथा प्राहुर्गोत्विद्या महीयसि॥३०९॥

- (Bṛ. Vā. 4-3-1806, 1807, 1808, 1809) ; 'अव्यावृत्तानुगतिं निःसामान्यविशेषतः।
ब्रह्मति मुख्यवृत्तेष्ठ वस्तु श्रुत्याभिधीयते॥' - (Bṛ. Vā. 4-3-1851).

The purport implicit in these verses is: Because neither Avidyā nor its effects (viz. Mithyāpratya and Samshaya) do not exist in Him, Ātman is Advaita (non-dual). If there is no Avidyā, there cannot possibly exist any Dvaitabuddhi (awareness of duality), is it not so? That phenomenon which is split up, divided into two parts is itself Dvaita (duality); absence of it alone is Advaita. Existing in two, three or many kinds is Dvaita; because this does not exist in Ātman, Pratyaagātman (innermost Self) is verily Advaitaswarupa (of the essential nature of non-duality). Thus discarding (or showing such indifference to) the Śruti which has undertaken the task of negating, refuting Bheda and Samsarga and further, alas, these people are interpreting it in a different (distorted) manner; what a great phenomenon this Avidyā! Because the categories of Sāmānya (genus), Vishesha (particulars) do not exist at all, It (i.e. Brahman) has not been associated with anything whatsoever, nor anything has been left out of It; such an Entity (Vastu) is called 'Brahman'.

Some others have opined: The Buddhī (sense of awareness) of the form or shape of Ātman (Ātmākāra) that is engendered by the Śruti Vākyā of 'तत्त्वसि' - (That thou art) is capable of burning the Ātmajñāna (ignorance about or of Ātman, the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness); but the cognition that accrues from the Śruti sentence of 'नेति, नेति' (Not this, not that) is capable of bringing about complete dissolution of distinction superimposed on (Brahman or Ātman), but it does not ‘know’ how to become Ātmākāra (form or shape of Self). Let it be any Vastu (entity), unless the knowledge of its conceptual form or shape ensues, the Ajñāna (ignorance) pertaining to the entity cannot disappear or be got rid of; for instance, the ‘snake’ that is brought about due to the Ajñāna of the rope - without the Jñāna that kindles or illumines the rope merely by the negative knowledge (Nishedhajñāna) of the type - “This is not a snake” - it will
not disappear, is it not so? Therefore, only through the examination of the words of 'Tat' and 'Twam' that are to be found in sentences of Vidhirūpa (form of injunctions) like “Tattwamasi” - alone, the statement of the type - “Neti, Neti” - may be capable of yielding the fruit of Moksha (Beatitude) indeed, but directly the Jñāna that can yield Moksha cannot accrue from it; or, in the alternative, by the strength or capability of the Jñāna that accrues from the Vidhvākya the Nishedhavākya may just repeat or reiterate the Bādha (sublation, falsification) of Dvaita (duality) that has by itself disappeared; that is all. In our workaday transactions too we get an experience of the type - “This is a rope only, not a snake” - and this is quite familiar too, is it not so?

This opinion is not proper. For, even if by any particular sentence we attempt to signify Ātman, the function of using the sentence has perforce to culminate in negating the Upāya (logical device) adopted for indicating Ātman. In places where the Nishedhavākya (sentences used for negation) have been found, as a remaining part of those sentences, nowhere in any Upanishad - whichever it may be - once again a Vidhirūpavākya (a sentence of the nature of an injunction) is to be found. In fact, in all the Upanishads, without exception, it is seen that a common path of signifying Ātmaswarūpa by means of sublating all special features conjured up by Avidyā is being followed. First and foremost, the objection itself which these disputants have raised, viz. “The Nishedhavākya cannot possibly give rise to Ātmajñāna” - is not proper; for, since Ātman is Swayamsiddha (self-established) there is no need at all for signifying Him; with regard to the illustration of the rope, we may even accept the statement that merely by means of a Nishedhavākya (negating sentence) its real essential nature may not possibly be signified; for, the rope is a Prameya (an object of a valid means of knowledge); it is not Swaprakāshaka (self-effulgent). But in order to signify Ātmajyoti (the Light of Self, of the essence of Pure Being-Consciousness and self-effulgent, self-illumining) why should there be any need and of which Jñāna? If we go deeper into the matter, even in the illustration of the rope, though the rope lies in front and is appearing, the
real, correct cognition of the rope has not accrued, and for this their (i.e., the viewers’) Bhrānti (delusion) of the nature of misconception alone is responsible, is it not so? Therefore, it is not proper to assert that even after sublating Anyathājñāna (misconception), in order to signify a Vastu (entity, object) which lies in front there is a necessity of Jñāna (knowledge) arising out of Vidhi (injunction). How at all can there remain anything to be done other than removing the Bhrānti that exists pertaining to It in the matter of depicting Brahmavastu which happens to be verily our Ātman alone? Even with regard to the Veda Vākya - “That alone are you” - in this same manner we should reckon the Vākyaprāmāṇya (validity of the scriptural sentence), and this tenet is accepted by Shri Śaṅkara, as evident from his statement in Upadeśaśāstras, poetry 18-4) :

“सिद्धादेवाधिशिकस्माणाप्रदेहमेव निशिष्टते | रज्ञाभिषेधिषोपुरुषाः तत्तत्त्विद्यादिशास्तः: II’

- In this text it is very clearly mentioned that - “In Ātman who is Swatahsiddha those Anātmadharma (qualities or special features that belong to the not-Self) which are misconceived - by negating or sublating those (adventitious features) alone the Vedāntavākya which is Vidhirūpa (of the distinctive form of an injunction) is a Pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge).”

To conclude finally, what we have to discern here is this much only: (a) There is no dispute in regard to the fact that the Nishedhavākyas do negate all, special features that are misconceived or imagined in Ātma Vastu; (b) it is also possible to interpret that the Śruti Vākyas describing Śrishti actually (have the prime purport of) teaching ‘Māyāśrishti’ (illusory, magical creation). The Śruti is proclaiming in the manner: “Ātman by virtue of Māyās (His magical powers) is appearing in manifold forms”; (c) in addition to this, the Śruti stridently negates Upatti (coming into being, birth) and Nānātwa (manifoldness, duality, diversity); (d) whatever devices the Śruti acknowledges and adopts in order to signify, teach Ātmaswarūpa (essential nature of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness) in the beginning - all those features are at the end negated, sublated by it; now this methodology, called ‘Adhyāropa-Apavāda’ (Superimposition-Rescission), is invariably to be found in all the Upanishads. From all these reasons, we have perforce to decide, determine
that the Śruti exclusively undertakes the task of teaching Ajādvaya Paramārtha Tattwa devoid of any special characteristic whatsoever. For this reason alone we have to interpret Srishtisthitivakya as: ‘The whole gamut of Śrishi Śrutis teach, exclusively and invariably, Māyika Śrishti (magical, illusory creation) - which has not really occurred at all.’

**THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN AJĀTIVĀDA AND ACCEPTANCE OF SATKĀRYAVĀDA**

सतो हि मायया जन्म चुन्त्यते न तु तस्वः ।
तस्वः जाते यस्य जाते तस्य हि जाते।

Meaning: “To Sat (that Entity, really existing) by virtue of Māyā a Janma (birth) becomes proper; but to say really it has Janma - it cannot be proper. In that doctrine of one in which It really is born, it amounts to saying that which is born will again be born.”

**FOR THE SADVASTU (REAL ENTITY) JANMA (BIRTH) IS BY VIRTUE OF MĀYĀ**

On the strength of several Śrutis so far it has been determined that -(i) in all ways Ātmatattwa is devoid of birth; (ii) apart from It there does not exist any second thing or phenomenon whatsoever; (iii) to such an Aja-Advaita-Tattwa of Ātman birth is possible only by virtue of Māyā and not in reality as an actual event. Now once again by means of Yukti also that teaching alone will be decided.

Here for the word ‘Sataha’ used in the Kārikā we have to interpret it taking Panchami Vibhakti (the ablative case) and then the meaning of the sentence will be - Janma takes place from or is caused by Sadvastu alone; if we assume Shashṭi Vibhakti (the genitive case) for that word, the meaning of the sentence will be that to the Sadvastu Itself Janma occurs. Because both these meanings are suitable in the present context, both of them will be explained in some detail. In the Absolute, Pāramārthika sense nothing is born; Ātman is Aja (birthless) - this alone is the ‘Ajātivāda’ that is acceptable to Vedānta. In our empirical, workaday world whatever thing is appearing to be born - all those things are invariably appearing to be born on the basis or
support of an existing thing alone, and not that from an open, empty space it is possible for anything to be born. The fact that - "For any object that is to be born there should necessarily be a particular real cause" - is accepted by all common people as well as logicians. But only 'Śūnyavādins' (followers of Buddhist theory of non-existence) have acknowledged the Ajātivāda of the type - "Anything being born is itself not there (existing) ; from anything, whatsoever it may be, nothing whatsoever is born." Hence, their doctrine has to be refuted here. In the previous verse it has been stated that - "Since Ātmātattwa is Agrāhya (incomprehensible) - meaning It cannot be discerned by any valid means of knowledge (i.e. It is Aprameya), - the Śruti is negating all kinds of means or devices as 'Not this. not that', is it not so ? There a doubt arises : When the teaching that - 'Tattva is ever Agrāhya' - is itself true, why cannot we say that It does not at all exist ? But this doubt is not proper. For, every body is seeing that in our workaday world Padārthas (things, substances) are being born. Those substances which appear as if they are born may not really exist in their true form ; but merely on that count it cannot be said or concluded that they do not have any cause at all. Let us assume that a magician demonstrates as if he has made an elephant, a horse, a cart to come into being afresh. Merely on that score can it be said that none of those objects exists, in any form whatsoever ? At least, it has to be accepted that the magician exists really. He makes himself appear in all these forms of magical substances. That is all. In the same way, in order that this Māyā called 'Jagat' (world of diversity) to appear as if it is born, it is reasonable to believe that that world also - seeking the support of Paramātman alone who, like the magician, without revealing Himself, is hiding and who is the Absolute Reality - is appearing. For the illusory or magical effect that the magician has created by means of his magical power has to have perforce a real Sadvastu as its support, substrate. For this teaching there is the support of the Śruti : 'यदृढः सोमेद्यप्रय आत्मीदक्मेवाविदितिः' - (Chh.) - meaning, "Oh dear, this Jagat (world of duality) was in the beginning existing as one Sat alone without anything second to It" - which is affirming that 'From Sadvastu alone this world of duality is caused' ; in any case, thus one of the meanings is :
When this Jagat is being caused from Sadrūpa Tattwa alone, it is created by virtue of Māyā alone and not in reality.

If we assume the meaning of the Shashti Vibhakti (the genitive case) for the word ‘Sataha’, then the interpretation of this sentence will be: When the Sadvastu (real entity) like a rope etc. gets (apparent) births of the forms of a snake, a streak of water etc., those births are caused by Māyā (illusion, magic) alone and not in reality. The rope really does not become a snake; merely it appears in the form of a snake. That is all. In the same way, although Ātman is not to be comprehended, grasped through any sense or instrument of knowledge (experience), because Nīrviśeshā Ātman is Niravayava (without parts or limbs, components) He appears by virtue of Māyā - just like the rope appears like a snake, in the same way - as the form of the Jagat; but He is not born really. This is the second meaning.

This alone is the Vedāntic ‘Satkāryavāda’, which means - “That which appears keeping an existing entity as its support or substrate”; or, in the alternative, “The existing entity itself by illusion (Māyā) appears as a false - i.e. in another apparent - form.” The Sāṅkhyaśātras too have accepted ‘Satkāryavāda’; but in their doctrine it is propounded that a phenomenon called ‘Pradhāna’, which is a Triguṇātmaka Prakṛiti (primordial matter endowed with three Guṇas, called Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) really existing, really gets transformed, converted into categories like Mahat, Ahaṅkāra etc.; but they do not at all say that Kārya (the effect) of Jagat (world of duality) of the forms of Mahat, Ahaṅkara etc. is a false appearance. Thus in Advaita Vedānta a distinct ‘Māyāsatkāryavāda’ has been acknowledged; in fact, that Vastu (entity), which really exists, itself appearing as if it has assumed another form is Māyāsatkāryavāda. This theory has been previously, in the Āgama Prakaraṇa also, mentioned as: ‘प्रभवः सर्वभावानां सत्तमिति विनिरवचयः’ (1-6) - meaning, “Existing in the beginning only, all the existing entities (Bhāvas) get Utpatti (creation, birth).” Whatever effect it may be, existing in the beginning in the form of Prājña alone it comes into being - thus it has been propounded; and in the next Kārikā (1-7) also it has been stated: ‘स्वज्ञप्रभवस्थः सत्तमिति चूप्तित्वैविवक्तित्वा’ - meaning, “Some
others have imagined that Śrishti or creation is equal to Svapna (dream) and Māyā (illusion).” Thus it is affirmed that the creation of the world of duality is Māyika (illusory) alone.

THE MISCONCEIVED THEORY OF VYĀKHYĀNA VEDĀNTA (PHILOSOPHY PROPOSED BY POST-ŚAṆKARA COMMENTATORS)

Here in this context we should necessarily remember a salient point, which we cannot afford to forget: ‘Māyasatkāryavāda’ means merely - “It is not Paramārthasatkāryavāda (i.e. Satkāryavāda in the Absolute sense)” ; but it does not at all mean that the Mithyārūpa Jagat (the apparent form of the world of diversity, duality) is actually, really born or created (as an event in time and space). Some present-day Advaita Vedāntins have defined this word ‘Māyasatkārya’ to mean that this Śrishti is verily a ‘Mithyāsṛishti’ which is a ‘kind of creation’ ; although for the sentences like - “From the rope alone the snake is born due to Māyā” ; “The rope itself by virtue of Māyā has become the snake” - the intended meaning is that : ‘All of us misconceive or wrongly conceive (believe) the rope itself to be the snake (i.e. mistaking one for the other)’ - these disputants have imagined that in the rope an apparent snake (Prātibhāsika sarpa) really comes into being by virtue of the material cause (Upādāna Kāraṇa) called ‘Avidyā’ - just as a pot is born out of clay ! It is very clear that this queer doctrinaire theory has rendered even the empirically established illustration as a highly controversial topic ! For, in our workaday world no one does really believe that - “At the time of the delusion a particular kind of snake is really born and as soon as the Bhrānti (delusion) is falsified, sublated the snake too dies and disappears from sight.” Even (delusion) the disputants who are not Advaitins will never at all accept this theory ; there is no gainsaying this truth, is it not so ?

Let it be. These ‘Brahmaparināmavādins’ may question in the manner : “Accepting the Māyasatkāryavāda, just like the rope-snake, the Jagat appears in Brahman due to Māyā - meaning, Brahman Itself appears in the apparent form of the world” - this is the Vedānta Siddhānta ; without acknowledging this teaching, why can’t we imagine, conceive that the Jagat is really born alone ?
Prior to Gauḍapādācārya some Advaitavādins had accepted the theory that - “Brahman gets really transformed (Pariṇāma) into the Jagat.” Now their tenet is being shown to be wrong in the second half verse of this Kārikā by Yukti (reasoning). In the doctrine of those who opine that Brahman gets transformed, it amounts to their assuming that - “It is not of ‘Ajaswabhāva’ (of the essential nature of birthlessness) ; is not Nirvikāra (devoid of mutations).” That means, it amounts to their giving up the Upanishadic teaching of - “Brahman is eternally existing as It is ; in It there was no change that occurred, in the past nor there will be any change occurring in the future” - and thereby it will amount to their saying that Brahman is of an essential nature which invariably keeps on changing. Then it amounts to their doctrine giving full scope for the logical defect called ‘AnavasthāDosā’ (defect of not being able to reach a finality) in the manner : Brahman is the effect (Kārya) of a particular cause (Kāraṇa) which existed prior to It ; that cause also was the effect of another prior cause existing ; that again becomes the effect of yet another cause - ad infinitum. Therefore, this Brahmaparīnāma vāda is not proper ; the purport behind the Kārikā is : “Brahman is Aja (i.e. birthless) ; being Nirvikāra (immutable) It is appearing to our Avidyā Drishti (viewpoint of ignorance) as of the form of the world of duality, diversity also (at the same time). Thus all disputants have to perforce accept.

असतो मायया जन्म तत्स्तो नौच युन्नते ।
बन्ध्यपुत्रा न तत्चेन मायया बाहिष्प जायते।२८॥

Meaning : “Asat (that which is itself not existent) getting born either due to Māyā or in reality is not tenable. A barren woman’s son cannot possibly be born either really or by means of Māyā, is it not so ?”

REFUTATION OF ASATKĀRYAVĀDA

The truth that - “Asatkāryavāda (the theory that a thing is born from an unreal or false phenomenon) is not proper, tenable” - has been, it amounts to saying, established by our acknowledging Satkāryavāda itself ; even so, believing it, to be reasonable, to stridently refute the Asatkāryavāda, now it is being undertaken to prove that that theory is not tenable.
‘Asat’ means that another phenomenon or entity which is of the essential nature that is opposed to Satpadārtha (a real existing entity) - thus opine Naiyāyikas (followers of one of the famous six Darshanas or schools of philosophy of India). Vaishe-shikans (followers of another school of philosophy), Śāṅkhyans say that the world of duality has come into being from Paramāṇu (atoms), Pradhāna (primordial matter respectively. Vedāntins do not acknowledge any kind of Satkāryavāda other than or apart from Māyāsatkāryavāda - to wit, a theory which teaches that from any other Vastu (entity) which is not Brahman the Jagat has come into being - “Such a Satkāryavāda is opposed to Śruti and Yukti” - this truth was stated in the previous Kārikā. Now this Kārikā has undertaken the task of refuting the Buddhists’ Asatkāryavāda - which propounds that the Jagat is born from a cause which is ‘Abhāvarūpa’ (of the nature of non-existence). “Asat means ‘Sarvabhāva’ (non-existence of everything); before the world was born (came into being) Asat alone - meaning Sarvabhāva alone - existed; from that alone the Jagat came into being” - this theory is not proper; for, to assert that such an Asatpadārtha (unreal or false thing) existed before creation there is no Pramāṇa (valid means of evidence) whatsoever. The theory that - “Asatpadārtha really or by virtue of Māyā has been born as the world of duality which is Sadrūpa (of the nature of a real entity)” - is beyond all logical reasoning. There cannot possibly exist any difference, distinction whatsoever between a barren woman’s son and that ‘Asat’. No one can ever accept the statement that a barren woman’s son is born as another entity either in reality or by Māyā, is it not so?

WHOSE CONCEPT IS THIS ASATKĀRYAVĀDA?

(Objection) : To say that Buddhists are Asatkāryavādins is not tenable. For, Viśiṣṭnavādins (the Buddhist Idealists) say that Viśiṣṭa (intellectual consciousness, awareness) alone appears as the external objects; that doctrine especially cannot possibly be Asatkārya, is it not so? Now, Shūnyavādins also are to be accepted by all as not Asatkāryavādins. For, they condemn Satkāryavāda and in the same way, they condemn Asatkāryavāda also. For instance, in ‘Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamikakārikā’ there is the following verse : "नैवासतो नैव सतः प्रत्येकार्थस्य युक्तेऽ | असतः प्रत्ययः"
To an existing entity there is no need of a cause; if it does not exist, for which thing is the cause needed? To the existing entity what can the cause do? Because none of Sat, Asat or Sadasat can possibly be born; to say that there should invariably be a cause for its birth, how can it be tenable?" Thus in a very clear manner when the Buddhists have refuted the Asatkāryavāda, is it proper to thrust this Asatkāryavāda on their head?

(Solution): Not so. For, since they have refuted all Vikalpas (concepts) like Sat, Asat etc. alone, it amounts to their accepting Asatkārya only in a different form.

(Objection): Merely on the count that they have refuted, rejected saying - "This is not so" - does it not amount to saying that they have not accepted any doctrine whatsoever?

(Solution): True. Even so, because of the facts that they have not accepted the Vyāvahārika Janma (empirical birth), as also they have totally rejected Utpatti (coming into being, creation) itself, there is no escape for them from self-contradiction.

(Question): Because they are accepting the fact that the phenomenon of Vyavahāra is mere Samvṛiti (Avidyā, ignorance) it does not fit or is not proper to allege that - "Merely because they have refuted Janma they are affected by the word of Vyaghata (opposition, contradiction), is it not so? They do not at all accept the fact that Janma (creation, birth), Sthiti (sustenance, maintenance) and Pralaya (dissolution) are really occurring. In fact, they are saying very clearly: 'यथा भास्या तथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगराय भास्या । तथोत्तादस्तथा स्थाने तथा भृस्मं उदाहितः' - (Mā. Kā. 7-34, p. 57) - meaning: "Just like Māyā, Svapna and Gandharvanagara, phenomena like Utpatti, Sthiti, Pralaya also should be understood", is it not so?"

(Answer): This is also not proper. In our workaday world those people too, who accept phenomena like Māyā, Svapna etc. to be false, reckon the Māyāvi (magician), those people who have seen or observed Svapna (dream) and such others to be very much existing only. It being so, in complete contrast to universal experience and without accepting the truth that even Māyāvi etc. do exist and then to undertake to exemplify illus-
trations of Māyā, Svapna etc. - such people will not hesitate even to assert that a barren woman’s son has a Māyājanma, is it not so? Because it is so only, our calling these people, who have rejected both ‘Samvritisatya’ (Vyāhāric reality) and ‘Paramārtha-satya’ (Absolute, Transcendental Reality), ‘Sarvasatkāryavādins’ (disputants rejecting everything as Asatkārya) is not wrong. Because we are examining this Shūnyavāda at the time of deliberation on this subject in the next Ālātashānti Prakarana, for the present the deliberation on this topic may be stopped here.

Now, Vaisheshikans (the proponents of the indigenous atomic theory) are, in fact, a type of Asatkāryavādins. To wit, the quintessence of their doctrine is: Before it is born, an effect (Kārya) is Asat (false, unreal) alone. Because of the function of the Kārana (cause) it is born and by a particular kind of relationship called ‘Samavāya’ (inherence) between its cause and the Sattājāti (genus of existence, being) it associates itself with them. We should ask them the question: Because Kāryabhāva (non-existence of the effect) is verily Asat (unreal), how at all can it be born merely on the ground of Kāraṇavyāpāra (dealing, functioning of the cause)? When it has not yet come into being or is not born yet, how at all can there ensue any relationship whatsoever between it and its Kārana as also the Sattajāti? Take the case of the barren woman’s son: First in the beginning, he being Asadrīpa (of the nature of unreality) and by the functioning of Kāraka (instruments or means of action) he is born either really or by Māyā; thereafter he becomes associated with or related to either Sattajāti or some other Asadpadārtha (false thing) - thus it cannot be said in his case, is it not so? For that reason alone, on the strength of Yukti alone the Śruti is stating: 'तद्द्रैक आहुरस्त्वेदनमः आसीदेक्मेववाच्छिद्वितीयम् तस्मादस्त: सह्मन्ति तु कर्त्तु खलु सौम्येऽव स्वादिति \(\text{होवाच कयमस्तः सज्ज्यातेति । सत्वेऽव सौम्येऽव आसीदेक्मेववाच्छिद्वितीयम्} \)।' - meaning, “Some people say that: ‘This world was in the beginning Asat alone; it was one alone without anything second to it. From that Asat, Sat was born.’ My dear, how at all can this be possible? How at all can Sat be born from Asat? - thus (the father) asked.”

(Vaisheshika): Even in your doctrine too if Kārana (cause) is real, then Kārya (effect) too becomes real only, is it not so?
If you contend that it is of a different quality or nature other than Sat, it becomes Asat only, is it not so? Then does it not amount to saying that Kāraṇa is Asat? Is not the Smriti stating: ‘नामावौ विद्वद्वेषः सत्’ - (Gītā 2-16), meaning, “There is nothing like Sat becoming non-existent” - ? There is no illustration to say that from Sat only Sat is born. From one earthen pot, another earthen pot is not born. is it not so?

(Solution) : True. For that reason alone, though Sat is Sadrūpa (of the essential nature of Reality) it is quite reasonable to say that It gets birth due to Māyā; thus the Kārikā states. What is a Kārya (effect) is not at all extremely or totally different (Atyanta Vilakṣaṇa) from the Kāraṇa (cause); for, its nature or form is such that it can neither be said (or ascertained) to be Kāraṇa itself nor something other than Kāraṇa. Though the Kāraṇa does not lose its Swarūpa (essential nature or core of Being of a thing), because it assumes another form or shape it gets the name of ‘Kārya’ (effect), is it not so? Therefore, there is no defect in this. Hence, in the opinion (doctrine) of Ajātivādins, Sat Itself gets a Janma by virtue of Māyā; but Asat cannot at all in any manner get a Janma. Therefore, there is no scope whatsoever for Asadvāda here.

Meaning: “Just as in the dream the mind vibrates by virtue of Māyā in the form of duality, in the same way in the waking too the mind vibrates due to Māyā alone. In the dream the mind being Advaya alone appears as if it is Dvaya (dual), and there is no doubt about this; in the same way, in the waking too the mind being Advaya alone appears as if it is Dvaya. About this there is no doubt.”

HOW IS IT THAT SAT HAS JANMA ONLY DUE TO MĀYĀ?

(Question) : Sadvastu has Janma (birth); by virtue of
Māyā alone (i.e. it is a Māyic or illusory birth alone) It has Janma - how is it possible to say this?

**Answer:** We will tell you, listen carefully. Just as the ‘snake’ that appears in the rope, though in its form of appearance, is a Vikalpa (misconception) but in its real form of the rope is Sat (real) alone, this is also similar to that.

Those who discern the truth that even the Vikalpa (misconception) called ‘mind’ is, in the ultimate analysis, Ātmātūpa (of the essential nature of Self) alone - who is Paramārtha and Chaitanyarūpa - will cognize it (i.e. the mind) too as Sadrūpa (of the essence of Reality) alone. Just as that very Advaya Sadrūpa mind itself appears in the dream as though it is Dvaya (duality) - to wit, in the differentiated forms of Grāhya (grasped, known object) and Grāhaka (grasping agent, knower), due to Māyā - in the same manner, in the waking too the mind, being Advayāvibhakta (non-dual and non-differentiated) alone, by virtue of Māyā, is appearing as if it is Dvaya (dual). In its real form it (i.e. the mind) is Advaya (non-dual) Paramātman (Supreme Self) alone, but in its apparent empirical form it is appearing to be Dvaya. That is all.

Because it is said that as the mind vibrates duality of the forms of Grāhya-Grāhaka appears, it should never be understood or reckoned that the mind is a particular kind of real entity. What the common people have believed to be the ‘mind’ is, in reality, Advaya Ātman alone. None among us has ever believed that either the elephant etc. - that appear in the dream as Grāhya - or the eyes etc. - which see those phenomena therein as their Grāhaka - really exist. All those phenomena are verily our Ātman who is Paramātman indeed; that Ātman is Pure Chaitanya (Consciousness) alone which is Kūtastha (Transcendental, Immutable Reality). That very Chaitanya is appearing in our empirical, workaday transactions as our mind; the fact that - “In the dream the flow and vibration of the mind is itself occurring, flashing in the forms of Grāhya-Grāhaka” - is a statement, truism which all of us will have to accept from the empirical viewpoint indeed. Hence, since it is very clearly determined in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa that there is no real difference of any kind whatsoever between waking and dream, it evolves that - “In the waking too, because the Paramārtha is Advaya it is
Sachhinmātra (Pure Being-Consciousness) indeed; due to Māyā the vibration and flow of the mind, which is misconceived in that Sachhinmātra Ātman alone, is this Grāhya-Grāhaka Dvaita (duality of the forms of the known object and the knowing subject).” Full support is lent to this teaching if we bring to our mind the meaning of the Kārikā (2-12) which says: “Ātman Himself imagines by Himself.”

Meaning: “All this Dvaita which is Charācharātmaka (of the nature of movable and immovable phenomena) is appearing to the mind. For, if the mind attains Amanībhāva (the state of no-mind, mindlessness), then Dvaita does not appear at all.”

EVIDENCE TO ASSERT THAT DVAITA IS MERE MISCONCEPTION (IMAGINATION) OF THE MIND

It has been already stated that what is conceived as duality is, just like the rope-snake, a mere appearance of the mind’s conjecture, misconception alone. The phenomenon of the rope-snake never exists apart from the essential nature of the rope; even so, in our Ajñānāvasthā (state of delusion, ignorance) it appears as though it is having a different form with a hood, the marks etc.; in the same way, this phenomenon of the mind too, being verily Pure Ātmachaitanya, is appearing in the forms of Grāhya-Grāhaka. If it is questioned: “What is the evidence, proof for this?” - the answer is given here by means of a Yukti (logical device) which is of the form of Anvaya (agreement), Vyatireka (contrariety, contrast).

All this is mind alone; for, only when the mind exists this Dvaita is appearing. Only if the mind exists, by virtue of Dvaitajñāna (knowledge of duality, perceptual knowledge) it appears as though we are having Sukha (happiness), Dukhha (grief). But when the mind is not there, neither the Dvaita nor the Bhōktrutwa (enjoyership) of Sukha and Dukhha exists in the least. To wit, by means of Vivechana (discrimination) if we repeatedly examine with insight as to - ‘What is this?’ - then by dint of Abhyāsa (this practice) as also by Vairāgya (sense of renunciation) in the
things of the external world, if we curb, restrain (Nirōdha) our mind - just like we reject or rescind the (reality) of the snake that has appeared in the rope - or, in the alternative, if the mind gets by itself lapsed, merged (Laya) - just like it gets subsided by itself in deep sleep - Dvaita does not at all appear. ‘In deep sleep when there is no mind there does not exist any duality therein’ - is again a truism known to everyone indeed; similarly by means of Nirōdha (restraint, curbing) also the truth that - ‘If there is no mind, there does not at all exist any Dvaita’ - is well-known to Tattwadarshins (Realized souls, people who have Intuited the Ultimate Reality of the Self). Thus when there is mind, Dvaita is there; if the mind is not there, Dvaita also is not there - by this kind of Anvaya-Vyatireka methodology it becomes established that - “Dvaita is merely a misconception, queer imagination (Vikalpa) of the mind alone.”

9. ATTAINMENT OF AMANĪBHĀVA (NO-MINDNESS) BY MEANS OF ĀTMAṢATYĀṆUBHŪDHĀ (SPIRITUAL INSTRUCTION ABOUT THE REALITY OF THE SELF)

Meaning: “When the mind, as a result of the spiritual instruction about the Reality of the Self, rests without imagining (gives up volition), then it becomes no-mind; for, since there is nothing to be grasped it does not comprehend, grasp anything whatsoever.”

DEVICE FOR ATTAINING THE STATE OF NO-MIND

Now a doubt may arise: “It has been stated that - ‘If the mind attains ‘Amanībhāva’ (state of no-mindness, mindlessness) Dvaita is not at all seen’ - is it not so? To this mind how at all that ‘Amanastavasthā’ accrues? If the Swarūpa (essential nature of Being) of the mind remains, then Amanasta cannot be obtained, attained; so, if that Swarūpa itself is destroyed, then especially how at all ‘Amanastwa’ (no-mind-ness) accrue? In fact, this doctrine that the mind becomes ‘Amanas’ (no-mind) is opposed to universal empirical experience; for, if it is contended
that one substance attains the Swarūpa of another thing, it amounts
to saying that no substance - whatsoever it may be - has a
Swarūpa at all and thereby you arrive at Shūnyavāda only; in
our workaday transactions in toto we will not have any trust
whatsoever. Is it not so? Therefore, how at all is it possible for
the mind to acquire Amanībhāva?"

To this a consolation is: By means of Ātmasyānubōdha
this Amanībhāva accrues. To wit: If the Intuitive Knowledge
(Experience) of the type - “Ātman alone is real” - is engendered
by means of the spiritual instruction based on the Śāstra and
taught by an Āchārya (spiritual preceptor), then that instruction
is called “Ātmasyānubōdha” - in Vedāntic parlance. It is true
that from our Loukika Drishti (empirical, workaday viewpoint)
the objects are many, and since they exist without getting their
respective Swarūpas or essential natures of existence transformed
or changed they are real. But from the Paramārtha Drishti Ātman
alone is real; all else is Mithyā (false appearance) alone. This
truth has been taught by Uddālaka to his son (Śhwetaketu). Just
as when the truth or reality of one substance or object prepared
out of clay is cognized, it amounts to having known the reality
of all effects, products of clay, in the same way if the Ātmatattwa
is cognized, it amounts to having cognized the whole of the Jagat
(world of diversity) which is Its Kārya (effect). For, as stated in
the Sruti - 'वाचारम्भम्य विकारे नामेयार्य' (Chh. 6-1-4), all that is called
‘Kārya’ is mere ‘name’ caused by speech. All the effects pro-
duced from clay like pot, pitcher etc. are real in our empirical
dealings, being the effects of clay; their names, forms and the
action that is produced by them - since all these are different
from one another, all those effects are real alone - thus the
people carry on their dealings. But observed from the Paramārtha
Drishti, that thing the essential nature of Being (Swarūpa) of
which does never change and remains as it is, that thing alone
is said to be real. When we observe from that transcendental
(Intuitive) viewpoint, all these various objects which we are
calling by different names like pot, pitcher, lid etc. are mere clay
alone and not things which exist independently by themselves;
therefore, they are not real entities, clay alone is the one real
substance in this illustration. Thus all that is called ‘Kārya’
(effect) does not exist apart from its Kārāṇa (cause) and is real only in its form of cause and hence the Kārya called ‘Jagat’ also is not different from its cause of Paramātmavastu; in fact, it is mere name brought about by mere speech; its reality is verily Ātman. One who discerns this truth culminating in his Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) here and now as depicted by the Scriptures and as explained by the Sadguru (genuine preceptor) who is an Āchārya (one well-versed in the traditional but secret methodology of delineating this subtle truth of Brahman-Ātman) to such a person the truth that - “The world in its entirety is Ātman” - will spontaneously flash to the mind. Then, as the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) of the type - “The phenomenon of the mind too is verily a distortion, mutation of Ātman; verily an effect of Ātman - to wit, it is verily an imagined, misconceived appearance in Ātman and nothing else” - is engendered as a result of having followed the Śāstra Dṛṣṭi as also the Āchārya Dṛṣṭi - the mind does not remain as mind (any more); the truth that - “It is always Ātman alone; the common people are misconceiving Ātman (i.e. their very Swarūpa) as ‘Manas’ (mind)” - will be Intuited. ‘Mind’ means misconceiving that things are - “Like that, like this” - and then guessing in various ways. In fact, Saṅkalpa (imagination, volition) and Vikalpas (misconception) themselves form the essential nature of the mind. But when the truth of the type - “No object seen outside is different from Ātman; Ātman alone is the essence of everything” - gets rooted in our awareness, then because there is no Bāhyavastu (external object) existing for the mind to do Saṅkalpa (imagination, volition) - just like the fire, in the absence of firewood or any other matter (fuel) to burn, gets extinguished in itself - the mind also, because there is no external object whatsoever necessary for doing or having Saṅkalpa, becomes quiescent and becomes one with its source or substratum of Ātman alone. This alone is called ‘Amanibhāva’. When in this above manner Amanibhāva accrues, Dvaita (duality) is not ‘perceived’ at all.
Meaning: “Because of the facts that it is *Akalpaka* (that which cannot be imagined), *Aja* (birthless), Ātmajñāna exists without being separate from *Jñeya* (what is known). For that (i.e. Ātmajñāna), Brahman Itself is the Jñeya. It is *Aja* (birthless) and *Nitya* (eternal); one cognizes by means of Jñāna which is Aja, Brahman, which is Aja.”

ĀTMAN IS OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF NIRVIKALPAKA JÑĀNA (INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE DEVOID OF MISCONCEPTIONS)

(Objection): The Kaṭhāpanishad काठोपानिषद् (2-1-11) is stating that - “In order to cognize Ātman mind alone is the valid means or instrument”. If it is said that - “All duality is false alone and the mind too is false alone” - then there does not remain any *Karana* (valid means or instrument) to cognize Ātman at all, is it not so? Even if we assume that also to be so, by means of what can we at all cognize Ātmatattwa which is birthless?

(Solution): True. Before the cognition of the type: “Ātman alone is *Satya* (real)” - the mind alone is the instrument for Jñāna. But merely on that count it is not possible to imagine that even after Ātmajñāna accrues the mind remains as mind only. What you have exemplified as the authoritative Śruti statement, its real meaning is: Before Ātmajñāna is attained or born the seeker should acquire the requisite *Sañskāra* (spiritual refinement) of the mind both from the spiritual preceptor well-versed in the traditional methodology of teaching and the Śāstra and by means of such a refined mind alone the Ātmatattwa should be cognized; in that manner after cognizing that Paramātma Tattwa alone not even the least bit of manifoldness or diversity remains, subsists; for, by then the mind becomes one with Ātman alone.

This Ātmajñāna is *Akalpaka* (not to be imagined by the mind), meaning, none of the misconceived divisions like *Jñātru* (the knower), *Jñāna* (knowledge), *Jñāna Karana* (the means of knowledge) exist in It. Therefore, this is *Aja* (birthless), meaning it is not a cognition, Intuition which is of the nature of being born afresh; in fact, It is the very essence of (or substrate
for) cognition (mental awareness) which is eternal. Like the rest of the Ṣaṁjñānas (intellectual knowledges) this is not separate, different from the Ṣaṁjñeya (the object of knowledge, cognition). It is Ṣaṁjñeyābhinnā (not different from the known object); meaning, It exists in the very essential nature of Brahman which is Its Ṣaṁjñeya (known, cognized object); the Brahmajñānis are affirming that - "Just as the heat is not separate from the fire, in the same way apart from the Ṣaṁjñeya called ‘Brahman’. Its Ṣaṁjñana does not exist.” The Śruti is proclaiming that - “For the cognition of the cognizer there is nothing like a lapse, extinction at all” - (Bṛ. 4-3-2), while the Ṣaṁjñāsū (one who wishes to know or cognize the Ṣaṁjñeya Brahman) is (practising) learning to cognize the Ṣaṁjñeya Ātmāntatta by means of such a Jñāna, which is verily Aja and his Ātmāswarūpa, he should not get deluded to think, since it is stated that just as the Viṣṇānavādins say - “One cognizes the Aja by means of the Aja” - that Jñāna cognizes Itself by Itself. As stated above, when the mind attains the Amanibhāva - just as the sun is shining by himself - Ātmāntatta (which is self-existent, self-effulgent to boot) manifests by Itself; this alone is the purport behind the Kārikā. Because this Ātman is Nitya-Viṣṇāna-Ekarasa-Swabhāva (of the essential nature of Pure Consciousness which is eternal and of one and the same core of Being), there is no need whatsoever of any other Jñāna to cognize Him; this alone is the real import of the verse.

10. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ĀTMASATYĀNUBODHA AND SUSHUPTI

निगृहीतस्य मनसो निगृहीतल्पमय: शीतसः।
प्रचार: स तु विशेषः सुरुस्तेत्यन्यो न तत्समः।

Meaning: “(The seeker) should cognize (discern) the conduct of the mind of one who is having Vivekañāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) which is opposed to (the common man’s mind) and is Nirvikalpa (devoid of any misconception). The conduct (of it) which is in the Sushupti is different; it is not equal to that.”
THE STATE OF THE RESTRAINED MIND IS IN ITSELF OF A PARTICULAR KIND

It has been stated that by means of the Anubodha (following the spiritual instruction) of the type - "Atman alone is real (in the Absolute, Intuitive sense)" - when the mind attains Amanibhāva - just as a fire, without any firewood available to burn, gets extinguished - Manonirōdha (restraint of the mental functions) will ensue, is it not so? Thus when the mind becomes 'no-mind', duality is not seen; between such a descriptive state of the mind of a Jñāni and the state of the mind that rests in deep sleep what distinction exists has to be discerned now. For, in deep sleep there does not exist any Pratyaya (mental concept) whatsoever; similarly in the Amanibhāva that accrues as a result of this Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) which is called 'Ātmasatyānubodha' there does not exist any Pratyaya whatsoever; it being so, what difference at all can there exist between these two states of the mind? - such a doubt may arise in the minds of the Jñānasus. But there is a very great distinction between the Chittanirōdhasaithiti attained or engendered by Jñāna and the Chittalayaasthititi brought about quite naturally by mere sleep.

In deep sleep while the mind gets Laya (merged), existing as it is it disappears for a little while. In the materialistic (extroverted) people's minds, by nature alone Āvidyā-Mōha (attachment or delusion, concomitant with ignorance) exists; when they are asleep their mind, without performing any function or action - just as the creatures like crocodiles etc. lie motionless in one and the same state at deep levels in the sea - exists still; that mind does not know or comprehend anything else whatsoever other than (a) to be asleep without doing any function; (b) being active with Pratyayyas raising in it. A tiger which is asleep, as soon as it wakes up, out of hunger starts preying upon a deer; in the same way, the mind of the common (ignorant) people, remaining still (functionless) for some time in deep sleep, as soon as it wakes up (i.e. it becomes active) once again commences its usual activities of Pravritti (progressing towards an object) and Nivṛtti (receding from the object) which are engendered by Āvidyāvāsara (latent impressions, proclivities
brought about by ignorance). *Kumbhakarna* (a demoniac character mentioned in the epic ‘Rāmāyana’) who slept continuously for six months in a year - when he got up was Kumbhakarna only, is it not so? In the same way, the mind of those people who have woken up from sleep does not (cannot) get rid of the defects that lurk deep in it merely by going to sleep. But the state of the mind of these *Vivekins* (discriminative people) who have cognized the *Tattwa* (Ultimate Reality of the Self, Brahma) following, or on the strength of, the spiritual instructions of the Śāstra as well as the Āchārya is not like this. For, their mind herefore (i.e. after attaining Amanībhāva) does not remain as a mind at all. From the standpoint of the other people of the world (i.e. extroverted, extremely materialistic in their outlook) they (i.e. Jñānis) too may appear as having a mind; but from the standpoint of those Jñānis, apart from Ātman alone no duality whatsoever exists at all. In truth, their mind has become ‘no-mind’. Hence, from their viewpoint in that mind which has attained ‘Nīshmāntmaswabhāva’ (the essential nature of Pure Being, devoid of agentship of action), henceforth there is not even an iota of scope for *Louikika Pravṛtti - Nivṛtti* (mundane, empirical dealings of hankering after outer objects or receding away from them). They are, in truth, of the very essence of *Nityashuddhabuddhamuktaswabhāva* (eternally pure, eternally conscious and eternally liberated state).

**THE WRONG INTERPRETATION, MADE BY SOME PEOPLE, OF THIS KĀRIKĀ**

Here, in this context, some people have imagined a different kind of meaning for this Kārikā of Shri Gauḍapāda and the Bhāṣya written by Shri Śaṅkara on it. They say: In *Sushupti* (deep sleep) there exists a phenomenon called ‘Mūlāvidyā’ which is the cause for all Samsāra’s travails and tribulations; but in ‘Asamprajñātatasamādhi’ (a kind of trance in which there is no awareness whatsoever of anything else) there does not exist any Mūlāvidyā. Therefore, between the state of mind of Vivekins who have attained Jñāna by means of Asamprajñātatasamādhi and the state of mind of people of the world there exists a very great distinction. This is their doctrinaire theory.

In the opinion of some others: The ‘Vaidharmya’ (difference in quality, degree, calibre) that exists between Sushupti and
Jñānis’ Samādhi (trance) is that in Sushupti the mind’s Swarūpa (essential nature) remains the same as it is; but in Samādhi it does not exist at all. Thus these two types of commentators have come out with their respective queer interpretations to this Kārikā and both are at variance, having adopted their own dogmatic theories (but in contradiction to Śrutī, Yukti and Anubhava) with ours.

Now both these above commentaries (interpretations) are not proper. For, they do not agree either with Shri Gaudāpāda’s text or with the Prakaraṇa (topic) that we have taken up for deliberation. In Shri Gaudāpāda’s Māṇḍūkya Kārikās which he has graciously composed for our benefit, nowhere is there any casual reference or mention of this Mūlāvidyā; this fact we have already stressed. Now, what we are deliberating upon here in this context is not pertaining to Patañjala Yōga Samādhi at all. When the deliberation on Samādhi is itself not relevant here why should the author all of a sudden write anything about the distinction between Samādhi and Sushupti? - How this doubt did not arise or flash in the minds of these commentators - we do not know, we cannot surmise! Therefore, both these commentaries (interpretations) are not tenable here.

Another point: For both Sushupti and Samādhi there exists Samāna (equal) Yōgakshematwa (good and bad features); to wit, whatever Guṇas (good qualities) or Dōshas (defects) suit for Sushupti, the same Guṇas or Dōshas are suitable to Samādhi also. There is no support of any valid means to conjecture, surmise that there is a distinction of the type that - “In deep sleep Ajñāna, which is the seed (cause) for Saṃsāra, exists, while in Samādhi it does not exist.” For, when we experience those Avasthas the fact that duality is not seen is common to both; on waking up (or emerging out of Samādhi) the examination, scrutiny of the type of - “Then I did not know anything” - is again common to both states. Hence in this regard there is no increase of a quality in one, nor decrease of that quality in another. For this reason alone Shri Śaṅkara in his Sūtra Bhāṣyā, in order to establish the truth that - “Though in Pralaya (dissolution of the world, creation) no divisions exist, as soon as creation ensues those divisions may appear” - he has taken both Sushupti and Samādhi as illustrations. He has written the follow-
ing sentence: ‘यथा हि सुपुजितसामाय्यादावपि सत्याः स्वाभाविक्याम् अविभागायात् विनियानस्यायामवर्तितवात् पूर्ववत् पुनः: प्रबोधे विभागो भवति एवम् इहापि भविष्यति’ - (Sūtra Bhāṣya 2-1-9), meaning - “Although in states like Sushupti, Samādhi etc. (devoid of Dvaita Darśana or appearance of duality) the natural Avibhāga (non-division) has accrued, because Mithyājīna (misconception) has not been removed, as soon as one wakes up once again, as before, there accrues divisions; in the same way, here too (when Pralaya or dissolution takes place, although there are no divisions, at the time of creation once again the divisions may appear).” This is the purport behind this Bhāṣya sentence. Apart from this, the truth that - in Sushupti (from the Paramārtha Drishti) there do not exist categories like Avidyā, Kāma and Karma - is being stated by the Śruti: ‘तत्त्वत्तदतिप्रचल्यते अपेक्षतपानाभूत रूपम्’ - (Bṛ. 4-3-21), meaning - “For this Jīva this Sushupti form is one, which has transcended Kāma (desire), in which the demerit of Dharma (righteousness) and Adharma (unrighteousness), in which the Avidyābhaya (fear born out of ignorance) is not there.” Further the Śruti says: ‘अत्र विताभिध्यं भवति .... अनन्तागमं पुष्पेनान्यान्यागं पपेण तीर्थो हि तदा सर्वाच्छकानूऽ इदास्य भवति’ - (Bṛ. 4-3-22), meaning - “In this state of deep sleep the father is no longer a father ....... here the merit has not followed or accompanied one, nor has demerit followed one; then he has got over all the miseries of the heart, is it not so?” Hence, even if observed in this manner too, it becomes certain that the theory of the Vyākhyaṇākāras in imagining Vaidharmya (different qualities or grades) between Sushupti and Samādhi is not proper, tenable at all.

THE DIFFERENCE (DISTINCTION) OF SUSHUPTI MENTIONED IN THE KĀRIKĀ

Therefore, here if we interpret the Kārikāvākyya (sentence of the Kārikā) to suit the Prakaraṇa (topic which this Chapter is dedicated to expound), then the intended purport will evolve as: Because, while entering the state of deep sleep, the common people have not yet attained the Ātmatattva Jñāna, at that moment, although the mind obtains the Amanibhāva, it is not the absolute, final (real) Amanibhāva at all. When we have
acquired deep sleep, although the mind goes into the oblivion, so to say, for that much time, because therein lurk invariably Vāsanās (latent impressions of the past actions and enjoyments) which are the cause to engender many calamities which, in turn, are the root cause for Āvidyāmōha (attachment, delusion projected by ignorance), the mind has not acquired the capability of attaining the final Amanāsta (no-mindness). When we have misconceived the rope to be a snake alone, if the latter for some reason or the other disappears from sight for a while and once again is seen, can we avoid getting deluded that it is a snake? No. For, our misconception of the rope has not been falsified, sublated. Instead of this, if we get the correct knowledge that it is actually a rope and thereby the misconception is falsified or sublated, we get the sense of certitude that it is not a snake at all. Is it not so? In the same way, in the present context too, although it gets submerged in deep sleep and disappears, the mind which had apparently become no-mind (mindless), has never reached the final and absolute culmination of the process. For, we have not acquired or reached the sense of certitude by properly cognizing (Intuiting) Ātman in the manner - “All this is verily Ātman; and not Anātman (not-Self) of the forms of the mind etc.” But when we attain the Intuitive Knowledge (Experience) of the type - “Ātman alone (exclusively, non-dually) is Paramārtha Satya (Absolute, Transcendental Reality beyond all vestiges of duality or diversity)” - and simultaneously when the seed of Pravṛtti (mundane activity) which is the cause for all life’s calamities projected or conjured up by Āvidyā - in other words, when the Āvidyāvāsaṇa (latent proclivities of mind projected by Āvidyā) - is destroyed as also the quality of Rajas, which is the fountainhead of all miseries like Mōha (attachment) etc. are destroyed, then the plenary, final, consummate Amanibhāva is attained. Here, in this context, one important point that we have to remember is: If observed from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi, even in Sushupti Ātman exists without any association whatsoever with any Klesha (affliction, distress) like Āvidyāmōha etc. For, ‘अस्त्यैतित्विच्यः’ - (Bṛi. 4-3-21) in this manner, as we have already exemplified, from the standpoint of the Śruti when we observe, there too (i.e. in Sushupti also) Ātman exists without Āvidyākāma-
karma categories. Even so, if we observe from the empirical, workaday viewpoint, - to wit, when we notice from the waking viewpoint - therein the Pravṛttibija (seed germinating later on to give rise to mundane, empirical activities) projected by Avidyā invariably exists indeed; for, as soon as we wake up once again the Vāsanās (latent mental proclivities, impressions), which are the root cause for all kinds of miseries, catastrophes of life, do remain, subsist as they are. Therefore, accepting the fact that there exists a distinction between the Manōnirōḍha (restraint, cessation of the mind) by means of Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) and the Laya (temporary merger of the mind) in Sushupti, this difference indicating comparative superiority and inferiority has been mentioned in the Kārikā - thus we have to discern. Thus, when we observe from the predominant waking viewpoint, it becomes evident that in Sushupti the form of behaviour or conduct of the mind in merging (tāya) is occurring quite naturally or automatically, so to speak, being Parādhīna (dependent on external sources, helplessly). For, the Vishrānti (rest, quietude) alone, which the mind acquires in order to solve or get rid of the strain or exhaustion caused by the performance of Karma, is deep sleep. But, in the waking itself by means of the Jñāna of the type - “Ātman alone is the one Absolute Reality” - which accrues by means of the spiritual instructions by the Śāstra and the Āchārya, the mind getting destroyed (falsified, sublated) occurs by self-effort alone. Therefore, there is a great difference between the Manōlaya that occurs in Sushupti and the Manōnirōḍha that accrues from Jñāna. Hence, it is said that - “One should discern the behaviour, conduct of the mind (Manah Prachāra) of the form of Amanībhāva that accrues from Jñāna.”

Meaning: “For, in Sushupti the mind gets merged; if that itself is (by means of Ātmajñāna) made Nigraha (completely controlled, overpowered), then it does not merge. That alone is the Nirbhaya (fearless) Brahman (Ultimate Reality), the Light of Knowledge which manifests, appears everywhere.”
THE CAUSE FOR DIFFERENCE IN BEHAVIOUR

We have mentioned the cause for this distinction while explaining the meaning of the previous Karika. All the distinctive knowledges that accrue in the waking get conglomerated into the form of Vāsana (latent impression) and become a dense mass of Jñāna, so to speak. When we observe from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi, in the waking also Ātman alone exists really; but till the Mithyājñāna (misconception) is sublated and by means of Jñāna this truth is fully established (to culminate in Intuitive Experience), the divisions of the forms of Jñātṛu (knower)-Jñāna (knowledge)-Jñeya (object of knowledge) - just as to a person having cataract, in one moon alone the divisions like many moons appear - continuously manifest themselves. Although the truth that - “In the dream no division whatsoever exists in reality in Ātman” - is acceptable to everyone till one gets awake, within the dream - just as in the waking - it has become certain that an uninterrupted division alone exists invariably; and just as no one then gets the conviction of the type - “This is verily a dream of the form of misconception” - in the same way, in the waking too till one attains Jñāna of the type - “Ātman alone is real” - the dealings of divisions like Jñātṛu-Jñāna-Jñeya verily appear to be real indeed. In the same vein too, in the Sushupti also, observed from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi, although Ātman alone devoid of any divisions is existing really, till we attain that Jñāna, the Vāsana of the divisions which is brought about by Mithyājñāna continues to exist. Thus in the waking Vibhāgajñāna (knowledge of divisions, distinctions), in deep sleep the Vāsana of Vibhāgajñāna - both these features do not disappear for anyone - whosoever he may be - unless and until he attains Ātmajñāna. For, both these are caused by Mithyājñāna (i.e. misconception) alone. Therefore, merely by getting Sushupti no one can ever acquire the Ātyantika (plenary, consummate) Amanibhāva (no-mind state). Especially in Sushupti, neither Śāstracllfuya Upadesha nor Ātmasatyānubōdha can ever possibly accrue; for, Sushupti means a state wherein the Nirvishesha Chinmātraswarūpa (essence of non-dual Pure Consciousness devoid of any attributes whatsoever) alone has remained. For that reason alone the Śruti has stated the reasons for no knowledge whatsoever being ever possible to be attained in Sushupti in the
sentence: ‘यदैतन्त्र विज्ञानति विज्ञानयौ तन विज्ञानति न हि विज्ञानतुर्विज्ञानात्विपरिलोपे
विद्यते।विनाशित्वात् न तु तदविद्वित्यमस्ति ततोव्यद्विन्निः यदैज्ञानीयात्’ - (Bṛ. 4-3-
33), meaning - “Therein He does not cognize anything whatsoever, is it not so? Even then (Ātman) having been of the
essential nature of a cognizer, He does not cognize (thus it should be understood); for, to the cognition of the cognizer
there is never any lapse, loss whatsoever; for, He is Avināshi
(indestructible). But, apart from Him, a second thing of any kind
does not exist therein. Only if such a second thing were to exist,
He could possibly have cognized it, is it not so?” Hence, really
speaking, though in Sushupti the Amanibhāva is apparently en-
genendered, the mind has - from the Vyavahāra Drishti - merged
(Laya). That is all. This explanation is reasonable indeed.

When this very mind is fully sublated by non-comprehen-
sion or giving up identification with it (Nigraha) in the waking
by means of Vivekavijñāna (Intuitive Knowledge born out of
deliberation) - it does not merge (Laya) ; for, then the one who
has cognized has already cognized (Intuited) Ātmaswaruṇa Itself
which is never tarnished or tainted in the least by the Mōha
(attachment, delusion) born out of Ajñāna. In truth, then the mind
has verily become one with Ātman. It being so, the great
difference between the Samādhi that is taught in Pātañjala
Yoga and this Samādhi of the essential nature of Amanibhāva
taught in Vedānta is: The Vedānta Samādhi is verily
Ātmaswaruṇa ever devoid of any relationship whatsoever of
phenomena like mind, Prāṇa (vital force) etc. When there is
no Vivekavijñāna, this (Ātmaswaruṇa) exists, remains as if
Aprāpta (unattained), but as soon as Vivekavijñāna accrues
It appears as though It has been Prāpta (attained) to the
Vyavahāra Drishti (empirical viewpoint). But with regard to
Pātañjala Samādhi especially, it is of the nature of Chittavṛitti-
nirōḍha (curbing, suppressing the mental concepts, thoughts ;
it is of the nature of indicating merely the Viveka (discrimi-
native deliberation) with regard to Chitta (mind) and Ātman
(Self) ; but not Ātyantika (plenary, consummate).

Thus when the Samādhi expounded by Vedānta Śāstra as
of the form of Amanibhāva accrues, the mind verily becomes one
with Brahman; that alone is Nirbhaya (fearless); for, then the
Dvaitagrahāna (comprehension of duality), which is Avidyākṛita (projected by ignorance) and is Bhayahetu (cause for fear, anxiety), does not exist whatsoever. The Śrutis like Taittirīya (2-7) are teaching that - “That alone is verily the Śānta (peaceful) Abhayabrhaman (fearless Ultimate Reality).” That very Swarūpa is Jñānālōka (the eternally Witnessing Light of Intuition) which is all-pervading. But in Pātanjalajī Yōga the Samādhi - which is taught as being attained by Jñānālōka but in increasing gradations like - ‘a little clarity’, ‘medium grade clarity’, ‘superior grade clarity’ - is not of this kind or nature. There the Samādhi that is obtained by means of the light of knowledge brought about by Yōga is propounded; but here in Vedānta what is taught or expounded as Jñānālōka is verily Brahmaswarūpa indeed. It is like the Ākāśa (empty space) - Sarvavāyāpaka (all-pervading), Svayamjyōti (self-effulgent) Chaitanyamātra (Pure, Absolute Consciousness). In It never at all there is any scope whatsoever for Ajñānatamas (the darkness, indolence of ignorance).

Meaning: “This is Aja (birthless), Anidra (sleepless), Asvapna (dreamless), devoid of names and forms; always illuminating, Sarvajña (omniscient); in no manner there is any trace of any Upachāra (external show or conduct, praise, obeisance, no predication whatsoever).”

ĀTMAJṆĀNI IS KRITAKRITYA (ONE WHO HAS ACHIEVED FULFILMENT IN LIFE)

Thus this Ātmātattva (Transcendental Reality of the Self) determined by Śāstra and Yukti (logical arguments) can be cognized (Intuited) by Ātmasyatānubodha (spiritual instruction of the Absolute Reality of the Self) alone. (i) Because It has no cause whatsoever for giving birth, It is internally or externally everywhere Aja (birthless). (ii) By virtue of Avidyā alone one begets birth, is it not so? This fact has been explained previously in 3-19, 3-24. That Avidyā gets destroyed by Ātmasyatānubodha, and hence It is Aja. For that reason alone, It is Anidra (sleepless). (iii) Being caused by Anādīmāyānītā (beginningless illusory sleep) called Avidyā, having woken up from Svapna and
having become Advayaswarūpa (of the essential nature of nonduality) this Ātmaswarūpa is Asvapna. This opinion has already been expressed and explained previously in Āgama Prakāraṇa (1-16). (iv) Further this Ātmattattwa is Anāmaka (nameless) and Arūpaka (formless); meaning, It is Advaita (non-dual). Because the ‘waking’ of the nature of Jīvāna (Intuitive Knowledge) has not accrued, those names and forms were appearing, and were the cause for the deep-seated belief that Ātman is Sadvitiya (dual in form), is it not so? Now, because the practitioner has ‘woken up’ from Māyāsvapna, it is neither possible to call this Brahman by any name nor is it possible to know that It is of such and such a form. For this reason alone It is Anāmaka and Arūpaka. (v) Apart from this, It is Sakṛidvibhāta, meaning, always (eternally) shining, illumining only. If Agrahaṇa (non-comprehension) called ‘Sushupta’ occurs, then the Pramāṭṭurūpa (form of cognizership) of Ātman does not appear or is not manifested; if Anyathāgrahaṇa (misconception or wrong comprehension) called ‘Jāgrat’ and ‘Svapna’ occurs, then that Pramāṭṭurūpa of Ātman appears - these two kinds of differences may occur. But even when we are misconceiving Him (Ātman) as of the forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, for this Ātman who eternally exists in the essential nature of Aja-Advaya alone there is no possibility whatsoever of these Āvirbhāva (disappearance) and Tirobhāva (manifestation) occurring. Although for the people on the earth the events like day, when the sun appears, and night, when he does not appear, are actually occurring, both of them do not at all pertain to the sun who is Nityaprakāsārūpa (eternally of the essential nature of lustre, brilliance). Is it not so? In the same way, for Ajīnas (ignorant people) the ‘I’ form appearing and not appearing do occur incessantly just like day and night. The reason for the Turiya (Paramātman who is Transcendental beyond the three states) - who is eternally, self-effulgent - not illumining or shining is Agrahaṇa (non-cognition, non-comprehension), Anyathāgrahaṇa (misconception, comprehending It in a different, wrong form) - these two kinds of wrong knowledges alone. When the Ātmasatyānubōdha accrues especially, because that wrong knowledge (misconception) is not there at all and that Turiyātmarūpa is Nityachaitanyaswarūpa (of the essential nature of eternally Pure Consciousness), It is ‘Sakṛidvibhāta’ (eternally
The Essential Gaudapāda

shining) - this statement is reasonable. The Śruti: ‘सकृद्धिमातो ख्रेष्ठ 
ब्रह्मलोकः’ - (Chh. 8-4-2), meaning: “This world called ‘Brahman’ 
is eternally shining” - is the supporting, authoritative source or 
proof for the conclusion.

In any case, in this manner removing or negating the 
 misconception of the forms of Avasthātraya, that Aja-Advaya 
Ātmatattwa, which was expounded in the Āgama Prakaraṇa, 
that very Tattwa has been shown to be Advaita which is Shiva 
auspicious, sacred) by proving that all Dvaitavyavahāra (empiri­
cal dealings of duality) are Āvidyaka (projections, effect of 
ignorance) in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa; once again the same 
Tattwa is being shown to be Aja by means like Śruti and 
Upapatti (logical arguments) and the topic is being concluded. 
Once such a Brahmaswarūpa is cognized on the strength of 
Ātmasatyānubodha ‘there does not remain in any manner any 
Upachāra’, meaning - nothing else remains to be done; but for 
such of those who have not been fortunate enough to have had 
such ‘Ātmabodha’ - as we are going to describe herefore - just 
as there remains a duty of attaining Samādhi, in the same way, 
for one who is an Ātmajñāni there does not remain anything to 
be done or any duty to be discharged whatsoever. This purport 
is implied in the Kārikā.

EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY THAT TATTWAJÑĀNI 
ALSO HAS PERFORCE TO ACQUIRE SAMĀDHI

Some people are saying that - “Even one who is a 
Tattwañāni (Realized soul), in order to wear out the miseries 
of life, has necessarily to acquire Asamprajñāta Samādhi. 
Their this understanding is verily a delusion (Bhrānti) indeed. 
For, since by means of Ātmasatyānubodha the mind becomes no­
mind and there does not at all remain any Kartrutwa (doership 
or agentship of action), there is no scope for or possibility of any 
duty to be performed then. Even after the Kartrutwa which is 
conjured up in Chidātman (Self as Pure Consciousness) is 
removed by means of Vidyā (Self-Knowledge), because in the 
adjunct of Antahkarana (inner instrument of mind) which is 
edowed with Chidābhāsa (reflective consciousness), there 
subsist invariably thousands of mutations; since the self-
established Kartrutwa continues to exist as long as the Manödravya (the stuff of mind) exists, those disputants have opined that that much portion of Kartrutwa remains for Tattwajña also. But this theory is not proper. For, to entertain the concept that - 'There exists Kartrutwa' - the cause is verily Adhyāsa (misconception) brought about by Aviveka (lack of discrimination) of the type of not having distinguished between the essential natures of the two terms 'Ātman' and 'Manas'. When observed from the Paramārtha Drishṭi, neither to the Pure Ātman there is Kartrutwa, nor to the mere mind too there is any Kartrutwa ; for, Chidātman is devoid of mutations (immutable), while the mind is Achetana (insentient) ; if we go still deeper into the matter and observe, because the mind appears only due to Avidyā, for such a thing Kartrutwa cannot possibly be made applicable in any manner whatsoever. Besides, nowhere in the Upanishads it has been taught that by practising Pātanjala Yōga etc. Mukti accrues.

Here one objection can be raised : It is true that once Tattwajña accrues, for Moksha there is no need of any Sādhana (spiritual practice) whatsoever. Even so, in order that the mind gets peace, quietude, Klesha (misery) should get emaciated, worn out ; for that purpose, we can say that Samādhi should be acquired or attained, is it not so?

(Solution) : This objection is not proper. For, as long as the mind really exists the Jñāna of Āmatattwa which is Aja-Advaya cannot possibly be attained at all. Just as the Sāṅkhyans say, viz. “One should deliberate upon and know both Ātman and Manas (mind) and that alone is Tattwajña” - the Vedāntins have not accepted that doctrine at all. In truth, Advitiya Ātman alone is Satya (real) and this is verily Tattwajña ; therefore, when that Jñāna accrues the mind really does not subsist ; neither does the Sādhana that is to be practised in order to attain Samādhi for the sake of its quiescence also subsist. Therefore, once the Jñāna of the type - “Atman who is of Nityashuddhabuddhamuktaswabhāva alone is the Paramārthasatyā (Absolute Reality)” - accrues, there does not remain any Kartavya (duty or responsibility) that has yet to be discharged. This alone is the Vedāntic Siddhānta.
Meaning: “One devoid of Vāk (speech), one who has got over all worries or anxieties, one who is extremely peaceful or quiescent, self-effulgent Light of Consciousness, \( \text{Samādhi} \) (mind having become one with the Self), unmoving, fearless.”

**HOW COME THAT ĀTMAṬATTWA IS OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF ANĀMAKAṬWA ETC.?**

In the previous Kārīkā it has been delineated that Ātmatattwa is \( \text{Anāmaka} \) (nameless), \( \text{Arūpaka} \) (formless), \( \text{Sakrīdvibhāta} \) (self-effulgent Light of Consciousness) and \( \text{Sarvajña} \) (omniscient) - is it not so? For all those natures the reasons have been mentioned here in this Kārīkā. This Ātman is \( \text{Sarvābhilāpavigata} \), meaning one who is devoid of all speech. Here speech is exemplified in a representative sense. Because He is devoid of speech, Ātman is name-less; not only this, but also because He has no \( \text{Bāhyakaraṇa} \) (external sense organs) whatsoever, it amounts to saying that qualities like Shabda, Sparsha etc. are not there in Him. This Ātman is \( \text{Sarvachintāsamutthita} \), meaning in Him there is no rising of \( \text{Buddhivritti} \) (intellectual concepts) whatsoever; to wit, He is devoid of \( \text{Antahkarana} \) (Mind in its entirety). Therefore, ‘He is \( \text{Arūpaka} \) (devoid of form)’ - this statement is justified. In any case, the meaning of the first half of this verse is that - “Ātman is devoid of any special features like \( \text{Vyākṛita} \) (manifested) and \( \text{Avyākṛta} \) (unmanifested) forms.”

Thus, because He is devoid of any special characteristics whatsoever this Ātman is \( \text{Suprāshānta} \), meaning, of the form in which the world of duality or diversity has completely subsided, merged; further, He is \( \text{Sakrījyoti} \), meaning, eternally of the essential nature of Light of Consciousness; to wit, He is \( \text{Nītya Chaitanyarūpa} \); for that reason alone, ‘\( \text{Sakrīdvibhāta} \)’ is used previously. He is ‘\( \text{Samādhi} \)’, which means keeping or maintaining a refined mind in a quiescent, peaceful state; because by means of \( \text{Prajña} \) (Consciousness) which is the cause of that ‘\( \text{Samādhi} \)’ this Ātman is to be cognized, He too is known as ‘\( \text{Samādhi} \)’. The Śruti sentence: “One who is \( \text{Ashānta} \) (devoid
of mental peace or equipoise) and Asamāhita (having no control over his mind and senses)......cannot cognize Him by means of Prajñāna (Intuitive Knowledge)” - (Kaṭha 1-2-24) - is an authoritative sentence in support of this conclusion. Or, in the alternative, because only when the mind gets established in Ātman it attains Samādhi (peace, tranquillity), Ātman is called ‘Samādhi’ - in this manner also the purport behind this adjective can be explained. For, unless and until the mind attains to Ātman, who is eternally of the essential nature of Nirvishaya (devoid of features), it cannot possibly attain Samādhi. For that reason alone, Ātatattwa is ‘Sarvajña’ - meaning, having Himself become everything, He is of the essential nature of Nitya Nirvishaya Chaitanya - thus it was stated in the previous Karika. For that reason alone, this Ātman is Achala, meaning, one who is devoid of mutations, who is devoid of any cause giving rise to Vikshepa (projection, scattering of the mind). In this manner because He is Vikriyārahiita (immutable), this Ātman is ‘Abhaya’ (fearless). Because a Jñāni’s Ātman is of this essential nature alone, the Brahmatattwa that he has attained by means of Amanībhāva is stated by us in the previous Kārika to be of the essential nature of Anāmaka etc. This is the whole purport of this Kārika.

HERE THE DISCUSSION OF SAMĀDHĪ IS NOT RELEVANT;
IT SHOULD NOT BE.

Because here the expression - ‘Samādhirachalaha’ - is used, some modern scholars have conceived that “Here the ‘Achala-samādhi’ alone, which is popular in Buddhistic philosophy, has been examined”. But this does not suit, or fit in, even the least bit, here in this context. For, this is a Prakaraṇa (Chapter) devoted to Ātmasatyānubodha ; for that topic, what these people propound as the ‘Samādhi’ of the Saugatamata (Buddhism) does not possibly suit even the least bit. Apart from this, in the context of describing the Ātmaswabhāva which is Kūṭasthanitya (Transcendental and eternal) how at all can this ‘Samādhi’ which is said to attain quiescence for a while become suitable? Whichever Samādhi it may be, being Anvartha (having a meaning easily deducible from the etymology of the word, i.e., true to the sense) can it become ‘Achala’? Never. Therefore, here Ātmaswabhāva alone, which is of the very
essence of Kūṭasthanitya Chaitanya, is called ‘Samādhi’. For this reason alone in the previous Kārikā it was stated that herein anything going by the name of Kartavya (duty) does not suit in any manner. It has been stated: “नोपचारः कण्यवन्” - (3-26). Therefore, being deceived by the mere word ‘Samādhi’ the seeker should not raise the topic of Samādhi (trance) here in this context.

ग्रहो न तत्र नोत्संगोख्चन्ता यत्र न विचित्रे ।
आत्मसंस्थितं तदा ज्ञानमधाति समन्तं गतम् ॥१८॥

Meaning: “Where there is no worry, there is no grasping, nor giving up. Then Jñāna (Consciousness) has come to a standstill (is established) in Ātman ; becoming Ajāti (birthless) It has attained equipoise.”

**HOW CAN THE ASSERTION - ‘AFTER THE ATTAINMENT OF BRAHMĀTMAJÑĀNA THERE IS NO DUTY TO BE PERFORMED’ - BE JUSTIFIED?**

We have mentioned the grounds for the four adjectives of ‘Anāmakam’, ‘Arūpakam’, ‘Sakṛidvibātam’, ‘Sarvajñam’ used in the previous Kārikā. Now, to the question - ‘नोपचारः कण्यवन्’ ('Performing any duty does not suit in any manner') - ‘How is this proper ?’ - an answer remains to be given. For that purpose this present Kārikā is forwarded.

Brahmātman Himself is Samādhi ; this truth has been already stated, is it not so ? For that reason alone in such Brahmaswarūpa there is no ‘Graha’ (grasping) ; nor ‘Utsarga’ (giving up). Where there is change or an object of change, there is such Loukika (empirical) or Vaidika (scriptural) transaction. There may be activities like Hāna (giving up) or Upādāna (acquisition) ; but in Brahman who is Sarvavyavahārātita (transcending all empirical transactions) both those transactions cannot possibly exist. For, apart from Brahman who is Advitiya there cannot possibly be any cause for change ; Brahman Itself also is not having any mutations. Therefore, here both Hāna and Upādāna do not exist - this is the implication here. In this Brahman there is no worry or anxiety whatsoever ; for, since the mind has become no-mind and there being no external object at all for Jñāna (Pure Consciousness) ; it (i.e., the mind) has
become Ātmasamstha, meaning, it has become one with Ātman i.e. it has attained the Ātmarūpa or essential nature of Pure Consciousness.

EXAMINATION OF VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS’ THEORY

Here Vijñānavādins like Vasubandhu etc. say that: ‘यदा त्वालम्बनं ज्ञान नैसन्यपल्ल्पे तदा स्थितं विज्ञानमं गृह्यं गायत्र्यापि तदग्रहणं।’ - (Trimshikā - 28) - according to this Trimshikāvachana - ‘When Vijñāna (intellectual awareness) does not have any Grāhya (object to conceive) that remains in a purely Vijñānarūpa (of the form of intellectual awareness) ; in Samādhi because Vijñāna (Intelligence) does not have any Ālambana (object) - none whatsoever - then it becomes pure Vijñāna alone’ - this is the doctrine of Vijñānavādins belonging to ‘Yogācāra’ school. But this opinion is not in consonance with reasoning. For, in the doctrine of the Vijñānavādins there is no Grāhya (object) whatsoever apart from Vijñāna in reality; they have accepted that Vijñāna experiences itself by itself, is it not so? It being so, how at all even in Samādhi Vijñāna cannot have any object? Vijñāna has been called ‘Vijñāna’ because it invariably has a Grāhāṃshā (aspect of grasping an object) of the form of Vijñeya (object of knowledge) indeed. Therefore, if it is stated that it (i.e., Vijñāna) does not have any Grāhya, they will have to perforce accept that its Vijñānātva (the capability of being aware of anything) itself will vanish. It being so, to imagine that Vijñāna, which is Kriyārupa (of the nature of action) and of Grāhakālasvabhāva (the exclusive essential nature of comprehending or grasping), becomes Nirvishesha (without any special features) in Samādhi is analogous to saying that for a river there exists a particular state of not flowing or moving. A river means a phenomenon of the essential nature of flowing. It being so, how at all can it acquire Sthiratva (steadiness, immovable or motionless state)? If it acquires such a state, does it not amount to its destruction itself? Therefore, in this Chapter there is no scope, even the least bit, for ‘Vijñānamātratāvāda’ (theory of pure Vijñāna existing by itself). Because Vijñāna or Chitta (mind) is Vikalpita (misconceived) in Ātman, who is the Witnessing Consciousness for even Vijñāna - which has many special features like being born, getting destroyed, manifoldness etc. - as also who is
Kūṭastharūpā (of the essential nature of Transcendental Reality), when the mind becomes Ātmasaṁsthā owing to Ātmasyānubodhā - meaning when the Intuitive Knowledge that - ‘Ātman alone is the Absolute Reality’ - dawns or accrues, then Jñāna becomes ‘Ātmasaṁsthā’ - this is the implicit meaning of the third part of the Kārikā.

CONCLUSION OF AJĀTIVĀDA

So far what was stated, viz., “Although Ātmaswarūpā is eternally Aja, Advaya and Ampta alone, from the viewpoint of the Ajñās (ignorant people) That also appears to be born ; therefore it was stated : ‘अतो वक्ष्याम्यकार्पणायमानाति सम्भव गतम्’ - meaning, ‘Because It is eternally of the essential nature of not getting born and It is of the essential nature of being without any changes of increase or decrease whatever ; only if this truth is cognized one gets Akārpanya (absence of helplessness or destitution) ; how it is I will tell’ - (2-2) - thus what was stated in the beginning was established on the strength of Śrutivākyas and Yuktī ; now here with the fourth part of the Kārikā, viz. ‘अन्तरि सम्भव गतम्’ it is being concluded.

What was described so far as Ātmasyānubodhā is itself Akārpanya ; all else is Kārpanya, a subject-matter of people who have superimposed upon themselves Dīnatwa (helplessness, destitution) - thus it has been stated here. For that reason alone, in the Manusmṛti it has been stated : ‘एतत्त्व जन्मसाप्तल्यं श्रायणस्य विशेषत्:। प्रायौति कूटकृत्यो हि हि भवति नात्यथा ॥’ - (Manu 12-93), meaning - “Cognizing this Tattva alone is the cause for ‘Janmasāphalya (fulfilment of Life’s purpose) for man, especially a Brahmin. One who attains this alone is called a Kritakṛitya (one having fulfilled Life’s purpose), as also Dwija (twice-born).”

अस्यश्रयोगों वै नाम दुर्दशिः: सर्वोपग्रन्धिः।
योगिनो विभवति हस्मादभिः प्रयदशिः: ।३९॥

Meaning : “This has become popular (famous) as ‘Asparshayōga’. This is something not being seen by any Yōgins. Although it is fearless, Yōgins, seeing fear in it, are afraid of it.”
FEAR ABOUT ĀTMAJÑĀNA FOR THOSE WHO ARE NOT QUALIFIED

Thus this Paramārthadarshana (Intuition of the Transcendental Reality of the Self) is capable of yielding Samādhi (equipoise of the mind, Amanībhāva) which is Achala (immutable), Abhaya (fearless). This has been called ‘Asparshayoga’ - meaning, Yōga devoid of any relationship whatsoever with anything second to It - in the Upanishads. In the Upanishadic sentences like - “Oh Maitreyi, I am not saying anything which is confusing, deluding. This Ātman is Avināshi (indestructible); He has no quality or nature whatsoever of being extirpated or eradicated. When Jñāna accrues, since the relationship or association with Bhūtamātras (primordial elements) is lost (He has no particular knowledge of the type - ‘I am so and so’)” - (Brī. Mā. 4-3-14, 15); “If He is cognized, there is no more taint of the demerit or defect of the form of Dharma (merit) and Adharma (demerit)” - (Brī. 4-4-23); “That this Ātman is Mahānta (supreme) and Aja (birthless). He is Ajara (undecaying), Amṛita (immortal), Abhaya (fearless), verily Brahman; Brahman is fearless, is it not so? He who cognizes this truth in this manner, he becomes verily fearless Brahman” - (Brī. 4-4-25) etc. - it has been propounded that when Ātmajñāna accrues to a seeker he has verily become Advitiya Brahman, devoid of any Sparsha (touch or taint) of anything else whatsoever.

Even so, this cannot be acquired by those who do not have attained the Jñāna expounded in the Vedānta Śāstra. Ajjanais - meaning, those who are having identification with Parichhinnaajñāna (the distinctive knowledge) of the type of ‘misconceiving’ Ātman to be the object for the ‘I’-concept - when they listen to this topic of Yōga of the form of this Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) which is Nirbhaya (fearless), they become afraid thinking that - “When this Jñāna accrues, since the Ātmarūpa (nature of Self) of the empirical form of ‘I’ itself vanishes, it amounts to the destruction of Ātman (one’s own being).” The experience of the type - ‘Aham’ (I-concept) - even this form is not there for Ātman in deep sleep; then, without there being any grief or misery whatsoever, Paramānandaprāpti (attainment of supreme Bliss) itself is attained. This truth is there invariably in everyone’s
experience indeed. Although they are seeing or witnessing this daily as their experience, the common seekers or practitioners of spiritual disciplines are afraid of ‘Asparshayoga’ which is of the essence of this Samyajñāna (Intuitive Knowledge), fearing that - “If Amanasta (Amanibhāva) is attained, I myself will get destroyed or will die!” This is the intended, implicit meaning here.

‘ASPARSHAYOGA’ IS NOT ANY SPECIAL KIND OF YŌGA

Here in this context, some people are deluded to think or believe that a particular type of Yōga (related to Pātanjala Yōga practices) called ‘Asparsha Yōga’ is taught. But for those who have discerned facts about the real purport of the Prakarat as also the earlier and later spiritual instructions (i.e. in what context this Yōga is taught) it will become clearly understood as to which Yōga has not been taught, and that the Darshana (Intuitive Experience) of Aja-Advaya-Paramārtha Tattwa alone has been called by the name of ‘Yōga’ - that is all. Just as when we are awake there is Sparsha (touch, contact) with external objects or phenomena, in the Yōga Samādhi (trance as taught in Pātañjala Yōga philosophy) there is no contact whatsoever with the external objects, is it not so ? In the same way, this is not a Samādhi Vishesha (special kind of trance) devoid of any contact or touch with external things ; in truth, this is verily the essential nature of Aja-Advaya Ātmatttwa. In order to signify that this has no birth or destruction at all, Samyajñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self, Pure Being-Consciousness) has been called ‘Asparsha Yōga’. The other Yōga types - let it be of any duration of being without any contact with external objects - it is invariably Kālaparicchinna (distinctive in time, an event in time) ; such Yōga Samādhi having been attained by anyone - whosoever he may be - the fathomless depth or sublimity of this Asparsha Yōga (of Vedāntic spiritual science) of the nature of ‘Samyajñāna’ is not known ; thus in order to eulogise the greatness of this Jñāna the commonplace variety of Yōga has been criticised here ; thus it should be reckoned.
11. FOR ATTAINMENT OF ĀTMAJÑĀNA THE DEVICE CALLED ‘MANÖNIGRAHA’

Meaning: “For Yōgins by means of Nigraha (complete hescission of identification) with the mind alone Abhaya (fearlessness), Duhkha-kshaya (destruction of misery), Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self), Akshaya Shānti (indestructible Bliss) - all these accrue.”

THE SEEKER SHOULD ATTAIN ĀTMAJÑĀNA BY MEANS OF MANÖNIGRAHA ALONE

“Those people - who are endowed with an excellent viewpoint (Uttama Drīṣṭi) and to whom neither the mind nor the senses etc. really exist at all apart from Ātman who is of the essential nature of Aja-Advaya-Brahman, and who have gained conviction that all those phenomena are, just like the snake (appearing) in the rope, imagined in Ātman - since they have Intuited the truth that - ‘Brahman of the very essence of Nitya Shuddha Buddha Mukta is verily myself’ - by means of Ātmasatyanubōdha, and since the Akshayashānti (eternal Bliss) called ‘Moksha’ is established in their very essence of Being - for such people there is no Sādhana (spiritual practice) whatsoever that remains to be practised” - (3-36) - thus we have stated, is it not so?

Different from such people with superior viewpoint, those people who have adopted a Sādhanamarga (path of spiritual practice) and are endowed with low-grade or middle-grade viewpoints - meaning, people who have believed that - “Apart from Ātman but associated with Ātman there exists a thing called ‘Manas’ (mind)” - and for that reason alone getting disturbed by the fickleness and waywardness of the mind, they are desiring to get rid of the sense of identification with the body seen in the manner - ‘I am verily the body, the senses etc.’ - to all such Yōgins (seekers of spiritual solace) who are not having the benefit of Ātmasatyanubōdha the
The great fruit of *Abhaya* (fearlessness) can be attained exclusively by *Manonigraha*.

In this Chapter for the sake of such Manda-Madhyama-Drishti people ‘Manonigraha’ form of spiritual practice will be instructed in order that they may achieve Amanasta state and attain *Nishtā* (fully rooted, established state) in Advaitātman. Those who are endowed with Ātmasatyānubodha - since they are *Kṛitārtha* (those who have achieved the fulfilment of Life’s purpose) and since for them Manonigraha is self-established and hence readily available, this is verily a Lakṣaṇa (a significant hallmark) for them. In fact, what is Lakṣaṇa for *Kṛitārthas* - that alone is recommended as a Sādhana for the rest of the seekers by the Śāstra. For, the others have to *perforce* acquire through concerted efforts alone. Hence, here also for the benefit of those who wish to attain Ātmajñāna by the device of Manonigraha its methodical details are being taught.

*(Objection)*: Sādhana of the type of *Chittdanirōdha* (restraint or cessation of the mental functions) etc. has been taught in the *Yogashastra* (Patanjali’s school of philosophy), is it not so ? If that itself is practised here, merely on that count does it not amount to procuring or providing a Sādhana for Ātmajñāna ? In that case, here once again why should Manonigraha be taught ?

*(Solution)*: Not so. For, Pātanjala Yōga is a device for mere *Nirōda* (restraint, suppression) of *Chittavṛtti* (mental concepts) ; therefore, it does not culminate or achieve its fruition in *Advaitatma Darshana* (Intuitive Experience of non-dual Pure Being-Consciousness of the Self). The Śruti (i.e., the whole gamut of Upanishadic lore) is affirming that apart from Vedic Ātmaikatwa Darshana by no other means Moksha can be attained at all. Therefore, for that Jñāna as a device Vedic *Dhyāna* (contemplation) alone has been taught in the Upanishads. That Dhyāna has other names like ‘Adhyātma Yōga’ etc. also. That alone has been instructed by the name of ‘Manonigraha’ and not the Dhyāna that has been taught in Yōgashāstra at all ; for, that has *perforce* to culminate, end up in Dvaita invariably. Not being opposed to Vedas, those aids like Āsanas etc. which are useful for this ‘Manonigraha’ and which are taught
by the followers of *Yogadarshana* (i.e., Patanjali’s *Yoga* philosophy) - since using those aids is proper here too - by that selective adoption there is no harm done at all. It should be discerned that although Manonigraha has been instructed here in this manner, because it has been instructed to the low-grade and middle-grade qualifiers invariably keeping in view the *Avidyākalpita Dvaita* (duality projected by or conjured up by ignorance) which is universally popular, this teaching will not cause any hindrance whatsoever to Aja-Advaita tenet.

**BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM MANÖNIGRAHA**

Let this incidental topic be kept aside. In this *Karikā* the answer to the question - “What are the benefits accruing from this Manonigraha?” - is provided. Because as long as the mind exists the *Dvaitadarshana* (appearance of duality) invariably exists, fear is unavoidable; but by the *Nigraha* (full renunciation of identification) with the mind - (a) fear will be got rid of. Similarly, for the seekers (b) *Duhkhakshaya* (riddance from or destruction of grief) also will accrue from Manonigraha alone, and (c) Ātmajñāna also will accrue from this Manonigraha. The belief that the mind belongs to, or is associated with, Ātman is caused by *Mithyābhimāna* (wrong or misconceived identification) only; therefore, if the mind is fully conquered this Dvaita disappears; (d) Advaitātmajñāna also will be gained. In the same way, (e) *Akshayashānti* (eternal Bliss) - Moksha or Liberation by this nomenclature also will be attained by means of the Manonigraha alone. Because Manonigraha is a *Sādhana* (spiritual exercise, practice), the Moksha that is caused, engendered by a Sādhana will be rendered *Anitya* (non-eternal), is it not so? - thus we should not doubt. For, Manonigraha does not at all mean fully conquering (*Nigraha*) a mind which really exists; on the other hand, it means: Although Ātmatattwa is Advitiya alone, due to Avidyā a misconceived identification (*Mithyābhimāna*) that a mind which exists apart from Ātman is associated with or tagged on to Ātman is entertained. Therefore, an effort to get rid of that mind with a false appearance is itself called ‘Manonigraha’. Hence, there is no possibility whatsoever of any harm being caused to Advaitasiddhānta merely by the *Sādhanō-padesha* (instruction of a spiritual practice).
Meaning: “Just as the siphoning or measuring out of the sea, drop by drop, by means of the tip of a blade of grass, in the same way (by means of a relentless effort) without any disgust or tedium the Nigraha (conquering) of the mind will ensue.”

(A) FOR MANŌNIGRAHA NOT ALLOWING THE MIND TO GET DIMINISHED IN VIGOUR OR TO DECAY AS A DEVICE

To the question - “How can this Manōnigraha be achieved?” - the answer is: By means of a steady, steadfast attempt - analogous to drying up a sea of all its water by pouring it out drop by drop by the tip of a blade of grass (i.e., seemingly impossible Herculean task) - of not allowing the mind to get disgusted and without allowing it to sag or decay by means of such a supreme concerted effort the mind will become fully possessed, conquered, as it were. For that reason alone in the Bhagavadgītā (6-25) it is stated: “By means of an intellect fully gripped by Dhi (alertness, awareness) one should step by step recede within unto oneself” ; “That Yōga should be practised by means of a Chitta (mind) without any disgust, tedium” - (6-23).

Meaning: “One should hold firmly the mind which is spread out (i.e., drawn out and scattered by distractions) in Kāmabhūgas (manifold desires and enjoyments). If it merges or disappears and becomes Suprasanna (goes to sleep), it has to be Nigrahita (fully controlled and awakened) . Just like Kāma (desire), similarly Laya (merger) too (is a hindrance).”

(B) METHOD OF GETTING RID OF LAYA AND VIKSHEPA

Merely making an effort without any disgust is not enough; if the mind gets Vikshipta (distracted or disturbed) either by any desire or by the enjoyment of an object of desire or if it gets spread out and squanders its faculties, then that mind
should be brought under full control (*Nigraha*), meaning, should be tied down to the Self and it should be subdued. And if the mind gets into *Laya*, meaning deep sleep in which it becomes *Suprasanna* (merged), then that mind - to wit, if the mind without any contact either with the objects or the senses becomes unruffled, undisturbed, gets stabilised in the Pure Consciousness (Self) and becomes clear or pure devoid of any thoughts, identifications etc. - then that sort of a pure mind should be gripped firmly. If it is asked : “When it gets clear why should it be controlled ?” - the answer is : “Just as *Kāma* (desire) is a hindrance to this Yōga, in the same manner if it gets *Laya* (merged in sleep), then also it becomes a hindrance indeed ; for, **Laya is the cause for Vikshepa (distraction)**. Therefore, just as the mind which has been distracted, disturbed due to Kāma has to be controlled, the mind having a proclivity towards *Laya* (getting merged in sleep) also should performe be controlled. This is the implicit meaning here.

रुपः कर्मनुस्पृखः कामभोगात्तिकिर्यत्।
अर्जः कर्मनुस्पृखः जातं नैव तु पत्यति॥३३॥

**Meaning** : “Realizing the truth that everything is Duhkha alone, (the mind) should be turned away from *Kāma* (desire) and *Bhoga* (enjoyment) ; if it is cognized that everything is *Aja* (birthless) alone, then nothing that is born is seen.”

(C) **GETTING RID OF KĀMA (DESIRE) BY MEANS OF PRACTICE OF VAIRĀGYA (RENUNCIATION) AND JÑĀNA (INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE)**

By an *Upāya* (subtle ruse, device) the mind should be fully controlled - (3-42) - thus it was stated, is it not so ? Which is that subtle ruse ? - this fact is being stated here. After ratiocinating or ruminating over the subtle truth - “All duality, diversity is invariably misery only” - in our mind and cognizing it with complete conviction, we should withdraw the mind from Kāma and Bhōga. In fact, all Dvaita is the *Vilāsa* (pastime or diversion) alone of Avidyā. The following Śrutis signify that Dvaita is the effect, projection of Avidyā : “Where it appears as though there exists another object there one will see another” - (Bri. 4-3-31). “(In the dream it appears as though) someone is beating
me as also captivating me” - (Bṛi. 4-3-20) etc. From the Smritis it becomes known that Dvaita is the cause for Duḥkha. “Oh Kounteya (son of Kunti), the enjoyments or pleasures that accrue from Vishayaparśha (contact with external objects) are verily the cause for Duḥkha; in those things which have a beginning and an end a Vivekin does not take delight” - (Gītā 5-22) - such Smritis can be exemplified here. In this world the truth that from Ādhyātmika (internally within the body), Ādhibhoutika (external objects) etc. Kāmas (desires), Bhūgas (enjoyments) giving rise to their respective Duḥkhas (miseries), which are unavoidable, are known to be caused to each one of us indeed; in the same way, we can imagine or infer that in other worlds too enjoyments are the cause for Duḥkha alone. The purport implicit in the Gītā sentence is: Not only during the period of enjoyment alone but also before they accrue we suffer from an anxiety of the type that - ‘They have not yet been acquired’ - as also after they are lost or gone we suffer from resentment of the type that - ‘They are not there now’ - thus they are the causes for Duḥkha alone. Bringing all these facts to our mind if we feel a sense of Vairāgya (renunciation), then the mind remains without opting for Bhūga. Another device for Manōnigraha is the Jñāna Abhyāsa (repeated practice of Intuitive Knowledge), which is nothing but constantly remembering or ratio-cinating the Śāstraic instructions along with the Yuktis mentioned in this Prakaraṇa to cognize the truth - “All this is verily Aja-Advaya Brahman” ; by means of this Jñānābhyāsa we attain the conviction or sense of certitude that there is no worthwhile object for the mind at all, and the hankering after Kāma and Bhūga will disappear.

There is a marked distinction between the Jñānābhyāsa mentioned here and the Abhyāsa that is taught in Pātanjala Yōga. There in Pātanjala Yōga an Abhyāsa (repeated practice) of Sātvika Eka-grata (mental equipoise of the quality of Satva) being repeated often endowed with the Samskāra (mental proclivity, refinement) of the Nirōdha (suppression) of Chittavṛitti (mental thoughts or concepts) ; but here in Vedāntic teaching although Dvaita appears as real, in reality all this is verily Aja-Advaya Brahman - thus Abhyāsa of Jñāna born out of Śāstra-Āchārya instructions has been signified. It is true that this Abhyāsa is
not Sulabhasādhya (easily to be attained) for everyone. Even so, as being taught step by step we should merge the senses, the mind, the intellect one into the other in that order and finally we should endeavour to get established in Brahman alone of the essential nature of Aja-Advaya-Ātman. The Adhyātma Yōga mentioned in the Kathopanishad, the Dhyāna Yōga taught in the sixth chapter of Gītā are the Śādhanas meant for this Aja-Advaya-Ātmajñāna alone. Only the external aspects of Āsana (posture) etc. mentioned in Pātañjala Yōga are helpful here also; this fact we have mentioned previously itself.

लये संबोध्येच्छित्र विक्षितं शामयेत् पुनः ।
सक्षायं विजातीयत् समाप्तं न च चालयेत् ॥४४॥

**Meaning**: “If it gets merged, the mind should be woken up. If it becomes distracted or disturbed, then once again the mind should be brought under control. We should cognize that (mind) which is associated with Kashāya (the potent or latent Vāsanās or proclivities attached to external objects) and if it attains equipoise, then it should not be disturbed, shaken up.”

(D) EXAMINATION OF LAYĀVASTHA (STATE OF MERGER)

Thus even after avoiding, or escaping from, Viksṛcpa, there is a chance of the Chitta (mind) getting into the sleep state and thereby getting Laya (merged) due to the potency of the seed form of Avidyā, Kāma etc. ; because that is also the cause for Anartha (undesirable miseries), then the mind should be woken up, activated. The principle reasons for the mind to get into sleep are: (i) insufficient sleep; (ii) food not being digested and remaining in the stomach; (iii) exhaustion - from these, as also (iv) neglecting Vivekābhyāsa (practice of Intuitive deliberation, discrimination) without putting in concerted efforts. Therefore, having enough sleep, eating Sātvika food which is quickly digestible observing frugality, not doing any work which is too strenuous - all these features being introduced in our life style and routine, constantly practising Vivekābhyāsa we should keep our mind alert and attentive - this is the implicit meaning of the Kārikā.
If we observe properly and deeply, in the Sushuptāvasthā Jīva has become one with (merged in) Aja-Advaya-Ātman’s Swarūpa. The Śruti describes this as: “Just like pure water He is clear, Advitīya (non-dual), Sākṣīchaitanya (Witnessing Pure Consciousness), Ekaśwarūpa (of the essential nature of unity). Oh Emperor, this alone is the Brahmaloka - said Yājñavalkya” - (Bri. 4-3-22). It further explains: “For this Jīva this alone is the Paramagati (Supreme Absolute state), this alone is his Paramasampat (extraordinary wealth), this alone is his Paramaloka (Supreme Transcendental abode); this alone is his Paramānanda (Absolute Bliss), this alone is his Paramaloka (Supreme Transcendental abode); this alone is his Paramānanda (Absolute Bliss), from one part of this Reality the rest of the creatures are thriving” - (Bri. 4-3-32). Even so, merely by deep sleep no one ever acquires Paramapurusārtha (the Absolute Supreme Goal of Life, i.e., Moksha). For, since all Jīvas are becoming one with Brahmaswarūpa quite naturally without finally, consummately getting rid of Avidyā by cognizing (Intuiting) Brahmaswarūpa, they are waking up again and again in their respective Jīva Rūpas in accordance with their respective Karmas. From this viewpoint alone in the Śrī Bādarāyana’s Vedānta Śūtras it is written: ‘पुनर्विस्तविवत्तत्त्व सतोभिविभक्तिभोगात्’ (Ved. Śūtra 2-3-31), meaning - “Just as the Pumstwa (manliness), which invariably was latent in the childhood, manifested itself in the youth state - the association with Buddhi, which invariably existed in a seed form in the deep sleep state, once again manifests itself in the waking.” Therefore, from the standpoint of the practitioners who wish to practise and attain Manonigraha to get Laya (merged in deep sleep) also is verily a defect.

Thus when there is Layaprāpti (acquisition of sleep) even after the mind is woken up once again it may get Vikshepta (distracted, disturbed); then as stated previously with the aid of Vairāgya and Abhyāsa again and again the mind should be brought into equipoise.

(E) KASHĀYA PARIHĀRA

Even when both Laya and Vikshepa are not there, and when a state, which is in between these extreme states, is acquired the mind may be Sakashāya, meaning embedded in or associated with the seed of latent impressions of previous pleasures or enjoyments; even then, with the help of devices like
Advaita Prakaraṇa

Viveka, Abhyāsa, Vairāgya - the mind should be purified, cleansed of its dross.

(F) ACQUISITION OF EQUIPOISE IS DESIRABLE

The mind which is rid of these three defects (viz. Laya, Vikshepa and Kashaya) is fit to acquire ‘Samaprāpti’ - meaning, it is turning towards equipoise; then if it is stabilized without disturbing it, in due course it acquires Ātmārupa (the essential nature of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness-Bliss). This has been stated in Kārikā (3-37): ‘समाधिरचलोस्मयः’.

This Kārikā sentence has been written by Śri Gauḍapāḍa- chārya following a sentence of Maitreyanātha in his work called ‘Mahāyānasūtrākaṇakāra’ which runs like : लीनं चित्त्वय गृहीतवादुं तथा शमित्व पुनः, शम्प्रसमुपेक्षेत तस्त्रिवालम्बनेपुनः” which is also accepted by Yōgāchāras (Buddhists) - Thus the author of ‘Āgamaśāstra’, Śri Vidhushekha Bhaṭṭāchārya has surmised. But the ‘Shama’ of Chitta that the Buddhists have acknowledged is ‘Nāsha’ (destruction); in the present context what Śri Gauḍapāda has propounded is Aja-Advaya-Ātmajāna; there is no relationship whatsoever between these two approaches or viewpoints. Here ‘Samaprápta’ is the correct text; for, in the Kārikā (3-2) ‘अज्ञातसमतात् गतम्’ - it is proclaimed that - “We are stating Aja-Āmatattwa which is immutable (devoid of any distinctions like increase and decrease).”

‘नास्यादयेत् सुखं तत्र निःसंध्रणं प्रज्ञा भवेत् ।
निश्चलं निर्बृत्तंचित्तं कुपकुः प्रयत्नं।’

Meaning: “The happiness that is acquired there should not be tasted; without having any association or contact one should be fully aware (with Pure Consciousness); if the non-vibrating or still mind goes out outwardly, by a concerted effort it should be brought back and unified with (merged in) Pure Consciousness.”

(G) GETTING RID OF SUKHĀSVĀDA

Thus, if by means of Vishayavairāgya we manage to see that the mind does not become extroverted and practise
Vivekābhyaśa, then in the mind, which is directed towards the (innermost essence of Being) Self, if the Kashāya also is got rid of, then it will become fit for Samaprāpti (equipoise). Here at this stage it appears as though all the defects or impurities are removed and the practitioner is likely to be deluded that that state itself is the one essential nature of Sukha. But discerning in the manner - “This Sukhābhāsa (a mere reflection of happiness) is projected by Sattwagūṇa, conjured up by Avidyā which is devoid of Vivechana (discrimination) between Vishaya and Vishayi” - he should remain without association with it. In this Sukhābhāsa (reflection of Bliss) which accrues at the beginning of Samādhi, only after we give up our association the mind attains Ekābhāva (unity, consummate merger) in Ātman, who is the really real Ānandarūpa (nature of Pure Bliss).

(H) ESTABLISHING THE MIND IN ĀTMAN ALONE

Thus even after all kinds of hindrances, impediments (impurities) are removed, the mind abruptly - by virtue of (due to) some remnants of previous latent impressions - may wander out towards the external objects of the world at large. Then again by a concerted effort it should be made to merge in the Self alone and stay put there. "यतो यतो नित्यवैलक्षण्यस्ति रात्रिकालस्पर्शितोऽतएव | ततस्ततो
नियतंतदान्येव वर्षं नयेत्॥" (Gītā 6-26) - meaning - “Whenever due to external objects like the Shabda, Sparsha etc. the mind wavers and wanders out, then and there by means of Vivechana (discrimination) decide that it is all Āvidyaka (conjured up by ignorance) and drag the mind back, as it were, towards the Self and establish it there.” This is verily the implicit purport of Bhagavān in the Gītā verse.

(12) BRAHMABHĀVA (SENSE OF UNITY WITH BRAHMAN) ALONE IS THE FRUIT OF MANŌNIGRAHA

यदा न लोके चिरं न च विक्षिप्ते पुनः ।
अनिहिकङ्गननागारस्तिनष्टं ब्रह्म तत्तदा ॥१४६॥

Meaning: “When the mind remains without getting merged, but without again getting distracted outwardly, with-
out any vibration, without any Ābhāsa (reflection of anything) whatsoever, then it has verily become Brahman.”

IF BY MEANS OF MANŌNIGRAHA THE MIND BECOMES PRASHĀNTA (EXTREMELY QUIESCENT) THEN IT IS BRAHMATWAPRAPTI

By virtue of Viveka-Vairāgya, as mentioned before, without giving any scope for Vikshepa, after waking up the mind which has got Laya (sleep), without shaking even the least bit, without getting any Ābhāsa either of the external or the internal objects - if the mind rests still in that supreme state, then it should be reckoned to have become one with Brahman (the Transcendental Reality). In this Kārikā though Kashāyatāga (giving up latent proclivities of past pleasures) has not been mentioned, on the strength and authority of the previous texts that too can be safely included. Just as a person realizes the truth that what was appearing as a snake is really, in its essence, a rope only, the Jīva giving up his separated, distinctive form as an entity, attains Amanībhāva, then he remains in his essential nature of Paramārtha Brahmātmā Rūpa. This is the implicit meaning of the Kārikā. As stated previously in (3-32) that by means of Ātmasatyanubodha the mind becomes 'no-mind', by means of this device of 'Manonigraha' also that very same 'Amanasta' - meaning, Intuiting quite clearly as a profound transcendental Plenary Experience of that Ultimate Brahmātmaswarupa - will be realized.

MARKED DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FRUIT OF MANŌNIGRAHA AND ASAMPRAJÑĀTA SAMĀDHI

In the Yōgashāstra (of Patanjali Rishi), according to the method of Chittanirodha taught by it, all the thoughts (Vṛittis) disappear and the mind being endowed with the remnants of Samskāras attains ‘Asamprajñāta Samādhi’. In the Sādhana called ‘Manonigraha’ in that Śāstra, it has been propounded that by the three devices, viz. (a) Dhāraṇa, meaning to stabilise the mind in a special region (Deshavishesha) ; (b) Dhyāna - there in that region alone keeping the mind in one and the same form (uninterruptedly like Taila Dhāra, or stream of oil) ; (c) Samādhi - there in that region itself the mind appears as though it is not existing in its very essence - the ‘Asamprajñātasamādhi’ is attained.
fested as Brahman” - is it not so? This Brahmānanda is not, like the Vishayasukha, something that culminates in Duhkha; nor is it that which appears as ‘Kṣūrīmasukha’ (deceptive happiness) prior to acquiring or going into Samādhi (trance); for, it is one which manifests itself by virtue of Ātmasatyānubodha. ‘Manōnigraha’ means not only keeping the existing mind in full control, but also the mind after acquiring Amanībhāva finding its culmination in Ātmasatyānubodha alone. By means of that ‘Bōdha’ alone this Sukha (Bliss) will become our Intuitive Experience (Anubhava); for, It is ‘Svastha’ (still, quiet), to wit, in Its essential nature of the Self It has remained still and steady; It is ‘Shānta’ meaning, It exists in a form in which all the ‘Anartha Prapañcha’ (the whole gamut of the miseries of the world of duality) is destroyed; It is ‘Sanīrvāna’, meaning, It exists in the essential nature of Kaivalya (Transcendental Reality); since It is Advaita (non-dual) It is Shivarūpa (of the essence of auspiciousness); It is also ‘Akathya’, meaning, It cannot be determined in the manner - “It is such and such” - and be described or signified by any word as It is of Nirvīsheshasvarūpa (of the essential nature which is devoid of any special features or characteristics); It is ‘Uttamasukha’; It is the Ānanda (Bliss) which is Intuitively experienced by superior type of Yōgis who are totally immersed in Aja-Advaita-Anusandhāna (Intuitive practice of getting established in birthless non-dual Self of the essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness-Bliss). It is non-different from ‘Jñeyabrahma’ (Brahman to be known through the Upishadic teachings) who is verily our own Swarūpa devoid of birth; It is ‘Sarvajñā’ (omniscient); since It is everything and Nitya Chaitanyarūpa, that Sukha is Brahman alone - thus the Brahmajñānis affirm. The Śruti statement: “That which is Vijñāna and Ānanda is verily Brahman” - (Bṛi. 3-9-27-7), as also the Smṛiti sentence expressed by Shri Kṛishṇa Bhagavān: ‘प्रशान्तमनस्स श्लोत्तष्ट ‘गुरुगाँव सुखुक्तिम् । उपदिष शास्त्रग्रन्थं

Bṛhamānandakhamsam II’ - (Gītā 6-27) - meaning, “For the Dhyānayōgi who has become one with Ātman the Rajōguṇa has completely vanished; he has verily become Brahman; he is Nishkalmasha (devoid of any impurity whatsoever); he gets immensely great Sukha”, - is in truth this very state of the Jñāni. In the sixth
On the other hand, here in Śrī Gaudapāda’s Advaita Vedānta, because on the strength of the spiritual instructions by both Śāstra and the Āchārya, the practitioner examines Intuitively Vastutattva (the Ultimate Reality in Its Transcendental, Absolute essence) Itself, the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) of the type - “Everything is verily Brahman” - accrues. Therefore, between both these Sādhanas and their respective Phalas (fruits) there exists a great distinction. Even so, neglecting this marked difference some adherents of Vyākhyaṇa Vedānta Prasthāna (method of approach of the post-Śankara commentators) calling themselves Advaitins (Vedāntins) are asserting that ‘Śravana’, ‘Manana’, ‘Nididhyāsana’ taught in the Śrutis are verily ‘Dhāraṇa’, ‘Dhyāna’ and ‘Samādhi’, respectively, and that ‘Darshana’ means ‘Samādhi’ alone. Here because Ātman is Sākshāt (directly, immediately) Aparōkṣa (Intuitively) Brahman alone, there is no scope whatsoever for ‘Ātmasākshātkāra’ (materialisation of the Self) - this eternal truth they have forgotten. It becomes very clear from the Bādarāyana Vedānta Sūtra (3-2-24) that what is taught therein as ‘Samrādhana’ is not ‘Samyama’ that is propounded in Yōgashāstra (of Patañjali) which is evidently, unequivocally a Dvaita philosophy. This fact is clearly brought out in that Sūtra-Bhashya itself. Therefore in this Prakaraṇa ‘Brahmanishṭha’ that is taught here is to be determined in the manner that it is just like for the Adhyārōpita (superimposed or misconceived) snake, Nīshpatti (birth, projection) of Rajjwamsha (apparent reality lent, as it were, by the real rope) is imagined - following the Vedāntic methodology.

Meaning: “This is quiescent, peaceful, endowed with liberation from mundane existence - thus having determined, it is being described (in the Śāstra) that It is indescribable supreme Bliss, birthless, Abhinna (non-different) from a Jñeya (known entity) which is Aja (unborn), Sarvajñā (omniscient).”

THE FRUIT OF MANONIGRAHA IS SWARŪPĀNANDA

In the previous Kārikā it has been stated: “Then it mani-
Mantra of *Māṇḍūkyo'panishad* what is described as Turiyātma-sthiti should be compared with this opinion expressed in this Kārika.

**(13) CONCLUSION OF AJĀTIVĀDA**

न काशिचिन्नायते जीवः सम्बोध्यते न विद्यते ।
एतत्चुतुर्म सत्यं यत्र विज्ञितं जायते ॥ ४८ ॥

*Meaning:* “No Jīva is born; such a contingency is not there at all. In That in which there is not an iota of birth, That (Entity) alone is the Utamasatya (profound Reality) indeed.”

**AJĀTABRAHMAN ALONE IS THE PARAMĀRTHASATYA**

Whatever has been stated so far like Manōnigraha, Srishi by means of illustrations of clay, metal etc., Upāsana - all these are mentioned as subtle devices to cognize, Intuit Paramārthasatyā alone and, in truth, none of them are really real entities. For, then for reasons that: In the theory propounding that the mind should be fully controlled (Manōnigraha) the difference of the type - the mind as a distinct entity apart from Ātman ; the difference of - Īshwara who creates and the world that He creates ; the differences of - the person who meditates, Upāsana and Īshwara who is Upāśitavya etc. - invariably exists - and thereby it will amount to saying those differences or distinctions themselves are Paramārthasatyā and the Vedantic teaching of - “Brahman which is Aja, Advaya is alone the Paramārtha (Absolute Reality)” - will be vitiated. But *in the doctrine that all these are taught merely as devices to cognize Paramārtha, they do not become Paramārthasatyā at all ; all that is taught by the Śruti as a device over and over again and it reiterates that “That Ātman who is neglected in the manner - Not this, not that’ - is Itself this one” ; thus because the Śruti negates repeatedly in this manner - as it is stated in a part of the Kārika (3-33), ‘अनेनाज्ञ विचुन्यते’ - the Aja-Advitiya-Ātmatta alone will manifest Itself in the seeker’s Intuitive Experience.

It being so, what is ‘Paramārthasatyā’ (the Absolute Truth) is : No Jīva is really born; nor the *Kārya Kāraṇasanghāta*
(conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.) which is an adjunct for him is born. We have already mentioned that - “At a few places the Ṣīvasṛishti (creation, birth of Jīva) which the Śrutī has instructed is - just like the birth of Ghaṭākāsha etc. - a Māyikajanma (illusory birth) and is mentioned as a device for the purpose of teaching the Tattwa to Jījñāsus (seekers) of the low-grade intellect”. Therefore, for Ātman who is by His very essential nature Aja - ‘Sambhava’ (a cause for His birth) - is not existing at all ; hence, the fact that - “No Jīva has birth” - is itself the Absolute truth (Paramārtha). In the previous portion of the treatise among all the Vyāvahārikasatyas (empirical truths) mentioned as a device to signify the Tattwa the ‘Uttamasatya’ (the most profound truth) s : “In Brahman who is Satyaswarupa nothing in the least, even a iota, is ever born”. The Śrutis like “The Real of the real - is Its name” - (Bṛi. 2-1-20) ; “That which is Satyam, Jñānam and Aaśmartam is verily Brahman” - (Tai. 2-11) - etc. are the authoriative sentences for this conclusion.
IV ALĀTASHĀNTI PRAKARĀNA

1 RELATIONSHIP (RELEVANCE) OF THIS CHAPTER

THE GIST OF PREVIOUS CHAPTERS

On the pretext of determining the meaning of Ōmkāra in the first Prakaraṇa it has been taught that - “Advaita alone is Paramārtha (the Absolute Reality).” There it was instructed (spiritually) that - “Ōmkāra, devoid of Mātras (metres) or Pādas (quarters), is verily Turyātman, who is not having any relationship with the qualities or special features of Ātman, of the Avasthās like waking, dream, who is related to the Avasthās ; further that Turyātman alone is verily Advaitātman who is Shiva (auspicious, sacred).”. In the second Prakaraṇa this same meaning (purport) was established by proving on the basis of Yukti (reasoning) of the type - “All the internal and external objects or phenomena are ‘Vitatha’ meaning ‘false appearances’ alone”. There it was demonstrated that both the waking and the dream are states of one and the same kind and therefrom it was established that - “All Dvaitavyavahāra (transactions of duality, diversity) is Avidyākalpita (projected, conjured up by ignorance) in Ātman” ; thereby it was concluded that from all this it evolves that - Advayātman (non-dual Self), who is Prapañcchopashana (in whom the world of duality is completely merged), is himself verily Paramārtha”. In the third Prakaraṇa once more by means of Śāstraic statements (teachings) and Yukti (Intuitive reasoning) directly, meaning Intuitively, Advaita (non-dual Self) was determined. There in the following order several important enets were revealed : (i) Though Jīvas and their adjuncts of Āryakaṇaṇasaṅghāṭas (conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.) - just like the Ghaṭākāshas and Ghaṭas, like the objects seen in a dream - are appearing to be born, that Janma is verily Nyāika (illusory) - this truth is explained ; (ii) the Śrutivākyas which describe the Srishṭi (creation) are merely a device to signify, teach the subtle truth of Ātmaikya (unity of the Self) - indating these by means of Upapatti (reasoning) ; and thereby establishing the fact that the Śrutis have the ultimate purport of teachin1Aja-
Advaya-Brahman alone ; (iii) because the whole gamut of duality is merely Manōdirishya (a projection of the mind), Advaita alone is the Uttamasatyā (supreme, profound truth) ; (iv) Manōnigraha, Śrīṣṭi, Upāsana etc. are subtle devices which are merely Āpekshikasatyā (relatively true) - thus it is concluded. Anyway, thus in the previous three chapters through the doorway of Anvaya (comparison-agreement) it has been taught that Advaita alone is Paramārtha.

**THE SALIENT TOPIC OF THIS PRAKARANĀ WORTH DELIBERATION**

Now in this fourth Prakarāṇa through the doorway of Vyatireka (contrariety, contrast) also that very Tatwa is being established. For this Advaita Darshana the principal opponents are Sāṅkhya etc. who are followers of Āstikadarshana (philosophy which believes in the authority of the Śāstra i.e., Vedas) as also Buddhists (who do not acknowledge Vedas as authoritative sources). Because they oppose one another in their arguments, Dvaita which gives full scope for Rāga (attachment, affinity to one’s own philosophy and preceptor), Dwesha (hatred towards other schools of philosophy) and Klesha (miseries) is a Mithyādarshana (false, unreal spiritual precept) - this fact was indicated in the previous Chapter (3-17) ; because Advaita Darshana (non-dual philosophy) is not opposed to those philosophies and does not give any scope for any Kleshas, it is verily the Samyāgdarshana (the correct, real spiritual philosophy) - thus this philosophy has been eulogised also (3-17, 3-18). Therefore, this Prakaraṇa has been written to analyse in detail and refute the Dvaita Darshanas on the ground that since they are mutually opposed to one another they are not the correct (Samyag) Darshanas and thereby, by contrast, conclude that Advaita Darshana alone is the Samyāgdarshana.

**THE AXIOMS THAT ARE UTILIZED IN THE CHAPTERS**

In the previous three Prakaraṇas for reasons like : (a) By an examination of Avasthātraya, Advaitatattwa alone is Paramārtha and the rest of the Vikalpas (imagination or misconceptions) are appearing each by leaving out another ; in states like Sushupti etc. their essential nature itself does not exist and hence they are shown to be Asatya (unreal) on the strength of Anubhava (In-
tuitive Experience) and (b) then it has been established that - “Advaita alone is Paramārtha” - on the basis of Yukti in consonance with (or subsidiary to) Intuitive Experience - in those Chapters the axiom that is adopted is *Vita* (Anvaya, agreement) *Nyāya* (axiom) ; on the other hand, in this Chapter, for reasons that Dvaitins are arguing one against another and that nc one’s Yukti (reasoning) remains established or sustained, it is shown that Dvaita Darshana is not Yukti Yukta (in keeping with reasoning) ; thereby the truth that - “Advaita alone is sustained” - is proved meaningfully ; hence it is said that here *Avīta* (Vyatireka, contrast) Nyāya is utilized, that is all ; but it should not be misunderstood here that merely on the basis of Anvaya-Vyatireka-Anumāna (inference based on the axiom of agreement and contrast) - Advaita is established. Like the other Darshanas (schools of philosophy) here mere logic or reasoning is not believed ; in truth, *Anubhava* (Intuitive Experience) alone is important.

**WHY THIS NAME OF ALĀTASHANTI?**

For this Prakaraṇa the name ‘Alātashanti’ is given with a purport behind it. To wit, *Alāta* (a firebrand, torch) - when it is being swung round, the light of the fire draws, as it were, various kinds of figures and all of them are appearing falsely indeed to create an illusion. When observed properly the light exists in its singular form always (i.e. devoid of any multiple, manifold shapes of light) and it has never any taint or touch whatsoever with those shapes or forms. Is it not so ? In the same way, although Ātmatattwa, which is Aja, Advaita, appears to be born, to move, to get divided into Grāhya-Grāhaka categories due to Avidyā, from the Vidyā Drishi It always (eternally) remains or subsists as Shānta, Shiva and Advaita. This truth is elucidated and established here. Anyway, thus through the device of showing the various defects found in other alien Darshanas, the eternal fact that - ‘Advaita Darshana is truly the Samyagdarshana’ - is being concluded and thus the name of - ‘Alātashanti Prakaraṇa’ is a fitting nomenclature in all respects.

**2. MAṆΓALĀCHARAṆA (INVOCATION)**

\[\text{ Invocation text here.}\]
Meaning: “I salute that Purushashresṭha (the greatest, holy man) who has cognized by means of Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge), which is like Ākāsha (empty space) and non-different from Jñeya (the object of knowledge) those Dharmān (Jñānis, Realized souls) who are also like the Ākāsha.”

THE GIST OF THE TEXT ON THE PRETEXT OF AN INVOCATION TO THE PRECEPTOR

The reason for this invocatory verse written at the beginning of this Prakaraṇa is given by Shri Śaṅkara to be: “The Advaita Darshana Sampradāya Kartaṇu (the founder of the traditional methodology of teaching of the school of philosophy of Non-dualism) - in order to salute Him with Advaitaswarupa alone this first verse is composed. By this veneration of Āchārya at the beginning of a treatise one’s purpose is fulfilled by it”. The intended purport of this comment is: For all these four Chapters Advaita alone is the subject-matter. In the previous Chapters Advaita has been propounded by means of Śruti and Yukti; in order to create a high sense of reverence in the minds of Mumukshus (seekers of liberation) by signifying the truth that Advaita Darshana (the school of philosophy of Non-dualism) is one that yields the Purushārtha (the goal of human existence) which is of the essence of Shānta (peace), Shivaswarupa (auspicious nature) without giving any scope for Rāga (attachment) and Dwesha (hatred) - the invocation, which salutes Paratattva (Absolute, Transcendental Reality) as Advaitarūpa (in the form of non-duality) alone, has been composed here; because all the four Prakaraṇas are propounding Advaitatattva alone, though the whole treatise itself being called a ‘Śāstra’ is reasonable, since the very quintessence of Vedānta Śāstra has been provided in a concise and concentrated form in this fourth Chapter Shri Śaṅkara has conceived this Prakaraṇa alone as a compact ‘Śāstra’ (scientific text) and eulogised it.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF ‘BHAGAVANTA’ WHO IS SALUTED

“I salute Īśwara who is called ‘Nārāyaṇa’, that Purushashreshthha (the supreme, Absolute Being) who is (a) all-pervading like Ākāsha; (b) non-different from Atmans (Selves) who are
Jñeya—(known objects) ; (c) like the heat of the fire and light or brilliance of the sun, non different from these selves but verily their Swarūpa ; (d) who ever cognizes the Dharmān meaning Ātmans (Jivas) and the external objects who by virtue of their Jnana are also all-pervading like Ākāsha alone.

The Vyākhyaṅakāras (post-Śankara commentators who profess to be his followers only) refer to a legend that Shri Gauḍapādāchārya in the past did long and intensive penance keeping as his Upāśya Devata (Deity to be meditated upon) Bhagavān Shri Nārāyaṇa (popularly known as Shri Mahāvīrṇu) in Badarikāśrama, which was the residential abode of Nara and Nārāyaṇa sages ; a highly pleased Bhagavān then materialized before him and blessed him with ‘Brahma Vidya’. Secondly, it is mentioned in the epic ‘Mahābhārata’ that Shrimānārāyaṇa (i.e. Shri Mahāvīrṇu) incarnated in four forms of Nara, Nārāyaṇa, Hari, Krishna in order to keep alive Dharmā (righteousness, ethics, morals) ; among them Nara and Nārāyaṇa were highly dedicated to do penance, and Nārāyaṇa had a dialogue with Nārada (a divine sage) and taught Nārāyaṇa Tatātwā (the Reality of Nārāyaṇa) ; there, in the Moksha Dharma Parva 335-1, it is found that Nārāyaṇa is called by the epithet ‘Dvipadām Varishtha’. Because Shri Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda belongs to the traditional lineage of spiritual teachers of (Nārāyaṇasampradāya) of Nārāyaṇa, even to this day at the beginning of the Shāntimantrapāpa of Śaṅkara Bhāshya the followers of Shri Śaṅkara recite a verse pertaining to the Guruparampara beginning with Nārāyaṇa. Therefore, even if anyone of the above two theories is assumed, it can be stated unequivocally that the author is revering and invoking Shrimānārāyaṇa Bhagavān who is of the essential nature of nonduality.

Anyway, this invocatory verse signifies Advaita darśana which is extremely different from the doctrines of the rest of the Darshanakāras who invariably propound that Jñātru-Jñāna-Jñeya are three distinct categories.

THE TOPIC FOR THE AVĀNTARA TATPARYA (EXTRANEOUS, EXTRA PURPORT) OF THIS CHAPTER

In this Prakaraṇa Shri Gauḍapādāchārya has refuted all those who have followed or championed the cause of the reality
of external world of duality by adopting Yuktis (logical devices or arguments) in consonance with Vijñānavāda (Idealism of Buddhists) and thereafter he has refuted Vijñānavāda itself by adopting the Yuktis forwarded by those disputants in their own Siddhānta (philosophy); even though he has adopted the Yuktis of Shūnyavādins (Nihilists among Buddhists), in order to drive home the idea that - ‘The rest of the doctrinaire theories can be refuted’ - he has exemplified here and there Yuktis of Shūnyavādins; even so, he has continually but invariably pointed out that -

(a) Aja-Advaya-Siddhānta (i.e., Advaita Vedānta) is not merely to be comprehended by means of dry logic; (b) on the contrary, It has to be perforce cognized, Intuited by means of Yuktis in consonance with Anubhava (Intuitive, Transcendental Experience of the Pure Consciousness) alone. Thus with the intention of demonstrating the fact that - ‘Quite distinct and different from the logic that is acknowledged and adopted by the extroverted disputants is this Shrouta Tarka (logic which is in-built, adopted in the Śrutis or Upanishads)’ - he has vociferously, stridently proclaimed (that less-known but implicit) fact by utilizing common words which are suitable to both Buddhistic doctrines and Vedānta philosophy in this invocatory verse.

To wit: Since Vijñāna (intellectual ideation) is Nirvishaya (without any object), it is like Ākāsha (empty space), Asanga (devoid of any relationship) - thus opine Buddhistic Vijñānavādins; since Ākāsha is Nihswabhāva (devoid of any essence); it is Shīnya (essenceless); in the same way Jñāna (objective knowledge) also is Nihswabhāva (essenceless) - thus the Buddhistic Shūnyavādins assert. Refuting both these Buddhistic doctrines, and taking the support of the Śrutis which expounds: “Ātman is like Ākāsha is Sarvagata (all-pervading) and Nitya (eternal)” - it is propounded in this Prakāraṇa that “Because Bhagavān is all-pervasive and Advitiya Chaitanyaswarūpa (of the essential nature of non-dual Pure Consciousness) His Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) is ‘Ākāshakalpa’ (imagined to be like empty space).” The implicit meaning of the expression - “the Dharmas (external objects) which are akin to Ākāsha” - in the sentence is: ‘Dharmas’ are verily the transformations of Vijñāna (intellectual ideation or knowledge) and are not independent entities; and hence they exist just like Ākāsha. This is the doctrine of
Vijñānavādins. Because they (i.e. external objects) are *Nihsvabhāva* (devoid of any essence) they exist just like *Ākāsha* (in an essenceless or unsubstantial form). This is the doctrine of Shūnyavādins. Brushing aside or discarding both these disputants, the Siddhāntin (Shri Gauḍapādāchārya) draws his conclusion that - “Dharmas, meaning *Ātmans* (Jivas), are also Advaya-brahmaswarūpas (of the essential nature of non-dual Brahman); they are appearing to be different or distinct from one another due to their different Upādhis like the body, the senses etc. alone” - on the strength of Śrutis like - “एवें धर्मान् यथाकाम पश्यन्त्यानं” (Kaṭha 2-1-14) ; ‘न हि सुविष्णमपूर्व घरः’ - (Kaṭha 1-1-21) and thereby he has explained here that - “They too (i.e. Jivas) are really existing like *Ākāsha*.” In this part of the sentence itself it amounts to having said that - “Those Dharmas which exist in the forms of the external objects or phenomena are also existing just like *Ākāsha*.” For, all of them are mere Vikalpas (misconceptions, imaginations) and hence in the essential nature of Advayātman who is their substratum they exist just like *Ākāsha* (empty space) alone. From Śruti statements like - “All this is verily *Ātman*” - (Chh. 7-25-2) etc. it evolves in this manner.

From this, it amounts to having signified the implicit meaning of the qualifying phrase - “By *Jñāna* (Intuitive Knowledge) which is *Jñeyābhinna* (non-different from the object of knowledge)”. To wit, because there is a rule of law that both ‘*Jñāna*’ and ‘*Jñeya*’ are known conjointly (simultaneously) - *Jñāna* is *Abhinna* (non-different) from *Jñeya* - thus say Vijñānavādins ; since both of them are *Swabhāvashūnya* (devoid of any essential nature of Being), *Jñāna* is *Abhinna* (non-different) from *Jñeya* - thus opine Shūnyavādins. Now both these doctrines are refuted and discarded and the Siddhāntin has concluded : “Because everything is verily Aja-Advaya-Ātmaswarūpa, *Jñāna* (Intuitive Knowledge) is *Abhinna* (non-different) from *Jñeya* (the known object)”. This conclusion can be known from the explanation of the Kārika (3-33) : ‘आकल्यकमां ज्ञानम्’.

In the same manner, the implicit meaning of the qualifying phrase - “Sambuddhaha’’ should be discerned. To wit : Just as in the doctrine of Buddhists it has been stated that as a result of Śādhanas like *Dhyāna* (meditation, contemplation) etc. the
lower categories of Avidyā were transcended and step by step the *Sambōdha* (Intuitive Knowledge) pertaining to all the *Vastus* (substances, entities) existing in time-space accrued to Buddha - here, in Advaita Vedānta Siddhānta, Bhagavān's Jñāna does not accrue (as a resultant effect); on the contrary, because of the facts that: (a) He is devoid of *Vastupariccheda* (divisions of various entities, substances) in time and space; devoid of divisions like Jñātū, Jñāna, Jñeya; *Nityātmaka* (eternally of the essence of Pure Being-Consciousness) and *Nityabōdhaswarūpa* (eternally of the essential nature of Intuitive knowledge); (b) the categories of *Bōddhrū* (Intuitive Knower) and *Bōdha* (Intuitive Knowledge) - etc. are, in truth, special empirical forms of that very Bōdha (Ātman's Intuitive Knowledge or Pure Consciousness), - it is stated that the one who has cognized ('Sambuddhaha') all the *Dharmas* (external empirical phenomena) by means of Jñāna which is Jñeyābhinnat is this Nārāyaṇa who is Samyag-bōddhrū. This is said by *Gounavṛitti* (in a secondary sense) alone. For this conclusion there is support of Vyāsa's statements also:

"चतुरूक्तस्य लोकतंत्रस्य धाम वेद्यप ये बोधयते: यो बोध्यते स न बोध्यते।
मन्त्रं नवव्याप्तिः प्राचिनयेः नास्यं स्पष्टिं स्पष्टेन्द्रयम्।
प्रत्यत्त्वं व्यावहितं व्यावहितं ज्ञातं हृद्यं सृष्टं निरूपणं च।
यद्भेद प्राचरं चतुरं सम्प्रकृष्ठं निरूपं चैतत्त्वं श्रायतेः सात्त्विकः
च।।" - (Moksha Dharma 351-17, 18).

In these verses it has been very clearly stated that *Grāhya Grāhaka*, *Saguṇa* (with qualities), *Nirguṇa* (without qualities) - all these are *Paratattwa* (Absolute Reality). Previously in (1-12) it was mentioned that Turīya is always *Sarvadarshi* (Witness of everything), is it not so? That very truth has been affirmed in the manner - “He has cognized by means of Jñāna which is non-different from Jñeya” - in so many different words.

असर्वस्येऽगी द्वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हित:।
अविवादीविवरूपस्य देशितस्य नमाम्यहू।।२१।।

Meaning: “I salute that Darshana which is instructed in the Śāstra and which has a name of ‘Asparsha Yōga’, which is blissful and beneficial (benign) to all creatures and which is devoid of any arguments and any opposition.”
EULOGY OF ADVAITA DARSHANA YÔGA

Here salutation (reverence) to Advaita Darshana has been signified with a view to eulogising it. That which has no Sparsha (touch, contact) - no relationship whatsoever with anything - is called ‘Asparsha Yôga’. The reason for calling this ‘Yôga’ is to stress the fact that this alone is the true Yôga - what the other disputants have accepted is not the Paramântha Yôga (i.e. the really real Yôga). It has been stated previously (3-39) : “This is not possibly to be seen by all Yôgins” - is it not so ? This is popular by the name of “Asparsha Yôga” in the Upanishads. ‘तत् केन संस्पृश्येत्’ - (Therein with what can he touch what ?) - this Śruti is an authoritative source for this conclusion. This is Sarvasattwa Sukha ; the Śruti : ‘एतत्त्त्वंवाणपदस्यायानि मात्रपुज्जोबद्विष’ - (Bṛi. 4-3-32) meaning : “By virtue of a part of this Bliss alone the other creatures are thriving” - is a Pramâna for this conclusion. Or, in the alternative, although the Sâdhana of Tapas (penance) is the cause for a greater happiness it is of the nature of Duhkha (misery) ; but this is Sukha (easy) for all creatures. Just as examining or scrutinizing and cognizing the real worth of a gem is possible without any strain, in the same way this can be easily acquired. In our workaday world the enjoyment of an external object - though it is Sukha (easy) - is not Hita (beneficial) ; but this is Sukha as well as Hita ; for, It is of the essential nature of Kûtastha (immutable, steadfast Transcendental Reality) which never shakes or vibrates.

Apart from this, It is Avîvâda (indisputable) ; with regard to this Tattwa (Transcendental Reality) there is no necessity whatsoever of debating or arguing, assuming viewpoints in favour and against. For, this Reality is also Aviruddha (unopposed) ; to wit, there is nothing else existing which is second to It. For, all that is different from Brahman is, in the Absolute sense (in the ultimate analysis), not existing at all ; because the duality which is appearing is Avidyâkalpita (imagined due to ignorance), it is Asadrûpa (of the nature of unreality). There is no possibility of any opposition whatsoever between this Yôga which is Sadrûpa and Dvaita which is Asadrûpa. Although previously it was stated in 3-17 that - “This is not opposed to the doctrine of the Dvaitins”, since Advaita is Paramârtha (Transcendental Reality),
It is the substrate for all *Dvaitavikalpas* (misconceptions of duality); there in that context it was only stated that - ‘The philosophies of Dualists are founded on *Mithyābhinivesha* (false sense of faith in a doctrine cherished for a long time, misplaced sense of affinity to a teaching)’; but here, the salient feature is - in order to depict the fact that - ‘Because, in addition, among the Dvaltins there are mutual debates and arguments, this Yōga is, in truth, Avivāda and Aviruddha’ - this topic is once again broached here.

Because it is stated that - “Salutation to that Samyagdarshana which has been instructed, taught as such a Yōga in the Śāstra” - it amounts to saying that those who are Mumukshus should perforce aspire for cognizing this Yōga alone.

**WHAT IS MEANT BY ASPARSHA YOGA?**

To this Advaita Darshana the name of ‘Asparsha Yōga’ suits well; for, in the state of duality conjured up by Avidyā it is possible to touch the external object which is Grāhya by means of the senses which are Grāhaka; in the Advaitavasthā there is no scope for this transaction at all. Because the name *Asparsha Yōga* is very popular among Buddhists, some people have imagined that that Asparsha Yōga itself must have been reviewed in the Kārikā by Shri Gauḍapāda; but that is purely a wild imagination indeed. For, in this text which has dedicated itself to the task of explaining and expounding the Vedānta Siddhānta to say that the Buddhistic doctrine is accepted submissively and with reverence (salutation) is simply ridiculous. Since shortly we are going to justify or vindicate the strong reasons for the usage of the technical terms and certain individual sentences of Buddhists in Alātashānti Prakarāṇa, this topic need not be taken up. The word ‘Sparsha’ with the connotation of - ‘to touch or contact the objects by means of the external senses’ - is seen being used in Gītā verses - ‘भाग्यस्यांस्तु कौन्तेय’ (Gītā 2-14); ‘स्पर्शानु न कृत्वा बर्त्तरभाद्रानु’ - (Gītā 5-27) etc.; hence, where there is no contact between the Indriyas and the Vishayas there that ‘Advaitanubhava’ (Intuitive Experience of non-duality) Itself can be called ‘Asparsha Yōga’; with this opinion in his mind alone Shri Gauḍapāda has written that - ‘Asparsha Yōga is popular’; this is reasonable indeed to conclude in this manner. Even calling this Darshana
'Yoga' is popular, familiar in places like 'हर्म विचवस्वते योगम्' - (Gītā 4-1) etc. Therefore, there is not the least scope here to imagine that ‘Asparsha Yoga’ is a particular kind or special type of Samādhi (trance) which the Buddhists propound.

THE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE TO AFFIRM THAT ADVAITA DARSHANA ITSELF IS ‘AVIVĀDA’

The implicit purport behind the usage of the two qualifying expressions like ‘सर्वसत्त्वमुखो हितः’, ‘अविवादोविवद्वस्व’ is : Buddhists also have claimed that their philosophy alone is pleasant, easy (Sukhakara) for Sarvasattwas (all creatures), as also it is Hita (beneficial) ; for, being pleasant to the majority of the people, gives rise to beneficial, benign influence. “That alone is Avivāda (indisputable, indebatable). For, Vivāda (a dispute) arises from opinions like ‘Asti’ (exists) ‘Nāsti’ (does not exist) ; ‘Shuddhi’ (purity), ‘Ashuddhi’ (impurity) is also Vivāda ; if we accept Vivāda, then Duhkha (misery) cannot become Shānti (peace), and from Avivādaprāpti (attainment of indisputability) Duhkha is got rid of” (Samādhirāja 9-28) - thus it has been clarified in Buddhistic texts. But because using mere Yukti (logical devices) they refute the opinions of ‘Asti’ and ‘Nāsti’ etc. it is not possible to convince everyone that their Darshana (philosophy) is Aviruddha and Avivāda. Similarly, it cannot possibly be acceptable to everyone if they assert, on the strength of individual experience of the type of ‘Nirūdha Samādhi’, that their Darshana is Sukhakara and Hita to Sarvasattwas.1

In the Advaita Darshana, on the other hand, Advaitatman, who is devoid of any divisions of time and space whatsoever, has been conclusively depicted on the strength of Yukti in consonance with universal Intuitive Experience, based on an in-depth examination of the three states of Consciousness so as to culminate in everyone’s experience. Therefore, it is the firm opinion of Shri Gaudapādāchārya that what is expounded here as the two special features (viz. Sukhakara and Hita) are fully applicable exclusively to Advaita Darshana alone.

1. In the book - “Āgamashāstra” - a commentary in Sanskrit on Kārikās by Vidhushekharā Bhāttāchārya this doctrine is dealt with in full detail.
3. BY THE EXHIBITION OF THESE DISPUTANTS’ DISSENSIONS OR DISPUTES AJÀTIVĀDĀ GETS ESTABLISHED

Meaning: “Only a few disputants agree that an existing entity has birth; some other brave (wise) people agree that a non-existent thing has birth. None of the existing things is born, nor the non-existing thing can ever be born. Those Dvaitins who are debating with one another in this manner are, in truth, commenting on Ajāti (birthlessness).”

THE QUARREL BETWEEN SADVĀDI AND ASADVĀDI

Here it has been mentioned that Dvaitins (dualists) are always disputing with one another taking opposing views. Only a few disputants, viz. Sāṅkhyaśa, agree that - “Only to an existing thing there is birth” ; all Dvaitins do not accept this tenet. For, some others who have been calling themselves as Pṛājñās (wise people) - viz. Vaisheshikas and Naiyāyikas accept the doctrine that - “A non-existent thing alone is born”. Thus these disputants debating and opposing with one another are trying to conquer one another in arguments. Vaisheshikas etc. who are Asatkāryavadins point out defects in Satkāryavadā of Sāṅkhyaśa etc. To wit: Anything that exists already - whatsoever it may be - cannot be born ; for, as it is already existing, where is the necessity for it to be born ? - This is their opinion. Apart from this, if an existing thing can be born, then it amounts to saying that Ātman also may once again be born ; but Sāṅkhyaśa do not at all accept that Ātman is born ; the Śruti is also saying that Ātman is Aja (birthless). Therefore, what is existing cannot

1. ‘Advayāha’ - assuming this text here instead of ‘Dvayāha’ Vidhushhekha Bhattāchārya has totally misinterpreted this verse. Refer to Introduction.
be born - This is Vaisheshikas’ doctrine. In the same way, the Sānkhyyan too blames the Asadvāda accepted by the Vaisheshikās and others belonging to their group. To wit : What is non-existent can never be born; a hare’s horn which is totally non-existent in the beginning itself - how at all can there ensue a change like birth? To an entity in which any new change or mutation can take place categories like Kāraṇa (cause) and Kārya (effect) can be made applicable, is it not so? Any great change having taken place if an effect comes into being, then it amounts to saying that that which was Asat (not existing, unreal) becomes Sat (existing, real); there is also a Śruti saying - “From Asat (unreal) how can Sat (real thing) come into being?” Therefore, that which is not existing can never be born - This is Sānkhyans’ doctrine.

Thus the Dvaitins, disputing with one another, have been following doctrines mutually opposed to one another. In fact, whether in the case of Satkāryavādins or in the case of Asatkāryavādins - it is not possible at all to solve the defects that are pointed out by their opponents; for a thing that is already existing there is no possibility whatsoever of a birth; to say that a thing, which is Asat (unreal, non-existent), is born is not at all reasonable. To say that in Yathārthajñāna (a knowledge of the ground reality) there is a dispute - is never tenable. It is a quite popular belief or truism that - “All those who say that substances are born - among those disputants there will invariably be disagreement.” Among these disputants - whether he is a Sānkhyan or whether he is a Vaisheshika - no other logician has accepted anyone of them as - ‘Śarvottama Dārshanika’ - (the best among philosophers); only if it is so, we can possibly say that - “Such and such a person’s tenet alone is the correct Jñāna (Knowledge)” - is it not so?

**As a Result of the Dispute Among Jātivādins Ajāti (Birthlessness) Gets Established As Yathārtha (Ground Reality)**

Because these disputants are thus engaged in raging debates with one another, what gets disclosed and established from their arguments is : As a result of these Dvaitins arguing thus among themselves (without arriving at a final decision) it evolves that both Sat and Asat do not have birth and thereby it amounts to
accepting that ‘Ajāti’ - meaning, nothing whatsoever is really born - is itself the Paramārtha (Absolute truth). In fact, barring these two theories, viz. Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda, no other theory can possibly be imagined, is it not so? The implicit fact to be discerned here in this context now is: It amounts to saying or admitting that - ‘From all these various arguments forwarded by these two factions, by virtue of their mutual squabbles alone they have established (indirectly) that Ajātivāda (the theory that nothing is ever born) is correct.’

Here we should keep in mind an important point, viz.: For an existing thing or an entity by virtue of Maya (illusion) a birth may be possible (3-27) - although this Maya-satkāryavāda (theory that a thing, which is already existing, due to illusion may appear to have a birth) has been accepted already by the Siddhāntin (i.e. Advaita Vedāntin), Dvaitins who are Jātivādins (professing various theories of birth) have not acknowledged this doctrine or theory of Maya-satkārya. Because ‘Mayājanma’ means ‘Ajanma’ (birthlessness) alone, it should be discerned that it is stated here that as a result or consequence of the Jātivādins’ mutual squabbles this Ajātivāda alone gets established.

4. HOW CAN THERE BE AVIVĀDA IN AJĀTIVĀDA?

Meaning: “We too take delight in welcoming or consenting to the Ajāti which those (disputants) reveal, and we are not at all arguing with them. Know that in our doctrine thus there is Avivāda (absence of dispute).”

BECAUSE AJA-ADVAITA IS SARVĀNANYA (NON-DIFFERENT FROM EVERYTHING) IT IS DEVOID OF VIVĀDA

Thus by dint of their mutual quarrel what they have unconsciously, as it were, revealed is Ajāti - i.e. the fact that both of them have unavoidably accepted Ajāti itself to be correct - we have acknowledged; but not that we, like them, have propounded or championed yet another argument and are opposing them.
Without being able to resolve the defect pointed out in their own doctrine by the opponent, both have been rendered helpless, as it were, and thereby they have themselves helped project, evolve the fact that Jātivāda is Ayukta (irrational, unjustifiable); their decision itself we too have accepted - that is all; and not that we have propounded or projected a different doctrine at all.

5. WHY IS IT THAT AMONG THE JĀTIVĀDINS’ THEORIES THERE IS A DISPUTE?

अनालस्यैव धर्मस्य जातिमिश्च्छन्ति वादिनः ।
अनातो ह्यमृतो धर्मो मर्यादतां कथमेण्यति ॥ १५॥

न भवत्वाकेत मर्य न मर्यादेवतं तथा ।
प्रकृतेर्वन्यशास्त्रो न कथमिचं भविष्यति ॥ १६॥

स्वभावेनामृतो धर्मय च संघर्षिति मर्यादाः ।
कृतकेनामृतस्वस्त्य कथं स्वास्त्यति निरंचलः ॥ १७॥

Meaning: “Disputants are acknowledging a birth to a Vastu (entity) which is Ajāta (birthless) indeed. How at all can a Dharma (entity) which is Ajāta (birthless) and Amṛta (immortal) acquire Martyatwa (mortality)? What is Amṛta cannot become Martya (mortal); in the same way, what is Martya cannot become Amṛta; to say that Swabhāva (essential nature of an entity) becomes another is not possible in whatever manner. In the doctrine of one - that Vastu (substance, entity) which is Amṛta, in its very essential nature itself, is Martya - then in his doctrine how at all can that entity which is artificially immortal remains as Nischala (immutable)?”

DEFECT IN JĀTIVĀDA

The proponents of Jātivāda, championing the cause of mutually opposed doctrines or theories, have revealed the truth that this Ajātivāda alone is fully rational and justifiable; for, all these Jātivādins - whether they are Satkāryavādins or Asatkāryavādins - have acknowledged a Janna for Ātmatattwa which, by virtue of Its very essential nature of Being, never gets born and is
Ajātavastu (birthless Reality). The word ‘Janma’ connotes that a thing or entity begets a transformation, is it not so? But how at all can there be any Martyatwa to the Amritavastu which is of Ajaswabhāva (of an essential nature of birthlessness)? In the Advaita Prakāraṇa (3-2, 21, 22) these three verses were mentioned with a view to refuting the doctrine of some ‘Vedāntins’ who accept that - ‘Brahman Itself, which is of the essential nature of Aja-Aṃrita, is born as Jīva’. Here especially it has been exemplified once again with a view to pointing out that this defect is common to the doctrines of all kinds of Jātivādins.

IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF SHRI GAUḍAPĀDA TO SAY MERELY THAT THERE IS NO BIRTH AT ALL

Since here the qualifying phrase like - “To a Vastu which is Ajāta alone” - has been used, what is being stridently emphasized or stressed here is: Here we do not accept the Ajātivāda which is acknowledged by Buddhists. How is that? To wit: Those disputants are asserting that - “Because all Dharmas (things) are being born on account of Parāpeksa (dependence on another external thing), it is proper to say that they are not born by virtue of their essential nature; this alone we call ‘ैवस्मातस्य’ of Dharmas.” In fact, in order to establish this doctrine of theirs they are refuting Jātivāda. But Shri Gauḍapāda has undertaken the task of dislodging in this Prakāraṇa the doctrinaire theory of - “Dharmas are Nīhsswabhāva (essenceless)” and then propound expressly and exclusively (the Advaita Vedānta) teaching that - “They (i.e. Dharmas) are, in the Pāramārthic (Absolute) sense of the essential nature of Amṛta (immortality).” For this reason alone here an objection has been raised; “How at all can there be any Pariṇāma (transformation) of the form or nature of Martya (mortality) to a Vastu (entity, Reality) which is of the very essence of Amṛta (immortality)?” The Yukti (logical device) that is used here is: “For the Prakṛiti (essential nature) of a Vastu there can never accrue another form”. In this context the implicit purport of the Āchārya is: All Jātivādins - since they are invariably imagining a Janma for Brahmavastu which is of Ajātaswabhāva and is Amṛta - are misconceiving various kinds of birth of the type - ‘What is existing is born’, ‘What is not existing is born’ - and thereby
they are becoming victims of this defect; each group is facing the onslaught of the other group’s logic, with the result all of them are receding or moving far away from Paramārtha (the Absolute Truth). The doctrinaire theory that - ‘A Vastu which is in its very essential nature Amṛita becomes Martya’ - is self-contradictory, is it not so? In our Vedāntic Siddhānta especially, we never swear by any doctrine and try to establish it; but we are giving our consent to the Ajāti alone which gets established by their mutual dispute or debate, that is all.

Meaning: “Prakṛiti is said to be Sāmsiddhika, Swābhāvika, Sahaja, Akṛita. That Prakṛiti can never give up its essential nature.”

IN OUR WORKADAY WORLD TOO PRAKRITI (NATURE) EXISTS UNCHANGED

Let us keep aside the question of the Absolute viewpoint (Paramārtha Drishti); even if we observe from the empirical viewpoint Prakṛiti (Nature) remains without changing. Which is this Prakṛiti? It is ‘Sāmsiddhika Prakṛiti’; to wit, that which is caused or has come into being by proper Siddhi (mystic power); for example, the Animaṇḍyaishwarya Prāpti (attainment of the excellence of mystic powers like becoming microscopic in form etc.) of Siddha Yōgis (mystics). That Prakriti does not change whatsoever in all the three periods of time viz. past, present and future. In the same way, Swābhāvika Prakṛiti (nature in its own essence) i.e., Prakṛiti which exists in its substantial form of primordial matter; for example, the heat and light of fire etc. That Prakṛiti which is Sahaja (natural) born alongwith oneself is called ‘Sahaja Prakṛiti’; for example, the capability of birds etc. to fly and wander about in empty space is called ‘Sahaja Prakṛiti’. Apart from this that Prakṛiti which exists by itself without being caused by anything else is ‘Akṛita Prakṛiti’; for example, water flowing down to a lower region without any effort is called ‘Akṛita Prakṛiti’. All such Prakṛitis (natural principles or laws) do not give up their essential natures.
Anyway, it is a universally accepted topic that even among the empirical Mithyākalpita Vastus also Prakṛiti remains unchanged. It being so, where is the need to say that in Ātmatattwa, which is a birthless, Absolute, Transcendental Reality, Prakṛiti (Its essential nature of Pure Being) cannot possibly change? - This is implied here. This truth that - Ātmatattwa is in Its very essential nature Aja, Amṛta - is popular in the Upanishadic lore: For example - "That this Mahānta (great) and Aja (birthless) Ātman, is devoid of old age, death and is of a nature which cannot possibly have any taint of death, fearless, is Brahman" - (Bṛi. 4-4-25); "This Ātman who is omniscient is not born, nor does He die" - (Kaṭha 1-2-18) etc. Therefore, though Jīvas and other objects are, in the Pāramārthic sense, of an essential nature of Aja-Amrita, they appear as if they are having birth - this truth is established as a result of the dissensions among these disputants.

HERE FOR THE DHARMAS CALLED 'ĀTMANS' IT IS TAUGHT THAT BRAHMĀTMAN ALONE IS THEIR PRAKṛITI

Here the secret is: Although Shūnyavadins (Buddhists), who are Āvaidikas (people who have rejected the Vedas as an authoritative source) as also are Mahāvaināshikas (champions of the doctrine of ultimate essencelessness), are asserting that - "For Prakṛiti the category of Anyathabhāva (another apparent existence) can never be suitable, applicable" - (Mādhyamika Kārikā 15-8, Vṛitti, p. 97), they are not saying thus accepting the doctrine - "All Bhāvas (existing things) invariably have a Prakṛiti"; on the contrary, in order to create an Anishtaprasāṅga (inconvenient, undesirable situation) for their rivals they are forwarding a logical argument thus asserting that - unlike the Prakṛiti-vādins who propound that there is a Prakṛiti - for all Bhāvas there is nothing like a Prakṛiti in an absolute sense. Chandrakirti, who has written a commentary on Madhyamika Kārikās of Nāgārjuna, has made an emphatic statement which is signifying this fact. He says: "What is that Dharma (essenceness) of Dharmas (existent entities)? - The answer is: The Swabhāva (essential nature) of Dharmas. Which is this Swabhāva? - Prakṛiti. Which is this Prakṛiti? - Shūnyatwa (essencelessness) alone, Naiḥs瓦bhāvyā (nothingness as the essential nature) indeed. What is
meant by Naihswabhāvya? Tathata. What is meant by Tathata? Tathābhāva, meaning, being devoid of mutations, always remaining steady. With regard to fire and such other phenomena their nature of always, perennially not being born - without desiderating anything else and not being artificial or affected (unnatural) - is itself called ‘Swabhāva’ (essential nature of being), is it not so? So far what we have stated amounts to: As a result of the after-effects of the disease of cataract called ‘Avidyā’ the whole gamut of objects are seen or appearing; but they are not witnessed by one who has got rid of this Avidyātimira (defect projected falsely by ignorance) by means of his Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being) and in this unseen (falsified, sublated) form it is being witnessed by him Intuitively; that ‘Swarūpa’ alone is said to be their Swabhāva (their essential nature) - this truth is established. For that entity this is a Lakṣaṇa (significant mark, symptom). Āchārya Shri Nāgārjuna has established the truth that - ‘अकृत्रिमः स्वभावो हि निरेषः प्रक्तः’ (Mādhyamika Kārikā of Nāgārjuna 15-1) - meaning - ‘‘Akritrimaswabhāva (essential nature which is not artificial or affected) is not desiderating anything else”. Thus we have to discern here. Since this Bhāvaswabhāva which is unborn is not existing whatsoever, it is merely an Abhāva (non-existent thing) and hence it is Aswabhāva (that which is devoid of any essential nature) alone. With this purport in mind we must understand or discern that - “Bhāvas (entities) do not have any Swabhāva (essential nature) - (Mā. Kā. Vṛitti 15, p. 94-95).

But in this our Upanishad Darshana (Upanishadic or Vedāntic philosophy) especially, in order to establish the teaching that - “All Bhāvas have Brahmatwa alone which is Aja and Amṛta as their Swabhāva” - in this Kārikā it has been stated that - “That which is Amṛta cannot become Martya; that which is Martya cannot become Amṛta; for Prakṛiti the phenomenon of Anyathābhāva can never be made applicable in any manner.” Therefore, it is not possible here to doubt that there is any Sāṅkarya (admixture, intermingling) whatsoever between this (Vedāntic) Ajātabrahmāswabhāva Vāda and the doctrinaire theory that - “No Bhāva whatsoever has any Swabhāva” - which the Buddhists who are Mahāvaināshikas (staunch Nihilists) have accepted.
Meaning: “All Dharmas by their very nature are devoid of Jara (old age), Maraṇa (death); even so, accepting these Jara-Maraṇa and with the same belief they (Dharmas, i.e. Jīvas) are slithering, slipping down.”

FOR JĪVAS AJA-ADVAYA BRAHMAN ALONE IS PRAKṛITI

This truth alone the author has been vociferously stating here: For which entity the disputants are imagining a transformation to occur, which is that Prakṛiti? What is the defect in imagining in that manner? - Providing answers to these principal questions alone is the instruction that is implicit here.

‘Jara-Maraṇa’ (old age and death) - both these symptoms have been mentioned here by way of representation, symbolically; the intended purport is - ‘those who have no mutations whatsoever.’ ‘All Dharmas’ means ‘all Ātmans’; in the invocatory verse they were referred to as - ‘those who are like Ākāsha (empty space)’ those very people; they are in their very essence without any changes, mutations; although they are endowed with such an essential nature of Pure Being (Swabhāva) - just like mortals who desire, wish for old age and death akin to imagining a snake in a rope - they go on misconceiving all kinds of changes like Jara-Maraṇa etc. in Ātman and identifying themselves with such misconceptions of having old age, death etc. - they are slipping down from their Swabhāva - meaning as if (they appear to be) slipping down. For, to the Swabhāva (essential nature of Being) of any entity there can never be any Chyuti (slipping down, fall) - thus it has been already pointed out. Therefore, the real intended meaning of the sentence is: Imagining or misconceiving Paramātman, who is in His very Swabhāva ‘Aja’, to appear as if He has become, or has assumed the apparent forms of, many Jīvas - and due to that Avidyā - those apparent, misconceived forms of Jīvas are experiencing Sāṃsāra. For this conclusion Śrutis like - ‘जरयन्तु ते पुनरेज्ञयति’ - (Mūḍaka 1-2-7), meaning - “They are again acquiring (are associated with) old age and death”; ‘अविद्यायामंतरे वर्तमाना:’ - (Mūḍaka 1-2-8) - mean-
ing, “They are within Avidyā (delusion).” Smṛritis like - ‘सवा
तद्वैवाभवितः’ (Gītā 8-6) - meaning, “Always believing in those
concepts (he identifies with, becomes that alone)” - etc. are in
support of this teaching.

Here the secret is: In states like Sushupti (deep sleep),
Pralaya (dissolution of the world at the end of a Kalpa) the
categories like time and space too become one with, or merge
in, Prājñātman, is it not so? Because of the facts that - (a)
That Prājñātman is Niravayava (devoid of parts, limbs) ; (b) has
attained Samatwa (equipoise) - to such an Aja (birthless) Prājña
the category of Kāraṇatwa (causation) in the real, Absolute sense
- does not suit or is not applicable whatsoever in any manner ;
in the same way, in the waking state also and in the state of
sustenance, to Ātman, who is the Witnessing Consciousness of
all kinds of concepts like time, space, causation etc. and who is
of Chaitanyaikarasaswabhāva (essential nature of Pure Conscious-
ness as His one and only non-dual nature), this category of
Kāraṇatwa does not suit in any manner ; it being so, it gets
evolved from this that - “To Ātman - who is eternally devoid
of Kāryakāraṇabhāva (categories of cause and effect) - being
verily Aja (birthless), Ajarā (devoid of old age), Amṛita (immor-
tal) is His Swabhāva (essence, core of Pure Being). Even so, in
order to strengthen this teaching, taking recourse to two Yuktis
like - (a) neither the mutual dissensions between Satkāryavādins
and Asatkāryavādins, (b) nor the Anyathābhāva of an entity’s
Swabhāva will in any manner be applicable - an elaborate debate
has been carried out to teach that Ātman is Aja and Amṛita for
the benefit of people with a low-class intelligence and not with
any intention of teaching that Ātman’s Ajatwa, Amṛitatwa etc. are
established merely on the basis of Tarka (logic, dialectics).”

6. REFUTATION OF SATKĀRYAVĀDA

Meaning: “In whose doctrine cause itself is the effect,
in his doctrine the cause itself is born. That which has birth,
how can it be *Aja* (birthless)? If it is different or separate, how can it be *Nitya* (eternal)?

**IN SAJJĀTĪVĀDA THE RATIONALE BASED ON THE CATEGORIES OF CAUSE AND EFFECT**

Thus it has been shown that - “In the Jātivāda the defect of accepting that Swabhāva itself changes or gets transformed is unavoidable” ; and thereby any Ajātivāda, which is evolved and established due to their mutual opposition, has been demonstrated to be strengthened by means of Yukti ; that is all, and not with the intention of arguing with them. Now here it is being demonstrated that by virtue of their opposite opinions with regard to the relationship between categories of cause and effect too those disputants are implicitly revealing the fact that Ajātivāda alone is correct.

Among these disputants *Sāṅkhya*ns who are Satkāryavādins attempt to establish their point that - “Even prior to birth *Kārya* (effect) exists” - in the following manner : ‘असद्कारार्थार्थान्तराध्यात् सर्वसंभवाभावत | शक्त्य शक्तिकरणात् कारणभावायच सतु कार्यम्’ - (Sāṅkhyā Kārikā 9). The purport of this verse is : For reasons that - (a) what is not existing cannot possibly become a cause ; (b) we have to *perforce* reckon as a rule of law a particular *Upādāna* (material cause) for its respective *Kārya* (effect) ; (c) from everything, everything cannot possibly be born ; (d) from a capable (probable) cause alone the capable effect is born, or a pot-maker etc. who is capable is invariably producing the possible effects like Ghaṭa etc. ; (e) *Kārya* has the same Swabhāva of the Karāṇa - the Kārya exists even prior to its birth or production.

The Vaisheshikas point out as to how the argument of these Satkāryavādins as mentioned above is unreasonable. The meaning of the doctrine that - “In whose doctrine the cause itself is the effect” - is : Just like the clay for the pot, the Pradhāna which is the material cause (*Upādāna* Karāṇa) and which gets itself transformed into the form or shape of the effect. Although the Sāṅkhyaṇs say that between the Karāṇa and Kārya there exists a relationship of the *Āshraya* (support) and Āśhrayī (the thing resting on the support), for them (i.e. Sāṅkhyans) the real purport lies in asserting that the subsequent or later form of the
cause is itself the effect. But the usage of 'the supported' and 'the support', especially, is meant for the purpose of merely denoting that for categories like Prakriti, Mahat etc. there is invariably a different form. Hence, that aspect is not very important for them. With this fact in mind, they have stated that—"In whose opinion Kāraṇa itself is getting transformed into the Kārya"—Thus we have to understand this. It means, then, it amounts to saying that the Sāṅkhyan, who opines in this manner, affirms that—"The Pradhāna which is Aja itself has acquired the form of the Kārya." The objection raised by the Vaisheshika is: Thus if the Pradhāna is being born in various forms of Mahat, Ahaṅkāra etc. how at all can it be reasonable if it (Pradhāna) is said to be Aja (birthless)?

Here the Sāṅkhyan may answer in this manner: Because Pradhāna is not born from any other thing, it is said to be 'Aja', but we are not saying that from it another Kārya is not born at all, is it not so? For that reason alone, the Śruti is stating: 'अजामेकां लोहितल्पककृष्टाम्'—(Shwetāshwatara 4-5) — meaning—"Pradhāna which is Trigunātmaka (of the essence of three qualities like Satwa, Rajas and Tamas) is 'Aja'—"—is it not so?

The solution for this is: To say or assume that this Śruti is referring to Pradhāna which is accepted by the Sāṅkhyan, there is no valid proof, evidence. It has been determined in the Brahmasūtra text that the Śruti in question is mentioning 'Avyakta' (unmanifested seed form) which is within the control of Parameshwara and which is imagined in Him. But the Sāṅkhyan are also asserting that Pradhāna which is independent (Swatantra) is itself Aja and from it categories like Mahat, Ahaṅkāra etc. are produced. Therefore, it has to be concluded that they are trying to establish on the basis of Anumāṇapramāṇa (inferential logic as a valid means of knowledge) alone that category of 'Pradhāna'. But if it is contended that from the cause of Pradhāna effects like Mahat etc. are produced, then it amounts to agreeing that one part of Pradhāna gets split up and becomes Mahat; in that event, how at all can it be reasonably sustained that it (i.e. Pradhāna) is 'Nitya' (eternal)? To say that thus there is a possibility of it splitting up, but at the same time it is Nitya— is Vyāhata vachana (a self-contradictory statement), is it not so? How can
it be proper to say that a Vastu (entity) which is Niravayava (devoid of parts) is born in different form?

(Sānkhyān) : Let us agree that because Pradhāna means the state of equilibrium among the three qualities (of Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas) it has these Avayavas (parts) which are of the nature of qualities! By virtue of Vinyāsavishesha (special, extra-ordinary structure) of Avayavas (parts) let it be said that Pradhāna may also have Utpatti (birth)!

(Refutation) : This is not proper, reasonable. For, how at all this statement to the effect - ‘Sattwa etc. are verily Nitya (eternal), they are also born in the forms of Mahat etc.’ - can be reasonably sustained? If they are to be born, how at all can it be maintained that they are Nitya?

(Sānkhyān) : (The Sānkhyāns have accepted that the Swabhāva of these Guṇas is wavering, fickle; they rise up by rejecting or discarding one another). Because getting transformed is itself their Swabhāva and a sense or awareness of the type - “They themselves are these” - follows continuously, they may be Nitya also, is it not so?

(Solution) : This is not proper. For, if there exists any Nityāṃśha (aspect of reality) they cannot be born at all; when observed from the standpoint of the aspect of birth, they are verily Anitya. Therefore, there is no solution whatsoever for the objection: “If it is being born, how at all can anything be Aja as well as Nitya?”

Meaning: “If it is contended that Aja is that which is non-different from Kārāṇa, how can the Kārāṇa which is born in the form of Kārya be Dhruva (eternal)?”

TO SAY THAT CAUSE-EFFECT ARE NON-DIFFERENT IS NOT TENABLE

Because the cause of the form of Pradhāna is born in the shape of effects like Mahat etc., Kāryakārāṇa are mutually non-different - in this Sānkhyāns’ doctrine to say that Kārāṇa is Aja as well as Nitya is Ayukta (not reasonable). This fact we have pointed out. In order to clarify, elucidate that very fact now Shri
Gauḍapāda is saying: "If it is contended that the Kāryas like Mahat etc. are Ananya (non-different) from the cause of Pradhāna, then since it amounts to saying that Kārya is verily Kāraṇa it amounts to the Kārya being Aja. Now yet another defect of the type - 'It is Kārya and also it is Aja' - is faced by your doctrine. Previously it has already been revealed that there is a contradictory statement of the type - 'Kāraṇa is born, (at the same time) it is Aja and Nitya.' What we are pointing out now is another defect: 'It is a Kārya, even so you are saying that it is Aja !'

If you say - 'Kārya is non-different from Kāraṇa' - then this defect entails you. In the concept that - 'Kāraṇa is non-different from Kārya' - especially, how at all can it be justified to say - 'Kāraṇa which is non-different from Kārya which is born is Dhruva (eternal)' - ? All that is born should necessarily be Adhruva or Anitya (non-eternal), is it not so ? It is not possible to assert that different or distinct from the part that is born a separate Nityāṃsha (eternal part) invariably exists. It is not possible to say that a part of a hen is kept for cooking and from its other part a chicken may be born, is it not so ? Such a silly defect alone will entail these disputants if they assert that - 'One part of Pradhāna is Nitya, another part is born as effects like Mahat etc.'

BECAUSE IN VEDĀNTA A MĀYIKĀ (ILLUSORY)
KĀRYA-KĀRĀṆA-VĀDA IS ACCEPTED THIS DEFECT IS NOT THERE

Here there lurks a secret: Vedāntins too are Satkāryavādins alone. For, it is stated in the Śruti that - "Sat, without a second to It, alone existed; It imagined in the manner - 'I will become many, I will proliferate' and created Tejas (fire)" - (Chh. 6-2-1, 2). They say that the cause of Brahman Itself gets transformed into the shape of the effect, as also that Kārya is not different from Kāraṇa. 'पैतृतत्त्वमिदं सबस्म' - (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning, "For all this, this alone is Ātman" - thus the Śruti says. 'तदन्तत्त्वम' - (Ved. Śūtra 2-1-14), meaning, "Kārya is Ananya (non-different) from Kāraṇa" - thus the statement of the Śūtrakāra also is there. Even so, in this philosophy (spiritual teaching) the defects that the followers of Vaisheshika philosophy point out are not to be made applicable. For, in this Siddhānta it is acknowledged that - "By
virtue of the distinctions of forms, which is itself Māyika (illusory), called Nāma (names) and Rūpa (forms) which is projected by Avidyā and is appearing in Vyākṛita (manifested) and A vyākṛita (unmanifested) forms, which cannot be defined either as Brahman Itself or something other than That - by virtue of such a Rūpavivesha (extraordinary form) Brahman becomes the object for all empirical transactions like Parināma (transformation); even It being called ‘Sat’ (real) is within the purview of Avidyā alone. But from the standpoint of Its own essential form or nature which is Pāramārthika (Absolute, Transcendental) especially, Brahman has exceeded all empirical transactions and exists as Aja (birthless) and Advaya (non-dual).” This truth has been mentioned also in this treatise ‘सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वः’ (3-27). But in the doctrine of those who claim and profess that - “For Brahman which is Aja changes like Parināma (transformations) etc. which are Pāramārthika (i.e. in the Absolute sense)” - the defects pointed out above get attached or stuck like a very hard cement coating. Since such a defect has been explained in detail in the previous Prakaraṇa itself, here it is not necessary to deliberate upon it again.

अजात्वे जायते वर्षयुज्यतस्य नास्ति वै |
जातात्वं जायमानस्य न व्यवस्थया प्रसावयते ||१३||

Meaning : “In whose doctrine a Kārya is born from one that is Aja, he does not have any illustration (to substantiate his theory). If it is said that from a born thing that object is born, then it amounts to saying there is no finality only.”

WHETHER KĀRĀṆA IS SAID TO BE
JĀTVA (BORN) OR AJĀTVA (BIRTHLESS)
EVEN THEN THERE IS INVARIVABLY A DEFEAT

Apart from this, if in the doctrine of a disputant it is propounded that from a Vastu which is Aja and hence not born a Kārya is born, that disputant will have no illustration whatsoever to adduce. The inference that from an Ajavastu also birth, production may take place cannot be correct, propor in the
absence of or without the support of a proper illustration. From this, on the basis of a literary meaning, it becomes established that - “From Ajavastu nothing can possibly be born.” Instead of this, if it is accepted that - “From a born thing a Kāryavastu (a thing as an effect) is born” - then that thing from another Jātvastu (born entity), that in turn from yet another Jātvastu is born - thus without reaching any finality the logical defect of ‘Anavasthā Dōsha’ gets entailed. In order to avoid this defect, let us accept that - “From an Ajavastu alone a Kārya is born - alone! Otherwise, the categories of Kārya, Kāraṇa themselves cannot possibly be established, is it not so?” - thus it is not possible to doubt. For, the Vastusthiti (ground reality based on universal experience) does not exist so as to fulfil our whims and fancies. It is our aspiration that the categories of Kārya-Kāraṇa should invariably be established; therefore, although there is no Yukti (logical device) whatsoever, to assume whimsically a doctrine that - “From a birthless Kāraṇa also a Kārya is born” - so as to satisfy our ambition can never be proper. We have already pointed out the defect that - “In whose doctrine it is propounded that from an Aja Kāraṇa birth takes place - in that doctrine there is no illustration whatsoever to adduce.”

THE DEFECT IN ASATKĀRYAVĀDA

So far the defects that the opponents point out in the doctrine that - “Kāraṇa itself is born in the form of Kārya” - were explained and demonstrated. Because the doctrine of Vaisheshikas, who are Asatkāryavadins, especially can never be tenable in any manner - here we are not showing the defects lurking in that doctrine. If observed from a particular viewpoint, since Vaisheshikas are propounding that the Kārya, which is endowed with parts, starts functioning (Ārambha) as a result of the Samyōga (contact, association) between the Kārya and the Dravyas (substances) which have accompanied it, in the doctrine of those disputants also first (in the beginning) the Ārambhakadṛavya (the functioning or motivation) having been there, they get transformed into their Kāryarūpa - thus in another dubious or devious manner they too have accepted. Though this defect can be easily shown in their doctrine, many more irrational, improper doctrines of the type - “The Kārya itself which does not exist
before its birth, after its birth by virtue of a particular relationship called ‘Samavāya Sambandha’ (inheritence) with its Kāraṇa it exists in the latter seeking its support ; it thus acquires a ‘Sattāsambandha’ (relationship with the genus of reality)” - etc. are imagined by them, and this, in the main, is a great defect in their theory. Is it possible to imagine in our mind a birth for a substance or thing which is as unreal as a hare’s horn, cause for it, relationship of being a cause inhering or lurking in it ? Therefore, even though it is not desired by them they too have been compelled to accept a doctrine that Paramāṇus (atoms) themselves get transformed into forms of binary and tertiary atoms (Dvyanuка, Tryaṇuка) etc. Even the present-day (modern) empirical scientists by valid means like Parikṣaṇa (examination or investigation), Prayōga (experiment), Samvāḍikarana (comparison, analogy) etc. are establishing the atomic theory, and using methods of chemical reactions, they are arguing that from a compound comprising several atoms another new substance with another combination of atoms with its own new extraordinary qualities is ‘born’ or ‘produced’. They too will have to accept inevitably, helplessly Satkāryavāda alone. For, the Yukti that we have mentioned above cannot be refuted reasonably by them also. Because we have pointed out defects even in the doctrine that - “Satkāryavāda is verily Pāramārthika”, “For a Vastu (entity or substance) which exists in the beginning itself due to Māyā (illusion, magic) a birth ensues” - this tenet alone is capable of being sustained. Even the particle physicists, who have discovered the nuclear atoms, extremely microscopic beyond electrons, protons and neutrons, and who have determined that they are all effects of nuclear energy by way of their fission or fusion and all such matter is ‘abstruse’ only, have in a different manner fully established Māyājanma alone.

In any case, because in this manner both Satkāryavādins and Asatkāryavādins demonstrate their staunch sense of pride and predilection towards their own doctrine and point out defects in each other’s theories, it amounts to their revealing Ajātivāda ; this theory which we had stated at the outset alone stands out as inviolable.
7. SINCE THE CATEGORIES OF CAUSE AND EFFECT DO NOT SUIT HETU-PHALA ALSO AJĀTIVĀDA IS ESTABLISHED

Meaning: “Those who have accepted that Phala (fruit of obtaining the conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.) itself is the cause for Hetu (merit and demerit) and for Phala Hetu is the cause, how at all can it be proper if they adduce Anāditwa (beginninglessness) to both Hetu and Phala?”

ĀTMAN IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF HETU AND PHALA

We have mentioned so far that in this manner in the doctrines of Jātivādins, because of the facts that: (a) The predicament that an entity’s essential nature itself gets changed arises; (b) it is not possible to decide about the exact relationship between Kārya and Kāraṇa, it amounts to saying that those disputants have indirectly demonstrated that Ajāti itself is correct. Now it will be shown conclusively that because it is not possible at all to determine that Ātman is of the nature of Hetu and Phala, Ajātivāda alone gets evolved out of it.

We had so far merely shown the Anisṭaprasakti (resulting in an undesirable situation) that - “If it is accepted that Brahman gets transformed into a Saṁsārirūpa (form of a mortal, transmigratory soul), it amounts to imagining that an entity’s Swabhāva (essential nature) too gets changed” - in the doctrine of the Jātivādins. But now a special feature is: Questioning in the manner - “Saṁsāritwa (transmigratoriness) which is of the nature of Hetu (merit and demerit), Phala (fruit of obtaining the conglomeration of body, senses etc.) is itself not established first of all; it being so, how at all can there be any scope possible for an imagination of the type that - ‘Brahman gets transformed into a Samsārirūpa’ - ?” - we will further strengthen the refutation of the doctrine of preaching a birth for Brahman. In the Śruti : ‘यत्र त्यस्य सर्वमातृवात्मां तत्स्तथेऽपि स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ - (Bṛi. 4-5-15) - it is proclaimed that from the standpoint of those (Jñānis)
who have utilized the *Paramārtha Dṛishti* (Intuitive Experience or Absolute viewpoint) and cognized the *Ekātman* (non-dual Ātman) alone there is no Dvaita whatsoever of the nature of *Kriyā* (action), *Kāraka* (means of action) and *Phala* (fruit of action) in Ātman. With the intention of refuting the categories of *Kārya* (effect) and *Kārana* (cause) for Hetu-Phalas by drawing full support from this Śruti statement in this Kārikā Shri Gauḍapāda has stated thus:

Those people whose doctrine is: “For Hetu, meaning *Dharma* (merit) and *Adharma* (demerit), *Phala*, meaning the conglomeration of the body, the senses etc., is the *Ādi* (cause)” - and those people whose doctrine is: “Hetu is the cause for Phala” - thus for these disputants who are propounding *Anyonya Kāraṇatwa* (mutual causation) between Hetu (merits and demerits) and Phala (acquiring the fruit of having a conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.), how at all can the defect of *Vyāghāta* (self-contradiction) remain without confronting them? The purport implicit in the Śruti sentence is: To Ātman who is *Ananta* (without an end) the form of a fruit or resultant of acquiring a conglomeration of the body, the senses etc. can never be applicable in any manner whatsoever. If it is contended that - “As a result of the Dharmas and the Adharmas that he performed he may possibly get this fruit of the form of *Saṅghāta* conglomeration of body, senses)” - then without first establishing the truth that - “To Ātman this Saṅghāta exists really, absolutely” - it cannot at all be established that - “Ātman is a *Kartṛu* (agent of action) for *Dharma* and *Adharma*” ; by means of a doctrine, which is itself not established, one cannot possibly decide, prove another unestablished doctrine, is it not so? In the present context, in order to establish that - “Ātman is a Kartṛu of Dharma and Adharma” - they have *perforce* to assume that Ātman has the adjuncts like the body, the senses etc. In order to establish the truth that - “Ātman has a body, senses etc.” - they have to assume that - “Ātman has the Kartṛutwa of those Dharma and Adharma.” Therefore it is clearly evident that for these disputants the logical defect of ‘*Anyonyāshraya*’ (mutual dependence) will attach itself unavoidably.

(Objection) : It is verily our doctrine that - “Samsāra is *Hetuphalātmāka* (of the nature of merit-demerit giving rise to the
fruit of acquiring a conglomeration of a body, senses etc.) is Anādi”; therefore, this defect does not entail us at all, is it not so?

(Solution): Here a question: (1) Are you saying that between Hetu and Phala each one is Anādi (causeless, eternal); or (ii) are you saying that these Hetu-Phala mutually having the relationship of cause and effect each with the other - is itself Anādi; or (iii) since both these are existing with a relationship of cause and effect are you saying this Hetu-Phala-Santāna (continuum of these two categories of Hetu and Phala) is Anādi? Here, first having accepted that there is invariably an Ādi (beginning, causation) between Hetu and Phala and later to say that each one of these two is Anādi (beginningless, causeless) - how at all can it be proper? Is it not a contradictory statement?

(Prima facie opponent): Because this Ātman Himself who is of the nature of Hetu-Phala, is Anādi, we say that Samsāra, which is also Hetu-Phalātmaka, is also Anādi. But what is the defect in saying - “For Hetu, Phala is the Ādi (cause) and for Phala, Hetu is Ādi (cause)”?

(Siddhāntin): In the first place, the statement that - ‘Ātman is Himself of the nature of Hetu and Phala’ - is not correct. For, He is in His very essence (Swabhāva) Kutastha (Absolutely immutable devoid of any changing categories like causation etc.). Ātman who is Kutastha (Absolute) and Avichāli (immutable) cannot possibly be said to be a Kartrū for a Kriyā like Dharma and Adharma, is it not so? Only if this condition or pre-requisite is possible, it can be said that He has any relationship with the Phala of the type of having a body, is it not so?

हेतुताल्पद: फल येदामादिर्देहुः: फलस्य च।
तथा जन्म भवेच्छसा पुनर्जन्म चितुर्वर्षश।।१९५।।

Meaning: “Those people in whose doctrine Hetu has Phala as its cause and Phala has Hetu as its cause - for them Janma will be as reasonable as saying from the son the father was born.”

A DEFECT ENTAILS IF MUTUAL CAUSATION IS ACCEPTED BETWEEN HETU AND PHALA

Now let us examine the second theory among those we
have mentioned above. In this doctrine wherein for the Hetu the cause is Phala, and for the Phala the cause is Hetu - it becomes as ridiculous as saying from the father the son has Janma and from the son the father has Janma.

संसाधिते हेतु-फलायोथिथित्वः क्रमस्वयम्।
युगपथ संसाधिते यस्मादसंबंधो विषाणवतः।११६।।

Meaning: “If there is birth or production of Hetu and Phala, you should *perforce* admit an order. For, at one and the same time if they are to be born like two horns, it amounts to saying verily that they do not have any mutual relationship at all.”

**HETU AND PHALA CANNOT POSSIBLY BE BORN TOGETHER**

If you reckon that the defect mentioned above is not proper, then an order in the birth of these Hetu and Phala in the manner - “Hetu is born first and Phala is born later” - you will have to *perforce* accept. If it is not accepted that from one thing only another thing is born, then it is not possible to neglect or discard any order. For, if they were to be born together, it will amount to saying that there is no relationship whatsoever between the categories like cause and effect. For this an illustration: ‘Like two horns’; just as between the two left and right horns of a bull there is no mutual relationship whatsoever - in the same way, here too there cannot be any relationship. This is implied here.

फलादुत्सदामानः सन्त न ते हेतु: प्रसिध्धिः।
अप्रसिद्धः कर्ष्य हेतुः फलमुत्सदायस्यति।११७।।

Meaning: “If in your doctrine Phala alone is born, then Hetu is not established; a Hetu which is itself not born - how at all can it create Phala?”

**FOR UNESTABLISHED HETU AND PHALA THERE CANNOT BE ANY RELATIONSHIP OF CAUSE AND EFFECT**

How can it be said that there is no relationship whatsoever? - if this question is asked, the answer is: If from a Phala,
which is yet to be born and which is not yet born, just like a hare’s horn etc., anything is to be born from Asat, then Hetu cannot possibly be established, cannot possibly be born. Therefore, just like the unknown or unfamiliar, unborn hare’s horn etc. how at all can Hetu, which is itself non-existing, give rise to Phala? Nobody has seen anywhere a relationship being there between two *Asatpadārthas* (false, unreal things), which are to be born mutually each from the other, themselves unestablished - which are just like the hare’s horns - either of cause and effect or any other kind of relationship, is it not so?

यदि हेतोः फलाद्विसिद्ध: फलसिद्धिरच्छ हेतुतः ।
केतरतु पूर्वनिष्णतः यस्य सिद्धिरपेश्या ||९८॥

**Meaning**: “If you say that for Hetu birth is from Phala and for Phala birth is from Hetu alone, then between these two which was born first? Because it was born first, from it the other has to be established, is it not so?”

**FOR HETU AND PHALA THE TEMPORAL RELATIONSHIPS OF ‘PRIOR’ AND ‘LATER’ DO NOT EXIST**

Thus even after we have refuted the dogmatic theory in the manner that - “Because there is no relationship whatsoever between Hetu and Phala, there cannot possibly exist any cause-effect relationship between them” - if you are still going to contend that they do get mutually established each by the other, we will ask the questions: Between Hetu and Phala which is born first? Which of the two was born first due to which the other came into being? - Answer these queries. The implicit meaning of this argument is: Without the temporal order of the type - ‘prior’ and ‘later or posterior’ - one cannot be established by means of the other, is it not so?

अशक्तिरविज्ञानं क्रमकोपोस्थवा पुनः ।
एवं हि सर्वधा बुद्धिरजाति: परिदीपिता ||९९॥

**Meaning**: “Among the three (defects) - ‘Ashakti’ (incapability), ‘Aparijñāna’ (though the question is understood, the proper answer has not flashed) or ‘Kramakōpa’ (infringement of rule of order) - one will get attached. In this manner
in all respects Buddhists have - it amounts to saying - brought to light Ajāti alone."

**IF IT IS NOT DECIDED AS TO WHICH OF THE TWO - HETU AND PHALA - IS FIRST ESTABLISHED, THEN A DEFECT ENTAILS THAT DOCTRINE**

As otherwise if your opinion is that it is not possible to determine as to which of these two is first established, then you suffer from 'Ashakti' (incapability), 'Aparijñāna' (lack of comprehensive knowledge). It will amount to saying that this is a Moudhya (stupidity or dullness) of the nature of not being able to distinguish the Tattwa (Reality) in that though you have cognized, understood what I have said, the correct answer did not flash to your intelligence. This is reckoned by Naiyyāyikas as a Nigrahasthāna (state of non-comprehension) called 'Apratibha'.

As otherwise, if you still maintain that - “No one can possibly decide as to which of these two gets established first” - it may amount to the defect of 'Kramakopa' (bringing about disorder in the orderliness). You first said that - “From Hetu, Phala is established and from Phala, Hetu is established”; the orderliness of the type ‘one after another they are born’ - is made topsyturvy, is upset. Having first accepted the orderliness of the type - “One after another they are born” - later, your statement to the effect - “The question of ‘prior’ and ‘later’ is not possible to be decided” - will not go without contradicting your promise, solemn declaration, is it not so?

By these disputants who are thus pointing out defects in one another’s doctrines and who are staunchly believing and professing themselves to be erudite scholars it amounts to affirming the truth of Ajāti (birthlessness) alone publicized and popularized. Among them the Lōkāyatikas, believing or imagining that when the elements get transformed into the shape of a body - just as intoxication is produced - all the functions of vital force like breathing etc. as also cognitive faculty are produced automatically, they say that the body itself is Ātman. This doctrine is not accepted by the other disputants. For, cognition (consciousness, awareness) etc. do not exist till the body exists - just like the Rūpa (form) etc. which last till the body exists - Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) cannot possibly be a quality of the body - this
is their Yukti (logical argument). Vijñānavādins (Idealists among Buddhists) are asserting that apart from Vijñāna (intelect) neither the external object nor another Ātman who is related to Vijñāna exists. For, their Yukti is: Associated or bound with the intellect alone there occur the dealings of Pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge) and Prameya (objects of knowledge) within the body. On the other hand, the Mādhyamikas (another school of Buddhists) aver that - “Ātman is neither one that exists, nor one who does not exist; he is of the essential nature of Shūnya (essencelessness).” Karma Mīmāṃsāsakas especially say: Because there is a Śruti sentence: ‘स एष यजामुद्धेष यजनांनोऽवेजः स्वर्ग लोके याति’ - (?) - meaning - “This Yajamāna (performer of a sacrifice) who is equipped with the weapon of a Yajña (sacrifice) goes directly to Svargaloka (heaven)” - quite different from Vijñāna (intellect) there exists an Ātman. But in their doctrine because between Hetu and Phala the question as to which is first has not been determined, the statement that between them there exists a relationship of cause and effect is not tenable - thus the other disputants point out a defect in their doctrine. Thus all these disputants who are supposed to be accepted as erudite scholars are propounding or following doctrines which are opposed to one another and hence it amounts to their evolving the truth that - “Jeevātman is not really born” - alone. Therefore, the truth of Ajatī alone which gets evolved out of their debate we have acknowledged - this is Shri Gauḍapāda’s opinion here.

Meaning: “The illustration with the nomenclature of ‘Bijāṅkura’ (seed-sprout) is always equal to Sādhya (a thing that is possible to be attained through an effort). A Hetu (cause) which is Sādhyasama (equal to an effect, resultant of effort) cannot be suitable or proper thing to establish a Sādhyā (effect of an effort), is it not so?”

TO SAY THAT HETU-PHALA SANTĀNA (CONTINUUM) IS ANĀDI (BEGINNINGLESS) IS NOT REASONABLE

Now the third theory that we had mentioned in the com-
mentary on the 14th Kārikā is being taken up for consideration (Hetu, Phala - both these are Anādi is the first theory; Hetu-Phala - both these have a relationship of cause and effect mutually between them - is the second theory; the Santāna or continuum of Hetu-Phala is Anādi is the third theory - which is being taken up for deliberation).

(Jātivādin’s doubt): It is our statement that there exists a relationship of cause and effect between Hetu and Phala. Clinging on to our mere statement without understanding fully our real intended purport, now you are pointing out ‘Chhala’ (obduracy, doggedness) in our statements in the manner - “Just like the father being born from the son” (4-15); “Like the horns of a bullock they do not have any mutual relationship” - (4-16) etc.; now the Naiyāyikas say that - “To imagine a meaning different from the real intended purport of a speaker by taking the meaning of a statement without its later explanatory portion is called ‘Vākchhala’ (obdurate statement)” - (Nyāya Sūtra 1-2-112). Here what we merely stated as: “Between Hetu and Phala there exists a cause-effect relationship” - is without any special reason, purport behind it. You have, in fact, imagined that there exists a mutual cause-effect relationship between these two phenomena, as also between these two which are born together alone there exists a cause-effect relationship - thus quite a different, alien opinion you have imagined and you are pointing out these above-mentioned defects. But you have not taken into account our intended purport at all. We have not at all stated anywhere either that from an unborn or unestablished Hetu the Phalasiddhi (the birth of Phala) or from unborn, unestablished Phala the Hetusiddhi (the birth of Hetu) takes place; on the other hand, we have acknowledged the theory that like the Bijānkura (seed-sprout) between these two (i.e. Hetu and Phala) there is a cause-effect relationship. Here what is the defect? Point out.

(Siddhāntin): We will explain, listen. It is our opinion that the opponent mentions the illustration with the name of Bijānkura - that illustration is always Sādhyasama (equal to the effect produced by a Sādhana or effort). For, that is also not established; in fact, it has yet to be established. Even the question of - “Whether there exists a cause-effect relationship between Bija-Āṅkura (seed-sprout) or not?” - is itself to be decided.
(Objection): The fact that there exists a cause-effect relationship between the seed and its sprout is actually perceived by our senses, is it not so?

(Solution): Not so. Just as you have accepted the fact that there is an Ādi (beginning) for Hetu and Phala, in the same way you have accepted that between Bīja and Aṅkura - to the preceding one in a series - there is invariably an Ādi. Just as the sprout that is just now born is born from the seed and hence it is one with a beginning, since that seed also is born from another sprout it is invariably with a beginning - thus you have perforce to agree. Therefore, to imagine Anāditwa (being without a beginning, i.e., birthlessness) to individual units like the Bīja-Aṅkura - amounts to a path being verily followed by a line of congenital blindmen. Similar is the case also with the theory that between Hetu and Phala there exists an Anādi (beginningless) cause-effect relationship. As otherwise, if you still contend that - “We are not saying that each of the individual Bija or Aṅkura is Anādi ; the Bija-Aṅkura Santāna (continuum) alone is Anādi and this alone is our intended purport” - then that too is not proper. For, there does not at all exist ‘Ekatwa’ (unity, oneness) here. To wit, the individual units of Bija and Aṅkura, especially, are many ; they are not evidently a ‘Santati’ (a series, continuum), is it not so?

These Anādivādins are not arguing that - “Apart from the Bija and Aṅkura, quite separately, independently - different from those two individual units - there exists a Bijaṅkura-Santāna.” In truth, these individual units of Bija and Aṅkura themselves when endowed or associated with a relationship of the type of ‘the previous one’ and ‘the later one’ - they appear to be or conceived by us as ‘Bijaṅkura Santāna’ - that is all. Therefore, neither the seeds nor the sprouts are Anādi ; in fact, apart from these Bija and Aṅkura there does not at all exist a Padārtha (substance, entity) called Bijaṅkura-Santāna. It being so, in the illustration there is nothing whatsoever which is Anādi. The illustrated example also we should discern in the same manner. Hence, what we asked in (4-14) as : “How at all your statement that there exists Anāditwa between Hetu and Phala is correct, proper !” - is verily reasonable. In the same way, what we stated as : “Just as from the son the father is born”; “Just as the two horns they
are unrelated alone" - also is not 'Vākchhala' (obdurate statement). For, the theory or concept of mutual relationship of cause and effect and theory of cause-effect relationship for simultaneous birth itself are not tenable; this truth we have already demonstrated by means of Yukti (logical devices) indeed.

It being so, since the illustration of Bijāṅkura is Sadhyasama it is not a proper illustration. In the Kārikā the expression that - "It is a Hetu which is Sadhyasama" - is used in the sense or with the meaning of - "an illustration which is Sāmyasama (having similarity)" ; for, here the opposing disputants have not illustrated the Bijāṅkurasantāna as a Hetu (cause) at all; they have, in fact, used it as an illustration itself. Therefore, just as a Hetu which is Sadhyasama and unestablished is not a proper cause, in the same way an illustration which is Sadhyasama is not a proper, legitimate illustration. With this purport in mind it is stated that a Hetu which is Sadhyasama is not helpful for the establishment of the Sadhya (theory to be proved). This alone is the purport behind the Kārikā indeed.

8. CONCLUSION OF THE DELIBERATION ON HETU-PHALA

Meaning: "Not to cognize the facts as to which is the previous one and which comes into being later - brings out, evolves in its wake Ajāti alone. How can it be proper to say that - 'When one Dharma (entity) is being born, its precedent is not being known' - ?"

NOT TO KNOW THE PūRVA ((PREVIOUS, PRIOR) AND APARA (LATER, POSTERIOR) PROJECTS AJĀTI ALONE

Previously in 4-19 it was stated that - "Buddhists - who are disputants with a high sense of pride thinking that they themselves are erudite scholars - are bringing to light Ajāti (birthlessness) in all respects" - is it not so? How can it be said that they are projecting Ajāti alone? - To this question the answer is: Inability to cognize as to which of the two viz. Hetu and Phala, is existing first and which is born afterwards - illumines and
and shows up Ajāti; to wit, how can it be proper to say that the thing that exists prior to the Dharma (entity) is not known? Those who find out (cognize) in the manner - “This thing is born” - should invariably come to know the cause that gives rise to that birth, is it not so? For, only after knowing the relationship that exists between the Janya (born object) and the Janaka (that which gives rise to the birth) the fact that - “This too is a Janya (born object)” - is cognized. Although cause and effect are Nityasambaddha (eternally related), merely on the ground of some saying - “We do not know the cause” - it amounts to their agreeing that - “Ajāti alone is the real truth.”

**THE PURPORT BEHIND REFUTING HETU-PHALA CATEGORIES**

Here the secret is: ‘पुण्यो वै पुण्येऽन् कर्मणां भवति पापः पपेन्द्र’ - (Bṛ. 3-2-13) meaning - “One who performs righteous, meritorious deeds is born in a meritorious birth, while one who performs unrighteous, sinful deeds is born in an inauspicious, low birth” ; ‘योनिनमः प्रपन्धे ......’ - (Kaṭha 2-2-7), meaning -“Some people, for the purpose of obtaining a body, attain a separate birth ; some others attain Sthāvaratwa (stationary existence)” ; ‘यण्या कर्म यथा शुद्धम्’ - meaning - “As per one’s Jñāna (knowledge) - Karma (deeds) - Vāsana (latent impressions, proclivities) (transmigration is taking place)” - etc. - from all these Śrutis it is to be known that Ātman is ‘Hetu-Phalātmaka’ (of the nature of cause and effect). Just as it is stated in the Mantra - “सूर्यचंद्रब्रम्सु धातापूर्वमकल्पयत्” - meaning - “The Creator created the sun and the moon as before” and “न रूपसम्रूपं तथोपताप्ते नान्तो न च चादिर्य च संप्रवतिष्ठ” - (Gītā 15-3), meaning - “For (this tree of) Samsāra no form is seen, no end is seen, no beginning also is seen ; the middle state also is not seen”. - according to this Gītā Smīriti sentence; the Siddhāntin also has accepted the fact that - ‘Samsara is Anadi’. But all these tenets the Siddhāntin has accepted accepting ‘Māyika Janma’ (illusory birth) alone as an ‘Upāya’ (subtle device) alone so as to teach that - ‘Ātman alone who is Aja and Advaya is Paramārtha (the Absolute, Transcendental Reality)’ - and not that in the Absolute sense the empirical entities have a birth, accepting
thereby Jātivāda. When observed from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi, the Śāstra does not at all accept Jātivāda. For, it is stated in the Śruti: ‘स वा एष महानज्ञ आत्मात्मार्जोऽस्मरोऽस्मृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म’ - (Bṛi. 4-4-25) - stressing that the Jīvātman is Aja-Advaya Brahman alone; ‘अपपरं हि वै ब्रह्म भवति य एवं वेद’ - (Bṛi. 4-4-2) - signifying that by means of Jñāna alone one can attain the state of fearless Selfhood. For this reason alone, in various verses of the Advaita Prakaraṇa too it has been taught that - “While dying or being born, he exists like Ākāśha”; “Now, all Saṅgītatas (conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.) are like those of the dream” - (3-10); “The different kinds of creation are mentioned in order to teach the Tattwa and to prepare the intellect (to be receptive)” - (3-15); “This has become distinct or separate due to Māyā” - (3-24); “Though Ātman is not born, He is born due to His Māyā” - (3-24); “That this one is the Ātman who is said to be Neti, Neti” - (3-26) etc. But here with a view to acknowledging Ajātivāda which is evolved, deduced from the mutual contradictions of the disputants who accept the doctrines that - “The Jīva is really of the nature of Hetu-Phala” - as also - “The Santāna (continuum) of Hetu and Phala is really Anādi” - their doctrinaire theories are refuted.

 HOW COME THIS DIVISION OF VYĀVAHĀRIKA AND PĀRAMĀRTHIKA DRĪṢṬIS? 

(Question) : What is the authoritative proof, support for having divided these two Drīṣṭis (viewpoints) as Vyāvaḥārika (empirical) and Pāramārthika (Absolute, Transcendental)? Why should it not be accepted that Ātman is really Hetu-Phalātmaka?
(Answer): For this the answer is: Since the waking state is the support or substrate for all Vaidika (religious, Vedic) and Loukika (mundane, workaday) transactions, it is called 'Vyāvahārikāvasthā'. That viewpoint in which that state alone is kept or taken predominantly as the ground reality (basis) is verily Vyāvahārika Drīṣṭi. In fact, it has taken only one part of the Jñeya (phenomena to be known or objectified). We have acknowledged that all pervasive (Intuitive, Absolute) Drīṣṭi as Pāramārthika Drīṣṭi which - without entertaining in the least any partiality or preferential consideration with regard to any matter pertaining to the three universal states of experience of Jāgrat (waking), Svapna (dream) and Sushupti (deep sleep) - objectifies everything completely or comprehensively. For, apart from these three states of experience there does not exist any Jñeya (object of knowledge) whatsoever. The truth that by the Intuitive examination of the Avasthātraya how the Siddhānta (spiritual teaching) that - “Ātman who is Aja, Advaya and of Nityashuddhabuddhamuktaswabhāva is Himself the Paramārthasatya (the Absolute Reality)” - is established, has been demonstrated in the Āgama Prakaraṇa. First showing by means of Yuktī as to how the two states of Jāgrat and Svapna are in all respects equal, then the truth that all Drīṣṭya (object of perception) is really Māyika (illusory, Vitatha or false) was proved in Vaitathya Prakaraṇa. In the Advaita Prakaraṇa it was shown as to how there is no opposition between Ajātivāda and Māyikajātivāda. Now in this Alātashanti Prakaraṇa especially, because observing merely from the exclusive limited (parochial) viewpoint of the waking state those disputants, who have accepted the categories of cause and effect to be absolutely real, cannot possibly determine as to which of the two, viz. cause and effect is first, prior and which is later or posterior - and since this fact has been acknowledged - from their viewpoint also - it amounts to bringing to light Ajāti alone; thus it has been proved by means of Avīta (Vyatireka) Nyāya, and hence what we have mentioned as the distinction of Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika Drīṣṭis is irrefutable, inviolable indeed.

स्वतो वा परस्तो चापि न किञ्चिद् वस्तु ज्ञापते ।
सदसच्छद्भविपि न किञ्चिह्वस्तु ज्ञापते ॥२२॥
Meaning: "No entity or object - whatsoever it may be - either by itself or from another is born. Sat (real), Asat (unreal) or Sadasat (real as also unreal) - in whatever manner - no Vastu whatever is born."

TO ACCEPT JANMA TO BE REAL ALONE IS IN ALL RESPECTS OPPOSED TO LOGIC (REASONING)

There exists yet another Yukti (logical device) to assert that - "Nothing whatsoever is born". That is: If an object is to be born, then in any one of the following six ways it should be:

(i) Itself by itself; (ii) from another; (iii) both joining together it is born; (iv) Sat (that which exists); (v) Asat (that which does not exist); (vi) Sadasat (existing yet non-existing). Barring these ways in no other manner whatsoever an object can possibly be born.

Now let us examine each one of those ways of birth one by one: Here (i) first of all any object, entity - whatever it may be - cannot possibly be born from itself. For, it is already established as existing. Now there is no need whatsoever for it to be born afresh. This is too evident a fact. For example, an earthen pot cannot possibly be said to be born from itself, is it not so? (ii) The fact that one object cannot be born from another is also very clear; the object called 'pot' - how can it possibly be born from another object called 'cloth'? Or from one piece of cloth how can another piece of cloth be born? (iii) Now, to say that one particular object from itself and from another - thus from both it is born - this is especially an impossible event or matter; for, it is a contradictory statement. For example, a pot is born both from itself and from a piece of cloth which is different from itself - thus no one utters a blatantly contradictory statement, is it not so? It is very clear that just as from both Ghata (pot) and Pata (piece of cloth) a pot being born is not possible at all, in the same way jointly from both a piece of cloth being born also is not possible at all.

(Objection): It is perceptible that from clay a pot is born, from a father a son is born - is it not so? Even when one particular object being born from another is seen, how can you reasonably refute the method or type of birth like - "One object is born from another" - ?

(Solution): True. There is an empirical transaction among
the ignorant, deluded people of the form of the usage of an expression - “is born”. Without examining anything - whatever it may be - to conclude that it is real is not proper at all, is it not so? Therefore, those persons who are discriminative have perforce to examine the usage of an expression by those deluded persons to find out whether it is like that really or not. The object for those *Shabda Pratyaya* (word-concepts) which is called ‘*Kārya*’ (effect) - does not exist at all; thus it becomes decided. On the strength of the Śruti: ‘वाचारंपर्ण विकारे नामेत्यं नृतिकेह्वेव सत्यम्’ - (Chh. 6-1-4) - if we examine the *Kāryavastu* (the entity or object which is an effect of a cause), we can discern that that thing is merely a name alone and not a real entity. Hence what we have stated that - “Nothing can possibly be born from another” - is proper indeed. Therefore, there is no defect whatsoever in what we have stated.

Now the question - “Whether the Vastu that is born is *Sat* (existing), *Asat* (not existing) or *Sadasat* (though existing not existing) ?” - is to be decided. (iv) That is especially not *Sat*; for, if it were *Sat* and it is already existing, it cannot be born; for, about already existing clay, father etc. to say that they are born again is nonsensical. *Sat* means that thing which is already born, is it not so? (v) If it is *Asat*, even then it is reasonable to say that it is not born; for, like a hare’s horns etc. where is the question of a thing which is never existing being born? (vi) Now especially if it is said that it is *Sadasat*, then it is not possible for such a thing to be born in any manner whatsoever; for, *Sat* and *Asat* which are opposed to each other - these two qualities existing in one substance alone is not possible at all. Thus it amounts to saying that among the six ways which we have imagined above, not in any one of those ways a Vastu can possibly be born. Barring these six ways no other method of birth exists. Therefore, it evolves that - “No entity - whatsoever it may be - is possibly born in any manner”.

**EVEN IF NO CATEGORIES OF THE TYPE OF SAT, ASAT ETC. ARE APPLICABLE TO AN OBJECT TO BE BORN, IT IS IN ITS ABSOLUTE FORM OR NATURE BRAHMAN ALONE**

Here, on the face of it, it appears as though Shri Gauḍapāda has followed, adopted a Buddhists’ Yukti alone. For, in the
doctrine of the Shūnyavādins it has been propounded that "न स्वतः नापि न धार्म्यां नायपहेतुः। उत्त्थता जातु विद्यनो भावः कचन कैचन ॥" - (Mādhyaṃika Kārikā 1-1), meaning - "Whatever objects they may be - either from themselves or from others they are not born; since for these two reasons and since no Hetu (cause) whatsoever exists, objects which are born do not exist anywhere and none whatsoever; as also they are asserting that "न सनासन सदसन्यो निर्विन्तति यदा। कथन निर्विन्तको हेतुरेव सति हि युज्यते ॥" - (Mā. Kā. 1-7) - meaning - "When it evolves that an existing, not existing or though existing not existing - no such entity can possibly exist, then how can it be proper to say that a Hetu (cause) which brings about a Kārya (effect) exists? Even it being so, here in the present context what is relevant is only this much: It is merely stated here that for objects in their forms of cause and effect does not become rational or justifiable in any manner whatsoever. In the doctrine of the Buddhists 'Pratītyasamutpāda' (if one thing exists another is born - the theory of dependent origination) theory is followed and it is deduced that in no way whatsoever as Sat, Asat etc. there exists for objects any Sattwa (existence) whatsoever. In their doctrine it has been stressed that - "No entities ever exist at all"; "They do not exist with any substrate whatsoever" (Mādhyaṃika Kā. 1-1) - thus in both ways they do not have any existence whatsoever. But in the Vedāntic teaching especially it has been acknowledged that there exists a 'Māyika Kāryakāraṇabhāva' (illusory cause-effect relationship) first; then utilizing the tenet that - 'Since all phenomena in the form of Kārya (effect) are mere Vāchāraṃbhana (forms projected by mere speech or words), they are invariably non-different (Anyōnya) from Kāraṇa (cause) and not that they among themselves have any cause-effect relationship whatsoever; for, they do not possess any independent existence whatsoever' - finally, it is taught that - 'Brahman alone which is the substratum for everything is the Paramasatya (Absolute, Transcendental Reality).' "That alone is Satya" - (Chh. 6-8-7) is the Śruti which supports, substantiates this teaching. Thus we must discern that there exists a very great difference between the Buddhistic 'Shūnyavāda' and Vedānta.
THERE IS NO SYSTEMATISATION OF HETU-PHALA CATEGORIES IN THE DOCTRINE OF KSHANIKAVIJÑĀNAVĀDINS AMONG BUDDHISTS

We have so far exposed the defect that among all the proponents of the doctrines propounding that in this manner the Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala are different categories - there is no relationship whatsoever between Hetu and Phala. Now those who accept the doctrine that - "Janma itself is born" - and thereby a kind of unity or identity among Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala is accepted as also it is propounded that an object (Vastu) exists invariably in a Kshanika form (momentarily) - all these Buddhists are far away from Yukti. For, in their opinion barring the Kshanā (moment of time) which decides in the manner - "This is like this" - the Vastu does not exist for another moment at all. In their doctrine the commonplace transaction of the type - "I did this action then and now I am experiencing its fruit" - which is of the essential nature of a memory of a past experience (Anubhava-Smriti-Rūpa) is itself untenable. Although all the common run of people are familiar with the 'Pratyabhijñāna' of recognizing at present an old or past object or phenomenon and reckoning in the manner - 'That thing alone is this' or 'That person alone am I' - this is not applicable in their doctrines. For, since they have accepted that any object - whatever it may be - is destroyed in a moment - no Anubhava (experience) whatsoever is possibly applicable in their doctrine; nor the memory of a thing which is not experienced also is possible, is it not so? Thus it is not possible for them to say - "The transaction of the type - 'Similar to that thing is this' - may occur from Sārūya (similarity, analogy)"; for, no one gets the Pratyabhijñāna of the type - "Similar to that thing is this" - at all; however empirical transactions are definitely occurring in the manner - "That alone is this"; "That person alone am I" - alone.

A DEFECT IN THE DOCTRINE OF THE PRESENT-DAY VIKĀRAPRAVĀHĀVĀDINS (PROPOUNDS OF THE FLOW OF CHANGE)

The present-day followers of a theory of Bergson say: All the phenomena - both within the body (corporeal) and what is seen in the external world - are of the form of a flux of change alone; a thing which is absolutely in a stationary state is not
existing at all. In truth, the Vastu Tattwa (the Ultimate Reality) is verily what is changing prior and posterior to the moment when we decide in the manner - “This is like this.” This too is an unreasonable doctrine; for, in this theory there is no purpose, benefit whatsoever from Tattwajijñāsā (pursuit of Reality). Although phenomena which are stationary and those which are moving are, in the experience of all people, opposites, it evolves from their doctrine that all that is mere Bhrānti (delusion) alone. Really speaking, if there is no object or entity whatsoever which is steady or stationary, how at all is it possible to say that the cognition - “It is so” - is a delusion? Besides, in their doctrine it is not possible even to conjecture, imagine in one’s mind as to what is meant by ‘movement’; for, as a substrate for movement they have not accepted even an empty space. Especially to accept movement for the Ākāsha also is not possible at all. In the same way, to imagine that there exists a movement which does not desiderate any time factor is also an impossible proposition. For, the experience of movement has necessarily to occur in the manner - “From that time to this moment it was moving”; if not, for the word ‘movement’ there is no meaning at all. Apart from this, if everything is only movement, it will amount to saying that there cannot be any experience whatsoever of two movements; or, in the alternative, that also will amount to being a delusion alone. And one movement is faster than another or slower - to say thus also it is not suitable or applicable in this doctrine. Although it is in everyone’s experience in the manner - “Movement occurred in a particular moment of time and movement towards a particular direction; movement has come to a standstill” - such universal experiences they will perforce have to deny. Because in their doctrine categories like time, experience, vital force - all become one and the same phenomenon, it will have to be concluded that this doctrine itself is opposed to universal experience. Therefore, this theory of a flux of change is, in all respects, to be declared as unreasonable, irrational alone.

Meaning: “Hetu cannot possibly be born from Phala
which is *Anādi* (beginningless) or since it (Hetu) is itself *Anādi*; Phala also due to its essential nature cannot possibly be born. For, a thing which has no Ādi, it cannot possibly have birth."

**SINCE THEY ARE ANĀDI ALONE BOTH HETU AND PHALA ARE AJA**

Another point: By your acceptance of the fact that Hetu and Phala are Anādi alone, you have perforce to accept that Hetu and Phala are not at all born. We have already in 4-14 refuted the theory that Hetu and Phala are Anādi by saying: "How can you say that Hetu and Phala have Anāditwa?" Now, by accepting that they are Anādi we point out this defect: If that is so, it amounts to your accepting Ajātivāda alone. How is it? - To this the answer is: From a Phala, which does not have Ādi, Hetu cannot possibly be born; you have not accepted at all that from a Phala, which is Anādi and which is not born at all, Hetu is born - is it not so?

(Doubt): What is the defect if it is said that from a Phala alone which is established as Anādi Hetu is born?

(Solution): Not so. For, without any proper reason a Phala, which is established to be Anādi by its very nature, is born in the form of Hetu - thus you do not agree, is it not so? For, if you say so, it amounts to saying that it will have perforce to continue being born all the time, or if you contend that Phala itself is of an essential nature of being born, then it will amount to saying that it is not Anādi.

For this part of the verse, yet another meaning can be adduced: Hetu is not born; for, it is Anādi. In the same way, Phala also is not born; for, it is in its very essential nature Anādi, that means, it has no beginning. This is the implicit meaning.

Therefore, because you have accepted Anāditwa for both Hetu and Phala it amounts to your accepting Ajātivāda alone. For, that thing which has no Ādi, meaning *Kāraṇa* (cause), that has no Ādi, meaning *Janma* (birth) is not there at all; in our workaday transactions people will accept the fact that - "That thing alone which has a *Kāraṇa*, has a *Janma*" - but no one will
ever accept a Janma for a thing which has no \textit{Kāraṇa} (cause). This is the implicit meaning here.

In any case, in this manner whether it is accepted that - (a) a mutual causation between Hetu and Phala exists; or (b) both of them are born together (simultaneously); or (c) it is assumed that the Santāna (continuum) of Hetu and Phala categories is Anādi, it is unavoidable to be entailed with various types of defects in Jātivāda. Especially if it is contended that both of them are Anādi in their very essential natures, it amounts to acknowledging Ajātivāda alone. Thus the Jātivāda being rendered untenable in any manner, it finally amounts to the Jātivādins revealing the truth that - “Ajāti alone is the Siddhānta”.

\textbf{FOR THE WORLD WHICH IS KRIYĀ-KĀRAKA-PHALĀTMAKA THERE CAN BE MĀYIKAJANMA ONLY}

Here there lurks this secret: Because between the waking and the dream states of Consciousness there does not exist any distinction whatsoever and though the phenomena that appear internally and externally in both of them are false, within these two states the phenomena appearing in their respective Avastha seem to be having the distinctions of ‘false’ and ‘real’ indeed. As per their respective places, both the ‘Chittakāla’ (mentally formulated time category) and the ‘Bāhyakāla’ (external time category) are appearing along with the category of ‘Ākāsha’ (empty space) seen to be the support. Further, all the phenomena that are seen in these time-space as substrates appear to be of the forms of Dravya (substance), Guṇa (quality) and Kriyā (action). Besides, when the Kriyā (action or movement) of the forms of Pariṇāma (transformation) and Parispanda (hectic vibrations or pulsations) appearing therein is compared to some other Vastus which remain steady or stationary as they are, then it appears as though in certain Vastus the two forms of Pariṇāma and Parispanda do exist. This whole world which is beset with such wonders as three periods of time viz. past, present and future and the concomitant categories of Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala does not exist without any traces or taint of it left behind and subsides in Sushupta Avasthā (deep sleep state) and becomes one with the Prājñātmarūpa (state of unalloyed Pure Consciousness). Even so, it exists therein (in such a subtle but potential form) without
vitiating Ātman in the least by its Dharma (qualities) ; further it is being witnessed by everyone that from that Prājnātman alone, without bringing about any change whatsoever in that Ātman (i.e. Prājnātman), the world of diversity or duality is attaining a ‘Māyika Janma’ (illusory or magical birth or creation) both in the waking and the dream. All this has been clarified in the previous three Prakaraṇas. In this manner, without cognizing the truth of life that - “Ātman, who is never at any time is born in the form of Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala, apparently acquires a Māyajanma” - the various disputants, observing merely from the Jāgrat Avasthā Drishti (viewpoint of the waking state experience only), are assuming or putting on, as it were, the Mithyābhimāna (false pride or egoism) to believe that - “All the perceived objects are really being born (in time and space with some causation).” Thereupon they are refuting one another’s doctrines arguing in the manner - “The objects are born in this particular manner only and not in that manner” - and they are all revealing the truth that Ajātivāda alone is correct. This much alone is clarified here.

9. AS A RESULT OF THE QUARREL BETWEEN VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS (IDEALISTS) AND BĀHYĀRTHAVĀDINS (REALISTS) 
AJĀTI STANDS REVEALED

प्रज्ञेच: सनिमित्तत्त्वमन्यथा द्वयनाशत: ।
संक्लेषस्योपलब्धेष्च परत्नासिस्ति मता ॥३४॥

Meaning : “Any cognitive knowledge must have a cause ; otherwise, Dvaya (duality) will become non-existent. Since extreme distress or anguish is also seen, it is our opinion that there is dependence on another.”

OBJECTIONS RAISED BY REALISTS AGAINST IDEALISM

It has been stated so far that by the opposing opinions or doctrines of disputants who have been following Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda etc. Ajāti itself is established. With a view to strengthening this tenet further the contradicting doctrines of the Idealists and the Realists have been exemplified here.

The Vijñānavādins’ (Idealists’) doctrine is: Apart from the
intellectual awareness (*Vijñāna*) externally no other really real (Paramārtha) object whatsoever exists. For, only if *Vijñāna* is there the external object appears, if not it does not appear. Therefore, it amounts to saying that *Vijñāna* itself is appearing in the dual form as the form of cognition and the form of an object.

The objection, against this doctrine, by the *Bāhyārthavadin* (Realist) is: For *Prajñāpti* (*cognitive knowledge* - meaning for cognition or becoming aware of an object - externally, outside there should necessarily be a cause. *Nimitta* here means an external object. Apart from the cognitive knowledge there should necessarily exist an external object; for, without any object being there externally the cognitive knowledge of sound, touch etc. cannot accrue or occur. As otherwise, if it is accepted that without there being any object whatsoever externally cognition (consciousness) may occur, then it amounts to saying that cognition, without the external objects being there, has itself the capability of depicting, showing phenomena like sound, touch etc. Then, in that event, "At all times the cognitive knowledge of all objects may take place" - it will amount to admitting such a ridiculous principle. Another reason also can be adduced here. If it is not so, you will have to agree that there is no duality whatsoever; *Dvaya* means various types of *Pratyayas* (concepts with a stamp of certainty or percepts occurring); if there is no external cause for them, then it evolves that these various *Pratyayas* should not have occurred. As per the doctrine of the *Vijñānavādins* none of the following: The variety or diversity of *Shabdapratyayas* (percepts of sound) which are appearing in various forms of pleasing, harsh, loud or soft sounds; the variety of *Sparshapratyayas* (percepts of touch) which are appearing as being hot or cold; the diverse *Rūpapratyayas* appearing as black, yellow, red etc.; the variety of *Rasapratyayas* appearing as sweet, sour, bitter etc.; the variety of *Gandhapratyayas* appearing as fragrant, stinking etc. - can possibly occur. Especially to say that - 'Pratyaya Vaichitrya (variety of perceptual knowledge) does not at all occur' - is opposed to universal experience, is it not so? Besides, since cognitive knowledge is of one and the same form or nature without the external objects like sound, touch etc. there cannot possibly be any cause for such variegated percepts occurring in
this manner. In a clean crystal - without there being any external adjuncts with colours of red, black etc. - no variety of forms can possibly be seen, is it not so? Therefore, in order that such variegated percepts occur or appear, it is quite reasonable and proper to imagine, surmise that there should necessarily exist a Bāhyārtha (external object) which is the cause for such perceptual knowledge. This indeed is his opinion.

The Buddhists are using the word ‘Prajjñapti’ not only with the meaning of cognitive knowledge but also with the meaning of ‘sound’. Even then, if there have to be a variety of sound which is used for the naming purpose, the corresponding external objects which are meant (signified) by those words should necessarily exist distinctively; if not, this Shabdavaichitrya (variety of sounds) cannot possibly exist - thus a meaning for this part of the Kārikā has to be imagined. For the expression - ‘Dvayanāshatāha’ - if a meaning of - the categories of Grāhyya (comprehended object), Grāhaka (comprehension)’ for the word ‘Dvaya’ (dual) - is assumed, then it will have to be perforse accepted that in order that a cognition of the categories like Grāhyya-Grāhaka of the type - ‘Prajjñāna’ (cognition) ‘Prajjñāta’ (cognizer); ‘Prajjñapti’ (the final cognitive knowledge), ‘Prajjñāpya’ (the named external object) - to accrue or occur - there invariably exists an external object as a cause; if not, it amounts to saying that this distinction of Grāhyya-Grāhaka should not appear at all. In this manner a meaning will have to be imagined for this part of the verse.

Paratantra (dependence on another thing) - which is the opponent’s doctrine - is proper and as they say - “Apart from Vijñāna there should necessarily be a Bāhyārtha (external object)” - to assert in this manner there is another Yukti too; as the Vaibhāshikas (a buddhistic school of philosophy) and the Vaisheshikas (Indian school of philosophy propounding atomic theory) assert that apart from Vijñāna for an external object to exist ‘Saṅklesha’ - meaning, grief being experienced - is a strong evidence. If there are no causes like fire etc. in the external world why at all should an Anubhava (experience) of the appearance of Duhkha, brought about by touching fire, occur? In the same way, if there is no contact or association with the benefit accruing from an external object why or how at all can there occur
Sukha? For these questions there is no consolatory answers in the philosophy of Vijñānavādins. Besides, Vijñānavādins have propounded: “Klesha (grief), Karma (action), Janma (birth) - these three together are called Saṅklesha” - (Trimshikā, a Buddhist text, p. 28) - thus they have also accepted a doctrine. It is their opinion (theory) that due to Saṅklesha (defilement of the mind) Samsāra and due to Vyavādāna (by purification of the mind) Mukti occur.

In any case, it is the doctrine of the Bāhyārthāvadin (Realist) that the Bāhyapadartha (the external object) which is the cause for Pratyayavaichitrya (variety of percepts), Grāhya-Grāhaka Bheda (distinctions of the comprehended object and the comprehension) and Saṅklesha Anubhava (experience of grief) - should necessarily exist.

Meaning: “For Prajñāpti (cognitive knowledge) there should necessarily be a cause - this fact you have accepted, being convinced by Yukti (reasoning). The fact that ‘Nimitta (cause) is not Nimitta’ - has been accepted by us on the ground of Bhūtadarshana (cognition of the Ultimate Reality).”

THE REASON GIVEN BY VIJÑĀNAVĀDIN TO SAY THAT THE BĀHYĀRTHA DOES NOT EXIST

Thus for the objection raised by the Realist the Idealist’s answer is: All right, there is the Pratiṣṭi (long-cherished, deep-seated belief) of Dvaya-Saṅklesha (grief from duality or external objects) - on the basis of this Yukti you are trying to prove that in the external world, apart from Vijñāna (intellectual awareness), there should necessarily exist an object which is the cause, is it not so? But we are saying that that Nimitta (cause) is not really the cause based on Paramārtha (the ultimate reality). To wit, what is called a ‘pot’ does not exist at all (separately, independently) apart from the form of clay; in the workaday world the common people believe that apart from a horse a he-buffalo exists; but in that manner we do not see at all these phenomena of Vijñāna (intellectual awareness) and Bāhyanimitta (the external cause) existing separately. In the same way, the phenomenon of a piece
of cloth is not seen as cloth at all by those who have cognized the truth that cloth is entirely the cotton threads alone. Similarly, those threads too are not seen separately apart from the cotton staples. In the same strain of reasoning, those who examine anything existing as it really (in its real material form) exists - if they pursue till both 'the sound' and 'the percept' end up there is nothing at all that is seen as an external 'Nimitta' (cause) whatsoever.

THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT BY BĀHYĀRTHAVĀDIN

(Objection) : Thus even after you have refuted phenomena like Ghaṭa (pot), Paṭa (cloth) etc. something or the other invariably remains as a cause, is it not so ? Then how do you say that no cause whatsoever remains ? Besides, to assert that apart from Viṃāṇa nothing ever exists is not reasonable. The fact that the appearances (percepts) of the type - "This is Viṃāṇa ; this is an object" - distinctly is in everyone's experience, is it not so ? Merely on the ground that the Viṃāṇa accrues in the forms of 'Ghaṭavijñāna' (pot-awareness), 'Paṭavijñāna' (cloth-awareness) as a separate awareness for each object, you do not deny in the manner that that kind of distinctive awareness also does not exist at all, is it not so ? Therefore, just as in the manner of witnessing (perceiving) an object alone Viṃāṇa has to thrive, in the same manner the external object too has necessarily to appear as an object for Viṃāṇa, and to this extent alone you should perforce accept (the reasoning) in accordance with the Vastusthiti (ground reality). For, Viṃāṇa and Vishaya are both appearing endowed invariably with a relationship of Vishayi-Vishaya, respectively. For this reason alone we have to acknowledge, in consonance with universal experience, that the objects like Ghaṭa, Paṭa etc. exist in many numbers as also those who know or cognize them also exist in many numbers. For, even when the Viṃāṇa is unitary or singular in our workday transactions, the objects like pots, cloth etc., are seen separately, distinctively ; as also the knowers or cognizers of these objects are also seen separately and distinctively. If it is contended that there is no other cognizer (than oneself), then consequently, you will have to perforce agree that there are no differences of the type - 'Instructing about the Viṃāṇavāda' and 'Cognizing or understanding it' - etc. Apart
from this, because the phenomenon of - 'The existence of an object' - is an object (percept) for the Vijñāna, it is to be accepted as separate only; for, only after a relationship between an already existing entity or object and Vijñāna is brought about the Vijñeyatwa (the ability to be aware or conscious of something) ensues - thus to conclude is reasonable. Astitwa (existence) is Tattiwa (ground reality) which is found in an entity or object (Vastu) without any desideration of or dependence upon another thing; but it becoming a Vijñeya (an object of awareness, cognition) especially is a thing that accrues only after it is related to the Vijñāna (cognition, awareness) of the Vijñātru (cognizer). Therefore, what you said: "Having seen or realized the Paramārtha (ultimate reality) we are saying that a Nimitta is really not a Nimitta" - is not proper. For, you have perforce to acknowledge - even if you don't desire so - the fact that - "Only when Paramārtha is seen, then only the Bāhyārtha exists" - is it not so?

SOLUTION TO THIS OBJECTION PROVIDED BY THE VIJÑĀNAVĀDIN

To this the solution that we provide is: You said that whether it is any object of the form of pot or cloth etc., or whether it is the cause for it of the form like the clay or cotton thread etc., they are invariably an object to the Vijñāna - is it not so? Even in that illustration also, you too will have to perforce acknowledge that - without assuming any special feature in the Vijñāna of the type - Ghata Vijñāna, Pata Vijñāna - those objects of Ghata, Pata etc. existing is not tenable; and so there exists a Vijñāna of the form or shape of the Vishaya or object; only after accepting that Vishayākāra (form or shape of the object) merely on that count it amounts to having realized the Tattwa (the ground reality) of the categories of Vishya-Vishayi, and so why should we at all acknowledge another object external to or outside Vijñāna? You further said that - "There exists a phenomenon called 'existence' associated with a Padartha (an object) and it is distinct from Vijneyavishaya (cognized object), is it not so?" Since that fact that - "There exists a phenomenon called 'existence' - has perforce to be imagined by Vijñāna and then has to be cognized, it amounts to saying (accepting) that
apart from Vijñāna there is nothing else whatsoever existing and so from this it does not amount to your showing any defect at all in our doctrine! Even for the arguments which you forwarded in the manner: "Vijñāna (cognition) and Vijñeyapadārtha (cognized object) - since both these are to be known or cognized mutually being dependent on (related to) each other, you will have per-force to accept that - both those phenomena (viz. Vijñāna and Vijñeyapadārtha) do exist, objects are many, those who cognize them are also many" - it amounts to our providing merely an answer by this above counter-argument alone; for, apart from Vijñāna we are not seeing any of these whatsoever. The defect of the type - "In that case, if you contend that there does not exist another Vijñāttru (cognizer), the empirical dealings of instructing about Vijñānavāda, understanding it etc., will have to disappear" - cannot also be possibly forwarded; for, even when asserting that externally there exist some objects, without any relationship with Vijñāna being there no empirical transaction is possible at all; it is enough if it is agreed that all these transactions are caused due to an excessive or abundant change alone in the Vijñāna.

ANOTHER COMMENTARY TO THE SECOND HALF OF THE VERSE

For the latter half of this verse a different version like इत्यते अपूर्वदर्शनात् can be adopted by separating words (Padachheda) and another commentary also in the following manner may be made: Nimitta (the cause) is really not a Nimitta - thus we say because there is "Abhūtadarshanāt" - meaning - an object, which is not real in the ultimate analysis, appears. For this the illustration is: In things like rope etc. what appears as snake etc. Because when phenomena like the rope-snake, a celestial city, dream, Māyā etc., are appearing, without there existing any object: externally, the forms or shapes of Grāhya-Grāhaka are seen; in the same manner, even in situations where you say - "Really we are seeing Ghaṭa, Paṭa Vishayās" - it is reasonable to infer that there do not at all exist any real objects outside. For, the fact that - "Externally objects appear to be existing" - is common (equal) to both the illustration and the illustrated example. Since what you are calling 'Nimitta' (cause) is invariably an object for the illusory
appearance (a delusion), it can be rightly said to be not a real cause. For, when the *Bhrántidarshana* (illusory appearance or delusion) of a rope-snake etc. does not exist, apart from the *Nityanirmala* (eternally pure) *Vijñānaswarūpa* (essential nature of awareness, cognition) no external object whatsoever is seen at all. It can be said that this is just like the knowledge of the mad people; those objects which appear to mentally deranged persons are not seen as such by people who are not mad, is it not so? Because a 'cause' that is imagined in the manner - "In this way it should necessarily be in our workaday transactions" - is not to be seen whatsoever in states like deep sleep etc., it has to be realized that our seeing objects is merely a *Bhrántidarshana* (illusory appearance or a total delusion) indeed.

Further, even if we interpret the word 'Prajñāpti' to mean *Shabdaprayoga* (usage of word), then also it amounts to saying that 'Nimitta' is not a *Nimitta* (cause) alone. For, it is realized by us that the ground reality (in the ultimate analysis) is like that alone. To imagine a rule of law in the manner - "Wherever there is a usage of words there should necessarily be a *Padārtha* (material object) which is *Shabdvāchya* (signified by the word)" - there is no cause whatsoever. In the *Lāṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (a Buddhistic text) it is said: "Oh great intellectual (wiseman), it is seen (in the workday world) that *Asatpadārthas* (false, unreal objects) are being dealt with or signified using words ; to wit, 'a hare's horns', 'a tortoise's body-hairs', 'a barren woman's son' - etc. are indicated by words by people in general ; Oh great wiseman, they are neither real objects nor are they unreal objects too ; even so, they are communicated by means of words. Therefore, what you stated that - 'Because there is a transaction of words, all entities or objects do exist' - that argument is not proper - (Lanka. Sūtra P. 104).

By this it amounts to our refuting 'Dvayadarshana', 'Saṅklesha Anubhava' (4-24) - of doctrines ; for, *Dvaya* (Pratyayavaichitrya, Grāhya-Grāhaka Bheda) *Saṅklesha* (suffering brought about by an object) - there is no Pramāṇa whatsoever to prove that these phenomena exist apart from *Vijñāna* ; because that they are not seen by people who are in deep sleep and such other states, it evolves that their appearance is mere *Bhrānti* (delusion) alone ;
and hence they occur with regard to *Abhūtārtha* (non-existing, unreal phenomena) alone. Thus also it can be concluded.

चित्त न संस्युष्टत्वच्या नाथामास्य तथैव च ।
अभूतो हि यतःचायथि नाथामासस्तता: पृथक् ॥२६॥

**Meaning**: "The *Chitta* (mind) does not touch the object; for that reason only it does not touch the *Arthābhāsa* (the reflection or appearance of an object). For, *Padārtha* (an object) is verily *Abhūta* (not really existing); therefore, apart from it *Arthābhāsa* also does not exist."

**IT IS AN ESSENTIAL NATURE OF CHITTA (MIND) TO SIGNIFY AS IF THERE EXISTS AN EXTERNAL OBJECT**

**Objection**: If there is no object whatsoever externally, why is it appearing? If distinct, or a variety of, objects are not at all existing, then how at all is it possible for some among them to appear to be near and some far away, as also for them to desiderate sufficient temporal, spatial and causal relationships among them? If it is true that all these phenomena lurk within the mind alone, all these should have perforce appeared within the mind internally alone; objects which have distinctions like being near or far-off should not have appeared to exist outside at all, is it not so?

**Counter-argument**: Even if we assume that externally objects do exist, you answer the query - 'How does the mind cognize the respective distinctive features of the objects?' In fact, you have already acknowledged that - 'Chitta exists internally (to the body) and the *Artha* (object) exists outside, externally' - alone, is it not so? When the Chitta touches the object, let there be various, distinct *Vrittis* (concepts) engendered in the Chitta; even then, that *Vaichitrya* (variety) of those Vrittis has perforce to be cognized by the Chitta, but it should not cognize the external objects with the shapes of Ghāta, Paṭa etc. Even so, though the Chitta cannot cognize the special features themselves that lurk within it, is it not a great wonder that the Chitta does invariably cognize the external object in the distinct manner - 'This is such and such a thing' - ?

**Objection**: All the people have believed that - "The external object alone appears in all such ways" - alone; how
is it possible to refute, discard what is thus seen in our experience by a mere Yukti deducing that it is not tenable? The Chitta cannot by itself possibly create the object, is it not so? No one is thinking in the manner - “In my Chitta (mind) a tree or a hill is created”, - is it not so? A mental concept to the effect - “That which is existing alone is appearing to me” - is engendered. It cannot also be said - “All this is Bhranti (delusion)” - for, since Saphalapravṛtti (an empirical progress with the tangible fruit) is caused, it becomes certain that it is a valid transaction alone. Even knowledgeable people are saying:

‘प्रमाणोऽध्वतित्तत्रार्थविद्ध्यात्मार्थविद्म’ (Nyāyasūtra Bhāshya 1-1-1) alone. Based on the belief that it is a fire, when people hold out their hand and if the fruit of burning accrues (is experienced), then all the people decide that their belief was Pramanika (valid), is it not? Naiyyāyikas describe the sequential order of causes for a Pratyaksha Jñāna (perceptual knowledge) in this manner: “Ātman gets the Samyoga (contact) with the mind; the mind gets the contact with the senses; the senses get in contact with the Ārtha (external object) - only then Pratyaksha (Jñāna) accrues”. It being so, why is it that the fact that - “The external object really exists” - is not becoming comprehensible to you?

(Counter-arguments) : Because of the solitary, exclusive reason that all the people are thus thinking, are you saying that the Bāhyārtha (external object) is real, or because the Chitta does not have capability of showing the external object, are you saying thus? Or, because the well-wishers like Naiyyāyikas are thus affirming alone, are you saying that the Bāhyārtha is Satya (real)? In any manner, it appears to us that this your doctrine is unreasonable alone. To wit: (i) If it is maintained that for the exclusive reason that it is appearing thus to all people, then to this we have already (4-25) given a counter-argument like: “Nimitta is not really a Nimitta”; we have also pointed out (4-24) that the Dvayasaṅklesha (misery from duality) appear due to Bhrānti. Merely saying that - “To all the people it is appearing in that manner alone” - there is no prominence or greatness acquired by cognition at all. (ii) Your second Yukti that - “If there is no external object the Chitta cannot show it” - is also not proper; for, in the dream though there is no Bāhyārtha, the
Chitta is seen showing an external object in that manner. In any case, thus because there is no cause of an external object, it (Chitta) does not signify the external object by touching it; even to say that it shows a phenomenon which appears like an Artha (object) also is not proper. In the dream there does not exist any Artha whatsoever; therefore, therein the Chitta does not show any Arthābhāsa (reflection of an object) also; in fact, it is itself appearing as Arthābhāsa. In the same way, because the Jāgrat Chitta (the waking mind) also is verily a Chitta, here (in the waking) too without touching either Artha (object) or Arthābhāsa (reflection of an object) the Chitta itself appears as the Artha - to conclude thus alone is reasonable. Here a doubt: It is proper to say that in the dream due to sleep the exhausted mind, though there is no object, by virtue of Bhrānti shows or projects an Artha; but in that manner there is no scope for the Jāgrat Chitta to show Arthābhāsa at all, is it not so? To this doubt, a consolatory answer is: We have already shown that “There is a Yukti to affirm that the phenomenon of an object itself does not exist”; for the sake of an illustration, we have exemplified the (universal) experience of a dream also. Therefore, because the Jāgrat Chitta also is invariably a Chitta alone, it is proper indeed to say that it has no contact, touch with Artha; for that reason alone it is also proper indeed to conclude that apart from Chitta there does not exist Arthābhāsa also. When Artha itself does not exist, wherefrom can Arthābhāsa come into being? Therefore, just as if a particular woman states that ‘I embraced a Vandhyāputra (a son of a barren woman)’ – it becomes a meaningless, ridiculous statement, in the same way even if there does not exist any Artha, to assert that to the Chitta there occurs an actual contact with an Arthābhāsa is a meaningless statement indeed. Therefore, to say that for Pratyaksha Jñāna there should necessarily exist either Artha or Arthābhāsa is not proper. This truth is now established.

Now (iii) you had quoted the statement of the well-wishers (Āptas) called Naiyyāyikas (in support of your doctrine), is it not so? On the basis of the above Yukti that statement (quotation) too gets established as Ayukta (unreasonable) alone. Even if we agree that apart from Chitta there exists a certain Arthābhāsa (reflection, shadowy phenomenon appearing as an entity), we will
have to say that what those people, supposed to be well-wishers, had described about the methodology of *Pratyaksha* (perceptual knowledge) is not tenable at all. For, Ātman is not one who belongs to the species of the mind, He is devoid of *Sparsha* (touch) etc; how at all can He acquire any contact with the mind? Even if we accept that somehow this contact also takes place, then we will have perforce to answer the query - “Why should Ātman in one particular known, stipulated moments of time alone get in touch with the mind?” - with a proper reason. For, without any reason whatsoever if any *Samyōga* (contact) were to take place, then all through Ātman will have to be getting in contact with the mind, or, in the alternative, He may not at all get in touch with it - it amounts to saying thus. Even though at a particular moment of time there is no *Pravṛitti* (progress or motivation) in Ātman and there is no Samyōga whatsoever, the *Artha* (object) itself through the medium of the senses may get prompted or induced (*Pravṛitta*) and may become an object for perceptual knowledge - thus also we cannot possibly surmise even. For, in that event there is no reason to say that - ‘Among the many objects in the external region only one particular known object at one particular moment of time (that one object) alone through the medium of the senses proceeds or progresses.’ Therefore, it seems to us that what you quoted is merely an ‘*Anāptōkti*’ (non-beneficial, unhelpful statement of a so-called well-wisher). Apart from this, you too will have to perforce agree that in this matter to exemplify Āptōkti (statement of a well-wisher) also is not proper. For, those very Āptas have verily opined that - “*Pramiti* (the end fruit of cognition i.e. knowledge) is a thing which has to culminate in *Pratyaksha* (perceptual knowledge); once after the object or entity is perceived by means of *Pratyaksha*, *Jiñāsā* (the ambition or desire to know) ceases” - (Nyāyasūtra Bh.1-1-3)

With regard to the present topic we have already established the truth that - ‘*Artha* (object) is *Abhūta* - meaning, *Aparamārtha* (unreal); we have also demonstrated that the *Chitta* (mind) has the capability of appearing in the form of an object on the strength of the illustration of the dream. By this line of argument alone it amounts to our refuting totally the present-day (modern) empirical, physical scientists’ theory that: “The change
or mutation in the eyes brought about by the returning, reflecting rays of light from the *Artha* (external object) pass through the nerves of the eyes and reach the brain and give rise to (cause) the knowledge of the respective or particular external object in the mind*. For, in the dream although no such materials or instruments whatsoever exist, the Chitta appearing in the form or shape of the external object is is everyone’s experience. For this a *Pramāṇavachana* (authoritative statement) is: “*Abhūtā (unreal) Parikalpa (phantasmagoria) is neither a Grāhya (comprehending subject) nor a Grāhyā (comprehended object) for anything whatsoever; on the other hand, it is merely a Vastu (entity) devoid of any Grāhyā-Grāhakatwa (categories of cognizer-cognized). Just as in states like dream etc., - apart from Viññāna (consciousness), outside (in the external region) Rūpa (form) etc., (i.e. the five kinds of sensations or perceptual knowledges like sound, touch, form, taste and smell) are not seen in the waking too. In fact, Viññāna itself in the forms or shapes of appearances of these five-fold sensations is engendered (transformed) indeed. To say that - ‘That which is the cause for a particular thing, without that cause it is formulated or engendered’ - is not reasonable. Therefore, just as in states like dream and such other experiences, in the waking too the Viññāna (consciousness) due to Sarvabijaparipāka (the ripening or fruition of all the seed forms) - is born as Arthābhāsa (an apparent appearance, reflection of an object) - thus alone it should be discerned”.- (Madhyānta Vibhāga Sūtra Bhashātaka, p. 10 of Sthiramati’s sentence). [This is the sentence which Prof. Vidhushekhar Bhattāchārya has exemplified in his commentary (Vṛitti) on ‘Āgamaśāstra’]  

**Meaning:** “The Chitta does not ever touch whatsoever the Nimitta (cause) in any of the three ways. Without any Nimitta how at all can there ensue any Viparyāsa (contrariety, error, delusion)?”

**CONCLUSION OF VIJÑĀNAVĀDA**

**(Doubt)**: It amounts to saying that without a *Nimitta*
(cause) like a pot etc., to say that it appears just like pot etc., is mere Viparyāsa - meaning Bhrānti (delusion). If that is so, then you will have to perforce say that - “Aviparyāsa (absence of delusion) is (exists) in such and such a place”. Has not the Nyāyabhāṣyakāra (commentator on the Nyāya Sūtra) stated that - “In order to determine what a particular thing is not in the manner - ‘such and such an entity’, there should necessarily be a causal support or substrate; to wit, when determining a pole, which is not a human being, to be a man, there should be a Pradhāna (a causal support); without having seen a man, to determine a pole, which is not a man (Apurusha), to be a man, it is not possible at all, is it not so?” - (Nyāya Sūtra Bhāṣya 4-2-32). Although in the waking the objects like Ghata etc. are not existing, if it is to be assumed that Chitta appears as the Ghata etc. - then for that Bhrānti there should necessarily be an ‘Abhrānti’ (non-delusory entity) existing as a substrate. What is it? - You have to say.

(Solution) : To this our answer is: In all the three periods of time, viz. Bhūta (past), Bhavishyat (future) and Vartamāna (present), in none of them the Chitta (mind) touches the Artha (external object) at all. If we were to say that - by assuming an object like Ghaṭa etc., as Nimitta - in any one particular moment (point) of time the Chitta appears as of the form or shape of Ghaṭa etc. then when compared to that thing the Chitta appearing in a different place in the shape of the Ghaṭa etc. would have amounted to a Viparyāsa (delusion). But it is not like that at all. What we have said is that - “The Chitta does not at all touch or have contact with either the Ghaṭa or the Ghaṭābhāsa” - is it not so? If being so, how can it possibly amount to saying that - “Without the cause of Ghaṭa the phenomenon of the appearance of the shape of Ghaṭa is a Bhrānti” - ? In fact, without there existing any Ghaṭādi Padārtha (entity of the type of a pot etc.) to appear in the form of Ghaṭa etc, is itself the essential nature of the Chitta. For this the authoritative statement is: In the Lankāvatārasūtra [This statement is quoted in ‘Āgamashāstra Vṛtti’ by Prof. Vidhushekhar Bhaṭṭāchārya on page 101] there is a statement that - “Because Viparyāsa alone really exists, whatever things are being seen all those phenomena are verily
Nihswabhāva (essenceless) indeed; those are not existing at all” - (Lankāvatārasūtra 10-123).

10. REFUTATION OF VIJÑĀNAVĀDA AND SHŪNYAVĀDA

स्तंभात्र जायते चिन्तिष्ठं चित्तदृश्यं न जायते।
तत्त्व परम्यति ये जातिः खे वै पश्चायति ते पदम।।२४।।

Meaning: “Therefore, Chitta is not born, nor is the Chittadṛṣṭha born; those who see its birth, they are seeing the imprints of steps in empty space only.”

VIJÑĀNA ALSO IS ASAT ALONE LIKE BĀHYĀRTHA

Beginning with the Kārikā - ‘प्रक्षेत् सत्यमिथ्यम्’ - (4-25) up to now Shri Gauḍapāda has accepted the methodology of the Buddhist who is a Vijñānavadin (Idealist) in refuting the doctrine of the Bāhyārthavadin (Realist). Now keeping his Yukti (logical device) itself as the reason, he begins to refute the doctrine of the Vijnānavādin himself.

Because what the Vijñānavādin has stated, viz. “Without the Ghaṭa etc. being there the Chitta itself is appearing in the forms or shapes of the Ghaṭa etc.” - is agreeable to Paramārtha Darśana (the philosophy of the Transcendental Reality of Vedānta) - [‘Vijñānavāda is agreeable to Paramārtha darśana’ - means, it suits or is in consonance with Yukti (logical arguments). For, without Vijñāna (empirical consciousness, awareness) the Vastu (object) is never seen at all. But from the Vyāvahārika Drṣṭhi both Vijñāna and the object of Vijñāna have invariably to exist. But from the Paramārtha Drṣṭhi both these do not exist whatsoever apart from Ātman] - it is agreeable indeed to us (Vedāntins) also. For this very reason we opine that - “Even the Chitta appearing as if it is born should necessarily have occurred without any real birth - to deduce thus is reasonable. Therefore, Chitta is never born at all. The doctrine that - ‘The Chittadṛṣṭha (appearance as an object for the mind) is not born’ - is acceptable to both, is it not so? In the same way, Chitta also is not born. It being so, though that Chitta is not born, the Vijnānavādins have imagined - ‘It is really (actually) born, as also that it is
Kšaṇika (momentary, ephemeral), it is Duḥkhi (miserable), it is Anātman (not-Self) - is it not so? In that event, they are capable of tracing the signs or imprints of the steps of the birds etc. in Ākāsha (empty space)! Just as it is impossible to keep track of the imprints of the steps of the birds who have flown away in the sky, in the same way to see the birth of the Chitta in the Nirmala Chinmātraswarūpa (Pure, Absolute essence of Consciousness) Ātman is also not possible at all for any Vivekin (discriminative person).

(Vijñānavādin): Because Vijñāna is of the essential nature of light, to say that it experiences itself by itself is not at all contradictory; in that manner alone we are cognizing, is it not so?

(Siddhāntin): Not so; for, in that event even though the doctrine of the Bahyarathavadin that - “Because the external object is appearing distinct from Vijñāna, that too should be accepted to be real alone” - had died away, it may amount to your having once again resurrected it by sprinkling Amṛta (ambrosia)! On the other hand, if you contend that - “Because the object is appearing being under the control of the Vijñāna alone, apart from that Vijñāna it is not a separate entity” - then you too will perforce have to agree, though you don’t desire so, that - “Because Vijñāna too is appearing being within the control or purview of Kūṭastha Chaitanyarūpa Vijñānasākshi (Absolute, Witnessing Consciousness of Vijñāna and of the very essence of Pure Consciousness) alone, apart from that Sākshi (Witnessing Pure Consciousness) it (i.e. Vijñāna) is not distinct.”

(Doubt): In that case, why should anything 'illumine' Vijñāna which is of Prakāshaswarūpa? When both Vijñāna and Sākshi are of the Prakāshaswabhāva, how at all can it be reasonable for you to stipulate a rule of law that - “Vijñāna alone is Bhāṣya (that which is illumined) and Sākshi alone is Bhāsaka (that which illumines)” - ?

(Solution): Although a light is of the essential nature of brilliance, it has necessarily a Chaitanya Grāhyatwa (the ability of being comprehended, cognized by Pure Consciousness) which is distinct from it, is it not so? Although Vijñāna without being able to illumine itself by itself is illumining all external phenomena, it needs Ātmachaitanya (Pure Consciousness of the Self) to
illuminine it; because Ātmachaitanya which is illumining it is by virtue of a rule of law of the very essence of illumining (all else), It is not a Grāhya (a thing which is comprehended or cognized) for anything else whatsoever; It is always Grāhaka (cognizing agent) alone - Thus what we stipulated as a rule of law is proper indeed.

Thus if it is contended that - “Because a Vastu is being cognized alone, it exists” - then because both Bāhyārtha (the external object) and Vijñāna (intellectual or empirical awareness) are invariably perceived alone - you should agree that both exist. As otherwise if you argue that - “That which is perceived by another, which is distinct from itself, does not at all exist apart from the Grāhaka which cognizes it” - then you will have to perforce agree that both Vijñāna and Bāhyārtha are Asatpadārtha (unreal phenomena) indeed. Thus the arrow unleashed by the Vijñānavādin is likely to boomerang and hit him alone. For this reason what we said, viz. “Therefore, Chitta is not born; Chittadrishya too is not born; those who say that we are seeing that Chitta being born in Chidātman are verily those who are seeing the imprints of the steps of the birds in the sky” - is quite reasonable indeed.

**AS A RESULT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS AND SHŪNYAVĀDINS TOO AJĀTIVĀDA GETS ESTABLISHED**

Here by virtue of a sentence mentioned to the effect: “Therefore Chitta is not born........” it amounts to Shri Gaudapādāchārya vociferously (unequivocally) declaring that - “Because the votaries of the various Nikāyas (schools of philosophy) within the Buddhistic fold are disputing mutually among themselves, it amounts to bringing to light Ajātivāda which is acceptable to Vedāntins indeed.”

To wit, the Shūnyavādins’ doctrine is: “Just as the Vijñānavādins are refuting the birth of objects on the ground that the Chittadrishya is not seen apart from the Chitta in all the three periods of time, in the same way the birth of the Chitta, which these disputants (i.e. Vijñānavādins) propound, can also be refuted; for, the birth of the Chitta also is not seen. In the Āryaratnakūtasūtra it is stated: “Oh Kashyapa, however much you search for the Chitta, it is not found. That which is not
found, that thing is not seen. That which is not seen, that is not Bhūta (an entity existing in the past), not in Bhavishyat (an entity coming into being in the future) or not a thing existing at present; that which is not in the past, not in the future or one that is not existing now - such a thing has no Svabhāva (essential nature of Being) at all" - (Mādhyamika Sūtra Vṛitti p.12) etc. [This is the quotation from Chandrakīrti’s “Mādhyamika Sūtra Vṛitti.”] - Therefore, since it is not seen in all the three periods of time Chitta also is not born. The Vijnānavādin may say here that - “Because the Chitta appears to itself by itself, the defect that - ‘The Chitta is not seen’ - does not affect us” - but that argument too is not proper. For, to say that - “A thing itself sees itself” - and thereby imply both Karmatwa (to be an action) and Kartrutwa (the agentship of an action) to one and the same object is not reasonable. This fact has been signified in the following manner in “Āryaratna Chūdarpapicchā” : If there is an object, the Chitta is born, is it not so? If that is so, then do you say that the object is different, Chitta is different? Or, do you say that that entity alone is Vishaya, that alone is Chitta? First of all, if you say that the object is different and Chitta (mind) is different - then it amounts to saying - Chitta are two in number. Instead of this, if you maintain that - that which is the Vishaya (object), that itself is Chitta, then how is it possible to see Chitta by Chitta? It is also not possible to see Chitta by Chitta itself. An illustration for this: Just as it is not possible to cut the edge of a sword by the edge of the same sword, just as by the tip of a finger to touch the tip of the same finger, it is not possible - in the same way by the Chitta to see the same Chitta it is not all possible" - (Mā. Vṛi. p.16).

For this the counter-argument of some Vijnānavādins is: If it is properly observed - there are no categories of Grāhya and Grāhaka at all. The form that is not possible to be cognized by means of another is indicated by negating that which it is not. Where there is no other light seen, that alone is indicated in the manner - ‘The light illumines itself by itself’ - that is all; for, not to be illumined by another is itself its Swarūpa (essential nature of Being). When the light etc. are illuminating, other thing does not have Prakāśhatva (the ability to illumine). For that reason alone, we give the illustration of a light or lamp
for Vijñāna. Even when the sense organ of the eye is functioning in the dark, the Artha (object) is not seen; but in the vicinity of the light it appears and hence it is said to be ‘Dīpaprakāśhya’ (that which is illumined by the light). However, the light etc. are not so; therefore, we say that they illumine themselves by themselves. Here it cannot be said that the sense organ is a Grāhaka. For, it is by dint of its very Swarūpa (essential nature), illumining (Pramāṇa Vā. Bhā. p.426).

For these Nāvīna Vijñānavādins’ doctrine too in the Kārikā portion of – “Chitta is not born” – it has amounted to our providing a solution. To wit, if the ultimate ground reality is observed, then since that Chitta too is Sākshigrahyā (cognized by the Witnessing Consciousness) that too is to be known as not born. In states like Sushupti (deep sleep) etc. Chitta apart from Sākshi Chaitanya has not at all been seen by anybody. The Vijñānavādin may say: “What we call ‘Ālambana Vijñāna’ is itself being called ‘Sākshi’ by you; here only the name is different but not the opinion.” But this is not proper; for, ‘Ālambana Vijñāna’ means the Kshanika Vijñāna Santāna (the serial flow of momentary awareness of the mind); to say that it exists in all the three states of Consciousness there is no Prāmaṇa (valid proof, evidence) at all. If it is affirmed like that, then there is no Upapatti (reasonable argument) whatsoever to answer the question: “How is it the Chittaswabhava that is seen in Jagrat (waking) and Svapna (dream) is quite queer each from the other?” Everyone has accepted the truth that in both these states the Svabhāva of the mind is distinct. Hence it is not possible at all to deny or refute that truth. In the doctrine of these Kshanika Vijñānavādins it is not possible to make the observed fact of – ‘I who slept alone have woken up’ – tenable by means of Yukti. Therefore, these disputants’ doctrine is verily the bravado of seeing the imprints of the steps of the birds in the sky!

By refuting the doctrine of the ancient Vijñānavādins of our country it amounts to our refuting the present-day Western Vijñānavādins’ or Idealists’ theory. The half verse with the meaning – “Therefore, Chitta is not born, nor Chittadrīshyā too is born” – is verily a thunderbolt of a weapon sufficient to refute their doctrinaire theory; for, the Yukti of the type – “Chitta is
not capable of cognizing itself by itself" - is based on universal experience. No type of disputants who have endeavoured to examine the special features of Chitta (mind) can ever possibly refute or deny that Sarvasākshi (Witnessing Consciousness of everything) which is witnessing, cognizing that Chitta itself; for, if anyone denies, refutes Its existence, it amounts to denying any support or substrate whatsoever for the examination or consideration itself of the essential nature of the mind, psyche.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SHŪNYAVĀDIN IS OPPOSED TO UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE

The Shūnyavādins (Nihilists) - who are, while they are seeing the phenomenon of everything being 'Shūnya' (essenceless), asserting that their cognition also is Shūnya - are showing more bravado than the Vijñānavādins indeed. We may say that they are people who can catch hold of the empty space (Ākāsha) in their clenched fist. Ātman who is witnessing both the Vijñāna and its Abhāva (non-existence) is of an essential nature which is all-pervading like the empty space, never having any lapse (of Pure Being or Existence) and Chitanya Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Consciousness). Any attempt or effort which undertakes either to objectify Him or to determine that He is of Shūnyaswarūpa is - just like the attempt of catching hold of the sky or empty space in one's clenched fist - an extremely impossible task indeed. For this assertion the Śruti sentences - "You cannot see Him who is witnessing the Drishṭi (vision) itself" - (Bṛi. 3-4-2); "To the Drishti of a Witness there is nothing like getting destroyed at all" - (Bṛi. 4-3-37) - which are in consonance with universal experience (Anubhava) - are the authoritative sources.

THE STATEMENT THAT MĀDHYAMIKAS ARE MAHĀVAINĀŚHIKAS (GREAT NIHILISTS) IS NOT A MERE ALLEGATION OR DEFAMATION

(Doubt) : Alleging that Shūnyavādins opine that - "Everything is Shūnya (essenceless) and their philosophy also is Shūnya" - is merely a vain, shallow blame of loading something which they have not accepted on their head, indeed! Just as they have been refuting Astitwa (existence) they have been refuting Nāstitwa (non-existence) also, is it not so? Has not Nāgārjuna in his
Mādhyamika Kārikā 5-8 stated: “Those people of low-grade intelligence who are - like the Astitwa, seeing Nāstitwa also - they do not know the Shīvatattwa devoid of any Drashtavya (sight) whatsoever” - ? The commentator of this text, Chandrakirti also has explained the original text in the following manner: “Those, who have a steadfast belief in, or affinity towards, the categories of Astitwa and Nāstitwa because they are of low-grade intelligence, do not see Nirvāṇa (Beatitude) which is Drashtavyōpashama (wherein the perception has come to a standstill), which is Mangalakara (benign, auspicious), devoid of any Kalpanājāla (ramifications of thought-constructs), of the very essence of Jñāna-Jīnaya Nivṛitti (liberated, freed from all knowledge and objects of knowledge), devoid of old age and death, Nishprapaṅcha (devoid of the world of duality), Śūnyatārūpa (of the form of essencelessness)” - (Mā. Ka. Vṛitti p.40). It being so, how at all can it be proper for you to heap unreasonable allegations on them falsely?

(Solution): This is not a false or unreasonable accusation at all; in fact, it is a genuine repetition or quotation of what those Śūnyavādins have said. For, those Śūnyavādins have stated in the following manner very clearly: It is declared that - “Because it is cognized that without there being the cataract of the eye called ‘Avidyā’ the Āryans (virtuous people) are not seeing - that Swarupa Itself is the Swabhava of these phenomena.” ‘अकृत्रिम्: स्मानो हि निरपेक्षः पत्र च’ - (Mā. Ka. 15-7) - meaning, “Not desiderating another entity is itself a Swabhāva (essential nature) which is Akṛitrīma (genuine, not deceptive or affected)” - thus our preceptor has decided. “Because this Swabhāva of the type of - ‘Bhāvas (entities) not being born’ - is nothing whatsoever (i.e. non-entity, unsubstantial), merely it is Abhāva alone and hence by virtue of their being Aswabhāva (essenceless) alone, the Bhāvas (objects, entities) have no Swabhāva (essential nature of Being) at all” - thus it should be reckoned. - (Mā. Vṛ. p. 95).

Thus those disputants who are saying that no Bhāva (entity) - whatsoever it may be - has any Swabhāva (essential nature of Being) at all - it amounts to their saying that their own Ætman also does not have any Swabhāva whatsoever. Apart from this, they raise a doubt of the type - “Bhāva-Abhāva categories do
exist, is it not so? For, one - who has begun to examine their Swarūpa - does exist indeed?” - and answer it saying - “If Bhāva does not exist, then we should ask - ‘Of which thing is this an Abhāva?’ One who is totally different from the categories of Bhāva and Abhāva and who is capable of cognizing - how can he cognize Bhāva and Abhāva categories themselves?” (Mā. Kā. Vṛi. 5-6, p.40). Thus nothing whatsoever exists. One who examines them, i.e. ‘I’, also does not exist. Because they say thus, what we have stated that - “They opine that everything is Shūnya and their own Darshana also is Shūnya alone - thus they argue” - especially is not at all a false, unreasonable allegation or accusation at all. This fact is established now. Further, they say : ‘स्वभावं परभावं च भावं चाभावेऽवेभं परस्यन्ति तत्स्वादहि बुद्धपादस्यानः’ - (Mā. Kā. Vṛi. 14-6, p. 96). meaning - “Those who say that they are perceiving Swabhāva as well as Parabhāva, Bhāva as well as Abhāva - they are not cognizing the Tattwa (Reality) of Buddhāpadesha (instruction of Buddha)” - thus they are even criticising their own people as not being Āgamajñas (those who know the traditional method of teaching). ‘न शुन्यं नापि वाशुन्यं तत्स्मात् सर्व विद्यमाते’ - (Mā. Kā. Vṛi. 160) - meaning - “We do not say whether it is Shūnya or Ashūnya. One should perforce say it is Shūnya ; it may be said to be Ashūnya also ; both are there, both are not there - thus for the sake of empirical dealings we have stated.” (Mā. Kā. 22-11, Vṛi. p. 94-169) - thus they say that even ‘Shūnya Darshana’ is Shūnya only ; “Although the sky or empty space, a hare’s horns, a barren woman’s son - all these do not exist at all, they appear ; in the same way, all Bhāvas are being imagined by people” - (Mā. Kā. Vṛi. p. 196) - thus if we have called these disputants who are asserting that all Bhāvas are extremely condemnable - ‘सत्त्वशून्यवादिनि:’ - it is in consonance with their doctrine alone. In this there is no defect or mistake whatsoever committed by us. Thus we should properly discern.

THE INFERENCE THAT SHŪNYA MEANS THE TATTWA WHICH IS THE SUBSTRATE FOR ALL MENTAL CONCEPTS IS NOT HAVING ANY TRUE SUPPORT, EVIDENCE

In recent times some scholars - [This opinion is expressed
in Prof. T.R.V. Murthy’s ‘Central Philosophy of Buddhism’ - which is a treatise describing or explaining the doctrines of Mādhyamika Tattwa Darshana] - have conjectured in the manner: The Shūnyavādins are calling the Paramārtha alone which is non-conceivable by the intellect or beyond the ambit of the intellectual knowledge by the name ‘Shūnya’ and not calling either Sarvabhāva (a phenomenon devoid of all essence) or Tuc̄iha (something contemptible) Shūnya. For this assertion the authoritative or supporting statement is:

(84x1071) ‘मुद्देरोणीत्सत्त्त्वबुद्धि: संबोधितस्य:’ - (Bodhicharyāvatāra 9-2) - meaning, “That which is not conceived by the intellect (Buddhi) is itself the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality) ; Buddhi itself is said to be Samvīriti (cover, concealment)” - thus it is the meaning of the half verse. For this Paramārtha another name is ‘Prajñāpāramita’. It becomes Abhivyakta (clearly manifested, revealed) as one’s experience only after determining the truth that all the Dharmas (entities) are seen or appearing by virtue of the system of Pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination). Therefore, the allegations made against the Shūnyavādins is indeed a mistake, which is unreasonable. One should not doubt in the manner: “In that case, it will amount to saying that Prajñāpāramitā itself is Tattwa and thereby Shūnyavāda also will be rendered to be a particular Drishti (viewpoint) alone, is it not so?” For, ‘Prajñāpāramita’ is of the Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being) which examines, analyses all viewpoints ; how at all can that be included among the Vimrīshya Drishtis (viewpoints which are themselves being examined or analysed) ? Because it is itself a Vimarshaka (examining agent or subject) alone, it is not another viewpoint - thus it gets evolved. For this his opinion this new researcher quotes certain authoritative, substantiating statements and they are: ‘शून्यता सर्वतृतीयोऽन्यो निष्कर्ष निःसर्यं जिनेऽ:। येषोऽधून्यता दृष्टिस्तत्सत्साध्यान्त चतुदिकोऽपि॥’ (Mā. Kā. 13-8, p.88) meaning, “Shūnyatā (essencelessness) is one which invariably refutes all Drishtis (viewpoints) ; it being so, those to whom Shūnyatā also is meant to be a Drishti they are impossible (i.e. outrageous or intolerable) people” - this is the meaning of this Nāgārjuna’s Kārikā. Further, to say that - ‘Prajñāpāramitā’ is itself Paramārtha the authoritative quotation is: ‘प्रज्ञापारमिता ज्ञानमद्वृख
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- (Abhisamayālāṅkārālōka Sūtra, p.28) - a statement of Dīnāgā; here both the words - ‘Prajñā’ and ‘Tathāgata’ are said to be one and the same entity alone - this is their (Shūnyavādins’) opinion. ‘न खलु प्रज्ञां भिक्षु: सत्कार्य कार्य मन्यचयः। धर्मार्यपरिविभिन्नतितो नाम भिक्षुवो दक्ष्यत्स्येष च तथागतकायो भूतकोटिप्रभावितो यदुत प्रज्ञापारमिता’ - (Abhisamayālāṅkārālōka Vṛitti, p.94). Here too Prajñāpāramitā is called ‘Bhūtakōti’ and hence it is saying that it is ‘Paramārtha Tattwa’ - this is the new researcher’s (i.e., Prof. T.R.V.Murthy’s) opinion. It is his surmise that this being called ‘Buddhamātṛu’ is a significant pointer to conclude that Prajñāpāramitā itself is the Paramārtha (Ultimate Reality).

In this regard our considered opinion is: This researcher’s surmise is not proper. For, Nāgārjuna and others having described in their works that Prajñāpāramitā is ‘सर्वप्रयोज्यपारमी’ is not to be found anywhere. (i) To the question: ‘If the fact that - Prajñāpāramitā is the substrate for all Vikalpas (concepts) were itself their opinion why did they not stress this fact?’ - there is no possibility of an answer being met here.

(ii) ‘शून्यता सर्वदृष्टिनां’ - the meaning that this examiner has given to the Nāgārjunakārikā : - is not the proper one. For, this verse has been written to remove the wrong belief in case anyone reckons that Shūnya also is a Bhāva (entity, existing real thing). Chandrakīrti also has written a commentary expressing the same opinion. His relevant statement is: “How to remove, and by what, Bhāvābhīhinivesha (steadfast belief that real objects exist) in the minds of those who have a deep affinity in believing Shūnyata also to be a Bhāva (real entity) ? Those people who are smearing or tainting a defect on to the great medicinal herb have been invariably refuted by Tathāgatas who are supreme diagnosticians and great medical experts” - (Mā. Vṛi. p.88). Therefore, this evidence which the Professor has adduced is not the genuine supporting proof at all.

(iii) ‘प्रज्ञापारमिता ज्ञानमेध्य सा तथागतज’ - Especially with regard to the statement: The fact that it is endeavouring to determine the question - ‘For the word ‘Prajñāpāramitā’, which is the Gouṇārtha (secondary meaning or sense) and which is the Mukhyārtha (predominant meaning) ?’ - is known from the Vākyasheshā
(remaining portion of the verse): ‘साध्यात्मकार्योपयोग तात्त्विकत्वान्त्रयं गत्यमार्गयोः’
- is the latter half part. Both Advayajñāna and Tathāgatatwa are
Sādhyā (possible to be achieved) ; therefore, the word ‘Prajñā-
pāramitā’ signifies both those in the Mukhyavrātti (predominant
sense) ; Grantha (text) and Mārga (path) - both these are signified
in the Gouṇavrātti (secondary sense) ; for, as Tādarthya - since
it is wanted, needed for Sādhyā - both those are called in that
manner. The statement - “A plough is life” - means - “It is a
valid means for living” - is it not so? In the same way, here
too the word ‘Prajñāpāramitā’ indicates both the text and the path
in the secondary sense only - this is the implied meaning of the
sentence. Therefore, here to say that - ‘Paramārtha (the
Absolute Reality) Itself is Prajñāpāramitā’ - there is no support
seen. It being so alone, in the text called ‘Abhisamayālāṅkāra’
there is a sentence : "प्रज्ञापरमिता ज्ञानमिथ्यासा तथागतः"; on the validity
of this sentence - “Here Prajñāpāramitā means Tathāgata alone”
- (Abhi. Sam. p.153) - thus it is stated. Haribhadra has quoted
this sentence in Abhisamayālāṅkāra and has exemplified : "प्रज्ञा
भगवान् मायोपम् ज्ञानमिथ्यम्" (Abhi. Sa. p.28) - the purport being
“Because it is vociferously, stridently stated that Advayajñāna is
‘Māyopama’ (an illustration for magic or illusion) - how at all
can it be accepted that such a Jñāna is ‘Paramārtha’ (Absolute
Reality) ? Haribhadra himself has at another place - it is to be
found - stated : ‘Rūpa (form) etc. are phenomena devoid of
Swabhāva - how come?’ - thus raising a doubt, he has an-
swered : “Because it has been propounded that Prajñāpāramitā is
something that is Swabhāvashūnya (devoid of any essence), it
amounts to propounding that the rest also are devoid of any
Swabhāva” - and in support of this he further says : “Prajñāpāramitā
is something which has neither Sāmānyarūpa (genus of form) ;
nor is it something which has any Vishesharūpa Lakṣaṇa (sym-

(iv) "एष च तथागताः पूवकोटिप्रमावितो यमत प्रज्ञापरमिता" - By means
of this, it amounts to our clarifying the intended purport of the
(above) sentence. For, there it is stated expressly that Dharmakāya
alone, in the predominant sense, is Prajñāpāramitā. This has been
mentioned in the Abhisamayālāṅkāra itself in the following
manner: ‘प्रजापारमिता ज्ञानमद्वय सा तथागत:’ - by virtue of this Nyāya (reasoning, axiom) in the Mukhya Vṛtti (predominant sense) Tathāgata who is Dharmakāya is Himself Prajñāpāramitā Shabdavācyha (the object indicated by the word ‘Prajñāpāramitā’); therefore, because by worshipping the ‘Mātṛu’ (mother) which illuminates that, it amounts to worshipping Dharmakāya who is Sarvajñā Jñāna (omniscient) - a very great merit accrues” - (Abhi. Sa. p.181).

(v) To the question - “Is it that Prajñāpāramitā is called ‘Buddhamātṛu’?” - it is said that - “It is not for the reason that it is the Paramārtha which is the Upādānakārana (material cause) for Buddha also; on the other hand, we have called it like that for the mere purport of indicating that - ‘If it is practised, ‘Buddhatwa’ is attained’ - thus it may be understood. Apart from this, it is further stated that: “Because in the ‘Bodhisattvāvastha’ by the practice of Mātṛu one attains Buddha, by that means Sarvajñatwa also accrues. While one is in the Buddhāvasthā, by exhibiting or demonstrating Prajñāpāramitā to the disciples Prajñāpāramitā is influenced by Sarvajñajñāna - in this manner since there is a relationship of Hetu (cause), Phala (fruit, effect) between these two, if one salutes, invokes Prajñāpāramitā it amounts to invoking Sarvajñajñāna alone” - (Abhi. Sa. p.298) - thus it has not only been stated that Prajñāpāramitā is the cause for Buddhatwa, but also that the fruit, benefit of Buddhatwa being instructed is to be seen - and hence in what manner we have adopted (stated) their doctrine is the correct one - this fact is decided beyond doubt now.

(vi) Further, even Tathāgata also cannot possibly be said to be the Paramārthataattwa. For, in the textual portions like - “One who has come into being by desiderating another Bhāva (entity) - he cannot be reckoned to be Ātman; one who is not at all Ātman - how at all can that Tathāgata exist?” - (Mā. Kā. Vṛi. 22-3, p.158); “Tathāgata has no Swabhāva (essential nature of Being); this Jagat (world) also does not have Swabhāva” (Mā. Kā. Vṛi. 22-16, p.162) - etc. it has been propounded in such portions of the Madhyamika Śāstra that Tathāgata also is of Nihswabhāva (devoid of any essential nature of Being).

(vii) Merely on the one ground of having called by various
names like “Bhūtakōti” etc., it cannot possibly be asserted that Prajñāpāramitā is Paramārtha; for, by indicating it also these names might have come into vogue. This fact also Haribhadra has expressed clearly also: “The phenomenon of Bhūtakōti is Dharmadhātu (origin of Dharma); because it signifies it Prajñā-pāramitā has gained that name” - From all these several reasons it is established that in the Buddhists’ Sāstra - the doctrine that - “There exists a Paramārtha which is the substrate for all concepts (Vikalpas)” - is without any authoritative or convincing support or evidence.

**THE EXAMINATION OF Prajñāpāramitā**

Whatever all this may be. Even if we assume that the Buddhists affirm that - “Prajñāpāramitā is the substrate for the entire Vikalpa Prapañcha (imagined world of duality)” - alone, then the defect of their giving up their doctrine of Nairātmya (absence or non-existence of Ātman) entails them; besides, it amounts to their accepting that very Sarvātmavāda (theory that everything is Ātman alone) alone which is acknowledged (nay, expounded by) Vedāntins who say: ‘स एषोपचित्तद्वित्त्वभर्तिं सर्वम्’ - (Chh. 6-8-4), meaning - “This extremely subtle Reality is there, is it not so? That alone is the essence of all this world.” - etc. This is not acceptable or desirable at all at anytime to the Shūnyavādins. As otherwise, if it is contended that this ‘Advayaparamārtha’ (non-dual Absolute Reality) is quite different from that which the Vedāntins propound as ‘Advaitaparamārtha’, even then it may amount to saying that it is verily Vījñāna which their fellow-Buddhists Vījñānavādins propound. For, that ‘Prajñā’ is invariably to determine that no Dhāma (object, being) - whatsoever it may be - is not born, is it not so? Because it exists along with Dharmas which are Parasparāpeksha (mutually dependent upon one another for their existence) only, the doctrine that it exists is itself untenable. Just as Vījñāna cannot survive or thrive without the Bāhyārtha, in the same way with regard to this Prajñā also we have to conclude. “Because ‘Prajñā’ means the Dharma (essential nature of being) of the Dharmas (beings, entities), this defect cannot possibly taint our Siddhānta (philosophical teaching)” - thus too it cannot be argued; for, Vījñānavādins also can contend in the same manner. Some
**Vijñānavādins** (Idealists) are also asserting always that - “The impurity of the form of Grāhya-Grāhaka is appearing due to Avidyā alone; but Vijñāna is *Nityanirmala* (ever pure).” To say that - “One can attain the experience of Prajñāpāramitā in a particular kind of Samādhi which is got by means of the *Shūnyabhāvana* (feeling of essencelessness)” - also will not become an uncommon feature of Shūnyavādins; for, the Yōgāchāra Vijñānavādins (yet another school of Buddhists) also invariably propound that Vijñāna is experienced in a particular Samādhi. It being so, the defect of ‘keeping or taking an individualistic experience which is not acceptable to everyone equally as their supporting evidence’ is faced equally by these two disputants indeed. Apart from this, just as this Prajñāpāramitā, which is not of an ascertained, settled nature of Dharmas, is formulated in the waking state, in the same way, according to any other particular disputant’s doctrine, the Prajñāpāramitā’s *Siddhi* (attainment) also may become possible in the dream state wherein it is of a fixed or settled form of Dharmas existing therein. The fact that that Prajñāpāramitā should necessarily be quite different from the Prajñāpāramitā of the waking state is to be accepted by everyone indeed. It being so, for the **doubt** of the type - “Between these two, which Prajñāpāramitā should be enthroned and hailed as the real one?” - there is a great deal of scope to be raised in this doctrine.

Let this too be there. Only after deciding, on the basis of *Yukti* (reasoning) only, the fact that there is no *Swabhāva* (essential nature) whatsoever for Dharmas (entities, beings) - this Prajñā is established on the basis of *Parishesha Nyāya* (aphorism according to which a verdict is based on the remainder of a statement in a text), is it not so? The genuine doubt that - “*Without the support of Sārvatrika Anubhava* (universal experience) how at all can this be installed on the high pedestal of Prajñāpāramitā?” - may also be anticipated reasonably. It is not possible to raise an objection of the type - “Even that Anubhava - whether it is real or unreal, false - how can we say? - since there is a scope for such a doubt to arise, this counter-argument is not proper” - also. For, no one can ever say that this Sārvatrika Anubhava itself does not exist, and hence that Yukti alone which has its (i.e. Sārvatrika Anubhava) support is
to be necessarily accepted by everyone as ‘Sadyukti’ (proper, real logical device) ; if not, if by means of any particular Yuktyābhāsa (shadowy, fake reasoning) another Yukti is struck down, we may have to accept that too (such a pseudo-reasoning also) to be a Sadyukti ! Therefore, it becomes established that this Darshana (philosophy) which the Shūnyavādins have imagined, conjectured in order to stabilize their this dogmatic theory of - “All the Dharmas are verily Shūnya” - is not to be acknowledged at all.

SHŪNYAVĀDA IS OPPOSED TO SĀRVATRIKĀNUBHAVA

Because this Shūnyavāda is opposed to Sārvatrikā Anubhava also this should not be accepted by those people who aspire for Shreyas (Beatitude). To wit, because, with regard to the two states of waking and dream, when one exists or is experienced the other is not there at all - the truth of life that both those states are evidently unreal or false appearances indeed is evolved on the basis of universal experience alone ; it being so, it evolves from this that the Sākshi (Witness) to these two states is Ātman who is Nirvikalpa (beyond any imagination object or concept) at all and that He alone is verily everyone’s Ātman. In spite of this universal truth, discarding such a clincher as this Sārvatrikā Anubhava, these disputants have obstinately affirmed that Ātman too is verily Shūnya. But to insist that Ātman does not exist it is not possible for anyone - whosoever he may be ; for, he who persists in saying that Ātman does not exist - he himself ‘exists’ as Ātman. Here in this context anybody may say : “Svapna (dream) means an Anubhava which is cognized only by a particular individual ; it being so, how at all can it be reasonable, proper to say that Ātman is established on Sārvatrikā Anubhava ?” This objection is not proper. For, everyone has acknowledged that Svapnānubhava (the experience of dream) does exist, and hence there is no room whatsoever for any difference of opinion to arise with regard to it. Here we are not at all endeavouring to prove that the Bhāvas (objects, phenomena) which appear within the dream are either real or false, unreal on the support of Sārvatrikā Anubhava. On the other hand, we have undertaken the task of merely signifying the truth that - “One who witnesses both the waking and the dream is Ātman for everyone” - ; that is all. To say that - Ātman who is
established in this manner does not exist - is not possible whatsoever. Merely on this count it evolves that Shūnyavāda is opposed to Sārvātrika Anubhava. If observed deeply, to prove that - ‘The waking is a state which is common to everyone, while dream especially is an uncommon state experienced by that particular person or individual’ - is not possible at all for anyone; in every Avasthā (state of Consciousness) the world that appears lurks, subsists within that particular Avasthā alone - this truth has been already demonstrated in the Vaitathya Prakarana; in the forthcoming verses too this truth will be proved. Therefore, it stands established that this methodology of Shūnyavāda is certainly opposed to Anubhava.

THE TATTWA (PHENOMENON) OF PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ

Here in this context there is an important point which has to be pondered over carefully and discerned: Here the Buddhists have endeavoured with great gusto to prove that - “Prajñāpāramitā helps determine the Naiḥśvabhāvyā (essencelessness) of all Dharmas (beings, things)” - is it not so? It is not our intention to show that in this doctrine there is not the least bit of truth at all. For, what these disputants have accepted as this Prajñā (awareness) is merely a Vṛitti (concept) of the Antahkarana (mind) alone; this is depicting everything always being associated with the Ābhāsa (reflection, shadow) of Ātman who is Prajñānāgahanā (a veritable lump or homogeneous mass of Consciousness, Awareness) indeed. What is seen there (i.e., in the Mind or psyche reckoned in its entirety) - of whom it is an Ābhāsa - that Ātman is verily Prajñānāgahanā; for, He is of the Chaitanya Swarūpa which is Kūṭastha (Absolutely existing) and A vyabhicharita (immutable). Merely in His vicinity, as it were, the Antahkarana (i.e., Mind) becomes Chidvyāpta (pervaded, permeated by Pure Consciousness) and Chidābhāsa (reflected as if it is Consciousness, awareness) and assumes various mental concepts or thought forms and acquires various names of ‘Prajñāna’ etc. In the Śruti: ‘यदैलिगुद्दपत्र नस्तवैतन्त। सन्तुत्तानानं विज्ञानं प्रज्ञानं मेधादुष्टपुर्वतदेवाशीणम् जूति: स्मृति: संकल्पः क्रुद्धस्य: कामो वश इति। सर्वपाण्येवात्ततुनि प्रज्ञानस्य नामादेवाविरी वविति ।’ - (Aitareya 3-2) - Ajñāna, Vijnāna, Prajñāna - etc. all these are also stated to be the various names of
Prajñāna. For that reason alone, the people by virtue of their Prajñā (awareness) are deluded to think that all this is totally ascertained, determined. That Prajñā which is being called by various names like Chitta, Buddhi, Vijñāna etc. is - from the Vyavahāra Drīṣṭi - one each for every person; for, it has perforce to function with a particular adjunct (Upādhi) being alone. According to the methodology which the Yōgis have accepted, that (i.e. Prajñā) increases by Bhāvana (meditation or contemplation) and when it reaches its consummate stage it becomes extremely pure and radiant and yields particular Siddhis (magical or mystic powers). Those who have attained such Siddhis and who are endowed with Vishuddha (supremely pure) Sattwas (those having such Chitta) are called ‘Sarvajña’ and ‘Siddhas’. Because in this Avasthā having attained Dharmas (excellences) like being extremely pure and immensely subtle one remains in close vicinity to Ātman, not only may this Prajñā be capable of determining the Paramārtha of all Dharmas (beings, objects) but also the Yāthātmya (essential nature of Pure Being as It is) of Paramātman who is really Asanga (unattached); but for that the Saṃskāra (refinement) especially gained through the Upadesha (spiritual instruction) by an Āchārya (preceptor) who has acquired the Āgama (traditional methodology of teaching the Reality in accordance with the time-tested Śāstras and Sārvatrikā Pūrṇa Anubhava) has yet to accrue. Now, this Prajñā which is there as the Ābhāsaśwarūpa (the very essence of Being for this reflection), being an Ātman (Self, the very core) alone for all Prajñās (various empirical awarenesses), quite different from all of them, being Sarvasākshi (the Witnessing Principle of everything), is it not? - That alone is the Pratisthā (substrate) for the whole universe. For this conclusion the Śruti sentence: ‘सर्व तत्त्त्वात्मेऽत्मने प्रतिलिखित प्रज्ञाने लोक: प्रज्ञा प्रतिश्च प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म’ - (Aitareya 3-2), meaning, “All this has an eye called Prajñā. It is established in Prajñāna; the people are the Prajñā eyes; Prajñā Itself is the Pratisthā (substrate); Prajñāna Itself is Brahman” - is the authoritative source for it. This Prajñā which is Nirvishesha (devoid of any special attribute), which is Niraṅjana (devoid of any blemish), which is Nirmala (devoid of any impurity), Nishkriya (devoid of any action), Shiva (auspicious),
Shānta (blissfully quiescent), Eka (unitary), Aja (unborn), Advaya (non-dual) is Itself Brahman (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality); because It is the Ātman for everyone, It cannot possibly be and in any manner either rejected or acquired by anyone - whosoever he may be. Therefore, what we said earlier that whether it is any attempt of making or converting this Ātman as a Karma (action) [i.e., any attempt at predication of Him], or whether it is an attempt to reduce Him to Shūnya (essenceless) alone is akin to the vain endeavour of catching the empty space in one’s fist is proper indeed. In this matter nothing more remains to be said in detail.

THE TEACHING WITH REGARD TO PRATĪTI (CHERISHED BELIEF) ABOUT CHITTA (MIND) AND CHITTA DRISHYA (OBJECTS SEEN BY THE MIND)

Here there lurks a secret: It is a well-known fact of life that all of us know indeed, viz. in states of Adarshanavrittis (absence of any mental concepts) like Sushupti, Samādhi etc. wherein there are no concepts whatsoever of distinctions like external and internal, nor distinctions of Vījñāna (intellectual awareness) or Vījnāya (object of intellectual awareness) - Advitiya Ātman alone who is verily Prajñānaghana (a homogeneous mass or lump of Pure Consciousness), is in one’s Anubhava (Intuitive plenary experience). In such a kind or species of Avasthas - it is stated in the Śrutis that - the whole universe of the form of duality has blended and become one with Vijnānātman (Self, Pure Awareness or Consciousness) which is of the essential nature of Paramārtha (Absolute, Transcendental Reality): ‘स यथा सोम्य वर्यासि वासोवृत्तं सप्तप्रतिष्ठिते ऐवं है तत्स्वर पर आत्मनि सप्तप्रतिष्ठिते……’ - (Prashna 4-7) etc., meaning - “Oh, Soumya, just as the birds return in the evening to their respective residing nests in a tree, in the same way all that (i.e. the diverse phenomena of the universe) return to Paramātman and become one with Him. Prithivi (earth) and its Tanmātra (subtle element) of Prithivi, Ap (water) and its Tanmātra, Tejas (fire, light) and its Tanmātra, Vāyu (air) and its Tanmātra, Ākāsha (empty space) and its Tanmātra, the Indriya (sense organ) of Chakshus (eyes) and the seen object, the sense organ of Shrōtru (ear) and the object of hearing, the sense organ of Ghrāṇa (smell) and the object of smell, the sense organ of
Rasana (taste) and its object, the sense organ of Twak (touch) and its object, the organ of Vāk (speech) and the Vaktavya Vishaya (object of speech), hands and the objects they hold, the organ of Upastha (procreative organ) and its object of pleasure, Payu (the excretory organ) and the matter which it excretes, Pādas (legs) and Gantavya (going), Manas (the mind) and Mantavya (that which is thought about), Buddhi (intellect) and the object that is to be cognized by the intellect, Ahaṅkāra (ego) and the act of owning, Chitta (memory) and the object to be remembered, Tejas (fire) and the object to be illumined, Prāṇa (the vital force) and the object to be upheld - all these have become one with Paramātman; This Purusha (Being) who is Vijñānātman and who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, cognizes, does any act, - He too merges in the Paramātman called ‘Akshara’. That Tattwa (Reality) which is Advaya, Eka, Shiva and Shānta and which is being experienced in these Avasthas like Sushupti (deep sleep) etc. - that is Ātman alone. This Ātman alone who is devoid of any changes of increase or decrease, devoid of divisions like Pramāṭrū (cognizer), Pramāṇa (valid means of cognition) and Prameya (the object of cognition) - is being realized by those who observe (Intuitively) deeply within the dream and the waking experiences - thus it is stated. It is not possible to think or fancy that for the Vyākṛta (manifested) and Avyākṛta (unmanifested seed-form) Prapāṭha (world of diversity) which keeps on appearing in all the three Avasthas there may be another cause which is its substrate. Even the Prapāṭha which appears in the diversified form of Pramāṭrū, Pramāṇa and Prameya - at the very time of its appearance too - is being illumined by Sākshi Chaitanya alone and appears as if having an existence totally depending, relying on It (i.e. the Witnessing Pure Consciousness) alone and not existing by itself independently at all. Therefore, because it becomes tantamount to saying that - this Ātman alone, who is of the essential nature of Advitiya, Aja, Advaya imagines or conjectures Himself by Himself in a manner which is impossible to be argued out and settled in the form of the world comprising Pramāṭrū etc. it evolves that - “Ātman both in the form of Chitta (mind) and in the form of Chittadrīshya (objects seen by the mind) is manifesting Himself - all this is verily Māyika (illusory)
Thus alone it has been taught in the Śruti sentence: ‘एव योनि: सब्बस्य’ - meaning “He alone is the cause (the womb) for everything.” Shri Gauḍapādāchārya also has explained, clarified the real purport of the Upanishadic sentence in his Kārikas like - “This is the essential nature of the Deity” - (1-9) ; “This Dvaita (duality) is Māyāmātra (merely illusory)” - (1-17) ; “The deity called ‘Ātman’ is conjuring up Himself by Himself by His Māyā” - (2-12) ; “Inside (internally) those which are Chittakālas (mental temporal concepts) are merely imaginary” - (2-14) ; “First He imagines the Jīva” - (2-16) ; “This is that deity’s Māyā alone” - (2-19) ; “Everything is that which is created by Ātmanmāyā (Ātman’s illusory, magical power) alone” - (3-10) ; “This is separate only by dint of Māyā” - (3-19). Here we have elaborately explained and demonstrated this much only: Without realizing, cognizing this Tattva (Transcendental, Absolute Reality of Brahman-Ātman) Buddhists like Mahāvaināśhikas (Nihilists) Vijñānavādins (Idealists), Bāhyārthavādins (Realists) - just like the four congenital blind people who touched the various parts of an elephant and made wild, bizarre conjectures - have been imagining this Ātmatattwa in all sorts of ways, arguing with one another and finally have helped reveal this Ajātivāda.

11. THE CONCLUSION OF THE YUKTI WHICH ESTABLISHES THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR SVABHĀVA TO CHANGE

अजात जायते यस्मादानिति: प्रकृतिस्ततः।
प्रकृतेन्त्यथाभावो न कर्घ्यितः भविष्यति॥२९॥

Meaning: “That which is not born is itself born, is it not so? Therefore, Ajāti is Prakṛiti; to say that Prakṛiti changes is not possible in any manner.”

NOT BEING BORN IS ITSELF THE SVABHĀVA OF CHITTA

Because we have proved, demonstrated that none of Kārya-Kārana Sambandha, Hetu-Phala Sambandha, Vijñāna-Bāhyārtha Sambandha - (relationships) can possibly be justified, defended, it has been thereby established that Brahman is devoid of birth and Eka (one). Now, it was stated at the beginning (4-6) that -
“For the Ajāta Dharma alone the disputants are saying there exists Jāti (birth), is it not so? That was established by taking recourse to the Yukti - “To adduce Anyathābhāva (an alien, unnatural existence) to Prakṛiti (essential nature of Being of a thing) is not proper”, and then the resultant effect of that logical device is being concluded here.

Chitta means Ajātabrahman alone; this truth we have already indicated by making it tenable by means of Yukti. Because the disputants are imagining that this Ajātabrahman alone is ‘born’ in the form of Chitta, it amounts to saying that Ajāti alone - not being born itself - is its Prakṛiti (essential nature of Being). Because to affirm that the Tattwa, which is of the essential nature of not being born, is born in the form of Chitta - amounts to saying that for Prakṛiti itself there exists another alien, unnatural existence (Anyathābhāva) - it is not proper, reasonable. The name ‘Prakṛiti’ is not suitable, applicable to the Swarūpa (essential nature of Being) of an object which keeps on changing, is it not so? Hence, all disputants who champion Jannavāda perforce have to agree that ‘Jāti’ - ‘being born’ - is Māyika (illusory) alone. This fact we have already explained in the commentaries on 4-6 and 7; that should be adduced here too and understood. For, here too on the pretext of refuting the Buddhistic tenets the Ajādvayabrahmavāda alone has been concluded and not merely the refutation of Jātivāda - meaning, the doctrine that entities (Vastus) are born - alone is not the ultimate goal.

12. IN PARAMĀRTHAJĀTIVĀDA (THE DOCTRINE OF THE ULTIMATE REALITY BEING BORN)
BANDHA-MŪKSHA ARE NOT ESTABLISHED

अनादेर्तवर्त्तेचं संसारस्य न संस्त्यति।
अनन्तता चादिमथो भोक्ष्यस्य न भविष्यति॥३०॥

Meaning: “It cannot be established that Samsāra which is Anādi (beginningless) has an Anta (end). Mōksha which has Ādi (beginning) cannot also be established to be Ananta (endless).”
YET ANOTHER DEFECT THAT LIES IN JĀTIVĀDA

In the doctrine of those disputants who say that - 'Samsāra (i.e. Bandha)-Moksha, which occur to Ātman, do really exist' - there lies a defect of the type that - 'Prakriti acquires another (alien) nature' - this fact has been signified so far. Now Shri Gauḍapāda is pointing out yet another defect in their doctrine.

If it is contended that both Bandhāvasthā and Mokšāvasthā are Paramārtha (Absolutely real) alone, then it has to be agreed that they occur one after another ; for, just as the acts of standing still and wandering about are not possible at one and the same time, in the same way Bandha-Moksha - which are mutually opposed to each other - cannot possibly exist to one and the same person always. If it is contended that they occur one after the other, then it will have to be conjectured either they have a cause or there is no cause whatsoever, is it not so ? First of all, (i) especially it is not possible at all to say that Bandha-Moksha occur without any Nimitta. For, if Bandha is accepted to be Nirmimitta (devoid of a cause) then it amounts to saying that it can never be got rid of ; if Moksha is assumed to be Nirmimitta. then it amounts to accepting that there is no need whatsoever of practising any Mokshasādhanas. Then, in that event, Bandha being Heya (that which can be discarded, given up), Moksha being Upādeya (that which can be acquired) - this distinction itself will be rendered untenable, inapplicable.

(ii) Further, if it is contended that they have another cause, then they themselves become non-existent and it amounts to saying that they are not Paramārtha alone. As otherwise - (iii) If it is further contended that - 'Samsārabandha being Anādi exists at the beginning itself, whereas Moksha, occurring after that, is Nitya (eternal) ; for, by means of Jñāna alone Moksha has invariably to accrue' - then, that way also it does not suit. For, to say that Samsāra which has no beginning will come to a standstill - is not possible to be established by Yukti ; for, in our workaday world there is no illustration to show or support the theory that a thing which is Anādi is having an Anta (end). It is not possible to doubt in the manner : 'The seed-sprout continuum - though it is Anādi - is one that has an end, is it not so ?' ; for, the phenomenon of 'Santati' (continuum, series)
is not a \textit{Vastu} (entity) - thus we have already provided a solution. Therefore, that which is \textit{Anādi} - for it there is no possibility of an \textit{Anta} occurring.

In the same way, when \textit{Jñāna}, which has an \textit{Ādi}, accrues - for the \textit{Mōksha} - which is born or caused - \textit{Anantatwa} (endlessness) does not become suitable, applicable. If it is said that - 'Just like the destruction of \textit{Ghaṭa} etc., though it is having an \textit{Ādi} it may be \textit{Ananta}, is it not so?' - that is also not proper; for, the phenomenon of \textit{Vināśa} (total destruction) is not a \textit{Vastu} (entity), but \textit{Mōksha} is \textit{Bhāvarupa} (of the nature of an existing entity). Therefore, to assert that - '\textit{Mōksha}, which has an \textit{Ādi}, may be \textit{Ananta}' - \textit{Vināśa} cannot be an apt illustration; for, then the undesirable theory of - '\textit{Mōksha} is not \textit{Paramārtha} (absolutely real)' - entails it. Apart from this, \textit{Nāsha} is not an entity at all; because, just like the hare's horns which are not entities at all, \textit{Nāsha} (destruction) too is \textit{Avastu} (non-entity), the theory that - 'It has \textit{Ādi} but no \textit{Anta}' - is not tenable. The concepts like - \textit{Pragabhāva} (non-existence prior to birth), \textit{Pradhvamsābhāva} (non-existence after destruction) etc. in \textit{Abhāva} (non-existence) which are imagined, conjectured by logicians are mere phantasmagoria indeed; for, there does not at all exist special features of the type - 'It is such as this; it is such as that' - in \textit{Abhāva} (non-existence).

\textit{Abādāya} tē jñānātī tadāmbāneṣṭi pita tathā।

\textit{Pitāy:} sadoṣā: santoṇā-vijaya eva laksita: \textit{1.31.1}

\textit{sambhyojana} tēṣām svāne vipraśṭēṣyate।

\textit{tattvādāyādhvāndveśe mādhyam khalu te śṛṣṭa:} \textit{1.32.1}

\textbf{Meaning} : "That thing which does not exist in the beginning and at the end, it does not (exist), in the same manner, in the present time too. The objects, being equal or common to what is false alone, are appearing as if they are not false. To think that they have benefit is like giving scope for a contradictory opinion in the dream. Therefore, because they have a beginning and an end they are said to be false alone."
SINCE THE OBJECTS SEEN IN THE WAKING ARE FALSE
ALSO BANDHA-MÖKSHA DO NOT EXIST

In the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa (2-6 and 7) for these very verses a commentary had been given. Because - (a) in the waking for the various objects there exist beginnings and ends; (b) their being endowed, invested with Artha (existence), Kriyakāri (capability of acting, functioning) gets falsified in the dream, it evolves that they (i.e. objects) are false, unreal alone - with the intention of driving home the truth that - 'Both Bandha and Moksha, that have necessarily to accrue (occur) in the waking alone, are verily false, unreal' - here once again those very same verses have been repeated. That is all.

Meaning: “All the beings or objects (Dharmas) which appear in the dream are verily false; for, they appear within the body. How at all is it possible to see those Bhūtas (things) in this limited or restricted space?”

SINCE THE CAUSE OF BANDHA DOES NOT EXIST ALSO SAṂSĀRA ETC. DO NOT EXIST

From this verse uptill - ‘प्रहणान्तरागतिवधा’ (4-37), in all these verses there exists an explanation alone of the expression “We say Nimitta is Animitta indeed” - (4-25). In order to clarify that statement alone here the illustration of the dream has been adduced. Although Shri Śaṅkara has taken up the dream illustration in the Bhaṣṭya on the Kārikā (4-26) : ‘चिर्च न संस्मृतत्वपूर्णं’ - in the original it is not seen; especially here, on the other hand, the Kārikākāra himself has shown the fact that between the waking and the dream there exists a similarity in all respects, and on the strength of that evidence - wanting to conclude the prime purport of the Prakaraṇa of ‘Ajātivāda’ - this Avasthāsāmya (equality, similarity of the two states) has been explained. Apart from this, incidentally with a view to showing that Saṃsāra and Mōksha do not really exist, it is being established that - “Jāgrat (waking) too is, like the Svaṃpa (dream), Mithyā (unreal or false).” This is being explained in these verses. Therefore, adduc-
ing the dream illustration here in this context is quite apt and reasonable.

All the Ātmanṣ (beings) who appear to exist endowed with special attributes of Kāryakaranasaṅgha (the conglomeration of body, senses, mind etc.) in the dream are verily false; for, they appear within the body only. How is it possible to see so many creatures in such a restricted space? Just as in the Vaitathya Prakarana, we should discern that here also from the waking viewpoint alone this illustration has been given. Really speaking, in the dream neither the Chitta (mind) nor its cause exists in substance; neither Dvayadarshana (perception of duality) nor the experience of Samklesha (misery) exists substantially (i.e. in reality) therein. In the same way too, in order to drive home this truth ‘that - In the waking also neither the Chitta (the mind) nor the Chittadṛishyas (mental concepts) exist whatsoever’ - it is first stated that the substantial conglomerations of body, senses etc. do not exist therein.

Meaning: “It is not proper to say that they go therein and see the objects; for, in order to travel therein the sufficient temporal regulations do not exist in that space or region. Besides, no one who wakes up - whatsoever he may be - exists in that region (of the dream).”

IN DREAM THERE DO NOT EXIST ANY GATI (GOING) AND ĀGATI (RETURNING)

Just as there exists in the waking a rule of law with regard to the question as to how much time is needed for anyone to go anywhere and again return - in that manner there does not exist any rule of law in the dream to the effect that the same time is needed for such an event. For, the time therein is not that long or protracted at all; the space is limited, restricted. Therefore, it is not possible to assert that therein one really travels to another region and sees various objects.

मिन्त्रः: सह संस्मृतः प्रबुधः न प्रपदते ।
ग्रहीतः चापि यत्किल्निच्यं प्रतिबुधः न परस्यति ।३५॥
Meaning: “One who has had a discussion with friends and then who got awakened, does not believe (that). And if he had taken or borrowed something, the one who has woken up does not see (it).”

WHAT IS SEEN IN THE DREAM DOES NOT EXIST IN THE WAKING

Just as to go to another place there does not exist sufficient time or space, in the same way in order to see an object the necessary organ of sight or the action does not exist therein (i.e. in the dream) - thus it has been stated here. A person often discusses with elders or subordinates etc. and decides to do a particular thing in a particular manner, is it not so? In the waking it is realized that that particular discussion itself did not really take place; by such decision or action what was to be achieved that fruit also is not found in the waking. Even for a different reading of ‘संबुध्दो न प्रपद्यते’ the same meaning is there. Gold or any other valuable thing that is acquired in the dream is not to be found in the waking. For this reason too, in the dream a person has really gone to another place - this phenomenon is rendered false.

In any case, it has been evolved, established that because thus there does not exist at all any Karana (valid means of action) for Dvayadarshana (perception of duality) or the Kriyā (action) necessary to achieve a particular action, or the Anubhava (experience) of the Samklesha (misery) that is engendered by performing a particular job - there is no cause whatsoever (which is real and rationally viable, feasible) entertained or envisaged for the Svapnachitta (the dream mind). Apart from this, because the Chitta that exists in the dream is invariably of a quite different essential nature than that of the Jāgrat Chitta (waking mind), immediately on waking - the dream mind by itself becomes nonexistent, and for this reason also it is false indeed.

Thus the two verses that are mentioned here have a meaning which was previously explained in the commentary on - ‘अदृष्टव्यवाच्च कालस्य’ (2-2) ; even so, in order to demonstrate the truth that - “That which appears as a Nimitta (cause) for Chitta (mind)
is really not a Nimitta at all” - these verses have been mentioned again. Hence there is no defect here of repetition.

Meaning: “The body that is there in a dream is verily unreal; for, another body which is different from it is being seen. Just as the body, in the same way all that is Chittadrishya (seen by the mind) is Asatya alone.”

THE BODY ETC. WHICH ARE SEEN IN THE DREAM ARE ALL FALSE INDEED

The body which appears to be wandering about in the dream is false indeed; for, apart from it, in the region of the dream itself, the waking body often appears. It is not possible at all to imagine that for one and the same person especially two bodies exist, is it not so? Just as the body seen in the dream is unreal, in the same way for the same reason - to wit, another (a similar) body is being seen in the waking also and as soon as we wake up it gets falsified or sublated - the whole gamut of the objects seen by the dream mind is determined, established to be Asatya (unreal) indeed.

Thus it is now established that all the Drishya (scenario) seen outside (or externally) and inside (or internally) in a dream is verily false, unreal. In the same way, in the waking too everything is false only; for, it is also Chittadrishya (that which is seen by the mind) alone. Therein (i.e. in the dream) what is stated as ‘Chittadrishya’ is only for the sake of Upalakshana (as a representative example); here (i.e. in the waking) not only the Drishya (what is seen) but also since Chitta (mind) is itself Chittadrishya, it is Asatya (unreal) alone - thus we should conjecture. In the original the intended purport behind the word - “Avastuka” is: All that which is seen (i.e. object for the mind) exists without any substantiality alone. We have perforce to determine by the usage of the ‘Ka’ pratyaya (the suffix of ‘Ka’) that therein there does not even exist the Vāsana (subtle impression or taint, proclivity) of any Vastu (entity) apart from the Draṣṭṛu (seer). Because the waking too is equal or similar to dream in all respects, it is also verily Asat
THE UTILITY OF (PURPOSE SERVED BY) HAVING ADDUCED THE DREAM ILLUSTRATION

Here what we have to discern is: Assuming what is established (or rather staunchly believed by everyone) in our workaday transactions (Vyavahāra) that the states of waking and dream are different, distinct states - alone and then further assuming for the time being that the dream beings, as also the dream body, senses etc. are false and according to that same line of argument or reasoning and adopting the tenet that the waking is also false, unreal - this Yuktī which the Vijnānavādins use - we utilize (follow) here too and have concluded that - 'Chittadrishya - all of it - is false'. However, the Vijnānavādins - keeping as their objective the doctrine that - 'The Svapnachitta does not have an object at all' - and on that analogy that - 'The waking mind too does not really possess an object at all' - are attempting to establish on the basis of inferential logic. Although in the Vaitathya Prakāraṇa in the Kārikā portion of - 'स्वप्नागतिस्यायने ब्रेकमाङ्गमिनिषिण:’ - (2-5) etc. after it was propounded that: “There is no difference whatsoever between the waking and the dream; for, both these 'exist within (internally)' - (अन्त:स्थानत) - although the Parama Siddhānta (final spiritual teaching) of - 'कल्पयत्यत्तत्त्वात्मानप्र’ (2-12), meaning - “Ātman Himself has imagined, conceived in Himself the Jīvātwa etc. forms” - has been depicted, there it was undertaken to mention that - “The Aja-Advaita-Ātman, who is instructed through the traditional Śāstraic methodology (Āgama), can also be taught by means of Upāpatti (reasonable arguments).” However, here the cause or reason for assuming this different methodology is only to show the fact that: First, according to the method of the doctrine of Vijnānavādin refuting the Jātivāda (doctrine of birth) which is acceptable to the Bahyārthavādins (Realists), and then, by utilizing that same Yuktī of Vijnānavādins (Idealists) alone with a view to refuting their doctrine of - “The Utpatti of Chitta (the birth of the mind)” which is acceptable to them - the mere Anumānaprakriyā (inferential methodology) itself which is approved by them only is adopted; from this the truth
that - "As a result of the debate among these disputants even, the truth that Advayatman is verily (birthless)" - gets evolved.

13. BECAUSE THERE IS NO MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAKING AND DREAM ALSO AJÅTIVÅDA GETS ESTABLISHED

Meaning: “Because it appears just like the waking alone, the dream is felt to be having that alone as its cause. Because it is endowed with the causation of that, to him alone the waking exists - thus it is felt."

THE WAKING STATE IS NOT COMMON (SIMILAR) TO EVERYONE

So far we have - following the dream illustration - established the truth that - "Ajåti alone is Paramårtha" - by showing that though the waking world appears with the differences of Gråhya-Gråhaka invariably, it is Asatya alone. Now in order to indicate the truth that - ‘By means of establishing the fact that there does not exist any mutual relationship between the waking and the dream also Ajåtivåda alone is established’ - this forthcoming textual portion is dedicated.

First of all, because the waking state is common experience to everyone it is quite different, bizarre from the dream and thereby the deep-seated belief of those people who have reckoned it (i.e. waking experience) to be Paramårtha (Absolutely real) alone is being refuted. The intended meaning of the verse is: To say that the waking object is not really existing this too is a cause. Because the dream - just like the waking - is appearing with forms like Gråhya-Gråhaka, some people have believed that for that dream experience the waking itself is the cause. Because the dream is the effect of the waking alone, we should invariably infer that one who sees the dream - he alone has the waking state and should not assert that for the rest of the people too it is common. In fact, one who sees the dream - to him alone the dream experience exists and not to the others -
thus all of us have invariably agreed, is it not so? Even so, that
dream appears to all those people who exist therein as if it is
‘common experience’ at that particular time (i.e. during the dream
time), is it not so? In the same way, the waking too which
is its cause, though it appears to be a common experience to
everyone (those who are within the waking state), really it -
just like the dream - belongs to the one individual (who is
awake), indeed; to believe that it is common experience to
everyone there is no valid reason whatsoever. Here we should
discern the secret that in this context, assuming the
Vyāvahārikasattva (the empirical reality of things or phenom-
enon) alone and on the basis of the axiom (Nyāya) of Adhyātma-
Apavāda (Superimposition and Rescission) it has been stated that
- “To him alone it is Sat or real” - thus we have to reckon.
However, here from the Paramārtha Drishti it has not been
acknowledged at all that really the waking is the cause for the
dream. [In fact, there cannot be any mutual relationship inferred
between two phenomena which never co-exist in one and the
same time-space continuum and there is no possibility whatsoever
of those two co-existing at any future period of time].

\textit{तत्त्वादस्याप्रिष्ठत्वादं सर्वदेहाहहि}
\textit{न च भूतादपूर्वस्य सम्भोगस्ति कथयन्नचैः}

\textbf{Meaning}: “The phenomenon of being born itself being
\textit{Aprasiddha} (not established), it is being said that everything
is \textit{Aja} (unborn). Because this is the truth, to say that a non-
eexisting thing is born can never be tenable in any manner
whatsoever.”

\textbf{TO SAY THAT DREAM IS THE EFFECT OF WAKING
ALSO IS NOT TENABLE}

As stated in the previous Kārīka thinking that - some people
may believe that the statement that the dream is an effect of the
waking is itself the absolute truth - here it is shown that that
statement is not one that can be acknowledged.

Here the opponent may raise a \textbf{doubt} of the type: Even
if we agree that the waking is the cause for the dream, it cannot
possibly be said to be, just like the dream, false only. For, dream
is merely a Vikalpa (wild imagination); but, on the other hand, the waking, being a common (experience) to everyone, is an entity which really exists. Although, since the dream is caused, brought about by the Vāsanā (subtle impression) of the waking, it may be said to be verily the effect of the waking - one who is in the waking and due to whose Vāsanā alone the dream is caused - his alone is that Vikalpa indeed. A rope may be the cause for an imagined snake; one who imagines it also may be said to be its cause; merely on that count, it does not amount to saying that the rope also is false and the person who imagines it also is false only - is it not so? Apart from this, it is seen also that there exists a great difference between waking and dream; to wit, dream is extremely fickle, unsteady; for, it keeps on changing from moment to moment. One person alone in one day alone may see many dreams which are extremely bizarre, each from the other. But waking is not like that at all. Everybody - those who are in the waking - are recognizing it in the manner: "That alone is this" - is it not so?

(Solution): To this our answer is: For the Avivekins (non-discriminating people) this alone is proper; but from the viewpoint of the Vivekins (discriminating people) it is not established that - "Any object whatsoever is born." Therefore, because 'birth' itself is not established, in the 'Vedāntas' (i.e. Upanishads) it is stated that - "Everything is Aja (birthless) indeed." We have already mentioned in the Vaitathya Prakarana a proper consolatory explanation for the doubt raised about the difference (or contradiction, opposition) between the waking and the dream - which the opponent also has agreed. That same solution should be remembered here also.

Now, what the opponent has reckoned that - "From the waking the dream has been caused (is born)" - that understanding too is not proper. For, in our workaday world no one has seen a false thing having been born from a real entity; none of us has ever seen anywhere non-existing hare's horns etc. being born, is it not so? For the illustration of the rope-snake which the opponent had mentioned we have already given a counter-argument. Neither is a snake born from a rope, nor it merges in the rope; neither in the dream the snake is born, nor does it merge; neither from both these it is ever possible for it to be
born. Hence, it is merely a misconception (wild imagination of the mind) alone - thus we have already stated. Therefore, even if we accept that waking is real, from it a non-existing dream can never possibly be born ; it being so, to say that - 'From the waking, which is itself non-existent, a dream that is non-existent being born is not possible in any manner' - where is the need at all?

THE BENEFIT FROM THE YUKTI THAT IS EXEMPLIFIED HERE

Here this aspect should be carefully discerned and imbibed. When it is established that - "Between the waking and the dream there does not exist any relationship of cause and effect" - by the reasoning of the type - "All this is Aja (birthless) alone" - even after such an extremely satisfying consolation, explanation has been provided - the reason for having provided yet another Yukti (logical device) is : It is indeed the intention that - "To those who have a great fascination for logical, dialectical arguments let there be a firm conviction created with regard to any subject-matter that is established by the valid means of Āgama (Śāstra or a traditional methodology of teaching)". That is all, and not that by means of this purely inferential or syllogistic logic the Ajātivāda can be established. In all the three previous Prakaraṇas too it has already been propounded in a more detailed and clearer manner the truth that there is no relationship whatsoever between the waking and the dream. Even after we have demonstrated, proved by means of some Upapattis (logical arguments) of the type - (a) Both the waking and the dream are verily Viparyāsa (delusion, mistake) by means of the reason that they are both having Ādi and Anta ; (b) they are the support or substrate for objects or phenomena which have Chittakāla and Dvayakāla ; (c) both those states are merely the Manahspandana (vibration of the mind) caused by Māyā (illusion) etc. - if there are any persons who are not able to comprehend the teaching that there is no relationship whatsoever between the two states of Consciousness - for such people how at all by merely listening to the bare singular Yukti of the type - "From that which is existent a non-existent thing cannot be born" - any abiding, lasting faith be created?
Meaning: "Seeing what is unreal in the waking and getting engrossed in it, a person sees that in the dream also. (But) seeing that which is unreal in the dream, one who has woken up does not see it."

**WHAT KIND OF A CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN WAKING AND DREAM?**

(Doubt): You only had said that - "For the dream that (i.e. waking) alone is the cause" - (4-37), is it not so? It being so, now your saying that - "Utpatti (being born, coming into being) is something which is unestablished" - is opposed to that, is it not so?

(Solution): Please listen, we will tell you as to what kind of Kārya-Kāraṇa-Bhāva has been accepted by us in our doctrine, teaching. Seeing an Asatpadārtha (unreal object) which is wildly imagined - just like the rope-snake - in the waking, getting completely engrossed in it and thinking about that alone in the dream too he sees Asatpadārthas alone in the forms of Grāhya-Grāhaka. And in the dream having seen the unreal object alone, on waking up he does not see it. Because in the original text of 'Drishṭā Cha’ the word ‘Cha’, meaning - ‘and’ - which is a word signifying or connoting a link or combination, has been used, what is seen in the waking is often not seen in the dream - there is such a possibility - this meaning should also be added here. In any case, thus what Asatpadārtha alone one sees in the waking he sees that kind of a phenomenon again in the dream; merely on this ground we have stated that the waking is the cause for the dream but we have not stated it at all invariably assuming that - (a) whether the cause or the effect is absolutely existing; (b) the object which one sees in one particular state an object equal to that alone he sees in another state. Everywhere all Drishya (seen objects) is Kalpita (imagined) alone - thus we have previously (2-16) stated too. Therefore, from the Paramārtha Drishṭi the tenet that - “There is no relationship whatsoever between the sets of objects seen in the waking and the dream” - is itself our Siddhānta (spiritual teaching) indeed; for,
between two objects which are unreal - like between a barren woman's son and bow made out of hare's horns - there is no relationship whatsoever, is it not so? In the same way, the fact that there does not exist any relationship whatsoever is reasonable also.

नास्त्यसङ्ग्लुककमसत्तु सदसङ्ग्लुकक तथा ।
सच्य सङ्ग्लुकक नास्ति सङ्ग्लुककमसत्तु कुतः ॥१५०॥

Meaning: "An Asat (unreal) thing which has a Hetu (cause) which is Asat does not exist; neither there exists a Sat (real object) which has a Hetu (cause) which is Asat (further), a Sat which has a Hetu which is Sat also does not exist; then how can there exist an Asat which has Sat as its Hetu?"

THE PHENOMENON OF 'JANMA' WHICH IS SUBSTANTIAL ITSELF DOES NOT EXIST AT ALL

Having accepted the theory that between the waking and the dream there exists a cause-effect relationship which is Māyika (illusory), we have said like this. But from the Paramārtha Dṛṣṭi, for any object or thing there being a possibility whatsoever of any cause-effect relationship existing with any other object in any conceivable manner is not tenable, suitable at all.

To wit: A hare's horns etc. - such an Asat object being a cause for another Asat - for example, for a flower in the sky etc. - there is nothing of this kind at all anywhere. In the same way, for an existing earthen pot etc. a hare's horns etc. which is Asat being an effect is not seen in our workaday world. In the same way, we have not seen a Satpadārtha (a real entity) also for which Sat alone is the cause. Then, where is the question of seeing an Asatpadārtha (unreal object) which is the effect of a Sat (real object)? There is no other manner or method whatsoever in which this relationship of cause-effect can possibly exist; nay, even to imagine that a relationship exists it is not possible at all. Is it not so? Therefore, from the viewpoint of discriminating people the relationship between cause and effect categories is itself not established - this is the implied meaning here. In the
Kārikā : 'स्वत: वा परतो वाचि' - (4-22), keeping in mind the essential nature of a Vastu (entity) that is being born it was stated that - "It cannot possibly be born by itself or from another" - etc. ; here, after stating that the types or kinds of objects, which may possibly have the cause-effect relationship, are so many only (i.e. enumerating and exemplifying them) the teaching that - "Among those kinds, in no manner whatsoever, an entity, object ever is born" - alone has been justified in another method. Hence there is no defect of repetition here.

Śūnyavādins too have written a Kārikā - "It is not possible for an object (Bhāva) to be born from a Bhāva" - (Mādh. Kā. 21-12, p. 151) etc. which has this very same opinion, and have depicted their own Siddhānta saying in the manner - "Disputants (Vādins) are always arguing among themselves, one with the other, and hence nothing whatsoever is born; this doctrine alone evolves from it." But between these two doctrines (viz. that of the Vedāntins and of the Buddhistic Śūnyavādins) the salient differences between them are : "In the Nāgārjuna Kārikā the Jātivāda (doctrine of birth) has been refuted from the viewpoint of the waking alone and there itself it has come to a standstill; but here because it is decided that - 'Between the waking and the dream there does not at all suit any cause-effect relationship in any manner' - the truth that both the states are merely wild imaginations has been signified in everyone's experience; further, our methodology has reached out, extended up to the Sākshi (Witnessing Pure Consciousness) which is totally different from those two states indeed.

Although in the Vedānta Siddhānta also the teaching that - "Ajātabrahman also is born in an illusory (Māyika) manner" - has been acknowledged, it is not opposed to Ajātivāda; this fact we have already stated in the past. Especially those who assert that - "In the Absolute sense alone (i.e. in the Pāramārthika viewpoint alone) there is birth" - for such people it is not possible at all to justify or provide any proof for 'birth' in any manner whatsoever; therefore, from their doctrine also it has amounted to their having evolved Ajātivāda alone; this particular fact has been established here. Hence, the Yukti that is mentioned is inviolable, incontrovertible indeed.
The Essential Gaudapada

Meaning: “Just as in the waking due to misconception beings which cannot be imagined are touched (contacted) by him as if they are real, in the same way in the dream too due to misconception only he is seeing the beings therein only.”

IN WAKING AND DREAM NON-EXISTENT THINGS ONLY ARE WILDLY IMAGINED

‘Although the waking and the dream are unreal alone they have a cause-effect relationship’ - thus those who say, their doubt is once more solved and thereby Ajativada is being firmly established here; due to Viparyasa - meaning, because one has not deliberated upon the extreme difference (Vailakshanya) that exists between the Vastu (entity) which is Sadrūpa (of the very essence of Reality) in the Absolute sense, on the one hand, and the waking and dream states, on the other - the misconception (Viparitabhāva) that is caused has got itself embedded, rooted in the mind - and hence just as any one in the waking state imagines that he is coming in contact with phenomena like the rope-snake etc. which are Achintya - meaning, which can neither be imagined as things having changes like birth and destruction etc. nor as things having a particular cause - as if they are Bhūtavastus (really existing entities) - through the respective senses - in the same way due to Viparyāsa (misconception, delusion) he is seeing therein only the various beings; in fact, he is wildly imagining (Vikalpa) that he is seeing; really speaking, they are not born out of the waking.

Here the reason for exemplifying objects like rope-snake etc. only which are Achintya (unthinkable, for which it is not possible to imagine any birth and death, nor having a particular thing as their cause) alone is: In order to refute the theory (doctrine) that - ‘The dream is born or caused by the waking’ - the example that is given should necessarily be common both to the general run of people and the examiners; that is all, and not at all for any reason like - ‘For misconceptions of the type of a snake etc. objects like rope etc., which are the substrate, are Suchintya (capable of being imagined, conceived by the mind)
and thereby Paramārtha (Absolutely real).’ In the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa (2-6) it was stated: “It exists as equal alone to the objects which are false and appears as if real” - and thereby it was affirmed that - “All objects are false only” - is it not so? Therefore, all the objects that exist in the waking and the dream are verily Asat alone; for them it is not possible at all to imagine any kind of cause-effect relationship whatsoever. This alone is the implied purport here.

Here an important point that should necessarily be remembered is: Objects like rope-snake etc. are Achintya; neither their essential nature of Being nor their cause can possibly be imagined by the mind - thus Shri Gauḍapādāchārya has stridently, vociferously stated. It is not possible at all to imagine that these are born from either the external things like the rope etc. or the internal mind, or even from both these together. Therefore, these are mere (wild or weird) mental imaginations alone - thus Shri Śaṅkarāchārya, the Bhāshyakāra, also has written. It being so, the present-day commentators (called Vyākhyaṇakāras) have misconceived and misinterpreted these authoritative and traditional teachings to say: “In the rope the snake etc. have (actually) taken birth after being transformed (Parināma) as a result of a particular type of Avidyā (which they have newly, erroneously coined as ‘Mūlāvidyā’).” Thus having forwarded a new conceptual theory which even the common run of people cannot possibly believe, they have erected a huge barrier, as it were, to genuine Vedāntic Intuitive deliberation. Since this new-found doctrine is opposed to Ajātivāda - the teaching that - “Whether it is Sat (real), or Asat (unreal), or Sadasat (real as also unreal), nothing is ever born at all” - this present-day dogmatic doctrine (of Mūlāvidyāvāda) should be shunned by every discriminative seeker; thus a conclusion gets established by itself.

14. THE REASON FOR ADVOCATING THE EXISTENCE OF BIRTH IN THE VEDĀNTIC SIDDHĀNTA ALSO
Meaning: “For the sake of those who are saying that the Vastu exists because it is appearing as also because of religious duties, practices and for the sake of those who are always afraid of Ajāti the tenet of Jāti (birth of things) is being instructed by the Buddhas (knowledgeable people).”

JANMA IS INSTRUCTED AS A DISCRIMINATIVE DEVICE FOR THE BENEFIT OF AVIVEKINS

Knowledgeable Advaitavādins too are instructing about Janma, is it not so? ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जाप्ते’ - (Tai. 3-1), meaning - “From which these creatures are being born” - etc. - by such Śrutis also ; ‘अहं सर्वत्र प्रप्तः’ (Gītā 10-8), meaning - “I am the cause for everything to be born” - etc. - by such Smṛitis also ; ‘स सर्वकालेऽ कर्णाति सर्वस्य’ - (Mōksha Dharma 30-2-12), meaning - “He creates everything at the time of creation” - by such Purāṇavachanas - it has been stated even by Jñānis that Janma exists, is it not so? But all these are not instructed to indicate that really (in the Absolute sense) there exists a phenomenon of birth. On the contrary, it is taught by way of a subtle device (Upāya) to Āstikas (believers in the Śāstras) of limited ability of discrimination (Alpavivekins) who have staunchly believed that the objects really exist, because the objects appear in the external region and they are accessorial aids, instruments for performing or observing the religious duties as per the scriptural Varnāśrama Dharmas - so as to enable them to cognize, Intuit the Aja-Advaya Tattwa. “Let them first assume this Janma to exist ; after they follow and practise Vedāntic teachings, automatically the truth that - ‘Aja-Advaya Itself is the Tattwa (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality)’ - will be Intuited, cognized” - this alone is the purport behind all these teachings and not what is instructed just now - i.e. ‘Janmavāda’ is itself the Paramārtha (Absolute Truth).

In that case, if it is asked : “For those Jijnāsus why is it that directly the Ajāti itself has not been taught?” - then we answer : “Because they are always afraid of Ajāti.” Because those Shrōtriyas (people who listen to the scriptural texts) are endowed with Sthūlabuddhi (gross, indiscrete intelligence), they have staunchly believed that Ahampratyayagamya (what people are saying - ‘I’, ‘I’) Ātman alone is the really real Ātman as also
Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala (action-means of action-its fruit) are Paramārtha alone; therefore, for them Aja-Advaya-Vastu means ‘fear’ always. To wit: Their fear lurks in the manner - “If Ajāti alone is real, then why should Ārūḍha like - ‘A Brāhmaṇ should perform sacrifice’; ‘One who is a Svargakāma (desirous of attaining heaven) should perform Yāga (sacrifice)’ - etc. will be rendered invalid! Even the empirical transactions will have to be treated as false only, is it not so? In that case, we ourselves - it amounts to saying - do not exist, is it not so?” Therefore, according to their level of understanding the teaching about the existence of ‘Janma’ has been imparted. That is all, and not that this instruction of the existence of Janma is meant to indicate it to be verily Paramārtha (i.e. Absolutely real) ; “Because this entire world of duality is born from Brahman alone, exists in Brahman alone and finally merges in Brahman alone, it is verily of Brahmaswarupa - let this Viveka (discrimination) dawn in them too in stages, gradually!” - with this prime intention alone this phased-out methodology of teaching is adopted. It has already been stated that - “This is verily a Upāya (device) for coming down to the level of the intellect (i.e. it becomes within the purview of the common man’s level of intelligence, comprehension); but there is no distinction whatsoever” - (3-15), is it not so? The same tenet is being mentioned in a different manner as: “The reason for the knowledgeable people to have instructed Játi is that it is meant for those who are afraid of Ajāti.” That is all.

INSTRUCTION ABOUT ‘JANMA’ IS NOT AN ERROR ON THE PART OF JñāNIS

(Doubt): Although the phenomenon of Janma itself is really existing, why is it instructed that it exists? From this does it not amount to their (i.e. Jñānis, the knowledgeable traditional teachers) being verily cheats?

(Solution): Not so. Because they keep in mind, or take into consideration, the level of understanding, comprehension of the seekers (who wish to qualify for this highest, sublime knowledge) and then instruct in this manner, it is not possible - not reasonable - to level this kind of a defect, blame whatsoever against the Jñānis. In fact, it is a subtle attempt on their part to have first assumed that very staunch belief of those who have
given full credence to the deep-seated belief that - “Because the object is appearing and is an instrument for the performance of Karmas, it is really existing” - as a subtle device and then to have taught the Paramārtha (the Ultimate Reality). They have first accepted the Janma which is established in our workaday transactions and then they have taught in the manner that - “All this is a Māyika (illusory) Srishṭi (creation) caused by Brahman alone; it is not at all created by sentient things like Pradhāna (or Prakṛti) etc.” Because this Upadesha (spiritual instruction) based on the Adhyārōpa Dṛśhti (viewpoint of deliberate Superimposition) is rescinded, sublated later on in the Upadesha on Aja-Advaya-Tattwa, there does not exist any error whatsoever in their teaching. With this very purport in mind the knowers of the Sampradāya (traditional methodology of spiritual instruction) have stated : - (Gīta Bhasālya, 13-12), meaning - “By virtue of the axiom of Adhyārōpa-Apavāda (Superimposition and Rescission) the Tattwa (Reality) which is Nishprapāṇcha (devoid of any world of duality) is taught in full detail.”

(Doubt) : Even if it is so, does not the defect of having uttered a lie entail them? Even though the phenomenon of birth does not really exist, they have taught that it exists, is it not so?

(Solution) : Not so. For, they have not at all instructed, preached so in the Pāramārthika-(Absolute) sense. Although the Shishyas (disciples) have believed firmly that the Dvaitavastu really exists, in the Absolute sense, none of the Dvaita-Vikalpas (misconceptions of duality) of the type - ‘Śāstra’, ‘Shishya’, ‘Guru’ etc. does exist whatsoever in reality; this alone is the Paramārtha Siddhānta (the Absolute philosophical or spiritual teaching of Advaita Vedānta). It being so, the fact that the knowledgeable people (i.e. Jñānis) are teaching ‘Māyika Janma’ is also mentioned from the Avidyā Dṛṣṭi alone. For that reason alone, we had previously stated : “This doctrine was taught for the purpose of Upadesha” - (1-18). Therefore, it is not possible at all to doubt at any time any defect whatsoever being there in Aja-Advaya-Vāda.
Meaning: “Those who are afraid of Ajāti because the Vastu is appearing and have given it up, for them the defect of having accepted Janma is not established; even if there is a defect, it will be a small one indeed.”

FOR THOSE WHO HAVE TAKEN TO THE VEDIC PATH EVEN BY ACCEPTING JANMA THERE IS NO DEFECT

(Question): Why should the Jñānis instruct those qualified seekers who are Vaidikas (following the Vedic tenets) and who have obstinately held on to the belief that Bheda (difference, distinction) does exist? If they affirm that there exists Janma, how at all can it be said that by that a defect does not arise?

(Answer): Those who - out of a deep-seated belief that the Vastu exists because it appears as also it is an instrument, implement needed in the performance of righteous scriptural rituals - have discarded Aja-Advayavāda and are behaving contrary to its teachings - to such people who are afraid of Ajāti no defect will entail them because of their belief in the existence and of Jāti, because they have full faith (Śraddhā) in Veda-prāmāṇya (authority of the scriptures as valid texts) and they have taken resort to a sacred path which is Vedōkta (stipulated by the Vedas). For, they have followed a Vivekamārga (a path of discrimination) alone which removes the defect of Jāti (birth). For that reason alone, the Karmas and Upāsanas stipulated in the Vedas are instructed for their benefit, is it not so? The real intention behind this scriptural instruction is: “Let Chittashuddhi (purification of the mind), Antarmukhatwa (introvertcdness) - these qualities be engendered in them and systematically, step by step, they will consider the source of Vedānta; let this Ajāti Tattwa alone flash in their hearts!” For that reason only, since they are invariably guiding along the royal (safe) path which in the ultimate analysis will enable them to reach Aja-Advayavāda alone - they are not affected by the Jātidōsha (defect of accepting, believing in Jāti or Janma); to wit, at least in the end they will unfailingly reach the Paratattva (the Absolute Reality). Although a small defect to the extent that in them the Ajāti Drishti (the viewpoint of birthlessness) which yields the fruit of Sadyōmukti (Beatitude, Liberation here and now) has not dawned yet a small defect does occur in them, they will
certainly reach (attain) Brahman either (i) through the path of deliberating upon the Vedāntopadesha in accordance with the level or standard of their respective understanding or comprehension and by the method of deciding the truth that the Kārya (effect) is Ananya (non-different) from the Kāraṇa (cause) and such other methods or (ii) by the path of Parameswarā Upāsana (meditations on the Supreme Lord) attaining Kramamukti (phased out Liberation i.e. attainment of Brahma-lōka). Whereas, the Nāstikas (atheists, sceptics and non-believers) - will according to the sentence - ‘माममार्थ्यैः कौन्तेय ततो यात्वचमात्मक गतिम्’ - (Gītā 16-20), meaning - “Without attaining, reaching Me, they obtain a low, wretched state alone” - they go down to a miserable state of being. But these people (i.e. those who have taken to a Vedic path) - as per the Lord’s assurance - ‘कौन्तेय प्रविक्षानन्द न मे पक्षः प्रणव्यति’ - (Gītā 9-31), meaning - “Oh son of Kunti, My devotee never gets destroyed, this truth you know to be certain” - at the end at least they will surely attain Sadgati (a Blissful state).

उपल्लभात् समाचारामायाहिति यथोऽच्छते ।
उपल्लभात् समाचारादद्विति वस्तु तथाच्छते ॥४४॥

Meaning: “Because it is invariably appearing and in the same way our scriptural rituals are being performed also - just as the Māyāhasti (illusory, magical elephant) is believed to be a real elephant, in the same way since it is also appearing and by virtue of Dharmācharaṇa (observance of religious rituals and disciplines) also the external object appears to exist indeed.”

THAT DVAITA IS NOT REAL IS ITSELF PARAMĀRTHA

(Doubt) : Why should it not be decided that the object which is appearing outside is really existing alone since it is appearing as also it is an accessoriable aid for Dharmācharaṇa ?

(Solution) : Not so. For, though an object is appearing and is an accessoriable for performance of duties, still it may not be really existing. For this an illustration is: The elephant conjured up by Māyā (magic) as also the elephant that appears in a dream
do appear to exist; they too—just like a real elephant is used as accessorial means for a ride etc. by mounting upon them and for such other purposes are used. Merely on that count, no one believes them to be really existing elephants. Therefore, whether anything is appearing or whether it is being used as an accessory for certain acts or whether being called by any name—none of these can possibly be the proper reason for deciding that a Vastu (object) really exists.

**IN THE ILLUSTRATION THE APPEARANCE AS WELL AS THE UTILIZATION ARE MERELY ABHINIVESHA**

(PERSEVERANCE OF BELIEF ALONE)

Here the purport behind giving Māyāhasti, dream elephant as illustrations is to indicate the truth that—“Merely on seeing that both appearance and utilization seem to exist, it cannot be said that the Vastu really exists”—and not with any intention of signifying that either Māyāhasti or Svapnahasti really appear or there really exists their utilization for any particular job. This fact will be mentioned later on in the Kārikā: ‘अष्टाविभिन्निवेषोज्जिति’—(4-73), meaning—“There exists an Abhinivesha (perseverance of belief) in a non-existing thing and not that there exists any duality” ; in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa too it has already been stated that—“The wise people in Vedānta have determined that this world is unreal, false just like dream and Māyā as well as Gandharvanagara (a celestial city)”—(2-13). The same fact is being utilized to prove here also that as a result of the dispute and disagreement among the disputants the truth that—‘Ajāti alone is real’—gets evolved.

15. **AS A RESULT OF DISSENSION AMONG THE VARIOUS DISPUTANTS AJĀTIVĀDA ALONE IS EVOLVED - CONCLUSION OF THIS TEACHING**

Meaning: “Although it is Jātyābhāsa (merely a reflection of birth), Chalābhāsa (a reflection of movement, vibration) as also Vastvābhāsa (reflection of an entity), Vijñāna is Aja
(birthless), Achala (immovable), Avastu (non-entity), Shānta (quiescent), Advaya (non-dual).”

JĀTI ETC. ARE IMAGINED IN AJA-ADVAYA-ĀTMAN ALONE

(Question) : With regard to which really real Entity (Paramārtha Vastu) are these Janma and such other Asadbuddhis (false concepts) engendered in Avivekins?

(Answer) : We will mention ; that Paramārtha (Absolute Reality), though It is devoid of Janma, appears as if having a birth. An imagination of the type - “Such and such a person is born” - is an example for this. Though the Ultimate Reality is not at all born, this Vikalpa (misconception) is caused. Similarly, although that Paramārtha Tattwa is verily Achala (non-moving), It appears as if It is moving. For that reason alone, people are misconceiving in the manner that - “Such and such a person is going.” In the same way, although that Tattwa is not a Vastu endowed with any Dharmas (qualities, special attributes), people are misconceiving in the manner that - “It is endowed with such and such qualities, special features” ; for the people to misconceive in the manner - “Devadatta is white-complexioned, is tall” - this alone is the reason.

Here because illustrations like Jātyābhāsa (misconceptions of birth), Chalābhāsa (misconceptions of movement) etc. have been mentioned, we should not think that the Kārikākāra had an opinion that a separate Padārtha (entity) - really having birth, movement, special attributes, being not quiescent and being dual - exists. Here from the Avidyākālpita (conjured up by ignorance) Vyavahāra Drishti (empirical viewpoint) objects with Jātyādi attributes are accepted indeed ; it is true that in the Śruti : “The Paramārtha Satya became both Satya and Asatya” - (Tai. 26) it has been stated like that also. But when observed from the Paramārtha Drishti it has already been shown in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa that - “All Dvaita like Janma etc. is really false only” ; that too is in accordance with Śruti teaching alone as evidently clear from the Śruti statement - “Vikāra (mutation) is Vāchārambhaṇa (mere an exercise in speech) and it is a mere name only” - (Chh. 6-1-4). Hence, although there does not at all exist any Vastu with the Svabhāva (essential nature) of having real birth, from the Vyavahāra Drishti
what are seen as if to exist like Jāti (birth) etc. are assumed to be Upamāna (illustrations) only; this fact we should discern.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF PARAMĀRTHA CHAITANYA

In any case, this is certain (determined) that - “Paramārtha Vijnāna (the Absolute, Transcendental Reality of Pure Consciousness) which is Aja, Achala, Nirdharmaka keeps on appearing just like objects having various attributes of Jāti (birth) etc. of the type - ‘He is born, he goes about, he is tall, he is white-complexioned’ etc.” Here the ‘Vijnāna’ does not mean the predicative form or nature of awareness or consciousness (i.e. at the empirical level). Especially the ‘Ālaya Vijnāna’ which the Buddhists propound is not at all relevant here. For, in the Kārikā : “Therefore, Chitta is not born at all” - (4-28) - itself that has already been refuted; ‘एवं न जात्येन चित्तम्’ - (4-46) - meaning - “Thus Chitta is not born” - in the next Kārikā also it is being refuted. Apart from this, because Ālaya Vijnāna is of the nature of ‘Vijnānasantāna’ (continuum of objective awareness) which is associated with Nitya Avachhinna (perpetually separated, distinct) Chalana (movement) - it is not fit to be transacted as ‘चलाभासम्’ (as if moving). If it is questioned - “In that case, why is it here in this context Paramārtha Tattwa (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality of Pure Consciousness) is called by the word - ‘Vijnāna’?” - the answer is : It is for the purpose of indicating the fact that - “As a result of the dispute between the two factions among Buddhists, viz. Vijnānavādins (Idealists) and Bāhyārthavadin (Realists) the Vijnānabrahman alone which is Aja and Advaya is established.” For this conclusion the Śruti ‘विज्ञानमानंदेन ब्रह्म’ - (Bṛi. 3-9-27) meaning - “Brahman is Vijnāna, and Ānanda” - which has called Brahman by the word - ‘Vijnāna’ - is itself the authoritative source. To the question - “What is the Swarūpa of this Paramārtha Vijnāna?” - the answer is : Since It is devoid of Prapañcha (world of duality) like Jāti (birth) etc. It is ‘Shānta’ (quiescent, Blissful) ; since It has never any opposing entity or object It is ‘Advaya’, Pure Consciousness, without anything second to It and non-divisible. For this conclusion - the Śruti like : ‘विज्ञानधन एव’ - (Bṛi. 2-4-12), meaning - “It is verily a mass,
lump of Consciousness” ; ‘निष्कलन निक्रिय शांतम्’ - (Shvetāśwahara 6-19), meaning- “It is devoid of parts, of action, It is peaceful” ; ‘एकमेवाहिनीयम्’ - (Chh. 6-2-1) - meaning - “One alone without anything second to It” - etc. are the authoritative sources.

Meaning : “Thus the Chitta is not born, thus the Dharmas (beings) are said to be Aja (unborn). Those people who have cognized (Intuited) thus only will not fall victims to Viparītajñāna (misconception, erroneous knowledge).”

CONCLUSION OF THE YUKTI THAT CHITTA AND CHITTADRISHYA ARE NOT BORN

Hitherto it was depicted that - “Therefore, Chitta is not born’ - adopting the Vijñāvādins’ Yukti, viz. Like the Chittadrishya Chitta also is never born at all, is it not so ? By explaining this tenet with the help of various reasons and illustrations, it was established that Ajāti alone is Paramārtha (the final Absolute Truth). In order to conclude that very topic this verse is employed.

By means of these Yuktis what was previously stated viz. “Chitta is never born” - is proved to be correct. By means of these very Yuktis - the Brahmajñānis reckon that - “Dharmas, meaning Ātmans (beings), the Padārthas (objects) which are Chittadrishya are verily Ajaswarūpas (of the very essence of birthlessness) ; for, they are not separate, different from Ātma Tattwa which is Aja-Advaya.” The Śrutiṣ like - ‘नेह नानास्ति किचन’ - (Bṛ. 4-4-19), meaning - “Here there does not exist even the least bit of distinction” - etc. which are proclaiming this truth are the authoritative sources for this conclusion. Here the word - ‘धर्मा’; - the plural word ‘Dharmas’ is used because there are many Upādhis (adjuncts) ; even those Upādhis too are really, in the Absolute sense, Aja-Advaya-Ātman and hence we should discern that - “The fact that - ‘Ātmans are also Aja’ - becomes self-established.”
THE BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM THE COGNITION OF AJĀTI

Those who cognize so as to culminate in their experience that this Ātmatattwa is in this manner devoid of Janma, of Chalana and of Dharmas but is verily of the essential nature of Vijnāna (Pure Consciousness) which is Shānta, Advaya - they become capable of having given up their Eshanātraya (the triad of attachments, desires) like Putraishāna (attachment to children, wife, kith and kin), Vittaishāna (attachment to one’s assets) and Lōkaishāna (desire for name and fame or to attain higher regions of existence) and they will never fall once again in the ocean of Avidyā. The Śruti : ‘तत्र को मोहः कः शोक ऐक्तमानपुप्तः’ - (Īṣa 7), meaning - “One who has searched out (Intuited) Ekatwa (unity, non-dual Self) - there which attachment, which misery possibly can exist ?” - is the authoritative source for this conclusion.

16. ILLUSTRATION FOR THE TEACHING THAT JĀTYĀDI (i.e. BIRTH etc.) ARE NOT ABSOLUTELY REAL

Meaning : “Just as appearing as if to be straight, crooked etc. is (merely) the turning or movement of the firebrand (torch), in the same way appearing in the forms of cognizing, cognizer is verily the movement of Vijnāna.”

ILLUSTRATION FOR THE TENET THAT VIJNĀNA (PURE CONSCIOUSNESS) REMAINING AS IT IS, STILL APPEARS IN VARIOUS FORMS

In order to clarify whatever has been taught so far about the Paramārtha Darshana (Spiritual teachings or philosophy of the Absolute Reality of Pure Being-Consciousness) an illustration is being given here. Just as a moving, swinging torch or firebrand, though it subsists as it is, it appears as if many forms like straight, crooked etc. exist in the light, in the same way what appears in the various forms of Vishaya (objects) and Vishayi (the subjective consciousness) is verily the movement of the
Vijñāna (Pure Consciousness) alone. This so-called, apparent movement of this Vijñāna is also verily Avidyākṛita (a projection brought about by ignorance); really speaking, (from the Absolute viewpoint) Vijñāna is not at all moving. Vijñāna is ‘born’ as Chitta due to Māyā alone, is it not so? To an entity which is absolutely Achala (devoid of movement) how at all can there be movement? This truth has already been stated in the Kārikā -

‘अजाचलयम्’ - (4-45), meaning - “It is birthless, motionless.”

FOR VIJÑĀNA VIBRATION IS NOT THERE AS ABSOLUTELY REAL

But those who affirm that - ‘Vijñāna has really a vibration, motion which is its essential nature, as also for Paramātman, who is of the Vijñānaswarūpa, there invariably exists a particular power of vibration, motion’ - are Bhrāntas (deluded people). For, if that Spandana (vibration, motion) is Nihsākshika (without a Witnessing Principle, Consciousness), then it amounts to saying that it has no Pramāṇa (valid means of proof) whatsoever. But if it is said that it has a Sākshi (Witnessing Principle or Consciousness), then it will have to be perforce accepted that that Sākshi is always (eternally) devoid of any Spandana whatsoever. Even to imagine, conjecture that for the Vijñāna (Pure, Absolute Consciousness beyond time-space-causation categories and duality itself), which is Kūṭasthanitya (Absolute, eternal) and Sarvasākshi (Witnessing Principle of everything) there exists a phenomenon of vibration, it is not possible whatsoever, is it not so? Further, to assert in the manner that - “For that Ātman, devoid of any parts, there exist two parts - one which is of the form of Kūṭasthasākshi, and the other of the form of Its Sākshya (witnessed object) which is capable of motion - at one and the same moment of time” - is not tenable in logic. The Śrutis like - “(That Ātman) is Nishkala, Nishkriya and Shānta” - (Shvetāśvatara 6-10); “One who is birthless outside and inside” - (Mṇḍaka 2-1-2); “That this Ātman is Mahānta, Aja, Ajara, Amara, Amṛita Brahman” - (Bṛi. 4-4-25) - etc. are repeatedly proclaiming this Absolute, Transcendental nature of Being of this Ātman. Therefore, it is not proper to say that for Ātman who is of Vijñānaswarūpa there exists an independent Spandana-shakti (power of motion, vibration). In truth, Vijñāna does not at
all mean a predicative form of consciousness, awareness; only if it is so, we will have to imagine that to that too there exists a proclivity, innate nature of motion, is it not so? Further, it is not at all false to say that this Vijnana is endowed with a potential power needed for the creation (birth), sustenance and dissolution of the world; Srutis like - 'परास्य शतिविविषेव ब्रूयते' - (Shweta. 6-2) - etc. meaning - “His Parashakti is said to be varied indeed” - are authoritative sources for this statement. Therefore, for the Karika expression - ‘विज्ञानस्पद्धिम्’, meaning - “The motion of Pure Consciousness” - we have to interpret it to mean - “appears as if a motion due to Avidyā” - only.

अस्यन्द्रामनलामानात्माभासमं तथा।
अस्यन्द्रामां विज्ञाननात्माभासमं तथा॥४८॥

Meaning: “Just as a motionless firebrand remains Aja, and without appearing in a different form of light, in the same way the Vijnana devoid of motion remains Aja without the alien (apparent) forms of appearance.”

ILLUSTRATION FOR THE TENET THAT WHEN AVIDYĀ IS REMOVED ADVAITA (NON-DUALITY) ALONE SUBSISTS

Although when the firebrand is moving it appears in various forms, when it is not being moved it does not appear in various forms and remains in its true form as it is, in the same way Vijnana, in the absence of (disappearance of) Avidyā, does not appear in the forms of Janma etc. and remains Aja in Its non-dual form as It really is (in Its Absolute, Transcendental Being).

अलाते स्पन्दनाने वै नागभासा अन्यतो पुंवः।
न ततोस्यम्य निस्पन्द्धालातात्प्रविषाण्विति ते॥४९॥
न निर्गता अलाताचे द्वार्त्तवापाम्योगतः।
विज्ञानेनथि तत्कैव स्तुर्प्राप्तस्तिवाविषयसः॥५०॥

Meaning: “When the firebrand is swung round the designs of light have not at all come from another source; when it is not swung round neither do they not leave it and go to another region or direction, nor do they enter at all into
the firebrand. They have not come out of the firebrand; for, they are not real objects. With regard to the Vijñāna also those appearances must be existing in a similar manner; for, their being an appearance is a common feature (between the two)."

\[\text{विज्ञाने स्पन्दनाने वै नास्ति वासा अन्यर्धोपव:} \]
\[\text{न ततोअन्तः निस्पन्द्वन्ति विज्ञान विशाशिति ते} \]
\[\text{न निर्गतातो विज्ञानाद द्रव्यत्वाधारयोगता:} \]
\[\text{कार्यकारणाभासावाद यतोधिन्त्या: सदैव ते} \]

**Meaning:** "When Vijñāna is shaking the appearances have not come from another thing; when it is not shaking they do not go to any other region or place away from Vijñāna; neither do they enter into Vijñāna too. They have not come out of Vijñāna; for, they have no Vastu Swabhāva (essential nature of being a substance) at all. Because there is no relationship of cause-effect they are always existing as Achintya (inconceivable) only."

**Abhāsas (Reflections, Appearances) are Always of the Nature of Being Inconceivable**

When the firebrand is being swung round many forms of light are seen in it, is it not so? No one believes that those forms have come from some other object and have entered into the firebrand. When the firebrand is not swung round, none of us ever thinks that those shapes or forms of light have left it and gone somewhere else, nor do we believe that they have entered into the firebrand itself. In the same way, when Chaitanyaswarūpa Ātman is appearing in various forms of not-selves those appearances are not born; nor do they come from somewhere else and enter into Ātman; when we decide that Ātman is Advitiya alone by means of Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) it is not possible also to reckon that they have actually entered into Ātman Himself. Whether in the case of the illustration or whether it is in the case of the illustrated example of Ātman, appearances are always mere appearances alone. They have neither any resultant effect, nor do they have any cause; therefore they are verily Achintya, meaning, they are mere appearances alone and it is never possible to
conceive or conjecture in the manner: “They came from such and such a cause; they gave such and such a fruit; they traversed to such and such a region.” Just as in the illustration although there exists one firebrand alone, in it we, out of a deluded vision, imagine things (shapes) which do not exist at all, in the same way people themselves (in their deluded Avidyā state) misconceive the Dvaita that is appearing in Ātman and are questioning about it. This Dvaita is neither something different from Ātman, nor is it in its apparent form Ātman also. In the Bhāshyas of Shri Śaṅkara these apparent false forms are described as: ‘तत्तत्त्वक्षमागुणन्विवृत्तियम्’, meaning - “An appearance which can neither be determined as that very particular thing nor something which can be determined to be other than that thing and defined.” But the present-day Vyākhyāna Vedāntins are affirming that - “They are Anirvachaniya which are Sadasadvilakṣaṇa, meaning - they are Anirvachaniya Bhāvas (indefinable entities) which can neither be possibly defined, determined as Sat (real) or Asat (unreal).” In any case, it is quite certain that they - in the real, Absolute sense - do not exist at all.

HERE VIJÑĀNA MEANS ADVITĪYA CHAITANYA ALONE

The Buddhists too affirm that because the external objects are verily Vijñāna (intellectual awareness, consciousness) alone they do not possess Gati (going somewhere), Āgamaṇa (coming from somewhere). ‘अन्यतो नानिकायां न विषयितं न गच्छति। मायायेतौ सो विचित्रोद्भयम्

नमूद्ये सत्तवा: कृतम् ॥’ - (Bōdhi Chāryāvatāra 9-143), meaning - “It has not come from somewhere else, does not exist (subsist), does not also go anywhere; what difference is there between Māyā and this? Even so, the foolish people are saying that this is real!” - thus they are also saying. Even then, because it has been stridently, vociferously stated that - “In this manner Chitta too is not born” - (4-46) - thereby Vijñāna is not different from Ātman who is Aja, Achala and Vijñapti (the end product of Intuitive Knowledge) - that Vijñāna too like the various shapes of the firebrand is verily a false appearance - thus we should discern. Some people among the Vijñānavādins are saying: ‘Vijñāna itself is born in the forms of Bāhyārtha and is having
Sanāklesha (misery); when it gets transformed into *Nirvāṇarūpa* (liberated state), it attains *Vyavādāna* (disappearance) — is it not so? By virtue of that part of the verse which says: “They have not come out of Ātman who is of the essential nature of *Vijñāna* (Pure Consciousness)” — these Buddhists’ doctrine also stands refuted.

Now, those disputants (among the Buddhists) who are assuming that for all *Dharmas* (beings, entities) *Shūnya* (essencelessness) alone is the *Tattwa* (Ultimate Reality) and are asserting that — “Seen from whatever viewpoint or aspect, it has no *Nirūdhā* (suppression), no *Utpādana* (production), no *Āgamana* (coming), no *Nirgamana* (going)” — quite contrary to universal experience, are saying so on the basis of dry, vain logic that all those things do not exist; such people are, in fact, like (the idiots) who are trying to box the empty space and hence they have no access to an entry whatsoever into the purport of this Kārikā, so to speak. Therefore, we should never doubt that in this teaching of Vedānta the doctrinaire logical theory of these opponents — who are outside the purview of the Vedic teachings (Vedabāhya), which is devoid of Yukti and *Nishprayojana* (totally without any lasting benefit) — is mixed up or interpolated. On the contrary, Shri Gauḍapādāchārya — in the true Vedāntic traditions — has taught: “The external objects are all *Achintya* (inconceivable); they are imagined (misconceived) in Ātman who is Advaita-Vijñānaswarūpa; it is not possible to say whether they are *Tattwa* (Ātman Himself who is the Absolute, Transcendental Reality) or *Anyatwa* (something other than Ātman). Hence, if they are observed from the Paramārtha Drishṭi, they do not have any relationship whatsoever of *Janya* (that which is produced) and *Janaka* (that agent which produces or causes the birth) between them; they are mere appearances of the various shapes of light of the rotating firebrand as if they are straight or crooked.” Those who realize this truth attain the fruit of establishing themselves as Paramātmaswarūpa alone which is Nityashuddhabuddhamukta Vijñānātman.

**Dravya Dravyasthāt: Svaadhyayasya Chaev Hi.**
**Dravyatvamnityabhāvo Cha Svarāṇām Nopapadyate.** ॥१५३॥
Meaning: “One substance may be the cause for another substance; one thing may be the cause for another. But to say that Dharmas (beings, souls) are either Dravya or different from another is not tenable.”

THE CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP IN THE ABSOLUTE SENSE IS NOT TENABLE

Ātman is of the essential nature of mere Vijñāna (Pure Consciousness) which is Aja, Advaya and Kūṭastha. In Him Chitta, the Dharmas (objects, entities) of the forms like Jīva etc. are misconceived; they are merely Avidyāspandana (vibrations due to ignorance). Just as in a swinging firebrand the various shapes of light like straight, crooked etc. are seen, these Dharmas too seen in Ātman are verily false appearances. It is being established that there does not exist any Kārya-Kāraṇabhāva whatsoever between them. To say that there exists a cause-effect relationship between them is opposed to Yukti indeed - this fact is being proved now.

Those who assert that between Chitta and Dharmas there exists a Kārya-Kāraṇabhāva - according to their teaching also one Dravya (substance) may be the cause for another; for the word ‘Dravya’ here the meaning is: ‘A really existing Vastu or entity.’ In the previous verse, because the expression -  ‘Dravyatwa or substantiality is not tenable’ - has been used, we have to perforce determine that for the word ‘Dravya’ this above meaning alone is apt. In any case, the Kāryakāraṇavādins (disputants who champion the cause of cause-effect theory) also have accepted that - “Dravya alone - really that which is an existing entity (Vastu) - may possibly be a cause for another Dravya, but anything which is Adravya (non-substantial), Avastu (that which is not a Vastu), can never be a cause for something which is not a Vastu.” It is true that from a really existing Vastu like a rope etc. an Avastu like a snake etc. is ‘born’; but in that example, there is no real cause-effect relationship at all. Hence, it is seen in our workaday world that - “A real entity alone should necessarily be the cause for a real entity.” In the same way, “The cause is separate. The effect has necessarily to be separate from it; a thing cannot itself be the cause for
itself" - thus it is acknowledged by the Paramārtha-Kārya-Kāraṇa-vādins. For a cause like a seed there should be another thing like a sprout which is separate as a Kārya (effect) - thus it is seen in our empirical world of transactions; no one ever accepts that - "For a seed the seed alone is the cause; for a sprout the sprout alone is the cause" - is it not so?

But whether it is the Jīvas or other Dharmas (objects) - to say that they are Dravyas is not tenable. For, they are - just like the various shapes of light seen when a firebrand is swung round - mere false appearances alone. Therefore, they are neither Dravyas nor are they anything separate from the Chitta. Even the Vijñānavādins do not accept that - "The imagined things like a snake, a streak of water etc. in a rope - just as the buffalo is different from a horse - are different from one another" - is it not so? In the same way, any Dharma which is the vibration or motion of Avidyā is not a Vastu; Dharmas - whatever they may be - among themselves are also not different from one another. They are also not different from Chitta. Therefore, the Kāryakāraṇabhaṅga (relationship of cause-effect) is not at all tenable.

(Objection) : Are you saying that Vijñāna is Śānta, Advaya, as also that alone is Ātman? From that all else is caused, is it not so?

(Solution) : True. But why we call that Vijñāna, known as Ātman - 'Dravya' - is for the purpose of indicating the truth that - 'Although it is not a Dravya, when compared to the Dharmas which the people have imagined (misconceived) to be Dravya, that alone is the real Vastu.' That is all and not that Ātman is really (i.e. in the Absolute sense) a Dravya at all. Let it be. Thus Ātman Himself who is said to be relatively a Dravya is verily everything; He is neither the cause for anything that is separate or different from Him nor an effect. For that reason alone the Śruti defines Ātmatattva as 'अपूर्वमयस्य' - meaning, "For Ātmatattva there is neither a prior nor a posterior." Hence, because there is no cause-effect relationship whatsoever, Ābhāsas (reflections, appearances) are always Achintya (inconceivable) - (4-52) - thus what we had said is itself correct.
17. **BY MEANS OF THE CONVICTION THAT THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP OF CAUSE-EFFECT DELIVERANCE FROM SAMSĀRA (TRANSMIGRATORY EXISTENCE) ACCRUES**

ऐवें न चित्तज्ञ धमोशिष्टं बापि न धर्मावर्ज्यम।
ऐवें हेतुफलात्मि प्रतिशान्ति मनीषाः: ॥१५४॥

**Meaning**: “Thus neither Dharmas are born from Chitta, nor the Chitta is born from Dharmas. In this manner those who are Vivekins will imbibe (cognize, realize) the teaching that Hetu-Phalas are never born at all.”

**HOW COME THE TEACHING THAT BETWEEN CHITTA AND DHARMA AND ADHARMA THERE IS NO CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP?**

Thus because - (a) the birth etc. of Ābhāsas (reflections) are mere appearances, (b) Ātman is Sarvānanyaswarūpa (of the essential nature of everything); (c) apart from Him there is no Paramārthatavastu (Absolute Entity or Reality) whatsoever - to say that He is the ‘cause’ is untenable. Therefore, it is not possible for the Chitta (mind) itself which the common run of people have assumed (misconceived) to be the adjunct of the Jīva (transmigratory soul) to be born; for, it is not separate from Ātmachaitanya (Pure Consciousness of the Self) at all. Thus it is evolved. For that reason alone, from the Chitta - the Dharmas - meaning, the external phenomena, are not born at all; the Chitta too is not born from those external objects (reflections or appearances). In fact, all Dharmas (phenomena) are verily the mere Ābhāsa (appearances) of Ātmavijñānaswarūpa (the essential nature of Pure Consciousness of the Self). No one believes or thinks that either the silver which is the mere appearance of sea-shell is born from the snake which is the mere appearance of a rope, or the rope-snake is born from the nacre-silver - is it not so?

In the past it was stated that - “Thus the Chitta is not born” (4-46) because the Chitta, which the Vijnānavādin has accepted, is not seen apart from Ātman. Whereas here, the special feature is: Even if we agree to the methodology of those who have assumed that - “The relationship between cause and effect cat-
categories is *Paramārtha* (absolutely real)" - we have demonstrated - on the strength of Yukti of the type - "Because Chitta etc. are Adravya and they are not different from one another - there is no cause-effect relationship among them" - the truth that - "Neither from the Chitta the external *Dharmas* (phenomena) are born, nor from the external Dharmas the Chitta is born."

**THE BENEFIT THAT ACCRUES IF ONE DISCERNS THAT CHITTA ETC. ARE NOT BORN**

Thus by virtue of discerning this truth that for Chitta etc. there is no cause-effect relationship, those who are Jñānis - for this reason only - enter into the Intuitive realization of this profound teaching that - "Neither from a *Hetu* (cause), which is of the form or nature of Dharma or Adharma, the body which is the *Phala* (resultant effect), nor from that body the Dharma or Adharma phenomena are born"; to wit, they cognize the truth that - "In Ātmān these Hetu-Phalas do not exist whatsoever."

**यावद्येतुफलावेशतावदेतुफलोऽवःः।**

**क्षीणे हेतुफलावेषे नास्ति हेतुफलोऽवःः।** ॥5॥

Meaning: "As long as the influence of Hetu-Phala exists, these Hetu-Phalas are being born; if the influence of Hetu-Phala dies out, Hetu-Phalas are not born."

**FOR THE BIRTH OF HETU-PHALA ABHINIVESHA (AFFINITY OR DETERMINATION) ALONE IS THE CAUSE**

Here in this Kārikā answers to the following questions have been given: (a) Those, who without having this *Jñāna* (Self-Knowledge) are having *Mithyābhimāna* (false pride) of the type that - "Hetu-Phalas are really existing" - to such people what harm is caused? (b) But if that Mithyābhimāna is not there, then what benefit accrues? To entertain an *Abhimāna* (misconception of the type) - "I have *Hetus* (the causes) of the type of *Dharma* (merits) and *Adharma* (demerits). Performing these Dharmas and Adharmas, in due course of time I am born in a particular species of creatures and then I enjoy the fruits of those merits and demerits" - is itself called ‘Hetuphalāvesha.’ As long as a person misconceives this Hetuphalāvēsha in Ātmān and possesses
that kind of a mind, these Hetu-Phalas will be incessantly born in him - to wit, performing acts of merit or demerit and experiencing or enjoying their respective fruits - this attitude will continuously, without any break, proceed. But if this Abhinivesha is got rid of or given up - just like a person who is possessed by an evil star or force is relieved of that evil by the strength of Mantra (Vedic hymn) or herbal medicine - if this deep-seated misconception of the mind is exercised away by Tattwajña - then the birth or generation of Hetu-Phala will not occur anymore, as stated in the Śruti ‘तदा विद्यानु पुण्यपाये विषय निरंजनः परमं साम्यपूर्विति’ - (Muṇḍaka 3-1-3), meaning - “Then to the Jñāni these Punya (merit) and Pāpa (demerit) do not taint or touch at all; there will occur Paramasāmya (supreme similarity, identification) between him and Paramātman indeed.”

Meaning : “As long as Hetuphalāvesha exists, the transmigratory existence is spreading out. When the Hetuphalāvesha wears out, one does not acquire Saṃsāra. For, then Dharma-Adharmas which are the cause for Saṃsāra do not exist at all.”

**THE EXTINCTION OF ABHIMĀNA (VAIN PRIDE, FALSE IDENTIFICATION) OF THE FORM OF - ‘I AM KARTRU-BHOKTRURUPA’ IS ITSELF MŪKSHA (LIBERATION, BEATITUDE)**

As long as the Abhimāna (vain pride, misconception) of the type - “I am of the essential nature of experiencing the fruits of Dharma-Adharma after I perform them” - exists in one till such time the Samsāra has spread out its ramifications. The moment this Abhimāna gets extinct, or disappears, there is no acquisition whatsoever of Samsāra; only if there is the cause the effect exists, is it not so? Therefore, in order to get rid of this untenable (wrong) belief completely a person who is discriminative in his approach to life should necessarily acquire Aja-Advaya-Ātmavidyā.
18. JANMA-NĀSHA (BIRTH-DESTRUCTION)
ARE VERILY ĀVIDYAKA (PRODUCTS OF IGNORANCE)

Meaning: “From the viewpoint of Saṃvṛiti (empirical transactions carried out due to Avidyā) everything is born; therefore, there is nothing like Shāswata (eternal). From the Paramārtha Drīshṭi (viewpoint of the Transcendental, Absolute Reality beyond time-space concepts) everything is Aja (birthless) alone; from It there is nothing like Uccheda (extirpation, destruction) at all.”

JĀTI IS ĀVIDYAKA ; AJĀTI IS PARAMĀRTHA

(Doubt) : Even after stating that apart from Ātman, who is Aja there does not exist anything whatsoever, you are mentioning that both Hetu-Phalas and Samsāra have Utpatti (birth) ! Is it not a contradiction of what you said first and later?

(Solution) : There is no defect whatsoever in this. To wit: From the viewpoint of Samvriti - meaning from the standpoint of empirical transactions which are Avidyākalpita - everything is being born; from this Avidyādrīshṭi, there is no entity whatsoever which is Shāswata (eternal). Thus because from the Avidyāvyavahāra Drīshṭi there is nothing like Shāswata, we said that - “As long as this Hetu-Phalāvesha exists Samsāra has its ramifications.” But when we observe from the Paramārtha Drīshṭi, this Vishwa itself is Aja (unborn); therefore, Jāti (being born) - is itself not there at all. Hence, observed from that Paramārtha Drīshṭi, Hetu, Phala etc. - for none of them there is any destruction whatsoever. Therefore, our mentioning Utpattināsha for Samsāra is not opposed to Ajātivāda.

HOW COME THIS DIVISION (DISTINCTION) OF SAMVṛITI AND PARAMĀRTHASATYA ?

Here ‘संवृति’ means ‘the empirical transaction with regard to ‘Avidyā’, ‘संवृतियते समाचार्ययते परमार्यत्तत्त्वमनया’, meaning - ‘That thing
which has concealed, hidden the Paramārtha - that is Saṃvrīti'.

When we examine and observe from the Paramārtha Drishti - although everything is Brahman which is Aja, by virtue of, or due to, Saṃvrīti - meaning - because from the viewpoint of Vyavahāra which is itself projected by Avidyā it appears as though it has split up into the forms of Pramātru (cognizer), Pramāṇa (means of cognition), Prameya (cognized object) etc. - it amounts to saying that there exists an apparent 'concealment' of Its essential nature. Further, because for such people having or entertaining this Drishti of Saṃvrīti this Bāhya Drishti alone (i.e. extroverted viewpoint) exists, there is an apparent impediment of the forms of Ajñāna, Samśhaya and Mithyājñāna with regard to Brahmajñāna which is one's inner Ātman; therefore, they do not get, attain Brahmajñāna.

Buddhists too have acknowledged 'Saṃvrītisatya' and 'Paramārthasatya' - such two kinds of realities. 'द्वितीयां सत्यं सामप्रवृति सत्यं सत्यं च परमार्थं' - (Mādhyamika Kārikā 24-8, Vṛtti p. 180) - thus alone says Nāgārjuna Kārikā - meaning - "Relying on two kinds of Satyas (realities), Buddhists are preaching Dharma; they are - Lōkasamvṛītisatya, Paramārthasatya." But the reason that they have adduced for dividing Satya in this manner is quite a different one altogether. Chandrakīrti who has written a commentary on this, explains it thus:

(i) 'Saṃvrīti' means - 'that which is hidden all around'; Ajñāna conceals the Tattwa (essential nature of Being) of all Padārthas (objects, entities); therefore, it is called 'Saṃvrīti'.
(ii) One thing being born from another thing, meaning, one thing depending on another is itself 'Saṃvrīti' - thus also we may say; or, in the alternative - (iii) 'Saṃvrīti' means, Samketaha (an indication, sign, allusion), the empirical transaction Vyavahāra of Abhidhāna (name) and Abhidheya (named object), Jñāna-Jñeya-Vyavahāra (transaction of knowledge and object of knowledge) - etc. such Lōkavyavahāra (workaday or empirical transactions) - we may also describe it like this' - (Mādh. Vṛ. p. 180). It is their doctrine that - "Without assuming Abhidhāna-Abhidheya-Vyavahāra as Paramārtha (absolutely real) it is not possible to teach Paramārtha (the Absolute Reality), as also if It is not taught
it is not possible for anyone to cognize, know It - keeping, assuming Lōkasaṃvyāti as a device alone the Paramārtha is instructed.” - (Mādh. Kā. 24-10, Vṛi. p. 181) ; it is called ‘Saṃvṛiti’, because it is ‘Yuktibādhya’ (that which is sublated by a device, or it is something which is sublated by means of Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) of Yogis. Here ‘Yukti’ means ‘Pratītya Samutpāda’ (dependent origination) ; that alone is the Pramāṇa (valid proof) for Śūnyata (essencelessness). Further - how it is ‘Anubhavādhyatwa’? To wit : ‘तत्र प्राकृतको लोको योगिलोकेन बाध्यते।’

On the other hand, in our Vedānta Siddhānta how is this Samvṛiti Paramārtha Viveka? The answer is : From the waking viewpoint to imagine Pramātṛutwa (cognizership, ‘I’ notion) in Ātman as also the Pramāṇa-Prameya etc. Vyavahāra which depends upon that Pramātṛutwa is ‘Saṃvṛiti.’ This Samvṛiti is misconceived due to Avidyā. Avidyā means a misconceived (deep-seated) belief born out of mixing up Ātman who is real and Anātman which is unreal. Shri Śāṅkara has explained in detail in his Śūtra Bhāṣya that - “All the Saṃvṛiti which is of the form or nature of Vyavahāra is verily Avidyākalpita.” On the contrary, Paramārthasatya means - ‘though the Avasthās like Jāgrat are leaving out one another, quite distinct from all of them that Reality which exists in one and the same essence of Pure Being and which is Sarvasāksi (the Witnessing Principle of everything) is Ātman alone. “The Vyavahāras (empirical transactions) of the type of Pramāṇa-Prameya-Vyavahāra etc. which
are Avidyākṛita (projected by, conjured up by Avidyā or ignorance) are called 'Saṃvṛitisatya', because they are not sublated as long as this Paramārthasatya is cognized or intuited, and not because they are sublated either by mere Yukti (reasoning) or by the Anubhava of Yūgis. Here the salient, special feature that is pointed out is: What the Buddhists call 'Saṃvṛiti' as that Yukti as well as Anubhava is verily that Saṃvṛiti which is included or comes within the purview of Vyavahāra - Āvidyaka (a product of Avidyā) alone."

**WHAT EXACTLY IS IT REFUTED IN THIS VERSE?**

Here we have to discern that: ‘सत्यांगुण श्रेष्ठसर्वं’ - (From the viewpoint of the Paramārtha everything is Aja alone) - by this sentence, having indicated the truth that - “Everything is Nitya (eternal)” - merely Uccheda (destruction) alone is not sublated; on the other hand, it has been pointed out that when observed from the Paramārtha Drīshṭi both 'Shāśhwatāta' and 'Ucchedatāta' do not exist at all. For, in Ātman who is of the essential nature of Prajñānāghana (a sheer mass of Pure Consciousness) there is no possibility or scope whatsoever for any kind of Vikalpas (extreme imaginations, misconceptions) like Nityatwa (eternity) etc. For that reason alone, in the epic 'Mahābhārata' it has been stated that ‘उपेक्षादिका नेहानिति भावनित्य न विद्यते’ - (Mōksha Dharma 219-6) - meaning - “Here it does not culminate either in eradication, extinction, or in existence.” If it is asked: “In this Kārikā it appears as though ‘Nityatwa’ is accepted by the expression - ‘Everything is Aja alone’ - is it not so?” - the answer is: It is stated like that only to sublate Janma which is imagined, misconceived due to Saṃvṛiti, and not to indicate that in Ātman there exists another Dharma (special attribute) called ‘Ajatwa’. This fact will be clarified later on in the Kārikā - ‘अजः कल्पितसंबृव्यः’ - (4-74). Therefore, nothing contrary to our Siddhānta has been stated here at all. Since it has been mentioned that - “Due to Saṃvṛiti everything is born” - it should not be misunderstood or misinterpreted that it has been accepted here that everything is really born indeed; on the other hand, it should be discerned that whatever objects or phenomena seem to be born - all those are
‘born’ due to Saṃvṛiti - thus first it should be assumed by way of superimposition - and then by way of rescission, it is taught that - “Nothing whatsoever is Shāshawata (eternal). Hence, the real purport behind this half verse is : “From the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi, Ātmakatwā (unity - non-duality - of Ātman) alone exists ; It is devoid of Uccheda but It is ‘Shāshawata’ ; but from the point of view of Saṃvṛiti Uccheda as well as Shāshawata - both exist.”

Meaning : “Those Dharmas which thus are born, they are not born really. Their Janma is analogous to Māyā ; that Māyā too does not exist.”

SĀMVṚTIKAJANMA (EMPIRICAL BIRTH DUE TO AVIDYĀ) IS MĀY(OPAMA) (SIMILAR TO ILLUSION)

Ātmans (beings, Jīvas), external Vastus - these Dharmas (phenomena, beings) are believed to be born by the ignorant people, is it not so ? How are those Dharmas born ? They are born due to Saṃvṛiti alone but not in reality at all. ‘Those beings or objects are born due to Samvṛiti’ - this statement also signifies that they are Māyopama, meaning - ‘Just as Māyā (illusion) is born’ ; ‘just as objects or phenomena are born due to Māyā (illusion), in the same way these are born’ - this is implied here. Because it is stated - “The birth of those Dharmas is - ‘just like the birth due to Māyā’ or ‘just like Māyā itself is born’ - brought about” - it should not be imagined, reckoned that ‘Māyā’ is a really existing entity ; that phenomenon of ‘Māyā’ also is something non-existent ; ‘Māyā’ is a name given to something that does not exist at all. Therefore, Janma - just like Māyā (magical act, illusion) - meaning just as Māyā is not really existing - in the same way - the intended purport here is that - ‘The Janma of Dharmas (beings) is really not existing’ - alone and not that - ‘Due to a particular cause called - Māyā - they are (really) born’ - at all. This truth should be discerned here.
Meaning: “Just as from a totally illusory (Māyāmaya) seed a totally illusory sprout is born, and just as that is not Nitya (eternal) as also not destructible, similarly we should make this illustration applicable to Dharmas and comprehend the intended purport.”

MĀYĀJANMA REALLY MEANS AJANMA ALONE

If a question of the type - “In that case, how could it be said that the Janma of those Dharmas is Māyopama (analogous to an illusion) ?” - is raised, then the following answer is given: From a seed - which is Māyāmaya (completely illusory) and has as its very essence mere appearance alone - a sprout, which is also Māyāmaya, is born, is it not so ? But the Janmādi (birth, growth etc.) of that sprout are not real entities at all. For that reason alone, that sprout is neither Nitya nor destructible also ; for, it is an Avastu (non-entity), is it not so ? That which is Avastu cannot possibly be said to be either eternal or destructible, is it not so ? In the same way, we should understand the Janma and Nāsha of all Dharmas ; the purport here is : It cannot be said justifiably that they too really have either Janma or Nāsha. For, everything is verily mere Māyā, conjured up by Avidyā, which is quite natural.

“एवं सति क उच्चेदः: शाक्षरो च वर्षभ भवेत्। स्वभावदृ वर्तमानेनु सर्वप्रभूतम् हेतुतः॥” - (Mōksha Dharma 259-41) - meaning - “If all Dharmas are thus existing by virtue of that cause alone called ‘Swabhāva’ (essential nature), to say there is extinction for them too - which is that ? Which is, then, the thing that is Shāśhwata” ? - this sentence of Mōksha Dharma text affirms this truth alone.

“Shāśhwatavāda” means, the doctrine of the cause being eternal ; “Ucchedavāda” means, the doctrine that the cause gets destroyed - refuting both these doctrines by means Yukti (reasoning) is the Buddhistic Siddhānta (philosophy of Buddhism). Because everything is verily Aja-Advaya-Ātman, to prove by means of Yukti as well as Anubhava that “In Ātman both these ‘Shāśhwata’ and ‘Uccheda’ are mere conjectures, misconceptions” - is Vedānta Siddhānta. In order to signify this truth alone here the Buddhistic technical terms of ‘Shāśhwata’, ‘Uccheda’ are themselves being used - thus we should discern.
19. WHEN OBSERVED FROM PARAMĀRTHA Dṛṣṭhi THE DVAITA PHENOMENON IS NOT PERCEPTIBLE TO VĀK (SPEECH) AND MANAS (MIND)

Meaning: “Whatever Dharmas there are, which are Aja - in them there are no ‘Shāśwata’ or ‘Ashāśwata’ concepts. Where there are no categories or concepts (words), there Viveka (discrimination) is not recommended.”

DHARMAS ARE REALLY BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF SPEECH

If observed from the Paramārtha Dṛṣṭhi in all Dharmas - which are eternal, of one and the same essence of Chaitanya or Pure Consciousness and Aja with regard to Ātmans and the external objects - it is not proper, reasonable to say that either they are Shāśwata or Ashāśwata. Where there are no words or concepts available whatsoever to name, there the distinctions like Nitya and Anitya cannot possibly be stated; for, in Aja Ātman there are no special features whatsoever. Previously in 4-58 it was stated that - ‘Dharmas in their apparent forms, their birth is like a Māyā Janma; it is not possible to say whether they are Nitya or Anitya’; but in this Kārikā it is being stated that - “Because from the Tattwa Dṛṣṭhi - (a) they do not exist apart from Aja Ātman; (b) in the essential nature of Pure Being of Aja Ātman they do not possess any special features whatsoever” - they are not objects for Vāk (speech).

Here the expression - ‘वर्णा न वर्तने’ (words are not capable of indicating them) - has been mentioned as a Upalakṣaṇa (implication of something in addition, synecdoche) only; by this implication, we should include the mind also; for, the Śruti - “Without objectifying (signifying) Brahman the words as well as the mind return” (Taittiriya 2-9) - is stating thus.

यथा स्वतः हृदयाभासं चिरं चलति मायया।
तथा जाग्रृत्याभासं चिरं चलति मायया॥१६२॥
Meaning: “Just as in the dream the Chitta is shaking (vibrating) as if it is dual due to Māyā, in the same way in the waking too the Chitta is shaking as if it is dual due to Māyā. There is no doubt with regard to the fact that in the dream the Chitta (itself) being Advaya alone appears as if it is dual; in the same way, in the waking too it being Advaya only (the Chitta) appears as if it is dual - there is no doubt.”

(Dharmas being objects to Vāk and Manas is Māyika (Illusory))

(Objection): The statement that - ‘The speech and the mind cannot possibly objectify Dharmas’ - is opposed to Pratyaksha (perceptual knowledge, experience), is it not so? The fact that people are objectifying them by means of speech as well as the mind and expressing in the manner - “This is Satya; this is Anṛita”; “This is Shāśhwata; this is Ashāśhwata” - is perceptible, is it not so?

(Solution): We have stated that - “All these are - from the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi - Aja-Advaya Ātman only; if this truth is remembered, then it will not be possible to indicate them after discrimination either by the speech (words) or the mind.” Really speaking, although all of them are mere Advaya Vijñāna alone, it is seen in our empirical transactions that they are objectified, is it not so? - this is nothing but the objectification of their appearance; and they are thus appearing because the Chitta is vibrating due to Māyā. For this the illustration of the dream is adduced in the Kārikā.

Previously in 4-49 it was stated: “Both the seed and the sprout are Māyāmaya (totally illusory)” - that was said from the viewpoint that - “Those who are witnessing the Māyā are also knowing, cognizing them at the moment of their appearance only.” In fact, that seed-sprout seen is neither Nitya nor does it get destroyed - thus it was mentioned. For those onlookers who are seeing the various phenomena like the seed-sprout etc. which the Māyāvin (magician) is showing (projecting) merely as a pastime, pleasant recreation, there is no abiding interest in delib-
erating upon questions like - "Whether those seed-sprout etc. are Nitya or Anitya ?" - is it not so ? Thinking in the manner that - "All this is verily Māyā ; neither they are Nitya nor are they destructible" - alone, they (i.e. onlookers) are indifferent towards that question, is it not so ? But, in the dream though the Chitta is invariably vibrating illusorily, the cognition of the truth that - "All this is verily Māyā" - does not occur to anyone whatsoever during that period of the dream ; the Dharmas that exist therein are verily objects for Shabdapratyaya (the concepts projected by the words) of the type - 'Shāśhwata, Ashāśhwata' - this is the special feature in this case. Just as in the case of Tattwa, which is verily Advaya, It is appearing as if It is Dvaya due to Māyā, and even so during that time those Dharmas therein are invari­ably objects for Vāk and Manas - in the same way it is so in the waking too ; thus a similarity between the illustration of the dream and the illustrated example of the waking is pointed out. These very same verses are also mentioned in the Advaita Prakaraṇa also ; (Therein, instead of the word ‘Chitta’ the word ‘Manaha’ has been used, that is all). There, in that context, they were stated in order to establish by means of Yuktī the teaching that - ‘For a Sadvastu there may be a Jānma due to Māyā’ ; but here the special feature of these verses is to prove the fact that - ‘Even the objects which are created, projected by Māyā may become objects for the speech and the mind.” This point is to be discerned.

20. ALL DUALITY IS NON-DIFFERENT FROM CHAITANYA

स्वप्नदूर्दृष्टिः प्रचररुः स्वने दिश्यु वै दशास्य स्थितानुः।
अण्णजानूः स्वेदजानूः वारयापि जीवानुः पस्यति यान्सदा ॥६३॥

स्वप्नदूर्दृष्टिः दूसरास्ते न विद्यते ततः पृथकः।
तथा तद्वस्येवेव दूर्दृष्टिः यथासम्वितमिवस्ते ॥६४॥

चरणागारिते जाप्रकृष्टिः वै दशास्य स्थितानुः।
अण्णजानूः स्वेदजानूः वारयापि निजानुः पस्यति यान्सदा ॥६५॥
Meaning: "One who sees the dream wanders about in the dream and is seeing Anḍajas (creatures born out of eggs), Swedajas (born out of warm vapour or sweat, like insects) existing in all the ten directions and whatever creatures he is seeing always - all of them are objects for the dreamer’s Chitta alone; they are not existing apart from it. In the same way, the Chitta also of this dreamer is seen by him only. One who is running about in the waking is seeing either creatures born out of eggs or insects born out of sweat in all the ten different directions as also whatever creatures he is seeing always - all of them are objects for the waking person’s Chitta alone; they are not existing separate from it. Similarly, it has to be accepted that the Chitta of these waking persons is verily an object to the respective waking person alone."

THE DUALITY THAT IS AN OBJECT FOR VYAVAHĀRA IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM CHAITANYA (PURE CONSCIOUSNESS)

It has already been stated that - "The duality that is object for the transactions of speech and mind is not Paramārtha (Absolutely real); because it is Chittaspadana (vibration of the mind) it is verily Māyā." That Chitta too - because it is not existing in the Absolute sense, it amounts to saying that all duality is verily Asat (false, unreal). Thus it has been concluded here.

All the Jīvas who are seen by one who is carrying out the transactions in the dream, are invariably perceived by his Chitta alone. Therefore, apart from that Chitta those creatures do not exist at all; the fact that - "The Chitta itself is imagined (misconceived) in the various forms of Jīvas etc. seen in the dream" - is known to everyone. Apart from this, that Svapnachitta (mind of the dream) also does not at all exist by itself apart from the dreamer. In the same way, it is reasonable to accept the proposition that all the Jīvas also seen in the waking do not exist apart from the waking person.

What was previously stated viz. : "Therefore, Chitta is not
born" - (4-28) - that teaching alone is strengthened by a proper cause. Because the Chitta of the waking person does not at all exist by itself apart from his Ātman, really it is not born at all; by means of the very Yukti, which the Buddhist has acknowledged to say: "Apart from Chitta the Chittadrishya does not exist" - it becomes established that - "Apart from Ātman who illumines the Chitta even that Chitta also does not exist"; thus this truth is clarified here. It has already been demonstrated in the Vaitathya Prakāraṇa that - (a) "Waking, dream - the Ātman who illumines both these is one and the same" as also - (b) "There is no Vailakshānya (distinction) whatsoever between waking and dream"; adding those teachings also here, the seeker should discern the teaching that - "Ātman who illumines both these states of Consciousness is alone (unitarily, non-dually) Paramārtha (Absolutely real)."

Meaning: "Both of them are objects for each other. We are not saying as to which is existing. Both are devoid of Lakshaṇas (hallmarks, signs); by that Buddhi (intellect) alone (this truth) is cognized."

THE EXISTENCE OF CHITTA (MIND) AND CHETYA (OBJECT CONCEIVED BY THE MIND) IS RELATIVE

(Objection): Why should we accept that the Chitta by itself is not separate from one who sees, perceives? That which cognizes the external Dharmas (beings, objects) is itself the Chitta - thus only it can be stated, is it not so?

(Solution): Our answer to this is: Apart from the seer or perceiver the Chitta by itself, independently cannot at all be established. For, its existence too - just like the external objects - is verily Sāpekshasatta (relative existence). To wit, both Chitta (mind) and Chetya (mental concept to) are to be invariably established being dependent upon (mutually related to) each other. That which cognizes the externally existing Dharmas like Jīva etc. is itself Chitta; and that which is object for the Chitta is itself the Dharma - thus mutually depending upon each other these two are being known and none of them is singly established
to exist independently. Therefore, it is never possible to say which of them really exists. In the dream neither the elephant nor the Chitta which perceives the elephant is really existing, is it not so? Even so, it is being seen. In the same way, in the present case or context too, the Vivekins (people who are capable of such Intuitive deliberation, discrimination) do not at all cognize that either Chitta or Chittadrishya is really existing. This alone is the implicit purport.

**BETWEEN CHITTA AND CHETYA THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP OF PRAMĀNA (VALID MEANS OF COGNITION) AND PRAMEYA (THE COGNIZED OBJECT)**

How is it that both Chitta and Chetya do not exist? - The answer is: Both these are Lakṣaṇāśūnya (devoid of signs of recognition); for both there is no Pramāṇa (valid means of cognition); for, by the Mati (belief) alone, that is, by the belief or concept of the type that - “This is Chitta; this is Chetya” - alone it is appearing and not that it is established on the basis of any Pramāṇa. Due to the awareness of the type - “This is a pot” - the pot is appearing; that Ghaṭabuddhi (awareness of pot) also is not established independently; it is, in fact, established because it is ‘cognizing’ the pot. It being so, it is not possible to affirm or ascertain as to which of them is established by which. This is the implicit meaning here.

यथा स्वप्नमयो जीवो जाते प्रक्षेपस्य च ।
तथा जीवा अमो सवेद भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ||१६८||

यथा मायामय जीवो जाते प्रक्षेपस्य च ।
तथा जीवा अमो सवेद भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ||१६९||

यथा निर्मितको जीवो जाते प्रक्षेपस्य च ।
तथा जीवा अमो सवेद भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ||१७०||

Meaning: “Just as the Jīva who is caused by the dream is born and dies, in the same way all these Jīvas are caused and become extinct. Just as the Jīva who is Māyāmaya is born and dies, similarly all these Jīvas are caused and become extinct. Just as an artificially produced Jīva is born and dies, in the same way all these Jīvas are caused and become extinct.”
THE JIVAS WHO EXIST IN THE WAKING ARE ALSO NOT REALLY EXISTING

‘Nirmitakajīva’ means a Jīva produced by means of Mantra, herbs, roots etc. Although Svapnajīva (dream soul), Māyāmayajīva (an illusory soul), Nirmitakajīva (artificially produced soul by means of Mantra, herbs etc.) - these are not really existing, they appear as if they are born and are dying; in the same way, the Jīvas who appear in the waking are also not existing at all really. This is the total meaning of the three verses. In the same way, although the Chitta is not really existing it appears as if it is existing - thus also we should add to the meaning of the verses.

HERE THERE IS NO SCOPE FOR INTRODUCING THE EKAJĪVĀDA

Here, in this context, by the expression - “All these Jīvas” - to interpret it to mean - ‘except the waking Jīva all the other Jīvas’ - and then we should not conceive of any scope for ‘Ekajīvāda’ (the theory of one and one Jīva only). For, this Prakarana is written with the intention of signifying, teaching that the commonality of Jīvas is itself not existing really. In the next verse it is vociferously, stridently stated : ‘न कक्षिच्चित्यते जीवः’ - (4-71), meaning - “No Jīva whosoever is born.” Therefore, both Chitta and Chetya are without any Pramāṇa; we should discern here the fact that - “The empirical dealing of ‘Jīvas’ is due to Samvrti alone” - is relevant here.

21. CONCLUSION OF AJĀTIVĀDA

न कक्षिच्चित्यते जीवः सम्पवोस्त्य न विद्यते ।
प्रेततदुच्चरमर सत्यं यत्र किल्लित्त जायते ॥७१॥

Meaning : “No Jīva whosoever is ever born; there is no cause for his birth also. That state wherein nothing even the least bit is born - that alone is the supreme state.”

AJĀTI ITSELF IS THE ABSOLUTE REALITY

The preceptor is concluding that the teaching - “Ajāti Itself is Paramārtha” - becomes determined from the fact that - “It is not possible to decide that the apparent forms of Chitta and
Chetya are such and such.” In fact, that no Jīva is born is itself the Absolute Truth (Paramārtha). The statement that - “Jīvas being born is like the birth of Svapna-Māyā-Nirmitaka Jīvas” - is meant for the purpose of indicating that Vyāvahārika Janma (empirical birth) is Māyika only and not with the intention to say that either Chitta or Chetya (the concepts of the mind) are really, absolutely existing. Chitta means verily mind. The statement that - “The mind is born from Paramātman” - in the Muṇḍaka Upanishad (2-1-3) - is to denote that all the Vikāra (Kārya or resultant effects) or empirical mutations in general are verily or merely an exercise in words ; really speaking, in Ātman there is no mind whatsoever existing indeed. For this the Śruti that - “(Paramātman is) Aprāna, Amanaska, Shubhra” - (Muṇḍaka 2-1-2) is the authoritative source.

It being so, in the Absolute sense no Jīva is ever born ; for him to be born there does not exist any cause whatsoever. Whatever statements were made previously to refute the various Jātivādas were all Vyāvahārikasatya (empirical reality) alone ; but Paramārthasatya (Absolute reality or truth) is : “Nothing whatsoever even an iota of it is really born.”

This verse has already appeared (3-48) in the Advaita Prakaraṇa also. There the purport of the verse was to signify the teaching that - “No devices (Upāya) whatsoever are real ; the Aja-Advaya-Tattwa which is the Upeya (that Reality indicated by the devices) is the Paramasatya (the Ultimate Reality).” But here the purport for the verse is to conclude the demonstration of the truth - “By the disputes and differences among the various disputants Aja-Advaya-Tattwa (the birthless-non-dual-Transcendental Reality) alone gets evolved.”

The teaching that - “No Jīva is ever born” - does not become relevant in the Buddhistic doctrine ; for, all the different schools or factions of Buddhistic Philosophy are invariably Nairātmyavādas (doctrines of negation of Ātman’s existence). But this teaching here is exclusively committed to Advaita Vedānta alone. In the ‘Introduction’ this fact has been clarified.

चित्तस्यनिर्विषयं नित्यमस्थरं तेन कीर्तितम्।
चित्तनिर्विषयं नित्यमस्थरं तेन कीर्तितम्।।७२॥
Meaning: “This Dvaita (duality) of the form of Grāhya and Grāhaka is verily the vibration of the Chitta. Chitta is Nirvishaya (devoid of any object); by this, they say it is Asanga (non-attached) only.”

CHITTA ALSO IS ADVAYATATTWA ALONE

It has already been stated previously that - ‘अद्वैत च द्वायतात्त्व’ (4-62), meaning - “All Dvaita of the form of Grāhya-Grāhaka is verily Māyika, a vibration only of the Chitta.” “Because that Chitta, in the Absolute sense, is Ātman alone, it is verily Nirvishaya” - thus it becomes evolved. Thus because it is Nirvishaya, knowledgeable people say that Chitta also is always Asanga (non-attached). The Śruti: ‘असंगो द्वायत्व मुर्लेः’ - (Bṛi. 4-3-15) - is an authoritative source for this conclusion. To wit: That which is Savishaya (having an object) - to that thing there is a Saṅga (attachment, contact) with its object; but this Chitta in its intrinsic form being verily Ātman, devoid of the categories of Vishaya (object) and Vishayi (subject), it is Nirvishaya indeed. Hence it is Asaṅga.

HERE FOR THE WORD ‘CHITTA’ THE MEANING IS NOT ‘VIJÑĀNA’ OF THE BUDDHISTS

Because it is taught here that - “This is verily the vibration of the Chitta”; “Because the Chitta is Nirvishaya, it is Asanga” - there is enough scope for the common uninitiated people to misconceive that it is verily Buddhists’ ‘Viññāna’. For, Viññāna-vādins among Buddhists also say: ‘चित्रंत्रमित्रं सर्वं हिर्सा चिरं प्रवले । ग्राह्यप्राचरणा आत्मात्मायं न विद्वले’ (Laṅkāvatāra 3-121), meaning - “All this is verily Chitta; Chitta alone exists in a dual form of Grāhya and Grāhaka; in this there is no division of ‘I’ and ‘mine’.” But if the true seekers discern the subtle teaching of Shri Gaudapāda here in this Kārikā to the effect that - “Chitta is always Nirvishaya and hence it is Asaṅga” - then it becomes clear to them that this is not what the Buddhists refer to as Viññāna. For, Buddhists do not accept the teaching that - “Because Viññāna is always Nirvishaya, it is Asanga.” On the other hand, they affirm that - “Viññāna transforms itself by itself into the form or shape of Vishaya; if it gives up its impurity of Grāhya-Grāhaka, then it
attains Nirvāṇa (Beatitude).” Apart from this, because what was stated in the previous Advaita Prakāraṇa as Aja-Advaya-Brahmavāda in the manner - “This is Advaitavāda which refutes the birth of Dvaita itself” - by saying - ‘No Jīva whosoever is born’ - that very Aja-Advaya-Brahmavāda alone has been recapitulated here too - Chitta alone subsists exclusively. Because this Prakarāṇa is emphasizing the truth that - “Chitta is merely Chittadṛk (mind as seer)” - also this teaching is contrary to Buddhists’ Vijñānavāda. Hence, we should understand that this teaching - “Chitta, being Nirvishaya, is Nitya as also Asanga” - is not in the least convenient to the Buddhistic doctrine.

22. THE INSTRUCTION ABOUT AJĀTI ALSO IS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF SAŚTVITI (EMPIRICAL TRANSACTIONS) ALONE

Meaning: “That thing which exists due to Kalpitasāṃvṛiti - that thing does not exist in the Absolute sense. It may exist by virtue of Paratantrābhisaṃvṛiti (dependent upon a progressive, serial causation); but, in the Absolute sense, it does not exist at all.”

ŚĀSTRAS ETC. AS ALSO THE OBJECTS MENTIONED IN PARASHĀSTRA (TEXTS OF OTHER PHILOSOPHIES) ARE NOT PARAMĀRTHA (ABSOLUTELY-REAL)

(Doubt): If you agree that because it is Nirvishaya, Chitta is Asaṅga, then Asaṅgatwa (non-attachment) itself does not get established, is it not so? You have invariably acknowledged the distinctions with regard to various objects (Vishaya Vibhāga) like Śāstra, Shishya, Shāstā (the preceptor who teaches the Śāstra or science) etc. is it not so? It is not possible to deny that those distinctions do not exist; for, if your Śāstra too is said not to exist, then what it teaches - viz. Aja-Ātmātattwa also - it amounts to saying - does not exist, is it not so? It is not a desirable conclusion for you indeed. Apart from this, in this Prakarāṇa, you have refuted the philosophical teachings of schools like Sāṅkhya,
Vaisheshika, Boudha etc., haven’t you? Now you have to accept that they too invariably exist. For, if it amounts to saying that there is no object which is to be refuted - then it is tantamount to saying that this refutation also does not exist. That too will not be desirable to you; for, without refuting the rivals’ Śāstras your own Siddhānta cannot possibly be sustained, is it not so?

(Solution) : This defect especially does not at all exist in our philosophy. For - (i) first of all, what you insist in saying that Śāstra, Shishya etc. should necessarily exist - we have accepted that by virtue of Kalpitasaṃvṛiti (deliberately conceived empirical transactions). Because they are imagined by way of an Upāya (device) for teaching the Paramārtha, all these ‘exist’ only from the Adhyārōpa Dṛṣṭi (viewpoint of deliberate superimposition) but not from the Paramārtha Dṛṣṭi (viewpoint of the Absolute Reality). We have already stated in the Āgama Prakaraṇa that - “This tenet is taught only for the purpose of Upadesha (spiritual instruction), but if (the Paramārtha) is cognized there does not exist this duality” - (Āgama 1-18). Therefore, for that Vishaya that exists due to Saṃvriti alone - for the Chitta, which is Aja from the Pāramārthika viewpoint, there does not accrue whatsoever any Savishayatwa (being associated with an object or having objectivity).

(ii) Further, you had raised a doubt of the type - “Because you are refuting the objects which are established by the rivals’ Śāstras, it amounts to your admitting that they exist ; from this, you doubted that Chitta becomes susceptible to Savishayatwa, is it not so? For this, our solution is : In the opponents’ Śāstras the objects or phenomena like Pradhāna, Paramāṇu etc. which are acceptable to them exclusively are only existing due to Kalpitasaṃvṛiti - meaning, Avidyāvyavahāra Dṛṣṭi - alone and not absolutely existing. In the same manner, what they have acknowledged as Satkāryavāda, Asatkāryavāda etc. - all such dogmatic theories - if observed, analysed properly from the Pāramārthika viewpoint - do not exist at all, and hence from those objects, which are Avidyākalpita, for the Chitta no Savishayatwa whatsoever can attach itself. Because their doctrines are also being refuted adopting a methodology acceptable to those opponents (disputants) alone, that exercise of refutation also is Sāmvritika (i.e. due to Avidyākalpita
Vyawahāra) alone. By this no harm whatsoever is caused for the Paramārtha. For killing a snake in the dream by a stick of the dream no Pāpa (sin or demerit) or Punya (merit) entails him in the waking, is it not so? Therefore, what we said, viz. “Chitta, meaning Ātmatattwa, is said to be always Asanga” - is quite reasonable indeed.

अजः कल्पितसंबृत्या परमार्थेन नायपः।
परतन्त्रभिनिष्पत्त्या संबृत्या जायते तु सः।१७४।

Meaning: “What is said to be Aja is also from Kalpitasamvr̥iti alone; from the Paramārtha Drśhti Aja also does not exist. By virtue of or due to Paratantra Abhinishpatti (manifestation of dependence on another thing) He is born from Samvr̥iti alone.”

EVEN THE CONCEPTION OF HIS BEING AJA IS ALSO FROM SAMVR̥ITI ALONE

(Doubt) : If Śāstra etc. are also Avidyāvyavahāra alone, then it evolves that the conception of His being ‘Aja’ also is Āvidyaka alone, is it not so? What solution is there for this (anomaly)?

(Solution) : True; just like Śāstra etc., we say from Kalpitasamvr̥iti alone that He is ‘Aja’.

Here, we should discern the division of Samvr̥iti in this manner: ‘Samvr̥iti’ means Avidyāvyavahāra. Just as in that Vyawahāra also the division of ‘Satya’, ‘Anṛita’ is familiar in our workaday transactions, in the same manner it has been accepted in our Śāstra. The Śruti - “(Paramārtha) Satya became both Satya and Anṛita” - (Taittirīya 2-6) - is saying this. For that Śruti statement the implicit meaning is: Brahman alone which is Paramārthasatyam assumed the two forms of the sea-shell which is Sāṃvr̥itikasatyam and of the silver of the sea-shell which is Sāṃvr̥itikanṛita. “That which gets established, determined by Pramāṇa (valid means of proof) - that thing is Samvr̥itisatyam; when a thing gets sublated, negated as we examine it by means of Pramāṇas that thing is Sāṃvr̥ityanṛita” - thus we should discern. Although Kalpitasamvr̥iti also is Āvidyakasamvr̥iti alone, the preceptors have perforce to utilize this for the
purpose of teaching the Tattwa. But in this context what is a special feature is: ‘Lōkasauñvriti’ is brought about (conjured up) by Avidyā; because in our empirical transactions we have (quite naturally) assumed those things which are Mithyārūpa (of the form of false appearance) to be Satya, for the common run of people the Samsāra Anartha (the calamity of transmigratory existence) is caused from it; on the other hand, in the case of Kalpitasaumṛiti because it is Vyavahāra alone imagined (deliberately, knowingly) for the purpose of teaching the Tattwa to others, from it no harm whatsoever is caused to anyone whatsoever. If those knowledgeable people who have cognized the reality of Ākāsha (empty space), even though they transact in the manner that - “Ākāsha is blue” - in reality the empty space is not in the least blue, is it not so? Similarly, we say, from Kalpitasaumṛiti, that - “Ātman is Aja”; by this there is no harm, whatsoever caused at all to Ātman.

ĀTMAN IS SAID TO BE AJA WITH A VIEW TO NEGATING BIRTH ITSELF

From the Paramārtha Dṛṣṭi, Ātman is not Aja at all. We are saying that Ātman is Aja only for the purpose of refuting the assumption in others’ Śāstra that - ‘He is born’, and not that it is our intended purport that in Ātman in reality (in the Absolute sense) there exists a Dharma (quality or attribute) of Ajatwa (birthlessness) at all. In the Kalpanābhedas (various imaginations) of the type - ‘He is born’, ‘He is dead’ etc. the Dharma of ‘Ajatwa’ of Ātman is not really involved. Therefore, even the concept of ‘He is Aja’ is assumed or suggested (superimposed) from Saṃvṛiti alone. If Jātatwa (being born) is Saṃvṛiti, for the purpose of negating that what is conceived (as a counter) as Ajatwa (birthlessness) also is from Saṃvṛiti only, is it not so? Because Pratiyōgi (the opposite concept) of Jātatwa is Saṃvṛitika, relative to that the Kalpita Ajatwa also should necessarily be that much Āvidyaka alone. This is the intended purport here.

‘KALPITA’, ‘PARATANTRA’ ETC. ARE NOT BUDDHISTIC TECHNICAL TERMS

Here in this context some people are deluded to think that in Shri Gauḍapādāchārya’s commentary the Buddhistic doctrines have got mixed up. Their doubt is: The Buddhistic surmise is
that objects have three kinds of natures like Kalpita, Paratantra and Parinishpanna. “From whichever kind of Vikalpa (concept) whichever kind of object is Kalpita (imagined) it is called ‘Parikalpita’ - it is not something that is really existing ; by means of Pratyaya (a distinct percept) what is caused is a ‘Paratantra Swabhāva’ ; ‘Parinishpanna Swabhāva’, means ‘what was stated before not existing now’ (Trimshikā 20-21). Vasubandhu (a Buddhist scholar) has given the following examples for these terms : (1) On the strength of a Mantra (hymn) the form that is magically created - for example a Māyāhasti (magical elephant) - is Kalpitaswabhāva ; there the elephant’s form exists, but the elephant does not at all exist. That is called ‘Parikalpita’ ; (2) its shape is ‘Paratantra’ ; (3) there the elephant does not at all exist - this alone is ‘Parinishpanna Swabhāva’ (Trimshika Vivaraṇa 27-28). Although Grāhya-Grāhakatwa does not exist people imagine (misconceive) it to be existing and hence it is called ‘Parikalpita’ ; ‘Paratantra’ means ‘Because it is born from Hetu-Pratyaya (a percept as cause) it is said to be ‘Paratantra’ ; Paratantra is always non-existing and this alone is ‘Parinishpanna’ - this is the explanation they give. The Buddhists’ doctrine is : ‘Parinishpanna’ is the real Swabhāva (essential nature) of a Vastu (entity) ; whereas Parikalpita, Paratantra - though both these are Asat alone, they do exist from the Vyāvahārika Drishti and hence they are called ‘Swabhāva.’

It being so, in the Kārikā sentence : “That which is existing due to Kalpitasaṃvṛiti” - that does not really (absolutely) exist ; “It may exist due to Paratantrābhisamvṛiti, but not Pāramārthically (i.e. in the Absolute sense)” - how the Sougata Buddhists’ highly imaginary, misconceived ideas or theories of Parikalpita-Paratantra can possibly find a place or have any scope - we just cannot divine. Especially in the above Kārikā sentence the scope for, or relevance of, the three Swabhāvas propounded by the Buddhists, viz. ‘Kalpita’, ‘Paratantra’ and ‘Parinishpanna’, is not at all there ; nor for them any illustrations have been given here by Shri Gauḍapāda. Apart from this, in this argument for the repeated usage of the expressions - “Kalpitasaṃvṛityā” (due to highly imagined Vyāvahārika transactions), “Paratantrābhisamvṛityā” (the empirical dealings superimposed due to a percept as cause) in which the word ‘Saṃvṛiti’ is being repeated - there does not
appears to be any tangible purpose being served; for, the Buddhists have accepted that whether it is ‘Kalpita’ or ‘Paratantra’, it is invariably Sāmvrītika, meaning - Āvidyaka (projected by, conjured up by Avidyā, ignorance) alone, is it not so? On the other hand, according to the explanation given by Shri Śaṅkara for this Kārikā, it is stated: “Śāstra, Shishya etc. exist due to ‘Kalpitasamvṛiti’ alone; for, on the basis of the Nyāya (maxim) of Adhyārōpa (Superimposition) and Apavāda (Rescission) for the purpose of spiritual instruction alone these concepts, categories of Śāstra, Shishya etc. are deliberately conceived, is it not so? In reality (considering from the Absolute viewpoint of the Ultimate, Transcendent Reality) even Śāstra etc. do not at all exist, and hence for the Chitta there is no object at all. This teaching gets evolved inviolably and irrefutably.” In the same manner, alien concepts like ‘Pradhāna’ (of the Śāṅkhya) and ‘Paramāṇu’ (of the Vaisheshika) - which have been taken up for consideration only from the viewpoint of refutation - there is ‘existence’ from the ‘Paratantrābhinishpatti’ (advent or manifestation of dependence on another thing) only; they are accepted here from the viewpoint of Saṃvṛiti (empirical transactions conjured up by Avidyā) alone acceptable to the opponents’ Śāstras. They have been refuted by means of Yuktis (logical devices) acceptable to the respective disputant (followers of various schools of philosophies or Darshanas which are predominantly logic-oriented and dogmatic or doctrinaire in approach) after confronting them with logical conclusions undesirable to their respective doctrines, but we have not at all accepted that they do really exist even while refuting them. In the same way, the commentary on the sentence - “अजः कल्पितसंवृत्या” - also should be discerned. The refutation of ‘Janma’ which the alien Darshanakāras have imagined (misconceived) is invariably from the standpoint of Adhyārōpita Vyavahāra (superimposed empirical dealings) exclusively for the purpose of Tattwopadesha (teaching of the Ultimate, Absolute Reality) alone, but we have never at all accepted that ‘in the Absolute sense, Janma exists. In any case, thus only from Paratantrābhinishpatti - meaning, invariably assuming those doctrines which are established in the opponents’ Śāstras - it has been stated that - “He is Aja” - and hence it should be discerned that this teaching can
be suitably applied to the teaching that - "He (Ātman) is born due to Saṃvṛiti alone."

There is also another textual variation like - "परत्तन्त्रोपनिषिधिष्टेऽप्पञ्चा" - but that is not correct. Or, for that also somehow a meaning can be adduced. ‘Paratantra’ (dependent upon another), meaning, due to ‘Abhinishpatti’. By virtue of Janma it is ‘Paratantra’, meaning, under the control of another ; this is stated desiderating another ; this is said by assuming the Padārtha (an object signified by a word) that is established in another’s Śāstra. Therefore, it may also be explained in the manner - “It is born due to Saṃvṛiti”. Here “Saṃvṛiti” means ‘Āvidyakavyavahāra’ ; because this Saṃvṛiti conceals Paranārtha, it is given this name. In any case, thus everything becomes reconciled.

23. THE FRUIT OF PARAMĀRTHA JÑĀNA

अभूतविभिन्नवस्त्ति हुर्यं तत्र न विद्वते ।
हुर्याधावं स कुरैव निदिष्टं न जावते ॥७७॥

Meaning : “There exists Abhinivesha (staunch affinity to, identification with) in what is non-existent, but therein no Dvaita exists ; only if it is cognized that there is no Dvaita, it evolves that it is not born because there is no cause.”

BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF NON-EXISTENCE OF DUALITY THE PARAMAPURUŚHĀRTHA (ULTIMATE, SUPREME GOAL OF HUMAN EXISTENCE) ACCRUES

Observed from the Absolute point of view, because Vishaya (an object) does not exist whatsoever there is ‘Abhūṭabhīnivesha’, meaning : Though there is no duality existing, there is a persistent identification or belief that it exists. In that Advaitātman duality, especially, does not exist whatsoever. Just as in phenomena like Svapna (dream), Māyā (magical show), Gandharvanagara (celestial city) etc. there exists mere appearance - and if properly observed, no substance really exists - in the same way, here also when we cognize Aja-Advaya-Tattwa the duality is sublated. Because thus for birth Mithyābhīnivesha (vain, false identification or affinity) alone is the cause, merely by cognizing the truth that
the non-existence of duality does not exist one is not born at all. For this conclusion the Śruti: “Being Brahman in the beginning itself, he reaches (merges in) Brahman” - (Bṛ. 4-4-6) - is the authoritative source.

Meaning: “When the Hetus (causes) like Uttama (superior, best), Adhama (lowest, inferior), Madhyama (middle-grade) are not existing, then Chitta is not born; when there is no cause how at all can Phala (the effect) arise?”

IF THERE IS NO STAUNCH IDENTIFICATION, DHARMA AND ADHARMA DO NOT EXIST; JANMA ALSO DOES NOT EXIST

The Varna-Āshrama Karmas, if performed without any desires but along or associated with Upāsanas (meditations), are responsible for Devatwaprāpti (attainment of divinity) and hence those Karmas are called ‘Uttamaheitus’ (superior causes); even if they are performed without Upāsanas, merely by means of Varna-Āshrama Karmas fruits like Svargaprāpti (attainment of heaven) accrue; “After the enjoyment of the Phala (fruit),” - it is mentioned in the Smriti - “the practitioners acquire a Janma endowed with an excellent region or country, community or caste, race, religion, longevity, intelligence, behaviour, wealth, happiness, discriminative power.” Those Karmas which help acquire the lives of mute creatures are ‘Adhamahetus’. Dharmas (merits, righteous Karmas) mixed with Adharmas are ‘Madhyamahetus’ responsible for Manushyatwa (human birth). By virtue of the differences in Dharma and Adharma the various types of Janmas are obtained - this system is described in Manu Smriti and such other Smritis. All these three kinds of Hetus (causes) do not at all affect or arise in that person who has cognized Brahman who is beyond all Kalpanas and who is Akartru (non-doer, i.e. devoid of Kartrutwa, Bhoktrutwa projected by Avidyā); although for people who are devoid of discrimination it appears as though the sky or empty space is polluted by impurities, one who is a Vivekin that pollution is not visible at all, is it not so? We should discern it here in the same manner.
Thus when the Hetus are not born at all, then Chitta is not born at all; to wit, Ātman with the Chitta as an adjunct does not acquire the Janmas with the body, the senses etc. - this is the implied meaning here. For, there is no possibility of a Janma being acquired either by a mere Chitta or mere Ātman devoid of any adjunct whatsoever. We have already stated in the Advaita Prakarana that - “By virtue of an association with a Kalpita (misconceived, superimposed), Upādhi (adjunct, attribute) alone Janma etc. are being caused.”

The reason for our statement - “When there are no Hetus, one is not born” - is: Without there being any Hetu, the Phala cannot come into being in any manner; there is no scope whatsoever for the fruit called Janma to accrue. There is a Śruti also to this effect: 'ज्ञानद्वैपैत्या क्लेशैैैैत्या संपन्नति पुनः । ज्ञानद्वैपैत्या क्लेशैैैैत्या संपन्नति पुनः ।' (Moksha Dharma 211-17), meaning - “Just as the seeds burnt in a fire do not sprout out, in the same way the Kleshas (miseries) which are burnt by Jñāna do not once again taint or affect Ātman.”

अनित्यन्त्य चितवण्य कालनुस्तयः समाअन्तः ।
अजातत्वैव सर्वतर्गच्च चित्रद्वैत्य दे तद्यतः ॥१७७॥

Meaning: “There is a teaching that - ‘A Chitta which is Animitta (devoid of a cause) is not born’ - is it not so? That is nothing but (the Anutpatti or non-birth) which is Sama (one and the same everywhere) and Advaya (non-dual) of a Chitta which, being Ajāta (birthless), has become everything. For, it is verily Chittadrishya (object for the mind).”

THE FRUIT OF JÑĀNA IS ALWAYS IN ONE AND THE SAME FORM

What kind of Anutpatti (non-birth) is it of the Chitta which we have described as - “When the causes like Dharma (merit) and Adharma (demerit) become extinct, the Chitta is not born” - ? Is it that now the birth being real, after the Jñāna accrues it becomes extinct? It is not so. What we said previously that - “After one cognizes or Intuits the Paramārtha, any Nimitta whatsoever of the form of Dharma and Adharma becomes extinct and thereby there is no Utpatti (birth)” - that (Paramārtha) is not
a new one at all; on the contrary, the Paramārtha, ever, in all states of existence, remains, subsists in one and the same state, meaning, Nirvishesha (devoid of any special features whatsoever) nature. For, a Tattwa which is ever Sama and Advaya there cannot possibly exist variations like being Mukta and not being Mukta, is it not so? The Anupatti of the Advaya Chitta which has become everything, without being born, is verily its Swabhāva even before the cognition of the Tattwa indeed; for, both these phenomena - i.e. the Nimitta (Hetu) of the forms of Dharma and Adharma and the Janma which is the Phala - are verily Chittadrishya (objects of mind only). Hence even then it is Asat alone. We should here resort to that very Yuktī which is mentioned in the Kārikās - “The Chittadrishya is not born” - (4-28); “Chittadrishya is Avastu (non-substantial)” - (4-33). Therefore, merely because of Abhinivesha (vain or false affinity or clinging on to a belief) due to which we have assumed a thing, which really does not exist, to exist - it is not at all possible to imagine either that - “Due to Dvaita which is the Nimitta, Paramārtha is Asarva (not everything)” - or that - “Paramārtha is of a Swabhāva (nature) of being born with a Janma which is a resultant effect.”

If it is not so, it amounts to imagining that - “Jñāna removes something which exists, as also brings into being something that does not exist” - quite contrary to universal experience. Therefore, the correct understanding is: There is no Jñāna that is not capable of being Nivṛutta (removed), there is no Jñāna which is not born.”

Meaning: “If one cognizes the truth that being without any cause is itself the Reality, he attains a place, state which does not accept (desiderate) any cause which is extraneous, which is devoid of Shōka (misery, grief), desire and which is Abhaya (fearless).”

BY PARAMĀRTHA JÑĀNA HETU (DEALINGS OF DHARMA AND ADHARMA RESPONSIBLE FOR JANMA) BECOMES EXTINCT

Because the Dvaita which is the cause for vīraḥ - which is...
explained by means of a Yukti in the manner - “All this is verily Chittaspandita (vibrations of the mind) ; Chitta is verily Nirvishaya ; it is verily Advaya” - does not exist at all, - if one cognizes the truth that - and does not see (entertain) the motive for Devādiprāpti (attainment of the position of a deity) which is of the form, nature of Dharma (merit) and Adharma (demerit) - then true seeker realizes that - “only if there is Dvaita the Abhimāna (pride, identification) of the type of believing in the existence of Hetu (cause) and Phala (effect), exists and for the attainment of the Phala one perforce accepts the Hetu ? Because one has cognized, realized the Paramārtha, Dvaita itself is not there and then how at all can there be any scope for accepting Hetu ? Therefore, if one does not accept Hetu, meaning - if he gives up, renounces the three types of desires, aspirations like Putraishāna (desire to have progeny), Vittaishāna (desire to possess, amass wealth), Lōkaishāna (desire to attain supreme worlds of higher beings, fame, name in the world etc.) - he attains, reaches a state, position which is devoid of Shōka (grief), desire and fear - meaning devoid of Avidyā - i.e. he will never be born again.” This is the (order of reasoning) implied here.

For this conclusion the following Śruti sentences are the authoritative sources : ‘त्र को मोहः कः शोकः’, meaning - “There what attachment (can there be) ? What grief (can there be) ?” यदा पश्यत्वन्यीशस्य दुहित्यानमिति बीतशोकः’, meaning - “When (he) sees the Īsa (Lord) who is of queer nature, then he cognizes the truth that - ‘All this is verily His greatness, excellence indeed’ - and becomes rid of Shōka” ; ‘स कावःपिरधयते तत्र तत्र । पर्याप्तकामस्य कृतात्मनस्तु इहैव सवेप्राच्छिपिन्ति कामाः’ - (Mundaka 3-2-2), meaning - “He is being born here and there due to desires ; but for one who has attained totally all the desires and has become Kritātma (one who has attained the Self), here itself all desires become extinct” ; ‘हि वे प्रचिं व एवं वेदः’ (Bri. 4-4-25), - meaning - “One who cognizes in this manner, He verily becomes one with Abhaya (fearless) Brahman.”
Meaning: “Due to Abhinivesha for Abhūta (a non-existent thing) he engages himself is something which is equal to that. Once he realizes, cognizes that there is no real entity, he becomes Nissaṅga (detached) and recedes from it.”

FOR ACCEPTING DHARMA ETC. AJÑĀNA ALONE IS THE ROOT CAUSE

How can it be said that - “Merely by cognizing affinity he will not (in this manner) accept the Hetus” - ? To this, our answer is : “For, since there exists invariably an Abhinivesha (innate to the belief) that - ‘The non-existent thing is existing’ - Chitta gets prompted to indulge in something which is analogous, similar to itself.” The manner in which the Chitta engages itself in its transactions is : “This thing exists ; by accepting this cause this thing should be acquired ; by accepting this cause this thing should be got rid of” - is it not so ? Therefore, merely by cognizing that there is no Vastu existing, that Chitta becomes Nissaṅga (detached) and recedes, and once again it does not accept any cause or motive.

REALLY SPEAKING, CHITTA’S PRAVRTTI AND NIVRĪTTI ETC. ARE ABHUTA ABHINIVESHA ALONE

Here if we consider only the literal meaning of the verse, it means only this much : “Due to the Abhinivesha of the type - ‘Though there is no Vastu, it is there’ - the Chitta is prompted to act ; merely on cognizing the truth that - ‘The Vastu does not exist’ - it recedes.” We should determine, decide that - “Even so, “Though there does not exist any Vastu externally, there invariably occurs an Abhinivesha of the type - ‘The Vastu is there’ - alone; in the same way, ‘This is good ; this is bad ; this is desirable, this is undesirable’ - we have such a staunch belief ; then, feeling that ‘I am having attachment or hatred towards it, and in order to obtain or get rid of it I have Ṣaṅkalpa (wish, volition) and Pravṛtti - all these are verily Abhinivesha that we entertain. In the same way we should also determine that a belief like - “With a conviction that - ‘The Vastu does not exist’ - I should give up the Adhyāsa (misconception) of the type - ‘This is good, this is bad’ - and then recede from such a transaction” - also is verily Abhinivesha. If it is so, then only there will be agreement, reconciliation between the sentence -
"The Anutpatti of the Chitta is Sama, Advaya" - (4-77) and this present sentence. In the same way, among the verses prior to or posterior to this verse, in their respective contexts we should see that they are all reconciled and discern that everything is Abhinivesha alone. We should also understand that the statements like - "He attains to an Abhayapada (a position or state of fearlessness)" - (4-77) ; “Then a Nishchala (unshakeable) Sthitī (state) accrues” - (4-80) - are also made only from Kalpita-sāmvṛiti standpoint alone.

Meaning : “Then the condition or state of the Chitta which has receded but which does not proceed forward is verily Nishchala (motionless, still). This is an object for the Jñānis, it is Sāmya (of one and the same nature), Aja, Advaya.”

WHEN THE CHITTA BECOMES NIHSANGA (DETACHED) 
IT IS VERILY SAMA, AJA, ADVAYA ĀTMAN

In any case, in this manner with the cognition that - ‘There is no ‘Vastu’ - it recedes and without engaging itself in another object which is similar to it, it rests - for such a Chitta, its state then is Nishchala (still). Because it has become quite certain that at the time or moment of Jñāna this Chitta remains or stays put perennially introverted (Uparata), it has attained a resolute, steadfast or distinct state, which is devoid of any kind of motion, vibration whatsoever and which is verily Brahman - that is of Nityāchalaswabhāva (eternally motionless essential nature). This Chittasthiti (state of mind), which is verily of Brahmāswarūpa, Advaya Chaitanyāmātra (non-dual Pure or Absolute Consciousness), exists only in the Intuitive Experience of Paramārthadarshis (Self-realized souls, Jñānis) ; this cannot possibly be known by the Ajñās (ignorant people) who have Abhinivesha (a staunch clinging or affinity) for Mithyāvastu (unreal, false appearances of material objects) ; what is appearing to their Chitta is Sāmvṛitika, meaning - projected by Avidyā ; it is Sadvitiya (associated with duality) ; when its parts or components become uneven or imbalanced it is born, moves and then gets destroyed. But this truth is known only to Jñānis ; therefore, since by its very
essential nature it is Niravayava (partless) it is Sāmya (the same everywhere), the components do not get split up and are not born, it is Nirvishesha (devoid of any special attributes) ; it is also Advaya (non-dual). This alone was mentioned as - 'अजनाति सम्भात गतम्' - (3-38) in the previous Chapter. There it was stated that 'निष्प्रेक्ष्य रूपरूप तत्त्वा' - (3-40), meaning - “Then it became Brahman” - is it not so? Because it was a fruit accruing from Manōnigraha, it was stated like that ; but here the special feature is : That very same thing has been mentioned as a fruit of Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) which is devoid of duality - that is all.

Here by the expression - ‘विषयः स हि बुद्धानाम्’ - (It is an object for the Buddhas or Jñānis) - it is neither indicated here about a particular Samādhi (trance) nor the meaning that - ‘For those who are not Jñānis to attain that Samādhi it is very difficult’ ; on the contrary, it is affirmed that although this state which is Aja, Advaya is Nityasiddha (eternally established and available), it can be known (Intuited) by that Experience (Anubhava) alone which Jñānis have attained ; for, Ajñāna (ignorance, lack of knowledge) alone is the hurdle or concealing cover (impediment) for it. That is all.

अज्ञनीन्द्रस्वर्णं प्रभातं भवति स्वयम्।
सक्रृद्धामालो ब्रृवैश्च धमो धानुस्वभावतः: ॥५८॥

Meaning : “It is devoid of birth, of sleep, of dream, self-illumning. This Dharma (Entity) is by its very essential nature shining (illumining) incessantly.”

ĀTMAN WHO IS APPEARING TO JÑĀNIS' ANUBHAVA IS OF KŪṬASTHA (ABSOLUTELY IMMUTABLE), CHINMĀTRA (PURE CONSCIOUSNESS), PRAKĀŚHASWARŪPA (ESSENTIAL NATURE OF BRILLIANCE)

The special attribute of 'अज्ञनिन्द्रस्वर्ण' has been used in the Āgama Prakaraṇa (1-16) and in the Advaita Prakaraṇa (3-36). Because It is without Agrahaṇa (not having comprehension), Anyathāgrahaṇa (misconception) - it is that which is devoid of mutations like Janma etc. - this is the implied meaning here. Because It is verily a mass, lump of Pure Consciousness
“Swayamprabhāta.” (By Itself It is shining, It is self-effulgent), It need not be illumined by another. This aspect itself has been described in the Advaita Prakaraṇa as “स्वयमप्रभातम्” - (3-33). This Dharma (Entity, Reality) called Ātman is "Sakridvibhātā", meaning - an eternally illumining, shining entity - to wit, by virtue of Dhātuswabhāva (Its very core of Being) It is Chidaikapraṅkarṣaṛūpa (of the very essence of non-dual Light of Pure Consciousness). By virtue of Dhātuswabhāva means - by virtue of Vastuswabhāva (essential nature of Being, the Ultimate Reality) alone. The Śruti states that : "न तत सूर्य भाति न च चंद्रतारकः। नेमा विद्वृत्तो भाति कुर्वस्यमन्निः। तःतेव भातस्मुन्माति सर्वं तस्य भासं सर्वोद्धर्वं संभाति॥" - (Mundaka 2-2-10), meaning - “There even the sun does not shine, the moon or the stars do not shine; these lightnings also cannot shine, then where is the question of this fire shining? When He is shining all these are following Him and are shining, indeed; by means of His Light alone all this is shining.”

**COMMENTARY ON A VARIANT TEXT**

There is also a variant text like - ‘शतुः स्वभावः’. In that context too it means : The Swatantravastu (independent Entity) of the essential nature of Paramātman or Supreme Self by virtue of Its very core of Being is eternally shining and hence It is ‘Swayamprabhāta’. That which was, due to Samvṛiti, not shining in the beginning, by virtue of Jñāna It is ‘shining’ - for this empirical transaction ‘It’ becomes an object; but observed from the Paramārtha Drishti - since It is ever shining, It is by Itsself shining - this truth is cognized by the Jñānis. This is the implied meaning here. In the Advaita Prakaraṇa also it was mentioned : ‘अजमनिद्रात्मस्वभावायामकं सर्वंकृत्त्वा सर्वप्रज्ञाम्’ (3-36) - in order to signify the teaching that - “By means of Ātmasatyānubōdha (Spiritual instruction about the Self as the Absolute Reality) when one cognizes (the Ātmaswarūpa), there does not remain anything else to be done with regard to that Brahman Knowledge” but here it is stated that - “After having cognized the Truth there does not exist anything second to It, that Chitta which has receded (i.e. has become introverted and quiescent) - its Brāhmisthiti (state of total merger, rather becoming one with the Ultimate non-dual
Reality of Brahman-Ātman is Swayāmprabhātā (self-effulgent); for Its illuminating It does not desiderate anything else at all” - This much alone is the difference between these two variant texts.

Here in this context - a modern scholar, Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya has imagined that - “Although Shri Gauḍapādāchārya has used here the term ‘Dharmadhātu’ which is in vogue in Buddhistic literature, because he was not familiar with the Buddhistic philosophy (doctrines) he has imagined two variant expressions like ‘धर्मान् स्वात्मकः’ and ‘धर्मान् शातः स्वभावः’. But in none of the hand-written manuscripts this latter variant text (i.e. Dharmo Dhatuhu Swabhāvataha) is to be seen; in case even if we assume that in some hand-written manuscript it does exist - in that event also, we can conceive of a suitable interpretation in the manner - ‘Because this Paramartharupa Dharmadhātu, meaning - the Vastu or Reality which is the substrate for everything, of the essential nature of Paramārtha (Ultimate, Absolute Reality) - by Its very core of Being is Nityaprakāśa (eternally self-effulgent), for It there is no need whatsoever of a Light which accrues from Chittasamādhāna (quiescence, equanimity of the mind) etc. ; for, It is Advaya’.”

The word ‘Dhātu’ being used in this sense or with this connotation is to be seen in the Śūtra Bhāshya also. For instance, look at this sentence : “एक एव परमेश्वरः कृतस्थितियो विज्ञानधातुरविद्या मायायामयाविद्वत् अनेकव्यावहार्ये नान्यो विज्ञानधातुरसि” - (Śūtra Bha. 1-3-19), meaning - “One and the same Parameshwara alone who is Vijnānadhātu (the very core of Being of Pure Consciousness) and Kūṭasthanitya (eternally Absolutely immutable), due to Avidyā - just as by virtue of Māyā there exists the Māyāvi - appears to the common people in various forms ; there is no other Vijnānadhātu.” It has already been stated that - “Both Chitta and Chetya - because they are devoid of any special signs or symbols - do not exist whatsoever” - (4-67) - is it not so ? Therefore, since this Dharmadhātu is Advaya as also by Its very essence of Being - Nityaprakāśa - It is Swayamprabhātā ; that is all, but this ‘Dharmadhātu’ is never illumined by any other entity. This is the implied meaning.
Here in this context ‘Dharma’ meansParamātman alone. In the Śruti - ‘अयुज्य धर्मः’ (Kaṭhōpanishad 1-1-21) this word is seen being used in the sense of ‘Paramātman’. The reason for giving Him this name of ‘Dhātu’ is: Being the substrate for all Vikalpas (of the mind) this Paramātmatattwa ‘wears’ (Dhāranā) them. Just like the Mūlabhūtadhātvastus (primordial elements as the basic entities), because It has assumed its uncommon or unusual form also, It has been given this name. Here ‘Dharmadhātu’ can never even possibly be suspected to mean ‘Shūnya’ (essencelessness) - which the Buddhists, who are outside the purview of the Vedas, have assumed. For, with that meaning the Kārikā’s purport does not become suitable, agreeable at all. The Buddhists’ doctrine is :

‘तथाता घोंघतिप्रचारितम् (परमार्थकः)। धर्मधातुरूच ध्याया: शून्यत्यायः समसत्त:।।

(Madhyāntavinibhāga Sūtra 1-15) ; “अनवथाविधवयर्ससद्विद्विशां वायादीः।

हेतुवाचार्याः हार्याः पर्यायाः यथा क्रमम्।।” - (Ma. V śūtra 1-15, 16) -

[Prof. Vidhushekhar Bhattāchārya has quoted these two verses culling them from “Madhyāntavinibhāga Sūtra”, of Maitreyanātha, in his book ‘Āgamanāstātra’. In the first verse the synonyms of ‘Shūnyatā’ are found; in the second the meaning of introspection those words is to be found]. The implicit meaning of these verses (which is their opinion) is: Beginning with Samyagdrishti up to Samyagvimukti jñāna (the subtle knowledge of Liberation) whatever the Āryadharmas are there - for all of them since it is the cause, ‘Shūnyata’ alone is the ‘Dharmadhātu’ for them.

But neither the topic of those Dharmas nor their Ḥetu (cause) is to be found here. Especially the qualifying attribute of ‘अयुज्यवस्तत्वंयाम्’ can never be suitable for ‘Shūnyatwa’. Because the common people, who are seeing a dream due to Anādimāya, have an Abhinivesha towards Dharmas viz. ‘Chittadrishya’ due to Saṃvṛiti - they experience Nidrāsvapna like, ‘Agrahaṇa’, ‘Anyathāgraḥaṇa’; but when these (ignorant) common people acquire the ‘waking’ of the nature of Jñāna of the type - “We are really Aja-Advaya-Ātman only” - then invariably the Intuitive Knowledge of the type - “That Paramātman who is Anidra, Asvapna, Sakridvibhāta is Himself our Ātman” - accrues; ‘Paramātmarūpa will shine by Itself as their Ātman’ - in this interpretation the qualifying attribute of ‘Ajamanidramasvapnam’
is rendered quite suitable. Therefore, here there is no scope whatsoever for the Buddhistic doctrine to be introduced or interpolated. Our explanation alone is the one which is a suitable commentary for the topic under discussion and deliberation.

24. THE TATTWA WHICH IS AJA-ADVAYA IS CONCEALED BY MITHYÄGRAHAŅA (MISCONCEPTION)

Meaning: “By assuming any particular Dharma (special attribute) this Bhagavanta gets always hidden very easily; and always He gets manifested with difficulty.”

ALTHOUGH ĀTMAN IS NITYAPRAKÄSHARÚPA, HE IS ONE HAVING THE COVER OF MISCONCEPTION

Even after affirming in this manner, if the question is raised as to - ‘How come this Paramārtha Tattwa of Nityashuddhabuddhamuktaśwabhāva is not known by the common run of people?’ - the answer is: Because of comprehending, grasping - meaning, because of Abhimāna (the pride or identification with) the belief that ‘we are grasping’; to wit, because of Mithyā Abhinivesha (vain, false sense of affinity, clinging on to a preconceived notion). ‘Mithyāgrahaṇa’ means ‘not really comprehending’; ‘Mithyā Kōpa’ - means ‘enacted (false) anger or dramatic acting as if angry’ alone, is it not so? In the same way, due to Mithyāgrahaṇa - meaning, due to the false notion or misconception that we are comprehending, knowing something - alone this Bhagavanta, meaning the Divine Being who is Nityaswatantra (eternally independent) and Advaya, though He is Nityanirāvaraṇa Jñānaswarūpa (eternally devoid of being concealed and of the very essence of Intuitive Knowledge), easily without any strain gets hidden. Just as the sun is ‘covered up’ by a cloud, He is ‘concealed’ by the cover of misconception. Seeing duality is the only cover for Ætman who is Bhagavanta; no other real cover is needed; and He manifests Himself with Duhkha (grief or difficulty). Although He is verily of the essential nature of
eternal manifestation due to the Abhinivesha of the type of
- "We are comprehending a Mithyāvastu" - there has been
an apparent impediment for His brilliance, effulgence as Pure
Consciousness. Just as for a person who has turned or directed
his attention towards another direction or region, though a golden
necklace worn around his neck is shining, it is not perceptible
- in the same way, although the Tattwa is Swayamprakāśaswarūpa,
for the extroverted (Bahlrmukhachitta) people it is very difficult
cognize or Intuit and hence it is stated here - "Always with
Duhkha It gets manifested". For this reason, although both the
Upanishads and the Āchārya (preceptor) are teaching with
the aid of various methodologies and pedagogic devices, for
the Ajñās it is not possible to cognize Him. The Śruti states
this : ‘गुप्तनोनि बहवो यं न विदुः। आश्चर्यो वक्ता शुचलोकस्य लम्बा’ -
(Kāthopāniṣad 1-2-7), meaning - ‘Although many people listen
to this Atman’s Swarūpa, they are not able to cognize It ; one
who preaches is of a wonderful nature ; one who obtains or
secures Him is a wiseman."

HERE BHAGAVĀN MEANS ĀTMĀN ALONE

“In this Prakaraṇa the deliberation on ‘Dharmadhātu’ is
taken up ; Shūnyatā alone which is Dharmadhātu has been called
‘Bhagavān’ here" - thus some present-day research scholars have
opined. It is their belief that previously from Verse 4-80 to 4-
84 because there was discussion about the state of the Chitta
alone, here there is no scope for Ātmavichāra at all. But the
purport of the Prakaraṇa is to refute the doctrine of the
Vijñānavādin alone, in the manner - “Chitta is not born, nor is
the Chittadrishya born.” Apart from this, here in this context the
teaching that - ‘Both these are not born’ - alone is not relevant
; on the contrary, what is really, more importantly relevant is :
‘Just as Chittadrishya is not separate from Chitta, in the same
way apart from Ātmān, who is Chidrūpa, Chitta does not exist.’
Therefore, in the Prakaraṇa wherein it is taught that - “Aja-
Anidra-Asvapna Advaita Ātmān alone is Paramārtha” - how at
all can there be any scope for Shūnya ? - This question these
research scholars alone have to answer. If one keeps in mind the
fact that - “In order to demonstrate the truth that Ātmān alone
is Aja - a proper Yukti has been utilized in this Ajāti Prakaraṇa”
- then the truth Here in this context, there is no relevance of Shūnyāvāda of Buddhism - will become very clear.

\[ \text{अस्ति नायस्तिनास्तीति नास्तिनास्तीति वा पुनः ।} \\
\text{चलस्थिरोपयायानौ नौरुपमौ बालिसः ।।८३।।} \]

**Meaning**: “He exists, does not exist, though existing does not exist - in this manner, never at all He exists; moving, steady, both and non-existent - by these one, who is childish, is incessantly covering Him up.”

**THE VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH THE EXAMINERS OR OBSERVERS MISCONCEIVE**

Because they are endowed with subtle observations, even the ‘knowledges’ of those who are famous as scholars are rendered to be verily ‘covers’ for Bhagavanta ; it being so, where is the question of mentioning about the knowledges of foolish people who are highly materialistic? - This topic has been proved here in this verse.

Some people have believed, with regard to Ātman, that He is *Sattāyukta Asti* (He exists), meaning - He is (associated with existence); He does not exist - thus the *Kshanikavādins* among the Buddhists, as also the *Lōkāyatikas*, meaning - *Chārvākas* (materialists) have believed; the *ArdhavaināshiKa* (half Nihilists) *Digambaras* (among the Jains) have believed that the Tattwa may be existing (*Syādasti*) or may not also be existing (*Syānnāsti*) in *Sadāsat* form. The Buddhistic *Shūnyavādins* believes that the Tattva does not at all exist; being devoid of both the opposite categories of *Asti* and *Nāstī*, It is *Nihṣabhāva* (essenceless), *Nirupākhya* (indefinable).

Here *Asti* (exists) - this form is *Chala*; for, it belongs to *Anityavastus* (non-eternal objects) like an earthen pot etc. *Nāstī* (not existing) - this form is *Sthira*; for, it has never any special attribute or feature whatsoever. *Asti Nāstī* (though existing, non-existent) - this form is *Chalasthirarūpa*; *Nāstinarūpa* (never existing) - is especially *Atyantābhāva*. For, in it Astitwa etc. - no such categories whatsoever ever exist.

Because due to the Abhinivesha alone of the non-existing
concepts like Asti etc. of the forms of Chala etc. are appearing in the Bhagavatswarūpa, devoid of any special characteristics whatsoever, all these people like Sadvādi etc. are incessantly covering up Bhagavanta due to their Mithyāgrahana (misconceptions) - meaning, they staunchly believe that the Bhagavattattvā is concealed alone. This is the implied purport here. For, although the sun is Nityapraṇāsha Swarūpa alone, the foolish ignorant people think that the clouds which are being seen with the help of his rays alone - cover up the sun; in the same way, these disputants too are trying to cover up Bhagavanta with their own Mithyāgrahana of the type of Asti, Nāsti etc.; but this Bhagavanta - in the Absolute sense - is verily of Chaitanyaśvabhāva which is eternally shining (manifested); by means of His brilliance (Pure Consciousness) He is illuminating everything; all concepts too are being illumined and manifested by His Chaitanyaśrīprakāśa alone. Even so, the non-discriminating people are carrying on their disputes as if to conceal Him by means of their respective beliefs, concepts. Although these disputants have reckoned themselves to be Panditas (scholars) and though some of their followers too are believing so, because they have not cognized the Paramārtha, they are just like children - ignorant of the Truth indeed.

**THE ASTITWA VĀDA (THEORY OF EXISTENCE) THAT IS FOUND IN THE SRUTI IS KALPITASĀMVRITI**

**(Doubt):** In the Śruti - 'अस्तित्वोपलब्धयः' - (One should reckon that He exists alone) - also, Astitwa (concept of existence) alone is taught, is it not so? It being so, is it proper to have ridiculed the Astitwādins calling them 'childish'?

**(Solution):** This is not at all wrong. For, the Śruti has no prime purport in instructing Astitwa (empirical existence). For the purpose of cognizing the truth that - “The Tattwa is devoid of any special characteristics” - using as a device this Astitwa as an Adhyārōpa (superimposition) - this instruction is imparted. Because of the facts that: (a) all through the people’s intellect (sense of awareness) is associated with the sense of the type - ‘It exists’ - with regard to the Kārya (effect, object) of the external world; (b) even if the Kārya of the world gets ‘merged’ (Laya), it culminates in the sense of - “It exists” - alone; (c)
even the *Buddhi* (intellect) which cognizes that the object does not ‘exist’ is itself invariably associated with the *Pratyaya* (concept of certainty) and gets merged - the Śruti in order to refute or negate the ‘Asadvāda’ (theory or concept of non-existence) instructs in the manner - “One should cognize, reckon (this Ātman) to exist alone.” But here too it is not the ultimate intention of the Śruti to indicate that - “Astibhāva (concept of existence) itself is the Tattva (Ultimate, Absolute Reality)” - at all. When the Śruti teaches the Tattva devoid of any Upādhis (adjuncts) whatsoever, it instructs only by negating all special characteristics in the manner - ‘Not this, not that’. Therefore, in the Śruti quoted by the opponent who has raised the doubt, it is also stated that : ‘अस्तीत्वेपोषपत्थ्यत्सम तत्त्वाभावः प्रसन्नदितः’ - (After cognizing It to be existing, the Tattwabhāva or the object of the Ultimate Reality will become (Prasanna) revealed or manifest”. Therefore, there is no contradiction whatsoever in the instruction of the Śruti.

Hence, what we stated that - ‘Even those disputants who have become known to be erudite, great scholars are verily childish in this regard’ - is correct indeed. Thus when it is said that even for examiners (or researchers) there is *Mithyādrishti* (false viewpoint), what is there to be gainsaid about extroverted people who are by their very nature foolish, puerile?

**ONLY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF LŌKASAMVRITI**
*(UNIVERSAL EMPIRICAL DEALINGS DUE TO MISCONCEPTION) ASTITWA ETC. ARE ĀVARAṆA*

Here there lurks a secret to be discerned : ‘Samvṛiti’ is of two kinds viz. *Lōkasamvṛiti* and *Kalpitasamvṛiti*. Between these two, because *Lōkasamvṛiti* is caused by misconception alone, wherever concepts like Astitwa, Nāsitwa etc. are believed to be real - in all such cases it amounts to our having invariably concealed the essential nature of Bhagavanta. On the contrary, in the case of *Kalpitasamvṛiti*, because the knowledgeable traditional preceptors have, for the purpose of teaching the Tattwa (Absolute Reality), following the *Adhyārōpa-Appavāda-Nyāya* (maxim of deliberate superimposition and rescission), assumed tentatively certain special attributes or features for Ātman - by this superimposition really no Āvarana whatsoever ensues. Even
when they assert that - “Ātman exists” - in their mind, in the real sense, the misconception of the type - “In Him there exists a quality or special attribute of ‘existence’ or ‘being’” - is not engendered, and hence there is no defect tainting their Antaḥkaraṇa (mind) at all. When observed from this viewpoint - even when the Śruti teaches in the manner - “One should cognize that Ātman exists only” - it is an empirical transaction carried out due to ‘Kalpitasaṁvṛiti’ (deliberate superimposition) with the intention of turning, inducing the intellect (discriminative faculty) of the Jijñāsus towards the Tattwa alone; but not stated in order to establish the minds of Jijñāsus in Astitva (the empirical concepts of existence etc.). For, if it is assumed that - “The ultimate purport of the Śruti in indicating, instructing that Ātman is really an object for an intellect entertaining the sense or awareness of ‘existence’” - then what we stated in the beginning as a preamble with the aid of the Śruti in the manner - ‘ैैैैैैै’ - (Kāthopanishad 2-3-12), meaning - “Stating by speech (or words) or imagined by the mind, He cannot possibly be cognized” - will be rendered false. Apart from this, in Śrutis like : ‘अन्यत्र धर्मद्वाराधर्माद’ - (Kātha 1-2-14), meaning - “It is different from Dharma, is different from Adharma” ; ‘अशव्दस्तत्वािश्च’ - (Kātha 1-3-25), meaning - “It is devoid of sound, touch, form, taste, smell” - thus all aspects of Āvaraṇa have been very clearly sublated, negated. Therefore, the Śruti saying - “He exists” - is not at all defective. In the same way, even if it is stated - with the intention or perfect understanding that everything (nay, all duality) is Kalpita (superimposed upon) in Ātman - that “Bhagavanta is ‘Sarvarūpa’” - there will not be any defect whatsoever tainting that teaching; for, even stating in that manner is verily from the viewpoint of Kalpitasaṁvṛiti. In the Vishṇupurāṇa it is stated that - ‘विश्ववृत्ति विष्णुर्वृत्ति विष्णुर्वृत्ति विष्णुर्वृत्ति विष्णुर्वृत्ति’ - (Vishṇupurāṇa 2-12-38), meaning - “The brilliant bodies like stars etc. are verily Vishnu, big mansions are verily Vishnu, forests too are verily Vishnu, mountains, cardinal directions too are verily Himself; rivers, seas, all are Himself; whatever things exist, whatever things do not exist - all those
are verily Himself, oh dear, great among Brahmins)!” - even this statement should be understood in the same manner. Therefore, what was said by us - “In various forms like Asti, Nāsti etc. the Avivekin has concealed Ātman” - is correct indeed.

**25. ĀTMĀJṆĀNI IS OMNISCIENT, ONE WHO HAS FULFILLED THE PRIME PURPORT OF LIFE**

Meaning: “That Bhagavanta who, because He is comprehending the four categories of corners (of empiricism), is always covered up - one who has seen (cognized) such a Bhagavanta who is devoid of any taint of these categories is verily a Sarvadarshi (omni-perceiver).”

**PARAMĀTMAN IS DEVOID OF FOUR CATEGORIES OR CHATUSHKŌTI (CORNERS) OF EMPIRICAL DEALINGS OF THE TYPE ASTI, NĀSTI ETC.**

In that case, how is this Paramārtha-tattva (existing) ? Only if It is known, people are not called ‘Avivekins’ but are recognized as Jñānis, is it not so ? - if this question is raised, the answer is:

Asti, Nāsti, Asti-nāsti, Nāsti-nāsti (He exists; He does not exist; though existing He does not exist; He never exists at all) - in this manner the various disputants have decided these four Kōtis (categories) - is it not so ? By the comprehension (awareness) of these categories alone that Bhagavanta is always covered up. It has amounted to their misconceptions having apparently covered up that Bhagavanta. This ‘Āvaraṇa’ is confined to the respective disputant alone and it is not applicable to everyone. Therefore, in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa it was stated that - “That entity which the preceptor propounds (shows) - that entity alone the disciple comprehends (sees)” (2-29). These, in fact, do not taint or touch the Ātmavastu at all; meaning, by means of the cognition of these categories of Asti, Nāsti etc. though Paramātman appears as if He is covered up by these empirical concepts, in reality they have not reached out to Him.
For this, the Śruti: 'स एव नेति नेत्याल्मा अगुण्डो न हि गृह्वते' - (Bṛi. 3-9-26), meaning - “That this alone is the Ātman taught as Neti, Neti (Not this, not this) ; He is Agrāhyā (incomprehensible) ; for, He is not to be comprehended with any means whatsoever” - is the authoritative source.

**HERE 'BHAGAVĀN' MEANS NIRVISHESA ĀTMAN ALONE**

(Objection) : 'ज्ञानशक्तिहै ज्ञानवीर्यमेवते जाप्स्यश्रेष्ठ: | भगववच्छन्दवाच्छानि विना हेन्यैगुणादिपिः' - (Vishṇupurāṇa 3-5-79), meaning - “Barring those qualities which are to be discarded, the remaining qualities or excellences like Jñāna, Bala, Ṣhakī, Aishwarya, Virya, Tejas etc. with all such Kalyāṇagnīnas (beneficent qualities) He is endowed that Paramātman alone is fit to be called ‘Bhagavān’. Thus sages like Parāshara etc. are saying. It being so, how can the assertion of Shri Śaṅkara that - “Pramārtha Tattwa alone which is devoid of all the attributes, categories like Asti, Nāsti etc. is the meaning for that word ‘Bhagavān’ ” - be proper, justifiable?

(Solution) : There is no defect whatsoever in this. For, though Paramātman who is verily the Ātman (i.e. the very substrate) for qualities like Jñāna, Bala etc. is not the object for any Shabda (word) or Pratyaya (concept), in comparison with Jīvas who are endowed with Ajñāna (ignorance), Ashakti (powerlessness) etc. He is stated - in Gouṇavṛtti (a secondary sense) - to be endowed with benign and beneficent qualities like Jñāna, Bala, Shakti etc. Here even the difference of Guṇa (quality) and Guṇi (one endowed with that quality) does not really exist.

In the same Vishṇu Purāṇa it has been stated : 'अश्वद्गोचरश्चत्त्वमेव 'व्रज'ष्ठीपर भगववच्छ: क्रियेष्ठे दृष्टानां: | पूजयां भगववच्छ: क्रियेष्ठे दृष्टानां: ' - (Vish. Pu. 6-5-71), meaning - “Though that Paramātman is not at all an object for words, for namesake He is called ‘Bhagavanta’ to signify reverence as a formality.” Even in the Śruti which the doubting opponent had quoted the difference of Guṇa and Guṇi is refuted and it has been stated that Jñāna, Bala, Shakti etc. alone are Bhagavanta. For the expression – ‘विना हेन्यैगुणादिपिः’ - the meaning is : Barring the Heyadharmas (qualities which are to be discarded) like Guṇa, Kriyā which are conjured up by Avidyā, the
benign hallmarks of Bhagavanta like Jñāna, Bala etc. are called by the word ‘Bhagavanta’. Apart from this, this Bhagavanta called ‘Brahman’, being Nirvishesha (devoid of any special attributes), is Sarvātmaka (the very essence of everything); hence apart from Him the phenomenon called ‘Saguṇabrahman’ does not exist whatsoever. It has been stated by the knowledgeable sages, on the basis of (or from the viewpoint of) Kalpitasamvṛiti alone that - ‘He alone who is Sarvaguṇātmaka merely by His will (volition) has assumed (worn) the bodies of everyone’. This very Nirvishesha Brahman Itself, endowed with the special attributes of names and forms projected by Avidyā, has been recommended in the Śāstra for the benefit of low-class and middle-class seekers for special Upāsanas (meditations).

Hence, the sage Parāshara has said: ‘समस्तकल्प्याण्वणात्मकोऽसैंस्वर्णकिलेशावक्तभूतवर्गः। इच्छाहीतातिममात्सदेहः संसाधितार्थश्रणगद्धि यः’ - (Vishnu Purāṇa 6-6-84), meaning - “He is endowed with all benign and beneficent qualities; by virtue of one part of His power He has covered up the whole gamut of the empirical, physical objects; merely by His will, whatever serene, excellent bodies He likes He wears or assumes and whatever good has to accrue to the whole world that He provides.” Therefore, here there is no defect whatsoever in our calling Nirvishesha Brahman ‘Bhagavān’.

HOW COME A SEEER OF NIRVISHESHĀTMAN IS OMNISCIENT?

That Muni (sage) who has cognized such a Bhagavanta is verily a Sarvadarshi; meaning - he alone is Sarvajña, a Pandita (scholar) who has known the Paramārtha (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality). Aja-Advaya-Ātman alone is everything, is it not so? Therefore, one who has cognized that Ātman is said to be Sarvadarshi.

प्राप्य सर्वज्ञतां कृत्तां ग्राह्यत्व पदमहमयम्।
अनापन्नदिमिष्यात् किमत: गर्वीहते।२८५।

Meaning: “Because he has attained complete Omnis-
cience (Pūrṇasarvajñatā) as also Advaya-Brāhmaṇya (non-dual
Brahmanhood), devoid of categories like beginning, middle and end, therefore how can he perform any Karma at all?"

**BRAHMAJÑÅNI IS KRITAKRITYA (ONE WHO HAS ACHIEVED WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED IN LIFE)**

Because it is said - "One who has attained this Pùrṇasarvajñatā" - it amounts to having signified that just like Darshanakāras like Kapila, Buddha etc. who have cognized only the Anātman akin to Apùrṇa (incomplete) Sarvajñatwa (omniscience), this is not Akṛitśna (incomplete, immature).

Just as it is stated in the Śruti: 'कस्मिनु प्रयो विज्ञाते सर्वगतिज्ञातां भवनि' - (Mūndaka 1-1-5) - "That Entity which if cognized it amounts to cognizing everything" - that person who has cognized that Brahman is called here 'Pùrṇasarvajñā'. That person who has Intuited that Brahman is verily Advaya Brāhmaṇa. On the authority of the Śruti sentence: 'य एतदशरं विदित्वांस्माल्लोकतृ प्रातिस ब्राह्मण:' - (Bṛi. 3-8-9), meaning - "Oh Gārgi, that person who cognizes this Akṣhara (Reality devoid of destruction or emaciation) and goes away from this Lōka - he alone is Brāhmaṇa" - (the definition of the word 'Brāhmaṇa' or what is called in our common parlance 'Brahmin' is given here) - 'One who cognizes Brahmātman and transcends the Samsāralōka which is the object for Mithyāgraṇa (also called Adhyāsa in Vedānta, i.e. 'I' notion) is himself called 'Brāhmaṇa'. Apart from this, just as the Śruti says: 'एष नित्येः महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य', meaning - "For a Brahmin this alone is the Nitya (eternal) Mahima (greatness, excellence)" - because one who has cognized Brahman which is described as "Neti, Neti" is himself one who has attained the Nitya Mahimā which is devoid of any increase or decrease, in the predominant sense, he is said to be 'Brāhmaṇa'. Because the person, who has attained this 'Brāhmanyapada' (state of Brahmanhood) which is beyond Utpatti (birth), Sthitī (sustenance), Laya (dissolution), has verily attained the Lābha (profit or precious benefit) of Ātman who is Advitiya - herefore what can there remain for him to be done or achieved? For this reason alone, in the Śruti: 'आत्मांन चेद विज्ञाताः अयमस्मीति पूर्ष: \textendash; किमिच्छ्वू कस्य कामाय शरीरसंस्पृणे तत् II' - (Bṛi. 4-4-12), meaning - "If a human being cognizes in the
manner - 'I am this Brahman' - desiring which object and for quenching, satiating which desire can he torture the body?' - thus it is stated. Even the Smritis too are saying: “Greater than Ātmalabhā there is no other Lābha” - (Āpastamba Sūtra 1-8-22-1) etc. In the Bhagavadgītā also it is stated: “For him by doing anything there is no benefit whatsoever that has to accrue” - (Gītā 3-18).

विश्रामं विनयो द्वारं शमं सर्वाङ्गे।

शमं प्रकृतिदानत्त्वादेव विविधानं शर्मं च।।

Meaning: “For the wise the dignity is this alone; this alone is said to be the natural Shama (control of the mind); because by its very nature it is Dānta (tamed, subdued) this alone is Dama (control over the senses), one who has known like this, attains Shama.”

THERE IS NO NEED FOR A JÑĀNI TO MAKE ANY EFFORT TO ACQUIRE SHAMA, DAMA ETC.

(Question): Because there is a Śruti sentence like: “One who has cognized in this manner should become Shānta, Dānta, Uparata, Titikshu and endowed with Shraddha and recognize Ātman in himself alone” - (Bṛi. 4-2-28), even a Jñāni should be performing Sādhanas like Shama, Dama etc. prescribed by the Śāstra, is it not so? Since there is also a Gītā statement like - “This is verily called ‘Jñāna’, what is different from this is Ajñāna” - (Gītā 13-11) the seeker should be practising Sādhanas like Amānitwā etc., is it not so?

Answer: Not so. For, to be established in Ātmaswarūpa alone is the natural Vinaya (humility) for Brahmajñānis. For them this alone is said to be the natural Shama. Because by Its very nature Brahmātman is Upashānta (quiescent), this alone is their Dama. Just as the ignorant people’s senses whisk away the mind due to its Rāga-Dwesha, they do not at all drag the mind of these Jñānis. It being so, where is the question of a Vidhi (scriptural injunction) stipulating that a Brahmajñāni should practise disciplines like Shama, Dama etc.?

Therefore, since the person who has cognized such an Advayabrahman is established in Brahmāmaswarūpa alone, he is
always endowed with the essential nature of Shama-Dama etc. These Sādhanas in their entirety rest in him as though they are decorative ornaments. Like the Mumukshus (seekers desirous of Liberation in this very life-span), the Jñāṇī need not at all practise these.

26. THE QUINTESSENCE OF OUR OWN METHODOLOGY

सवस्तु सोपलम्यं च हयं लौकिकामिन्यते ।
अवस्तु सोपलम्यं च शूद्रं लौकिकामिन्यते ॥८७॥
अवस्तु सोपलम्यं च लोकोट्तरमिन्यति स्पृतम् ।
ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च विज्ञेयं सदा बुद्धः प्रकृतितम् ॥८८॥

Meaning: “That duality which is associated with substance and awareness is called ‘Loukika’. That which is devoid of substance but having Upalambha (recognition or comprehension otherwise than from memory, the same as Anubhava) is called ‘Shuddhaloukika’. But that which is not having either substance or cognition, awareness is called ‘Lōkōttara’; thus the knowledgeable people are always talking about Jñāna, Jñeya and Vijneya.”

RELATIONSHIP OF THE TEXT

Because in this manner the philosophies of the various disputants are mutually opposed to one another and are responsible for Rāga-Dwesha, the fact that all of them are Mithyādarshanas (false, pseudo-philosophies) has been proved by means of their own respective Yuktis alone, and thereby it has been demonstrated convincingly that the Aja-Advaita-Darshana (i.e. Advaita Vedānta) itself which is devoid of the four-cornered logic or dialectical categories (called ‘Chatush Kōti’) as also which does not give any room for Rāga and Dwesha etc., is a Maṅgalakara (auspicious and beneficent) and by its very nature a Shānta (blissful) philosophy (i.e. spiritual science), and hence it amounts to our having concluded the truth: first, as stated in 4-2, this Darshana is devoid of disputes or controversies and secondly, it
is not opposed to anything else. Now Shri Gauḍapāda undertakes to expound, though briefly, this his own Vedāntic Prakriyā (methodology) alone. In fact, to observe the three states of Consciousness of waking, dream and deep sleep (and to cognize the Vedāntic truths) is itself the unique Vedānta Prakriyā. So far by means of Yukti the truth that Aja-Advaya-Ātmata-tva alone is the Paramārtha has been shown, is it not so? This alone is in consonance with Sārvatrika Anubhava (universal Intuitive Experience) ; (a) Whereas the philosophies of the various disputants which are predominantly logic-oriented do not possess this capacity ; (b) though keeping the Buddhists’ Yuktis in the forefront in this Prakaraṇa the teaching has been expounded, the objective of inculcating the fact that - ‘Between the first Āgama Prakaraṇa, which has begun its teaching based predominantly on Śruti instructions, and this fourth Alātashānti Prakaraṇa there is complete agreement’ - is the important benefit that accrues from the detailed consideration of this genuine, unique Vedāntic methodology. By this it amounts to having concluded the entire gamut of the Śāstraic teachings.

IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE PARAMĀRTHA LOUKIKA,
SHUDDHA LOUKIKA AND LÖKÖTTARA ARE A DEVICE

The state of Consciousness which is the support or substrate for the whole gamut of Avidyā Vyavahāra (empirical transactions conjured up by ignorance) of duality which comprises Samvṛiti Sadrūpa Vastu (a substance which is endowed with empirical reality) awareness - meaning the Śāstra, the Shishya and the Shāsaka (preceptor) and which is the support for Dvaita of the type of Grāhya and Grāhaka - is ‘Loukika’, means Jāgarita Avasthā. In fact, in Vedānta this alone is accepted as the ‘Jāgarita Avasthā’ (i.e. this is the Śāstraic definition of waking in Vedānta) but our commonplace empirical waking is not at all accepted as really endowed with any substantiality. It has already been stated that - “That thing which exists due to (from the viewpoint of) Kalpitasaṃvṛiti does not at all exist (Absolutely) from the Paramārtha Drishti” - (4-73), is it not so? Without the Samvṛitivastu, mere cognition or awareness existing is called ‘Shuddha Loukika’, meaning ‘Svapna’. Here the subtle teaching of Vedānta that - “The waking state is gross and is common,
equal to everyone, while the dream state is different from the waking which is grosser than the dream, and it is visible, perceptible exclusively to the dreamer - is said from the waking Sāṃvṛtitrdṛṣhti (viewpoint of empirical reality) alone” - should not be forgotten. For, it has been taught here that the Avasthāraya which is established by virtue of Sāṃvṛti is itself the ‘Upāya’ (a subtle device) for the Paramārtha Darshana (the Intuitive Experience of the Ultimate, Absolute Reality of Vedāntic spiritual science, philosophy).

Further, the essential nature of deep sleep is being described in detail. That state of Consciousness in which there is neither Vastu (substance), and knowledge or cognition of it nor the dual aspects of Grāhya and Grāhaka is called ‘Lōkottara’, meaning ‘Sushupti or deep sleep’. The word ‘Lōka’ connotes ‘being cognized and cognizing ; devoid of both these, that state which is the seed or cause for all empirical procedures (Pravṛtti) is ‘Lōkottara’, meaning deep sleep.

THE IMPLICIT MEANING OF WORDS LIKE ‘LOUKIKA’ ETC.

For the words like ‘Loukika’ etc. that are used here in this context we should not conceive that they mean merely the waking, the dream etc. On the contrary, we should reckon that they connote both meanings of Stāna (place, region), Stānī (the occupier of the region) or Avasthā (the state) and the Śākshi (Witnessing Principle) of the state viz. Ātman. Just as we have to assume the implied meaning of the sentence - “We should not enter the town” - (Gautama Dharma Sūtra 1-4-32) so as to imply both the town and the residents of the town, in the same way here also we have to interpret it. In fact, in order to determine the Paramārthaswarūpa of Ātman who is Avasthāvanta (associated with a state) alone these words like Loukika etc. are utilized. For that reason only we should discern that here for the expression - ‘ज्ञानम्’ - found in the second verse above the intended purport is that the Paramārtha Tattva associated with this device has been signified in this manner.

To wit: “Jñāna means that Intuitive Cognition (Knowledge) by means of which people cognize, without desiderating any instruments or senses or mind whatsoever, all the three states like Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lōkottara - i.e. they cognize.
by means of Jñāna which is Nirvikalpaka (devoid of any concepts), Anubhavarūpa (of the very essence of Intuitive Experience).” ‘Jñeya’ means all the three states like Loukika etc. taken together. For, apart from these there is no other phenomenon whatsoever to be called Jñeya (object of knowledge). For this reason alone, it was stated in the Āgama Prakaraṇa that - “Including the Ādhidaivika (celestial plane, region) also the entire Prapañcha (world of duality) is implied in the Loukika (waking state”). The implied purport here is that - “Sānkhyans and the other disputants - all of them - whatever Tattwas (entities) they have imagined are all misconceived and included in these three states alone.” Hence, if we cognize the Tattwa of all these three (i.e. the Absolute Reality which is the substrate, backdrop of the three states of awareness), it is tantamount to cognizing everything. Further, the word ‘Vijñeya’ means : When we observe these three plenary experiences of Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lokottara, that Paramārtha Tattwa which becomes ‘Sākshātkāra’ (Intuited spontaneously and effusively), meaning - the ‘Turyātmā’ Tattwa which is Aja (birthless), Advaya (non-dual). Thus, beginning with Loukika, what is ‘existing’ up to Vijñeya is both the Upāya (device) and the Upeya (the object pointed out by the device) - thus the ‘Buddhas’ - i.e. Paramārtha Darshis - affirm.

FOR THE WORDS LIKE LOUKIKA ETC. THERE IS NO PURPORT OF INDICATING THE ‘JÑĀNAS’ OF YOGĀCHĀRA PHILOSOPHY

In the Buddhistic school of philosophy called ‘Yogāchāra’ these three words of Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lokottara are used for three kinds of knowledge. But those meanings cannot possibly be adopted or assumed here. According to that Buddhistic philosophy, ‘Loukika’ means the commonplace Grahyā-Grāhaka Vishayajñāna (empirical subject-object knowledge) which is universal. ‘Shuddha Loukika’ means Paratantraswabhāva Jñāna (knowledge dependent upon an external agency). ‘Lokottara’ means the Nirvikalpa Jñāna (awareness devoid of any special attributes or features) that accrues or ensues in a state when there is neither the Grāhakachitta (comprehending mind) nor the Grāhyavastu (object which is comprehended) ; because it has transcended the Lōka (empirical world of duality) it is called ‘Lokottara’. Then to the Yōgi, who has entered into the Vijñaptimātra (pure aware-
ness, consciousness), a resultant fruit accrues - thus the Yōgāchāras opine. [For this doctrine refer to Mādhyamika Vṛtti, page 185].

But here (in Shri Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā) for the purpose of cognizing the Viśīya (object of Intuition) called ‘Turiya’ as a device the Avasthātraya of the type of Loukika etc. and its Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) is taught. Therefore, both these Prasthānas (approaches) are different, distinct from each other. Because special characteristics like - “Dvaya is called Loukika” etc. - which describe the Jñeyaswarūpa (the essential nature of the object to be known) are mentioned, thus it should be interpreted differently here. ‘स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः’ - (Māṇḍūkya Mantra 7) - thus the Turiyātman has been described in the Upanishad, is it not so? That very thing is expounded by using the word ‘Viśīya’. Apart from this, the proponents or followers of Yōgachāra philosophy have not accepted at all the fact that - “Apart from the Chitta or mind which is the Grahaka (comprehending principle) there exists a Viśīya (an object of comprehension).” In their teaching - for the Chitta alone which is devoid of ‘Samklesha’ is called ‘Ālayavijñāna’; they have accepted that such a Chitta becomes Anāsrava (independent), Dhruva (eternal, immortal) by virtue of Advayajñāna (non-dual knowledge) which is Nirvikalpa (devoid of special attributes).

**OBJECTIONS AND SOLUTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE USAGE OF WORDS LIKE LOUKIKA ETC.**

(Question) : No one among the ancients has called all the three states like the waking etc. by names like Loukika etc., is it not so? These words are profusely used in Buddhistic texts only. It being so, in the sense that no one has previously used - why is it that these words are used to cause delusion among the Shrōtrus?

(Answer) : Since the words like Loukika etc. are Yougika (in keeping with the syllogistic meaning) they can be used by anyone - whosoever he may be - in the sense of - ‘commonplace, known or familiar to everyone’ etc. as they like. There are no conventions stipulating that these words should be interpreted in such and such a manner with a particular meaning only. It is true that Yōgāchāras use these with certain conventional meanings. But in these senses they are using them as Pāribhāshika (tech-
nical terminology) and hence they cannot compel everyone to use them with that technical meaning alone. This is not a chapter devoted to divide Jñāna; the author Shri Gauḍapādāchārya also in the past had not divided or separated Jñāna in this queer manner. It is self-evident from these verses that by means of the devices of Jñāna and Jñeya, he has taken up the subtle task of recognizing (Intuiting) the Vijñeya. It being so, it is incomprehensible or inscrutable to explain away as to how could this alien methodology of Yōgācāra be suddenly (abruptly) brought forth here? When the opinion that - “In the first Āgama Prakāraṇa through the device of Avasthātraya (that is found in the Śastra, Upanishad) the Turya is propounded or taught and then that very Turiya is being concluded here” - is compatible, to interpolate an alien methodology not relevant to the context is not justifiable also.

Apart from this, the word ‘Lōka’ being used significantly for Avasthās cannot possibly be said to be extremely unfamiliar to Vedic scholars. In the Śruti: ‘स च मानः सदुपन्नोत्तत्वेऽविविधतिः’ - (Bṛ. 4-3-7), meaning - “He being equal to the mind traverses incessantly both the Lōkas or worlds” - thus as an illustration for Avasthādvaya (two states of waking and dream) this word being used in the Śruti is seen. Further, the Sushupti (deep sleep state) being referred as ‘Paramalōka’ is found in the Śruti: ‘एषोऽस्य परमो लोकः’ - (Bṛ. 4-3-32), meaning - “This itself is the supreme world for Him.” Besides, it is not possible to assert that there is no prompting, justifying reason at all for using the words like Loukika etc. to indicate the states like waking etc. In the waking there exists invariably ‘Sarvalōka Śādhāraṇatwa’ (commonality or universality acceptable to all the people). The facts that - in the dream the experience is confined to only the dreamer and in deep sleep all the Lōkavyavahāras (empirical transactions) are extinct, invisible - are in everyone’s experience (Sārvatrika Anubhava). Instead of this, in the teachings of Yōgācāras the doctrines that - Paratantra and Parinishpanna are objects for Shuddha Loukika Jñāna and Lōkottara Jñāna, respectively - are to be known fromVyaktigatānubhava (individually-acquired experiences). But those words are not as suitable, compatible as they are in our Vedāntic Siddhānta - thus too it can be concluded. Therefore, the author
Shri Gauḍapāda having utilized these words in this manner is not at all wrong; he has, in fact, used these special words purposefully and fully conscious of their import.

Further, ‘सत्य बुद्ध: प्रकृतितम्’ - thus the word ‘Buddha’ is used, is it not so? That word is used with the purport: “Those people who have cognized the Viveka (discriminative purport) of the words Jñāna, Jñeyā and Vijñeyā as we have now stated - they only are Paramārtha (Absolutely) ‘Buddhas’; not those who by virtue of their Yoga practices etc. are honouring themselves, saying that they alone are Lōkottaraprajña (knowers of the Absolute Reality).” For this the Mōksha Dharma Smṛiti: “एवं ज्ञातसात्यं ब्राह्मण्यं विशेषतः। आत्मज्ञानं शर्मशैव पर्याप्तं तत्परायणम्। एतद् बुद्धः। पवेद्वज्ञ: किमन्यद् बुद्धलक्षणम्॥” - (Mō. Dh. 249 - 10, 11), meaning - “This alone is the fruition of human birth; especially for a Brāhmīn’s birth this alone is the fruition; meaning, Ātmajñāna, Shama - to remain engrossed in these with all dedication and devotion. One who has cognized this becomes a Buddha (a Jñāni) ; what other special attributes of a Buddha are there?” - is the authoritative source for the above conclusion.

27. SARVAJÑATWA (OMNISCIENCE) ACCRUING FROM AVASTHĀTRAYA VIJÑĀNA

ज्ञाने च त्रिभिषे हेमे क्रमेण विदिते स्वयम्।
सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह महात्मियः।।८९।।

Meaning: “If one cognizes Jñāna and three kinds of Jñeyā in a systematic order, for such a great wise man everywhere Sarvajñatwa (omniscience) will accrue by Itself (spontaneously) here and now.”

EXPLANATION OF THE THREE WORDS LIKE JÑĀNA ETC.

To the question: What is the benefit accruing from the cognition of Turya through the three devices like Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lōkottara? - the answer is provided by this verse.

Some people have interpreted the ‘Jñāna’ used here to mean ‘Manovṛttiivishesha’ (a special mental concept); but that is not
correct. For, here the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge - Experience) pertaining to the three states like Loukika etc: alone is relevant. First of all, Loukika is of the essential nature of the external Grāhya-Grāhaka phenomena; hence, its knowledge cannot possibly be of the form or nature of the Grāhaka Manovṛitti (the comprehending mental concept) - which is one part of that whole, plenary Consciousness. To wit: The external comprehension of the form of sensual perception is that which is of the nature of the external objects like sound, touch etc., while the Jñāna which objectifies the internal Sukha, Manörūpa Dukkha etc. is of the nature of mental concepts or mentations. It being so, how at all can we accept that the Jñāna (Consciousness, plenary Awareness) which comprehends the Loukika of the form of Grāhya-Grāhaka both internally and externally in all its entirety is merely a Jñāna of the form of the mental concepts which are one part included within that plenary Consciousness? In fact, it is well-known to all of us that in order to cognize both the senses and the mind there invariably exists in all of us a separate Nirvikalpaka Jñāna (Pure Consciousness devoid of any mental concepts) called in Vedāntic parlance Sākṣhādanubhava which is quite apart from the two i.e. - the senses and the mind. In the same way, to comprehend cognize the Shuddha Loukika, Lōkottara - both these is verily this Sākṣhādanubhava Jñāna (Direct, Intuitive Experience or Knowledge). Although this Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge and not intellectual concept) is not Savishesha (endowed or associated with special attributes) like the Manovṛitti (mental concepts), due to the difference in the adjuncts it may become three types and hence in the expression - 'त्रिविध त्रिविषेष त्रितीय' - even if the special attributes of Trividha (three kinds) is used to be made applicable to Jñāna and Jñeya on the basis of a maxim called 'Madhyamaṇi Nyāya' to be endowed with - it will not be wrong. In the statement - "If cognized systematically in a particular order" - it should be understood that the reference is to Manovṛittirūpa Jñāna alone pertaining to the empirical categories like Jñāna - Jñeya; for, cognizing in an orderly manner is verily Vṛitti-jñāna (mental concept).

THE ORDER IN THE PROCESS OF COGNITION

Now, here in this context the order in cognition is: First,
we should cognize the gross Loukika. To cognize that - ‘The Vaishwānara (Cosmic Person), endowed with the total adjunct of that Loukika Avasthā, is itself the ‘Jñāna’ of Loukika. By sublating that - as stated in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, cognizing that both these (i.e. waking and dream states) are Sarvasama (equal, identical in all respects) to sublate, falsify Loukika ; then to determine that both these are Vitatha (verily false appearances) - to determine it to be Taijasa, endowed with an adjunct, is itself the Jñāna of Shuddha Loukika. Thereafter, if we sublate that Shuddha Loukika, the Lōkouttara Jñāna accrues. If it is recognized that Shuddha Loukika also is Mithyārūpa (of a false, unreal nature) alone, then we acquire the cognition that between Shuddha Loukika and Lōkottara there is no difference whatsoever ; for, then whether a second thing appears or not, we get a sense of conviction, certainty to the effect that - ‘By this no special feature whatsoever is caused in Ātman’ ; now only the mere name of an ‘Avasthā’ remains, subsists for Lōkottara. Apart from Ātman who is endowed with an adjunct that ‘Avasthā’ too gets completely extinct, as if to suggest that - ‘It is an object to be grasped or derived by means of the proverbial sixth sense.’ As regards the statement that - ‘It is the seed for the worlds of Loukika and Shuddha Loukika’ - what about it ? We answer : It is a mere Kalpana (mental concept) conjured up due to Samvṛiti alone. Even if we had imagined that Loukika and Shuddha Loukika are totally different from each other and that between them there is a cause-effect relationship - because all such beliefs are the effects of Samvṛiti alone, if we go deep and analyse these states with the Intuitive awareness, in the Absolute sense there is no difference or distinction between these two ; just as this truth is realized to be true with a stamp of certainty, similarly here the apparent distinction between Shuddha Loukika and Lōkottara also should be discerned.

In any case, thus among these three Loukika etc. states to merge or sublate the previous one into the next is their true cognition. Now, the particular Upāhitātman (Ātman associated with the adjunct of a state) who is Sthāni (confined to that particular state) cannot possibly be imagined not to be existing in any state. Although these Loukika etc. are getting separated one from the other - rather each one of them is leaving out
the other - the Chinmātraswarūpa (the essential nature of Pure Consciousness) of Ātman does not change whatsoever anywhere. He does not also get extinct anywhere. Thus after determining that - 'For Ātman there is no taint or touch of any Avasthā,' the concept or belief that He is endowed with Avasthās also gets extinct.

Anyway, thus all the three states becoming extinct, if we cognize Paramātman, who is Paramārthasatyaswarūpa, Aja, Advaya, Abhaya, and devoid of the categories of cause-effect - in a manner described in the Āgama, Vaitathya and Advaita Prakaraṇas - He by Himself - meaning, Ātman’s Paramārthaswarūpa alone - will subsist.

TO THAT PERSON WHO HAS COGNIZED LOUKIKA ETC. SARVAJÑATWA ACCRUES OF ITS OWN ACCORD

In order to eulogise this ‘Turyātma Jñāna’ it has been stated like this: To that person the Omniscience will accrue by Itself. Because He Himself is everything and is Sarvajñarūpa (of the very essence of Omniscience) Turyātman is called ‘Sarvajñā’. This omniscience which is, in truth, his very essence of Being - meaning, prior to his body (mortal coil) is given up or falls off, when he is still alive - accrues spontaneously of its accord to this great wise man of this Vedāntic wisdom here and now itself. Because he has merged (sublated) Loukika etc. and is endowed with a Buddhī (intelligence, wisdom) which is Sarvalokātishaya (exceeding and excelling all the worlds) and which has imbibed the knowledge pertaining to Ātmavastu, he is called ‘Mahādhiyaha’ (one endowed with great and sublime knowledge, wisdom). Because it has been stated: “If one cognizes the Trividhajñeya in an orderly manner this Sarvajñatwa accrues” - one should not get deluded to think that this Jñāna is a particular kind of Paricchinnā (distinctive) Jñāna which is attained afresh. In truth, It is always and everywhere existing. Once we cognize that Swarūpa, that Jñāna has become verily Ātmaswarūpa and hence the implicit meaning here is that It exists (beyond the time concept) without any change at anytime whatsoever. For such a Paramārthajñāni - unlike the other disputants who are endowed with Jñāna arising out of Yōga Siddhis etc. - his Jñāna does not have any birth and destruction
at all. As stated in the Kārikā - ‘नित्यमेंजेनांविवृद्धते’ (3-33), meaning - ‘It is verily Brahman which is Jñeya. In truth, by the Aja Jñāna the Aja Tattwa is always being cognized.’

28. THE DEVICES FOR ATTAINMENT OF JÑĀNA ARE NOT PARAMĀRTHHA SATYA

Meaning: “The four phenomena of ‘Heya’, ‘Jñeya’, ‘Āpya’, ‘Pākya’ - should be fully, clearly cognized. Among them, barring Vijñeya, in the other three cognition exists - thus the wise people say.”

JÑĀNĀNGA UPADESA (INSTRUCTION SUBORDINATE TO INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE)

Because it has been stipulated: “When the three kinds of Jñeya are cognized in an orderly manner” - people may wrongly think, believe that those three are existing Absolutely really; so in order to prevent this misconception, here it is refuted. Heya means the three states of Loukika etc. If it is asked: How come these are to be ‘Heya’ - meaning, those which are to be given up, discarded? - then the explanation is: In Ātman these Jagrat, Svapna and Sushupti (i.e. Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lokottara, respectively) are not existing whatsoever - thus, just as the apparent superimposed, misconceived appearances of snake etc. are merged in the rope - these three states are to be sublated or merged in Ātman; thus it has to be cognized and hence, even when a particular state is existing because it is Chidbhāṣya (a reflection of Pure Consciousness) as also Chidvyāpta (being pervaded by Pure Consciousness), these three states do not exist whatsoever apart from Ātman, who is Chidrūpa (of the very essence of Pure Consciousness) - thus determining also, any particular state can possibly be sublated (discarded) and the Turīya Tattwa can be determined, hence they are ‘Heya’. Thus when Vaishwānara, who is having the adjunct of the waking - by (means of Pravilaya complete merger of) the waking - is
determined to be Turiya (Atman) alone, there is no scope for imagining any other Avasthā whatsoever and hence there is no need whatsoever for any further attempt to be made to determine that He (i.e. Vaishwānara) does not exist. Even so, in order that it may become easy to comprehend and follow for people who are endowed with low-grade and middle-grade intelligence (wisdom, discriminating faculty), adopting a systematic order alone which is familiar in our workaday world this Pravilaya of the three states is mentioned (explained) - thus we should discern it.

Further, in this verse the word ‘Jñeya’ means the Paramārtha Tattva alone, i.e. Turiya alone devoid of the four-cornered categories. in the Śruti - “Always existing in Ātmārupa is verily this Jñeya” - (Shvetaśwatara 1-12) - is the authoritative source for calling Ātmā alone ‘Jñeya’. Āpya means the three disciplines of ‘Pāṇḍitya’, ‘Bālyā’ and ‘Mouna’ which a Yati (sage) who has given up the external three Esheṇas (desires like Putreshaṇa, Vittreshaṇa, Lōkeshuṇa) has perform to earn, acquire. In the Śruti : ‘तस्मातः प्रवाहः विचिदित्त्व विचिदेन तिष्ठाते। बाल्यं च पांडित्त्वं च निविद्याय मुनि:’ - (Bṛi. 3-5-1) - meaning : “One who is a Brāhmaṇa, cognizing (discerning) Pāṇḍitya without any residues by means of Bālyā, should aspire, endeavour to remain steady ; then after having completely controlled, conquered Bālyā and Pāṇḍitya, he should become a Muni” - thus it has been stated, is it not so?

There in that context ‘Pāṇḍitya’ means to acquire Ātmavijñāna (the Intuitive Knowledge of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness) from the Āchārya and the Śastra. ‘Bālyā’ means to stay put in the ‘strength of Jñāna’ (i.e. to get established in the Intuitive Experience of Pure Consciousness) and like an innocent boy or child to remain without Dambha (deceit, fraud, trickery), Darpa (pride, arrogance) etc. ‘Mouna’ means fully dedicated, engrossed (Tātparya) in Ātmachintana alone. These three are called ‘Āpya’ ; they are to be acquired. ‘Pākya’ - means, those defects like Rāga, Dwesha, Mōha etc. which have to be fully conquered by becoming ripe, mature by experience. The Smṛti : ‘कषये कर्मि: पक्षे
तलो ज्ञान प्रवत्तिः’, meaning - “When by means of Karmas the Kashāya becomes ripe enough, then Jñāna accrues” - is the authoritative support for this.
All these four disciplines - meaning, as devices for Jñāna are to be discerned first of all.

THE JÑĀNŌPĀYAS (DEVICES FOR ATTAINING JÑĀNA) ARE INSTRUCTED FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF KALPITA SAMVRITI ALONE

Among these, barring the Paramārtha Tattwa which is Vijñeya, the remaining Heya, Āpya, Pākya - in these three - Upalambha meaning, (cognition) - is Avidyā Kalpana alone - thus say the Jñānis. All these three are not Paramārthasatyā. Whatever the Śruti has instructed as a device - all that it indicates finally as 'Neti, Neti' - thus, as previously stated in 3-26, here too it is from the standpoint of Kalpitasamvriti alone and hence these Heya etc. have to be reckoned from the Adhyārōpa Drīṣṭi. Once the fruit of Vijñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) accrues, they too are Asatya - thus it will be rescinded (Apavāla) - in this way we should understand.

Especially in the case of Turya who is Vijñeya, though first there exists Vijñeyatwa, after the Vijñāna (Intuitive Experience) accrues, a special feature happens to be - “The Sādhaka who is the Vijñātu (knower, cognizer) is himself the Turya” - such a conviction is born.

THE WORDS ‘HEYA’, ‘JÑEYA’ ETC. ARE NOT THE TECHNICAL TERMS USED BY MAHĀYĀNAS (BUDDHISTS)

Because the words - ‘Heya’, ‘Jñeya’ and ‘Vāpya’ are used, as also the usage of the word ‘Agrāyaṇa’, some modern scholars like Prof. Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya (author of ‘Āgama Śāstra’) have imagined for these words the meanings of ‘Parikalpita’ and ‘Paratantra’ etc. which are very familiar in Mahāyāna Buddhism. This is verily a mere figment of imagination. For, this is not a Prakaraṇa which undertakes, or has the prime purport of, expounding doctrines of Parikalpita etc. at all. Nor is there any benefit accruing by using those alien terms. Merely because the words like Heya, Jñeya etc. are used, there is no cause whatsoever to stipulate and compel everyone that everywhere - i.e. wherever these words are used by anyone - they must be interpreted to mean the same as the Mahāyāna Buddhists have assumed; for, even for common people to use these words in the manner - ‘काययो हेयः’ (One should give up, discard a bad path) ;
\textbf{The Essential Gauḍapāda}

\textit{‘सुपथो ज्ञेयः अनुसर्त्त्वयस्य’} (One should reckon as to which is a righteous path, and follow it”’ - there is no restriction or objection at all. If suppose a person uses these words like Heya etc. with a particular connotation, merely on that count there cannot be any restriction whatsoever that those words should not be used with any other meaning and purport, is it not so? Besides, in Adhyātma Granthas which undertake the task of demonstrating the \textit{Muktiṁŗga} (path of Liberation) these words of Heya etc. being used is also found. For instance, in the \textit{Samyagmati Prakaraṇā} (17-82) of \textit{Upadeshāhasīri} Shri Śaṅkara has written in the following manner:

\begin{itemize}
  \item बन्ध ज्ञेयं च सर्वं यतं इदमुच्छतं हेयमेकं हुयं च।
  \item हेयं हेयाभ्यासतः परस्मणिगतं तत्त्वमेकं विशुद्धम्।।
  \item विज्ञायैतद् विज्ञायतुतित्तितुतिं शोकमोहावतीत।।
  \item सर्ववेदः सर्वकृतुं स्वादस्तवकाव्यस्तो भ्राष्टाणोपास्तः।।
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Meaning} : “Cognizing that - ‘The thing from which both \textit{Bandha} (bondage) and \textit{Mōksha} (liberation) are caused’ - is to be completely Heya (to be discarded, given up), if one discerns the Dvaita which is \textit{Jñeya} and that one unitary (non-dual) Entity which is called ‘Paramatattva’ which is \textit{Jñeyātīta}, Vishuddha in consonance with the teachings Śrutī and Munis, the aspirant transcends Shōka-Mōha and becomes a Sarvajña, Sarvakarta, devoid of Samsāra Bhaya, Kṛita Kṛitya and Brāhmaṇa.” Here in this verse both the words of Heya and \textit{Jñeya} are used in the sense of - ‘Heya’ is that which is the cause for Bandha and Mōksha, while the \textit{Tattwa} (Absolute Reality) which is not \textit{Jñeya} (known by the intellect) is Itself ‘\textit{Jñeya}’.”

\section*{29. THE CONCLUSION OF SHĀSTRĀRTHA}

\begin{itemize}
  \item प्रकृत्याः ज्ञेयस्य भर्त्रस्य: सर्वं धर्मं अनादयः।।
  \item निन्द्ये न हि नानायं तेषां क्रचन किल्ल्न।९९॥
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Meaning} : “All \textit{Dīarmas} (beings) by their very nature
are, like the empty space, beginningless - thus we must reckon; in them nowhere even the least bit of manifoldness exists."

**THAT ĀTMANS ARE MANY IS SAID FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SAMVṛITI ALONE**

Thus it has been expounded - both by means of the Yuktis of the opposing disputants as also our own methodology - the truth that Paramātman, who is Aja, Advaya, is Himself Paramārtha. Now all the teachings of the Śāstra will be concluded. Here what was first accepted from the Adhyārōpa Drīṣṭi, viz. - “Because the states like Loukika, Shuddha Loukika etc. are distinct, separate - Ātmans are many”- is being refuted.

The seeker should not believe either that the states are different or Vishwa, Taijasa etc. who are the Avasthāvantas (Cosmic Beings endowed with the adjuncts of the respective states) are different. For, this ‘Nānātva’ (manifoldness) is mentioned from the standpoint of Kalpitasamvṛiti (deliberate superimposition) but not that it is really (Absolutely) existing. From the Paramārtha Drīṣṭi if we observe, Dharmas, meaning - Ātmans (Jīvas), in their very essential natures are - just like empty space - subtle, Niranjana (who are devoid of any taint or touch of special qualities), Sarvagatas (all-pervading); in the original text the metaphor of ‘like the sky or empty space’ is mentioned to signify that their Swarūpa is extremely subtle etc. and not that they are ‘equal to, similar to Ākāsha or empty space.’ Because ‘Dharmas’ is used in the plural sense, one should not reckon that to emphasize this fact. Only Ātmans are really, invariably many - but ‘Everywhere’ means ‘at no time and in no state - whatsoever’ - even the least bit of manifoldness exists - thus it is stated. The difference is appearing due to the Upādhis alone; since the adjuncts are Avidyā Kalpita alone, in the Absolute sense there does not exist any Dharma-Nānātwa whatsoever. This is the implied purport here.

**HERE THE WORD ‘DHARMA’ MEANS ‘ĀTMAN’ ALONE IN THE PREDOMINANT SENSE**

Although it is true that Shri Gaudapādāchārya uses the word ‘Dharma’ to indicate both Ātmans (sentient beings) and Anātma
Padārthas (insentient things), here the fact that he has used it invariably to indicate ‘Ātman’ is evident from the purport of the Chapter. In the next verse since he has written that - “All are Ādibuddhas (from the beginning conscious) - it can be discerned that here, in the main, the manifoldness of Īivas (selves, individual transmigratory souls) is negated, refuted. For, in order to help attain (teach) Aja-Advaya-Ātmajnāna here, in the main, negating or refuting Jīvanānātwa itself is more essential. It has been taught in this chapter that - “No Jīva whosoever is born” - (4-71). Similarly, in the Advaita Prakaraṇa also, it was begun by saying - “The Dharma (Jīva) who has taken refuge in Upāsana exists in Jātabrahman (the world of Brahmā who is born, created)” - (3-1) and in the end it was concluded by teaching that - “No Jīva is born” - (3-48) and hence in order that there is agreement between that and the sentence found in this verse - here to accept the meaning of ‘Īivas’ for the word ‘Dharīnas’ is itself reasonable ; because having stressed that - ‘There is no Jīva-Nānātwa’ - it amounts to refuting, negating the various conglomerations of body, senses, mind as adjuncts for Jīvas (transmigratory souls), there is no defect whatsoever entailing us even if a ‘Bāhyārtha’ a (far-fetched or an extraneous meaning) for the word ‘Dharma’ is accepted. Even so, here in the main sense the fact that - we should reckon for the word ‘Dharmas’ the meaning of ‘Īivas’ - should not be forgotten.

In this verse ‘Kwachana’ (anywhere) means - whether it is in the Advaita Avasthā or whether it is in the Jīva Avasthā obtained due to Avidyā ; ‘Kinchana’ (even the least bit) means - whether it is observed from the Paramātma Drīṣṭi or whether it is observed from the viewpoint of Jīvas being different from one another - i.e. whether separately or whether without any difference - in any manner, Nānātwa (manifoldness) does not exist. This alone is the implied meaning here. This same teaching was made in the Vaiśāhitya Prakaraṇa by the sentence : ‘नात्मावेन ननेत्रे न स्त्वेनापि कर्षिषन । न पृथक्क नान्द्र्मक्षिषिकिति तत्वविद्वे विदः॥’ - (2-34), meaning - “This entity - whether in the form of Ātman or in the form it appears - in no manner it exists. Nothing whatsoever, either mutually different or without being different, ever exists - thus the people who know the Ultimate Reality have cognized.”
Meaning: “All the Dharmas by their very essence of Being are determined to be Ādibuddhas (of the nature of the effulgence of Pure Consciousness from the beginning). One who has such a Kshānti (patience, forbearance) becomes fit for Amṛitatwa (immortality).”

THAT ĀTMANS ARE JÑEYA IS SAID FROM SAMVṛITI VIEWPOINT ONLY

Since it is stated: “Just like the empty space one should reckon” - in the above verse, any one may misconceive that the tenet that Dharmas are Jñeya (those who are to be cognized, known) - is also Paramārtha (Absolutely real, true) and so, here in this verse it has been refuted. All Dharmas, by their very essence of Being, are invariably ‘Ādibuddhas’ - meaning, from time immemorial ‘Buddhas’ or Chitprakāśhaswarūpas (of the essential nature of the effulgence of Pure Consciousness). It means that just as the sun is Nityaprakāśhaswarūpa (eternally of the essence of brilliance), in the same way these Dharmas (Jīvas) too are Nityabōdhaswarūpas (eternally of the essence of Pure Consciousness). To these Ātmans never at all there exists any Ajñāna exists; only if it is so, in order to remove their Ajñāna, Jñāna will become necessary and thereby it will amount to their being Jñeyas, is it not so? Or, there is no room for doubting in the manner: ‘Whether these Ātmans are like this or like that?’ - they are not of that nature either. For, they are of Nityanishchita (of an essential nature which is ever or eternally established or determined) alone. In the case of these people who are of Jñānaswarūpa there is no scope whatsoever for Ajñāna, Samshaya or Mithyājñāna to exist.

ONLY IF ONE COGNIZES THAT - ‘ĀTMAN IS OF AN ESSENTIAL NATURE OF CERTAINTY’ - MUKTI ACCRUES

That Mumukṣhu (the seeker of Liberation) who has attained the profound patience, forbearance to realize, as stated above, that - “I am a Nityabuddha; because all these Ātmans are verily Nityabuddhaswarūpas, they are Sunishchitaswarūpas (of an essen-
tial nature of certainty)" - and who has cognized the truth that
- "There is no need for them to cognize the Tattwa afresh or
to communicate It to others - just as to see the ever-shining,
resplendent sun there is no need of any help of any other light
or of showing to others - in the same way, to these Ātmans also
there is no need of Jñāna - and further who has reckoned that
- "Our Ātman is neither Jñānāśraya (a substrate for knowledge)
nor Jñānavishaya (an object for knowledge)" - he alone is the
fully qualified person for Mōksha. This is the implied purport
here.

Meaning: “All the Dharmas are Ādishāntas (of a qui-
escent nature from the beginning), devoid of birth or birthless,
by virtue of their very essential nature they have completely
receded (i.e. are liberated from duality). Being in one and the
same nature, they are non-different. (They are all) Aja, Sāmya
(one and the same) and Vishārada (who have mastered this
Vidya, scholars).”

ĀTMANS ARE NITYASHĀNTA (ETERNALLY QUIESCENT)

Just as there is no need whatsoever to attain Intuitive
Knowledge (Jñāna) afresh with regard to Ātman, in the same
manner there is no need to acquire afresh Śhānti (tranquillity,
peace of mind). For, all these Ātmans are Nityashāntas (eter­nally
of the nature of peace, tranquillity) ; in fact, they are not born
at all. By their very essence of Being they are Sunirvrītas,
meaning - of the essential nature of being liberated. If it is
asked : “In that case, are they Shūnyaswarūpa (of the essential
nature of essencelessness, nought) ?” - the answer is : Not so ;
for, they are non-different from Aja-Advaya-Brahma. If it is
asked : “In that case, is there no difference whatsoever among
them ?” the answer is : No ; all these are, in the essential nature
of Advaya, Sama, Abhinna ; therefore, there is no need of
quietening of any undesirable thing or attainment of desirable
object. When they are all of one and the same essential nature
of Being - by doing what, which excessive thing can possibly be
caused in them? If anything is done, then that desired object endowed with qualities like increase or decrease will necessarily have to be one among the following four: \textit{Utpādyā} (that which is produced), \textit{Āpya} (that which can be procured), \textit{Vikārya} (that which can be transformed), \textit{Samskārya} (that in which a quality is brought about and a defect is removed). Ātmattattwa is not one of these four at all. The Śruti: ‘न वर्धितं कर्मणं नो कनीयतन’ (Bṛi. 4-4-23), meaning - “This greatness (Mahima) does not get increased by Karma nor does it get decreased by it” - is the authoritative source for this conclusion. Therefore, Ātmattattwa is birthless, that which exists in one and the same state and blemishless.

\textbf{THE QUINTESSENCE OF THESE THREE VERSES WHICH SHED LIGHT ON PARAMĀRTHA}

The secret teaching that is to be discerned here in this context is: It was stated in 4-90 that - “Barring Vijñāyana, in the remaining there is mere Awareness or Pure Consciousness” - and also that Heya etc. - these three phenomena are mere appearances but that they are not really existing entities - is it not so? How can it be said that Heya etc. do not exist? What exactly is that entity or substance which is Jñeya (object to be known)? - in answer to these questions these above three verses have been written.

(1) The reason to infer that all the three like Heya etc. do not exist is to be discerned as: \textit{Dharmas} (Ātmans) are all ‘Ākāśhakalpas’ (misconceived objects in empty space). They are, in fact, endowed with essential natures like \textit{Sarvagatāta} (all-pervasiveness), \textit{Nityatwa} (eternity) etc. ; for, they are verily Aja-Advaita-Paramātman. Therefore, they do not have states like Jāgarita etc. - \textit{This is the implied meaning of the first verse.}

(2) Because it has been stated that - ‘Paramārtha is Anidra, Asvapna - thus one should cognize’ - it may amount to saying that \textit{Dharmas} (Ātmans) are Jñeya (things to be known) and \textit{Anātmans} (not-selves). In order to dislodge this doubt - it was taught that - “That statement also was made from the standpoint of Kalpitasamvr̥ti alone ; if observed from the Pāramārthic standpoint Jñeyatwa also does not exist ; for, all Dharmas are in their very essence of Being Ādibuddhas and Sunishchitaswarūpas ; if the seeker cognizes in this manner - then merely on that count
Amṛitatwaprāpti accrues.” This is the implied meaning of the second verse.

(3) Because it has been stated that - “One who has cognized in this manner becomes the fit person for Amṛitatwa” - it may amount to saying that - “For the purpose of Shānti (quiescence) of Bandhadulikha (the misery arising out of bondage) there is a Sādhanā still remaining - that of Kashāyapāka (ripening, maturing of desires, proclivities lurking in the mind) etc., as also the attainment of Amṛitatwa afresh still remains.” In order to signify that there are no such residual Sādhanas, it is taught that - “All Dharmas are by their very essence of Being ‘Ādīsānta, Sunirvṛitas’; therefore, when observed from the viewpoint of Paramārtha there is nothing whatsoever to be done or performed in order to attain or acquire Shānti etc.” This is the implied meaning of the third verse.

Here the salient features of Shri Gauḍāpāda’s teachings are : (i) Those who are Upāsanāvādins (proponents of Upāsana as the ultimate means for Beatitude) - and are arguing to uphold their doctrine that - ‘Jīva by practising Upāsanas (meditations) alone attains Brahmātmātwa after the fall of the body’ - these disputants have been refuted in the first verse. (ii) He has refuted the doctrines of ‘Sākshātēkāravādins’ (proponents of the theory of materialization of Ātmajñāna) - who propound that - “Only after attaining Sākshātēkāra by means of Brahmajñāna or Jñāna Abhyāsa (repeated practice of Jñāna or Brahman Knowledge) Avidyā can possibly be got rid of” - in the second verse. (iii) Further, he has refuted the doctrinaire theory of Videhamukti-vādins (proponents of Beatitude only after death) in the third verse. These disputants opine that - “Only if the Jīva practises Sādhanas like Jñāna and Dhyāṇa etc., after the fall of the body the fruits of Duhkhaśaṅkṣa and Mokṣha accrue to him.”

It is true that in the Upanishads, Sādhanas like Upāsana etc. have been taught ; it is also true that it has been instructed that by means of examining the three states of Consciousness one should acquire the Jñāna Ātman, who is devoid of the three states ; it is true that it has also been taught that by Jñāna alone Kaivalyaprāpti (attainment of Beatitude) accrues ; but all that is taught from the standpoint of Kalpitasamvr̥ti to the respective qualified seeker according to his level of mental faculties and
purity, but merely on that count there is no harm or danger whatsoever caused to the teaching of Paramārtha Satya as described in these three verses. In truth, Nityasatya (eternal Truth) which is Paramārtha (Absolute, Transcendental) is: "All Dharmas or beings are of the essential nature of Aja-Advaya-Ātman who is of Nitya-shuddha-buddha-mukta-swarūpa" — indeed.

Here in the second verse, the benefit of using the word — "Kshānti" is: In the Buddhistic philosophy the Siddhis (spiritual extra-sensory perceptions or powers) called 'Kshāntis' — which they have accepted - are described in texts like "Samādhīrāja" etc., is it not so? In that text, it is begun teaching in the manner — "One who aspires for Samyaksambōdhi should cognize three Kshāntis" — (Sam. Rāja 7) — the various Kshāntis which the practitioners have necessarily to acquire and their special features are described. But here in these Kārikās, the word ‘Kshānti’ is used in order to indicate that the forbearance or patient self-control called ‘Nityatrupti’ (eternal satiation, sense of fulfilment) — which is described as: “Dharmas in their very essence of Being are Ākāshakalpas, Nityabuddhas and Nityanishchita-swarūpas; they are also Nityashāntas and Sunivrītatas” — should perforce be reckoned in this context.

Meaning: “To those who are always wandering about in Bheda (distinction) there is no Vaishāradya (scholarship, spiritual Knowledge). Those disputants who affirm about difference, distinction have leaned heavily on the side of difference; therefore, they are said to be Kripāṇas (low-level, indiscriminate, wretched persons).”

IGNORANT PEOPLE ARE IMPURE AND LOW-MINDED

Those who have cognized the Paramārtha Tattwa, which is devoid of the divisions, categories like Jñātṛu, Jñāna, Jñeyā — which we have described — they only are Brāhmaṇas who are Akripaṇas (not low-minded); but the rest are verily Kripaṇas (low-minded, wretched people): Those who have cognized (believed innately) that objects are distinct, various — in other words,
who are Dvaitins - they have heavily leaned, tilted themselves towards difference alone; in other words, they follow and indulge in variety, diversity - meaning, they are suffering in Samsāra only. Those who are always wandering about in diversity, difference conjured up by Avidyā - i.e. in the path of duality, diversity - they do not possess Vaishāradya (spiritual wisdom, knowledge); they do not have Vishuddhi (purity of heart and mind). Therefore, they are considered as Kṛiṇānas by Brahmajānīnis.

अनेसाम्ये तू ये केवल विचित्र्याति सन्निधित्वातः।
ते हि लोके महाज्ञानस्तथा लोको न गहते॥१५॥

Meaning: “Whosoever are Sunishchita (convinced about, steadfast) with regard to Paramārtha Tattwa which is Aja and Sāmya - they alone are Mahājñānis (great Realized souls) in the world; this fact is not known by the common people of the world.”

THOSE WHO HAVE COGNIZED AJĀTMA ARE MAHĀJĀNĪNIS

The fact that - “Those, who are not Mahatma (noble or holy), are not scholars and are totally outside the Vedānta spiritual science - such low-grade people with Alpaprajña (low intelligence, wisdom) cannot possibly comprehend this Paramārtha Tattwa” - has been mentioned here. Whosoever they may be - those who have got the conviction of the type - “This is proper, correct in this way alone” - with regard to Paramārtha which is Aja and Sāmya - they only are recognized in this world to be the Mahāprajñās (great erudite scholars), who are supposed to have cognized the Tattwa which is supremely great (Niratishaya) and Aparicchīnna (indivisible, impartible). This Śruti is saying: ‘तद्देवमयेऽतां य ऐवं वेदांग ब्रह्मास्मीति स इति सर्वं सन्तः भवति’ (Bṛi. 1-4-10), meaning - “Even now he who cognizes in the manner - ‘This Brahman alone I am’ - he alone will become all this.” The common run of people who are having their mind steeped in desires and proclivities of duality cannot possibly cognize, comprehend this path of the Jñānis. This is just like - the person who is dreaming cannot comprehend the state of a wakeful person. For this conclusion Smrītis like ‘सर्वं मूलात्म भूतस्य सर्वं भूतत्त्वस्य च। देवावपि माग्येव मुद्रत्यपदस्य पद्यांशयः॥’ (Moksha Dharma 293-23), meaning - “In the path of
one, who is the Ātman of all creatures, beings, who provides what is beneficial to all beings - even the deities lose their way, for, they are searching for the footprints in a region where there are no footsteps”. ‘शुक्लनीांमिन्वासुकाशे गतिमेवोपलथ्यते’ (Gita 2-69) - meaning - “Just as in the sky (the footprints of) the birds (are not visible, in the same way the Jñānis’ Swarūpa) is incomprehensible; “That which is night for all creatures, in that one who is engrossed in, identified with Paramātmā Tattwa - he is really awake” - are authoritative sources.

अजेयजमसुखान्तं धर्मेणु ह्यान्मिथ्यते ।
यतो न क्रमते ज्ञातसृखर्गे तेन कौटितम् ॥ ९६॥

Meaning: “It is said that among the Dharmas who are birthless, this Ajajñāna (Intuitive Knowledge which is birthless) exists without getting Samkrānta (transferred). Jñāna does not go anywhere else, is it not so? Due to this, it is said to be Asanga (detached).

THE JÑĀNA OF AJĀTMAN IS ĀTMĀBHINNA (NON-DIFFERENT FROM ONE'S SELF)

(Question) : How can it be said that they are Mahājñānis? Why is it that this is not known to the rest? “That which is Aja is Jñeya; that Sādhana (instrument, means) which enables us to cognize It is Jñāna; one who has verily attained the Ajātmajñāna is Jñātru” - in this manner their Jñāna also exists divided in categories like Jñātru, Jñāna, Jñeya, is it not? It being so, their Jñāna too is Parichhinna (divisible) Jñāna alone, is it not so?

(Answer) : Because it is not different, apart from Advayātman, from the standpoint of the Jñātruswarūpa of Ātmans who are the Aja, that is, never born, Dharmas (Jivas, beings) - Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge, Pure Consciousness) is Aja (birthless) alone. without being different or separate from Jñātrus - just as the heat and light that exists in the sun is not different, separate from him - in the same way, It is apart without joining or combining with another entity or object. In fact, Dharmas who are different from ‘Jñātru’ do not exist at all. Therefore, thus
Jñāna existing in the Ātmans who are Aja - just as the Jñāna or knowledge of the ignorant people mixes or associates itself with the Jñeya (object to be known) which is different from them - does not blend with them, and hence that Jñāna is called 'Asaṅga' (unattached, detached).

Previously what was stated as - "Jñāna which is like Ākāsha or empty space" - was for this reason alone. Because everything is the effect (product) of Ākāsha, it is not possible to say that Ākāsha is conjoined with another object; similarly, because there is nothing whatsoever which exists apart from Ajātmaswarūpa and since everything is verily the Swarūpa of Jnātru - those who have cognized It have cognized Akhaṇḍa Chinmātra Tattwa (the Absolute Reality which is immutable, whole Pure Consciousness) which is non-different from Ajātmaswarūpa by means of Jñāna - meaning, they have cognized by means of Pure, Absolute Intuitive Experience alone - their Jñāna is said to be Asaṅga (unattached). Therefore, that statement that they are Mahājñānāis is correct indeed.

अनुभवेपि वैषय्यं ज्ञायमानेवविपश्चितः
असंसृगता सदा नास्ति किमुतांशब्वरणच्युति: ||१७१||

Meaning: "To one who has not cognized (It) even though a little of Vaidharmya (dissimilarity) occurs, Asaṅgatwa (non-attachment) never exists; then where is the question of saying that he has no Āvaranachyuti (removal of covering) ?"

FOR DVAITINS THERE IS NO ASANGATWA ; THEY ARE ALWAYS AJÑAS (IGNORANT) ALONE

For the rest of the people who have not cognized Ajādvaya Brahmātmā, although a little bit of Jñāna of dissimilarity with regard the Tattwa accrues, in such a cognition of the nature of Ajñāna some other extraneous thing always gets conjoined and hence there can never possibly be any Asangatwa; it being so, how at all can the removal or destruction of Ajñānāvaraṇa (covering of ignorance) occur? The Śruti states: - ‘यदा हैवै ऐतत्स्मिनिदर्मंतरं कुले। अय तत्स्य धर्मं धवलि’ (Tai. 2-7) - meaning, "When this person thinks of even the least bit of difference, then he begets fear".
Therefore, one should not imagine even the least bit of difference.

Meaning: “All Dharmas are verily devoid of Āvaraṇa (cover); by nature itself they are Nirmala (pure). From the beginning they are Buddha (knowers), Muktaś (liberated). Because they are capable, they are cognizers.”

AJÑĀNĀVARĀNA ALSO IS NOT PĀRAMĀRTHIKA (ABSOLUTELY REAL)

(Question): Because it is said: “Dvaitins have no escape from Āvaraṇa”, it amounts to saying that in your philosophy Āvaraṇa’ (cover) is accepted by you. Is it true?

(Answer): No. To no Dharma (Ātman, being) there is any Āvaraṇa (covering of Avidya) whatsoever. We are not saying that Ātmans have a Bandha (bondage) of the type of covering of Avidyā etc. and that by an effort they should get rid of it; in fact, all Ātmans (Jīvas) in their very essence of Being are Nirmala (pure); there is no need whatsoever of their getting purified by any Samskāra (refinement). They are verily from the beginning Jñānis (Realized souls); there is no need whatsoever of destroying Ajñāna (or Avidyā) and then attaining afresh Jñāna (Self-Knowledge). All of them from the beginning (eternally) are Vimuktaś (liberated ones); there is no need whatsoever of their attaining afresh a state called ‘Mukti’. Thus all of them are verily of Nitya-shuddha-buddha-mukta-swabhāva.

Despite it being so, on the basis of (adopting the viewpoint of) Kalpitasaṃvṛiti we have said that - “By means of Jñāna - Ajñāna is removed, destroyed and after the Āvaraṇa gets removed (Chyuti) Moksha is attained.” That is all. Therefore, here there is no contradiction whatsoever.

HOW IS IT PROPER TO SAY - “JÑĀNIS COGNIZE”?

If a question of the type: “They are Mahājñānis; what they have known, the common people cannot cognize” - (4-95) it was stated previously by you. How is it? Those who are in the beginning Aprabuddha (devoid of awareness of Reality, i.e.
who are ignorant) later on attain the discriminative knowledge or
cognition, is it not so?" - is raised, to that our answer is: They
(i.e. Mahājñānis) are having the capability of cognizing (the
Ultimate Reality); in fact, their very essence of Being is
endowed with the power or capability of Awareness, Conscious-
ness. Therefore, we have said: "They cognize". Don't we say:
"Being eternally of the essential nature of light, the sun 'is
shining'? Similarly, if we say that - 'Those Mahājñānis, who are
verily Jñānaswarūpas, cognize' - what is wrong? Sometimes we
say that the mountains, which never move about, are 'standing' -
is it not so? In the same way, we should discern here that
those who are of the very essence of Jñānashakti (the power of
being aware or conscious eternally) are said to be - "They
cognize" - in a manner of speaking.

क्रमतः न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धम्मेषु तात्यिनः ।
सवेच्छ धर्मस्तथा ज्ञानं नैतत्रुद्देशन भाषितम् ॥९९॥

Meaning: "The Jñāna (Pure Consciousness) of Buddha
(the Mahājñāni, Realized soul) who is the all-pervading prin-
ciple (cause of all creation) does not move out and reach the
Dharmas. All Dharmas and Jñāna also are like this alone. This
truth the Buddha (the founder of the sect of Buddhism) has
not taught."

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF JÑĀNA IS
ADVITĪYA (NON-DUAL)

(Question): "Why cannot it be said that for the expression
- "They cognize" - the meaning is: "They are having the action
of cognizing?" In the Gouñaprayōga (usage in a secondary
sense) of the type - "The mountains are standing" - because in
the expressions used in a predominant sense of the type - "The
horses are standing" - etc. the quality connoting a state of the
'azione of going' - exists in the mountains too, it may be there
by namesake. But - "Ātmans are, in the predominant sense alone,
cognizing" - thus why can't we imagine?

(Answer): The word 'Ṭāyin' means 'one who is pervading
everywhere like the Ākāsha or empty space'. Thus for Jñāna -
which is Sarvavyāpi (all-pervading), Paramārtha (Absolutely, i.e.
beyond the concepts of categories of time-space-causation, nay
beyond all duality, relativity), of the very essence of *Aja-Advaya-Tattwa* (birthless, non-dual Reality) — there is no need whatsoever of conjoining another object or entity and then cognizing It. For, It is *Aja* and *Achala* (immovable). Or, ‘Tāyin’ may be interpreted to mean ‘Pūjya’ (venerable) or ‘Prajñāvanta’ (having the Intuitive Knowledge of the Reality). The etymological derivation of this word coming from the root - viz. ‘तनु श्रद्धो प्रकरणोऽऽ’ - can thus be interpreted. In any case, since the Jñāna of a Jñāni (Realized soul) is verily Advitīyatmaswarūpa, there is no need whatsoever for It to get in contact, touch with an object and then to signify or help get its cognition.

In the same way, because all the Ātmans (beings) are Pāramārtthically Ākāshakalpas (misconceptions in empty space), they do not touch or contact another object; at the beginning of this chapter it was stated: ‘ज्ञानेनाकाङ्क्षकत्वेः धर्मनूः यो गगनोपमान। ज्ञानिः प्रज्ञवान्तानि संबुद्धः’ - (4-1), the purport of which is - “Jñātu-Jñeya-Jñāna - all these are all-pervading” — is it not so ? What was stated in the *Upakrama* (beginning) is being concluded in the *Upasamhāra* (concluding verse). This entity called ‘Brahmātma Tattwa’ is - like the Akāsha or empty space - Achala, Avikriya, Niravayava, Nitya, Advitiya, Asanga, Adrishya, Agrāhya, that which is devoid of hunger, thirst and such other defects - of the essential nature of Jñāna, is it not so ? Therefore, the illustration, analogy of the empty space thus being given is quite reasonable indeed. This teaching is implicit in the Śruti statement: ‘न हि इतदुपरिशिष्टे विद्यते अविनाशितवात् न तु द्वितीयत्तत्त्ति ततोज्जितेदिपएव यदृ पस्येत्’ - (Bṛ. 4-3-23), meaning - “For the sight of the seer there is no lapse or extinction whatsoever ; for, It is Avināshi (indestructible). There is nothing second to It which is apart from It and which is different from It ; only if such a second thing exists, one can possibly see, is it not so ?”

**DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ADVAITAJÑĀNAVĀDA AND THE BUDDHISTS’ JÑĀNAVĀDA**

This Advayajñāna has not been taught by Buddha, i.e. Gautama Buddha (the founder of Buddhism). It is true that what he had preached - to wit, he had refuted the external objects and had imagined that Vijñāna (intellectual awareness) alone exists -
is very close to Advaitavastu (non-dual Absolute Reality). How is that which he had taught was close to Advayavastu (of Vedānta) ? - The answer is : For, in his doctrine Viśnāna alone is suitable to carry on the transactions of Jñāna-Jñeyya without any dependence on the Bāhyārtha (external objects) ; this reason is quite close to, as also partly acceptable to, Vedānta when it is compared with the opinion of the Bāhyārthavādins (Realists). But because by this very Yukti - without any dependence whatsoever on Kṣaṇikavijnāna - by virtue of Avidyā alone it can be established that all Pramāṇa-Prameya-Vyavahāra is carried on - it is determined that Advaita which is Prapañcchōpashama (in which the world of duality is extinct), Śiva (auspicious) exists ; for this reason alone, we are saying that their Viśnānavāda is close to Advayavastu. That is all ; but here Śri Gauḍapāda has not at all opined that either the Buddhistic philosophy or Kṣaṇikā Viśnānavāda is close to Advaita Vedānta. The Buddhistic doctrine is negating the Vyāvahārika Anubhava (empirical experiences of everyone) and thereby assuming and teaching that the external objects do not exist, is it not so ? That doctrine is not accepted at all here - thus we have to understand.

As regards the doctrine of Sarvashūnyavādins (Nihilists - another sect among the Buddhists who propound that everything is Absolutely essenceless) it undertakes to show, prove merely on the basis of Yukti (logical arguments) that - “All substances are Niḥswabhāva (essenceless).” But mere Yukti has nowhere finality and hence they have no scope - even the least bit - of advocating the Advayajñānavāda (the theory of non-dual Intuitive Knowledge) ; for that reason we have not considered it here in detail at all. In fact, the teaching that - “Advaitajñāna which is Paramārtha is expounded exclusively in the Upanishads” - is very close to, dear to the heart of Śri Gauḍapāda.

30. COMPLETE HARMONY IN THE TEACHINGS OF THE FOUR PRAKARĀṆAS

ALL THE PRAKARĀṆAS EXPOUND AJĀDVAYA TATTWA ALONE

Here what the true seeker has to carefully, cautiously discriminate (ratiocinate) and ascertain is : In the Āgama Prakaraṇa
on the basis of examining the three states of Consciousness the three metres (letters) of Ōmkāra were analysed and the Advayatattwa - which is extremely different from Abhidhāna (name) and Abhidheya (named object), which is not accessible to speech and mind, which is devoid of any mental concepts like Antahprajñātwa (internal awareness), and Bahiprajñātwa (external awareness) etc., which is Ajānidrāsvapa (devoid of birth, sleep and dream) - was determined following the instructions of the Upanishads alone. In the Vaitathya Prakarāṇa that very same Nirvikalpātma Tattwa was demonstrated by means of Upapatti (logical devices) and it was taught that that very Ātma Tattwa, which is Prapañchopashāna, Śiva and Advaya should be cognized by the true seeker to be his very essence of Pure Being and that he should get himself established in It. In the Advaita Prakarāṇa also it was expounded that Advaita alone is Śatya (Real) and then for the benefit of the Madhyamādhikāris (middle-grade qualifiers) - as a subtle device adopted to get oneself established in the Brahmāswarūpa - the Manōnigraha (complete cessation of the mind and its merger in Ātman) was taught and it was concluded that Ajādvayātma Tattwa alone is the Supreme Truth. In this fourth Alatashānti Prakarāṇa, especially, by virtue of the differences of opinion among various disputants it was shown as to how the truth that - 'Ajādvayātma Tattwa alone is Paramārtha" - gets evolved and at the end of the Chapter once again utilizing his own methodology of the form of Avasthātraya it was proved that - “Ajādvaya Brahma Siddhānta is, in all respects and always, inviolable, irrefutable.” Therefore, between the Upakramā and Upasmahārā there is complete harmony - this fact gets evolved and established.

‘IN THIS VERSE THERE IS ADOPTION OF BUDDHISTIC DOCTRINE’ - IS AN IRRELEVANT STATEMENT

In this manner when the Śāstrārtha (the Ultimate Truth propounded by the scriptural texts) is being established from the teachings of all the four Chapters, some people with a pride that they are research scholars, unable to detect the difference between Boudhāprasthāna Siddhānta (the spiritual teaching based on Buddhistic methodology) and Vedāntapraṣṭhāna Siddhānta, as also some others, who profess to be Vedāntins who are having a
The Essential Gauḍapāda

staunch affinity in proving the greatness of their respective school of philosophy, are affirming that:

(1) In the Gauḍapāda Kārikās at various places the Yuktis which are found in Buddhistic texts are seen to be copied. (2) Between the Pada (words), Vākya (sentences) found in various Buddhistic texts and some Padavākyas found in this text there is a pronounced literal similarity to be seen. Therefore, there is scope for inferring that—“Shri Gauḍapādāchārya also was either a Buddhistic preceptor or a ‘Pracchhannabouddha’ (pseudo-Buddhist) who had a reverential attitude towards Buddhistic teachings and was going about as a Vedāntāchārya.” Not being satisfied with this much of derogatory comment, some research scholars, who have undertaken an academic analysis of the teachings as propounded in certain ancient texts, have even ventured to show that it is not possible at all to ascertain whether an independent author by name ‘Gauḍapādāchārya’ existed or not!

In order to silence all these critics this one penultimate verse of the Alātashānti Prakaraṇa is sufficient. For, ‘नैनुद्वेदेन भाषितम्’, meaning—‘This is not a topic which Buddha taught’—this sentence emphatically proclaims that—“Vijñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) which is devoid of divisions like Jñātṛu-Jñeya-Jñāna and which is of the essential nature of Kūṭastha Chaitanya (Immutable Absolute, Pure Consciousness) has been taught only (exclusively) in Vedānta” —both in the Upakrama (preamble) and the Upansamhāra (conclusion). It being so, who at all can possibly say that Vedānta Siddhānta is similar to the Siddhānta of Buddhists who are Kshanīka Vijñānavādins?

For this sentence some present-day scholars like Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattachārya etc. have written a commentary and that is: Because Sarvadharmas (all religious, righteous qualities) and Jñāna is known to all the people, these have not been taught by Buddha; these are phenomena which exist from time immemorial. What is to be understood, discerned by each one by himself is not taught; it is not possible also to do so; whether Tathāgatas (enlightened beings) are born or not, the Dharmatā (righteousness) of Dharmas (beings) does not get evolved. It exists invariably at all times and hence this is not what Buddha has taught afresh.
It is not possible for this commentary to be suitable or correct. For, the question - 'Whether this has been taught by Buddha or not?' - is not at all relevant here in this context. Whether Buddha has taught it or not - irrespective of that - those who are Vaidikas (people having implicit faith in the teachings of the Vedas which are said or believed to be given unto the world by the Lord Himself) cannot possibly believe that his teachings are Paramārtha. Hence, if we say that Shri Gauḍapādāchārya has written that - “This (truth) has not been taught by Buddha” - then the wise people may think (interpret) that - “Because he has stated some peculiar, irrelevant thing, we need not take that into our reckoning.” Therefore, instead of discarding what has been actually stated thus by the author and imagining needlessly what has not been stated, if we comment in the manner - “A Jñāni’s Jñāna does not go out and associate Itself with anybody’s religious teachings; in the same way, because all Ātmans are Ananya (non-different, identical with) the all-pervasive Jñāna, they cannot possibly associate themselves with anything else” - then not only there will be full agreement or concord between Upakrama and Upasamhāra but also it becomes fully reconciled with the Śruti statement - “Where there exists Advaita with what, what else can He possibly see? ... ” - (Bri. 2-4-14). Apart from this, by this statement it amounts to depicting (confirming) that - “This Jñāna is not that which been taught by Buddha” - i.e. the extreme difference that exists between the Buddhistic philosophy and this ancient Vedānta philosophy. Therefore, the true seekers should conclude and get convinced that here in this context there is no scope for any fake, irrelevant commentary.

**HERE THE EXTREME DIFFERENCE THAT EXISTS BETWEEN BUDDHISTIC DOCTRINES AND VEDĀNTIC TEACHINGS HAS BEEN FULLY CLARIFIED**

In addition to this, in this Alātashānti Prakaraṇa after solving (i.e. refuting) the doctrines of the Realists that - “The external objects exist” - by means of the Vijñānavādin’s Yuktis and then the latter’s doctrines are also refuted by using his (i.e. the Vijñānavādin’s) own Yuktis alone by reiterating the statement - “तस्मात जायते विचित्रम्” - (4-28), meaning - “Therefore, Chitta also is
not born” - to drive home the tenet that the \textit{Vijñāna} (awareness) also, which has a different name of ‘Chitta’ is Aja, Asaṅga, Advayātman. Because all Ātmanas are verily of the essential nature of Aja-Advaya-Ātman, by their very nature they are of Nitya-shuddha-buddha-mukta-swarūpa - this truth has been clarified. At various places repeatedly the defects that are to be found in the Asatkāryavāda, which is acceptable to the Buddhists, are revealed. As against this, the genuine spiritual teachings of our own Vedāntic philosophy - which states that : “The Tattwa which is Sat is born due to Māyā” - is affirmed. This teaching which is in consonance with the Śruti : ‘अजयवमाने बहुषा विज्ञायते’ - (Though not born, in manifold ways He keeps on being born) - how at all and in what manner is it possible to assert that such a philosophy is equal to, or similar to, either \textit{Kṣanīka Vijñānavāda} of \textit{Nairātmyavādins} (disputants who reject the existence of Ātman or the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness) or the doctrinaire theory of those (Nihilists or Shūnyavādins) who revere \textit{Pratītyasamutpāda} (dependent origination) and assert that everything is verily \textit{Shūnya} (essenceless) ? This question should be deliberated upon Intuitively by the research scholars (who wish to cognize the Tattwa).

\textbf{IN THIS PRAKARĀṆĀ WHAT IS THE REASON FOR FOLLOWING THE SHABDAS (WORDS) AND YUKTIS (LOGICAL DEVICES) FOUND IN BUDDHISTIC TEXTS}

In this Chapter in order to depict the fact that there exists an extreme difference between the methodology of Buddhism and the methodology of Vedānta in a clear-cut manner so as to loom large before everyone, Shri Gauḍapāda has used those respective individual statements of the Buddhists with a totally different meaning altogether. Shri Bādarāyaṇāchārya, the author of ‘Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā Śūtras’, has used in that highly logic-oriented text \textit{Pārībhāṣhika Shabdas} (technical terms) like ‘\textit{Pratyaksha}’ (perceptual knowledge), ‘\textit{Anumāna}’ (inferential knowledge), ‘\textit{Pradhāna}’ (primordial or primeval matter before creation) etc. in order to signify the \textit{Śruti} (Upanishads), \textit{Smṛiti} (works of individual sages), \textit{Brahman} (the Absolute, Transcendental Reality beyond all empirical transactions or duality), respectively ; in the same way, here also we should discern (the
fact that Shri Gaṇḍapāda has used these apparently Buddhistic terms to wean away those misguided people towards the true Vedāntic Knowledge). The real purport behind his usage of some queer Yuktis which the Buddhists have presented as also some of their illustrations being quoted here is to show (drive home) clearly that their Yuktis are opposed to their own Yuktis and teachings. All these aspects were discussed and depicted in the introductory Chapter itself and hence on this count too here the true seeker should discern that there is no scope whatsoever even to doubt that there is similarity between the Buddhistic doctrines and the Vedāntic teachings (much less, to surmise that Shri Gaṇḍapāda has borrowed or copied the Buddhistic methodology; for, the two methodologies are poles apart).

INVOCATION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATISE

दुर्दशमतितिम्बेदार्म् सामं विशाशदम्।
बुद्ध्वा पदमातात्वं नमस्कृतं स्याबलम्।१००॥

Meaning: “That Pada (blissful state) - which, being very difficult to attain, highly profound (serene), Aja, Sāmya, Vishārada, is devoid of Nanatwa (manifoldness) - cognizing such a Pada we salute It to the best of our might or strength.”

SALUTATION THROUGH EULOGIZATION OF THE PARATATWA (ABSOLUTE, TRANSCENDENTAL REALITY)

At the beginning of this Prakaraṇa Grantha (an individual’s treatise), studying the Upanishad alone the Āgama Prakaraṇa has been started. Because for the Upanishad at the beginning there was Ōṃkāra alone, by its very study and remembrance alone it was tantamount to the author having invoked (the Paratattwa) at the beginning of the treatise. Now, because the Tattwa which is Nityanirastadvaita (eternally non-extinct, non-dual) has been decided, determined by means of Āgama (traditional methodology of teaching the Ultimate Reality) and Upapatti (reasoning in consonance with universal experience), Shri Gaṇḍapāda is observing, performing the traditional Mangala (auspicious conclusion) through eulogy:
Durdharsha, means - 'Because all the four-cornered logical paradigm of the type of 'Asti, Nāsti (exists, does not exist) etc. which were previously mentioned are non-existing, those people who are following their own respective doctrines and are arguing out - though they are scholars - they are not able to cognize this Tattwa ; and hence it is too difficult to reckon. Thus it has been stated in the Śruti : 'तं दुर्दहां गूढमनुविचित्तम्' - (He is too difficult to be cognized ; He is one who has entered into an impervious place which is secret, highly obstructive, estoric). 'Atigambhīra' means : For those who have not acquired the necessary Intuitive Knowledge - to such people, It is fathomless, deep like an ocean, extremely difficult to enter into. In the Śruti : ‘यमति: समुद्रे कवयो बयंति’ (Taittirīya Nārāyaṇapanna) - it is stated that : “Just like the deep ocean is difficult to enter deep into, this Tattwa, which is still interior even to Avyākṛta (i.e. the unmanifested seed form of the manifested world of duality), only Ṛishis (sages) who are Jñānis can possibly cognize.”

What is the reason for this Tattwa to be Durdharsha and Atigambhīra ? The answer is : This is Aja, Sāmya and Vishārada. ‘Aja’ means - devoid of Janma and such other changes, mutations ; ‘Sāmya’ means - because It is Nirvayava (without parts, components) It is that Reality devoid of such incongruities, disparities of having parts, components ; ‘Vishārada’ means - because It is Asaṅga, It is Pure without having any contact with anything else. Apart from this, being Anānātwa, meaning - devoid of the differences of Jñātru, Jñāna, Jñeya, It is Akhaṇḍa (a massive continuum) Chaitanya (Pure, Absolute Consciousness).

How at all a Tattwa of such an essence of Pure Being be perceptible to people steeped in the viewpoint of duality who are always seeing distinctively this duality which is variegated by divided ? Despite it being so, because It is the Ātman (very Self, core of Being) for everyone, is of the essence of Nityabōdha (eternally aware), It is always Self-effulgent alone. To those who are engrossed in perceiving the external objects and dealing with them this Tattwa appears to be Durdharsha and Atigambhīra. But to those who have earned, acquired the benign grace of the preceptor, the Śastra and Paramātman there does not exist anything else whatsoever which is more Sudarṣa (clearly perceptible
or Intuited) and *Supravesha* (easy to enter into or fathomed). As stated in the Vedic sentence: ‘तद्विषोऽपि परम्परद सदा पर्यायः सूरयः’ (Tai. Nārāyanapannya 1-3-6) - meaning, - ‘Those who are knowledgeable It is always visible.’

Cognizing such a Tattwa and attaining Its very Swarūpa, we are saluting that ‘Pada’ (subtle or serene state). How at all can anybody salute this Tattwa which the Śruti describes as - ‘अदृष्ट, अव्यवहार्य, अग्राह्य, अलक्षण, अचिन्त्य, अव्यपदेश’ - (Māṇḍūkya 7) ? The answer is : Though in Its very essence of Being It is *Avyavahārya* (not available for any empirical transactions, beyond all empirical dealings) alone, we are making it perceptible to our empirical dealings and that form alone we salute. Although It is non-dual without anything else as second to It, when seen from the Vyavahāra Dṛṣṭi alone It appears to all *Pratyayas* (mental concepts) ; in fact, whatever is perceptible to all the senses always is verily that very Pada - thus following the Śāstra Dṛṣṭi, being engrossed in Its Being, seeing (Intuiting) that Tattwa alone we salute that Pada - in order to signify this fact, the qualifying statement that - “to the best of our capacity, ability (we salute)” - is mentioned.

**THE QUINTESSENCE OF THE MANGALASHLOKAS MENTIONED BY THE BHĀSHYAKĀRA (I.E. SHRI ŚAŃKARA)**

अजमय जनियोंः प्रापदेशः पर्यापादागतिः च गतिमत्ता प्राप्तेऽक्र ब्लेक्कम्
विविधविषयप्रार्थिण्युपशेषणाः प्रणतप्राविषन्तु ब्रह्म यत्रतोऽस्मि ॥१९॥

**SALUTATION TO PARABRAHMAN**

The purport of this invocation is : (a) Although Brahman which is familiar in Vedāntic literature is Itself *Aja* alone, by dint of Its *Aishwarya Yōga*, meaning, by a relationship with Its Māyāshakti which is in Its full control - It has assumed a relationship with birth ; to wit, It appears in both the forms as *Sthāvara Jangama* (stationary and moving) creatures and *Chetanāchetana* (sentient and insentient) beings. Just as deities, sages etc. by virtue of their magical powers, without desiderating the help of any other accessory, merely by meditation or contemplation acquire whatever forms they like, in the same way this Brahman, for the sake of showering Its benign grace on the
spiritual practitioners, merely by Its wish, volition assumes various forms and thereby has acquired Māyājanmas. (b) Though It is Agati as also Kūṭastha and Achala, without there being any cause-effect categories It is Gatimanta (endowed with the capacity of going anywhere) - to wit, Gantru (one who goes), Gantavya (the act of going and reaching a region), Gati (going) - this division i.e. the Gatitrayavibhāga (three divisions of transmigration or going) like Devayāna, Pitruyāna, Kshudrajanma - this Tattwa has assumed. In the same way, (c) though It is Eka (one, non-dual) without anything second to It, It is having Anekatwa (manifoldness) - meaning, Jivas, Jagat, Īśwara - such forms It has assumed.

These Janma, Gati - mentioned above - are not states when observed from the Paramārtha Dṛśṭi ; from the ignorant, deluded viewpoint of people who are perceiving the various objects in their external viewpoint due to Samvriti alone this is apparently like that. Such a Māyājanma (illusory birth) etc. is being referred to by the Śruti also. Although It is appearing in all such ways to people with a deluded viewpoint, It is capable of destroying the fear of those who surrender unto It and salute It - to wit, It destroys their Avidyā which is the root cause for all kinds of duality, diversity. In fact, by Its benign grace alone they attain the Intuitive Experience of the type - “I am myself that Brahman alone which is Aja, Ajara, Amara, Amrīta.” ‘Such a Brahman I salute’ - is the purport of the verse.

SALUTATION TO THE GRAND-PRECEPTOR

The purport of this verse is : Aviratajananagrahaghoare, meaning, that which is dreadful since it is full of cruel crocodiles of the type of continuously (without interruption) obtaining various bodies - in such an ocean of Samsāra, seeing the creatures who are getting drowned in it, by means of his Prajñā (Intuitive
Knowledge) as the churning rod or pole - in the ancient times by churning the ocean of milk called ‘Veda’, from it by the grace of Shriman Nārāyaṇa what was earned by hard work - this Amṛita called ‘Brahmājñāna’ - which was not got even by the deities who had acquired the Amṛita (ambrosia) from the Amṛitamathana - that preceptor who took it out and gave it to the Jīvas who were immersed in Samsāra out of compassion - to that revered preceptor by name, Shri Gauḍapādāchārya, and grand preceptor who has been also revered by all - I pour my salutations at His feet.

बत्रज्ञालोकभासा प्रतिहतितमगमतु स्वातांतोहायकारो मर्जोन्मज्जच्च थोरे
ब्राह्मचन्द्रान्नोदन्ति त्रासने मे ॥
बत्रादावात्रितानां श्रुतिशास्त्रविन्यासानिघाया भ्रामोषा तत्सादापावनीयो
पवभवितनादित्सर्वभावाचैवनमस्ये ॥३॥

SALUTATIONS TO THE PRECEPTOR

The purport implicit in this verse is: In the dreadful ocean of the type of repeated births to me who was getting drowned and floating - thus I was suffering; the darkness of my heart was removed completely by the brilliance of the light of whose feet, to those who have taken refuge at whose feet Tattwahṛavaṇa (listening to discourses on the Absolute Reality), which is of greater value than everything else, Shānti (peace), Vinaya (humility) accrued - to the feet of such a preceptor, Shri Gōvindapādāchārya who drives away the fear of Samsāra - with all my devotion I salute.

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## PUBLISHERS' NOTE

- seakers
- interpolated
- literature
- elaborate
- genuine

## FOREWORD

1. Anutshava (Anubhava)
2. illusive
3. established
4. intellectual
5. constituting
6. thought

## PREFACE

1. predecesso
2. Advita
3. a line illustrious
4. time-honored
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## INTRODUCTION

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16 3 aim dialectic dialectic
" 4 wrangling wrangling
" 6 Bāhyāstītva vādins or realists Bāhyāstītavādins or Realists
" 11 Prakarana or chapter Prakaranaṇas or chapters
" 12 exaimning examining
" 14 his Ajātivāda of Ajātivāda
" 18 Vidhushekhara Vidhushekhara
" 20 predominantly predominantly
" 21 excessively excessively
" 25 calcutta Calcutta
" 32 'Brahmātmavāda' 'Brahmātmavāda'
" 33 Bhattachārya's Bhattachārya's
" 35 date Late
" 36 the another the author
"  " 'The central 'The Central
" 37 Buddhism Buddhism'
17 1 indulitable indubitable
" 5 in there in them there
"  " anything in the best anything in the least
" 8 chapter); that chapter) to show that the
" 14 averred averred
" 16 adopted used adopted or used
of truth. But because
Avasthātraya is exists
distinction
distinctions
(empirical,
dealings)
Vivartavāda exist prior
Avasthitraya is exists
Avasthitraya exists
(empirical
(dealings)
Vivartavāda exist prior
Siddhānta Siddhānta
over aver
Proponents to different
view to establishing
pristine
assumption
Upanishads
or alien
Pure Being
Anuṇu
etc. The Tattwa etc." - the Tattwa
Ultimate Reality
having adopted
himself to the
symptoms
cause-effect
(Nimittanaimittika
(Nimittanainithika
to scholars like
spiritual
Siddhānta
Siddhānta
theory of the not-self of the world
duality
Prof.
reason alone
Nāgārjuna's
conversant
avered
There is no room
puerile
" The Essential
predominantly
on dialectics
(b) school of Idealism of Buddhism only)
dialectics
Nihilism are Nihilism. They are preserving viewpoints oblivious initially From enounced in posed by this (Absolute Reality of Self Vijnānavādins (Idealists) Shūnyavādins (Nihilists) Buddhists' various places ing or texts For Nāgārjuna's Naihswabhāvya which is not of dependent Absolute Self unborn Self essenceless non-dual Self 'Tathāgatabhūtakōti' Vādāmi 'Vaddami' a pindārtha Paramārtha it is not the purport in 'Mādhyamika Kārikā Vṛitti Brahman (Ultimate Reality)' Ultimate Reality a kind of Reality Vijnānavāda

ADVAITA PRAKRANĀ
After the page 357 through inadvertence page 359 followed by page 358 and page 390 have been printed. So while reading after the matter on page 357 continue with page 358, 359 and 390. The error is deeply regretted.
About The Author

His Holiness Paramahamsa Sri Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swāmīji, the founder of Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya and author of over 200 reputed works on Advaita in Kannada, Sanskrit and English, blessed the earth with his presence for 96 useful and rich years (1880-1975).

His works are characterised by vast and deep scholarship, clear and precise perception and an attractive and lively style. His authentic interpretation of Śaṅkara has been greatly recognized by both the East and the West. He was not just a rare and accomplished individual but a mighty and magnificent institution.

About This Book

Shri Gaudapāda has established by taking as his central authoritative source the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad, which though smallest in size (only 12 Mantras or verses) among all the Upanishads yet the most famous one, the following profound Siddhānta by means of logic fully in consonance with Anubhava (universal Intuitive Experience) : "On the support of Anubhava of Avasthātraya or three states of consciousness, Ātman of all of us is verily Ajādvaya Brahman alone which is Nityaniravastha or eternally devoid of any state ; That alone is the Paramārtha satya". Further, he has not only clarified as to what exactly is the wide difference between the predominantly perverted logic-oriented Viśīṣṭa-Dvaitavādīs and Shūnyavāda, on the one hand, and Vedānta on the other, but also has convinced all true seekers about the facts that : (a) Vain logic can never stand its ground all through ; (b) all the devices adopted by the logically-oriented Darshanas or schools of philosophy are all meant for the worship (Ārādhana) of Paramātman.